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Military And Security Developments
Aug 15.
- Turkey: Detentions underscore opposition crackdown; unrest will be possible, despite protest fatigue. Earlier on 15 August, the Turkish authorities detained 40 individuals linked to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on corruption charges, including the mayor of Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district (Istanbul province). These developments come amid President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s widespread crackdown on his political opposition, likely aiming to consolidate power and extend his presidency beyond its current legal limit (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 July 2025). The crackdown highlights persistent significant democratic backsliding and worsening human rights conditions in Turkey. The detentions will possibly drive demonstrations and increase domestic unrest risks in Istanbul, particularly in Beyoğlu district, raising the threat of arbitrary arrests and sporadic clashes between protesters and the authorities. However, incidents of large-scale protests have decreased since the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in March, possibly indicating a reduced appetite for widespread mobilisation due to the government’s heavy-handed tactics. We assess that there will likely be further opposition detentions, along with additional restrictions on expression and heightened political repression in the coming months, ahead of proposed constitutional changes.
- Syria: Attack on convoy will elevate security risks for NGOs, humanitarian organisations. On 14 August, Syrian sources told Arab media that an unknown group abducted five aid workers while delivering supplies to the besieged Suwayda city (Suwayda governorate) on 11 August. Several people on motorbikes surrounded the aid convoy, looting its shipments, except for one vehicle that managed to reach the city. There is a possibility that radical elements within the government-aligned Sunni tribal forces besieging the city attacked the convoy, which was organised by Druze groups in the capital Damascus, underscoring persistent ethno-religious tensions. However, physical security risks will likely remain very high for all aid convoys and NGOs travelling to the city through the government-approved humanitarian corridor. This is primarily due to the high military tensions between Druze militias and tribal forces, as well as the general state of security instability in Suwayda, as the city and its suburbs are run locally by residents, increasing the risks of ceasefire collapse in the coming weeks.
Aug 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• A letter from the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) detailing rising concerns over diplomatic deadlock with Iran underscores the risk of the UN re-implementing sanctions.
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s deputy head visited Iran to begin negotiating a ‘co-operation framework’, though a lack of continuous monitoring will almost certainly sustain regional tensions.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Iran likely retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, underscoring the risk of further Israeli strike action in the coming months.
ISRAEL
• The Airports Authority Workers’ Committee will allow workers to strike on 17 August, highlighting elevated business disruption risks amid the nationwide general strike effort.
• A meeting between Israel’s Mossad chief, David Barnea, and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani possibly signals incremental progression in negotiations, though a ceasefire remains unlikely in the coming two weeks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Significant Israeli regulatory scrutiny of NGO operations in Gaza will likely continue disrupting aid delivery and distribution efforts, sustaining critical humanitarian concerns.
• Possible settlement plans risk exacerbating protest movements and international condemnation, elevating reputational risks.
IRAN
• A letter from the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) detailing rising concerns over diplomatic deadlock with Iran underscores the risk of the UN re-implementing sanctions. The E3 published a joint statement notifying the UN Security Council (UNSC) that it remains ‘ready’ to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause and to re-institute UN sanctions on Iran should diplomatic deadlock persist beyond the end of August. The statement also indicates that Iran has not responded to an offer from the E3 to extend the JCPOA clauses in exchange for commitments to re-engage in negotiations with the US and address international concerns regarding oversight of nuclear facilities. The letter underscores continued international diplomatic deadlock as the deadline for triggering the snapback clause (3 September) approaches (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Unless Iran credibly commits to engage in negotiations with the US and E3 in the coming weeks, the latter will likely move to trigger the JCPOA snapback clause, highly likely resulting in the re-institution of UN sanctions on Iran. Should Iran engage in negotiations in the coming two weeks, the E3 will likely propose a resolution to the UNSC to extend the JCPOA’s snapback clause, though international diplomatic tensions are unlikely to de-escalate substantially unless the US, Iran and the E3 reach a nuclear agreement in the short-to-medium term.
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s deputy head visited Iran to begin negotiating a ‘co-operation framework’, though a lack of continuous monitoring will almost certainly sustain regional tensions. On 11 August, the IAEA’s deputy head arrived in the capital Tehran for negotiations on re-establishing co-operation with Iran. The visit comes after Iran suspended formal co-operation with the IAEA in July, with the IAEA subsequently evacuating all remaining staff due to safety concerns (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 July 2025). Negotiations with the IAEA will likely take several weeks, with international parties almost certainly continuing to rely on covert surveillance and espionage to monitor nuclear activity, increasing verification and misidentification risks. The visit is highly unlikely to result in the immediate resumption of IAEA monitoring capabilities in Iran, with Tehran likely hoping to leverage existing restrictions on oversight during possible negotiations with the US and/or E3. This approach is highly likely to sustain elevated diplomatic tensions and further hamper prospects for productive nuclear negotiations in the coming week. Even if it unilaterally re-authorises IAEA access to declared nuclear facilities in the short term, Iran has routinely engaged in nuclear research and development activity at undisclosed sites in recent years. Consequently, elevated international concerns related to oversight of Iranian nuclear activity are unlikely to subside, further hampering prospects for successful negotiations in the coming weeks.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Iran likely retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, underscoring the risk of further Israeli strike action in the coming months. During an interview with the i24News outlet, Netanyahu stated that airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the Iran-Israel war had not ‘damaged’ Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, including the 400kg of uranium enriched up to 60%. Although Netanyahu emphasised that critical damage to nuclear facilities had severely degraded Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons rapidly, he also emphasised Israel’s ‘preparation’ for possible Iranian efforts to redevelop its nuclear programme. In the coming months, demonstrable Iranian efforts to re-develop its uranium enrichment capabilities and/or weapons production facilities will increase the risk of limited Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities (and possibly adjacent military facilities). We assess there is a realistic possibility of such strikes occurring in the coming months, particularly if nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran do not resume. Such strikes would almost certainly compound regional tensions and possibly trigger retaliatory Iranian missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, undermining security conditions and operational continuity within Israel, as well as likely temporarily disrupting regional airline activity. Although rapid and uncontrolled escalation into sustained armed conflict remains unlikely, military exchanges between Iran and Israel would likely trigger broader regional operational disruption as well as bouts of price volatility on international oil and energy markets.
ISRAEL
• The Airports Authority Workers’ Committee will allow workers to strike on 17 August, highlighting elevated business disruption risks amid the nationwide general strike effort. According to the announcement, the committee will allow its workers to strike in exchange for sacrificing a day of annual leave, elevating the risk of flight disruption and delays on 17 August. The announcement comes amid a series of statements by public authorities and private businesses that intend to participate in a general nationwide strike on 17 August in support of hostage releases. Several regional councils and municipalities have already approved their participation, including Israel’s bar association, elevating the risk of service disruption. In the coming days, additional municipalities, worker unions and private businesses are likely to join the strike, further compounding business disruption risks. Even so, the strike is likely to remain limited to 17 August; there is currently no indication that any action will continue into 18 August and the following days.
• A meeting between Israel’s Mossad chief, David Barnea, and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani possibly signals incremental progression in negotiations, though a ceasefire remains unlikely in the coming two weeks. Barnea’s return to Qatar signals that possible preparations are being made for the relaunch of ceasefire talks with Hamas. Currently, Israel does not have negotiating teams present in Qatar and has been engaging in limited talks with the organisation through Egypt since 12 August. According to Egyptian reports, negotiations currently revolve around a new proposal and complete deal to end the war and retrieve all hostages held in Gaza. However, there is also a realistic possibility that both sides will pursue maximalist goals, especially given that they both appear to have forgone the prospects for partial hostage releases in exchange for incremental agreements. As such, we assess that negotiations are likely to advance slowly and are unlikely to materialise into a ceasefire in the coming 14 days.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Significant Israeli regulatory scrutiny of NGO operations in Gaza will likely continue disrupting aid delivery and distribution efforts, sustaining critical humanitarian concerns. On 13 August, over 100 aid agencies signed a declaration alleging that Israel is ‘intentionally’ restricting humanitarian access to Gaza and routinely rejecting NGOs’ applications to deliver aid. Israel implemented new regulations on aid deliveries in March as part of a broader effort to prevent Hamas militants from intercepting or diverting aid deliveries within Gaza. The declaration alleges that NGOs risk blanket rejections of applications to deliver aid if they ‘delegitimise’ Israel and that the regulations require agencies to disclose sensitive personal information about Palestinian staff. The agencies also allege that these practices have prevented dozens of NGOs from delivering aid since March, exacerbating critical food insecurity and humanitarian conditions within Gaza. Israel has denied these allegations, stating that over 20 organisations are currently delivering an average of 300 trucks of aid into Gaza per day. Even so, on 14 August, the IDF announced that it had conducted an airstrike targeting five unidentified militants posing as employees of the World Central Kitchen (WCK) NGO; the organisation subsequently confirmed that the individuals were not affiliated with the group. The strike underscores the continued risk of militant groups co-opting NGO vehicles, uniforms and aid supplies within Gaza, despite increased regulatory scrutiny of NGO operations. In the coming weeks, Israel will likely continue intensely scrutinising NGO deliveries into Gaza, sustaining the risk of critical operational and supply chain disruption amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions. Such scrutiny will also highly likely sustain international condemnation of Israel and Israeli-linked entities from pro-Palestine activists, prolonging reputational concerns for associated firms.
• Possible settlement plans risk exacerbating protest movements and international condemnation, elevating reputational risks. On 13 August, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich allegedly approved plans for a settlement that would separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank (though official confirmation has not yet been issued). The ‘E1 project’ would involve building over 3,400 housing units and creating territorial continuity with the existing settlement of Ma’ale Adumim (Jerusalem governorate). Smotrich stated that the approval ‘buries the idea of a Palestinian state’, which will highly likely prompt international backlash in the coming days. As such, escalating diplomatic tensions between Israel and the West will likely persist, driving the risk of further sanctions on individuals and entities servicing and funding settlements, as well as government ministers. This is likely to exacerbate compliance and reputational risks for firms associated with (or doing business in) Israel. The announcement comes ahead of the UN General Assembly meeting in September, at which several countries, including Australia, Canada and the UK, have conditionally pledged to recognise a Palestinian state. There is a realistic possibility that the approval of the settlement plans will compound public pressure on additional states to commit to recognising Palestinian statehood. In response to the announcement, Hamas has called for a ‘Day of Rage’ on 15 August. The call has elevated the likelihood of labour strikes in the West Bank, as well as localised demonstrations, driving disruption risks for business operations and travel.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Settlement plans will sustain diplomatic tensions, compliance risks. On 13 August, Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich allegedly approved plans for a settlement that would separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank (official confirmation has not yet been issued). The E1 project would involve building over 3,400 housing units and would create territorial continuity with the existing settlement of Ma’ale Adumim (Jerusalem governorate). Smotrich said the approval ‘buries the idea of a Palestinian state’, a statement which will highly likely face international backlash in the coming days. As such, escalating diplomatic tensions between Israel and the West will likely persist, driving the risk of further sanctions on individuals and entities servicing and funding settlements, as well as government ministers. This would likely exacerbate compliance and reputational risks to firms associated with or doing business in Israel, and particularly the West Bank. The announcement comes ahead of the UN General Assembly in September, at which several countries, including Australia, Canada and the UK, have conditionally pledged to recognise a Palestinian state. There is a realistic possibility that the approval of the settlement plans will compound public pressure for additional states to commit to recognising Palestinian statehood.
• Turkey-Syria: New military deal will likely exacerbate tensions with Kurds. On 13 August, Syria and Turkey signed a military co-operation deal that includes exchanging personnel for specialised skills training and a series of programmes in counter-terrorism, cyber defence, logistics, military engineering, mine clearance and peacekeeping operations. The deal underscores Turkey’s growing influence in post-Assad Syria and comes amid military tensions between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). As such, we assess that the deal will likely exacerbate the current deadlock in negotiations to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian army; Syria and Turkey are adamant on expelling the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forces from SDF ranks. Furthermore, in the coming weeks, it is unlikely that Syria and Turkey will accept SDF integration as a block inside the new army, adding to the risks that talks will collapse. The new deal with Turkey will likely increase the risks of a military confrontation with the Kurds in northern Syria in the coming months, should the deadlock in talks persist.
• Aug 13.
• Syria: Ceasefire collapse in northern Syria will remain realistic possibility in coming weeks. On 12 August, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) said that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had infiltrated Syrian army positions in the Tell Maaz area (Aleppo governorate) and killed one MoD serviceman in heavy clashes. The clashes occurred days after similar bouts of fighting between the two parties near Dayr Hafir and Manbij (both Aleppo). While hostilities have now ceased, tensions along the lines of control in northern Syria remain very high, underscoring the fragility of the current ceasefire. As such, we assess there is a realistic possibility that armed clashes between the Kurds and several Turkish-backed factions within the army will resume in the coming weeks in the Aleppo countryside region. The clashes will also likely augment the ongoing rifts and deadlock in talks between the SDF and Damascus over the integration of the Kurdish forces into the new Syrian army, exacerbating political and security instability in the country.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Foreign ministers’ statement will drive sanctions, regulatory risks. On 12 August, the foreign ministers of 24 Western countries, including Australia, Canada and the UK, issued a statement claiming that the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has reached ‘unimaginable levels’ and calling on Israel’s government to allow unrestricted aid into the strip. The statement follows Israel’s decision to take over Gaza City and organise the mass evacuation of all Palestinian civilians from northern Gaza to southern Gaza; the move will almost certainly exacerbate dire humanitarian conditions on the ground, including from reduced energy, food and water security. Although immediate action against Israel remains unlikely, the move signals an increased risk of sanctions against Israel if it goes ahead with its operation in Gaza; this would highly likely increase regulatory and business operational risks for international companies operating in the country. The statement will also likely elevate diplomatic tensions, driving reputational risks for companies in Israel and projects involving Israeli companies. It is highly unlikely that Israel will provide authorisation for all international aid shipments into Gaza; this will sustain the ongoing crisis and critical security threats to NGO personnel near aid distribution sites.
Aug 11.
IRAN
• Despite the re-organisation of Iran’s security governance structure, the prospects for negotiations with the US are unlikely to improve significantly.
• The US announced it would sanction numerous Iranian financial entities, underscoring broader economic pressure amid stalled nuclear negotiations.
• Iran announced the seizure of a vessel on suspicion of oil smuggling, underscoring the risk of detention facing vessels and crews traversing the Strait of Hormuz.
ISRAEL
• Despite uncertainty over the scale of Israel’s impending military operation, the risk of international backlash remains elevated.
• Calls to shut down the economy will likely drive operational disruption, though the Histadrut will not participate.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israel has intensified its airstrikes in the Gaza City area in recent days, underscoring the growing threats to life in central Gaza.
• Australia announced that it will recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming weeks, though this is unlikely to impact security and governance conditions demonstrably within the Palestinian Territories.
IRAN
• Despite the re-organisation of Iran’s security governance structure, the prospects for negotiations with the US are unlikely to improve significantly. On 11 August, the newly appointed leader of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Larijani, began a three-day visit to Iraq and Lebanon to meet with ‘key political figures’. This almost certainly refers to representatives of Iran’s various proxies, namely the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The visit underscores broad policy continuity among Iran’s high-ranking security officials, despite a moderate re-organisation of Iran’s security governance structure and several high-ranking personnel changes following the recent Iran-Israel war. This continuity is also highly likely to extend to Iran’s stance vis-à-vis nuclear negotiations with the US; senior Iranian national security and foreign policy personnel recently stated that Iran has an ‘inalienable right’ to enrich uranium domestically and will not negotiate this principle. Contrastingly, the US has repeatedly stated that Iran cannot maintain domestic enrichment capabilities under a nuclear agreement. This has resulted in diplomatic deadlock, with senior Iranian officials claiming on 10 August that the US and Iran have not agreed on a location or timeline for further negotiations. Continued deadlock will undermine prospects for an agreement between the US and Iran in the coming months, in turn increasing the risk of the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) initiating proceedings to re-implement UN sanctions on Iran for violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by early September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 July 2025).
• The US announced it would sanction numerous Iranian financial entities, underscoring broader economic pressure amid stalled nuclear negotiations. On 7 August, the US sanctioned seven individuals and 11 entities associated with Iran’s financial system, including several banks created by the Central Bank of Iran to evade existing sanctions (such as the Cyrus Offshore Bank) and the RUNC Exchange System Company. The sanctions underscore ongoing US efforts to expand and enforce measures to isolate Iran from international financial markets as part of the ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign. These measures will increase compliance concerns and sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly financial entities providing banking services for Iranian nationals or facilitating payments for Iranian-linked companies. The sanctions will likely sustain substantial economic pressure on Iran, compounding broader socio-economic concerns and the risk of financially motivated cyber attacks carried out by Iranian-linked threat actors in the coming months.
• Iran announced the seizure of a vessel on suspicion of oil smuggling, underscoring the risk of detention facing vessels and crews traversing the Strait of Hormuz. On 11 August, Iran’s border police and naval forces claimed to have detained an oil tanker 23 miles (37km) off the coast of Jask county (Hormozgan province) for allegedly attempting to smuggle approximately 2 m litres of fuel out of Iran. The authorities also claim to have detained 17 crew members (who are all foreign nationals of unspecified origin); these claims cannot be verified at the time of writing. Amid broader economic pressure linked to US sanctions (see above), the Iranian authorities will likely intensify their efforts to crack down on illicit oil smuggling in the coming months, increasing the risk of detention facing vessels and their crews. The high volume of international shipping traffic passing through the Strait of Hormuz also underscores the increased risk of vessel misidentification and detention, exacerbating the threats to staff, vessels and supply chain continuity for regionally engaged firms. Although Iran is unlikely to conduct numerous seizures of oil tankers engaged in legitimate shipping operations in the short term, we assess that rising bilateral tensions with the US will increase the risk of such detentions in the coming months as Iran attempts to maximise its leverage and secure partial sanctions relief.
ISRAEL
• Despite uncertainty over the scale of Israel’s impending military operation, the risk of international backlash remains elevated. On 8 August, the Israeli security cabinet approved a plan to ‘Occupy Gaza’. However, the details of the plan itself more closely resemble those favoured by senior military officials; they involve large military cordons and airstrikes to enable the capture of specific areas rather than a complete military occupation of all of Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 August 2025). The current plan focuses on the cordoning off and capture of Gaza City and specifies the symbolic date of 7 October as the deadline for the evacuation of all Palestinian civilians from northern Gaza to southern Gaza. As Israeli operations are most likely to escalate once the evacuation has been completed, the plan’s execution is likely to progress gradually, providing opportunities for negotiations before it is fully implemented.
• However, negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming weeks. Israel’s cabinet has, for the first time, officially approved five principles for ending the war:
1. Hamas’ disarmament
2. The return of all hostages (both living and dead)
3. The demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip
4. Israeli security control in Gaza
5. A civil administration comprising neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority (PA)
• While there are suggestions that Hamas will possibly agree to elements of these terms, we assess there is likely to be significant resistance. This is particularly likely to be the case if Israel insists on maximalist goals to end the conflict. Furthermore, Hamas is unlikely to make concessions ahead of the UN General Assembly in September, during which several states have suggested they will possibly recognise a Palestinian state.
• Regardless of the actual scale of the operation (which will likely focus on northern Gaza as opposed to the entire strip), its approval and the gradual intensification of IDF operations in Gaza City will further undercut humanitarian conditions, driving elevated anti-Israel sentiment internationally. This will likely prompt further countries to cancel deals and joint projects with Israel (as well as entities considered to contribute directly to Israel’s military industry) in the coming months. Sanctions against Israel also remain possible, especially sanctions against individuals such as right-wing ministers and political figures. In addition, the operation will likely prompt further social media campaigns and/or consumer boycotts targeting Israel and businesses affiliated with (or perceived as supporting) that country. This will sustain elevated reputational and financial risks for businesses engaging either in or with Israel in the coming months.
• Calls to shut down the economy will likely drive operational disruption, though the Histadrut will not participate. Earlier on 11 August, the Histadrut Labour Federation’s chairman, Arnon Bar David, and senior business sector officials announced they would support (but not join) a planned national strike on 17 August. The announcement comes amid increasing calls by pro-ceasefire and hostage-release groups to facilitate a nationwide strike on 17 August following the Israeli government’s decision to expand its military operations in Gaza (see above). Calls for a nationwide strike and public demands to shut down economic activity will likely increase over the coming days, significantly elevating the likelihood of widespread operational and supply chain disruption on 17 August. Additionally, and in the following weeks, there is a realistic possibility that any such strike action will be repeated on a more frequent basis, further elevating disruption risks for business operations and subsequently undercutting revenues.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israel has intensified its airstrikes in the Gaza City area in recent days, underscoring the growing threats to life in central Gaza. On 10 August, Al Jazeera (a media outlet) announced that an IDF airstrike killed five of its staff members in Gaza, including Anas al-Sharif; the IDF subsequently stated that it targeted al-Sharif, who it claims led a Hamas ‘terror cell’. The strike targeted the journalists’ tent outside the al-Shifa hospital complex in Gaza City, underscoring the sustained risks of airstrikes in the immediate vicinity of medical and humanitarian infrastructure throughout Gaza. Also in the Gaza City area, the IDF has intensified its airstrikes targeting locations in the Shuja’iyya and al-Zaytoun areas; heavy airstrikes were reported overnight on 9-10 August. Such operations are highly likely to continue at pace in the coming days amid broader preparations for the expansion of ground operations into the city in line with the ‘occupation’ plan (see above). Such operations will almost certainly sustain critical threats to life for individuals within Gaza City, triggering further civilian displacement towards the al-Mawasi area in southern Gaza and significantly increasing demand for humanitarian services therein. Increasing pressure on already-strained humanitarian resources will drive the risk of critical food insecurity, as well as clashes in areas surrounding aid distribution points and medical facilities, while limited access to sanitation facilities will increase the risk of communicable disease outbreaks, particularly among minors. Such conditions will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns over conditions in Gaza, triggering further condemnation of Israel by international partners and scrutiny over Israeli-linked entities by pro-Palestine activists.
• Australia announced that it will recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming weeks, though this is unlikely to impact security and governance conditions demonstrably within the Palestinian Territories. On 11 August, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that Australia will recognise an independent Palestinian state at the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting on 9 September. Albanese stated that the recognition is ‘predicated’ on commitments from the PA to hold elections, to exclude Hamas from any potential Palestinian government and to demilitarise Gaza. The announcement comes after Canada, France, Malta, Portugal and the UK announced similar plans, exacerbating increasing bilateral tensions between Israel and numerous Western states (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 July 2025). Australia’s recognition is highly unlikely to improve security conditions within Gaza notably in the short term or to trigger a broader shift in IDF operations therein. Additionally, the PA is unlikely to make significant improvements to its governance conditions in the West Bank by 9 September, moderating the prospects for broader improvements in the medium-term. In the long term, ongoing tensions between the PA and Israel will likely undermine international efforts to establish the PA as the post-war governing authority in Gaza, underscoring critical governance risks throughout the Palestinian Territories.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• A deadly explosion at one of LH’s depots underscores the significant physical security risks during disarmament and clearing operations in Lebanon. On 9 August, a major explosion killed six Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers while they were inspecting and dismantling an LH weapons depot in Majdal Zoun (South governorate). The cause of the explosion is still under investigation. However, local reports claim the troops were removing unexploded ordnance left over from the Israel-Hizballah war. The incident comes shortly after the Lebanese parliament approved plans to disarm LH on 7 August and tasked the LAF with securing the state’s monopoly on the use of force on 5 August. In the coming months, efforts to clear unexploded ordnance will significantly elevate physical security risks for proximate staff, particularly in Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates, as well as the southern suburbs of the capital Beirut. Furthermore, given the ongoing tensions between the government and LH, the risk of domestic unrest within Shia communities in the aforementioned locations will increase during these clearing and disarmament campaigns in the coming months, in turn exacerbating the risk of sporadic clashes between LH militants and the security forces. However, the army is unlikely to implement full disarmament across Lebanon before the end of 2025, allowing more time for further negotiations with LH and offsetting direct military confrontation with the organisation.
• The UK authorities arrested hundreds of pro-Palestine protesters, which will likely fuel further reactionary demonstrations in the coming weeks. As of 10 August, the UK’s security authorities had arrested 532 individuals following a large-scale demonstration on 9 August against the proscription of the radical group Palestine Action (PA) under the Terrorism Act 2000. According to the Metropolitan Police, 521 people were arrested for displaying placards supporting PA at Parliament Square in the capital London. Although the demonstration remained largely peaceful, the authorities arrested six people for assaulting police officers and one for a racially aggravated public order offence. No serious injuries were reported. The recent protests marked the largest mobilisation of support since PA was banned in July, resulting in the UK’s largest single-day arrest operation in over a decade and underscoring ongoing domestic unrest risks linked to radical pro-Palestine activism. We assess that these large-scale arrests are likely to trigger further reactionary protests by PA supporters, possibly targeting UK and international corporations in London that deal with the Israeli government and/or related entities. This will, in turn, increase the likelihood of low-level scuffles in central areas of the capital in the coming weeks. Protesters are also likely to prioritise targeting the UK offices of the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems, as well as its UK-based supply chain and production facilities. Furthermore, PA activists are likely to sustain operations via proxy groups, and to infiltrate legitimate protest movements to radicalise participants therein, increasing security and bystander risks during pro-Palestine marches in the UK.
• Syria: Deadlock in integration talks will raise risk of domestic unrest, armed conflict. On 9 August, the Syrian government announced it would not participate in the planned 10 August meeting with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the French capital Paris. The decision was highly likely a response to an SDF-organised conference in Al-Hasakah (Al-Hasakah governorate) on 8 August, attended by Druze and Alawite figures who criticised the constitutional declaration and government policies. This ongoing deadlock in integration talks between the Kurds and the government will likely persist in the coming two weeks, exacerbating political uncertainty in Syria. Stalled integration will elevate the risk of domestic unrest among Arab communities in the Kurdish regions, driving the risk of mutiny among Arab elements within the SDF. Such mutinies would, in turn, increase the risk of clashes within SDF-held cities, including Al-Hasakah and Raqqa city (Raqqa governorate), as well as bouts of intercommunal violence. Furthermore, tensions along the line of control in northern Syria will remain elevated, increasing the risk of a resumption in armed conflict between the Kurds and Turkish-backed factions within the Syrian army in the coming weeks.
• Lebanon: Explosion during disarmament process highlights elevated security risks. On 9 August, six Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers died in an explosion while inspecting and dismantling a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) weapon depot in Majdal Zoun (South governorate). The cause of the explosion is still under investigation; however, local reports claim the troops were removing unexploded ordnance left from the LH war with Israel. The incident comes after the Lebanese parliament approved plans to disarm LH on 7 August and tasked the LAF with securing the state’s monopoly on the use of force on 5 August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 August 2025). In the coming months, efforts to remove unexploded ordnance from the Israel-LH war, particularly those close to LH weapon depots, will elevate incidental risks to proximate staff, assets and infrastructure, particularly in the southern governorates. Furthermore, we assess that efforts to disarm LH and other militant organisations will likely increase risks of sporadic clashes between militants and the security forces, elevating security risks across the country. (Source: Sibylline)
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