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Military And Security Developments
Aug 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• The continued failure to relaunch Iran-US nuclear talks will sustain the risk of UN sanctions and military strikes.
• An Iranian military drill has underscored the ongoing elevated regional tensions; it will likely drive limited disruption for shipping operations in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea.
ISRAEL
• The arrest of two US residents who allegedly took photos of a sensitive security facility highlights the augmented state of alertness across Israel and the risk of arbitrary arrests.
• On 21 August, Israel’s Settlement Subcommittee of the Civil Administration approved the E1 plan in the West Bank, elevating the risk of international backlash (including sanctions).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• A peace agreement between Israel and Hamas is highly unlikely in the coming weeks as Israel calls up thousands of reservists ahead of its occupation of Gaza City.
• Hamas’ attack on an IDF outpost in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) underscores increasing conflict-escalation risks in Gaza as Israel prepares to occupy Gaza City.
• The prevalence of informal shelters is set to increase in line with mass displacement from Gaza City, driving the threat of physical harm to NGO personnel.
IRAN
• The continued failure to relaunch Iran-US nuclear talks will sustain the risk of UN sanctions and military strikes. On 20 August, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the time for meaningful nuclear talks with the US had not yet arrived, but that Tehran would not fully sever its co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His comments follow Iran’s suspension of IAEA inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities in June, after US and Israeli military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Araghchi reaffirmed earlier reports that a meeting between Iran and the IAEA is likely in the coming days, though he clarified that a basis for further negotiations has not yet been established. While the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will possibly approve future IAEA inspections, talks involving the IAEA are likely to take several weeks. Regardless of any progress with the IAEA (which is likely to be limited), the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) have stated that their decision to activate the JCPOA’s snapback clause and move to restore UN sanctions on Iran is dependent on progress during talks between Iran and the US. As there is no indication of progress towards Iran-US negotiations, and considering details regarding Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to emerge for several weeks, international concern will almost certainly escalate. Snapback sanctions would likely exert significant economic pressure on Iran, increasing regulatory and compliance risks for local and regionally engaged businesses. A complete breakdown in negotiations following the reimposition of sanctions would almost certainly heighten international concerns over nuclear oversight and increase the risk of further Israeli (and possibly US) strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites.
• An Iranian military drill has underscored the ongoing elevated regional tensions; it will likely drive limited disruption for shipping operations in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Earlier on 21 August, Iranian state media announced the launch of Iran’s first military exercise since the Iran-Israel war in June. The two-day exercise will include the participation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval, ground and air force units, as well as coastal and sea-based missile launch platforms and electronic warfare (EW) units. Reports indicate that naval vessels have already launched missiles at targets in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. The exercise is possibly in direct response to an increased and sustained Israeli naval presence in the Red Sea (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 August 2025). The move also underscores elevated regional tensions; we assess that armed conflict escalation is a realistic possibility in the coming weeks (see above). In the short term, the military drill will likely drive temporary maritime disruption due to physical navigation restrictions, aggressive manoeuvring in proximity to exercise zones and the knock-on effects of testing EW devices, including GPS spoofing and signal jamming.
ISRAEL
The arrest of two US residents who allegedly took photos of a sensitive security facility highlights the augmented state of alertness across Israel and the risk of arbitrary arrests. Earlier on 21 August, the Israeli police arrested two US residents studying in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on suspicion of filming a sensitive security facility at the entrance to the city. The incident reflects rising levels of Israeli alertness tied to concerns that Iran and Iranian-affiliated entities will attempt to redress the current power imbalance by escalating espionage and sabotage campaigns against Israeli targets and interests. The Israeli security forces are likely to remain on heightened alert in the coming months, elevating the risk of arbitrary arrest for local and international personnel. We assess this risk is highest around sensitive areas such as military and security facilities, as well as government buildings and symbols; it is particularly acute for international personnel, who also face the risk of deportation. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that international companies employing arrested or deported individuals will be subject to increased scrutiny, exacerbating the risk of the Israeli border authorities rejecting visa requests for other employees of said firms.
• On 21 August, Israel’s Settlement Subcommittee of the Civil Administration approved the E1 plan in the West Bank, elevating the risk of international backlash (including sanctions). The plan features the construction of approximately 3,400 new housing units in the West Bank in a manner that will disrupt Palestinian territorial continuity between Bethlehem and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates. Several international organisations and states claim the plan significantly sabotages efforts to form a viable Palestinian state. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that undermining Palestinian statehood was his reason for supporting for the plan. The official approval of the plan and efforts to proceed with construction will elevate the likelihood of governments imposing sanctions on the parties involved, such as construction firms, as well as civil servants, Israeli ministers and Knesset members. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that several countries will introduce legislation targeting Israeli produce and commodities originating in the West Bank, driving financial and compliance risks for international businesses with operations therein. Companies operating in the West Bank will also be exposed to elevated risks of international public backlash, driving reputational risks and possible boycott campaigns.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• A peace agreement between Israel and Hamas is highly unlikely in the coming weeks as Israel calls up thousands of reservists ahead of its occupation of Gaza City. On 19 August, Israeli officials stated that the government was studying Hamas’ response to a ceasefire proposal submitted by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on 18 August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 August 2025). While Qatar’s foreign ministry claims that the ceasefire proposal agreed by Hamas was almost identical to an earlier plan for a temporary ceasefire put forward by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Israel has subsequently moved away from this position and is now seeking the release of all hostages for a permanent agreement. Hamas’ willingness to accept an offer that it previously rejected likely underscores the group’s degraded military capacity and its fears over the looming Israeli ground operation in Gaza City. On 20 August, the IDF began calling up 60,000 reservists in preparation for the expansion of offensive military operations in Gaza City, almost certainly indicating its intent to push forward with its takeover plan and rendering Israel’s acceptance of the mediators’ proposal increasingly unlikely. Even if Israel responds to the proposal, negotiations would likely take weeks, in which time the IDF would almost certainly proceed with its ground offensive, which would in turn further complicate efforts to finalise a negotiated settlement.
• Hamas’ attack on an IDF outpost in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) underscores increasing conflict-escalation risks in Gaza as Israel prepares to occupy Gaza City. On 20 August, at least 15 of Hamas’ al-Qassam brigade operatives launched a raid in an attempt to abduct soldiers stationed at an Israeli military outpost in Khan Yunis. The militants reportedly emerged from a tunnel located around 50m from the encampment and opened fire with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Hamas claimed that the assault also involved a suicide bombing. Three IDF personnel were wounded and approximately ten militants were killed during the clashes (and also in targeted airstrikes following the attack). The incident comes amid rising Israeli military pressure in Gaza ahead of its planned ground offensive, the first stages of which officially began on 20 August. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the attack reflects Hamas’ efforts to redirect resources southwards and to escalate its operations in areas where the IDF’s presence is less pronounced. This will compound the IDF’s concern regarding the (almost certain) displacement of militants from Gaza City to humanitarian areas, particularly al-Mawasi (southern Gaza), elevating the likelihood of IDF strikes in these areas. This will in turn drive crossfire and misidentification risks for NGO personnel, medical staff and journalists in southern Gaza, while also exacerbating already-critical humanitarian conditions in the strip.
• The prevalence of informal shelters is set to increase in line with mass displacement from Gaza City, driving the threat of physical harm to NGO personnel. On 20 August, several aid groups stated that shelter materials had still not entered Gaza despite Israel’s announcement on 16 August that such deliveries would be permitted via the Kerem Shalom border crossing (pending security inspections). An estimated 1.3 m Gazans lack tents, which has forced many to take up informal shelter in buildings with poor structural integrity, increasing the risk of collapse and serious physical harm. Amid the launch of Israeli offensive operations in Gaza City, we assess that mass displacement will almost certainly worsen, accelerating the use of informal shelters in southern Gaza. This will likely drive an increase in the prevalence of infectious diseases and exposure to crossfire for civilians and NGO personnel who are servicing civilian needs. On 19 August, the UN stated that the killing of aid workers has surged to a record high during the war in Gaza, underscoring these persistent and critical security risks for on-the-ground personnel. More broadly, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza will likely worsen in the coming weeks, exacerbating energy, food and water security risks for on-the-ground personnel.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Hamas attack on IDF outpost points to conflict-escalation risks in Gaza. On 20 August, operatives from Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, launched a raid on an Israeli military outpost in Khan Yunis, reportedly in an attempt to abduct soldiers. Three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel were wounded, while at least ten militants were killed. According to the IDF, the militants emerged from a tunnel near the encampment; they reportedly opened fire with small arms and launched rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). The attack comes amid the launch of IDF operations to occupy Gaza City and underscores the heightened efforts by Hamas militants to kidnap soldiers in Gaza (as well as elevated conflict-escalation risks ahead of Israel’s planned operation). This will drive critical bystander risks for NGO personnel, medical staff and journalists who remain in Gaza City stemming from cross-fire and misidentification. We assess that the operation itself will highly likely exacerbate already-critical humanitarian conditions in the strip, especially in the north, driving energy, food and water security risks.
• Syria: US raid highlights growing counter-IS efforts along border with Turkey, elevated security risks. On 20 August, a US raid in Atme (Idlib governorate) killed a senior Islamic State (IS) member who was a candidate to be IS’ leader in Syria. The operation was conducted in co-operation with local Syrian forces who cordoned off the area. On 7 August, Syrian forces arrested nine IS cell members in Harem (Idlib). These operations come amid ongoing counter-IS efforts in northern Syria near the Syria-Turkey border. Additionally, on 19 and 20 August, two US military convoys comprising at least 130 trucks carrying logistical supplies, including fuel, soldiers and ammunition, crossed from Iraq into al-Hasakah governorate (Syria). There is a realistic possibility this forms part of a gradual US withdrawal from Iraq and repositioning in Syria. As such, we assess there is also a realistic possibility of increasing US military operations in northern Syria, particularly along the Syria-Turkey and Syria-Iraq borders, elevating the risks of armed clashes and travel disruption in these border areas in the coming months.
Aug 20.
• Armenia-Iran: Yerevan will unlikely placate Tehran’s concerns over US involvement in transit corridor. On 19 August, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia and Iran plan to construct a second bridge across their shared border. The announcement followed Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Armenia on 18-19 August. During the visit, both leaders signed co-operation agreements and declared that bilateral relations would be elevated to the level of a strategic partnership. Pezeshkian’s visit comes shortly after Armenia agreed to open a US-operated transport route along the Armenian-Iranian border through the Zangezur Corridor, linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. The transit corridor, named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), will be operated by the US under a 99-year lease granted by Armenia. Iran has expressed opposition to any US involvement in the corridor. During the meeting, Pashinyan sought to placate Tehran’s concerns, explaining that the corridor would remain under Yerevan’s exclusive jurisdiction. While we assess that Iran will likely continue to resist US participation, it is unlikely to jeopardise the Armenian-Iranian relationship in the short-to-medium term, limiting the scope for major regional tensions.
• Israel: Reserve duty recruitment will elevate socio-economic risks, impact hospitality sector. Earlier on 20 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began calling up 60,000 reservists in preparation for the expansion of military operations in Gaza City. The recruitment orders are likely to come into force in early September. The IDF and the government are still discussing final details of the plan, named ‘Gideon’s Chariots B’. However, early reports indicate that, in total, the plan will involve the recruitment of 110,000 to 130,000 reservists across three recruitment waves over the coming months, likely extending into 2026. Furthermore, the IDF has decided to differentially extend current active reservist orders (Tsav 8) by another 40 days. The recruitment plans and the extension of current orders are likely to increase business disruption risks due to labour shortages in the coming months. Furthermore, the call to arms will likely impact consumerism in Israel, reducing households’ spending, particularly on leisure activities. This will likely particularly impact the hospitality industry, including restaurants and hotels, elevating financial and socio economic risks in Israel during Q4 2025 and H1 2026.
Aug 19.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Limited negotiation progress is likely; truce in two weeks is unlikely. On 18 August, Hamas accepted Egypt’s and Qatar’s ceasefire/hostage-release proposal. According to local reports, the proposal includes a 60-day truce, as well as the release of ten living Israeli hostages and (likely) over 150 Palestinian prisoners. Hamas’ announcement comes as Israel prepares to intensify its military operations in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) amid its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming two months. The proposal is similar to that of US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff (which Hamas rejected last month). Since then, Israel’s negotiation stance has shifted. In recent weeks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed for a complete deal that includes the release of all the hostages for a long-term ceasefire. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will reject the latest proposal, though it is possible the pitch will be used as the framework for broader negotiations and that ceasefire negotiations will advance in the coming weeks. As such, while a ceasefire is unlikely in the coming two weeks, we assess that a deal is possible in the coming two months.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Limited negotiation progress is likely; truce in two weeks is unlikely. On 18 August, Hamas accepted Egypt’s and Qatar’s ceasefire/hostage-release proposal. According to local reports, the proposal includes a 60-day truce, as well as the release of ten living Israeli hostages and (likely) over 150 Palestinian prisoners. Hamas’ announcement comes as Israel prepares to intensify its military operations in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) amid its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming two months. The proposal is similar to that of US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff (which Hamas rejected last month). Since then, Israel’s negotiation stance has shifted. In recent weeks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed for a complete deal that includes the release of all the hostages for a long-term ceasefire. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will reject the latest proposal, though it is possible the pitch will be used as the framework for broader negotiations and that ceasefire negotiations will advance in the coming weeks. As such, while a ceasefire is unlikely in the coming two weeks, we assess that a deal is possible in the coming two months.
Aug 18.
IRAN
• Talks involving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are likely to take several weeks, sustaining short-term nuclear safety risks and the threat of snapback sanctions.
• Iran’s alleged possession of a leaked document containing the names of UK intelligence operatives will likely drive diplomatic tensions and elevate arbitrary detention risks.
ISRAEL
• Nationwide demonstrations and strikes on 17 August have underscored the elevated risk of transit and operational disruption in the coming weeks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israeli plans to build hospitals in Gaza are unlikely to moderate the humanitarian crisis significantly.
• Airdrops will moderately reduce food security risks, though on-the-ground personnel and civilians face an increased risk of crushes and stampedes.
• The latest Gaza ceasefire proposal, which Hamas currently supports, is unlikely to secure a peace agreement, though further negotiations are possible in the coming weeks.
IRAN
• Talks involving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are likely to take several weeks, sustaining short-term nuclear safety risks and the threat of snapback sanctions. Earlier on 18 August, Iran stated that it would continue talking with the IAEA and that it expected a further round of negotiations to take place in the coming days. The announcement follows a visit by the IAEA’s deputy head, Massimo Aparo, to Iran on 11 August to negotiate re-establishing co-operation. This comes after Iran suspended IAEA inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities following US and Israeli military strikes in June. Negotiations between the IAEA and Iran will likely take at least several weeks, sustaining reduced international oversight of the country’s nuclear programme, as well as nuclear safety risks in the short term. Oversight constraints, coupled with limited progress in resuming talks between the US and Iran, will sustain the risk of the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) triggering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause and reimposing UN sanctions on Iran. The reapplication of UN sanctions would highly likely drive significant economic pressure on Iran and exacerbate regulatory and compliance risks for regionally engaged businesses. Additionally, the reimposition of UN sanctions would increase the risk of Iran breaking off talks with the IAEA; this would in turn compound international anxiety over a lack of nuclear oversight, raising the risk of further Israeli strikes against Iran.
• Iran’s alleged possession of a leaked document containing the names of UK intelligence operatives will likely drive diplomatic tensions and elevate arbitrary detention risks. Earlier on 18 August, UK media reported that, according to senior Iranian and Afghan sources, a group of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials visited Kabul (Afghanistan) last week to discuss a co-operation deal with the Taliban authorities. The officials sought access to the Taliban’s ‘kill list’, a leaked UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) spreadsheet containing the details of thousands of Afghan asylum seekers, as well as UK intelligence operatives and special forces personnel. In return, the IRGC is reportedly pressuring the government in Tehran to expedite its recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Reports indicate that Iranian border forces have already arrested several individuals whose names appear on the leaked list in recent days. Iran likely intends to use the ‘kill list’ to apprehend UK security personnel so as to exert diplomatic pressure on the E3 in the run-up to the deadline for triggering the snapback clause (3 September). The move has significantly increased the risks facing foreign nationals in Iran, as well as those in neighbouring states with significant Iranian proxy elements (such as Iraq and Yemen), in the coming months. Personnel perceived to be associated with European and/or US intelligence services/armed forces will face a heightened risk of arbitrary detention. Furthermore, the authorities are highly liable to employ aggressive interrogation techniques, compounding broader human rights concerns for targeted individuals. The latest reports are likely to degrade diplomatic relations between the UK and Iran, possibly stalling ongoing nuclear discussions. In the long-term, this would increase the risk of intensified sanctions and reduced nuclear oversight in Iran.
ISRAEL
• Nationwide demonstrations and strikes on 17 August have underscored the elevated risk of transit and operational disruption in the coming weeks. Numerous unions, private businesses and public authorities conducted a large-scale nationwide strike in favour of ending the Israel-Hamas war and securing the release of the hostages in Gaza. The action was accompanied by large demonstrations across Israel, including at highway junctions (see the demonstration spots in the map above). Demonstrators blocked key thoroughfares at protest hotspots, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), causing substantial congestion. Further demonstrations are scheduled to take place between 18 and 23 August (mainly in Tel Aviv), driving the risk of work stoppages, localised travel disruption and broader business disruption in the coming days. While such demonstrations are likely to remain peaceful, sporadic altercations involving demonstrators and drivers, as well as the security forces, remain possible. This will elevate the security risks in the vicinity of protest locations. While another general strike remains unlikely in the coming days, the widespread coverage of (and nationwide participation during) the events on 17 August have underscored increasing anti-war sentiment. This will drive the possibility of demonstrations growing in size and frequency, as well as the risk of further strikes in the coming weeks (sustaining the likelihood of operational disruption).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israeli plans to build hospitals in Gaza are unlikely to moderate the humanitarian crisis significantly. Earlier on 18 August, Israeli media reported that the IDF is preparing to establish medical centres for Gazans as part of its plan to occupy Gaza City. Additional field hospitals will likely moderately improve the IDF’s capacity to treat visible injuries such as amputations, burns and wounds. However, they are unlikely to mitigate against the humanitarian and healthcare risks that will almost certainly result from the months-long planned evacuation of northern Gaza, including Gaza City, to southern Gaza. There is no clear indication that the move is a pretence to eject private entities or NGOs from Gaza. Nevertheless, most major NGOs and humanitarian entities, including UN agencies, have already been sidelined. The majority of aid is passing through private channels such as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). As IDF operations continue in Gaza, widespread food insecurity, reliance on informal housing, the prevalence of infectious diseases and exposure to crossfire will almost certainly persist.
• Airdrops will moderately reduce food security risks, though on-the-ground personnel and civilians face an increased risk of crushes and stampedes. Earlier on 18 August, aircraft from Belgium, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Singapore and the UAE airdropped 180 tonnes of humanitarian aid into Gaza. This comes after Israel reauthorised airdrops by third-party countries on 26 July amid growing international criticism of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. While the resumption of airdrops will somewhat mitigate against food security risks, accessing pallets remains dangerous for on-the-ground civilians and personnel. Pallets will possibly land on top of individuals seeking to reach them first, while crushes and stampedes are also likely in the vicinity of pallets which land successfully due to dense concentrations of individuals attempting to access the limited supply of aid. Structural collapses are also possible as and when pallets land on buildings, or when large crowds gather to collect aid from structures that cannot support their collective weight. Furthermore, a BBC Verify investigation on 17 August revealed that in ten separate cases, pallets were airdropped into areas designated by the IDF as danger zones. This underscores the elevated risk of harm (including exposure to crossfire and misidentification) facing individuals on the ground who attempt to access aid drops, especially those moving into active conflict areas to retrieve goods.
• The latest Gaza ceasefire proposal, which Hamas currently supports, is unlikely to secure a peace agreement, though further negotiations are possible in the coming weeks. Earlier on 18 August, Hamas stated that it had approved the latest Gaza ceasefire proposal put forward by Egyptian and Qatari mediators. While the full terms of the agreement remain unclear, reports indicate the proposal is a reversion to previous ceasefire ideas; it specifies securing the suspension of military operations for 60 days and the release of ten living Israeli hostages (likely in exchange for over 150 Palestinian prisoners). There remains a realistic possibility that Israel will accept the proposal as a framework for further negotiations with Hamas in the coming days. However, over the past few weeks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed for the release of all hostages in exchange for a full ceasefire. The current proposal also likely falls short of addressing other Israeli security concerns, including Hamas’ disarmament and the civil administration of Gaza. This will sustain the prospects for deadlocked talks, ensuring the IDF proceeds with its plans to capture Gaza City.
• Israel: General, nationwide strike highlights increasing anti-war sentiment, elevated operational risks. On 17 August, numerous unions, private businesses and public authorities conducted a large-scale nationwide strike in favour of ending the Israel-Hamas war and the release of the hostages in Gaza. The day was accompanied by large demonstrations across Israel, including at highway junctions; this caused substantial congestion. Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) were primary protest hotspots; demonstrations blocked key throughfares. Further demonstrations and actions are scheduled to take place between 18 and 23 August (mainly in Tel Aviv), driving risks of work stoppages and broader business disruption in the coming days. While demonstrations will likely remain peaceful, sporadic altercations involving demonstrators and drivers, as well as the security forces, remain a realistic possibility. This will elevate security risks in proximity to protest locations. While another general strike remains unlikely in the coming days, we assess that widespread coverage and nationwide participation highlight increasing anti-war sentiment and risks of further strikes in the coming weeks, sustaining operational disruption risks.
• Jordan: Reintroduction of national service will drive labour flexibility, operational risks. On 17 August, Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah announced plans to reintroduce national military service, though no date for such a move has yet been set. The decision highlights concerns regarding national security (especially given Jordan’s heavy reliance on the US for defence), possible Islamic State (IS) expansion in Syria and increasing organised criminal activity in border regions. Additionally, this development likely reflects growing concerns over internal dissent, amid a crackdown on political groups, including the Islamic Action Front (IAF, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 7 August 2025). The reintroduction of national service will almost certainly increase labour flexibility risks, raising operational risks for businesses and NGOs. This will be particularly acute for small and medium enterprises, which will likely find it harder to fill positions. To address talent shortages, wages will possibly rise across the market, pushing some businesses to rely on informal labour practices and driving compliance and regulatory risks for associated businesses. Due to the unpredictable labour market, we assess that investors will be disincentivised to invest in the country, hindering long-term growth.
(Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 25. Israel says it has taken first steps of military operation in Gaza City.
• Summary
• Israel plans gradual, targeted operation in Gaza City
• Israeli troops clash with Hamas near Khan Younis
• Smotrich approves West Bank settlement project assailed abroad
Israel’s military announced the first steps of an operation to take over Gaza City on Wednesday and called up tens of thousands of reservists while the government considered a new ceasefire proposal to pause nearly two years of war.
“We have begun the preliminary operations and the first stages of the attack on Gaza City, and already now IDF forces are holding the outskirts of Gaza City,” Brigadier General Effie Defrin, Israel’s military spokesperson, told reporters.
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A military official briefing reporters earlier on Wednesday said reserve soldiers would not report for duty until September, an interval that gives mediators some time to bridge gaps between Hamas and Israel over truce terms. (Source: Reuters)
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