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Military And Security Developments
Aug 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukrainian forces are continuing stabilisation operations in the Dobropillia sector, located to the north-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), where Russian forces recently penetrated Ukrainian defences
• STRIKES: After scaling back its strikes in recent weeks, particularly in the run-up to the Alaska summit, Russia has resumed launching significantly larger attacks, with a high-intensity missile strike targeting western Ukraine
• DIPLOMACY: Despite growing expectations of a Putin-Zelensky summit, such a meeting remains unlikely in the short term, though various credible venues have been posited for a future meeting
• FORECAST: Competing interpretations, misunderstandings and contradictory proposals of possible ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine will highly likely prevent a major breakthrough being reached to end the war in the short term
• BAKHMUT: Russian sources have claimed that their forces have advanced west of Chasiv Yar and have now reached the south-eastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka itself (both Donetsk oblast), though this remains unconfirmed. According to Russian claims, Russian forces have advanced along the T-0504 highway to the outskirts of the town, which remains a principal Russian objective in the region. So far, Russian operations have only been confirmed in the village of Stupochky, located around three miles (5km) to the east of Kostiantynivka along the T-0504. Meanwhile, Ukrainian sources reported on 18 August that Russian forces have advanced to the south-east of Stupochky and have likely consolidated control of the eastern bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas Canal, which runs south-east from Chasiv Yar. Ultimately, further advances towards Kostiantynivka remain a possibility in the coming days, particularly if Ukrainian forces have had to shift forces westward to help plug the Dobropillia penetration (see DONETSK below).
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further south, Russian forces have continued to advance both to the north-east and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), amid wider efforts to steadily advance towards Kostiantynivka’s southern outskirts. Geolocated footage from 17 and 19 August indicates advances in northern Yablunivka and to the south of Oleksandro-Shultyne, located around seven miles (11km) to the south-west and four miles (6km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka, respectively.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian forces are continuing stabilisation operations in the Dobropillia sector, located to the north-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), where Russian forces recently penetrated Ukrainian defences. Ukrainian troops have likely succeeded in isolating the most advanced Russian infiltration groups from their main forces, effectively preventing the Russians from supplying these advanced units and further exploiting their advances in the area. Geolocated footage from 20 August confirms Ukrainian control over Petrivka, located to the north of Dobropillia. Ukrainian forces had claimed the capture of the settlement on 15 August.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian sources indicate that their forces have counter-attacked and narrowed the area through which Russian forces can funnel troops and supplies to support their penetration to the north, threatening the viability of Russia’s position east of Dobropillia. Ukrainian forces have seemingly taken the village of Zapovidne, located less than six miles (10km) to the south-east of Dobropollia. If Ukrainian forces hold this position, or even expand further to the east, this would threaten the viability of Russia’s positions to the north. It therefore remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to consolidate control of their recent penetration, or whether Ukrainian forces will successfully repel these Russian efforts – albeit at the expense of weakening another part of the frontline following the redeployment of reinforcements. Elsewhere, to the east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Hrodivka as of 18 August.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces have advanced at multiple points in northern Sumy oblast in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 20 August indicates advances in Oleksiivka, a village located around 14 miles (23km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, further to the west, footage published on 19 August shows Russian forces raising a flag in southern Bezsalivka, a settlement located just south of the international border and over 28 miles (45km) to the north-west of Sumy city. This north-western section of the Sumy border region has been relatively quiet for several months, following Russia’s expulsion of Ukrainian forces from the nearby town of Tetkino, located inside Russia’s Kursk oblast.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have continued to make gains in the Lyman direction through frequent small-scale infantry group assaults. Geolocated footage from 18 August shows Russian forces advancing in south-western Ridkodub, located to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Most significantly, as of 20 August, Russian forces have also made confirmed advances in southern Zarichne, a key town that sits just five miles (8km) to the east of Lyman. If Russian forces successfully consolidate control over the town, they will be in a position to exert pressure to the west and threaten the eastern flank of Lyman itself – an important logistics hub point to the north-east of Sloviansk (Donetsk oblast). Various Ukrainian military sources operating in the Lyman area report that Russia’s offensive operations are characterised by frequent assaults conducted by small infantry groups. However, the poor quality of personnel is likely limiting Russia’s scope for major advances at this stage.
• SOUTHERN: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have made advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, though momentum remains with the Russians. Geolocated footage published on 20 August indicates that Russian forces have seized Novoheoriivka, located just inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, around 12 miles (19km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, a credible Ukrainian source reported on 20 August that Russian forces have taken the nearby village of Maliivka, located around four miles (6km) to the north-east. However, Ukrainian forces have also continued to counter-attack in the area, with geolocated footage from 18 August indicating they have successfully retaken Oleksandrohrad, located just inside Donetsk oblast, around 13 miles (21km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on 18 August that Russian forces have stepped up their use of drones and artillery across the Zaporizhzhia axis in recent months, though we assess that overall Russian advances have remained limited. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are now using between 600 and 700 first-person view (FPV) drones and have increased their use of artillery by 54% (from 12,000 monthly rounds to 19,000). This indicates that Russian forces are seeking to increase pressure across the full breadth of the frontline. However, it remains unclear whether a concerted offensive effort will follow, given that Russian priorities remain in Donetsk oblast to the east.
• STRIKES: After having scaled back its strikes in recent weeks, particularly in the run-up to the Alaska summit, Russia has resumed launching significantly larger attacks. The recent strike on 21 August involved 574 Shahed-type drones, 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 14 Kalibr cruise missiles, four Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and one unidentified missile. In total, Ukrainian forces intercepted 546 unmanned aerial vehicles, 30 cruise missiles and one Kh-47M2 ballistic missile.
• STRIKES: The attack was the largest in weeks and primarily targeted central and western Ukraine. Air defences were active in the capital Kyiv, while explosions were reported in Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Rivne oblast. The Ukrainian authorities indicated that a large electronics plant operated by a US firm sustained damage in Mukachevo, located in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia oblast (bordering Hungary and Romania). The facility was reportedly struck by cruise missiles, though it remains uncertain whether it was deliberately targeted. Previously, a building associated with a US aerospace company had been damaged by a missile in Kyiv. However, after assessing the surrounding area, we identified facilities likely used for defensive purposes nearby, leading us to conclude that the damage to the US company was likely not intentional but rather the result of a miscalculation. A similar miscalculation could realistically have occurred in Zakarpattia this week.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Ukraine has continued to target Russian oil facilities, a trend that has intensified in recent weeks. On 19 August, the authorities in Volgograd oblast (Russia) reported that a Ukrainian drone attack struck an oil refinery in the region. This refinery, operated by Lukoil, had already been targeted on 13-14 August. Earlier on 21 August, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed another strike against a refinery in Russia’s Rostov oblast. Ukrainian attacks have escalated over the past month. Since the beginning of the month, Russia is said to have lost approximately 13% of its oil refining capacity, likely in part due to Ukrainian drone assaults on oil infrastructure. For further analysis on Russian oil exports, see INDIA below.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• DIPLOMACY: On 20 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on the US to react with a ‘strong response’ if Russian President Vladimir Putin fails to meet with him for a bilateral summit. Although US President Donald Trump stated on 18 August that he had begun arranging for such a meeting to take place, we assess that a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky remains unlikely in the short term. A meeting between Putin and Zelensky would undermine Russia’s long-standing narrative questioning Zelensky’s legitimacy as the president of Ukraine. As such, Putin will likely seek to avoid meeting Zelensky until the very end phases of the war to finalise a peace agreement. In the meantime, Moscow will realistically find or fabricate excuses to postpone a Putin-Zelensky summit and emphasise the existing Istanbul bilateral format of negotiations (headed by respective delegations rather than national leaders).
• DIPLOMACY: While we assess that a Putin-Zelensky meeting is unlikely in the short term, different countries have been floated as possible venues for a meeting between the two leaders; both sides will likely prefer jurisdictions which they perceive to be ‘neutral’ or ‘friendly’. Reports from 19 August claim that Putin offered to meet Zelensky in Moscow, which the Ukrainian president declined; we assess that this was not a sincere offer, given Zelensky could realistically never accept this venue. Meanwhile, Zelensky has voiced a preference for Austria, Turkey or Switzerland.
• DIPLOMACY: Switzerland has confirmed that it is prepared to grant Putin immunity from arrest, positioning itself as a potential summit location. The country is a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023 (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 20 March 2023). If Switzerland was selected as the venue for a presidential summit, it would almost certainly reinforce perceptions within Russia’s leadership that the ICC’s warrant is of little meaning. Additionally, Moscow likely perceives that the prospect of European countries being willing to facilitate Putin’s visit indicates that Western efforts to isolate Russia diplomatically are weakening following the Putin-Trump summit in Alaska (US).
• INDIA: Bloomberg reported on 20 August that India’s state-owned refiners have resumed buying Russian oil, despite the US’ recent executive order to impose additional tariffs for such purchases. According to unspecified traders familiar with the matter, Bharat Petroleum Corporation and Indian Oil Corporation have purchased Russian Urals crude over the past two days. The cargo will reportedly be ready for loading in September and October. While we cannot confirm the development, if true, continued Indian purchases of Russian oil will likely provide a considerable stream of revenue for Moscow, offsetting the squeeze on the federal budget.
FORECAST
GUARANTEES: Competing interpretations, misunderstandings and contradictory proposals of possible ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine will highly likely prevent a major breakthrough from being reached to end the Russo-Ukrainian war in the short term. On 20 August, President Zelensky stated that Kyiv wishes to have an understanding of the ‘architecture’ of possible guarantees within the coming seven to ten days. However, reports indicate clear divisions between potential future stakeholders concerning what role they are willing to play and what assets they are prepared to commit. This will highly likely delay the timeline Zelensky has envisioned.
US President Donald Trump has indicated a possible ‘co-ordinating’ role for the US regarding security guarantees for Ukraine, which could include air support; however, unconfirmed reports indicate that the US seeks to play a ‘minimal role’ in such efforts. A Politico report from 20 August based this claim on conversations between Pentagon Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby and European military leaders on 19 August.
Similarly, US Vice President JD Vance voiced expectations on 20 August that European countries will have to take the ‘lion’s share of the burden’ in security guarantees. While we cannot confirm what precisely Colby told European partners, the Politico report and Vance’s statement align with our assessment that the US likely seeks to reduce its long-term commitment to Ukraine, not increase it. In turn, perceptions in Europe that the US is not willing to substantively support a European reassurance force (which would possibly form the backbone of a security guarantee for Ukraine) will drive tensions and questions about European capacity to deliver a credible, long-term deterrence force.
On 19 August, Trump ruled out the possibility of US troops deploying to Ukrainian soil (which we assessed was highly unlikely in any case). However, Trump did not exclude the prospect of offering aerial support, which White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt later stated was ‘an option and a possibility’. At this stage, it remains uncertain what form air support could take, though European countries have reportedly urged Trump to deploy US F-35s to Romania to deter Russia from invading Ukraine in the future.
Aside from proactive air support, potential European members of a Coalition of the Willing likely seek continued access to US intelligence and satellites for GPS and reconnaissance in Ukraine, as well as a pledge from Washington DC to supply Kyiv with Patriot and NASAMS air defence systems. While the abovementioned options are possible, the provision of air defence equipment and reconnaissance support would be more likely as the US seeks to balance competing theatres of interest, such as the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Any decision on the type and extent of air support will also likely largely hinge on the terms (or lack thereof) regarding any potential end to the war.
Although the US has ruled out sending troops to Ukraine, a coalition of around ten countries is reportedly prepared to deploy on Ukrainian soil as part of a peace agreement, though it remains our assessment that Russia will not accept any such deployment as part of a deal. According to a report from Bloomberg on 19 August, which cited unspecified people familiar with the matter, discussions regarding a possible deployment centred on the size and position of any prospective force. The first stage of the proposed support would focus on strengthening the Ukrainian military through training and personnel reinforcement. A multinational group, comprising mostly European troops, would be responsible for supporting this, with France and the UK said to be ready to send hundreds of troops to Ukraine, far behind the frontline. These two countries have been leading efforts of a so-called Coalition of the Willing in recent months and are the two leading states which are the most likely to commit troops to form a reassurance force (whether inside Ukraine or in a neighbouring NATO country).
Russia has consistently opposed the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine and is highly unlikely to change its stance as part of a peace agreement. Russia has long regarded the enlargement of the military alliance close to its borders as a threat to its security and a ‘root cause’ of the invasion in the first place. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated earlier on 21 August that Russia opposes European troops being sent to Ukraine and that this would amount to a ‘foreign military intervention’. Lavrov’s statement comes after Trump claimed on 19 August that he did not think that Moscow would have a problem with European deployments.
Lavrov stated on 20 August that discussing security guarantees without Russia is ‘a road to nowhere’ and that China, France, the UK and the US could provide equal security guarantees for Ukraine. This is not a new Russian proposal; rather, it reflects earlier demands made under the Istanbul format in 2022, which envisaged new ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine that would essentially provide Russia with a veto. Lavrov’s preference for China’s involvement in security guarantees is likely connected to Beijing and Moscow’s shared view that security decisions should not be dominated by the US or Western interests and would effectively replicate the UN Security Council veto both countries enjoy.
Russia’s proposal for ‘security guarantees’ at present is highly likely a non-starter, given that such guarantees would effectively provide Moscow (and Beijing) with a veto that could prevent a coherent response to future Russian aggression. Instead, proposals to deploy a European reassurance force outside Ukraine are more likely to facilitate progress towards a deal. Nevertheless, serious questions will remain around the credibility of such a force, particularly without US support. In any case, one of Russia’s core objectives is to push back NATO; as such, it remains our assessment that any official deployment of a European reassurance force inside Ukraine would reflect the absence of a strategic settlement with Russia, rather than form part of a compromise deal agreed by all sides (including Russia).
• Russian state-sponsored group poses long-term security, espionage risks to global firms. On 20 August, the technology company Cisco Talos reported that a Russian state-sponsored group, ‘Static Tundra’, has been actively exploiting a seven-year-old software vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) in a cyber espionage campaign. The campaign targets the higher education, manufacturing and telecommunications sectors in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America. Once the threat group establishes a foothold in the targeted network (after exploiting CVE-2018-0171 for initial access), they conduct reconnaissance in the system to collect configuration files and other strategic data to facilitate unauthorised access. This underscores long-term espionage and security risks to firms. Reportedly, Static Tundra aims to establish a long-term foothold in strategic networks, propagate to other devices in a network and facilitate secondary future operations, underscoring the prolonged data theft and cyber espionage risks to the aforementioned entities. Additionally, this software vulnerability was reportedly exploited by Chinese state-sponsored actors to target US telecommunications entities. We assess that this highlights the necessity for robust patch management policies.
Aug 19.
• Russia-Ukraine: Competing security guarantee notions will likely prevent breakthrough to end war. On 18 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met his US counterpart, Donald Trump, in Washington DC (US) alongside several European leaders to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. The negotiations followed a meeting on 15 August between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Reports claim that Ukraine has promised to buy USD 100bn worth of US weapons with the hope of obtaining post-war security guarantees from Washington DC. While it ultimately remains uncertain what form these guarantees might take, Trump stated that he has not ruled out US troop deployments. Yet while this marks a notable shift in rhetoric, there is no evidence that Trump is committed to such a plan. Although Putin stated during the recent summit with Trump that he supports security guarantees for Ukraine, Russia’s idea of how any such arrangement should work is likely to differ significantly from that of Kyiv and its Western partners. Competing visions for possible security guarantees will likely represent yet another obstacle towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war in the near term, despite the possibility of a bilateral Russia-Ukraine summit in the coming weeks.
• Russia: Foiled attack underscores persistent international terrorism risks. Earlier on 19 August, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported the detention of an individual who was allegedly planning a terrorist attack against a train in the Udmurt Republic. The suspect, who originates from an unspecified Central Asian country, allegedly supports an unnamed international terrorist organisation; they also justified (on social media) the March 2024 Moscow oblast terrorist attack perpetrated by members of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). We assess that the individual highly likely adheres to a radical Islamist ideology. Searches at the location where they were detained led to the discovery of components needed for building an incendiary device, as well as a mobile phone containing instructions, a diagram marking the intended targets and correspondence with members of the unnamed international terrorist organisation. On 12 August, the Chairman of Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee, Alexander Bortnikov, reported that 18 terrorist attacks involving migrants had been foiled since the start of the year. We assess the development underscores that Russia remains a priority target for Islamist terrorist networks, which continue to focus their recruitment campaigns on migrant populations from Central Asia.
Aug 18.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukraine’s General Staff has reported that its forces have retaken several villages in the Dobropillia area (Donetsk oblast) as part of ongoing efforts to stabilise the frontline following Russia’s recent penetration
• STRIKES: Civilian casualties from Russian strikes have steadily increased in recent months, reaching the highest levels since the early phase of the war in 2022
• GAS: Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy has announced that Norway has allocated almost USD 100m for Kyiv to purchase imports of natural gas, further boosting Ukrainian preparations for winter
• FORECAST: On 15 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump convened for a summit in Alaska (US), which did not result in tangible progress towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian War, nor a ceasefire
• BAKHMUT: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 14 August that its forces had taken Shcherbynivka, a heavily contested town located to the west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, the town has been heavily fought over in recent months, with geolocated footage indicating that the town may have exchanged hands multiple times. It therefore remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to consolidate control of the area definitively, which would allow them to push north towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk). Nevertheless, the MoD’s official claim is significant and indicates the Russian forces’ level of confidence that they are in control of the area.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 16 August indicates that Russian forces have seized the town of Serebryanka, located around 2.5 miles (4km) to the north-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast). The town is the last significant settlement east of Siversk that had remained in Ukrainian hands. As such, if Russian forces are able to consolidate control of the town, they will be in a position to increase pressure on Siversk from the north (as well as the east), though overall progress on this axis remains very slow. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets assessed on 16 August that Russian forces have increased the number of assaults in the Siversk direction and are likely accumulating forces to the east of Siversk in preparation for renewed ‘mass assaults’ toward the town; Zaporozhets anticipates these will be launched before the end of August.
• DONETSK: On 17 August, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that its forces had retaken several villages in the Dobropillia area (Donetsk oblast) as part of ongoing efforts to stabilise the frontline following Russia’s recent penetration. Ukrainian troops reportedly succeeded in clearing several settlements that had been occupied by Russian forces. DeepState, a prominent Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analytical group, indicated that Ukrainian forces had effectively severed two Russian prongs, to the east and north-east of Dobropillia. In response to Russia’s incursion, the Ukrainian authorities redeployed reserves to the region, including the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, known as ‘Azov’. This mobilisation has helped stabilise the front and prevent Russia from taking advantage of the penetration. However, committing reserves to this sector has likely weakened Ukrainian defences in other areas. Ultimately, the so-far successful stabilisation of the frontline in this region suggests that Russian operations are still constrained by personnel and material limitations that prevent them from achieving operational breakthroughs and rapidly seizing fortified or urban areas. For further analysis on Russia’s penetration near Dobropillia, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 August 2025.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to advance in the Pokrovsk sector as part of an ongoing effort to encircle the logistical hub; however, it remains possible they are no longer operating within the city. On August 15, Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces had cleared Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) of Russian infiltration groups that had previously penetrated the city. However, Russian operations were still making gains around the settlement; geolocated footage from 15-16 August indicates recent Russian advances west of Novoekonomichne, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian security agency sources quoted by TASS earlier on 18 August assessed that Ukraine’s High Command have committed ‘all its resources’ in Sumy oblast to attacking the flanks of Russian positions in Yunakivka, located around 16 miles (25km) to the north-east of Sumy city. On 17 August, Ukraine’s General Staff claimed that its forces had advanced 1.2 miles (2km) in northern Sumy oblast in recent days. Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 16 August confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced east of Novomykolaivka, located around 15 miles (24km) to the north of Sumy city.
• KURSK-SUMY: Yunakivka has been heavily fought over in recent months, and Ukrainian forces have indeed managed to push the Russians back at multiple points across the Sumy frontline. It remains a realistic possibility that the Ukrainian High Command is prioritising counter attacking in northern Sumy in a bid to take Russia’s current territory in Sumy oblast; it would thereby deprive Russia of another bargaining chip in potential territorial exchanges as negotiations progress (see FORECAST below).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 14 August initially indicated that Russian forces had taken Andriivka-Klevstove, located around 17 miles (28km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka, a town located on the eastern Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border on the banks of the Vovcha River. However, geolocated footage from 16 August indicates that Ukrainian forces remain in control of the town. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) claimed that Russian forces had advanced using small infantry units to bypass Ukrainian defences and film themselves raising flags in the town centre, before withdrawing. While this remains plausible, the fact that Russian forces are increasingly able to circumvent Ukrainian defences (even temporarily) with reconnaissance and sabotage units reflects the growing pressure on Ukrainian forces across the frontline.
• SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 15 August indicates Russian forces have advanced and secured control over the villages of Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka. These are located just inside Donetsk oblast, over ten miles (17km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have continued to include relatively smaller drone attacks, but each attack has also involved a limited number of Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Russian forces have consistently struck civilian areas as part of their strike strategy. For instance, the attack on 15 August, which involved 97 drones and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, hit the central market in Sumy city (Sumy oblast), among other targets across the country. The strike earlier on 18 August killed at least three people and injured 23 others in Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Other oblasts that have sustained strikes in recent days include Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa.
• STRIKES: Civilian casualties from Russian strikes have steadily increased in recent months, reaching levels similar to the early stages of the war. On 13 August, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that civilian casualties in July reached a three-year high, with 286 civilians killed and 1,388 injured. In June, the UN OHCHR recorded 232 deaths and 1,343 injuries, which had been the previous three-year record. According to the UN body, 40% of civilian casualties in July were caused by Russian long-range strikes and loitering munitions. In July, Russian short-range drone strikes accounted for 24% of civilian casualties. The overall increase in July compared to June mainly occurred in Ukrainian-controlled frontline territory, likely reflecting the intensification of Russian military operations aimed at expanding territorial control. More broadly, casualty rates since the start of the year have increased by 48% compared to the same period in 2024.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities in Odesa oblast reported that Russian strikes launched in the early hours of 18 August hit fuel and energy infrastructure in the region. Local media outlets reported that drones struck a terminal operated by the Azerbaijani state oil and gas company SOCAR. The attack reportedly inflicted severe damage to the facility, marking the second such incident against SOCAR-operated infrastructure in the past ten days. Moscow is likely deliberately targeting SOCAR assets in Ukraine in retaliation for the recent rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Ukraine, with Kyiv having recently reached a deal to import Azerbaijani oil (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 August 2025).
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continues efforts to develop its own range of missiles, likely as part of broader attempts to reduce reliance on Western-supplied equipment. On 17 August, the Associated Press (AP) reported that Ukraine’s domestically developed long-range Flamingo cruise missile had entered serial production. The system is reported to have a range of 1,864 miles (3,000 km). In June, Ukrainian media announced that the Sapsan short-range ballistic missile (also known as Hrim-2) had completed combat testing and had also entered serial production. In response, Russia will highly likely seek to undermine Ukraine’s ability to mass-produce such systems by targeting production facilities with long-range strikes. Notably, on 17 August, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces had struck a storage site for Ukrainian Sapsan short-range ballistic missiles. On 14 August, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it had taken part in a joint operation with military forces that resulted in a strike on production plants for such missiles in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.
• SABOTAGE: On 18 August, the FSB reported that it had foiled a Ukrainian sabotage operation targeting the Kerch Bridge, which connects occupied Crimea to mainland Russia. According to the FSB, its forces prevented a car loaded with explosives from reaching the bridge after it had crossed into Russia’s North Caucasus from Georgia. The security service did not disclose the identities of the suspects driving the vehicle. The car was reportedly due to be delivered to Krasnodar krai. The Russian authorities stated that this was Ukraine’s second attempt to sabotage the bridge in 2025; an earlier plot allegedly thwarted in April also involved an explosives-laden vehicle intercepted on the Belarus-Poland border.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• HUNGARY: A Ukrainian long-range strike which hit Russian energy infrastructure has reportedly significantly disrupted oil supplies to Hungary and Slovakia. According to reports from 17 August, a Ukrainian drone and missile attack on the Uniecha pumping station (Bryansk oblast, Russia) on 13 August halted Russian oil transit to Hungary for four days. Slovak pipeline operator Transpetrol also confirmed that oil supplies to Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline had stopped. However, Hungarian oil company MOL stated earlier on 18 August that regional supplies of oil are guaranteed, despite the halt in Russian oil deliveries. This will likely mitigate against significant energy insecurity within Hungary and Slovakia in the near term.
• GAS: Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy announced on 15 August that Norway has allocated almost USD 100m for Kyiv to purchase imports of natural gas, further boosting Ukrainian preparations for winter. According to the ministry, the funds will be used to build sufficient reserves of gas ahead of the ‘heating season’. Russia has traditionally intensified long-range strikes ahead of and during the winter months to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Ultimately, Norwegian assistance will likely alleviate pressure on the Ukrainian government to fund energy purchases and aid with purchasing gas supplies. However, energy insecurity will almost certainly persist in the coming winter, which will likely sustain the risks of periodic blackouts and restrictions on energy usage for domestic and business clients.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: On 15 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump convened for a summit in Alaska (US), which did not result in tangible progress towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian War, nor a ceasefire. Despite this, the two leaders largely described the talks positively, with Trump stating that the two sides had agreed on ‘many points’ (without elaborating).
Although it remains unknown what the two presidents agreed upon, Trump now appears to be more aligned with Russia in how it perceives the war should end. The US president said that ‘it was determined by all that the best way’ to end the war would be to reach a peace agreement directly, rather than a temporary ceasefire first. This marks a notable shift from Trump, who had previously advocated for an immediate cessation of hostilities, which he argued would then facilitate peace talks. Ukraine and its European allies are also of the opinion that a pause in fighting is needed before concluding a peace deal. Meanwhile, Russia has long pushed for a ‘peace’ deal with wide-ranging terms that would essentially amount to Ukraine’s capitulation. We assess that pushing ahead of protracted peace talks (rather than agreeing to a ceasefire initially) would highly likely be preferential to Russia, as this would allow Russian forces to push for further advances in Ukraine, increasing its potential leverage.
Trump’s comments following the summit imply that he considers the onus to be on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to end the war; this indicates that his administration will increase pressure on Kyiv in the near term. Trump claimed on 17 August that Zelensky could end the war ‘almost immediately’ if he wanted to, echoing similar comments on 15 August that it was ‘really up to [him] to get it done’. Such comments have almost certainly reignited concerns that the Trump administration will pressure Ukraine to agree to a quick peace deal which disproportionately benefits Russia and requires Kyiv to make considerable concessions to Moscow. This is despite the fact that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 17 August that both sides will have to make concessions to reach a peace deal.
It remains unclear what concessions (if any) Putin said Russia was prepared to make to end the war, though we see no genuine signs that Moscow has substantively reduced its demands. The New York Times (NYT) reported on 16 August that Putin outlined a plan to end the war that would involve Ukraine ceding the entirety of Donbas (meaning Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) to Russia. Russia is estimated to control about 88% of this region. Ukraine controls around 30% of Donetsk oblast, including key cities such as Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, which make up the so-called ‘fortress belt’. In return, Russia would freeze the current frontlines elsewhere (likely in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts). In addition, some reports indicate a Russian willingness to discuss possible Russian withdrawals from Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.
The prospect of Ukraine withdrawing from Donetsk oblast (which boasts the most heavily fortified cities in the entire country) in exchange for much smaller and militarily and strategically less significant territories in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts would represent a painful concession for Ukraine, and would be demonstrably in Russia’s favour. Ukraine’s withdrawal from Ukraine’s most defensible terrain would also significantly increase Russia’s offensive potential thereafter, given that the border region of Donetsk oblast remains highly indefensible by contrast.
Amid discussions of territorial concessions, Russia is reportedly willing to offer a written promise that it will not attack Ukraine again or any European country; however, it remains our assessment that this will not be sufficient to prevent further Russian aggression against Ukraine (or other countries). US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who took part in the Alaska talks, stated on 17 August that Putin agreed to ‘legislatively enshrine’ such promises into Russian law. However, this will almost certainly provide little confidence, given Russia’s proven record of reneging on international law and multilateral agreements. This records includes the previous Minsk Accords, which had sought to end the first phase of the war in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion.
While we cannot confirm whether the Russian side did offer any ‘compromises’, Putin’s apparent demands largely align with other reports from before and after the summit and are consistent with Moscow’s long-standing war objectives. That said, the Ukrainian government has reiterated its objection to territorial concessions as of 18 August, with Zelensky also insisting that the current frontlines should be the basis for peace talks. This clearly indicates that Zelensky will lobby for a return to Trump’s previous position, which argued for a ceasefire before a peace deal. According to UK Defence Intelligence assessments as of 15 August, it would take Russian forces 4.4 more years to fully capture the Ukrainian regions that it has formally annexed (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts). Even still, Ukraine almost certainly views an arrangement that would merely freeze the frontlines as not removing the threat of a renewed attack from Russia in the future. As such, Ukraine will highly unlikely agree to such an arrangement in the near term, even if pressure from the US does ramp up notably for Kyiv to do so.
To that end, Zelensky and several of his European allies will meet with Trump later on 18 August in the capital Washington DC, likely to reiterate the terms that Kyiv believes are acceptable to end the war. The reactions of leaders who will be present at the talks to the Alaska summit are notably varied. For instance, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer claimed that Trump’s diplomatic efforts have brought the war’s end closer. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he does not believe Putin wants peace; rather, that the Russian leader seeks Ukraine’s surrender. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised on 17 August that international borders cannot be changed by force and that decisions concerning Ukrainian territory require Ukraine’s involvement. As European and Ukrainian input was absent from the Alaska summit, the upcoming negotiations also seek to prevent their security interests from being sidelined and the prospect of Zelensky being pressured into unfavourable conditions to end the war. However, it remains to be seen whether their presence will alter Trump’s position on key issues (specifically territory) and the Russian push for a peace deal before a ceasefire.
Possible security guarantees will almost certainly be amongst the most significant elements of the Washington DC talks; however, it remains unclear how far these will assuage Ukrainian (and European) concerns about further Russian military operations. Prior to the upcoming summit, Trump once again ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine as part of a peace deal, which would represent a significant concession for Russia. Even prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow had demanded a ban on Ukraine’s accession into NATO, among other contentious security guarantees.
Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff, who has travelled to Russia on multiple occasions this year as part of US efforts to end the war, specified on 17 August that ‘Article 5-like’ protections are possible for Ukraine. This refers to NATO’s principle that an attack on one member represents an attack against the entire alliance. However, it remains unclear how this would work in practice, what would constitute an attack that warrants intervention and the form of such a response. These are likely details Ukraine and its allies will seek to establish in the near term, particularly given that Russia’s own proposals for security guarantees for Ukraine in 2022 involved Russia being a guarantor itself. Given that Putin has repeatedly stated that his demands have not changed since 2022, this indicates that Putin has likely agreed only to his own definition of a security guarantee, which would essentially provide Russia (or its ally China) with an effective veto.
Lastly, we continue to assess that the prospect of a Putin-Trump-Zelensky summit remains unlikely in the near term despite reports suggesting such a meeting could be possible in the coming days. Axios reported on 16 August that Trump told his Ukrainian counterpart he wanted to hold trilateral negotiations as early as 22 August. Putin has not publicly committed to holding such a meeting. The Alaska summit is unlikely to have made Putin more willing to participate in this form of meeting in the near term, either. Although Zelensky has pushed to meet Putin in person, should the Ukrainian leadership perceive that Trump is further aligning with Russia’s vision of ‘peace’, Zelensky’s desire to engage in such talks will possibly decrease. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 25. Putin’s demand to Ukraine: give up Donbas, no NATO and no Western troops, sources say.
• Summary
• Putin demands Ukraine cede Donbas region, Russian sources say
• Russia could freeze front lines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson
• Russia won’t countenance Western peacekeeping troops in Ukraine
• Source close to Kremlin: if Kyiv refuses deal, war will go on
Vladimir Putin is demanding that Ukraine give up all of the eastern Donbas region, renounce ambitions to join NATO, remain neutral and keep Western troops out of the country, three sources familiar with top-level Kremlin thinking told Reuters.
The Russian president met Donald Trump in Alaska on Friday for the first Russia-U.S. summit in more than four years and spent almost all of their three-hour closed meeting discussing what a compromise on Ukraine might look like, according to the sources who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. (Source: Reuters)
20 Aug 25. Around 10 European countries are ready to send forces to Ukraine as part of security guarantees for the country following a peace deal, according to reports.
European officials on Tuesday fleshed out the plan to send a multinational “reassurance force” to deter future Russian aggression and now await Donald Trump’s approval, Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the matter.
The first stage would allegedly include European troops – including hundreds of British and French soldiers – being stationed in Ukraine, away from the frontline, to help its military with training and reinforcements.
A later stage of the plan calls for a US backstop to contribute to intelligence sharing, border surveillance, weapons supplies and possibly air defence.
The overall size and the role the European force will play is still unclear, however details are expected to be agreed in the coming days.
Mr Trump on Tuesday ruled out putting American boots on the ground once a peace deal is signed but instead suggested the US is prepared to air support to police Ukraine’s skies.
“When it comes to security, they’re willing to put people on the ground,” Mr Trump told Fox News. We’re willing to help them with things, especially — probably you could talk about by air, because there’s nobody that has the kind of stuff we have.”
The extent of US assistance remains murky, but at a minimum European officials expect Washington to provide intelligence and weaponry through European partners, Bloomberg reported. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
19 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian strike temporarily halts Russian oil transit to Hungary. A Ukrainian drone and missile strike on Russia’s Unecha pumping station in Bryansk Oblast briefly disrupted oil flows to Hungary last week. According to Ukraine’s General Staff, the Aug. 13 attack, carried out jointly by the Rocket Forces and Artillery, the Armed Forces’ Unmanned Systems branch, and the Defense Ministry’s HUR intelligence agency, resulted in direct hits and a fire near the station’s booster pump building.
The Unecha facility is a key node on the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, which transports Russian oil through Ukraine to Central Europe.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó condemned the strike, calling the pumping station “critically important” to Hungary’s energy security. In a Facebook post, he accused Kyiv of undermining European stability, stressing that Hungary currently supplies Ukraine with electricity.
However, sources in the oil and gas sector stated that the attack coincided with a scheduled maintenance shutdown on the Russian side of the pipeline. They suggested the timing pointed to a political signal directed at Budapest rather than an effort to cause lasting supply disruptions.
Oil transit resumes, but at lower levels
Oil deliveries to Hungary resumed on Aug. 15 via a bypass route, though volumes were reduced by roughly one-third while repairs continue. Russia’s Transneft and Ukraine’s Ukrtransnafta manage the transit under an agreement valid until 2030.
Data from NV Business and Argus Media shows Russia shipped more than 11 m metric tons of crude through Ukraine in 2024, including 4.8 m tons to Hungarian refineries. That represents just a fraction of Russia’s total crude exports of 202 m tons. With the Czech Republic no longer importing Russian oil, the southern Druzhba corridor now accounts for about 4.5 percent of Moscow’s exports.
The temporary halt comes as Hungary explores options to diversify away from Russian crude. Industry sources said talks are underway with Kazakh suppliers, with some shipments already reaching Hungary via Ukraine. Budapest is also considering access to the Odesa-Brody pipeline as an alternative supply route.
While Ukraine is bound by international agreements to continue facilitating oil transit, it has raised tariffs for Russian crude since the start of the full-scale invasion. The European Commission has previously stated that Kyiv may suspend flows on security grounds without breaching EU trade obligations, despite repeated complaints from Hungary and Slovakia.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-strike-temporarily-halts-russian-oil-transit-to-hungary/: https://cuashub.com/)
19 Aug 25. Auterion to Deliver 33,000 Skynode Drone Strike Kits to Ukraine. Auterion, the international defence software company and provider of AI-powered drone software solutions, has announced a landmark commitment to deliver 33,000 artificial intelligence-driven drone ‘strike kits’ to Ukraine. The initiative, backed by a $50m Pentagon contract, represents a major step forward in supporting Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
Auterion’s CEO Lorenz Meier highlighted the unprecedented scale of this commitment: “We have previously shipped thousands of our AI strike systems to Ukraine, but this new deployment increases our support more than tenfold. This is not only significant for Ukraine’s defense but also represents a substantial advancement in drone warfare technology.”
Auterion’s ‘strike kits,’ powered by the company’s advanced Skynode technology, transform manually-operated drones into autonomous weapons systems capable of AI-driven targeting. Once activated, the drones become resistant to electronic jamming and can reliably track and engage moving targets from distances of up to one kilometer.
Already extensively proven in combat scenarios across Ukraine, Auterion’s Skynode Strike Kit ensures precision targeting in complex operational environments, significantly increasing mission effectiveness while reducing vulnerability to electronic warfare. The contract highlights Auterion’s strategic role in bolstering autonomous defense capabilities, and underscores the United States’ enhanced commitment to autonomy-focused defense initiatives.
“Our technology provides allies and partners with advanced capabilities that they can integrate into their existing industry, enhancing their defensive capabilities while leveraging the manufacturing prowess of high volume drone manufacturers,” Meier explained. Auterion has a pioneering role in U.S.-Ukrainian co-production. Battle-hardened drone technology proven in Ukraine has become highly sought after by NATO members and in the Indo-Pacific.
Auterion expects this landmark contract to pave the way for further engagements with NATO and European countries, many of which are seeking advanced drone technologies proven under combat conditions in Ukraine. With offices in Arlington, VA, and Munich, Germany, Auterion is positioned to support defense initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic and committed to the transatlantic partnership.
The same robust Skynode technology has also been successfully integrated and adopted by Taiwan, underlining its global relevance in modern warfare scenarios. With the rapid escalation in the global deployment of autonomous defense technologies, Auterion continues to position itself as an indispensable partner to allied nations, supporting strategic deterrence initiatives against evolving threats. Shipments under this new contract are scheduled to commence within 2025, ensuring rapid deployment and immediate operational impact. (Source: UAS VISION)
18 Aug 25. Ukraine’s AI-Powered ‘Pavuk Dopkhina’ Drone has 50 km Deep-Strike Capability. The ‘Pavuk Dopkhina’ (Dophin Spider) drone, is cutting-edge technology developed by the 3rd Assault Brigade and Omnitech, with support from Brave1, according to a post on the official Telegram channel of Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation. The name “Dophin” honours a fallen Ukrainian soldier. It now serves as a powerful tool in striking enemy targets. The drone, capable of targeting over 50 kilometers, uses artificial intelligence algorithms to autonomously map and lock onto terrain, surpassing foreign counterparts in key performance metrics.
The drone’s primary function is to provide reliable communication for strike UAVs deep behind enemy lines. Thanks to Pavuk Dopkhina, Ukrainian drones can destroy surface-to-air missile systems, logistics, and other critical targets.
The 3rd Assault Brigade of Ukrainian Armed Forces is already carrying out missions with Dophin Spider, this innovation is already contributing to significant losses for Russian forces, Fedorov states.
Previously, it was reported that a Ukrainian ground-based robotic platform operated by the National Guard of Ukraine’s 13th Brigade “Khartia” has successfully completed a dual mission, delivering supplies to the front line and evacuating a wounded soldier over a 34-kilometer route. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24MEDIA)
16 Aug 25. Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency names FPV suppliers via new online marketplace. Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) has revealed five unmanned aircraft system (UAS) manufacturers who delivered orders of first-person view (FPV) UASs via the new online DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace, a representative from the agency confirmed to Janes on 15 August. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) operating in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions received 1,000 UASs that were ordered through the marketplace, according to a 14 August DPA press release. Some of the Ukrainian manufacturers who produced the FPV UASs are Escadrone, General Cherry, Gryph Dron, TAF Drones, and Vyriy Drone, the DPA representative added.
The DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace currently offers 138 FPV or bomber UAS models from 15 Ukrainian manufacturers, although the representative did not reveal their names.
The overall procurement process took less than two weeks, according to the DPA, with the first few orders placed on 31 July via the digital platform. Twelve AFU brigades “engaged in the most intense combat” are currently using the marketplace, it added.
The main aim of DOT-Chain Defence is to streamline the delivery of various equipment, including for unmanned operations, electronic warfare (EW), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and ammunition. If approved for procurement on the platform, AFU units are able to select the types of UASs needed and their quantity before placing an order and using Ukraine’s state funds to pay for the hardware. (Source: Janes)
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