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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS  

  • DONETSK: In recent days, localised Ukrainian counter-attacks have managed to liberate settlements around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), including the tactically important satellite town of Novoekonomichne
  • STRIKES: On 1 September, Russia launched a large-scale combined strike involving 502 drones, 16 Kalibr cruise missiles and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles
  • NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump admitted that ending the Russo-Ukrainian war has been more challenging than he initially thought, as Putin calls for Ukraine to hold a territorial referendum
  • FORECAST: French President Emmanuel Macron has stated that Ukraine’s European allies have finalised the preparation of post-war security guarantees ahead of a summit on the matter on 4 September
  • BAKHMUT: On 2 September, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had seized the village of Fedorivka, located around ten miles (16km) to the north-east of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast), though this has not yet been confirmed. Some Russian sources have since refuted the MoD’s claims, meaning it remains unclear whether an advance has indeed taken place.
  • BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further south, geolocated footage from 3 September indicates that Russian forces have taken Oleksandro-Shultyne, located just 3.5 miles (6km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). This is the closest confirmed position to Kostiantynivka that the Russians are now operating within, indicating the pressure being slowly but steadily placed on the city’s southern flanks.
  • DONETSK: In recent days, localised Ukrainian counter-attacks have managed to liberate settlements around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), including the tactically important satellite town of Novoekonomichne. Geolocated footage released by Ukraine’s General Staff on 2 September shows that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Udachne, which is located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Additionally, reports from military spokesperson Viktor Trehubov on 3 September confirmed that Ukrainian troops regained control of Novoekonomichne, situated to the east of Pokrovsk; Russian forces likely took control of Novoekonomichne in July. These recent advances suggest that Russia has not solidified its hold on several settlements surrounding Pokrovsk and remain vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-attacks following the Dobropillia tactical penetration last month.
  • KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 1 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced in north-western Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast) and have pushed the Russians back along the southern bank of the Vovcha River.
  • KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 3 September, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces had captured around half of the city of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) and released footage of a soldier holding a flag as evidence. Geolocation of the video suggests that the soldiers were present at four locations in northern, north-western and central Kupiansk. However, Ukrainian military authorities have denied these claims, dismissing the video as staged propaganda and stating that the soldiers featured in the footage had been eliminated. We assess that a limited number of Russian elements had likely infiltrated the city. As previously reported, Russia has been conducting infiltration operations in recent weeks. However, the number of troops involved was likely insufficient to hold positions inside Kupiansk, mirroring the situation in Pokrovsk, where Russian forces have also managed to penetrate the city without consolidating control. The likely infiltration of Kupiansk nevertheless underscores vulnerabilities in the city’s defences against such tactics.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces made confirmed advances into central Moskovka (Myrne), located to the north-west of Kupiansk, as of 2 September. The advance likely indicates that the settlement is now under Russian control. Our previous report indicated that Ukrainian forces had managed to retake this settlement. However, recently reported Russian control over Moskovka (Myrne) likely helped facilitate the limited penetration of Kupiansk, as the settlement is located immediately north-west of the city. Meanwhile, at the southern end of the Oskil-Kreminna line, geolocated footage from 2 September shows recent Ukrainian advances in south-eastern Zarichne, located to the east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to steadily advance towards the administrative border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, but progress remains slow amid Ukrainian counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from 1 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Dachne, a village located on the northern banks of the Vovcha River inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, around eight miles (13km) to the south of Novopavlivka. Russian forces likely controlled the majority of the village until relatively recently, when Ukrainian counter-attacks pushed them back, underscoring that the village remains highly contested.
  • SOUTHERN: Along the Zaporizhzhia axis further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 1 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced north of Robotyne towards the southern outskirts of Orikhiv (both Zaporizhzhia oblast). Robotyne was the focal point of Ukraine’s failed 2023 counter-offensive, and the recent advances mean the Russian forces have essentially retaken all the territory Ukraine attempted to seize in 2023. A Ukrainian army corps fighting in the area posted footage on 3 September showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian mechanised assault south of Orikhiv. Nevertheless, Russian forces are now estimated to be around three miles (5km) to the south of Orikhiv.
  • STRIKES: On 1 September, Russia launched a large-scale combined strike involving 502 drones, 16 Kalibr cruise missiles and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles. Ukrainian defence forces intercepted 430 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 14 Kalibr missiles and seven Kh-101 missiles. The Ukrainian authorities reported that the strikes hit civilian and transport infrastructure, as well as residential buildings in Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lviv and Sumy oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasised that Russian forces are increasingly launching projectiles during the daytime and are heavily targeting energy infrastructure. These strikes are highly likely aimed at causing disruptions to energy networks in Ukraine ahead of the heating season. Strikes on other days during this monitoring period were relatively smaller.
  • STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities are attempting to improve the defences of military training centres, as Russia has recently intensified long-range attacks against these targets. On 3 September, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced that he had instructed the rapid equipping of all training centres with underground shelters. However, he noted that this endeavour will take time. In June and July, Russia intensified attacks against these facilities, causing significant casualties. Given the likely lengthy process required to improve protection, we assess that these facilities will remain vulnerable to such attacks for the foreseeable future.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • NEGOTIATIONS: On 3 September, US President Donald Trump admitted that ending the Russo-Ukrainian war has been more challenging than he initially thought. Trump has sought to stop the conflict since resuming the presidency in January, though a major breakthrough in this regard remains elusive. Trump stated that his approach to many diplomatic negotiations is to bring together key leaders and have them broker an agreement but noted that this requires patience. Trump’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska (US) did not yield a ceasefire, nor any tangible progress towards a peace settlement. Despite US efforts to organise a meeting between Putin and Zelensky, Moscow continues to stall on this; the prospect of such talks happening in the near term remains low.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated on 2 September that the Kremlin never agreed to a meeting between Putin and Zelensky, contradicting previous comments from Trump. On 19 August, Trump claimed that he had spoken with his Russian counterpart and that preparations were underway for Putin to meet the Ukrainian president. Afterwards, Trump said he expected a trilateral meeting to take place involving himself, Putin and Zelensky. On 3 September, Putin stated that Zelensky should come to Moscow for peace talks, which will almost certainly be a non-starter for Ukraine. Ultimately, such a bilateral meeting remains highly unlikely in the short term; during his recent trip to Beijing (China), Putin reiterated his long-standing line that Zelensky is an illegitimate president.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Separately, on 3 September, Putin claimed that Ukraine should organise a referendum on ceding territory to Russia. Putin cited the Ukrainian constitution, which states that changing the composition of Ukraine’s territory is to be resolved exclusively by referendum. If the Ukrainian authorities were to hold a referendum on ceding territory, organising a fair vote would face a myriad of challenges, given that thousands of Ukrainians are displaced internally or have fled abroad. Similarly, many Ukrainians remain in Russian occupation, where their ability to vote freely would almost certainly be restricted. Russia organised controlled referenda in September 2022 to annex four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts); it also annexed Crimea in 2014 after a referendum. As such, Putin’s demand for a referendum (which would not realistically be possible under martial law without a ceasefire) highly likely aims to legalise and legitimise Russian claims to Ukrainian lands.
  • NORTH KOREA: South Korean intelligence estimates that approximately 2,000 North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia have been killed. South Korean news agency Yonhap reported these figures on 2 September, noting that South Korean intelligence believes Pyongyang is prepared to send an additional 6,000 soldiers. South Korean lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun stated that Seoul had increased its estimated death toll to 2,000 after reviewing intelligence with other countries. Some estimates claim that North Korea has sent 15,000 troops to support Russia since October 2024, initially to aid Russian forces in expelling Ukrainian forces from Russia’s Kursk oblast. Ultimately, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang will highly likely remain strong over the medium-to-long term, especially as North Korea’s leadership remains willing to provide manpower and weapons to sustain Russia’s war effort. However, amid confirmation from Moscow that North Koreans will be deployed as engineers inside Kursk oblast, it remains unclear whether combat deployments to occupied Ukraine will take place in the future.

FORECAST

GUARANTEES: French President Emmanuel Macron disclosed on 3 September that Ukraine’s European allies have finalised the preparation of post-war security guarantees ahead of a summit on the matter on 4 September.  Macron offered limited details but stated that their plans are awaiting ‘political approval’. Meanwhile, two unspecified European officials said that the ‘technical’ elements of the proposed guarantees had been finished. Even if Ukraine’s allies have indeed finalised their plans, we assess that these will highly likely be subject to change depending on what partners are willing to contribute, as well as Russia’s position.

Despite statements claiming that work on possible post-war security arrangements is complete, the prospect of troop deployments to Ukraine (or on its behalf as a reassurance force) is likely still an issue of contention among Kyiv’s key European backers (namely Germany). On 1 September, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius criticised European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent remarks that ‘precise plans’ were being outlined for a multinational deployment as part of security guarantees. Pistorius stated that publicly discussing such matters before negotiations between Russia and Ukraine was ‘completely wrong’. Meanwhile, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on 3 September that he would have considerable reservations about deploying German troops to Ukraine. Merz also said that the deployment of troops would depend on the type of agreement met to end the war; Russia will almost certainly continue to oppose the prospect of Western troops in Ukraine.

German apprehension about committing to a troop deployment will possibly moderately reduce confidence among other allies about committing military personnel to Ukraine as part of security guarantees. Germany is estimated to have 185,000 active personnel in its armed forces and 34,000 reserves. In comparison, the number of serving troops of countries leading discussions about sending troops to Ukraine as part of a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, France and the UK, totals 204,000 and 138,000, respectively. As such, Berlin’s current non-commitment to sending forces to post-war Ukraine could realistically deter countries that are also undecided on the matter and have similarly sized or smaller armed forces from sending troops.

However, Germany is still reportedly planning to contribute to ensuring Ukraine’s post-war security through military aid and training for the Ukrainian military. According to a report by German media outlet Der Spiegel published earlier on 4 September, Germany will offer to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence, including by increasing such support by 20% per annum. Berlin will also pledge to enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities by supporting the production of cruise missiles. The German government is ready to arm four mechanised brigades; this would entail providing approximately 480 armoured personnel carriers and other infantry vehicles per year.

Reluctance among European allies to send troops will also realistically decrease the US’ confidence in committing to aiding Ukrainian security over the long term. According to an unspecified French insider earlier on 4 September, Ukraine’s partners involved in the security guarantee process are waiting for US confirmation that it will act as an ‘ultimate backstop’. Trump and Zelensky are expected to speak by phone later on 4 September after the summit. Trump’s intentions to discuss the summit’s outcome indicate that he and his administration are unlikely to withdraw from the peace process in the near term, despite recent reports suggesting they will. However, it remains unclear how far US commitments to support a potential European operation would go. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 1 September 2025.

Sep 02.

  • Critics of Russia face heightened espionage risks from Russian state-sponsored actors. On 1 September, international news outlets reported that a Russian state-sponsored group (‘APT29’) targeted academics and other individuals critical of Russia in a cyber espionage operation. The group conducted a watering hole attack, injecting multiple commonly-visited websites with malicious code, redirecting approximately 10% of targets to actor-crafted domains. APT29 then tricked users into authenticating malicious actor-controlled devices via Microsoft device authentication flow to deploy malware, harvest credentials and collect information. The malicious domains emulated authorised Cloudflare authentication services to enhance legitimacy. The group also quickly pivoted to new infrastructure if detected and used multiple other techniques to remain obfuscated, highlighting APT29’s operational resilience and detection evasion capabilities. This operation further showcases the continued expansion of the group’s operations beyond government and key sector targets. We assess that the increasingly opportunistic nature of APT29’s attacks will raise security and cyber espionage risks to strategic targets amid the ongoing development of Russia’s cyber strategy.

Sep 01.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: Russia’s Chief of the General Staff has claimed that Russian forces have taken 1,351 square miles (3,500 sq km) of territory since March, though this is likely exaggerated
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 August, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving 537 Shahed-type drones, 37 cruise missiles and eight ballistic missiles, targeting a range of sites across the country
  • EXERCISES: On 31 August, the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military bloc began drills in Belarus, ahead of further drills on 12 September
  • FORECAST: Several European countries are working on ‘precise plans’ for potential military deployments to Ukraine with US military backing, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
  • OFFENSIVES: Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov claimed on 30 August that Russian forces have taken 1,351 square miles (3,500 sq km) of territory, including 149 settlements, since March. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), by contrast, has assessed that Russian forces have only taken 906 square miles (2,346 sq km) since 1 March. Notably, several Russian milbloggers have since openly criticised Gerasimov’s claims, including that Russian forces control over 50% of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), as exaggerated, which they likely are. Russia’s Minister of Defence Andrei Belousov gave a speech on 29 August claiming that Russian forces are currently seizing around 231-270 square miles (600-700 sq km) of territory per month. Belousov also emphasised that Russian industry is pivoting towards producing ever larger numbers of light vehicles, rather than heavy armoured vehicles and tanks, likely reflecting the shift in Russian tactics that we have been monitoring over the past 12 months.
  • BAKHMUT: Along the Toretsk axis, geolocated footage from 31 August indicates that Russian forces have taken control of the remainder of Rusyn Yar, a village located around ten miles (16km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Footage also indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the north-west of the village; further such advances in this direction will likely mutually reinforce Russia’s ongoing efforts to consolidate its tactical penetration north-east of Pokrovsk from the east. Meanwhile, on 28 August, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had taken Nelipivka, a village located around 3.5 miles (6km) to the north of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). However, we cannot confirm this.
  • DONETSK: On 30 August, Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russia’s most advanced units in the Dobropillia penetration had been cut off from the main offensive grouping in the sector and surrounded. However, Trehubov also noted that Russian forces continue to attempt infiltrations of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) with small infantry units approaching from multiple directions, particularly the south-west. Geolocated footage posted on 30 August shows recent Russian advances in south-eastern Novoekonomichne, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. While Russian forces are encroaching on Pokrovsk’s south-western flank in particular, it remains unclear whether its tactical penetration to the north-east is truly cut off. If so, Russian forces are at risk of being surrounded and forced to surrender.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk sector, Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate in and around Kupiansk but have simultaneously ceded ground to recent Ukrainian forces. A Ukrainian commander operating in the Kupiansk sector reported that Russian attacks primarily rely on small infantry groups conducting infiltration tactics to direct drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and logistics. Such tactics also target Kupiansk itself by moving through sewers into the city. These operations reportedly utilise equipment to conceal personnel’s heat signatures in a bid to approach forward positions undetected.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 30 August, Trehubov reported the recapture of Moskovka (Myrne), a settlement located to the north-west of Kupiansk. This likely means that Russian forces are not operating directly south of Myrne, in Sobolivka. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 28 August shows recent Russian advances near Borivska Andriivka, located to the north-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Gerasimov’s recent claim that Russian forces control 50% of Kupiansk is therefore likely inaccurate, as we have seen little evidence to support such an assessment.
  • SOUTHERN: Along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, Ukrainian forces continue to counter-attack and have retaken territory at multiple points. Reports from 30 August indicate that Ukrainian forces have likely retaken Zelenyi Hai, located within Donetsk oblast, approximately 17 miles (27km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces originally took the village in July amid wider efforts to reach the Vovcha River (which is the administrative border in this area). Similarly, geolocated footage published by the Ukrainian General Staff on 31 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken Dachne, a village located on the northern banks of the Vovcha River inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, around eight miles (13km) to the south of Novopavlivka. However, further to the south, geolocated footage from 30 August indicates that Russian forces have advanced in eastern Komyshyvakha, located 11 miles (17km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating on the Zaporizhzhia axis reported on 28 August that Russian forces are likely preparing for a new offensive. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are accumulating forces and preparing reserves along the frontline, mostly moving in small teams at night, and have stepped up their use of unmanned systems. According to a German source cited by Reuters on 28 August, Ukrainian intelligence warned German officials on 13 August that Russia was using the Alaska summit to ‘play for time’ ahead of a potential renewed offensive in October or November. While this remains unconfirmed, it remains possible that Russian forces are preparing for renewed operations not only in Donetsk, but also along the Zaporizhzhia axis.
  • SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 27 August and afterwards indicates that Russian forces have seized the village of Plavni, located around 16 miles (26km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The development follows earlier confirmation of Russian advances along the Prydniprovska railway south of Prymorske, located to the north-west of Plavni. As such, Russian forces are making efforts to consolidate their control over the region hugging the eastern bank of the Dnipro River in this area.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 August, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving 537 Shahed-type drones, 37 cruise missiles (including Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K and Kh-59 systems) and eight Iskandr-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force (UAF) reported the interception of 510 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 32 cruise missiles and six ballistic missiles. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the attack struck civilian infrastructure in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Volyn, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. The attack also hit major urban centres like Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and Zaporizhzhia city. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the main targets of the attack were air bases, power supply hubs and other infrastructure.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its drone strike campaign targeting Russian infrastructure. For instance, early on 1 September, a falling Ukrainian drone caused a fire at a power substation in Kropotkin (Krasnodar Krai). On 29 August, Ukrainian forces struck the Kuibyshev refinery, part of Rosneft’s Samara group, which was forced to halt operations.
  • STRIKES: The possible transfer of US-made long-range projectiles will likely enhance the lethality of Ukrainian strikes, provided that Washington DC revises its policy limiting long-range strikes against Russian territory. On 28 August, the US State Department approved the possible sale of air-launched cruise missiles worth an estimated USD 825 m to Ukraine. The deal would involve the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM), as well as associated guidance kits and electronic warfare defences for these missiles. According to sources familiar with the matter, the potential sale is being funded by Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway under the Jump Start programme, with additional funding via the US Foreign Military Financing programme. ERAM missiles have a range of 150-280 miles (240-450km) and would support medium-range missile strikes into Russia’s near rear.
  • STRIKES: On 31 August, President Zelensky announced plans for new strikes deep into Russia. The Trump administration has not made any official announcement regarding long-range strike policies. Ultimately, even if the sale of ERAM missiles goes ahead, it remains uncertain whether US President Donald Trump will approve their use against Russian de jure territory, given that he has long opposed such attacks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • EXERCISES: On 31 August, the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military bloc began drills in Belarus; these will include nuclear weapons planning, though such arms will not actually be deployed. While this will likely elevate already-high regional tensions, the non-involvement of nuclear weapons will mitigate against the threat of a nuclear escalation (which is highly unlikely in any case). More than 2,000 troops from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan will take part in the CSTO exercises. These drills come ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Belarusian-Russian military exercises in Belarus between 12 and 16 September.
  • EXERCISES: The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, has assessed that the upcoming exercises will fuel disinformation campaigns aimed at increasing pressure on Ukraine and European countries. We continue to assess that Russia is highly unlikely to use the exercises to stage a renewed invasion into northern Ukraine (specifically targeting Chernihiv and Kyiv oblasts). Similarly, Belarus and/or Russia will be highly unlikely to directly attack a neighbouring NATO country (namely Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) during the drills. However, state-aligned Belarusian and Russian media will likely seek to amplify information campaigns aimed at fuelling Western concerns about the exercises over the coming days and weeks; increased GPS jamming and interference, as well as potential drone overflights, are a realistic possibility during the exercises.
  • AID: Recent US approvals of military sales to Ukraine possibly indicate a potential willingness on the part of Washington DC to leverage arms sales to Kyiv to apply pressure on Moscow to end the war. This week, the US approved a possible foreign military sale worth USD 825 m of Extended-Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missiles to Ukraine. Meanwhile, on 29 August, the US State Department approved a possible sale to Ukraine worth USD 179.1 m for upkeeping Patriot air defence systems, which includes spare parts and maintenance support. Separately, Ukraine requested to buy an extension of satellite communications services for its Starlink terminals worth an estimated USD 150 m. Ukraine will likely hope that the recent uptick in approved arms sales reflects a growing readiness for the Trump administration to pivot towards increasing pressure on Russia amid stalled peace talks.

FORECAST

GUARANTEES: Several European countries are working on ‘precise plans’ for potential military deployments to Ukraine with US military backing as part of a post-war security guarantee, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In an article published on 31 August, she stated that any such deployment will have ‘the full backing of US capabilities’. Von der Leyen stated that US President Donald Trump has reassured European partners that there will be a US presence as part of a backstop, a point which she said was ‘very clear and repeatedly reaffirmed’. For further analysis on what US assistance could possibly look like and what form a Europe-led post-war security force could take, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 August 2025.

The EU will also possibly explore new funding mechanisms to finance Ukraine’s armed forces as part of security guarantees. Von der Leyen stated that this would include ensuring Ukrainian soldiers receive adequate salaries and that the military will be provided with modern equipment. According to her, the EU’s existing funding streams to Ukraine, including budgetary support, would need to continue during peacetime. The bloc will also maintain funding for training Ukrainian soldiers after a peace deal. At the same time, the EU is encouraging member states to either enter joint production agreements with Ukrainian defence companies or purchase weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. We assess that the Trump administration will likely welcome this clear commitment to at least fund the Ukrainian military, given the US belief that Europe should shoulder the main responsibility for Ukraine’s security. European leaders are expected to meet on 4 September in France, in the capital Paris, to further discuss security guarantees.

While the extent of US backing for a European force remains unclear, the Telegraph reported on 30 August that Trump is in discussions with European partners about US private military companies (PMCs) being sent to Ukraine. The PMCs would reportedly help rebuild frontline defences and new bases, as well as protect US businesses. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the report, if true, it could provide the Trump administration with an alternative option to support a post-war guarantee, given it has ruled out sending US troops to Ukraine. The presence of US private contractors in Ukraine would aim to deter Russia from reinvading and provide reassurance for US companies either in the country or those seeking to return or enter the Ukrainian market post-war. However, it remains unclear how acceptable even PMC deployments to Ukraine would be amongst Trump’s largely Ukraine-sceptic political base, who broadly oppose any long-term US embroilment in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports, which were refuted by a Trump administration official, claimed the US president has endorsed sending Chinese peacekeepers to Ukraine. The Financial Times reported on 29 August that Trump raised the suggestion of Beijing supplying peacekeepers to monitor a neutral zone along the frontlines as part of a peace settlement during a recent meeting with European leaders and Zelensky. Russia mentioned the use of Chinese peacekeepers as part of security guarantees during early negotiations aimed at ending the war in the early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. For further analysis regarding the prospect, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 August 2025.

Trump is reportedly ‘seriously considering’ stepping back from efforts to end the war until one or both sides begin to show more flexibility to cease hostilities. Axios reported this on 31 August, citing an unspecified senior White House official. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has made comments recently doubting whether both Ukraine and Russia are ready to end the war. Trump and some officials in his administration made similar comments earlier this year about withdrawing from the peace process; it remains unclear if and when Trump will pause efforts to reach a deal.

Amid stalled diplomatic efforts to make progress on peace, on 29 August, Zelensky outlined three key pillars he wants to see for security guarantees. The first concerns maintaining the existing size and strength of Ukraine’s armed forces, as well as ensuring consistent arms supplies from domestic, European and US manufacturers. The second component involves agreements with NATO member states concerning their readiness to support Ukraine in case of renewed Russian aggression. The last pillar focuses on sanctions against Russia and the use of frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. However, Zelensky’s vision will almost certainly clash with what Russia considers to be acceptable security guarantees. Points of contention will likely include the size and strength of Ukraine’s military post-war and the use of Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction. It remains unclear whether Western stakeholders will be able or willing to commit to ensuring all three of Zelensky’s principles for security guarantees, particularly given growing EU statements underscoring the legal difficulties of seizing frozen Russian assets.

Recent polling shows that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (75%) believe that Ukraine should agree to a ceasefire only if Kyiv receives international security guarantees in return. According to a survey published on 31 August by the Rating Group, Zelensky’s key three pillars for security guarantees broadly align with what the Ukrainian public wants any such arrangement to contain. Over half of respondents (52%) named funding for the Ukrainian armed forces and continued weapons supplies from partners as crucial elements of a guarantee. Meanwhile, 48% listed an obligation from allies to enter the war in the event of renewed aggression as another key component; 44% spoke in favour of allies patrolling Ukraine’s airspace and maritime waters. In general, 59% of Ukrainians said they supported ceasing hostilities and searching for a compromise. We assess that the polling underscores a readiness in Ukrainian society to seek an end to the conflict. However, without robust security guarantees, the likelihood of Kyiv agreeing to a ceasefire and peace will remain low for as long as Ukrainian forces can contain Russian advances.

  • Ukraine: Likely Russian-orchestrated killing of former parliament speaker reflects threat to officials. On 30 August, Ukrainian politician and former parliamentary speaker Andriy Parubiy was fatally shot by an attacker posing as a courier in the western city of Lviv (Lviv oblast). Ukrainian law enforcement detained the suspect. Head of the National Police, Ivan Vyhivskyi, alleged that there was a Russian link to the assassination. Parubiy was a nationalist politician who played an important role in Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution in 2013-2014. His assassination resembles that of former nationalist lawmaker Iryna Farion in Lviv in July 2024 and that of anti-Russian activist Demian Hanul in Odesa (Odesa oblast) in March. It also follows the killing of Colonel Ivan Voronych of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), reportedly carried out by Russian agents. We assess that, as with Farion and Hanul, Parubiy’s political work likely made him a target for Russian intelligence services. We assess that current and former Ukrainian politicians will very likely remain at elevated risk of assassination plots for the duration of the war, including those facilitated by Russia or pro-Russia individuals in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Sep 25.  Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be legitimate targets. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Friday that any Western troops deployed to Ukraine would be legitimate targets for Moscow to attack. Putin was speaking a day after French President Emmanuel Macron said 26 countries had pledged to provide postwar security guarantees to Ukraine, including an international force on land, sea and in the air. Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here. Russia has long argued that one of its reasons for going to war in Ukraine was to prevent NATO from admitting Kyiv as a member and placing its forces in Ukraine.

“Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction,” Putin told an economic forum in Vladivostok. “And if decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop.” (Source: Reuters)

 

04 Sep 25. The Russia-Ukraine War has seen  an extensive proliferation of loitering munitions. Ukrainian FPV drones (First Person View) are an adaptation of commercial drones used for the sport of drone racing. They use a simplified optical sensor that has little or no traverse, keeping the price to a minimum. The FPV drone controller usually includes a face-mounted vision device that the operator uses to steer the drone in conjunction with the usual joystick controller. The Ukrainian armed forces have adapted these for combat use by fitting them with a warhead. The FPV drones are inexpensive, typically costing the Ukrainians about $350 each when locally assembled from sub-components from China. With a warhead, they are still inexpensive, costing about $500-$750. These are not drones in the usual sense of the word, but rather loitering munitions or missiles, based on drone technology. The Ukrainian effort to accelerate the acquisition of drones and expansion of the trained pool of drone operators effort is called the “Army of Drones”, a July 2022 initiative by the Ukrainian deputy prime minister and head of Ministry of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov. The Army of Drones initiative is aiming at fielding about 60 assault drone companies, roughly one per maneuver brigade. These are intended to operate both FPV kamikaze drones as well as armed multicopter drones. Each company numbers about 65 troops. As of late July 2023, 16 companies had been formed with 6 more in the process of formation.  Besides the government funding, there has been a very extensive civilian volunteer effort including fundraising for individual combat units as well as nationwide fund-raising for weapons purchases such as the United-24 effort.  In March 2023, the Russian press complained that Ukraine had bought up “almost the entire market” for FPV drones in China, equivalent to 50,000 to 100,000 quadcopter drones. The British think tank RUSI stated in the summer of 2023 that Ukraine was expending 10,000 drones per month. When pressed on the issue, the RUSI analysts acknowledged that this was simply an estimate and was somewhere in the 5,000 to 10,000 range. In a press interview in late September 2023, Maria Berlinska, head of the “Aerial Intelligence Support Center” and the “Invisible Battalion” project outlined future Ukrainian drone requirements. According to Berlinska, Ukraine would like to manufacture 90,000 to 95,000 FPV drones per month. There has been a strong discrepancy between the reported number of monthly attacks and Ukrainian statements about monthly production. According to Ukrainian officials, production by early 2024 ramped up to about 100,000 FPV monthly. However, reported attacks were only about 1,000 monthly. The discrepancy may be explained by the difference between all attacks, and successful attacks. The reported number of attacks may refer to the number of sorties actually accomplished, suggesting an extremely high failure rate. This is entirely plausible for a variety of reasons. The FPVs are very cheap and probably have a high failure rate as a result. This includes simple mechanical failure due to poor construction as well as problems inherent in such weapons including a susceptibility to wind and crashes due to battery exhaustion prior to engagement. Another major factor in FPV failure has been Russian electronic jamming of the RF command link. One Ukrainian report in late 2024 indicated that Ukrainian forces were losing about 10,000 drones monthly to jamming, most of these the FPV drones.  Ukrainian sources have indicated that the first generation FPV drones have had a hit rate of 10%. The rate may have in fact been lower judging from the history of early anti-tank missiles, especially the manually-controlled types like the first generation FPV. For example, early MCLOS (Manual command line-of-sight) anti-tank missiles such as SS-11 had a demonstrated hit rate of 1:78 in Vietnam (1.3%) compared to SACLOS (semi-automatic command to line of sight) missiles such as the BGM-71 TOW that was about 1:2 in early versions (50%). The Ukrainians publicly acknowledged that they were attempting to integrate some form of semi-automatic command into their second-generation FPV drones to increase the hit rate to 20%. Sometimes this effort has been exaggerated as an attempt to incorporate AI into these weapons. Another significant change in 2023 was the introduction of FPV drones fitted with thermal imaging cameras to permit night attacks. Ukrainian drone expenditure in 2023 was probably on the order of 90,000 FPV kamikaze drones, probably increasing to about 150,000 in 2024.

 

03 Sep 25. £1bn of military support for Ukraine paid for using immobilised Russian assets as Defence Secretary visits Kyiv. Loan to Ukraine has enabled UK to deliver hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defence missiles, and other essential equipment. Money raised from immobilised Russian assets has paid for more than £1bn of weapons and military support, purchased by the UK on behalf of Ukraine, the Defence Secretary, John Healey, announced during a visit to Kyiv today.   This has enabled the delivery of hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defence missiles, spare parts, and new support contracts to help maintain and repair its equipment and vehicles.  From Kyiv, the Defence Secretary also co-chaired a Coalition of the Willing virtual meeting with representatives from more than 30 countries to cement further military contributions to a multinational force to be deployed to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal.   He told the meeting that the UK is reviewing readiness levels of UK Armed Forces and accelerating funding to be ready for any deployment to Ukraine. Ministers also discussed the composition of a multinational force, as well as tactical detail relating to how the deployment would be strengthened across the skies, seas, and land.  The Defence Secretary spoke with Minister of Defence, Denys Shmyhal, about a major boost in the UK’s direct military support for Ukraine in recent weeks – having urged allies and partners this summer to join a 50-day drive to step up delivery of vital weapons and munitions to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position.

UK support provided in the last 50 days includes:

  • 4.7m rounds of small arms ammunition for Ukraine’s soldiers
  • 60,000 artillery shells, rockets, and missiles
  • More than 2,500 drones
  • More than 200 electronic warfare systems
  • 100 light weapons
  • 30 vehicles
  • Additional counter-drone and air defence equipment

The Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have both been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine. The UK remains committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, with £4.5bn being spent on military support to Ukraine this year.

The Government has provided a £2.26bn loan by the UK to Ukraine through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration fund, which is being repaid using money raised from the proceeds from immobilised Russian assets.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “The UK is stepping up our military support to help Ukraine defend itself in today’s fight against Putin’s illegal invasion, while working hard to secure peace tomorrow through the Coalition of the Willing.   More than £1bn of military support for Ukraine has now been paid for by immobilised Russian assets, while we have accelerated deliveries of vital kit and equipment over the last 50 days into the hands of Ukrainian warfighters. We are also deepening and expanding our cooperation with defence industry and learning valuable lessons from the battlefield.  On my fifth visit to Ukraine, it was an honour to meet Minister Shmyhal to stress our continued unity for Ukraine – both from the UK and across the Coalition of the Willing.”

The Defence Secretary hailed the growing ties between the UK and Ukraine’s defence industrial sectors during the visit. The growing collaboration between the UK and Ukraine’s defence sectors delivers on the 100-year partnership signed between the UK and Ukraine in January. It comes as the Foreign Secretary confirmed new sanctions targeting perpetrators of Russia’s heinous attempts to deport, indoctrinate and militarise Ukrainian children.  To date, more than 19,500 Ukrainian children have been forcibly transferred or deported by the Russian authorities to Russia and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

02 Sep 25. UK prioritise British suppliers in UAV funds for Ukraine. More than 70% will be spent with domestic drone builders in this financial year.. British suppliers will build the majority of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) that the UK government will finance for Ukraine in this financial year.

“We are on track to spend over 70% through UK suppliers,” said Luke Pollard, the UK Minister of the Armed Forces, just five months into the forecast period.

This latest figure stems from the government’s promise to provide 100,000 drones in a £350m investment package to aid the beleaguered nation in its conflict against invading Russian forces before the end of 2025. If the UK meets this target, it would see a considerable uptick: ten times more systems than last year. But this leaves another 30% of UK-financed drones to come from other international suppliers.

Breakdown of Ukraine’s UAV supply

Army Technology contacted the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to find out which specific foreign drone-builders are financed by the UK government but the department declined to comment for security reasons. Nor did the MoD offer any information about the leading types of UAV sent to Ukraine. But it is believed that Ukraine’s global UAV supply chain covers a complicated industrial web from which the Western-backed country sources cheap components from China, one of Russia’s few strategic partners. Likewise, some Russian weapons systems obtained from the frontline were similarly powered by components sourced from the US companies such as Intel, a computer processor builder which the US government holds a 10% ownership stake.

Effect on the battlefield

UAVs have changed the modern threat landscape, accounting for the destruction of up to 70% of Russian systems. Particularly, UAVs have adjusted how units operate – experts have pointed to Russia’s revival of motorcycles, buggies, and ATVs to rapidly outmanoeuvre the stalking systems. According to GlobalData intelligence, the global drones market will reach $89.8bn by 2030, up from $32.2bn in 2024. Revenue from commercial drones will surpass military sales in 2025, driven by favourable regulations and an increase in beyond visual line of sight operations. Although one expert from the Royal United Services Institute in London advises that this should not lead to overreliance. It would be a mistake for Nato forces to rely heavily on massed small UAVs and long range one-way effectors to replace traditional weapons systems, such as artillery, in pursuit of improved lethality. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

03 Sep 25. EU Chief’s Plane Hit by Suspected Russian GPS Jamming Over Bulgaria. A plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen experienced GPS jamming while approaching Plovdiv International Airport in Bulgaria on Sunday. The Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority said the GPS signal was “neutralized,” prompting air controllers to guide the flight using terrestrial tools. The plane landed safely despite circling the airport for nearly an hour. Bulgarian authorities suspect Russia was behind the incident. “We have received information from the Bulgarian authorities that they suspect that this was due to blatant interference by Russia,” European Commission Deputy Chief Spokesperson Arianna Podestà said.

The Kremlin denied the allegation, with spokesperson Dmitry Peskov telling the Financial Times: “Your information is incorrect.”

The disruption came as von der Leyen toured eastern EU states to discuss defense and support for Ukraine. Speaking in Bulgaria’s capital shortly after the incident, she urged Europe to “keep up the sense of urgency.”

“[Russian President Vladimir] Putin has not changed, and he will not change. He is a predator. He can only be kept in check through strong deterrence,” she said.

GPS jamming and spoofing have surged along Russia’s borders since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. An internal EU report said Poland recorded 2,732 interference cases in January 2025, up from 1,908 in October 2023. Lithuania saw a similar increase, logging 1,185 cases in January compared with 556 in March 2024. Other officials have also been targeted. In March 2024, a UK military plane carrying then-Defence Secretary Grant Shapps was hit by GPS spoofing near Kaliningrad. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

29 Aug 25. US approves potential sale of Starlink services, Patriot equipment to Ukraine. The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of Starlink services and related equipment and Patriot air defense sustainment and related equipment to Ukraine, the Pentagon said on Friday. The transactions are worth $150m and $179m, respectively. On Thursday, the Pentagon announced U.S. approval for the sale of air-launched cruise missiles and related equipment to Ukraine for an estimated $825m. Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here. The Trump administration has agreed with European allies to step up military support for Kyiv as U.S. President Donald Trump seeks to pressure Russia into agreeing a peace deal to end its war in Ukraine. Under the agreement, European governments will pay for U.S. weapons on Ukraine’s behalf. (Source: Reuters)

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