Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
——————————————————————————————————————–
Military And Security Developments
March 25 .
- Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Hormuz passage is likely to remain limited, sustaining market disruption. On 24 March, Iran informed members of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) that it will allow ‘non-hostile vessels’ to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also conditioned these vessels’ passage on co-ordination with the Iranian authorities. Iran’s announcement comes amid growing international tensions and pressure to facilitate safe passage to vessels in the strait. However, Iran has already been providing passage to ships in the strait on a case-by-case basis, often in exchange for facilitation payments. Furthermore, Iran is highly likely to classify vessels transporting oil, gas and commodities from Gulf states hosting US military installations as hostile and prevent their transit. As such, Iran’s announcement is unlikely to signal a significant change to the state of passage through the strait and the threat environment surrounding the waterway. Furthermore, we assess that shipping companies are likely to remain wary of poor co-ordination, misfire and the overall targeting of their ships and crews, driving them to continue avoiding the strait in the coming days and weeks, and therefore sustaining supply chain disruption and pressure on oil and energy markets.
- Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Severe weather will exacerbate existing risks stemming from conflict.On 26 March, strong to severe thunderstorms, damaging winds and hail are forecast across much of the Gulf, with a rare but credible risk of desert tornadoes in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as parts of southern Iran. Some areas, including the UAE, will possibly experience up to a year’s worth of rainfall, increasing the risk of significant flooding. This is likely to impact low-lying, desert and urban areas, causing disruption to overland movement and increasing staff exposure to injury or death caused by debris from damaged infrastructure, collisions along highways and drowning. Severe weather conditions will possibly degrade the effectiveness of air defence and early warning systems, raising the likelihood of successful Iranian strikes against military, dual-use and energy infrastructure, therefore compounding elevated on-the-ground personnel security risks. We assess that successful targeting, combined with hazardous flying conditions, will likely exacerbate disruption to civilian air travel, leading to flight delays and diversions. Off-shore thunderstorms will possibly generate waterspouts and rough sea conditions, exacerbating regional risks to maritime operations and commercial shipping.
- Iran: Ongoing war will elevate security risks for linked organisations from cyber activiOn 24 March, international news outlets reported on a potential uptick in cyber operations targeting Iranian entities since the onset of the Iran-US-Israel war. Israel reportedly infiltrated Tehran’s surveillance camera system ahead of the initial airstrikes on 28 February. It subsequently used intelligence gathered through compromised cameras to locate and assassinate the then supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Earlier in March, the Israeli cyber security company Check Point highlighted an increase in Iran-led cyber attacks on internet protocol (IP) cameras across the Middle East used to inform retaliatory strikes, illustrating the widespread exploitation of surveillance equipment by all parties. Also on 24 March, a financially motivated threat group (‘TeamPCP’) reportedly attempted to wipe data from compromised machines located in Iran, highlighting the possible influence of the war on broader malicious cyber activity. We assess that Iran-linked entities will face elevated security risks amid the ongoing war and the subsequent escalation in cyber activity.
Mar 17.
- IRAN-US-GULF: Iranian strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure remain likely in the coming days despite the US’ announcement of postponed attacks.
- ISRAEL: The increased usage of medium-range interceptors elevates security risks from cluster munitions and reflects efforts to negate shortages amid prospective conflict protraction.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: Sustained Israeli targeting of bridges over the Litani River indicates that the IDF will likely launch ground operations south of the river in the coming days and weeks, driving conflict escalation risks in the area.
- IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Amid increasing speculation that the US will attempt to seize Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, Iran will possibly increase restrictions on vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz.
- ISRAEL-US-IRAN: The US and Israel will likely continue to launch airstrikes targeting security and police facilities and telecommunications infrastructure in Iran, sustaining threats to life in major cities. In the past 24 hours, the US and Israel have continued to engage in airstrikes throughout Iran, with explosions reported in cities including Bushehr (Bushehr province), Dezful (Khuzestan province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Jam (Bushehr province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province), the capital Tehran, Urmia (West Azerbaijan province) and Yazd (Yazd province). Airstrikes have been particularly intense in Tehran, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announcing several rounds of airstrikes targeting missile facilities, military bases and security installations in the city. Earlier on 23 March, Iranian state media announced that airstrikes had damaged a transmission tower linked to Iran’s state broadcaster in the Bandar Abbas area (Hormozgan province). In the coming days, airstrikes targeting Iran’s security forces, as well as state-linked media and telecommunications installations, are highly likely to continue. Risks of exposure to airstrikes, secondary explosions, shrapnel and cascading infrastructure failures will remain acute across Iran’s major cities. However, the Iranian security forces are highly likely to retain the capacity to continue engaging in retaliatory attacks targeting Israel, US military installations in the region and other locations in the Gulf, sustaining risks of armed conflict (see below).
- IRAN-US-GULF: Iranian strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure remain likely in the coming days despite the US’ announcement of postponed attacks. Earlier on 23 March, US President Donald Trump announced that military strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure would be postponed for five days (to 28 March) following ‘productive conversations’ between Iran and the US. The post follows escalatory back-and-forth exchanges in recent days, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stating it would strike regional energy facilities supplying US bases in the Gulf if Trump followed through on threats to strike Iran’s power infrastructure. This will somewhat moderate the threat of imminent uncontrolled escalation against regional critical infrastructure (President Trump’s previous deadline for reopening the Strait of Hormuz was due to expire at 2345hrs GMT on 23 March). However, Iran’s foreign ministry has denied that negotiations with the US took place. Over the past 24 hours, Iran has continued to pursue its campaign of regional economic disruption; it has conducted several strikes (some of which were successfully intercepted) against Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Given that the US will almost certainly continue to strike military targets within Iran in the coming days, this established strike and interception pattern is likely to continue, especially in the vicinity of major urban areas, airports, military bases and industrial and energy infrastructure sites (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 20 March 2026). The risk is elevated for those sites Iran previously identified as legitimate targets, including Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Industrial Complex (Eastern province) and SAMREF refinery (Medina province), Qatar’s Laffan refineries 1 and 2 in Ras Laffan and the Qatar Petrochemical Company plant in Mesaieed (al-Wakrah municipality), as well as the UAE’s Shah gas field (Abu Dhabi emirate). Any attacks resulting in significant damage or casualties will increase the risk of escalation and possibly even direct retaliation by Gulf states. Furthermore, Trump’s statement does not account for Israeli actions, sustaining the risk of Israel conducting attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure in the coming days, in turn raising the likelihood of Iranian retaliatory attacks against high-value energy assets in the Gulf. Moreover, contrasting US and Iranian statements regarding the status of diplomatic engagement underscore the limited prospect of a diplomatic de-escalation in the coming days.
- ISRAEL: The increased usage of medium-range interceptors elevates security risks from cluster munitions; it also reflects efforts to negate shortages amid prospective conflict protraction. In the past week, Israeli news outlets have reported the increased usage of medium-range interceptor systems (also known as David’s Sling) to intercept Iranian cluster munitions. This system intercepts ordnance within Earth’s atmosphere rather than outside it and consequently does not fully destroy all submunitions in a cluster warhead. The increased usage of David’s Sling over the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems (which can intercept outside Earth’s atmosphere) highlights Israel’s likely effort to conserve interceptors, amid risks of conflict protraction and associated shortages. This practice will likely increase the number of incidents of submunitions from a cluster warhead penetrating Israeli air defences and hitting targets within the country. In the coming days and weeks, this threat will compound elevated security risks across Israel from damage from Iranian cluster munitions.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: Sustained Israeli targeting of bridges over the Litani River indicates that the IDF will likely launch ground operations south of the river in the coming days and weeks, driving conflict escalation risks in the area. Over the past 24 hours, hostilities have continued, with Israel maintaining a tempo of frequent strikes against bridges over the Litani in southern Lebanon. The sustained pressure on infrastructure (particularly transport infrastructure), indicates that the IDF is likely preparing for a broad ground operation south of the river in the coming days and weeks. Israel will likely continue targeting such infrastructure, as well as targets between the Litani and the Zahrani rivers, to create a buffer zone for its forces when they eventually expand their operations up to the Litani. Israel is likely to first expand its targeted raids deeper into Lebanon and follow up with a broader operation involving substantial infantry and armoured forces.
- IRAQ: Despite a notable reduction in militant activity, physical security threats near military installations, airports and diplomatic missions will remain very high this week. On 22 March, the prominent Iran-backed group Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) announced that it would continue to refrain from targeting the US embassy in the capital Baghdad for a further five days. The group had originally declared this temporary truce on 19 March, if certain conditions were met (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 March 2026). Notwithstanding this pause, rogue Iran-backed factions continued to launch sporadic drone attacks over the last five days, primarily targeting the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Centre (BDSC), Baghdad International Airport (BWG) and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). However, notably, over the last 24 hours, militant activity has decreased across Iraq; one drone struck a Kurdish Peshmerga headquarters in Nineveh governorate, and at least one other drone targeted the BDSC in the capital. Separately, on 22 March, joint Israeli-US airstrikes continued to target several Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) positions in Al-Anbar and Babylon governorates, though the strike frequency declined marginally compared to the previous week. Despite this temporary reduction of militant activity driven by the KH truce, we assess that physical security threats will remain significantly elevated near military installations, energy infrastructure, airports, government facilities, major hotels and telecommunications infrastructure across Iraq. This is primarily attributable to the absence of a unified command over tens of smaller Iran-backed Shia factions operating under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) umbrella network. These groups retain the capacity to act semi-autonomously against Iraqi, Kurdish and US assets.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Amid increasing speculation that the US will attempt to seize Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, Iran will possibly increase restrictions on vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier on 23 March, the Iranian Defence Council issued a statement indicating that Iran would mine the Strait of Hormuz if the US attempts to seize Iranian territory, namely its islands or coastal regions. This is highly likely a reference to increasing concerns over the potential for US ground operations amid additional US Marine Corps deployments to the region (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 March 2026). Although US ground operations to seize Iranian territory remain highly unlikely in the coming days due to deployment lead times, Iran is highly likely to escalate hostilities, targeting Israel, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf in the event of any such operation in the coming weeks. Concerns that Iran will move to deploy sea mines in the Persian Gulf and/or Strait of Hormuz will likely sustain perceived transit risks for commercial vessels, with war-risk premiums and insurance costs likely to remain high for tanker operators in the coming weeks. More broadly, Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains in place. Although Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on 22 March that that the strait is open to vessels that ‘do not violate Iran’s territory’, this statement is highly unlikely to indicate that the waterway is open to commercial shipping. Rather, it likely reflects Iran’s efforts to moderate bilateral tensions with trade partners such as China, India and Pakistan, while negotiating passage for select vessels on a case-by-case basis. Earlier on 23 March, Lloyd’s List reported that a Chinese-owned feeder tanker had transited the Strait of Hormuz after making an unspecified payment to the Iranian authorities. In the coming days, Iran is highly likely to continue granting ad hoc permission for vessel passage in exchange for facilitation payments; entities making or processing such payments will face substantial risks of sanctions exposure amid broader corporate governance risks linked to engaging with the Iranian authorities.
- IRAN-UK: Ongoing Iranian espionage campaigns within the UK are likely to continue over the coming weeks, driving risks of site infiltration for defence contractors. On 21 March, Police Scotland stated that it had arrested an Iranian national and a Romanian national after they attempted to enter HM Naval Base Clyde (Scotland, UK) on 19 March. The base houses Trident-armed submarines as well as Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The attempted infiltration possibly reflects Iran-linked espionage operations in the UK, particularly targeting defence sites amid the Israel-US-Iran war. In the coming weeks, Iran is highly likely to continue pursuing espionage and harassment campaigns within the UK, with these campaigns likely escalating in the event of increasing UK involvement in the Israel-US-Iran war (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 March 2026). Iranian espionage campaigns will also drive risks of site infiltration attempts and cyber-attacks targeting UK- and Israeli-linked defence contractors, as well as their respective subsidiaries, sub-contractors and service providers. Associated businesses will face elevated risks of operational disruption over the coming weeks at least.
- IRAN-UK-EUROPE: The risk of attacks targeting Jewish and Israeli communities will remain elevated across Europe as the war continues, increasing pressure on counter-terrorism capabilities. Earlier on 23 March, four ambulances belonging to Hatzola (a Jewish emergency medical response NGO) that were parked outside a synagogue in the Golders Green area of London (UK) were set on fire. The police are treating this incident as an antisemitic hate crime; counter-terrorism police are investigating the incident at the time of writing. Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya claimed responsibility for the attack, though the UK authorities have neither confirmed nor denied this attribution at the time of writing. Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya is a newly formed threat group that has claimed responsibility for several arson attacks and explosions in Europe, including those targeting a synagogue in Liège (Belgium) on 9 March, a synagogue in Rotterdam (the Netherlands) on 13 March and a Jewish school in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) on 14 March. Although the relationship between Iran and Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya remains unclear, the risk of further hostilities targeting Israeli and Jewish communities in the UK will remain elevated as the Israel-US-Iran war continues. While robust policing capabilities will moderate the risk of successful high-capacity attacks, the risk of opportunistic and low-capacity attacks, including stabbings, car rammings and arson, will remain elevated, particularly in cities with substantial Jewish and Israeli communities.
Mar 11.
- STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Iran has likely conducted three attacks targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf, underscoring critical threats to vessel safety regardless of mounting military pressure.
- IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Concerns that Iran has begun to mine the Strait of Hormuz will likely trigger an intensification of strikes on naval facilities and port infrastructure on Iran’s southern coast.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: A second strike in a central area of the Lebanese capital Beirut highlights the elevated risk of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacks expanding beyond Beirut’s Dahieh suburb.
- US-IRAN: Continued ambiguity regarding the US’ war goals and the conflict’s duration is unlikely to trigger
- ISRAEL-US-IRAN: Airstrikes have continued to target locations throughout Iran, with further airstrikes and Iranian retaliation remaining likely in the coming hours. Recent airstrikes have primarily targeted locations associated with Iran’s military-industrial complex, particularly installations near Isfahan (Isfahan province), Shiraz (Fars province) and the capital Tehran. On 10 March, Iranian state media issued funeral announcements confirming the deaths of several mid-to-high-ranking commanders within the General Staff of the Armed Forces (AFGS) and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC). In the coming hours, the US and Israel are highly likely to continue targeting installations and individuals associated with Iran’s security forces, including with domestic policing and repression. This will sustain pressure on Iran’s security capabilities, though the country is highly likely to retain the capacity to conduct further missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, US military installations and the Gulf region in the immediate term, sustaining acute regional security concerns. There is also a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its current hostilities to include the routine targeting of US- and Israel-linked financial institutions in the Gulf region in the coming days, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) characterised these as ‘Iran’s new targets’. Any such attacks will increase substantial economic disruption risks in targeted locations, while also driving the risk of conflict escalation in the immediate term.
- STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Iran has likely conducted three attacks targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf, underscoring critical threats to vessel safety regardless of mounting military pressure. In the past 24 hours, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has reported three incidents of ‘unknown projectiles’ hitting vessels in the Persian Gulf. At approximately 1200hrs (local time) on 10 March, an unspecified bulk carrier reported a projectile in its vicinity while moored 36 nautical miles (67km) north of the UAE’s capital Abu Dhabi. At approximately 0605 hrs (local time) on 11 March, a projectile hit a cargo vessel approximately 50 nautical miles (93km) north-west of Dubai (Dubai emirate, UAE), though did not result in major damage. Finally, at approximately 0835 hrs (local time), an unidentified projectile hit a cargo vessel approximately 11 nautical miles (20km) north of Oman, triggering a fire which is ongoing at the time of writing. Also on 11 March, Thailand’s transport ministry announced that unidentified projectiles had hit a Thai-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, with three crew members still missing at the time of writing. Since 28 February, the UKMTO has received reports of 17 incidents impacting vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea, including 14 kinetic attacks targeting vessels, likely conducted by Iran. The occurrence of multiple such incidents in 24 hours underscores the increasing threats to vessels, crew and cargo located in the region. Regardless of US and Israeli efforts to escalate their airstrike pressure, Iran is highly likely to continue targeting vessels in the region, critically disrupting maritime supply chains and sustaining price volatility on international energy markets.
- IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Concerns that Iran has begun to mine the Strait of Hormuz will likely trigger an intensification of strikes on naval facilities and port infrastructure on Iran’s southern coast. On 11 March, CNN reported assessments by unnamed US intelligence sources that the IRGC has begun mining the Strait of Hormuz and has already deployed ‘a few dozen’ explosives. Although US President Donald Trump subsequently issued a statement saying there are ‘no reports’ of the IRGC mining the waterway, US Central Command (CENTCOM) subsequently announced that it had destroyed numerous Iranian naval vessels overnight from 10 to 11 March, including 16 ‘mine-layers’. The operations almost certainly reflect substantial concerns that Iran will shift focus to enforcing its de facto closure of the waterway with deep-sea mines, amid mounting pressure on its missile launch capabilities. Such a move would substantially increase security risks for vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, particularly without a naval escort. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the IRGC will partially mine areas of the Strait of Hormuz in order to deter efforts to bypass the blockade (including by covert means; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 March 2026). Even so, Iran remains unlikely to engage imminently in a comprehensive barrier mining campaign across the Strait of Hormuz, given the indiscriminate nature of sea mine detonations and the likely disruption this would trigger for Iran’s own crude exports. Nevertheless, US and Israeli escalation will increase the risk of such a campaign in the short term. This is particularly the case if airstrikes begin to routinely target Iranian energy infrastructure or if the US launches ground operations to secure locations, such as Iran’s primary nuclear facilities and/or oil infrastructure, including Kharg Island (Bushehr province). To mitigate this risk, the US is likely to intensify airstrikes targeting Iranian naval and port facilities in the coming days, with resulting damage to dual-use and commercial port facilities compounding supply chain disruption within Iran.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: A second strike in a central area of the Lebanese capital Beirut highlights elevated risks of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacks expanding beyond Beirut’s Dahieh suburb. Earlier on 11 March, the IDF conducted a strike on a residential apartment building in the Aisha Bakkar neighbourhood of Beirut. According to news channels affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH), the strike killed at least four individuals and targeted a senior Hamas member, though his status remains unknown at the time of writing. Israeli strikes in Lebanon, including Beirut, have significantly escalated since 2 March. IDF strikes in Beirut have mainly been limited to Dahieh and accompanied by evacuation warnings. However, the IDF did not issue an evacuation warning for this strike, which marks the second Israeli strike in central Beirut since the intensification of hostilities, following a strike on 8 March in Raouché neighbourhood (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 March 2026). The strike highlights the elevated risk that the IDF will gradually expand its targets in Beirut beyond Dahieh, further increasing security risks across the capital. This will particularly elevate security risks in areas near the port of Beirut and Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), as well as hospitality venues and roads across the city.
- GULF-IRAN: Iranian attacks against Gulf states continue, though they are unlikely to prompt immediate military retaliation due to conflict escalation concerns. Since our last report, Iranian missile and drone attacks have continued to target states across the Gulf region hosting US assets, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Earlier on 11 March, drones were intercepted over Saudi Arabia; they were en route to strike Saudi Aramco’s Shaybah oil field (Eastern province). Air defences also reportedly intercepted ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan air base (Riyadh province), while further interceptions were reported elsewhere in Eastern (province), including Hafar al-Batin. No casualties or damage were reported. Earlier on 11 March, the UAE’s defence ministry stated that debris from two intercepted drones in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB, Dubai emirate) caused several injuries, though no casualties. In Bahrain, the civil aviation authorities stated that several passenger and cargo aircraft from the national airline Gulf Air were relocated from Bahrain International Airport (BAH, al-Muharraq governorate) to other airports as part of the measures to enhance operational readiness. Earlier on 11 March, explosions likely linked to interceptions of Iranian ordnance were reported in Manama (Bahrain), with similar explosions reported in Doha (Qatar). Also on 11 March, Iran claimed to have fired missiles towards a US military installation at Kuwait’s Camp Arifjan (al-Ahmadi governorate), though neither the US nor Kuwaiti authorities have confirmed the attack. Despite continued Iranian attacks against Gulf states, it is currently unlikely that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will respond with collective military force in the coming days, amid efforts to moderate escalation risks. However, the sustained pace of Iranian strikes across the Gulf, including multiple successful attacks on key targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE in recent days, possibly indicates early signs of interceptor stockpile depletion. While Bahrain is currently the most exposed state, stockpile depletion poses a mounting risk across the GCC. This threatens to increase the success rate of Iranian strikes in the coming weeks and presents critical threats to energy and water infrastructure. Any substantial damage to key infrastructure would increase the risk of GCC states joining the conflict in an attempt to degrade Iran’s strike capacity and enforce deterrence. This risk will further increase in the event that the IRGC follows through on threats to target US- and Israeli-linked financial institutions in the Gulf in the coming days.
- IRAQ: Iran-backed militants’ attacks against US assets are set to continue in the coming days, sustaining proximate personnel security risks and underscoring communications vulnerabilities. On 10 March, six drones were launched toward the US Baghdad Diplomatic Support Centre near the capital’s Baghdad International Airport (BGW). Five drones were reportedly intercepted, while one struck the compound, causing a small fire and power disruption but no reported injuries. The attack was likely conducted by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), a broad collection of Iran-backed Shia militias. In Erbil (Erbil governorate), a drone was intercepted near the US consulate earlier on 11 March. The IRI’s targeting of the diplomatic facility near Baghdad Airport underscores persistent threats to civil aviation and airspace security in Iraq and the wider region. The targeting of urban and heavily staffed areas also sustains the risk of personnel exposure to direct strikes or shrapnel from interceptions. The reported power outage further highlights vulnerabilities affecting communications infrastructure within US-linked government facilities, which will possibly affect operational continuity during periods of heightened threat. Meanwhile, earlier on 11 March, airstrikes, which were likely conducted by the US, targeted the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters in Al Anbar governorate, while several PMF members were reportedly wounded in another strike on a PMF facility in Wasit governorate. Such strikes will almost certainly continue in the coming days, particularly in rural areas of Al Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin and Wasit governorates, in response to ongoing IRI and PMF attacks against US regional military assets.
- US-IRAN: Continued ambiguity regarding the US’ war goals and the conflict’s duration is unlikely to trigger the immediate resumption of pre-conflict import–export activity in the Gulf. On 11 March, US President Donald Trump stated that the Israel-US-Iran war will end ‘soon’, as there is ‘practically nothing left to target’ within Iran. Despite this characterisation, however, we assess that Iran likely retains the capacity to launch missile and drone strikes against Israel, US military installations and other targets in the Gulf, and will likely continue to do so in the coming 24 hours (at least). Even so, Trump’s statement underscores the US’ increasing strategic ambiguity regarding the likely duration of combat operations against Iran. In the coming days, the Trump administration is highly likely to continue issuing statements with varying indications of the US’ war goals, amid broader efforts to moderate price volatility on global energy and commodity markets. Despite these efforts, however, tensions between the US and Iran are highly likely to remain elevated, sustaining armed conflict risks. This dynamic is highly likely to continue disrupting maritime supply chains in the Persian Gulf in the coming hours and days, reducing the prospect of a rapid resumption of regional import–export activity.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel’s emphasis on negotiations under fire and the redeployment of IDF troops from Gaza to Lebanon highlight the risk of a protracted conflict. Earlier on 11 March, the IDF’s Chief of the General Staff ordered the reinforcement of the Northern Command and transferred the Golani Brigade combat team from Gaza to Lebanon. The order comes amid reports by international media that Israel has rejected diplomatic overtures from Lebanon requesting that Israel halt its offensive against LH as a precursor to further negotiations. By contrast, Israel has stated that any and all negotiations will be held while combat operations are ongoing. Israel’s demand is consistent with its previously established negotiating tactics and practices, wherein it has sought to apply continuous pressure on both the Lebanese government and LH to secure the most favourable terms, sustaining armed conflict risks through the coming 14 days (at least).
- Qatar: Military, energy sectors face heightened security risks from Chinese state-sponsored groups. On 9 March, cyber security company Check Point reported that a Chinese state-sponsored threat group (‘Camaro Dragon’) is targeting Qatari military and energy sectors in a cyber operation. Reportedly, Camaro Dragon distributes artificial intelligence (AI)-generated attachments purporting to provide information on the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war, in order to trick users into executing malicious code onto their systems. This highlights threat actors’ ability to capitalise quickly on ongoing geopolitical events. Camaro Dragon then uses dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading techniques to deploy and conceal malicious payloads within legitimate programmes, enhancing detection evasion. The malicious payloads include a known backdoor (‘PlugX’) to maintain long-term access, as well as ‘Cobalt Strike’ to conduct extensive reconnaissance, likely to enable additional malicious activities. We assess that China will likely seek to continue gathering intelligence on the military and energy sectors in the Middle East region amid growing regional instability. Consequently, Middle East-based organisations will face heightened security risks in the short term.
- Iran-region: Targeting of financial, tech organisations will elevate security, socio-economic health risks. On 11 March, officials affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened to target economic centres and banks affiliated with Israel and the US. The threat comes following a strike against an Iranian bank earlier that day; it also follows reported cyber attacks on IRGC-affiliated financial institutions earlier this week (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 March 2026). Additionally, on 11 March, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency published a list of offices and infrastructure of US companies (mainly in the tech sector) in the region that are Israel-linked, characterising them as ‘potential targets’. As such, we assess there is a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its kinetic activity across the Middle East to target banks, economic centres and US- and/or Israel-affiliated businesses in the coming days. We also assess that Iranian cyber attacks against these institutions are likely. Such attacks will elevate security and socio-economic health risks for civilian populations in the region, while also increasing the risk of further armed escalation in the ongoing conflict.
- Iraq-region: Attacks on oil tankers underscore regional threat to maritime safety, supply chain risks. On 11 March, two explosive-laden vessels struck the Marshall Islands-flagged Safesea Vishnu and the Malta-flagged Zefyros oil tankers in a ship-to-ship transfer area, located in Iraqi waters near Basra (Basra governorate). The resulting explosions set both tankers ablaze, killing at least one crew member. The vessels had loaded fuel cargoes in Iraq, with the Safesea Vishnu chartered by an Iraqi state-linked company. The Iraqi authorities have subsequently suspended operations across the country’s oil terminals. The incident underscores critical threats to maritime navigation and offshore oil operations in Iraqi waters, while the closure of oil terminals will almost certainly disrupt exports and increase financial pressure on the Iraqi state. The attack came after Iran struck four merchant vessels in Gulf waters also on 11 March, underscoring the broader regional threat to maritime supply chains and global tanker supply. This will increase operational risks for international businesses and exacerbate price volatility in international energy and commodity markets. Attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf will almost certainly continue in the coming days as US and Israeli strikes on Iran continue.
- Iraq-region: Attacks on oil tankers underscore regional threat to maritime safety, supply chain risks. On 11 March, two explosive-laden vessels struck the Marshall Islands-flagged Safesea Vishnu and the Malta-flagged Zefyros oil tankers in a ship-to-ship transfer area, located in Iraqi waters near Basra (Basra governorate). The resulting explosions set both tankers ablaze, killing at least one crew member. The vessels had loaded fuel cargoes in Iraq, with the Safesea Vishnu chartered by an Iraqi state-linked company. The Iraqi authorities have subsequently suspended operations across the country’s oil terminals. The incident underscores critical threats to maritime navigation and offshore oil operations in Iraqi waters, while the closure of oil terminals will almost certainly disrupt exports and increase financial pressure on the Iraqi state. The attack came after Iran struck four merchant vessels in Gulf waters also on 11 March, underscoring the broader regional threat to maritime supply chains and global tanker supply. This will increase operational risks for international businesses and exacerbate price volatility in international energy and commodity markets. Attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf will almost certainly continue in the coming days as US and Israeli strikes on Iran continue.
- Israel-Lebanon: Strike in central area of capital Beirut elevates target expansion, security risks. Earlier on 11 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a strike on a residential apartment building in the Aisha Bakkar neighbourhood of the Lebanese capital Beirut. At the time of writing, there are no reports of casualties, though these are highly likely. Israeli strikes in Lebanon, including Beirut, have significantly escalated since 2 March. IDF strikes in Beirut have mainly been limited to the Dahieh suburb and accompanied by an earlier evacuation warning. However, the IDF did not issue an evacuation warning for this strike, which marks the second Israeli strike in central Beirut since the intensification of hostilities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 March 2026). The strike highlights the elevated risk that the IDF will gradually expand its targets in Beirut beyond Dahieh, further increasing security risks across the capital. This will particularly elevate security risks in areas near the port of Beirut and Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), as well as hospitality venues and roads across the city. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Mar 26.. Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement. Operation Roaring Lion – Israel MOD Announces 200th Aircraft in Operational Airlift of Military Equipment and Munitions has Landed in Israel. As part of the ongoing procurement and shipping effort throughout Operation Roaring Lion, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and the IDF’s air and sea bridge operations have marked the landing of the 200th cargo aircraft. Since the start of the operation, over 200 aircraft and ships have arrived in Israel carrying approximately 8,000 tons of military equipment, weaponry, and munitions. Led by Defense Minister Israel Katz and IMOD Director General Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amir Baram, the effort to expand Israel’s defense industrial base and accelerate production rates across Israeli defense industries remains ongoing. The air and sea bridge serves as a critical component in this effort, strengthening operational continuity, supporting the full range of IDF needs, and enhancing readiness and stockpiles.
The air and sea bridge, which has been running continuously throughout the campaign, is led by the IMOD Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD), through its International Shipping Division, the IMOD Missions to the United States and Germany, and the IDF’s Planning Directorate. The Israel Airports Authority and the Israel Civil Aviation Authority are also partners in the operation.
26 Mar 26. C-UAS Hub said today that UK considers Ukraine-developed Octopus drones to secure Strait of Hormuz. The United Kingdom is reviewing the potential deployment of Ukraine-developed Octopus interceptor drones to help secure the Strait of Hormuz as allies work to reopen the critical maritime corridor.
According to reports, British officials are assessing a range of options, including autonomous mine-countermeasure platforms and the Octopus drones developed through cooperation between Ukraine and the UK. The move comes as the UK looks to support maritime security operations without committing additional warships to the region.
The Octopus interceptor drones are designed to counter aerial threats, including Shahed-type drones, while mine-hunting platforms could be used to clear explosive hazards from one of the world’s most important energy routes.
Roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making its security a priority for Western governments.
Officials are reportedly exploring the use of interceptor drones alongside mine-clearing technologies as an alternative to a larger naval deployment, offering a more flexible and potentially less escalatory response.
The debate over British involvement has intensified following calls from the United States for allied support in securing the waterway.
Military planners are now weighing whether autonomous systems could provide a more politically and operationally viable solution compared to sending additional naval assets into the region.
Expanding UK-Ukraine defense collaboration
The Octopus system is the product of a growing defense cooperation between Ukraine and the UK, with technologies developed during the war in Ukraine increasingly influencing security planning beyond Europe.
Systems originally designed to counter Russian and Iranian drone threats on the battlefield could now be adapted to protect commercial shipping lanes in the Gulf.
Britain has already taken steps to address the rising drone threat in the Middle East by deploying counter-drone specialists to the region, drawing on operational experience gained through cooperation with Ukraine.
The development also builds on the growing ties between the UK and Ukraine in the defense industrial sector.
A Ukrainian defense manufacturer has recently established a presence in the UK, bringing drone technologies shaped by frontline combat experience as Kyiv continues to grow its defense industry footprint abroad.
As ties between the two nations grow, Ukrainian defense leaders including Colonel Valentyn Kuianovof the Ukrainian Air Force and Colonel (Ret.) Vadym Slyusar of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will travel to London in April to address attendees at SAE Media Group’s Counter UAS Technology Europe conference, to share insights on the counter-drone tactics being deployed in Ukraine. The defense industry will also be present with Myroslav Popovych speaking on behalf of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry.
UK considers Ukraine-developed Octopus drones to secure Strait of Hormuz – cuashub.com
—————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————