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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Apr. 29.

  • Russia: Frequent Ukrainian drone strikes on oil infrastructure will drive socio-economic health risk. On 28 August, Reuters reported that Russia’s Ust-Luga oil export terminal (Leningrad oblast) will operate at half capacity in September due to Ukrainian drone strikes against pipeline infrastructure. Earlier in August, drone attacks targeted the Unecha pumping station in Russia’s Bryansk oblast, an important transit point for crude oil destined for Ust-Luga. The Ust-Luga facility plays a critical role in Russian exports to global markets. The latest developments underscore the increasing efficacy of Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian oil infrastructure. Such strikes have noticeably intensified over the past month, targeting depots, pipelines and oil refineries. This has resulted in growing disruption to domestic oil supplies, with some Russian regions and Russian-occupied territories experiencing fuel shortages. We assess that Kyiv’s current strike strategy, which involves heavily targeting Russian oil infrastructure, will sustain supply disruptions and place increasing pressure on Russian oil exports. Russia will highly likely retaliate with intense strikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, including energy facilities.
  • Germany: Drone flights over US weapon transit routes underscore Russian espionage risk. On 28 August, The New York Times cited unnamed US and Western officials who believe that Russia and/or Russian proxies have conducted surveillance drone operations over US weapons transit routes in eastern Germany. The officials reportedly suspect that the drones are collecting intelligence on logistical corridors (primarily in Thuringia state) used to channel military aid to Ukraine, which could be used to inform future sabotage operations. The report adds to the mounting evidence that Russia has been carrying out drone espionage in Germany since its invasion of Ukraine. Earlier in August, Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) reported that there have been 270 cases involving 536 drone flights in Q1 2025 alone (though these are highly unlikely all attributable to Russia). We have repeatedly assessed that Russia is likely responsible for a portion of the drone activity recorded near sensitive Bundeswehr (military) facilities, defence companies and critical national infrastructure (including liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, railways and port facilities. These drone flights will likely persist, given the difficulties the German authorities have faced in tracing and counteracting them.

Aug 28.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s General Staff have acknowledged for the first time that Russian forces are now operating inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, though we have assessed this for many weeks
  • STRIKES: On 28 August, Russia launched one of the largest combined strikes of the war, with a missile strike causing severe (and possibly deliberate) collateral damage to the British Council building in the capital Kyiv
  • BORDER: Ukrainian men aged 18 to 22 are now allowed to leave the country after the government revised travel rules, with an expansion of conscription unlikely in the short term
  • FORECAST: The US is reportedly prepared to provide significant intelligence and air support to a Europe-led post-war security force in Ukraine, though it remains unclear if the Trump administration will commit to such a plan
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces are making slow progress to the west of Chasiv Yar, which will slowly facilitate future advances towards the eastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 21 August onwards confirms that the Russians have successfully pushed west of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas Canal, which runs south from Chasiv Yar. Russian forces have likely consolidated their presence on the western bank of the canal and are slowly pushing west towards Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage from 22 August also indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the north-west of Chasiv Yar.
  • BAKHMUT: A commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion currently fighting in Chasiv Yar stated on 22 August that Russian forces have recently changed their tactics and are now using uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) to resupply their forces operating close to the frontline. Ukrainian forces already make use of UGVs to facilitate logistical support and limit casualties during dangerous resupply missions.
  • BAKHMUT: Over the last week, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has made various claims of advances to the north of Toretsk, though only some of them have been confirmed. Claims on 21 August that Russian forces had seized Oleksandro-Shultyne, located around 3.5 miles (5.5km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka, have not been confirmed. Various Russian sources have refuted this claim, and, while geolocated footage from 25 August confirms a Russian presence in the south of the village, the settlement likely remains contested. Nevertheless, further south, the Russian MoD claimed on 22 August that its forces had taken Katerynivka and the nearby village of Kleban-Byk, located over five miles (8km) to the south-west. Geolocated footage from 26 August has since confirmed the seizure of Katerynivka, but not Kleban-Byk.
  • DONETSK: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have continued counter-attacking to contest Russian positions east and north-east of Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast). A prominent Ukrainian military observer reported on 25 August that Ukrainian forces had captured several settlements east and south-east of Dobropillia and cleared Russian positions near the T-0514 Dobropillia-Kramatorsk highway and south of Vesele, located to the north-east of Dobropillia. The success of these counter-attacks underscores Russia’s failure to exploit its penetration, with infiltration tactics proving insufficient to translate the breach into an operational breakthrough.
  • DONETSK: The Ukrainian source further assessed that the command of the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) has created assault groups aimed at preventing the encirclement of the most advanced Russian elements. The 51st CAA is also reportedly consolidating the base of the Russian penetration near Zapvidne, while showing indications that it is abandoning plans to expand the breach and is instead refocusing on operations against Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) and Myrnohrad, which is located to the east of Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: Meanwhile, both sides have made gains around Pokrovsk over the past week, highlighting the dynamic nature of the frontline in this sector. Geolocated footage from 22 August shows Ukrainian advances in western Udachne, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. As of 24 August, Ukrainian forces have also made confirmed gains in southern Pokrovsk, on the northern outskirts, and north-east of Leontovychi, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. To the east of Pokrovsk, Ukraine has captured Mykhailivka and advanced south of Myrne, located to the north-east of Mykhailivka. Meanwhile, Russian forces advanced north of Myrnohrad and north of Hrodivka, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk, as of 26 August.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Both sides have continued to launch attacks and counter-attacks and have made limited advances in northern Sumy oblast. Geolocated footage from 21 and 26 August indicates limited Russian advances in Yunakivka and nearby Loknya, located around 16 miles (25km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, footage from 25 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced near Bezsalivka, located just south of the international border inside Sumy oblast. Notably, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian detachment fighting in Sumy oblast stated on 21 August that Russian forces have only conducted one infiltration attempt in the Sumy direction so far in August; he assessed this was due to Ukrainian fortifications in the area. While the spokesperson nevertheless reported that standard, small-scale assaults are launched five times per day, this overall aligns with our assessment that Russian forces have deprioritised the Sumy axis in recent months.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past week, both sides have made gains across the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. Geolocated footage from 24 August shows recent Russian advances within northern Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), amid broader attempts to encircle the city. However, according to a Russian milblogger, the elevation of Kupiansk is slowing Russia’s progress in the area. Ukrainian military sources have claimed that Russian forces are facing difficulties in moving equipment or motorcycles across the Oskil River due to Ukrainian drone strikes.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, further south, Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances north of Novoyehorivka, located to the south-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast), as of 25 August. To the north-east of Borova, Russian forces progressed north of Borivska Andriivka, according to geolocated footage from 27 August. Ukraine have also made confirmed advances in the Lyman direction over the past week. Footage from 25 August shows Ukrainian forces likely recapturing Novomykhailivka, located to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), and Novyi Myr, located to the north-west of Novomykhailivka.
  • SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s General Staff acknowledged for the first time on 26 August that Russian forces have penetrated the Donetsk oblast border and are now operating inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast. We have assessed for many weeks that Russian forces have been operating in the area.
  • SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 24 August indicates that Russian forces have taken Yalta and have advanced across the Vovcha River (which marks the boundary between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts) into the southern sector of Filiya, located over 16 miles (26km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). While the Russian MoD has claimed its forces have taken Filiya, we cannot confirm this. Further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 25 August indicates that Russian forces have taken Zaporizka, located 13 miles (21km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka, inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast; however, the Ukrainian General Staff have refuted this as of 26 August.
  • SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces have nevertheless pushed the Russians back at various points along the border region in recent days and weeks, though Russian counter-attacks are contesting the area and making further gains. Geolocated footage from 21 and 22 August shows Ukrainian forces raising flags in the centre of Tolstoi and Zelenyi Hai, villages located 14 miles (23km) and 17 miles (28km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka inside Donetsk oblast, respectively. However, subsequent Russian claims from 26 August suggest that a Russian counter-attack may have retaken many such villages and positions, though this cannot be confirmed.
  • SOUTHERN: Along the western-most flank of the southern Zaporizhzhia frontline, Russian forces have advanced along the Prydniprovska railway south of Prymorske, around 14 miles (23km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The railway runs close to the eastern shores of the Dnipro River and marks the closest point to Zaporizhzhia city that Russian forces are now operating.
  • STRIKES: Early on 28 August, Russia launched one of the largest combined strikes of the war, involving 598 Shahed-type drones and 31 missiles. The missile mix included 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles, nine Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and two Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian air force intercepted 563 unmanned aerial vehicles and 26 missiles (18 cruise missiles, seven Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and one Kh-47 ballistic missile).
  • STRIKES: The attack heavily targeted the capital Kyiv, which suffered multiple hits and at least 15 deaths, and resulted in severe damage to the British Council and the EU delegation buildings. Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko described it as one of the largest strikes on the city in recent months. Nearly 100 buildings in 20 locations across seven urban districts were damaged. Damage was also reported in four districts of Kyiv oblast: Brovary, Fastiv, Obukhiv and Vyshhorod. Russia struck the Intercity+ high-speed train depot in the town of Koziatyn (Vinnytsia oblast), while damage to critical and energy infrastructure left 60,000 residents without power across the country.
  • STRIKES: Available footage suggests that two missiles likely struck a building facing the British Council, appearing to constitute a double-tap strike. The significant blast of the strike indicates that the projectiles were likely ballistic missiles, with the shockwave likely reaching the European delegation around the corner.
  • STRIKES: While the strike’s intended target remains unclear, the proximity of the strike clearly highlights Moscow’s willingness to conduct missile attacks near Western facilities; this could realistically be a deliberate strategy to intimidate and test responses. In June, Russia designated the British Council as an undesirable organisation, with the Federal Security Service (FSB) alleging that it was used by British intelligence for activities threatening Russian interests. While there is no indication that the recent strike was linked to this designation, the development underscores the likelihood that Russia is, at the least, willing to accept collateral damage when conducting strikes near British or other Western facilities in Ukraine.
  • STRIKES: We have previously assessed that UK-owned and -linked assets face the highest threats of foreign assets in Kyiv. Russia has long considered that London is the most significant driver of the West’s efforts to contain Russia and support Ukraine. In any case, the substantial damage caused underscores the growing threat to Western assets in Ukraine more broadly, as Russia continues its intense long-range strike campaign.
  • STRIKES: Other strikes during the monitoring period were smaller in scale, though they still inflicted damage, including against energy infrastructure. For instance, on 27 August, a Russian attack caused power outages in Chernihiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. Energy operators have reported attacks against various facilities in previous days. This likely indicates that Russia is resuming frequent attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of the heating season.
  • STRIKES: Earlier on 28 August, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia has not reached any agreements with Kyiv regarding a moratorium on long-range strikes. On 22 August, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenko suggested that an air truce could be the first step towards a broader settlement between the two countries. We previously assessed that a temporary moratorium would more likely remain a ‘concession’ to which Moscow is willing to agree in a bid to prevent US secondary sanctions. However, given the increase in strikes since the Alaska summit, it is clear that, in the absence of US sanctions, it suits Russia’s military strategy to continue such strikes for the foreseeable future, particularly ahead of the winter.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its long-range strike campaign, heavily targeting Russian oil infrastructure as well as defence facilities. For example, overnight on 27-28 August, Ukraine reportedly struck an oil facility in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai that supplies Russian forces. It also targeted an oil refinery in Russia’s Samara oblast, as well as ammunition storage sites and logistical facilities elsewhere in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine. On 25 August, Reuters reported that Ukrainian strikes against ten Russian oil refineries had disrupted at least 17% of Russia’s refining capacity, representing approximately 1.1 million barrels per day, and caused A-95 (premium) gasoline shortages in parts of occupied Ukraine, southern Russia and Russia’s Far East.
  • STRIKES: On 24 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine uses domestically produced weapons to carry out long-range strikes against Russia and does not co-ordinate such targets with the US. His comments came shortly after the Wall Street Journal reported that the US has effectively barred Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia using US-supplied missiles since late spring. On 20 August, Zelensky announced that the country will begin mass-producing its own long-range Flamingo cruise missile this winter. Ukrainian efforts to boost domestic production of native missiles and deep-strike capabilities underscore attempts to reduce reliance on Western missiles, the provision of which has become increasingly uncertain.

 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • SANCTIONS: The EU is reportedly considering leveraging secondary sanctions to prevent third countries from facilitating Russian efforts to evade the bloc’s existing punitive measures. EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss the use of a so-called anti-circumvention tool when they gather on 29 and 30 August in Denmark, in the capital Copenhagen. Despite being adopted in 2023, this mechanism has not been used yet; it can prohibit the export, supply or transfer of certain goods to third countries that are considered to facilitate the bypassing of sanctions by Russia. Although the bloc has historically opposed the imposition of secondary sanctions, it is becoming more likely that the EU will use elements of this tool to increase sanctions pressure on Moscow. For further analysis on which countries could be targeted and how secondary sanctions work, see Sibylline Special Report – 6 July 2023.
  • SANCTIONS: Most US citizens support sanctioning Russia’s trading partners as a way to pressure Moscow to end the war, according to recent polling. The poll by Reuters and market research firm Ipsos, which ended on 24 August, found that 62% of US respondents agree with Washington DC taking such action. The US has already imposed punitive measures against India, a key trading partner of Russia, in the form of an additional 25% tariff for New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. Republicans were more likely to support imposing sanctions on Russia’s trade partners than Democrats (levels of support stand at 76% and 58%, respectively).
  • SANCTIONS: As per a report from Bloomberg on 26 August, India is planning to reduce its purchases of Russian oil in the coming weeks. State-run and private Indian refiners are expected to buy between 1.4 million to 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) for October loading and beyond, compared to approximately 1.8 million bpd in H1 2025. The size of purchases may possibly change if India reaches a trade deal with the US and Washington DC eases pressure on New Delhi for its trade relations with Moscow. This modest reduction, however, possibly indicates that threats of tariffs and/or other economic penalties will unlikely fully deter countries from engaging in trade with Moscow in the near term. For further analysis on Indian and Russian relations, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 18 August 2025.
  • BORDER: Ukrainian men aged 18 to 22 are now allowed to leave the country after the government revised travel rules. On 26 August, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko confirmed the decision, which applies to periods when martial law is in effect. Ukrainian men aged 18 to 60 have been prohibited from leaving the country since February 2022 after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, with limited exceptions. Men aged 25 and above can be conscripted. However, the decision is not indicative of intentions to relax travel restrictions for Ukrainian men more broadly. For instance, on 21 August, a bill was submitted to Ukraine’s parliament, which proposes introducing criminal liability for illegally crossing the border during martial law. It envisions a fine of between UAH 119,000 and UAH 170,000 (approximately USD 2,885 to USD 4,122) or imprisonment for up to three years. If passed, such punishment is unlikely to significantly deter men from attempting to leave Ukraine, however.

FORECAST

GUARANTEES: The US is reportedly prepared to provide significant intelligence and air support to a Europe-led post-war security force in Ukraine. According to unspecified European and Ukrainian officials cited by the Financial Times (FT) on 26 August, the US would be willing to contribute strategic enabling capabilities. This includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance, as well as command and control and air defence assets. The US contributions with regard to air support would reportedly involve US aircraft, ground-based radar and logistics enabling a European-enforced no-fly zone and air shield for Ukraine.   We cannot confirm the veracity of the report, but it sets out a potential US readiness to commit enabling capabilities that would make the European-led post-war security guarantees for Ukraine much more credible and viable. It comes after earlier reports claimed that the US would play a minimal role in any such efforts, and as such, it remains unclear if the Trump administration would indeed commit itself to such a plan. The FT article indicates that Washington DC’s contributions would be centred on co-ordinating and facilitating European efforts, rather than a model where the US was the principal security guarantor. US support is contingent on commitments from European governments to deploy ‘tens of thousands’ of troops to Ukraine, underscoring that the US perceives that the onus is on Europe to provide the necessary manpower. As such, even if an agreement is reached, serious questions around European capability (including the nominally most capable forces of the UK and France) mean US support could realistically fall through if a coalition of the willing later fails to supply and sustain an adequate number of troops.  Discussions of what post-war security guarantees for Ukraine could look like and the different roles of various stakeholders are still in their early stages; plans will highly likely be subject to change over time. Notably, the unspecified officials who spoke to the FT claimed that US offers of support could still be rescinded. The possibility of the US changing the scope of its involvement or refusing to support security plans entirely will likely sustain concerns in Europe regarding the viability and feasibility of a European-led post-war reassurance force, as well as such a force’s credibility to deter further Russian military operations in the future.

Meanwhile, unspecified Western capitals have reportedly outlined a preliminary three-tier plan for Ukraine’s post-war defence, according to the FT. The first element would involve a demilitarised zone that is possibly patrolled by a neutral force of peacekeeping troops agreed by both Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian troops armed and trained by NATO would guard a second line of defence behind this area; simultaneously, a European-led deterrence force would be stationed deeper in Ukraine and supported by US assets from the rear. This likely seeks to balance Russian and Ukrainian stances on post-war security arrangements, though the presence of European troops (including from NATO states) in Ukraine will almost certainly remain a non-starter for Russia. A realistic European ‘reassurance force’ would much more likely be deployed outside of Ukraine if part of a peace agreement with Russia.

China, which has become an increasingly important partner to Russia following the full-scale invasion, has reportedly signalled its willingness to participate in peacekeeping efforts in Ukraine. According to reports in German media on 23 August, unspecified Chinese government insiders said Beijing would only be willing to do so if the peacekeeping forces were deployed under a UN mandate. China has been a large contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously raised doubts about the ability of UN peacekeepers to deter renewed Russian aggression. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties of a conflict, are expected to be impartial and guided by the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence. As we have previously assessed, it remains highly unlikely that the UN would be able to marshal sufficient troops to sustain a long-term and credible peacekeeping force over what would likely be an extremely long demilitarised zone.

Amid a lack of progress towards a bilateral Russia-Ukraine summit, US President Donald Trump has renewed threats of economic penalties in the case of no ceasefire. On 26 August, Trump threatened to start an economic war, which he claimed would ‘be bad for Russia’. At the same time, the US president hinted that Ukraine could also face economic penalties in the form of sanctions and/or tariffs. Since resuming the presidency, Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose sanctions or tariffs on Russia if no ceasefire is reached and has set deadlines which have passed with no new punitive measures against Moscow. Nevertheless, Trump’s apparent readiness to target Kyiv with economic penalties suggests that he sees both countries as being responsible for the lack of peace progress.

US Vice President JD Vance claimed on 24 August that Russia has made ‘significant concessions’ during negotiations to end the war, though we have seen little indication to suggest this is the case. Vance opined that the Russian side has shown willingness to be flexible on some of its core demands, including alleged acknowledgement that there is ‘going to be some security guarantee’ to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, as we have previously assessed, this is not a shift in the Russian position, given they set out their own proposals for Ukrainian ‘guarantees’ in 2022. Additionally, Vance claimed that Moscow has conceded that it will not be able to install a puppet government in Kyiv without providing further comment.

However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent statements questioning Zelensky’s legitimacy indicate that Moscow has not abandoned its ultimate objective to push for regime change in Ukraine. In an interview aired on 24 August, Lavrov stated that Russia regards Zelensky as the ‘de facto head’ of Ukraine rather than the legitimate leader of the country. Lavrov also questioned Zelensky’s legitimacy in the context of signing documents to end the war and claimed that, at present, Zelensky is illegitimate based on the Ukrainian constitution (of which Lavrov gave a distorted interpretation). Under Ukrainian law, elections cannot be held while martial law is in effect; Ukraine will almost certainly continue to enforce martial law while Russia continues its war. On 26 August, Trump rejected Lavrov’s questioning of Zelensky’s legitimacy, describing it as ‘posturing’. While this may well be the case, at present, Russia has given little indication that its demands have substantively changed from 2022. Until this changes, or a major breakthrough on the battlefield occurs, it remains highly unlikely that a peace agreement will be reached in the short-to-medium term.

Aug 27.

Executive summary

  • In our updated Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
  • On 15 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump convened for a summit in Alaska (US). The meeting was followed by a summit on 18 August in Washington DC (US) involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and numerous European leaders. While neither summit achieved a tangible breakthrough, they have likely set the course for further (albeit modest) progress in the nascent peace process. While talks concerning security guarantees (specifically what can and cannot be provided) are ongoing, Russia has maintained its position that it will not allow any NATO troops inside Ukraine.
  • Following the Alaska summit, the White House claimed that Putin agreed to hold bilateral or trilateral talks with Zelensky. The US is pushing for such a meeting in the coming weeks. However, it remains unlikely that Putin will meet with Zelensky directly in this timeframe. If such a meeting were to take place, it would represent a notable shift in the Russian position; it would likely indicate increased Russian readiness to discuss more serious terms (there has been little variation in the original demands that Russia set out in 2022, when its forces were marching on Kyiv).
  • On the battlefield, Russian forces have continued to advance steadily over the past month. While they successfully penetrated Ukraine’s defences to the north-east of Pokrovsk near Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast), it appears at the time of writing that Russia has struggled to exploit this opportunity; Ukrainian counter-attacks have curtailed Russia’s ability to translate this penetration into a breakthrough.
  • Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in September include Trump’s ever-extending deadline for Russia to reach a peace deal. Trump threatened ‘very severe consequences’ if Putin refuses to agree to a deal; if no such agreement is reached (which we assess remains highly likely), fresh sanctions and/or tariffs are possible. If these do not come, Russia will only feel encouraged to continue delaying negotiations while its forces advance. (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Aug 25. Ukraine sees ‘priceless’ digital battlefield data trove as key to West’s support.

  • Summary
  • Ukraine holds vast trove of wartime data
  • Kyiv using AI for reconnaissance, pattern recognition
  • Minister says up to 90% of battlefield kills done with drones

Ukraine is looking at how to share battlefield data with allies, the country’s deputy prime minister said, calling the vast trove of stored information one of Kyiv’s “cards” to strengthen its position as it negotiates support from friendly countries.

“The data we have is priceless for any country,” Mykhailo Fedorov, who heads Ukraine’s digitalisation ministry, told Reuters in an interview, adding that Ukraine is currently “very careful” about sharing it. (Source: Reuters)

 

27 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine and Canada sign drone-focused defense production deal. Ukraine and Canada have signed an agreement to expand joint defense production, with a focus on manufacturing drones and counter-drone systems. The deal was formalized on August 24 by Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and Canadian Defense Minister David McGuinty in the presence of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Mark Carney. Shmyhal said the initiative aims to deepen defense-industrial cooperation, create new production facilities in both countries and strengthen supply chain resilience. He added that the agreement will enable the establishment of Ukrainian companies in Canada, support technology exchange and secure long-term supplies of modern weapons for Ukraine’s armed forces. Zelenskyy highlighted drone production as a priority area, pointing to shortages of unmanned systems at the front. and noting that Ukraine requires expanded production to meet frontline demand. The Canadian government has allocated initial funding to support the program. Discussions between Shmyhal and McGuinty also addressed investment in drone projects and the expansion of broader defense-industrial cooperation. The agreement comes alongside a wider Canadian military aid package announced the same day. Carney pledged $1.5 bn in support, including funding for drones, armored vehicles, electronic warfare systems and joint defense projects. The package forms part of Canada’s $2 bn commitment made at the G7 summit earlier this year. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-and-canada-sign-drone-focused-defense-production-deal/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

27 Aug 25. Russia’s Leading Drone Maker Nears Bankruptcy. One of Russia’s largest drone manufacturers, AO Kronstadt, is on the verge of bankruptcy after months of financial turmoil and mounting lawsuits, Russian media reported. According to CNews, the company has faced dozens of debt claims in recent months, with more than 600m rubles ($7m) sought since the beginning of summer. The largest cases involve lawsuits from LLC Innovative Technologies and Materials for 151.1 million rubles and AO Research Institute of Modern Telecommunications Technologies for 220.6 million rubles. By May, total claims against the company had already reached one bn rubles, highlighting the growing financial pressure on the manufacturer of the “Orion” and “Inokhodets” drones—systems often compared to the American MQ-9 Reaper. Industry sources told CNews that Kronstadt has been in difficulty for two years, with the problems traced to the 2022 exit of its key shareholder, AFK Sistema. Without that support, debt levels escalated rapidly. Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union have further strained the company, cutting access to critical foreign-made components and inflating costs. At the same time, large state contracts placed heavy production demands on Kronstadt at a moment when supply chains were already under stress. Nikolai Ryashin, general director of Rusdronport, suggested the company is headed toward collapse.

“The company will go the way of bankruptcy, so subcontractors are now rushing to file claims and get closer to the front of the line,” Ryashin said.

The report noted that Ukrainian strikes on Kronstadt’s production facilities added to the difficulties. The company, known for supplying drones widely used in Russia’s war against Ukraine, has seen its manufacturing plants targeted by Ukrainian forces. The combination of sanctions, battlefield strikes, and debt obligations has put the enterprise in what observers describe as its most precarious position since its founding. The case is emblematic of broader challenges facing Russia’s defense-industrial base under wartime pressure. The Kremlin has leaned heavily on unmanned systems to sustain its operations in Ukraine, and Kronstadt was central to that strategy. Its “Orion” and “Inokhodets” drones were intended to provide long-endurance surveillance and strike capabilities, giving Russia a domestic alternative to Western armed UAVs. Despite heavy government investment, the challenges appear insurmountable. Sanctions cut off key technologies, subcontractors are pushing claims in court, and financial liabilities have grown past the point of sustainability. Whether the company can be restructured or absorbed into another defense conglomerate remains uncertain, but for now Kronstadt is facing what many in the industry describe as an inevitable path toward bankruptcy. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

 

26 Aug 25. Zelenskyy urges Canada to send troops to Ukraine. This would strengthen the force presence commitment from European leaders to safeguard Ukraine’s territory after a potential peace deal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called on Canada to reinforce European security guarantees for the war torn country by sending troops to Ukraine.

“We are counting on the presence of Canadian forces in Ukraine,” beseeched the wartime leader, “this is important for us,” he emphasised in a joint press conference in Kyiv alongside the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on 24 August 2025.

This prospect builds on recent commitments from European leaders, particularly the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who floated the notion of sending a force presence to secure Ukraine’s territorial integrity after a prospective peace deal. It is not certain what this potential force presence would look like but it is certain that the British Army will be unable to undertake a high-intensity conflict in the conventional sense. This leaves the guarantor with little option other than a peacekeeping mission similar to its deployment in Kosovo during the late-1990s. No doubt aware of the limited deterrence of this solution against Russia, a hardened peer adversary, Zelenskyy understandably wants to bolster the combined Nato presence on the border with Russia. The president took the opportunity to discuss this move with Carney during his visit to Kyiv last week to iron out details of a new security cooperation deal. This deal is the latest bilateral arrangement with Ukraine – others include Denmark, Sweden and the UK – in which countries are tapping into Ukraine’s battlefield experience and industrial innovation. While the Canadian government has not offered any response to the prospect of inserting troops on the ground in Ukraine, according to Zelenksyy’s office Canada is considering the possibility.

Canadian strategy

In Canada’s strategic assessment, enshrined in Our North, Strong and Free, the Nato member does not underestimate the wider, strategic threat posed by Russian forces. The adversary’s reach is not limited to the regional conflict in Ukraine but also across Europe and in their own sphere of influence in the Arctic region. To that end, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) has increased defence spending by C$9bn ($6.5bn) for fiscal year 2025-26. But in a more sobering context, Canada currently spends just 1.37% of its gross domestic product on defence with an ambition to reach 2%, Nato’s old baseline target, by 2032. These funds will focus on increasing the number of personnel in a combined force of 71,500 troops by 2030, new military infrastructure and capabilities with a focus on the High North.  GlobalData, a leading data and analytics consultancy, list the major projects contributing to this increased spending, such as the procurement of 88 F-35A multirole fighters, the construction of a new fleet of multi-purpose frigates to replace ageing warships, Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), new ice-breaking patrol vessels for both the Navy and Coast Guard, and an ongoing search for an optionally armed Remotely Piloted Aircraft System.

In this spirit, during Carney’s visit to Kyiv, the Royal Canadian Navy inducted its sixth and final AOPS.

What can Canada provide?

This strategic context leaves Canadian officials with tough decisions when it comes to allocating units to the appropriate theatres. But with substantial work ongoing in the naval industry for the High North, it would be more suitable to provide Ukraine with troops and capabilities on the ground and in the air. Canada has contributed to deployments in Afghanistan, Syria, and Liby (Source: army-technology.com)

 

25 Aug 25. Canada to fund $500m PURL package for Ukraine. Canada announced today (24 August 2025) that it will fund a $500m package of military equipment and munitions for Ukraine sourced from the United States, under NATO’s new Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte welcomed the announcement as a strong demonstration of Canada’s enduring commitment to Ukraine’s defence.

“I commend Canada for stepping up to fund this package of US military equipment for Ukraine. NATO Allies continue to deliver essential equipment and supplies, making sure Ukraine gets what it needs to defend itself as it works towards a just and lasting peace,” said the Secretary General.

Canada’s contribution under the PURL initiative follows earlier announcements by the Netherlands, Germany, and a joint pledge from Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Each package is valued at around $500 million,and is designed to meet Ukraine’s most urgent operational requirements with equipment and munitions sourced from U.S. stockpiles. (Source: ASD Network)

 

25 Aug 25. Norway to provide Ukraine with air defence systems worth about $700m. Norway’s government said on Sunday that it will contribute approximately 7bn Norwegian crowns ($696.12m) of air defence systems to Ukraine.

“Together with Germany, we are now ensuring that Ukraine receives powerful air defence systems,” Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said in the statement.

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“Germany and Norway are working very closely together to support Ukraine in its fight to defend the country and protect the civilian population against Russian air attacks.” (Source: Reuters)

 

25 Aug 25. Russia Develops Fiber-Optic Drone Launch Vehicle. Russian engineers have developed a new unmanned ground platform designed to deliver and launch drones using a fiber-optic control link, according to the Scientific and Technical Center (STC) ‘Kornei.’ The system, presented at the ‘Unmanned Systems: Technologies of the Future’ forum, is intended to expand operational flexibility in contested electronic warfare environments. The platform, known as the Dronobus, integrates a software and hardware package that allows it to transport and launch unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) without relying on traditional radio control. Instead, both the platform and the drones are managed through a fiber-optic cable, reducing susceptibility to jamming. According to STC ‘Kornei’, the unmanned vehicle can travel up to 10 kilometers before deploying its drones, which can then operate at ranges of up to 15 kilometers from the launch point. In addition to UAV deployment, the Dronobus can transport cargo weighing up to 150 kilograms. The platform is built for year-round operation, capable of functioning in temperatures ranging from -20°C to +40°C.

“The robotic hardware and software complex ‘Dronobus’ is designed for the delivery and launch of unmanned aerial vehicles using fiber-optic communication or for the delivery of cargo weighing less than 150 kg,”

The use of fiber-optic tethering in UAV operations is not new, but its integration into a mobile ground launch system could offer advantages in environments saturated with electronic warfare. By maintaining a hardwired control link to both the vehicle and the drones, the system may avoid some of the vulnerabilities that have plagued Russian and Ukrainian UAV operations in the current conflict, where GPS spoofing and radio-frequency jamming have become routine. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

 

22 Aug 25. Zelensky confirms Flamingo cruise missile tests and production plans. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed to journalists in Kyiv on 20 August that the Flamingo cruise missile has been tested, and said it was planned to enter mass production by February 2026. Asked about the Flamingo, he said, “There were successful tests of this missile. And so far, the missile is the most successful that we have – it flies 3,000 km, this is important. I believe that we cannot talk much about this until we have the possibility of using hundreds of missiles.

“By the end of December or in January/February, there should be mass production. We need to look at the success of the tests and at the financing of this programme,” Zelensky added.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence told Janes on 20 August that it could not make public any technical details of the Flamingo, but highlighted the comments of Minister of Defence of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal who said on 18 August that “this is a very powerful weapon, long range, and it exists. These are key details. We will find out the rest when the right moment comes”.

Iryna Terekh, chief technical officer at Fire Point, the Ukrainian company making the Flamingo, told journalists on 14 August that it has a circular area probable (CEP) of 14 m and a 1,150 kg warhead. She added that the company is currently producing roughly one Flamingo per day, and by October they hope to be making seven per day. (Source: Janes)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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