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Military And Security Developments

Aug 16.

16 Aug 25. Trump says Ukraine needs to make a deal after summit with Putin ends without ceasefire.

16 Aug 25. Initial reactions of Royal United Services experts on the meeting of President Trump and President Putin in Alaska. Rusi.org will feature commentaries reflecting on the summit and outcomes in coming days. 

Attributable to Dr Neil Melvin, Director of International Security at the Royal United Services Institute.

Vladimir Putin came to the Alaska summit with the principal goal of stalling any pressure on Russia to end the war. He will consider the summit outcome as mission accomplished. Russia’s war aims have not changed since it launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.  At the summit, Putin was clear that he wants to address first what he calls the root causes of the war.  The Kremlin identifies these as NATO enlargement, the emergence of governments in Ukraine resistant to Russian integration projects, and challenges to Russian claims about territory and ethnic Russians in Ukraine. This is Russia’s precondition and underpins Putin’s demand for a ‘comprehensive peace deal’. This agenda would lead to the subjugation of Ukraine. Putin made no concessions at the summit. Moreover, he succeeded in presenting himself as a legitimate equal to the US president. He will also consider it a victory that he was able to marginalise Zelensky and European leaders from the central discussion about the future of European security. The focus will now shift to a battle over next steps. Much will depend on what Trump does. In the weeks ahead of the summit, the US President appeared to grow frustrated by Russia’s lack of substantial engagement in a meaningful peace process. Sensing growing resolve from the Whitehouse, Putin agreed to the summit to forestall Trump’s threat of increased pressure on Russia, including the possibility of secondary sanctions. Putin clearly seeks to pull the US into a protracted negotiation, with a particular prize being to get Trump to come to Moscow, as Putin indicated at the close of the summit press conference. Putin will look to further increase the pressure on Kyiv by continuing the Russia summer military offensive which in the past week has shown signs of gaining momentum in the Donbass region. Trump clearly remains interested in brokering a peace deal, not least since this is the easiest path to a Noble Peace Prize. Nevertheless, at the close of the summit he also seemed to suggest that it was now up to Ukraine and the Europeans to take the process forward. If Putin cannot bait Trump into a further round of bilateral strategic summits, he will be content if Trump grows tired of the whole thing and effectively walks away.

Zelensky, backed by the Europeans, will feel that the summit has avoided the worst outcome – a deal over their heads. Zelensky needs to prevent Putin luring Trump into a series of discussions on a broad economic and political agenda and gradually downgrading the Ukraine war in US-Russia bilateral relations. Zelensky has proposed the idea of a trilateral meeting to keep Trump engaged.  Zelensky will travel to Washington next week to press this idea. His key tasks on Monday in the Oval Office will be to shore up Trump’s resolve to remain engaged and to press him to increase pressure on Putin to make a meaningful and immediate commitment to the negotiating table through further sanctions and stepping up military support to Ukraine.

Attributable to Matthew Savill, Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute.

If Putin’s military objective was to avoid immediate constraints on Russian operations in Ukraine, then he appears to have succeeded: the continued intensity of fighting reinforces the impression that the Russians are prioritising changing facts on the ground ahead of any ceasefire. Indeed, Putin may have successfully neutralised the idea of a ceasefire by hinting at a broader deal he knows will take time to negotiate. While we await specifics on what he offered, which have now been transmitted to Ukraine and its European partners, it seems unlikely that Russia will be prepared to take any significant steps backwards. And though Russian progress on the ground is painfully slow, it still seems to be calculating it can outlast Ukraine and its international backers. Absent a credible threat of more painful sanctions and expanded military support to Ukraine, the Russians remain focussed on grinding the Ukrainians down. For all the US military power on display in Alaska, Putin appears to have little fear it will be turned his way. Meanwhile, the European ‘Coalition of the Willing’ is stuck awaiting a ceasefire that that it is insufficiently intimidating to force into being. Having made a European deployment conditional on US support, and begun briefing about a lowered set of ambitions, Europe now has a difficult decision to make on the level of risk it is willing to take when backing Ukraine. And Ukraine still needs to find answers to Russia’s military-industrial advantages.

Attributable to Tom Keatinge, Director of the Centre for Finance and Security at the Royal United Services Institute.

For the self-styled master of the deal, the economic dimension of the summit is probably where Trump had the most to offer. The lead up contained a range of contradictory signals mixing carrots (investment deals and sanctions relief) with sticks (heavier sanctions and more tariffs on Russia’s oil trading partners, notably India, to reduce Russia’s oil income). Arriving with a ‘business’ team seemingly ready to discuss deals with Trump, Putin got none of the carrots he perhaps hoped for. Equally, from the little we have learned from the leaders’ post-summit remarks and travelling teams’ comments, the threat of further economic pressure was not discussed. Thus the status quo remains. All eyes will now turn back to the impending imposition of 25% tariffs on India for its purchase of Russian oil. In short, with Russia’s economy on the ropes, Trump remains bafflingly unwilling to apply the maximum economic pressure on Russia that would mean summits like those held yesterday are more likely to yield the success Donald Trump craves.

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Aug 14.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS  

• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s long-range strike campaign has continued to consist of relatively smaller barrages, likely as part of a deliberate move ahead of the upcoming Alaska summit
• SUMMIT: US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, will meet on 15 August in Anchorage (Alaska, US), amid Washington DC’s efforts to end the war
• ENERGY: Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz has secured a record USD 586 million agreement for emergency gas purchases, which will support efforts to mitigate energy insecurity risks ahead of the winter
• FORECAST: Russian forces have successfully penetrated Ukrainian defences north-east of Pokrovsk, but it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to successfully translate this penetration into a breakthrough
• BAKHMUT: Heavy fighting remains ongoing in and around Chasiv Yar and Toretsk (both Donetsk oblast), but much of the frontline remains heavily contested. Geolocated footage published on 12 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken ground in northern Shcherbynivka, located just over one mile (2km) to the west of Toretsk. This is the latest report indicating a consistent back-and-forth advance between both sides over the last two weeks, which suggests that the region remains heavily contested. Nevertheless, Russian forces are pushing the Ukrainians back steadily and are likely consolidating control over Toretsk itself.
• DONETSK: Russia has continued its offensive operations in the Pokrovsk sector, where it has achieved confirmed gains in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 12 August shows recent Russian advances in eastern Rodynske and central Udachne, located to the north and south-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) respectively. For analysis on Russia’s recent offensive push north-east of Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast), see FORECAST.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 13 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully counter-attacked in central Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast). Ukrainian forces are now manning positions near the city council building in the centre of the town, which is notably on the northern banks of the Vovcha River. Russian forces have been fighting for well over a year to consolidate control over the northern bank of the river, but this latest footage indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain strong positions on the far side of the river. Additionally, further to the east along the international border, geolocated footage published on 12 August confirms that Russian forces have expanded their control of Milove. Russian forces have now seized the southern sector of the frontline town, located around 58 miles (92km) to the east of Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast).
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage published on 11 and 12 August indicates that Russian forces have advanced in central Oleksiivka and central Yunakivka, located around 14 miles (23km) and 15 miles (25km) to the north and north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast) respectively. Russian sources have reported in recent days that Russia is rotating forces in northern Sumy oblast to relieve exhausted units, which could facilitate further limited advances in the coming weeks.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Russian forces have made confirmed advances in the Borova and Lyman directions. Geolocated footage from 11 August shows that Russian forces recently captured Zelenyi Hai, a settlement located approximately nine miles (15km) to the east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Meanwhile, further south, Russian forces have advanced to positions north‑west and south-east of Kolodyazi, located around nine miles (15km) to the north-east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 12 August confirms recent Russian progress in south‑eastern Ridkoun, located 15.3 miles (24.6km) to the north of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces are continuing to launch mechanised assaults across the southern axis, but Ukrainian forces are seemingly containing these attacks. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast) reported on 13 August that Ukrainian forces successfully repelled a Russian mechanised assault near Mala Tokmachka, located around 37 miles (60km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The Ukrainians reportedly destroyed one tank and four motorcycles and damaged an unknown number of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). While we cannot confirm this, Russian forces have alternated between mechanised and infantry assaults at intervals across different sectors of the frontline. Russian forces are clearly adapting their tactics and integrating new drone capabilities in a bid to keep the Ukrainians off balance but have made little progress on the southern axis in recent weeks.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s long-range strike campaign has continued to consist of relatively smaller barrages, likely as part of a deliberate move ahead of the upcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
• STRIKES: Russia continues to demonstrate a significant expansion of its drone production capacity, sustaining the threat of ever larger and intense long-range strikes in the future. On 12 August, the Deputy Head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Vadym Skibitskyi, reported that Russia aims to produce 79,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025. Initially, the Alabuga Shahed production plant in the Republic of Tatarstan was expected to manufacture 6,000 drones by 2025, under an agreement signed with Iran in early 2023. However, Russia reportedly reached this target around a year ahead of schedule and is now able to produce 5,500 units at the plant per month. Ukrainian forces have reportedly targeted the plant twice in recent days, with the most recent attack on 12 August. Skibitskyi explained that such attacks aim to prevent Russia from meeting its drone production goals. We assess that, while such strikes are likely to cause disruption, the plant likely has sufficient defences to minimise the impact of such attacks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SUMMIT: US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, will meet on 15 August in Anchorage (Alaska, US) amid Washington DC’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine. The meeting will take place at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson at 1130hrs (local time). In a possible attempt to manage expectations, on 12 August, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt described the upcoming summit as a ‘listening exercise’ for Trump. Meanwhile, on 11 August, Trump stated that he believes the meeting will be positive, but also said, ‘it might be bad’. The president also acknowledged that ‘it is not up to’ him to make a deal to conclude a resolution to the war. We continue to assess that the likelihood of a major diplomatic breakthrough is low. There is no genuine indication that Russia is willing to compromise on its war objectives at present that would facilitate a settlement.
• SUMMIT: Trump has reportedly told European leaders that he will not discuss ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia with Putin; the US president will instead push for a ceasefire. According to unspecified European diplomats familiar with a call between Trump and European leaders on 13 August, Trump believes that a ceasefire would be a gesture of goodwill from Russia. He also said the issue of Ukrainian territory is not for him to negotiate. Comments from French President Emmanuel Macron also corroborate Trump’s stance on the matter of discussing territorial concessions without Ukraine’s participation. Trump’s seeming alignment with Ukraine’s European allies regarding territory will likely moderately alleviate concerns about Trump entertaining a proposal for a ceasefire in exchange for Ukrainian land without Kyiv’s input at the summit.
• SUMMIT: Meanwhile, Macron disclosed on 13 August that the US is prepared to provide Ukraine with security guarantees once peace is reached; however, membership in NATO would not be part of any such arrangement. Trump has reportedly not specified what he meant by security guarantees; he only discussed the ‘broader concept’. That said, Trump made it clear that the US will not continue to provide weapons or troops directly to Ukraine, though he will sell arms to Europe for Ukraine’s benefit. Ukraine and its European allies have long urged the US to support post-war security guarantees for Kyiv. Trump reportedly acknowledges that a security guarantee from the US must be part of a final settlement. However, Ukraine continues to maintain that membership of NATO would be the most effective deterrent against renewed Russian aggression. Kyiv will highly likely perceive that its non-admission into the military alliance will be a victory for Moscow, given that such non-admission is one of Russia’s primary war objectives.
• SUMMIT: Lastly, Trump has warned that there will be ‘very severe consequences’ if Putin does not agree to end the war in Ukraine. Trump did not specify whether such consequences would entail new sanctions or tariffs. In recent months, the US president has made similar threats that have yet to materialise, including a previously set deadline to impose new economic penalties (which lapsed on 8 August). Amid conflicting reports that limited sanctions relief and possible economic co‑operation with the US are possible (including a potential offer for Russia to access Alaskan minerals as an incentive for peace), it remains unclear what Trump’s position will be (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 14 August 2025).
• SUMMIT: We continue to assess that Russia highly likely believes it can withstand new sanctions; the possibility of additional punitive measures alone is unlikely to encourage Moscow to take serious action towards ending the conflict in the near-to-medium term. Additionally, the possible offer of economic concessions, including access to the Alaskan market, is unlikely to convince Moscow that ending the war now is in its interests. For further analysis of the possible outcomes and implications of the Alaska summit, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 August 2025.
• SANCTIONS: On 13 August, the US Treasury Department temporarily lifted certain sanctions on Russian transactions to facilitate the upcoming Putin-Trump summit. The sanctions waiver allows the Russian government to spend money inside the US if necessary to support attendance at the meeting. It also enables US companies and other entities to accept summit-related payments that would otherwise be restricted due to sanctions. The authorisation will expire on 20 August. The waiver does not reflect official intentions to significantly ease sanctions against Russia in the near term. Rather, such action aims to allow Russian officials to visit the US, to help US entities avoid violating existing sanctions and to mitigate against possible confusion with compliance. Nevertheless, it is a notable precedent in and of itself, particularly given that Trump has previously indicated his desire to offer sanctions relief to Russia in a bid to reach a deal on Ukraine.
• ENERGY: Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz has secured a record USD 586 million agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for emergency gas purchases. Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said the deal, which was signed on 13 August, is the EBRD’s largest project in Ukraine. The loan will be the first to be provided under EU guarantee without a Ukrainian state guarantee. According to the deputy head of EBRD’s Ukraine operations, this will free up the Ukrainian state’s guarantee capacity so it can be utilised for other infrastructure projects necessary for Ukraine’s recovery. In May, Ukraine’s gas reserves in underground storage facilities were said to be at their lowest level in at least 11 years. The arrangement will highly likely aid preparations for winter, when Russia has traditionally ramped up attacks against energy infrastructure. It will also help to mitigate against energy insecurity and protracted energy outages, though these risks will remain high.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: On 11-12 August, Russian forces successfully penetrated Ukrainian defences north-east of Pokrovsk, making notable tactical gains north-east of Dobropillia and advancing in two prongs, likely as far as six miles (10 km) from their previous positions. According to the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group DeepState, Russian forces entered a string of settlements, including the villages of Kucheriv Yar, Rubizhne, Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodiaz. The Ukrainian General Staff has stated that Russian forces do not control these settlements and that Ukrainian troops are conducting clearing operations in these areas. Russian military bloggers have issued contradictory assessments regarding the extent of Russian control, with some claiming that the Russian push is being contained. It therefore remains unclear to what extent Russian forces will exploit the tactical penetration of Ukraine’s defences to create an opportunity for a much larger and more significant breakthrough. Russia’s latest offensive has likely provided Russian forces with a tactical advantage, but it does not yet constitute an operational breakthrough or signal an imminent collapse of the Ukrainian frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the assault was conducted by three Russian groupings and consisted of a series of dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance operations. Active Ukrainian defensive efforts, particularly via drone operations, will attempt to limit Russia’s ability to translate this into a wider breakthrough in the area. Although Russia is on the front foot, its positions east of Dobropillia are likely highly exposed at present. This will provide an opportunity for a series of Ukrainian counter-attacks that could blunt Russia’s opportunity and prevent Russia from exploiting the penetration. As such, reports indicate that Ukraine has committed reserves to the region, including, for example, the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, ‘Azov’. However, given Ukraine’s chronic shortages of personnel and reports that the initial defensive positions through which Russian forces penetrated were not effectively manned, it remains unclear whether Ukraine has sufficient reserves to plug this hole. If it does not, Ukraine will be forced to make difficult decisions as to where to rotate troops from, potentially leaving other sectors of the frontline weakened. It nevertheless remains unclear whether Russia has sufficient reserves to surge into the salient and consolidate its advances in the area. While we cannot confirm Russia’s overall strength in the area, various Ukrainian sources have raised concerns that as many as 100,000 Russian personnel have been committed to the Pokrovsk area. If true, this could theoretically provide Russian forces with the means to exploit the penetration. However, Russia would need to bring up a large amount of equipment and drone cover to turn the tactical success into an operationally significant breakthrough.  In this regard, Russian forces will likely seek to cut off the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk highway, a vital supply and logistical route for Ukrainian forces in Donetsk oblast. Initial reports claimed that Russian forces had indeed reached this highway. However, the situation currently remains fluid, with Ukrainian forces likely actively contesting Russian efforts to control the vital logistical route. Reaching this key supply route would likely facilitate Russia’s broader campaign to encircle key Ukrainian defensive positions in the region. This would potentially force limited Ukrainian withdrawals and therefore limit Russia’s need for costly and protracted urban assaults.

The recent penetration near Dobropillia was achieved in a relatively short timeframe, particularly compared to recent Russian advances in other areas, likely reflecting Ukraine’s mounting operational difficulties. A prominent Ukrainian OSINT analyst assessed that these penetrations, as well as Russian operations in and around Pokrovsk, are a clear consequence of the systemic challenges facing the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU). These challenges include a persistent shortage of personnel, compounded by inadequate recruitment efforts and a growing problem of desertion. As a result, Ukrainian units holding the frontline are often understaffed, while ongoing materiel shortages further undermine their combat effectiveness. Ultimately, the Dobropollia tactical penetration has provided Russian forces with their greatest opportunity to shift the battlefield further to their advantage in well over a year. If translated into an operationally significant breakthrough, this could provide Russia with an opportunity to unhinge Ukraine’s entire eastern Donbas defensive line and seriously threaten the fortress belt of cities that has been the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive strategy to date. However, whether Russian forces have the wherewithal and operational capabilities to successfully exploit this opportunity remains unclear.

However, the Dobropillia penetration also provides Russia with a diplomatic opportunity to press its advantage just days before the highly anticipated Trump-Putin summit on 15 August. The timing of the push means it is almost certain that the Kremlin will attempt to use these advances to showcase Russia’s military strength in comparison with Ukraine and present the conquest of Donetsk oblast as an inevitability. The Kremlin will likely highlight and amplify its gains in the Dobropillia area (along with other recent advances) as evidence of Ukraine’s operational difficulties, its diminishing ability to resist and as a means to justify its unchanging demands for major concessions. Given the significant advantage the recent offensive push has provided Russia, we assess that Russia is highly unlikely to agree to a ground ceasefire at the Alaska summit, just as its forces are poised to take advantage of a significant opportunity to make further gains.

• Russia-US: Offerings of sanctions relief, resource deals are unlikely to encourage war’s end. Reports emerged on 13 August claiming that US President Donald Trump is considering offering his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, various economic incentives to end the war in Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, the various options include allowing Russia to exploit natural resources in Alaska (US) and easing certain sanctions on Russia’s aviation industry. Another potential offering includes the US granting Russia access to rare earth minerals in Russian-occupied (and particularly resource-rich) Ukrainian regions. The report comes ahead of the Putin-Trump summit in Alaska on 15 August, at which we assess a major breakthrough to end the war is highly unlikely to materialise. While we cannot confirm whether Trump does indeed intend to offer Putin any of the abovementioned arrangements, they would (if true) underscore the US president’s attempts to employ economic incentives and/or pressure to encourage Russia to cease fighting. Even so, a slight relaxation of punitive measures and/or the extension of potential economic opportunities are unlikely to be sufficient to incentivise Putin to end the war in the short-to-medium term, especially without wider strategic concessions vis-à-vis Ukraine’s coveted NATO membership (among other provisions).

Aug 11.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: Russian forces have intensified their offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), leading to a steadily deteriorating situation for Ukrainian forces
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia has continued to carry out relatively smaller-scale attacks against Ukraine, a trend that could realistically prefigure an offer for a moratorium on long-range strikes
• BELARUS: Recent reports claim that increased flights between Belarus and Libya indicate that Minsk is possibly attempting to trigger a new migrant crisis in Europe
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on 15 August in Alaska (US) to discuss resolving the war in Ukraine, amid confusion around possible territorial concession proposals
• BAKHMUT: Heavy and dynamic fighting continues to take place to the north and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), as Russian forces seek to advance to the southern outskirts of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk) from three directions. However, much of the area north of Toretsk likely remains highly contested, as both sides are advancing at intervals across the region. Geolocated footage published on 7 August indicates that Russian forces managed to advance as far north as Serhiia Street in the centre of Katerynivka. However, geolocated footage from 7 and 8 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have repelled the Russian attack and moved south into central Shcherbyrivka.
• BAKHMUT: At the least, it remains likely that much of Shcherbyrivka remains a contested ‘grey zone’, but as long as Ukrainian forces contest the area, it will likely delay Russian efforts to encroach upon Kostiantynivka’s southern flank. As such, the latest footage likely indicates either that the Russian advance north into Katerynivka via Shcherbyrivka was a reconnaissance-in-force operation that possibly failed to facilitate the consolidation of the area, or that Ukrainian forces successfully launched a significant counter-attack, pushing the Russians back. Further to the west, geolocated footage published on 8 August also confirms that Russian forces have taken control of Poltavka, a village located around 12 miles (18.5km) to the west of Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the north-east, on 9 August, spokesperson for Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps, Dmytro Zaporozhets, denied Russia’s claims that it is in control of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). Zaporozhets claimed that ‘most of Chasiv Yar’ remained under the control of Ukrainian forces. While we cannot confirm whether Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the town as Russia claims, it remains our assessment that Russian forces are in control of the majority of the town.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have intensified their offensive operations in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), leading to a steadily deteriorating situation for Ukrainian forces. Geolocated footage from 8 August indicates recent advances by Russian troops in eastern and central Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, to the north of Pokrovsk, Russian forces have reportedly captured Zatyshok, according to the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group DeepState. Zatyshok is located just to the north of Rodynske (Donetsk), which Russia aims to capture to support its efforts to encircle Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: A prominent Ukrainian OSINT analyst has emphasised the worsening operational situation for Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk sector, particularly given that Moscow has committed a significant number of troops to operations in this area. In recent days, high-ranking Ukrainian military officials have reiterated that Russia has amassed around 100,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction, giving them a manpower advantage over Ukraine in the sector. Additionally, Ukrainian military sources in the area have noted that elite Russian Rubikon drone units pose a growing threat by enhancing the capabilities of other drone units operating in the region. These concerted efforts and the momentum the Russians have built in this area will make a serious ceasefire highly unlikely, despite diplomatic efforts in the run-up to the Alaska summit (see FORECAST).
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: On 10 August, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that its forces have seized the village of Bezsalivka, located just south of the international border inside Sumy oblast. While we cannot confirm this, Russian control of the settlement had likewise never been confirmed, though Russian sources have refuted the claims that Ukrainian forces have retaken the settlement. Reporting from the Sumy axis over recent weeks has indicated that Russian forces are increasingly on the defensive. Ukrainian counter-attacks and unconfirmed reports of partial and limited encirclements of Russian forces are seemingly forcing the latter to reposition various units to support defensive operations across the northern Sumy region.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Ukrainian forces have carried out successful counter‑attacks to the north of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), likely aiming to relieve pressure on the town, which is facing increasing risks of encirclement by Russian forces. Geolocated footage from 8 August shows recent Ukrainian progress south-west of Kindrashivka, located 5.4 miles (8.8 km) to the north of Kupiansk along the H-26 (P-79) highway. Footage from 6 August also indicates Ukrainian advances in the sector north-west of Radkivka, which is situated just to the south of Kindrashivka. Recent Russian advances have reached Sobolivka, to the north-west of Kupiansk, likely successfully interdicting the H-26 highway, a crucial logistical route for Ukrainian forces in Kupiansk. As such, recent Ukrainian successes are likely aimed at restoring control over the H-26 highway amid broader efforts to reduce the encirclement risks facing Kupiansk.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, at the south-eastern sector of the Oskil-Kreminna line, Russian troops have achieved confirmed gains in the direction of Lyman (Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage from 8 August indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Zarichne, a settlement located to the east of Lyman. As of 9 August, Russian forces had advanced into northern Shandryholove and north-west of Kolodyazi, located to the north-west and north-east of Lyman, respectively.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia has continued to carry out relatively smaller-scale attacks against Ukraine, a trend we have noticed since the beginning of the month. For instance, the largest strike since the start of the month occurred on 4 August, involving 162 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), compared to hundreds more per attack last month. This relative decrease in the intensity of Russia’s strike campaign coincides with an increase in diplomatic activity ahead of an anticipated meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska (US; see FORECAST).
• STRIKES: We believe that the recent lull in strikes likely reflects Moscow’s attempts to appease Trump (who has been critical of Russia’s large-scale barrages against Ukraine in recent months), while also demonstrating a willingness to engage in peace talks. A moratorium on long-range strikes is a realistic possibility in Alaska, as it would provide Russia with an opportunity to rebuild its stocks in preparation for intense attacks in the run-up to winter. However, in the absence of such an agreement, Russia will likely resume significantly large-scale strikes comprising several hundred UAVs, accompanied by a varying number of missiles, in the coming weeks.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its long-range drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, successfully targeting facilities located far from the border. According to sources in Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), a drone attack struck the Lukoil-Ukhta oil refinery in Russia’s north-western Komi Republic on 10 August. This site is located approximately 1,243 miles (2,000km) from the Ukrainian border, marking the first time Kyiv has struck this region in north-western Russia. According to GUR, the facility supplies fuel and lubricants to Russian military personnel.
• STRIKES: Ukraine’s General Staff also reported a strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City (Saratov oblast, Russia), causing a fire overnight on 9-10 August. The facility supplies the Russian military with various petroleum products. These attacks are part of an intensification of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure following a relative lull in such activities in recent months. Russia will likely use these recent attacks to justify a resumption of large-scale, high‑intensity strikes against Ukraine if the Trump-Putin summit fails to achieve a breakthrough.
• STRIKES: On 9 August, Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) co-ordinated a drone strike targeting a Russian Shahed drone warehouse in Kzyl Yul (Republic of Tatarstan). This site is approximately 27 miles (43km) from Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, and it serves as Russia’s primary large-scale production facility for Shahed drones. It remains likely that Ukraine will continue to target the Alabuga SEZ, given its vital role in facilitating large-scale Russian strikes. However, we assess that Russia has likely allocated significant air defence resources to bolster the plant’s defences and mitigate any disruption to drone production from potential Ukrainian strikes.
• STRIKES: On 6 August, the Deputy Commander of the NATO Security Assistance and Training Initiative for Ukraine (NSATU), German Major General Mike Keller, revealed that Russian forces had significantly damaged a US Patriot radar station in Ukraine several months ago. The damage resulted in the equipment being disabled. According to Keller, the damaged equipment was sent to Germany, where an initial forensic assessment determined that it was out of order and beyond repair. However, as it could not be replaced with a new system, experts were able to complete the necessary repair work. The system was returned to Ukraine in July. The development clearly underscores the West’s inability to provide sophisticated air defence systems at scale, resulting in Ukraine remaining chronically vulnerable to Russian long-range strikes.
• STRIKES: On 10 August, a Ukrainian drone manufacturer announced the development of a reusable drone designed to intercept other drones at speeds of up to 124mph (200kph). The new UAV is equipped with a shotgun and an automatic firing system that can hold either two or four rounds. Additionally, the system reportedly includes a digital communications framework that enables the drone to evade Russian counter-drone measures. This development highlights Kyiv’s ongoing efforts to create cost-effective solutions to counter Moscow’s drone strikes, reducing its reliance on expensive Western equipment. However, such efforts will likely be offset by Russia’s own innovations. For instance, there is evidence that, in recent strikes, Russia has used drones equipped with jet engines, which significantly increase the speed of these drones to up to 500mph (800 kph). If Russia succeeds in scaling up the use of these jet-propelled drones, Ukraine’s interceptor drones will likely remain inefficient in countering the most modern long-range drones, though they will remain effective at intercepting decoys and more traditionally powered drones.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AZERBAIJAN: Azerbaijan may consider lifting restrictions on supplying military assistance to Ukraine if Russia continues targeting Azerbaijani interests in the country. Azerbaijani news outlet Caliber, which is considered to be a mouthpiece for the country’s Ministry of Defence, reported this on 10 August, citing unspecified insiders after a call between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Ukraine. The outlet accused Russian forces of systematically striking Azerbaijan’s energy facilities in Ukraine. On 7-8 August, Russian forces launched a drone attack against an oil depot belonging to Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil and gas company SOCAR in Odesa oblast; four SOCAR employees were reportedly seriously injured.
• AZERBAIJAN: Baku has refrained from supplying arms to Kyiv throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the (unconfirmed) reports suggesting a possible major policy shift. The developments also come amid a sharp deterioration of Azerbaijani-Russian relations in recent months, with these dynamics also possibly providing impetus for Azerbaijan to increase its support for Ukraine. Earlier on 11 August, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed an order allocating the country’s energy ministry USD 2 m to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. However, we assess that increased humanitarian aid and energy support from Azerbaijan will be more likely than military support in the coming months.
• AZERBAIJAN: Meanwhile, reports emerged on 8 August that the Romanian authorities are investigating a potential case of Russian sabotage concerning contaminated Azerbaijani oil destined for Romania’s Petrobrazi oil refinery (Prahova county). The supplies, which were transported via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline before being shipped to Romania, were found to contain ‘dangerously high’ levels of chlorine. According to unspecified insiders, the contamination could have been caused by the injection of chlorine into the pipeline. We cannot confirm who was behind the suspected contamination. However, should Azerbaijan supply Ukraine military assistance in the coming weeks or months, and if Moscow is determined to deter Baku from providing such support, this will realistically precipitate other similar incidents (either unconfirmed or confirmed). In turn, this will possibly modestly elevate energy security risks for Azerbaijan’s key energy customers in Europe.
• BELARUS: Recent reports claim that increased flights between Belarus and Libya indicate that Minsk is possibly attempting to trigger a new migrant crisis in Europe. The Telegraph reported on 9 August that the European Commission has tracked an increased number of flights operated by Belarusian flag carrier Belavia between the Libyan city of Benghazi (Cyrenaica region) and the Belarusian capital Minsk. Starting in summer 2021, the Belarusian authorities actively facilitated the travel of tens of thousands of Middle Eastern migrants and refugees to Belarus for onward travel to bordering EU countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). At the time, the West accused Belarus and Russia of orchestrating the influx of irregular migration as a hybrid attack against Europe, which came less than a year before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• BELARUS: In the first seven months of this year, the EU recorded approximately 5,000 irregular crossings on its eastern frontier; this is significantly fewer than during the previous migrant crisis. For example, in 2021, the three above-mentioned EU countries recorded 52,151 border crossing attempts, which decreased to 31,497 in 2022 before spiking to just over 43,000 in 2023. As such, it is premature to determine whether increased Benghazi-Minsk flights in recent months have increased the risk of a new migrant crisis, particularly given that frontline EU states have built new fortifications along the Belarusian border. Nevertheless, growing Russian influence in Libya and possible co-ordination with General Khalifa Haftar, who controls much of eastern Libya and cross-border smuggling routes, will possibly facilitate a new influx of irregular migration. However, bordering EU countries have likely increased their resiliency to crossing attempts from Belarus since 2021 and will likely be better prepared to thwart any large-scale influx of irregular migration.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on 15 August in Alaska (US) to discuss resolving the war in Ukraine. Trump’s confirmation of the upcoming summit on 8 August coincided with a deadline that he had previously set for Russia to either reach a peace deal or face tariffs and see its trading partners face secondary sanctions. The deadline passed without any new economic penalties materialising (as we had previously assessed was likely to be the case). For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 7 August 2025. Over recent days, competing reports have emerged detailing Russia’s conditions for an end to the war ahead of the summit, which we assess have not substantively changed and are highly unlikely to be acceptable to any party as they currently stand. Initially, on 8 August, Bloomberg reported that, as part of a peace deal, Russia would demand that Ukraine withdraw its forces from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the former of which Russia does not totally control. In this scenario, Russia would freeze fighting in Ukraine’s Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It was not immediately clear whether Russian forces would withdraw from these regions or if the conflict would be frozen along frontlines there. Putin and other Russian officials have previously demanded that Ukraine withdraw its forces from all four oblasts. However, it remains a realistic possibility that Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff misunderstood Putin when they met on 6 August. Rather, it remains likely that Putin wants Russia to retain control over all four regions and has no intention of withdrawing from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. We continue to see no indication that Moscow is willing to make meaningful concessions to end the war at present or in the near future. For further analysis on Russian demands, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 August 2025.

According to a report on 9 August from the German news outlet BILD detailing the potential misunderstanding, the Russian side has only offered partial ceasefires. These include an agreement between both parties to cease attacks against energy infrastructure or unspecified major cities behind the frontlines. The outlet reported that Putin does not want to halt Russian offensives under any circumstances, even though the US has proposed sanctions relief and new economic agreements in exchange. This aligns with our above analysis that the Kremlin will see current advances in Donetsk oblast as meaning a ceasefire is not in its interests in the short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, an unspecified insider in the Ukrainian presidential office has claimed that, as a ‘sign of goodwill’, Russia would withdraw its troops from Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, where Russian forces hold some territory, in exchange for much more significant territorial concessions in Donetsk oblast. Moscow has not formally annexed Kharkiv and Sumy, unlike Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Confusion around what compromises Russia is (or is not) willing to make is possibly part of a deliberate bid to stall serious negotiations in the near term. Either way, Ukraine remains opposed to ceding land to Russia and is unlikely to make significant changes to its public stance on the matter in the near term, given strong European backing on this issue. It is also possible that Russia has voiced its demands ahead of the summit, knowing that Ukraine will almost certainly reject them, so as to portray Kyiv (and its European partners) as being the principal impediment to peace. On 10 August, Deputy Chair of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev accused European officials of trying to derail the US’ efforts to broker peace. Ultimately, such messaging is highly likely aimed at driving a wedge between Europe and the US on how to handle the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Given the confusion and Trump’s possible readiness to pressure Ukraine to accept significant territorial concessions, the Alaska summit has almost certainly reignited concerns in Europe that Kyiv’s interests will be sidelined. Trump has stated that ending the war will require territorial exchanges ‘to the betterment of both’, but it remains unclear precisely what Trump meant by his comments. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s European allies released a joint statement on 9 August voicing their stance on peace negotiations. It emphasised that meaningful negotiations can only take place during a ceasefire or reduction of hostilities, that Ukraine cannot be excluded from the process and that the current frontlines should be the starting point of talks. This aligns with a reported counter-proposal from European officials; they argued that any territorial exchanges must be reciprocal, with firm security guarantees. Ultimately, the actions of Ukraine’s European allies likely underscore their concerns that the Trump administration will push for a quick deal between the US and Russia to end the war, at Ukraine’s expense.

US Vice President JD Vance has stated that neither side will be ‘super happy’ with a peace deal, though we assess that Kyiv will likely have to make more painful concessions to end the war. Such comments are highly likely aimed at minimising concerns that a peace deal will disproportionately favour Russia’s interests over Ukraine’s. Vance also disclosed that Trump told him privately that the negotiations may not succeed in ending the war, indicating a lack of confidence in the outcome of talks. We continue to assess that a major breakthrough that ends the conflict for good is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. Instead, Russia will possibly offer temporary or partial ceasefires (including moratoria on long-range strikes as long as Ukraine obliges) as mentioned above. However, the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms and significantly low trust between Russia and Ukraine will increase the risk of any cessation of hostilities collapsing.

Lastly, it remains unlikely that the upcoming summit will be expanded to a trilateral meeting to include Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. CNN reported on 10 August that Zelensky has not been named as a participant in the Alaska summit. However, the Trump administration reportedly has not dismissed the possibility of including him in some meetings. However, one unspecified White House official said that any engagements involving the Ukrainian president would likely happen after the Putin-Trump meeting. The Ukrainian side has pushed for Zelensky to meet Putin face-to-face, though the Russian president has so far refused until a full peace deal is reading for signing. We assess that Russia will highly likely want the upcoming summit to remain between Putin and Trump, to focus on deterring US tariffs and sanctions, and to extract possible territorial concessions without Ukrainian input.

• Russia-US: Presidential summit will unlikely result in major breakthrough toward ending Ukraine war. On 8 August, US President Donald Trump announced that he will meet his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on 15 August in Alaska (US) to discuss resolving the war in Ukraine. The meeting will be the first between a sitting US and Russian president since June 2021. The upcoming Putin-Trump summit has almost certainly reignited concerns among Ukraine and its European allies that Kyiv’s interests will be sidelined. Trump has stated that ending the war will require territorial exchanges from both sides, but Ukraine has maintained its opposition to ceding land to Russia. Pressure from the US for Ukraine to make territorial concessions will possibly increase over the coming days and weeks. While a major breakthrough that ends the war for good will be highly unlikely following the summit, a temporary and/or partial ceasefire is possible. However, we assess that the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms and significantly low trust between Russia and Ukraine will increase the risk of any cessation of hostilities collapsing. (Source: Sibylline)

14 Aug 25. Putin says US making ‘energetic’ efforts to end Ukraine war and floats nuclear arms control deal. Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday that the United States is taking action to stop the war in Ukraine, in a meeting with Russian top officials ahead of Friday’s summit in Alaska with US President Donald Trump. Before he travels to Alaska, Putin chaired a meeting that included members of the negotiating team that will join him at the summit, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, to brief them on “how the negotiation process on the Ukrainian crisis is going.”

“The current American administration… is making, in my opinion, quite energetic and sincere efforts to stop the hostilities, stop the crisis and reach agreements that are of interest to all parties involved in this conflict,” Putin said.

Putin said that peace will be strengthened between Russia and the US – as well as the wider world – if the two countries reach agreements in the field of nuclear arms control. (Source: CNN)

13 Aug 25. Ukraine successfully tests Starlink’s direct-to-cell technology. Ukraine’s largest mobile operator Kyivstar has successfully conducted the first field test of Elon Musk’s Starlink direct-to-cell satellite technology in Eastern Europe, the company said on Tuesday. The pilot test took place in the Zhytomyr region using Starlink’s direct-to-cell technology, Kyivstar said, with its CEO Oleksandr Komarov and Ukraine’s digital transformation minister Mykhailo Fedorov exchanging messages via regular smartphones. (Source: Reuters)

13 Aug 25. European military-industrial output for Ukraine outpaces the US.  European military industrial production in support of Ukraine has overtaken American output for the first time since Russia’s invasion, new numbers released Tuesday show. According to the tally by the German Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Europe allocated at least €35.1bn ($41.1bn) in military industrial output to Ukraine between the start of the war in February 2022 and the end of June 2025. This is €4.4 bn ($5.15 bn) more than the U.S. committed in the same period. The continent also overtook the U.S. in terms of total military aid in the spring, following a sharp rise in European support for Ukraine in response to America’s withdrawal under the nascent Trump administration. EU countries have allocated over $65 bn in military assistance to Ukraine, according to the Union’s own tally. Additionally, several non-EU European countries are major donors, bringing up the European total. The numbers do not include the recently announced American weapons deliveries, which are the first large batch approved by President Donald Trump’s administration, because they will be purchased by Kyiv, rather than donated. The disparity is even greater when accounting for other forms of aid, too. Europe has allocated €167.4bn ($196.1bn) in government aid to Kyiv and pledged another €90 bn ($105.4bn), according to the Kiel Institute’s tracker. The U.S. has allocated and pledged €114.6bn ($134.3bn) and €4.35bn ($5.1bn), respectively. Although Europe’s combined clout has consolidated to buttress Ukraine, the U.S. nonetheless remains the single largest donor. Its combined total is nearly twice that of the second-largest donor, the European Union, which has provided €60.5bn ($70.9bn) in financial aid and €2.7bn ($3.2bn) in humanitarian assistance.

The U.S. has also provided to Ukraine more infantry fighting vehicles and howitzers than any other single country, as well as multiple launch rocket systems and air defense systems. However, European tallies combined surpass the U.S. in all of these categories. The No. 1 European donor country is Germany, although as a portion of their gross domestic product, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia lead the pack. Denmark’s aid to Ukraine amounts to 2.9% of the country’s GDP, plus a further 0.4% if EU-provided assistance is considered in the tally. Poland has also been a significant supporter, including coming out as the No. 1 tank provider for Ukraine, having sent Kyiv a total of 354 tanks. The Netherlands has provided 104 and Denmark 94. Kiel Institute researchers noted that many of the weapons now going to Ukraine come straight from the military-industrial output of the sending countries, rather than from preexisting stockpiles, as had been the case in the earlier days of the war. Early on, stockpiles of weapons and gear had run low across many Western countries as the systems were rushed to the frontlines in Ukraine in defense against the Russian invasion. Unlike unpredictable American assistance, European support has remained consistent — and even expanded — as fighting in Ukraine dragged on into its fourth year. In May and June 2025 alone, European governments allocated €10.5bn ($12.3bn) in new military assistance, of which at least €4.6 bn ($5.4 bn) is being routed through procurement contracts, rather than pulled from existing stockpiles, underscoring the growing centrality of industrial output over surplus arsenals. (Source: Defense News)

13 Aug 25. Russia says it struck Ukrainian missile plants. Russia’s defence ministry said on Thursday that its forces had struck a number of Ukrainian missile plants, weapons design bureaus and rocket fuel productions enterprises with missiles and drones in July. Russian forces destroyed a number of Western missile defence systems – including Patriot launchers and fire control radar in the Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy regions – that had been deployed to defend the plants, the ministry said.

“An attempt by the Kyiv regime, together with its Western partners, to organise the production of missiles to carry out attacks deep into the territory of the Russian Federation was thwarted,” the ministry said. (Source: Reuters)

13 Aug 25. Russia Uses Shahed Drones to Deploy PTM-3 Anti-Tank Mines in Ukraine. Russian forces are modifying Shahed-series drones to deploy PTM-3 anti-tank mines over Ukrainian territory, according to Ukraine’s National Police.

“In the Sumy region, a hostile attack drone shot down by the Ukrainian Defense Forces was found, which had clusters of anti-tank mines PTM-3 attached under its wings,” the agency said in a social media post.

The PTM-3 is a small, plastic-cased anti-tank mine with a magnetic sensor that triggers when military vehicles pass close or stop nearby. Its non-metallic body makes it hard to detect with standard metal detectors. The National Police warned the drones could remotely mine roads, fields, and unpaved routes in active or low-visibility areas.  Civilians, especially agricultural and utility vehicle operators, were urged to avoid suspect roads and report any mines. Authorities also cautioned against approaching downed drones, citing possible secondary charges or booby traps. Russia has not commented on the discovery. However, footage posted Sunday by pro-Russian Telegram channels, including NGP-Razvedka, appeared to confirm the deployment, showing a Shahed releasing PTM-3 mines from wing-mounted cassettes onto routes used by Ukrainian forces. Without disclosing the location, NGP-Razvedka’s post said the Shahed drone remotely mined Ukrainian supply routes, destroying one vehicle and damaging another carrying soldiers.

“The guidance system will be further improved, the tactics of use will be expanded, and the Nazis’ logistics will be turned into a real nightmare,” the post added.

The Iranian-made Shahed-series drones, with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, are long-range loitering munitions capable of carrying large explosive warheads or specialized payloads. Guided by GPS and inertial navigation systems, they can strike both stationary and moving targets with precision. Satellite imagery and open-source intelligence earlier showed that Russian forces were converting the ruins of Donetsk Airport into a launch and storage hub for these drones.  (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

12 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine steps up drone strikes as Trump-Putin summit nears Ukrainian forces have intensified long-range drone operations deep into Russian territory, according to figures released by Moscow ahead of a planned Friday meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska. Russia’s Defense Ministry said its air defenses shot down 59 Ukrainian drones overnight into Monday, including nine intercepted en route to Moscow. Temporary flight restrictions were imposed at airports in Penza, Nizhny Novgorod, Kaluga, Volgograd and Saratov during the attacks, the federal air transport agency Rosaviatsiya reported. The latest tally brings the total number of Ukrainian drones claimed downed by Russia in August to 1,337, an average of more than 121 per day. In July, Moscow reported destroying 3,008 Ukrainian drones, averaging about 97 per day. Russia does not disclose the total number of incoming drones, and neither side releases full data on cross-border strikes. Ukraine’s air force said Russia launched 100 drones at Ukraine overnight, of which 70 were intercepted or suppressed. Russian strikes so far in August have averaged 74 drones and one missile per day, down from July’s record of 201 drones and six missiles daily.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has vowed to expand Ukraine’s long-range strike capability to pressure Moscow into talks, while rejecting territorial concessions or restrictions on Kyiv’s NATO and EU ambitions. Putin has demanded Ukraine cede several southern and eastern regions, limit its armed forces and rule out NATO membership, terms Zelenskyy calls an attempt to “partition Ukraine.”

Trump has floated the idea of “some swapping of territories,” a suggestion Zelenskyy dismissed, saying Ukraine would not reward Russia for its actions. On Monday, he called for stronger global pressure, accusing Moscow of prolonging the war. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-steps-up-drone-strikes-as-trump-putin-summit-nears/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

13 Aug 25. Ukraine Creates Reusable Interceptor Drone Equipped with a Shotgun. The Ukrainian company Besomar has developed a reusable interceptor drone equipped with a shotgun and an automated firing system. Representatives of the company told Militarnyi about their product during Iron Demo 2025. According to the developers, in the current configuration, the system mounted on an aircraft-type interceptor drone allows for two shots, but this number can be increased to four if necessary.

“Two shots can be fired from an airplane, and we can increase the number of shots to four on board. We generally develop airplanes and produce mass-produced aircraft. But there was a request to develop something new that could shoot in the air and still return,” says the company representative.

According to the developers, their interceptor can neutralize drones at speeds up to 200 km/h, including Gerbera UAVs that fly at 100-130 km/h and various types of reconnaissance UAVs. Since the interceptor is equipped with a digital communication system with a frequency response function, it can approach the target and hit it unnoticed by the evasion systems installed on Russian drones. A feature of the system is that it can fire at the target not only manually but also automatically. Due to a sensor in the nose of the drone, the system, with the pilot’s permission, initializes the shot when the target enters the kill zone. This significantly increases the efficiency of hitting maneuvering targets, as the pilot may not have enough reaction time to fire a shot manually. The weapon uses a recoil-free system based on 12-gauge ammunition, which ensures the stability of the UAV during the shot. This is not the first drone of this type developed in Ukraine. In March 2025, the Ukrainian drone manufacturer Sky Defenders tested a new version of a UAV with a shotgun mounted on it. The drone is made according to a standard airplane-type design and is launched from the ground using a catapult. The nose of the drone is equipped with a shotgun with a sighting scope for accurate firing during the flight. For easy target acquisition, the top of the drone is equipped with a rotating digital camera, which, according to the company’s video, is also used on the ZigZag interceptor drone. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI)

12 Aug 25.  Ukraine, sidelined in Trump-Putin summit, fights Russian grab for more territory.

• Summary
• EU leaders urge truce, right to Ukrainian self-determination
• Trump’s land swap proposal alarms Ukraine and EU
• Putin-Trump summit to be held at Alaska Air Force base
• White House calls summit a “listening exercise”
• Russia makes big push in eastern Ukraine, open source data shows

Small bands of Russian soldiers thrust deeper into eastern Ukraine on Tuesday before a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump, which European leaders fear could end in peace terms imposed on an unlawfully shrunken Ukraine.

In one of the most extensive incursions so far this year, Russian troops advanced near the coal-mining town of Dobropillia, part of Putin’s campaign to take full control of Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Ukraine’s military dispatched reserve troops, saying they were in difficult combat against Russian soldiers. (Source: Reuters)

12 Aug 25. Russia makes sudden advance in Ukraine before Trump-Putin summit.

Summary

• Some Ukrainian and Western war bloggers sound the alarm
• Ukrainian army plays down Russian advance
• Move threatens to breach Ukrainian defence lines
• Putin and Trump to meet on Friday in Alaska

Russian forces have made a sudden thrust into eastern Ukraine near the coal mining town of Dobropillia, a move that may be designed to increase the pressure on Kyiv to give up land as the U.S. and Russian presidents prepare to meet. Ukraine’s authoritative DeepState war map showed on Tuesday that Russian forces had advanced by at least 10 km (six miles) north in two prongs in recent days, part of their drive to take full control of Ukraine’s Donetsk region. (Source: Reuters)

08 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drone strikes hit 5 Russian jets. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) has claimed responsibility for an overnight drone strike on the Russian-controlled Saky airbase in Crimea, hitting five fighter jets and an ammunition depot used in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. The strike, carried out by the SBU’s Special Operations Centre “A,” reportedly destroyed one Su-30SM multirole fighter aircraft, damaged a second Su-30SM and damaged three Su-24 strike bombers. The drone attack also hit a depot used to store aviation weapons, according to a statement from the security agency on Tuesday. Saky airbase plays a key role in Russia’s operations over the Black Sea, supporting air patrols, radar surveillance and long-range strike missions targeting Ukrainian territory. The airfield is home to aircraft that regularly take part in bombing raids and reconnaissance missions against Ukrainian targets.

“The successful special operation carried out by the SBU in Saky marks another step toward weakening the enemy’s capacity to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine,” the agency said.

The Su-30SM is a modern, twin-engine, multirole fighter introduced in the 2010s, with a per-unit cost estimated between €30 and €43 m. The Su-24, in contrast, is a Soviet-era strike aircraft that entered service in the early 1970s and continues to be used by Russia for deep strike missions. The strike on Saky comes amid a broader Ukrainian campaign to degrade Russian airpower and naval capabilities in and around Crimea. In recent months, Kyiv has repeatedly targeted Russian naval and air assets in the region, including the successful destruction of the Caesar Kunikov landing ship, the Sergei Kotov patrol ship and the Ivanovets missile corvette. These losses have forced Russia to reposition much of its Black Sea Fleet further from Crimea. Ukraine has also increased its focus on Russian airbases and warplanes. On June 1, Kyiv launched what it described as “Operation Spiderweb,” a coordinated drone assault on four Russian airbases deep inside Russia. That attack reportedly damaged 41 aircraft and was notable for the use of drones launched from concealed truck platforms across multiple locations. Russia has not confirmed the extent of the damage at Saky, and independent verification of the Ukrainian claims remains limited. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-drone-strikes-hit-5-russian-jets/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

08 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian strike damages Russian drone infrastructure at key launch base. Satellite imagery has confirmed substantial damage to Russia’s drone infrastructure at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airbase following a Ukrainian strike last week, according to a report by Ukraine’s geospatial intelligence project Cyber Boroshno. The nighttime drone attack, conducted between August 1 – 2, targeted one of Russia’s most active long-range UAS launch sites. Analysts say the strike resulted in confirmed hits on three structures used to store Iranian-designed Shahed drones, commonly deployed in Russia’s long-range attack campaigns against Ukraine.

“High activity by cargo vehicles and UAVs was observed around these buildings,” researchers noted, citing satellite photos obtained in the aftermath.

The strike also inflicted critical damage on a separate facility used for storing and preparing aerial munitions. Fires were recorded across multiple parts of the base, including one of the primary launch pads used for drone operations. The extent of the damage suggests a significant disruption to ongoing drone sorties from the site. Primorsko-Akhtarsk, located in Russia’s Krasnodar region, primarily hosts tactical aviation but has evolved into a strategic drone launch platform. In recent years, Moscow has constructed dedicated infrastructure at the site, referred to by Ukrainian analysts as a “droneport,” consisting of three compact zones used for the storage, preparation and launch of UAVs. Eight fixed launch systems have been identified at the airbase by geospatial analyst Dnipro, alongside an adjacent airstrip used for mobile drone launches from vehicles. To protect the installation, Russian forces have deployed an S-400 air defense system consisting of six launchers and two radar stations. However, according to local media and satellite assessments, the system failed to intercept the Ukrainian drones responsible for the August 1 – 2 strike.

Ukrainian strike damages Russian drone infrastructure at key launch base

(Source: https://cuashub.com/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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www.exensor.com

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13 Aug 25. Potential use of military on domestic soil will raise supervision quality, domestic unrest risks. According to reports on 12 August, the Trump administration is looking at plans to set up a 600-person National Guard team for quick deployment to US cities to quell protests or other unrest. The ‘Domestic Civil Disturbance Quick Reaction Force’ would be outfitted with riot gear to be on constant standby and could be deployed in as little as one hour. This report follows President Donald Trump’s deployment of 800 National Guard troops to the capital Washington DC and the temporary takeover of the city’s police department. Also on 12 August, Trump threatened homeless individuals who do not comply with law enforcement with fines or jail time. In the short term, we assess that any widespread criticism of policing conduct in Washington DC will trigger an increase in activism. While a quick reaction force would likely only come to fruition in the longer term, it underscores Trump’s increasing inclination to use the military on domestic soil for traditional law enforcement duties. Any such deployment across the US would raise significant domestic unrest risks and increase concerns about infringement of the constitutional rights of free speech and assembly. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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14 Aug 25. Germany: Protest highlights activist threat to defence CEOs; further sabotage incidents are possible. On 13 August, the far-left Rheinmetall Entwaffen (Disarm Rheinmetall) group announced plans to protest outside the private home of Armin Papperger, the CEO of the defence company Rheinmetall. The protest is scheduled to take place on 28 August in North Rhine-Westphalia state. The announcement came after the police banned a protest camp that Rheinmetall Entwaffen planned to establish between 26 and 31 August in Cologne (North Rhine-Westphalia). The planned protest on 28 August (which will possibly be banned) underscores the physical security risks facing Papperger specifically. We assess (albeit to a lesser degree) that this risk extends to other defence CEOs in Germany. Far-left activists previously claimed responsibility for starting a fire on a property owned by Papperger. More significantly, a senior NATO official has confirmed there was a Russian plot to assassinate Papperger (who now has a permanent security detail). We have repeatedly assessed that Germany’s defence overhaul will drive far-left and anti-war activism risks. In the coming weeks, this will possibly lead to further sabotage incidents targeting the country’s railway system and/or vandalism against companies with ties to the defence sector. (Source: Sibylline)

13 Aug 25. Serbia: Clashes underscore risk of violence between anti-government, pro-government groups. On 12 August, clashes broke out between anti-government protesters and pro-government groups in Bačka Palanka and Vrbas (both Vojvodina province). According to the police, 16 police officers and 50 citizens were injured in Vrbas, where rival groups rallied outside the local headquarters of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). The police accused pro-government protesters of intending to attack SNS supporters. However, there are indications that the violence was instigated by pro-government groups (for which there is precedent Serbia); some members of pro-government groups were masked and possibly associated with hooligan factions. Anti-government protesters allege that the police allowed the pro-government groups to hurl objects and fireworks at them. Student-led, anti-government protests have been ongoing since November 2024 and have largely remained peaceful. However, the incidents in Bačka Palanka and Vrbas underscore the latent risk of violence breaking out at these protests, particularly when pro-government groups counter the demonstrations. Since the anti-government protests show no sign of abating, we assess that further violent outbreaks will likely occur on a sporadic basis. (Source: Sibylline)

07 Aug 25. Meloni presses Leonardo, Fincantieri on spending EU defense cash. Italian government and industry leaders are rushing this week to figure out how to spend a European Union-backed windfall of billions of euros in defense cash as Italy seeks to reach new NATO spending targets. In a week when most Italian politicians were heading for the beach, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni summoned the CEOs of state-controlled defense firms Leonardo and Fincantieri on Tuesday to discuss how to spend the cash. The talks followed Italy’s decision to apply for low-cost loans to be issued by the EU under its new SAFE, or Security Action for Europe, plan, which will see the creation of a €150bn ($174.2bn) pot to be used for defense spending loans. A source at Italy’s finance ministry told Defense News that Italy may procure loans worth €5 bn over five years to beef up defense spending and help push it towards the 5% of GDP spending that NATO members committed to in June. At the meeting, which was also attended by Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto and Italy’s finance and foreign ministers, Meloni asked the CEOs to “create a strategy to identify the principal ways to invest.” She asked them to “maximize dual-use investments” that provide benefits both inside and outside the defense industry, and “seek compatibility between our investments and those made by our European partners,” suggesting a focus on joint EU defense programs. The EU has already specified that spending based on SAFE loans should invest in fields including air and missile defense, artillery, missiles, drones and cyber warfare. As well as discussing the possibility of Italy signing up to the SAFE scheme, Meloni cited a second EU-backed plan launched this year to allow member states to ramp up defense spending even if it drives their national deficit spending over the EU limit of 3%. The government source told Defense News that Italy would not take advantage of the plan immediately since its overall spending has already pushed its deficit over 3%. (Source: Defense News)

08 Aug 25. Scotland at the heart of defence investment as small and medium businesses get a seat at the table. The contribution of Scottish SMEs to the UK’s national security was recognised during a roundtable held yesterday at Edinburgh’s Queen Elizabeth House, chaired by Defence Minister Lord Coaker following his visit to the Edinburgh Royal Military Tattoo.

• Small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) take part in Government roundtable in Edinburgh, discussing how defence can boost growth in Scotland.
• Chaired by UK Defence Minister Lord Coaker, the roundtable follows the MoD’s commitment to spend £7.5bn with SMEs by 2028.
• Scotland is at the heart of UK’s defence industry, keeping the UK safe at home and strong abroad, delivering on the Government’s Plan for Change.

The Minister met with representatives from eight companies, from Stirling to Forfar, to discuss their innovative work that helps keeps the country safe.   Ahead of the upcoming Defence Industrial Strategy, the government has announced the intent to increase spending with SMEs by £2.5bn over the next three years, reversing the fall that was recorded before last year’s election. This government’s commitment to SMEs recognises the vital role they play at all levels within the defence supply-chain – both directly and indirectly –with a total of £7.5bn to be spent with SMEs by 2028.

Defence Minister Lord Coaker said: “It was fantastic to meet many innovative Scottish companies who play a crucial role in strengthening our national security, boosting growth and providing jobs in their local communities.  Businesses in Scotland will be among those who can benefit from the £2.5bn increase in SME spending that we will deliver, helping drive defence as an engine for economic growth – as we deliver on our Plan for Change. As well as being home to thousands of military personnel and major bases, defence is a key driver for renewal in Scotland, with latest statistics showing that the MOD spends more than £2bn a year with the defence sector in Scotland, supporting nearly 12,000 industry jobs.”

Scottish Secretary, Ian Murray said: “We are proud of Scotland’s defence sector and we will always stand up for the industry and workforce. The UK Government’s historic uplift in defence spending will see a huge defence dividend for Scotland which will help ensure Britain’s security, deter our adversaries and drive economic growth for years to come as part of our Plan for Change. Through events such as today’s roundtable we are working closely with industry and supply chains to maximise Scotland’s defence dividend. Our new Brand Scotland campaign will seek to build on that success and help the sector export its world class technology around the world”

Programmes including the multi-bn pound redevelopment programme for His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde will also create skilled jobs – including for small and medium size firms – to boost the economy while addressing the critical skills gaps facing the country. As outlined in the Strategic Defence Review, the private sector, including small and medium businesses, are key to unlocking defence innovation, giving the UK and its allies the fighting edge. The upcoming Defence Industrial Strategy will provide further detail into future collaboration between Government and industry across the UK.  (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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07 Aug 25. Congo (DRC): Further clashes between security forces, CPR are likely, driving displacement risks. On 6 August, the Congolese security forces (FARDC) announced the surrender of approximately 60 militants affiliated with the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), which is led by the formerly Uganda-aligned rebel leader Thomas Lubanga. This follows a period of sustained clashes across several localities in Djugu territory (Ituri province) that have triggered displacement southwards to Bunia (Ituri). The clashes likely reflect attempts by the CPR to capitalise on the FARDC’s engagement against the IS-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) elsewhere in Ituri. As such, further CPR attacks and clashes with the FARDC are likely in the coming months, sustaining elevated attack and kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) risks during overland movement (particularly along the N27 highway). In addition, further clashes will highly likely drive additional waves of displacement to Bunia, intensifying pressure on aid resources. Recent displacement has already driven elevated insecurity in the city, with several shootings reported in the past fortnight. As such, we assess that additional displacement will elevate security risks for NGO staff and assets in Bunia in the coming months, including attacks on aid depots and convoys. (Source: Sibylline)

07 Aug 25. Togo: Renewed anti-government protests will increase unrest, travel disruption risks. On 9 August, numerous civil society groups plan to hold anti-government demonstrations in the capital Lomé to memorialise civilians killed by the police during protests in June and to reiterate their opposition to the indefinite extension of President Faure Gnassingbé’s rule. The protests will likely begin at Place Yéssouvito de Bè-Gakpoto at 1100hrs (local time) and move through Bè‑Kpota and Bè-Hédjé towards Lavista Park. The demonstrations are highly likely to disrupt movement along major thoroughfares connecting the Lomé beachfront to Lomé–Tokoin International Airport (LFW), driving travel delays. The police are highly likely to adopt an elevated posture in southern Lomé and employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse protesters, increasing bystanders’ potential exposure to tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition. The authorities will also likely further restrict access to internet and telecommunications services to limit attendance, disrupting communications with on-the-ground staff. We assess that the risk of protest-related unrest, including arson, looting and vandalism, will be particularly elevated in Bé, increasing the threats to staff and assets therein.(Source: Sibylline)

06 Aug 25. UK Carrier Strike Group visit to Tokyo underlines UK-Japan Strategic Partnership and Indo-Pacific commitment. HMS Prince of Wales, flagship of the UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG), will make a port call to Tokyo from late August to early September as part of Operation HIGHMAST, the Royal Navy’s eight-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan. The deployment reinforces the UK’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific as outlined in the government’s Plan for Change, supporting the mission to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad while fostering the international partnerships essential for economic growth and national security.  The visit of CSG to Japan , symbolises the close alignment of strategic interests and values shared between the UK and Japan, and  representing an opportunity to deepen UK-Japan defence cooperation, enhance interoperability through joint activities, and engage in dialogue on regional challenges.   The deployment also embodies the deepening partnership between the UK and Japan, demonstrating the unprecedented cooperation established through our enhanced global strategic partnership, including the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).

Strategic partnership in action

As each other’s closest security partners in Europe and Asia respectively, the UK and Japan share fundamental values and face common challenges. The CSG visit to Japan, and in particular the port visit to Tokyo by HMS Prince of Wales, marks a significant milestone in the multi-layered cooperation spanning politics, defence, economy, and culture that defines the modern UK-Japan relationship.

British Ambassador to Japan Julia Longbottom said:

The visit of HMS Prince of Wales to Tokyo underlines the UK’s strong commitment to a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific, while showcasing the remarkable depth of our partnership with Japan. Together, as trusted allies, we are strengthening cooperation across defence, economy, and culture. This visit demonstrates our joint determination to safeguard regional stability, and our shared ambition to deliver innovation, prosperity, and a sustainable future for the next generation.

Multi-day programme of engagement

The Tokyo port visit will feature a programme of events taking place over multiple days, designed to strengthen bilateral cooperation and regional partnerships. Key events will include the prestigious Pacific Future Forum, bringing together defence, security and industry leaders from across the region to discuss shared security challenges, from future technology to economic security.

A Defence & Security Industry Day will showcase British defence capabilities and innovation, providing opportunities for UK companies to demonstrate world-leading technologies and explore new partnerships with Japanese counterparts across advanced sectors including space, cyber and emerging technologies.

Global deployment of unprecedented scale

Operation HIGHMAST represents the most ambitious UK naval deployment in a generation, involving nearly 4,000 British personnel across the Royal Navy (2,500), Royal Air Force (592), and British Army (900). The eight-month deployment will cover over 26,000 nautical miles, visiting more than 40 countries and undertaking over 70 engagements, exercises and operations.

The deployment showcases true international partnership, with 12 nations supporting the CSG with ships or personnel. Norway is providing a warship for the entire duration of the deployment, whilst Canada, Spain, and New Zealand have also contributed vessels, demonstrating that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is fundamentally indivisible.

Showcasing British innovation and creativity

HMS Prince of Wales exemplifies the UK’s world-leading naval engineering and integrated operational capabilities, demonstrating advanced military readiness and technological superiority. The carrier uniquely combines cutting-edge technology with traditional British maritime expertise, representing the very best of UK innovation.  With up to 24 F-35B Lightning II fighter jets embarked, in squadrons from both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, HMS Prince of Wales showcases the largest concentration of fifth-generation aircraft ever deployed by the Royal Navy. These advanced systems demonstrate UK defence innovation whilst laying the groundwork for future UK-Japan joint development projects, including the groundbreaking GCAP programme – a joint initiative between the UK, Japan and Italy to develop a next generation fighter jet.  The UK’s industrial strategy drives not just security but high-value job creation, innovation, and economic growth across both nations. UK-Japan defence industry cooperation continues to strengthen both countries’ competitiveness in aerospace, cyber, and technology, with applications for solving global challenges that matter to people in both countries.

Creative cooperation between our nations delivers mutual benefits, with the CSG visit expanding industrial and technological partnerships that will drive innovation for decades to come.

Guardians of maritime security and global challenges

The UK’s CSG deployment to Japan demonstrates concrete action toward realising a free and open Indo-Pacific and our unwavering commitment to regional stability. As maritime nations, the UK and Japan will continue to fulfil their vital responsibility as guardians of the maritime rules-based order, ensuring the freedom and safety of the seas for all nations.  The CSG’s presence reinforces both countries’ shared approaches to complex security challenges, including maritime security, cyber threats, and the safe development of emerging technologies. This collaborative approach addresses the security concerns that affect our people’s prosperity and future.

The UK Foreign and Defence Secretaries recently visited Australia to observe Exercise Talisman Sabre, the largest-ever military exercise Australia has hosted, involving the CSG and 3,000 UK personnel. As part of the exercise, the AUKUS nations successfully worked alongside Japan to strengthen collaboration on the defence use of robotics and autonomous technologies.

Boosting UK trade and economic growth

The deployment directly supports the government’s Plan for Change through economic growth opportunities. Port visits in Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea will showcase British defence capabilities through trade demonstrations and fairs, supporting UK exports and international trade.  The Indo-Pacific is a critical region for UK trade, with the region accounting for 17% of total UK trade – worth £286 bn in goods and services in the 12 months to September 2024. The deployment provides opportunities for UK companies to participate in trade events during port visits, delivering British jobs and growth whilst building on the strong foundation established through the bilateral UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), and the multilateral Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Building a sustainable connection for the future

Alongside partnership between our governments and militaries, UK engagement with Japan spans civil society, business, culture, academia, and people-to-people links.. This comprehensive connection between our countries means that together, we can tackle the global challenges that both Japanese and British people care about, from environmental sustainability to technological security. The UK is committed to investing in this connection, and the many links between our countries that bring it to life, now and for future generations. The visit of CSG to Japan, and HMS Prince of Wales to Tokyo, will be an unforgettable moment in our partnership.

Further details of specific programmes and venues will be announced in due course.

• Operation HIGHMAST involves nearly 4,000 British personnel across the Royal Navy (2,500), Royal Air Force (592), and British Army (900)
• Exercise Talisman Sabre involved 3,000 UK personnel
• The deployment includes 12 international partners contributing ships or personnel, including Norway, Canada, Spain, and New Zealand
• The CSG will cover over 26,000 nautical miles and visit more than 40 countries over eight months
• This follows the successful 2021 deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth, which travelled 26,000 nautical miles and engaged with 40 nations
• The deployment supports the government’s commitment to increase defence spending to 2.6% of GDP
• This follows the establishment of GCAP headquarters in Reading and continued progress on the trilateral fighter programme between the UK, Japan, and Italy
• Trade between the UK and Indo-Pacific region accounts for 17% of total UK trade, worth £286 bn annually
• Japan is the UK’s 15th largest trading partner. Total UK exports to Japan amounted to £14.7 bn in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2024, whilst UK imports from Japan totalled £12.4 bn over the same period.
• The strong economic partnership is further evidenced by Japan’s record £17.7 bn investment commitment into the UK during the Japan G7, spanning sectors including green energy, offshore wind, real estate and quantum technology. The UK was the number two destination for Japanese investment in 2023, highlighting the mutual confidence in our economic relationship.
• Access restrictions will be implemented at the port terminal during the port visit. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

06 Aug 25.  Russia: Growing economic pressures will continue driving layoffs in several key sectors. Earlier on 6 August, a Russian media outlet reported that Russia’s largest shipbuilding company, United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), has begun layoffs at its Vympel Shipyard in Rybinsk (Yaroslavl oblast). Citing financial difficulties caused by a lack of orders, the company said that it will lay off less than 5% of staff but warned that further layoffs could ensue throughout the year. Similarly, the state-owned railway company, Russian Railways, recently required management personnel to take additional unpaid days off to preserve their employment and avoid mass layoffs amid growing financial difficulties. Meanwhile, according to official statistics, the number of liquidated companies significantly exceeded the number of newly registered ones in the first half of 2025. The most heavily impacted sectors include construction, manufacturing and trade industries, which are typically the most affected by rising costs and slowing demand. The latest developments underscore the financial strain on Russian businesses. However, we assess that widespread labour shortages will likely offset the impact of layoffs, as high defence spending continues to prop up the wider economy. (Source: Sibylline)

06 Aug 25. Moldova: Serious government instability is unlikely after jailing of pro-Russia regional leader. On 5 August, a court in the capital Chișinău sentenced the leader of Moldova’s Gagauzia region, Evghenia Guțul, to seven years’ imprisonment for her involvement in illegally financing the banned pro-Russia Șor party. According to prosecutors, Guțul systematically channelled funds from Russia to Moldova to finance the party between 2019 and 2022. A new regional election to appoint a new leader will be likely in the near-to-medium term, though significant government instability in Gagauzia is unlikely. The sentencing comes ahead of Moldovan parliamentary elections scheduled for 28 September, which Russia and pro-Russia forces in Moldova will highly likely seek to influence and destabilise. Russian and Moscow-friendly Moldovan politicians will likely leverage the verdict to stir tensions between the central Moldovan authorities and those in Gagauzia. We assess that limited, non-violent protests in Chișinău and Comrat (Gagauzia’s regional capital) will be likely over the coming days and weeks. While a small number of Gagauz politicians and members of society will possibly call for Gagauzia to break away from Moldova, secession remains highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. (Source: Sibylline)

06 Aug 25. Niger: New militia will raise ethnic tensions, human rights risk, hostility to western investment. On 4 August, the pro-junta M62 civil society coalition launched a government-backed civilian militia initiative, the Garkouwar Kassa or ‘Shields of the Homeland’. This followed recommendations by the government’s Consultative Council for Refoundation to train and equip volunteers to support the authorities in defending the national territory. The minister of the interior has confirmed that the government will provide this support; the force will initially organise night patrols and combat disinformation from ‘internal and external enemies’. We assess that the formation of the force will significantly elevate the risk of vigilantism and ethnically targeted violence, particularly against the Fulani community in southern Niger. A similar organisation, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) in Burkina Faso, has been accused of conducting summary executions of Fulani civilians. Additionally, the M62’s broader opposition to perceived foreign exploitation will raise the risk of hostility from such groups towards foreign organisations, particularly NGOs. This will increase staff exposure to harassment and detention, particularly during nighttime transit. (Source: Sibylline)

04 Aug 25.  Colombia: Drone attacks targeting military personnel will elevate physical security risks. On 2 August, the Gulf Clan (AGC) organised crime group (OCG) allegedly attacked military personnel using drones armed with explosives in Santa Rosa del Sur (Bolívar department). The attack killed one soldier and injured six. The authorities attributed the attack to the AGC’s Erlin Pino Duarte faction. On 31 July, clashes between the security forces and AGC personnel also killed one soldier in Montecristo (Bolívar department). The attacks follow an ongoing military counteroffensive operation against armed groups in southern Bolívar. Meanwhile, reports indicate that approximately 5,000 civilians are under curfew in the area due to an indefinite ‘paro armado’ (armed strike) conducted by the National Liberation Army (ELN). Attack risks will remain elevated for security forces personnel in Bolívar. Additionally, we assess that the use of explosives will increase physical security risks for bystanders. If explosive drone attacks persist, there is a realistic possibility that the armed forces will conduct strategic airstrikes against armed groups, heightening collateral damage risks. (Source: Sibylline)

04 Aug 25. Armenia: Joint drills with US will sustain regional tensions with Russia; significant unrest is unlikely. On 2 August, Armenia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that the country will host the Eagle Partner 2025 exercises (military drills conducted jointly with the US) between 12 and 20 August. The exercises will focus on peacekeeping tasks and medical evacuation procedures. This marks the third edition of the joint drills, which started in 2023. They are part of Yerevan’s ongoing strategic rapprochement with Washington DC, as Armenia pivots away from its historical partner, Russia. Last year, Moscow criticised the drills, claiming that they serve as further evidence of the West’s attempts to destabilise the region. Therefore, it is highly likely that these exercises will sustain regional tensions between Armenia and its former ally, Russia. Furthermore, we assess that the drills will likely incite criticism from conservative segments of society, including the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), which is a staunch critic of the government’s shift towards the West. Small-scale protests against the event remain a realistic possibility, though they are unlikely to result in significant disruption. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Military And Security Developments

Aug 08.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Gaza City occupation will drive humanitarian concerns, domestic unrest. Earlier on 8 August, Israel’s security cabinet approved plans to occupy Gaza City (Gaza). The plan, likely to be rolled out over the next two months, will almost certainly involve evacuating Palestinian civilians from the area before launching a full ground offensive.  Evacuation orders will almost certainly drive mass displacement from Gaza City into Rafah’s Al-Mawasi area, exacerbating pressures on limited public services and humanitarian aid. In turn, this will increase the risk of sporadic altercations between individuals seeking access to resources, driving bystander security risks for proximate humanitarian and logistics staff. Militants will almost certainly move to Rafah, elevating the risk of military strikes in the area. Confirmation of the plan will likely trigger mass domestic unrest in Israel in the coming days, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), with a realistic possibility of sporadic violent altercations, increasing transport and business disruption. The possible call-up of reservists in Israel will likely limit labour flexibility and undermine socio-economic health. An uptick in protests and pro-Palestine activism is also likely across the region, particularly in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen.

Aug 07.

IRAN

• Concerns over nuclear co-operation between Iran and Russia will increase risks of sanctions targeting firms and individuals that import dual-use technologies into Iran. On 4 August, the Financial Times reported that a five-person Iranian delegation visited production facilities servicing Russia’s nuclear weapons development programme in August 2024. The report alleges that discussions were held on the domestic production of dual-use technologies relevant to nuclear weapons development and that subsequently, in May 2024, Iranian officials attempted to purchase isotopes associated with nuclear weapons development from Russia. Regardless, Iran-Russia co‑operation will likely remain limited to technical advisory, knowledge sharing and high-level diplomatic support in international forums. Russia is unlikely to directly engage in the development of Iran’s nuclear programme or supply critical weapons development technology to Iran due to broader strategic and geopolitical concerns. Even so, Iran’s likely leveraging of domestically produced dual‑use technology to facilitate nuclear development and its broader missile development programme will likely trigger increased international scrutiny. This is most likely to impact firms that frequently import technologies and components associated with medical research, heavy industry and manufacturing, chemical processing and vacuum systems. Such scrutiny will increase risks of targeted sanctions, driving compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the pharmaceutical, engineering, manufacturing and shipping industries.
• Iraq will likely intensify efforts to crack down on Iranian oil smuggling due to risks of US sanctions, increasing operational disruption risks for shipping firms operating in Basra (Basra governorate). On 6 August, the Iraqi authorities in Basra detained a Liberian-flagged oil tanker on suspicion of smuggling oil. The vessel was reportedly carrying 250,000 tonnes of crude oil without documentation; regional media reports indicate that the Iraqi navy seized the vessel as part of broader efforts to crack down on Iranian oil smuggling via Iraqi ports and pipelines. The crackdown comes after the US reportedly threatened to sanction Iraq’s State Organisation for Marketing Oil (SOMO) if it did not take further steps to address widespread Iranian oil smuggling, as part of the US’ ‘maximum pressure’ campaign targeting Iran. The Iraqi authorities will highly likely continue efforts to enforce SOMO directives to identify, detain and disrupt oil smuggling efforts through Iraqi ports in the coming months. As such, oil tankers routinely transiting Iraqi waters and docking at the Khor al-Zubair and Umm Qasr port facilities (both Basra) will likely face increasing regulatory scrutiny in the coming weeks, driving risks of operational delays and staff exposure to petty corruption. While these efforts will possibly limit the volume of Iranian oil smuggled to global markets via Iraqi port facilities, cross‑border smuggling, pipeline tapping and ship-to-ship transfers will likely continue to facilitate partial Iranian access to international oil markets.

ISRAEL 

Significant protests across Israel are likely in the coming days, against the backdrop of a possible decision to militarily occupy Gaza. Later on 7 August, the Israeli security cabinet will meet to discuss the possibility of expanding military operations and occupying Gaza. In response to this proposal, pro-ceasefire and hostage release activities have been planned to significantly increase demonstrations across Israel from 7 August at least through the weekend. The largest protests will likely be in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), where there is an elevated risk of significant disruption. On 5 August, a large protest in Tel Aviv turned violent, with protesters blocking major traffic routes including Ayalon South (Highway 20), burning tires, lighting bonfires and allegedly attacking police officers, resulting in 13 arrests.  As such, there is an elevated risk of violence around large protests in Tel Aviv in the coming days, raising the prospect of police use of excessive force and clashes when dispersing demonstrators. These will elevate security risks near protest locations, including for personnel and assets, as well as travel disruption, particularly close to Kaplan Street, Menachem Begin Road and Aylon South (Highway 20). Protests will likely grow in size and frequency if the Israeli government decides to militarily occupy Gaza, which would compound the above risks.

• Israel’s security cabinet will likely vote in favour of a military occupation of Gaza, significantly increasing security, domestic unrest and international backlash risks. According to local reports, the government favours occupation over proposals favoured by the military to rely on cordons and the intensification of airstrikes. According to reports, the current plan involves the mobilisation of four to six divisions into northern Gaza, including Gaza City and the central camps (including Bureij, Deir al-Balah and Nuseirat) where Israeli hostages are likely held. The plan also involves the mass evacuation of Gaza citizens from northern Gaza to southern Gaza; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would likely to take four to five months to complete its manoeuvre and achieve full military control over northern Gaza. Even if the plan is approved in the security cabinet, it is unlikely to be immediately implemented. The mobilisation and recruitment of forces would likely take at least a week, with IDF efforts to address combat fatigue possibly delaying the operation into September or even October.
• Although the IDF engaged in similar activity between November 2024 and January 2025, the current plan likely involves a larger territorial remit in northern Gaza and possibly the large-scale destruction of infrastructure. The plan’s execution will increase local staff exposure to clashes between the IDF and civilians refusing to evacuate, increasing risks to NGOs working among civilian populations. Additionally, militants will almost certainly move to humanitarian areas, particularly al-Mawasi (southern Gaza). This will elevate risks of IDF strikes in these areas, similar to the increase recorded during November 2024 and January 2025, further exacerbating threats to life for local staff.
• Announcement of the plan will likely trigger mass domestic unrest in Israel, increasing risks of violent protests (see above). Furthermore, the mass mobilisation of forces, particularly reserve duty soldiers, will likely impact labour availability in Israel, possibly affecting business operations. An uptick in protests and pro-Palestine activism across the region and worldwide is also likely, particularly in Australia, Greece, Jordan and the US. Additionally, approval of the plan will likely increase reputational risks for companies and businesses operating in Israel or perceived to be supportive of Israel. These will also increase financial risks emanating from possible consumer boycotts and social media campaigns against such businesses. Approval of the plan will also increase risks of sanctions on Israel, elevating operational and compliance risks for companies operating in the country. These risks will significantly increase in the event rapid IDF mobilisation.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• West Bank – Nothing significant to report
• Israel will allow private-sector goods to enter Gaza, though humanitarian conditions are unlikely to improve. On 5 August, Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) announced it would begin allowing the entry of goods into Gaza through the private sector in the coming weeks. COGAT characterised the policy as part of broader efforts to increase aid provision into Gaza and decrease dependence on international aid mechanisms. COGAT restricted the entry of private-sector aid into Gaza in October 2024 due to concerns that Hamas was ‘exploiting’ the goods for economic and militant purposes. As private-sector goods will enter Gaza through the same border crossing as NGO aid supplies, the risks of bottlenecks at the Erez West (Zikim) and Kerem Shalom border crossings will increase in the coming weeks. The announcement will also likely trigger an uptick in demonstrations from Israeli anti-aid organisations (such as Tzav 9) targeting the border crossings and the Ashdod port facility (Southern district), which will disrupt broader supply chain continuity within Israel. Within Gaza, private-sector goods convoys will almost certainly face similar security risks to NGO convoys during transit to storage and distribution facilities; risks include looting, shooting incidents and the commandeering of vehicles by militant and organised criminal elements. UN data indicates that, since aid deliveries resumed on 19 May, approximately 90% of UN aid trucks have been looted during transit, while 66% of pallets have failed to reach their destination. Given such significant security concerns, private-sector aid distribution efforts will highly likely face critical risks of disruption and major security incidents impacting staff, vehicles and aid stores. The entry of private-sector goods will also likely contribute to widespread food price inflation within Gaza, compounding socio-economic concerns and food insecurity.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• Attempts to enforce the disarmament of all armed factions in Lebanon will increase risks of clashes with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) in the coming weeks. On 5 August, the new Lebanese cabinet tasked the army with drawing up a plan to implement a state monopoly over all arms in the country by the end of 2025. The move primarily targets the arsenals of LH, the largest non-state armed group in the country, as well as other smaller sectarian factions. The government’s unprecedented decision came shortly after a parliamentary session in which LH members and ministers rejected the current disarmament plan. Also, on the same day, LH leader Naim Qassem reiterated his rejection of the US-backed plan in a televised speech, warning that the group will respond if Israel resumes the war in Lebanon. In the coming days, LH will likely organise reactionary protests in the capital Beirut. Most of these protests will be held in the Dahieh district and downtown Beirut, driving localised bystander and travel disruption risks in the city throughout August. There is also a possibility that LH members will attempt a show of force by participating in these protests while carrying small arms. This will elevate the risks of sporadic armed clashes with the security forces and anti-LH factions during the coming weeks. While it is unlikely that the government will back down from its current stance on the disarmament of LH, there is a possibility that Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal movement, will actively seek mediation efforts between both parties. These efforts could lead to new negotiations, increasing the likelihood of a new, extended timeline for disarmament plans.
• Egypt’s record energy deal with Israel is unlikely to trigger major domestic unrest risks, despite significant anti-Israel sentiment. Earlier on 7 August, the operating partners of Israel’s Leviathan offshore gas field signed the largest export agreement in Israel’s history, worth up to USD 35bn, to supply gas to Egypt. Under the deal, Leviathan will export about 130 bn cubic metres of gas to Egypt from early 2026 until 2040, or until all of the contract quantities are fulfilled. Notably, Egypt already has active import agreements with the Karish and Leviathan fields, which were temporarily halted during the Iran-Israel war but fully resumed following the ceasefire in late June. While the deal is highly likely to draw major criticism from Egyptian pro-Palestine activists, it is unlikely to trigger major domestic unrest in the country. This is primarily due to the active ban on all protests in Egypt and the tight security grip of the authorities, which has continued to detain tens of pro-Palestine activists since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war.
• The uptick in pro-Palestine activity in Europe over recent days will raise physical security risks for Israeli companies and tourists. Earlier on 7 August, an unknown group vandalised the Paris office of Israeli airline El Al. The incident comes amid diplomatic tensions between France and Israel following the French president’s pledge in July to recognise a Palestinian state. The incident also underscores the increasing anti-Israel sentiment across younger generations in France, which is not limited to the Arab and Muslim communities. As such, risks of further copycat attacks, vandalism and protests targeting Israeli companies in France and/or French companies dealing with the Israeli army will highly likely increase in the coming weeks. Notably, the developments in France come amid widespread calls for further pro-Palestine protests in Greece, including in the capital Athens and multiple islands, starting from 10 August. These protests will likely extend through the coming weeks and will likely include attempts to disrupt cruise trips heading to islands including Lesbos (North Aegean), Rhodes (South Aegean) and Zakynthos (Ionian Islands), possibly preventing them from docking. Risks of harassment and direct physical attacks against Israeli tourists will remain likely during the coming days. Furthermore, increasing protest activity will undermine operational continuity for tourism companies, booking platforms, hotels and airlines associated with Israeli tourists in Greece. These risks will likely also extend to similar companies operating in Italy and Spain this summer, while the risk of targeted boycotts and activism will likely also rise.

Aug 06.

• Israel: Co-ordination efforts between Iranian cyber threat actors will elevate security risks. On 5 August, the security company Security Scorecard reported that Iran-linked threat groups displayed a higher level of co-ordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) than expected during the twelve-day Iran-Israel war in June. The report analysed approximately 250,000 messages on the platform Telegram concerning cyber attacks against Iran’s adversaries. The messages made reference to operations aimed at disrupting and manipulating the information environment rather than directly supplementing kinetic efforts. These efforts included the distribution of pro-Iran propaganda, as well as data-leak, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and web defacement attacks by pro-Iran and/or anti-Israel hacktivist groups, highlighting their involvement in Iran’s cyber strategy despite the attacks’ more opportunistic nature. Iranian state-sponsored groups also purchased several conflict-related domains in the days following the outbreak of the war to conduct cyber espionage and surveillance operations, showcasing their reactive nature. This underscores the likely ongoing consolidation of Iran’s cyber strategy, elevating security risks to its adversaries amid long-term regional hostilities.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Gaza occupation would drive humanitarian concerns, reputational risks. On 5 August, Israeli media reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior security officials are considering full military occupation of the Gaza Strip. Reports indicated that operations could also occur in areas in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) believes hostages to be held. However, the proposal reportedly faces opposition from the IDF’s chief of staff, moderating conflict escalation risks in the immediate term. Full Israeli occupation of Gaza would significantly increase risks to life for on-the-ground personnel, elevate severe disruption to NGO operations and exacerbate already-critical humanitarian conditions. This would likely elicit a significant response from the international community, possibly including sanctions on Israeli entities, which would drive compliance risks for businesses operating in the country. Businesses with operations in Israel would likely face reputational damage, driving a negative consumer response, including boycotts and associated financial risks. Furthermore, there would likely be protests in major regional cities, including the Jordanian capital Amman and the Egyptian capital Cairo, elevating regional domestic unrest and security risks.
• Lebanon: Calls for disarmament will increase security risks, unrest in coming days. On 5 August, the Lebanese government tasked the army with drawing up a plan to implement a state monopoly over all arms in the country by the end of 2025. The move primarily targets the arsenal of Lebanese Hizballah (LH), the largest non-state armed group in the country. The government’s unprecedented decision came shortly after a tense parliamentary session on the issue, during which LH members rejected the current disarmament plan. Also, on the same day, LH leader Naim Qassem reiterated his rejection of the US-backed plan in a televised speech, warning that the group will respond if Israel resumes the war in Lebanon. In the coming days, LH will likely organise reactionary protests in the capital Beirut. Most of these protests will to be held in Dahieh district and downtown Beirut, driving localised bystander and travel disruption risks in the city throughout August. There is also a possibility that LH members will attempt a show of force, participating in these protests while carrying small arms. This will elevate risks of sporadic armed clashes with the security forces and anti-LH factions.

Aug 05.

Key points

• The likely risk of cyber espionage and surveillance operations will be sustained amid current geopolitical tensions and unstable nuclear negotiations. Low-level disruptive attacks from pro-Iran hacktivist groups are also likely in this geopolitical climate, given the longevity of hacktivist attack patterns.
• We assess that high-impact disruptive and destructive cyber attacks against US and Israel-based operational technology (OT) and critical national infrastructure (CNI) will remain unlikely as actors seek to avoid a potential ceasefire breakdown and additional geopolitical escalation.
• Potential future geopolitical escalation, incited by stalling nuclear negotiations, will likely increase the risk of reactive distributed data-leak, denial-of-service (DDoS) and influence operations.

Context

On 30 June, US security agencies released a joint report warning US-based organisations and critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors regarding potential cyber attacks from Iranian-linked actors in the wake of US strikes on several Iranian nuclear facilities on 21 June. The report suggested that pro-Iran hacktivist and Iranian state-sponsored groups could use cyber operations to retaliate against the US, regardless of the current ceasefire between Iran and Israel. We assess that this development highlights heightened security, disruption and reputational risks to the aforementioned sectors. Escalation in the Iran-Israel war between 13 and 24 June also engendered a wave of high-profile cyber attacks against Israeli and Iranian national infrastructure, substantiating concerns of increased cyber activity and spillover impact amid ongoing geopolitical tensions. The possibility of further escalation will also raise the risk of cyber attacks if nuclear negotiations continue to stall, exacerbating existing risks.

Forecast

Ongoing regional tensions will likely sustain cyber espionage, low-level disruption and surveillance risks from Iranian-linked groups

In July, the cyber security company Nozomi Networks disclosed that it detected approximately 28 cyber espionage and surveillance operations from various Iranian state-sponsored actors against its customers between May and June. This constituted a 133% rise compared to the preceding two-month period, likely as a result of escalating geopolitical tensions that culminated in the outbreak of the Iran-Israel war. The attacks primarily targeted the transportation and manufacturing sectors and were carried out by multiple well-known advanced persistent threat (APT) groups including ‘MuddyWater’, ‘APT33’, ‘OilRig’, ‘CyberAv3ngers’, ‘FoxKitten’ and ‘Homeland Justice’.

Later in July, MuddyWater reportedly conducted a surveillance operation against English and Farsi speakers. The group began distributing a new version of the ‘DHCSpy’ Android spyware after the onset of the Iran-Israel war (alongside its increased usage of other malware variants), highlighting the evolution of Iran’s cyber tactics to respond to recent events. We assess that additional cyber espionage and surveillance operations are likely amid current regional tensions and unstable nuclear negotiations.

In June, a joint report by the cyber security organisations Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) and Akamai also indicated that the volume of DDoS attacks targeting the financial sector has increased significantly between 2014 and 2024. The report also highlighted that the majority of these attacks are typically carried out by politically motivated hacktivist groups, including pro-Iran and pro-Palestine organisations. Low-level disruptive cyber attacks from pro-Iran hacktivist groups are therefore likely, especially given the longevity of these attack patterns. Furthermore, in July, an Iranian Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation (‘Pay2Key.I2P’) offered larger profit shares to affiliates who would target Israeli and US companies. While these attacks remain a possibility in the short term, we have not identified any reports concerning such attacks as of the date of writing, indicating a somewhat mitigated threat.

Destructive cyber operations against US and Israel-based CNI will remain unlikely; this is likely in a bid from cyber actors to avoid a ceasefire breakdown and further escalation

The joint warning published by US security agencies in June outlined a cyber attack against an Israeli-made programmable logic controller (PLC) within the Municipal Water Authority in Aliquippa (Pennsylvania) in November 2023. The Iranian state-sponsored group Cyber Av3ngers displayed an anti-Israeli message on the compromised PLC, warning that it would attempt to target other Israeli-made equipment in retaliation to the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war on 7 October 2023. While the attack did not cause any significant disruption and/or destruction to targeted systems, it highlighted the actors’ ability to infiltrate operational technology (OT) environments for potential disruption and/or destruction.

Furthermore, in May 2024, another Iranian state-sponsored group (‘Void Manticore’) targeted over 40 Israeli organisations under the guise of an online hacktivist group (‘Karma’). During the attack, the group used a sophisticated version of the ‘Bibi’ wiper to delete key functions from a system’s disk and to inhibit data  restoration, showcasing destructive capabilities vis-à-vis IT environments.

However, we have not detected any instances of similar disruptive and/or destructive cyber attacks in the context of the Iran-Israel war and subsequent regional hostilities. The Aliquippa attack is reportedly an isolated instance of Iranian state-sponsored cyber attacks that have directly targeted US-based OT infrastructure since the Israel-Hamas war. We therefore assess that high-impact disruptive and destructive cyber attacks against US and Israel-based OT and CNI will remain unlikely in a bid to avoid a potential ceasefire breakdown and additional geopolitical escalation.

Future geopolitical escalation will likely increase data-leak, disinformation and disruption risks from varying Iran-linked groups

Iran remains vulnerable to a possible resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months despite claims that it has restored its air defence capabilities; this indicates increasing pressure regarding nuclear negotiations with the US. If nuclear negotiations with the US do not progress by mid-to-late August, the France, Germany and Italy (also known as the E3) will also possibly trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause. This would reimpose UN sanctions on Iran which coupled with latent progress in the negotiation and current restrictions to nuclear monitoring within Iran will continuously elevate the risk of resumption of Israeli strikes and maintain high regional hostilities. In turn, this would likely engender an increase in reactive DDoS, data-leak and influence operations by both Iranian state-sponsored and pro-Iran hacktivist groups.

Several pro-Iran hacktivist groups claimed responsibility for DDoS attacks against multiple critical sectors in the US (including aviation, defence and financial sectors) in the days following the US airstrikes on Iran. The hacktivist group ‘Mr Hamza’ claimed to have conducted DDoS attacks against several websites of the US Air Force and US aerospace and defence companies, causing operational downtime for over ten hours on 22 June. Similarly, another group (‘Keymous+’) claimed in an online post to have targeted several US financial entities, where it showcased website disruption for over an hour also on 22 June. Larger-scale DDoS attacks will, therefore, likely spike in the event of future escalation given the reactionary nature of these attacks.

On 1 July, an unnamed Iran-linked threat group also threatened to release several emails it had stolen from personnel involved in the 2024 election campaign for US President Donald Trump. Iran-linked groups (such as ‘Cyber Toufan’ and ‘Cotton Sandstorm’) frequently conduct data-leak operations to respond to geopolitical escalation. As such, data-leak operations are likely if nuclear negotiations continue to stall and geopolitical tensions subsequently increase. Any attacks would likely be opportunity-based and seek to cause indiscriminate reputational damage, as well as operational downtime of public and/or internal websites.

The war between Iran and Israel provoked an uptick in the distribution of artificial intelligence (AI)-generated mis- and disinformation on social media platforms. Namely, pro-Iran accounts increasingly shared fake media that exaggerated the aftermath of Iranian strikes against Israel. Similarly, pro-Israel accounts increased the dissemination of old videos depicting civil unrest in Iran to feign local Iranian support for Israel’s military campaign. These posts amassed over 100 m views between 13 and 19 June, highlighting their rapid propagation. It is unknown whether the accounts in question are linked to the Iranian and/or Israeli states. However, we assess that these developments underscore the mis- and disinformation risks stemming from AI-generated content in the event of future escalation.

• Israel-Yemen: Persistent Houthi targeting underscores security concerns, growing retaliation risks. On 3 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi drone in Bnei Netzarim (Southern district). While the IDF successfully intercepts Houthi ordnance on a near-daily basis, this usually occurs outside Israel’s airspace; as such, the successful incursion underscores the Houthis’ increasing capabilities to avoid detection, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel and civilians across Israel. Furthermore, the drone route, which likely passes above Egypt, highlights the elevated security risks of Houthi ordnance impacting that country (particularly the Sinai Peninsula) stemming from failure or interception. Repeated Houthi attacks and efforts to reconstruct port infrastructure that was previously damaged by Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 August 2025) will elevate the risk of Israeli airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in the coming weeks. We assess that any such strikes will drive security risks for personnel and exacerbate energy, food and socio-economic health risks within Houthi-controlled territory, elevating operational risks for NGOs and humanitarian concerns for civilians.
• Syria: Resumption of ethnic clashes underscores fragility of ceasefire. On 4 August, new clashes erupted in the towns of Atil, al-Ariqah, Ira and Rasas (all Suwayda governorate) between government forces and local Druze fighters. This comes a day after Druze militia affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hirji killed at least three soldiers in an attack on the government-controlled Tal al-Hadid area (Suwayda). While the clashes have since ceased, the recent violence underscores the significant fragility of the ceasefire in southern Syria, increasing the likelihood of its total collapse in the coming weeks. Furthermore, there is also a realistic possibility of intra-Druze fighting across Suwayda between al-Hijri militias and government-aligned units, compounding crossfire and movement disruption risks. In the coming days, ongoing tensions and sporadic clashes are likely to disrupt operators using humanitarian routes, including the Bosra al-Sham corridor. We assess that the closure of such corridors will exacerbate food security and public health risks in Suwayda city.

Aug 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Despite the re-organisation of its security governance structures, Iran will likely maintain a hawkish posture regarding its regional security policy and nuclear negotiations.
• The US continues to expand sanctions on Iran’s drone manufacturing programme, while oil smuggling activity in the Strait of Malacca will sustain sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged shipping firms.
• Despite international condemnation, Iran will likely continue with its efforts to identify, harass and abduct anti-government activists overseas, increasing the threats to Iranian nationals, particularly in Europe and North America.

ISRAEL

• The release of hostage footage amid stalled negotiations has increased the risk of domestic unrest.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Ethno-religious tensions, domestic unrest and the risk of attacks will be elevated in the coming months after the Israeli national security minister delivered a prayer in the al-Aqsa mosque compound.
• Despite a visit by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, humanitarian conditions within Gaza are unlikely to improve in the immediate term, sustaining critical threats to life therein.
• There is an increasing risk that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will intensify its military operations in Gaza if Israel’s possible offer to withdraw its forces fully in return for the release of all hostages is refused.

IRAN

• Despite the re-organisation of its security governance structures, Iran will likely maintain a hawkish posture regarding its regional security policy and nuclear negotiations. On 3 August, local media reported that Ali Larijani, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, will replace Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in the coming days. This reflects a continued hardline approach to domestic dissent, security and nuclear policy. Larijani’s appointment possibly also indicates efforts to bolster his domestic political profile ahead of the 2028 presidential election and to underscore his status as a senior regime figure in the event of Khamenei’s death. Also on 3 August, the SNSC approved the formation of the National Defence Council (NDC), which will assume responsibility for ‘overseeing national defense policies’. The announcement comes amid a broader re-organisation of Iran’s security and defence governance structures following numerous strategic failures during the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2025). However, the NDC will almost certainly remain under the direct influence of Supreme Leader Khamenei; its remit will likely remain highly fluid, with the SNSC and alternative councils likely re-assuming and delegating various competencies as per the preferences of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Even so, recommendations from the NDC regarding the mid-level re-structuring of the security forces will possibly trigger personnel changes in the coming months. Recommendations to increase defence spending substantially will likely sustain pressure on Iran’s socio-economic health and foment wider anti-government sentiment.
• The US continues to expand sanctions on Iran’s drone manufacturing programme, while oil smuggling activity in the Strait of Malacca will sustain sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged shipping firms. On 1 August, the US State Department sanctioned five entities and one individual associated with the state-owned Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, which facilitates the production of military aircraft and drones. The sanctions underscore continued US scrutiny of Iranian-linked entities as part of the ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign, particularly those based in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the coming weeks, the US will highly likely continue to try to expand and enforce sanctions targeting entities associated with Iran’s drone programme, as well as those linked to Iran’s oil exports, missile production and ‘shadow banking’ network. Further sanction notices will increase compliance risks for firms engaged in the manufacturing, shipping, defence, energy and banking sectors worldwide, as well as those employing Iranian nationals. Additionally, on 31 July, the US-based CBS news outlet alleged that, over a single day, its staff witnessed at least 12 ship-to-ship transfers of oil from Iranian-registered vessels to Chinese-registered vessels in Malaysian waters near the Riau archipelago (Indonesia). The claim underscores continued fuel smuggling activity facilitating the transfer of Iranian crude to China, despite numerous rounds of US sanctions targeting associated entities, individuals and vessels. Reports of continued oil smuggling will likely trigger further US sanctions targeting associated entities and vessels, particularly those frequently transiting from the Persian Gulf to China via the Strait of Malacca; this will compound sanction-exposure risks for locally engaged shipping and energy firms.
• Despite international condemnation, Iran will likely continue with its efforts to identify, harass and abduct anti-government activists overseas, increasing the threats to Iranian nationals, particularly in Europe and North America. On 3 August, Canada, the UK, the US and several EU member states (including France, Germany and Spain) issued a joint statement condemning the Iranian intelligence services’ escalating efforts to ‘kill, kidnap and harass people’ overseas. The condemnation noted Iran’s increasing collaboration with irregular and organised criminal entities to conduct harassment campaigns, abductions and targeted killings of regime dissidents and anti-government activists (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 June 2025). Despite the statement, Iran will highly likely continue funding, co-ordinating and initiating such harassment and abduction efforts targeting individuals associated with anti-government and opposition movements. The risk will be particularly acute for individuals and entities associated with banned groups and movements, such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) and the Women, Life, Freedom movement. We assess that Iranian nationals and dual nationals across the world will almost certainly continue to face elevated risks of harassment, extortion, abduction and detention, as will their associates and family members. The risk of Iranian espionage and cyber attacks targeting those who possess personal information regarding anti-government activists will also remain elevated, sustaining operational disruption and cyber-exposure risks for associated firms.

ISRAEL 

• The release of hostage footage amid stalled negotiations has increased the risk of domestic unrest. On 31 July, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published video footage of the Israeli hostage Rom Braslavski. On 1 August, Hamas published video footage of the hostage Evyatar David. The publication of the videos has prompted pro-ceasefire protests in Israel. Against the backdrop of stalled negotiations, these protests are likely to grow in size and frequency in the coming week. This will elevate travel disruption risks near protest hotspots, particularly in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While such protests are typically largely peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of protest action becoming more disruptive in the coming days (including through the erection of roadblocks along key highways), which would in turn increase the risk of clashes with the security forces. Under such conditions, the use of excessive force by the police is a realistic possibility; this would elevate bystanders’ exposure to tear gas and other such crowd-control techniques. Nonetheless, we assess that vandalism is unlikely, moderating the risks facing assets.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• Ethno-religious tensions, domestic unrest and the risk of attacks will be elevated in the coming months after the Israeli national security minister delivered a prayer in the al-Aqsa mosque compound. On 3 August, Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir led a prayer in the al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate, West Bank). Under the status quo agreed between the Jerusalem Waqf (an Islamic council appointed by Jordan) and Israel, Jews are allowed to enter the compound, which also serves as the holiest site in Judaism, but are forbidden from praying in it. Gvir’s act of prayer has provoked condemnation from both Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Commenting after the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel’s policy remains the maintenance of the status quo at the compound. Even so, in recent years, there has been growing pressure stemming from this issue, with numerous Knesset members and ministers calling for (and leading) prayers in the compound. Further such incidents are likely in the coming months, elevating ethno-religious tensions and the risk of radicalisation among Jewish and Muslim populations. This will elevate the risk of clashes between Jewish and Muslim worshippers, as well as between worshippers and the Israeli security forces throughout the Jerusalem area in the coming months. Furthermore, these trends will compound the risk of attacks stemming from both communities (particularly around Jerusalem’s Old City and religious sites therein) against both the civilian population as well as the Israeli security forces. The continued violation of the status quo will also elevate the risk of domestic unrest in Jordan, as well as attacks at border crossings between the two countries; this will in turn drive the risk of sporadic border closures, prompting temporary movement disruption for goods and personnel.
• Despite a visit by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, humanitarian conditions within Gaza are unlikely to improve in the immediate term, sustaining critical threats to life therein. On 1 August, Witkoff visited a Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) aid distribution point in Gaza and later stated during a meeting with family members of Israeli hostages that Hamas had indicated it would be willing to disarm in exchange for a ceasefire. Hamas subsequently issued a statement indicating that it would only be willing to disarm following the formation of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The statements underscore the persistent deadlock in ceasefire negotiations, moderating the prospects for the rapid implementation of an agreement in the coming days (see below). As IDF operations continue in Gaza, humanitarian conditions are highly unlikely to improve significantly, sustaining widespread food insecurity and humanitarian concerns. Such conditions will sustain the risk of clashes, shooting incidents and fatal crushes in proximity to GHF and UN agency aid distribution points; they will also sustain significant threats to life for civilians and locally engaged staff. More broadly, stalling ceasefire negotiations will sustain the risk of further large-scale pro-Palestine demonstrations in protest hotspots across the world, particularly in Australia, North America and Europe (see below). Deteriorating conditions within Gaza will also likely trigger further scrutiny of Israeli-linked firms by pro-Palestine activists, driving the risk of targeted activism, protests and vandalism in the coming weeks. Such risks will be particularly acute for firms associated with the GHF, such as donors, service providers and consultancy firms.
• There is an increasing risk that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will intensify its military operations in Gaza if Israel’s possible offer to withdraw its forces fully in return for the release of all hostages is refused. In recent days, sources within the Israeli government have indicated that Israel, with the support of the US, is considering a shift in its negotiation strategy from pursuing partial hostage release deals to securing a full hostage release agreement. In exchange, Israel would possibly offer a full withdrawal of its forces from Gaza, a key Hamas demand. This development underscores possible Israeli efforts to overcome the ongoing deadlock in talks, with Hamas hardening its position in response to perceptions that Israel is becoming increasingly isolated internationally. However, such an offer would likely include further conditions, such as the complete disarmament of Hamas. We assess that Hamas is unlikely to accept any kind of agreement outright, but that it will likely try to secure further concessions. Regardless, if Hamas refuses to agree to such a deal, Israeli officials are likely to argue that this refusal would legitimise the intensification of military operations in Gaza, raising the prospects of Israel disengaging from talks (though international condemnation of such action remains likely). Military intensification would likely manifest through an escalation in airstrikes and a tightened cordon around militant-controlled parts of the strip.

RED SEA 

• The Yemen-based Houthis’ reconstitution and rearmament efforts highlight rising tensions in the Red Sea, as well as increased risks of Israeli airstrikes. On 1 August, local news claimed the Iranian-backed Houthis have escalated their recruitment, training and mobilisation efforts. Further reports claim the Houthis are conducting rapid restoration operations at the ports of as-Salif, Hudaydah and Ras Isa (all al-Hudaydah governorate), which were recently damaged in Israeli airstrikes. This comes after at least six ships carrying unidentified cargo loads arrived in Hudaydah and two others arrived in as-Salif. These activities reflect the group’s ongoing rearmament and reconstitution efforts, underscoring the elevated security risks facing maritime vessels operating in Yemeni waters. Such activities, together with continued and sporadic Houthi missile and drone strikes against Israel, will elevate the risk of Israeli airstrikes against Houthi positions and infrastructure (particularly in the three aforementioned ports and coastal areas) in the coming weeks. Such strikes would exacerbate energy, food security and socio-economic health risks within Houthi-held territory.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS  Developments

• Continued IDF raids against armed smugglers in southern Syria underscore the volatile security environment therein; they will likely persist over the coming months. On 2 August, an IDF unit conducted simultaneous raids at four sites in the Druze town of Hader (Quneitra governorate, Syria), near the Israeli-Syrian border. The troops confiscated caches of weapons and conducted on-site interrogations of several suspects. While the IDF disclosed no further details, the operation highly likely targeted emerging arms smuggling networks. Since the fall of the former Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, in December 2024, these networks have attempted to exploit the security vacuum near the border. As such, similar Israeli raids targeting intricate networks deeper into Syrian territory are highly likely in the coming weeks, increasing the risk of clashes with rogue local fighters and smugglers. This will further compound instability across Syria’s southern regions, which has already been exacerbated by recent ethno-religious tensions in Suywada governorate (Syria) and Israeli airstrikes against government-affiliated forces in support of the Druze. Nevertheless, recent Israeli raids against smugglers are unlikely to impact ongoing talks with Damascus significantly over long-term security arrangements along the border, though we assess that the prospects for a deal will remain highly dependent on preserving the ceasefire in Suwayda.
• The Israeli embassy in the UAE evacuated most of its staff following a travel warning citing the risk of a terrorist attack, partially elevating operational disruption risks for hospitality firms in the UAE dealing with Jewish and Israeli travellers in the coming weeks. On 31 July, Israel evacuated most of its diplomatic mission staff in the UAE, including its ambassador, hours after a travel warning issued by Israel’s National Security Council (NSC). The NSC stated that the latest warning was based on intelligence indicating that terrorist operatives in the UAE are planning attacks against high-profile Israeli individuals around the Jewish holidays and Shabbat. The council also urged Israeli citizens in the UAE to take steps to minimise their visibility, including by avoiding public displays of Israeli or Jewish identity. While operations at the Israeli embassy in the capital Abu Dhabi remain active, as does air travel between Israel and the UAE, the warning will partially elevate the risk of operational disruption for the Emirati hospitality sector dealing with Israeli tourists in the coming weeks. Furthermore, security and bystander risks will remain elevated in the coming days around synagogues in Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Dubai emirate), especially as the security forces will likely augment their posture around these facilities.
• Tens of thousands of pro-Palestine protesters marched in Australia, increasing the risk of harassment facing Israeli and Jewish visitors during these events. On 3 August, more than 90,000 people attended the pro-Palestine ‘March for Humanity’ across Sydney Harbour Bridge (New South Wales state). On the same day, around 25,000 people participated in a similar march in Melbourne (Victoria state), during which riot police blocked participants from marching along King Street Bridge in the central business district (CBD). Local media captured several chants and signs calling for the destruction of Israel, as well as pictures of Supreme Leader Khamenei. The unprecedentedly large protests indicate significant pro-Palestine sentiment in Australia, partially increasing the risks of harassment facing Israeli and Jewish visitors and residents during similar events in the coming weeks. These risks will be particularly elevated around 24 August, as the local branch of Palestine Action Group has called for other protests on that date. Furthermore, we assess that pro-Palestine activists in the country will attempt to put pressure on the government to commit to recognising Palestinian statehood through further protests and possible strikes throughout August.

Aug 01.

• Israel-Slovenia: Arms embargo will partially raise compliance risks for European defence companies. On 31 July, the Slovenian government imposed an embargo on the export, import and transit of arms to Israel. This comes two weeks after it declared that Israeli ministers are banned from entering Slovenia. This marks the first time an EU member state has taken such a step. However, the move is unlikely to impact Israeli military operations; Slovenia is not a major arms exporter to Israel and bilateral relations have been tense since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023. Nonetheless, the embargo will partially increase compliance risks for European defence companies dealing with both governments. Additionally, and following the Slovenian move, we assess that boycott campaigns and protests against defence companies in the EU are likely to increase in scope in the coming weeks, exacerbating the already-heightened reputational risks facing the sector.
• Iran: Companies, staff are likely to face difficulty accessing water, driving health, operational risks. On 31 July, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned that the country is facing an impending water crisis, calling on citizens to moderate their consumption as dams supplying the capital Tehran near depletion. The announcement underscores the significant impact of heatwaves on Iran’s ageing infrastructure, which has been exacerbated by decades of government mismanagement. Water pressure will likely continue to drop in the coming days, rendering it challenging to access water, especially for businesses and personnel situated on floors above ground level. Unstable water supplies will also likely impact sanitary conditions, driving an increased prevalence of infectious diseases. Water stockpiling is likely, especially vis-à-vis bottled water, exacerbating socio-economic health risks arising from disparities in purchasing power. Public offices, banks, schools and most businesses in Tehran will likely close (intermittently) in the coming weeks to conserve water, disrupting supply chains and business operations throughout the city. We assess that Iran’s ongoing energy shortage will likely exacerbate the crisis, driving anti-government sentiment and increasing incidents of small-scale protests in the capital.
• UK: Plan to undermine proscription of pro-Palestine group will possibly fuel renewed activism. On 3 August, The Telegraph newspaper reported on a plan by pro-Palestine activists to undermine police enforcement of the proscription of the radical Palestine Action (PA) group under the Terrorism Act 2000. According to the newspaper, groups such as Cage International and Defend Our Juries are urging activists to openly express support for PA en masse at a protest in Westminster in the capital London on 9 August. Smaller actions will also be held across the country. The organisers reportedly believe that the police will be incapable of arresting all those who express support for the PA and will face reputational damage if they do so, which will in turn create pressure for the ban to be lifted. We assess that the police will almost certainly face difficulty enforcing the ban if the organisers manage to mobilise sufficient support. If the plan is perceived to be successful, we assess that it will possibly fuel a spike in activist targeting of businesses following a lull in the wake of the ban on PA in July.
• Israel: Further Jewish prayers at al-Aqsa mosque will be likely, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions. On 3 August, Israel’s far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir led a group of worshippers in a Jewish prayer at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Under the ‘status quo’ agreed between Israel and the Muslim authorities, Jews can visit the compound but not pray there. The move is likely to encourage other incidents of Jewish prayer in the compound in the coming weeks and months, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions and the risk of domestic unrest in the Jerusalem area, specifically the Old City (Jerusalem governorate, Palestinian Territories). This will elevate the risk of localised clashes between Jewish and Muslim groups, increasing personnel exposure to attacks targeting the security forces and crossfire in crowded public spaces and religious sites in Jerusalem. We assess that escalating tensions will likely drive a heightened security presence throughout the city, elevating travel disruption and supply chain risks.
• Syria: Clashes in north will sustain political, security instability. On 2 August, Syria’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) accused the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of launching a rocket barrage on one of the army’s outposts in Aleppo governorate, injuring four soldiers and three civilians. In response, the SDF claimed that the barrage was a retaliation for an unprovoked artillery assault by factions within the Syrian army targeting civilian-populated areas and called for the government to control ‘undisciplined’ elements. While the mutual hostilities ceased shortly after, tensions along the line of control in northern Syria remain elevated. As such, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of armed conflict resumption between the Kurds and several Turkish-backed factions within the army in the coming weeks. The clashes are also likely to augment the ongoing rifts in talks between the SDF and Damascus over the integration of the Kurdish forces into the new Syrian army, deepening political and security instability in the country. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 08.

• Ukraine: Cyber operation highlights sustained security risks for defence sector. On 7 August, international news outlets reported that a threat group (‘UAC-0099’) is conducting a cyber operation against the defence sector in Ukraine. The group distributes phishing emails to trick victims into clicking on an embedded link. The link then redirects the victim to a legitimate file-hosting service containing a malicious script that downloads a malware loader (‘MATCHBOIL’). The loader subsequently executes two payloads (‘MATCHWOK’ and ‘DRAGSTARE’) to maintain persistence. It then collects sensitive information (including archives, cookies and login credentials), highlighting the continuous development of the group’s toolset. MATCHWOK also displays several anti-analysis features and avoids and/or terminates its execution if security tools are detected, underscoring its stealth capabilities. While UAC-0099 has not been attributed to any state, it has targeted Ukrainian organisations since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. We assess that this highlights the long-term security risks facing the Ukrainian defence sector.

Aug 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia is accelerating its mobilisation efforts, meaning Ukraine will have no alternative but to continue its own mobilisation drive
• STRIKES: There has been a marked decrease in the intensity of Russian long-range strikes ahead of the US’ 8 August deadline; another moratorium on long-range strikes is possible in the coming weeks
• AID: The first batch of US weapons supplied to Ukraine via NATO is expected to arrive in the coming weeks, amid an ostensible US strategy to increase pressure on Moscow to agree to end the war
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump are set to meet in the coming days as the latter seeks to increase pressure on Moscow to end the war; a breakthrough is unlikely
• OFFENSIVES: On 5 August, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia is accelerating its mobilisation efforts; if true, this means that Ukraine will have no alternative but to continue with its own mobilisation drive. According to Syrskyi, Russian forces plan to form ten new military divisions by the end of the year, of which two have already been established. In terms of personnel, Russia’s advantage over Ukraine is only widening, which represents just one reason why it remains highly unlikely that Moscow will agree to end the war, despite the impending US deadline of 8 August (see FORECAST below for further analysis).
• OFFENSIVES: Under current recruitment and expansion efforts, Syrskyi estimates that Russian forces are adding around 9,000 additional troops to their numbers every month, despite heavy losses. This aligns with our long-standing assessment that Russia is substantially increasing the size of its forces inside Ukraine, while also facilitating wider reconstitution efforts, such as the expansion of the newly formed Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD); the former is likely to be positioned against NATO forces in the Baltics.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to make slow advances to the north and north-west of Toretsk, maintaining the current high pressure on Ukrainian positions defending the southern approaches to Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage from 4, 5 and 6 August indicate advances to the north of Toretsk, around the village of Dyllivka, as well as near Rusyn Yar, located around ten miles (16km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the north-east, Ukrainian forces have been counter-attacking along the southern flank of Chasiv Yar, where they have made several gains. Geolocated footage published on 4 and 6 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced in a forested area and along the T-0504 highway, located around 3.5 miles (6km) and 1.7 miles (3km) to the south-east of Chasiv Yar, respectively.
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations around Pokrovsk remain centred on encircling the key logistical hub of Pokrovsk. In an interview with a Ukrainian media outlet, military expert Ivan Stupak warned that Russian forces are currently focusing on creating a pocket around the city. According to Stupak, such Russian efforts could render withdrawal a necessity, as was the case during the final stages of the Battle of Vuhledar which precipitated a Ukrainian withdrawal. While it remains unclear if (or when) the Ukrainian High Command will deem it necessary to withdraw, pressure is rising along the southern, eastern and northern flanks, with Russian forces still likely operating inside the city. Geolocated footage from 6 August also shows recent Russian advances along the T-0509 Fedorivka-Novoekonomichne highway in north-eastern Fedorivka, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Additional footage from the same day confirms that Russian forces recently advanced in western Chunyshyne, located to the south of Pokrovsk.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 6 August indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances at the Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast). Various Russian sources claimed on 5 August that their forces have now taken the entirety of northern Vovchansk (located to the north of the Vovcha River), though this is unconfirmed.
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian forces have secured positions in the north-western outskirts of Kupiansk, threatening Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the city. Geolocated footage from 6 August shows that Russia has likely captured Sobolivka, located immediately to the west of Kupiansk and just to the north of the crucial P-07 highway, which is the main GLOC supplying Ukrainian forces in Kupiansk. Cutting off this logistical route will significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to defend the town.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, along the southern sector of the frontline, geolocated footage from 5 August indicates that Russian forces made limited gains to the north of Novomykhailivka, which is itself located to the north-east of Lyman. To the north-west of Lyman, Russian forces also advanced to the north-east of Serednie, as of 6 August.
• SOUTHERN: On 4 August, Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn assessed that Russian forces are currently regrouping in preparation for renewed assaults across Zaporizhzhia oblast. While he did not specify where he expects these attacks to fall (or when), Russia has been making slow gains at various points along the southern axis over the past two months. Most notably, geolocated footage from 6 August confirms that Russian forces have advanced to the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk, which is located just to the north of Kamianske.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes over the past few days have comprised relatively smaller drone barrages (fewer than 100), occasionally accompanied by a limited number of missiles. Hits were recorded in various Ukrainian oblasts, including Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odesa. While the recent reduction in the intensity of long-range strikes possibly merely reflects Russian efforts to stockpile missiles and drones following unprecedently intense strikes this summer, they possibly also reflect Russia’s readiness to agree to a moratorium on long-range strikes as part of ongoing negotiations with the US (see the FORECAST below).
• STRIKES: Ukraine continues to strike Russian oil infrastructure in a bid to disrupt Russia’s oil production. On 7 August, Ukrainian forces reported that a drone struck the Afipskiy oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai (south-western Russia). The refinery, located roughly 124 miles (200km) from the frontline, serves as a strategic logistics hub for diesel fuel and aviation kerosene used by Russian troops. Over the past week, Ukraine has carried out similar strikes against multiple oil facilities, including major infrastructure.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: The first batch of US weapons supplied to Ukraine via NATO is expected to arrive in the coming weeks. An unspecified NATO official revealed details of the incoming military assistance on 6 August, which includes components and missiles for Ukraine’s arsenal of Patriot air defence systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 5 August that European members of the military alliance have pledged more than USD 1 bn in two days for the purchase of US weapons. Meanwhile, the US has approved foreign military sales for Ukraine worth over USD 200m, which includes equipment, repairs and technical support for M777 howitzers. According to Ukrainian Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal, unspecified ‘partner countries’ are entirely funding the assistance. Ultimately, the arms sales are likely part of the US’ strategy to increase pressure on Russia by increasing military support for Kyiv and also by issuing threats of new economic penalties against Moscow (see FORECAST below). This initiative will also offset the impending munitions shortages caused by the cessation of Biden-era military transfers.
• OIL: Starting 3 September, the EU will implement a new dynamic price cap on Russian oil as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Under the measures, the EU will set a new price cap for exports of Russian seaborne oil calculated at 15% below the average global price over the previous three months. As of now, that equates to USD 47.60 per barrel (pb) compared to the G7’s previously fixed USD 60 pb. The UK has also supported the EU’s revised price cap. While the extent to which the new limit will undermine Russia’s ability to generate revenue from its oil imports remains to be seen, the move is the latest in an increasingly co-ordinated Western approach targeting Russian oil revenues. For further analysis on the 18th sanctions package, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 June 2025.
• OIL: The Financial Times reported on 5 August that the US is considering the imposition of additional sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet if Moscow does not agree to a ceasefire by 8 August. Such action would mark the first time that the US has imposed sanctions on Russia since US President Donald Trump resumed the presidency in January. It remains unconfirmed whether the Trump administration will impose these measures; the decision to do so will likely depend on the outcome of the upcoming summit (see FORECAST below). Nevertheless, doing so would likely allow the US to present itself as taking a tougher stance against Russia without completely eroding the limited progress made thus far to engage with Moscow.
• CORRUPTION: On 6 August, the Ukrainian government appointed Oleksandr Tsyvinsky as head of the Economic Security Bureau (ESB). The IMF had given Ukraine a deadline of 31 July to appoint a new chief of the bureau; Kyiv had previously pledged to find a replacement as part of the requirements outlined by the IMF and EU. The ESB is responsible for investigating economic crimes in Ukraine, including tax evasion and goods smuggling. Ultimately, Tsyvinsky’s appointment will possibly increase confidence in the Ukrainian government’s commitment to reforms after the swift reversal of controversial legislation that had undermined the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. However, missing the original 31 July deadline in tandem with the controversial legislation has likely elevated concerns about future delays to corruption reforms.
• CORRUPTION: Trust in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has since dropped following recent developments, which we previously assessed was likely. According to polling data published on 6 August by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), trust in Zelensky has fallen to 58% compared to 65% in early June. However, this is still a healthy approval rating and does not indicate increased government instability. For further analysis on corruption in Ukraine and the implication of the controversial bill, see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025.
• FORECAST

DIPLOMACY: Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump are set to meet in the coming days as the latter seeks to increase pressure on Moscow to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Earlier on 7 August, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov detailed that the place of the meeting has been agreed upon in principle, though he did not offer further clarification on the date and location. Should a Putin-Trump summit take place in the coming days, it will be the first face-to-face meeting between both presidents since June 2021 and the first Putin-Trump summit since the Helsinki Summit in 2018.

The upcoming summit likely points to a de facto extension of the 8 August deadline and possible postponement of the threatened tariffs and further secondary sanctions if no peace is agreed by this date. However, an unspecified White House official disclosed on 6 August that secondary sanctions are still expected to be implemented despite a meeting earlier that day between Putin and Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff. The Kremlin and the White House both described that meeting (which lasted around three hours) as positive. However, just hours after the meeting, the US announced additional secondary tariffs on India, underscoring the possibility of further US punitive measures.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio disclosed on 6 August that Trump will decide whether or not to impose ‘secondary sanctions’ on Russia’s trading partners in the next 24-36 hours. Nevertheless, on 6 August, Trump issued an executive order to implement additional 25% tariffs on India due to its purchase of Russian oil. The White House stated that the tariffs aim to deter countries from supporting Russia’s economy through oil imports and to ‘impose serious economic consequences’ for its war in Ukraine. Russia supplies over one third of India’s oil imports; before Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India sourced approximately 0.2% of its oil from Russia.

Trump has warned that more countries purchasing Russian oil will be subject to secondary sanctions, meaning that China and Turkey will possibly face new tariff hikes in the near term. That said, it is possible that the Putin-Trump meeting could delay the US’ imposition of such measures against China, particularly as trade talks between Washington DC and Beijing are in a critical phase. In a similar vein, the expected meeting will possibly encourage the US to postpone the introduction of tariffs against Russia. As we have previously assessed, trade between Russia and the US has fallen to a significantly low level since the former’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; tariffs would therefore highly likely entail a limited impact. In the meantime, Russia likely views its agreement to a bilateral meeting as something it can offer to feign commitment to the peace process without having to make more meaningful concessions to end the war in a bid to avoid economic penalties. It remains our assessment, however, that even the prospect of tariffs and further secondary sanctions will not deter Moscow from continuing its war in the medium term.

Despite the willingness of Putin to meet with Trump, a face-to-face meeting between the Russian president and Zelensky is unlikely in the near term. Trump reportedly aims to hold a trilateral summit with Putin and Zelensky shortly after his engagement with Putin without any European representatives present. Although Kyiv has called for a meeting between Zelensky and Putin on numerous occasions, Moscow has so far refused. Earlier on 7 August, Putin stated that a meeting with Zelensky is possible, but that the right ‘conditions’ had to be made for this to happen. While Putin’s remarks were vague, they highly likely reflect Russia’s long-standing position that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky should only take place when an agreement has already been signed – pushing the prospect of such a meeting far into the future.

Despite the impending summit, our assessment remains that Russia is highly unlikely to be willing to end the war, especially as its forces continue to make gains on the battlefield. Citing unspecified Kremlin insiders, Reuters reported on 5 August that threats of sanctions are not ‘catastrophic’ and that Moscow perceives there is ‘not much more’ the West can do to inflict economic pain on Russia. Meanwhile, the sources also assessed that Putin’s war goals take precedence over concerns that his actions may be jeopardising the prospect of improving Russia’s relations with the West – which aligns with our own assessment.

Although a major breakthrough towards peace is unlikely to be announced when Putin and Trump meet, smaller gestures that both sides are able to present to domestic and international audiences as a ‘win’ are possible. On 6 August, President Zelensky claimed that Russia now seems to be more inclined towards a ceasefire and that US efforts to pressure Moscow are working. However, Zelensky did not specify why he was of this opinion, nor whether he believed as much after Trump informed him of developments concerning Witkoff’s meeting with Putin.

Partial ceasefires, such as a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes, remain possible in a bid to stave off US economic measures; however, we have seen no substantive change in the Kremlin’s approach to its war (or objectives). As we reported earlier this week, Putin and the wider Russian government have reiterated their long-standing demands and objectives in Ukraine, which include at the very least the complete conquest of the four annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia). Nevertheless, and as was the case during periods of intense US diplomacy earlier this year, temporary and partial ceasefires could be more palatable options for Russia than a comprehensive or full ceasefire, given Moscow highly likely wishes to continue its war for the foreseeable future.

Aug 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: Reports from the end of July indicate that Russian forces have penetrated the defences of Pokrovsk, advancing to its centre from the south, underlining growing pressure on the pocket
• NUCLEAR: US President Donald Trump reportedly ordered two nuclear submarines to deploy closer to Russia in response to nuclear threats from former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, though a serious nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely
• AID: On 1 August, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius confirmed that Berlin will supply Kyiv with additional US Patriot air defence batteries within two to three months, but will provide additional launchers within days
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin has underscored Russia’s unchanging position on Ukraine ahead of Trump’s impending 8 August deadline to reach a peace deal, which is likely to elapse without a deal
• BAKHMUT: A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), Ivan Petrychak, reiterated Ukraine’s position on 2 August that Russian forces have not captured the town. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces took control of Chasiv Yar on 31 July (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 31 July 2025). However, there have been no confirmed advances by either side in recent days; geolocated footage of Russian forces operating in the western outskirts of the town will be a key indicator that they have fully captured it. In any case, the Russians are almost certainly in control of the majority of the settlement.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, Russian forces have continued to advance on the flanks of the largely Russian-controlled city of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) as they continue efforts to advance in the direction of Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage posted on 24 and 28 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Dyliivka, which is located to the north of Toretsk. Additional geolocated footage posted on 2 August indicates Russian forces have advanced north of Oleksandro-Kalynove, which is located to the north-west of Toretsk.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the north, Russian forces also recently advanced in the direction of Siversk (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage circulated on 31 July and 1 August indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the Donetska railway (which is located to the north-east of Siversk) as well as north-west of Ivano-Darivka (which is located to the south-east of Siversk). A prominent Russian milblogger stated on 1 August that, if Russian forces capture Serebryanka (located to north-east of Toretsk), the conditions for a direct assault on Siversk itself will be set.
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations heavily rely on sabotage and reconnaissance activities as part of an ongoing effort to infiltrate Ukrainian defences in the Pokrovsk sector. On 2 August, Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, noted that the Pokrovsk area remains the most difficult hotspot for Ukrainian forces. Syrskyi highlighted that Russian forces are intensifying efforts to capture key settlements and probe Ukrainian defences for vulnerabilities in addition to stepping up sabotage operations as part of a ‘total infiltration’ strategy aimed at penetrating Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Reports from the end of July indicated that Russian forces had already penetrated the defences of the city, advancing to its centre from the south. However, Syrskyi claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully repelling these infiltration attempts, particularly through the deployment of anti-sabotage reserves and the reinforcement of defensive fortifications. On 31 July, the Telegraph reported that Russia’s extensive use of fibre-optic drones is supporting its advances near Pokrovsk. Drone swarms are creating breaches in Ukraine’s anti-drone netting and loitering near tunnel exits. In response, according to Syrskyi, Ukrainian forces are working to strengthen anti-drone tunnels to mitigate these threats.
• DONETSK: According to the UK Defence Intelligence report from 2 August, Russia is concurrently attempting to envelop Pokrovsk, making gains north-east of the settlement in an effort to cut off Ukraine’s critical logistical routes and ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian drone company commander reported that Russian forces are using drones to place mines along these GLOCs. Rodynske, a settlement located approximately four miles (6km) to the north of Pokrovsk, remains a hotspot for such operations; Russian forces are employing similar infiltration tactics as those used against Pokrovsk. The status of Rodynske remains contested, with the Ukrainian authorities denying recent claims that it has fallen under Russian control as of 31 July. Nevertheless, Russian forces are making progress to the north of the town, which is placing mounting pressure on the entire Pokrovsk pocket. Meanwhile, to the south of Pokrovsk, geolocated footage published on 3 August likely shows that Russian forces have recently captured Novoukrainka.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces have continued to push back Russian forces in Sumy oblast in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 31 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north-west of Andriivka, which is located to the north of Sumy city. Commentary from Russian milbloggers indicates that Ukrainian forces are contesting Russian positions at various points across Sumy oblast.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over recent days, Russian forces made confirmed gains along the Oskil-Kreminna line; however, localised Ukrainian counter-attacks in the Borova and Lyman directions are likely contesting Russian advances. Geolocated footage from 1 August shows recent Russian advances along the P-07 Kupiansk-Shevchenkove highway south-west of Stepova Novoselivka, a settlement located to the south-east of Kupiansk. Further south, geolocated footage posted on 31 July confirms that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Hrekivka, located to the south-east of Borova. Similarly, Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed gains in the eastern outskirts of Torske as of 1 August, located to the east of Lyman. Footage from 2 August shows Russian forces having progressed in southern Torske. The latest developments likely indicate that Torske remains highly contested.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces have achieved marginal advances in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts in recent days, likely as Russian offensive operations have provided opportunities for counterattacks. Geolocated footage circulated on 2 August indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Plavni and northern Kamyanske, which are located to the west and south-west of Orikhiv, respectively. Further to the east in Zaporizhzhia oblast, geolocated footage circulated on 31 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Temyrivka, which is located to the north-east of Huliapole. To the north-east  (in Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Ukrainian forces have similarly achieved confirmed advances. Geolocated footage posted on 31 July indicates that Ukrainian forces likely recently recaptured the settlement of Maliivka, which is located to the south-east of Velykomykhailivka.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes over the past few days were generally of moderate intensity but continued to inflict damage and cause casualties. The attack launched overnight on 2-3 August; it included one Iskander-M ballistic missile, five S-300/400 missiles and one Kh-22 cruise missile, along with 72 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Six missiles were intercepted, most likely cruise systems. The Ukrainian authorities reported that a missile, most likely the ballistic projectile, targeted Mykolaiv City (Mykolaiv oblast), damaging infrastructure and injuring at least seven people. Regions under attack in recent days include Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa oblasts.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, it remains likely that Russian forces are preparing airbases inside occupied Ukraine to launch drone attacks from much closer range. According to Ukrainian sources, satellite imagery published in July indicates that Russia has partially removed fortifications on the runway of the airport in northern occupied Donetsk City (Donetsk oblast). The imagery reportedly shows that the Russian authorities are constructing closed storage areas near the destroyed airport terminal and are preparing manual drone control points, warhead unloading areas, air surveillance posts, as well as a runway. This likely reflects Russia’s attempt to increasingly launch long-range drones against Ukraine from sites closer to the frontline, which would highly likely reduce reaction time for Ukrainian air defences. Moreover, the multiplication of launch points would likely allow Moscow to diversify strike paths, further complicating Ukrainian interception efforts.
• STRIKES: On 1 August, Business Insider reported that Ukrainian mobile fire teams and domestically produced interceptors are likely struggling to counter Russia’s new Geran-3 drone. Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Geran-3 is equipped with a high-power jet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of up to 497mph (800kph). It also allows the drone to function like a cruise missile in its ability to evade air defences. On 30 July, Ukrainian forces reported that Russia had launched eight jet-powered drones, possibly referring to Geran-3 UAVs, though it remains unclear whether any were intercepted. The inclusion of jet engines has increased the drones’ lethality; Russia is likely to expand the use of such engines, posing a growing challenge for Ukrainian air defences.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has in recent days conducted a series of long-range strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure. Overnight on 1-2 August, Ukrainian forces confirmed a strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan city (Ryazan oblast). The attack reportedly caused a fire at the plant, resulting in significant damage. The facility reportedly produces 840,000 tonnes of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year (8.4% of Russia’s total TS-1 production) and up to 17 m tonnes of oil per year (6.1% of Russia’s total oil refining). The attack also hit the Novokuibyshevsk plant in Samara oblast and an oil depot in Voronezh oblast. Ukrainian media outlets reported that drones also targeted a power substation in Rostov oblast.
• STRIKES: On 2 August, Ukrainian forces also struck various defence-related targets such as the Elektropribor plant in Penza City (Penza oblast). The plant reportedly manufactures equipment for Russian military digital networks. Other targets included drone launch sites at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base in Krasnodar krai.
• STRIKES: The Kyiv Post, quoting sources within Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), reported that an explosion on 2 August disabled a section of Gazprom’s Central Asia-Centre pipeline in Volgograd oblast. The cause of the explosion remains unknown. The pipeline transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Russia and reportedly supplies Russian defence industrial enterprises. Ukraine’s General Staff also reported a successful drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot at Sochi International Airport (AER) in Krasnodar krai on 3 August. The latest attacks on energy infrastructure form part of Kyiv’s co-ordinated strategy aimed at undermining energy supplies to Moscow’s frontlines and defence industry.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian ongoing strikes against Russian military aviation assets continue to underscore persistent deficiencies in the defences of such infrastructure. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that it conducted a drone strike on the Saky military airfield in occupied Crimea. The SBU claimed to have hit a weapons depot and destroyed one Su-30SM aircraft; it also damaged another Su-30SM and three Su-24 aircraft. A Su-30SM, according to the SBU, costs between USD 35 and 40 m. However, we cannot confirm this.
• STRIKES: On 1 August, Alexander Maksimtsev, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), announced that Moscow is developing a new generation of Voronezh early-warning radar capable of tracking ballistic missiles on any trajectory. Maksimtsev also reported ongoing efforts to equip all Russian airports and air bases with shelters to protect aircraft. His statements underscore Moscow’s attempts to address the vulnerability of its military aviation assets to Ukrainian strikes.POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NUCLEAR: On 31 July, Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US administration’s 8 August deadline for Russia to reach a peace deal. He stated that Russia will continue along its own path, while alluding to Russia’s semi-automatic nuclear control system. Medvedev regularly threatens the nuclear annihilation of Russia’s enemies and adversaries, often on his English-language Telegram account.
• NUCLEAR: On 1 August, US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines (either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed) closer to Russia in ‘the appropriate regions’ in direct response to Medvedev’s ‘highly provocative’ statements. Trump also warned Medvedev that he was ‘entering very dangerous territory’. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio commented on 31 July that Medvedev’s statements cannot be ignored. Rubio assessed that Medvedev is not a ‘relevant decision maker’, but due to his role in the Russian government, ‘his words are going to have impact’. This aligns with our long-standing assessment that Medvedev does not remain a significant centre of political gravity in the Kremlin.
• NUCLEAR: The Kremlin likely sees Medvedev’s often outlandish threats as a useful vehicle to remind the world of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, but he ultimately retains very little influence in the Kremlin. Indeed, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated earlier on 4 August that Moscow is ‘very cautious’ about statements regarding nuclear issues and that Medvedev has his own point of view, indicating a limited effort to distance the official Kremlin line. Despite this, Medvedev’s statement was likely part of a co-ordinated Kremlin-led strategic communications effort to deter the US from imposing punitive measures.
• NUCLEAR: On 1 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a joint event with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, at which the latter criticised Trump’s threats to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions and effectively reiterated implied and indirect nuclear threats. Lukashenka stated that it is not for Trump to ‘dictate the rules’ around the ongoing war in Ukraine, ‘especially to a nuclear power’ like Russia, and that Trump must proceed ‘carefully’. Despite the uptick in nuclear rhetoric, we have not adjusted our worst-case nuclear escalation scenario likelihood, which remains highly unlikely. Further nuclear sabre-rattling, posturing and indirect threats will be likely in the coming weeks and months, but we do not anticipate a significant escalation. For further analysis on the 1 August press conference, see FORECAST below.
• AID: On 1 August, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius confirmed that Berlin will supply Kyiv with additional US Patriot air defence batteries within two to three months, but will provide additional launchers within days. Pistorius stated that his government had reached a deal with the US to backfill its own supply of air defences and jump the queue for US export replacements. While Pistorius did not confirm the number of new batteries, Germany will likely supply two to Ukraine (with Norway possibly providing a third). A complete battery is made up of an antenna mast, a control station, a power plant, a radar unit, multiple launchers, as well as the interceptor missiles themselves.
• AID: Ukraine is understood to currently have six operational Patriot batteries (three of which were supplied by Germany). Additionally, on 31 July, the US Department of Defense confirmed that it will sell Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to Ukraine under a contract worth USD 3.5 bn. These latest announcements are significant milestones in offsetting the increasing frequency, intensity and lethality of Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine. However, the production timelines for Patriot systems (which take about two years to produce) and growing worldwide shortages of air defence munitions mean Ukraine’s chronic air defence shortages will highly likely continue for the foreseeable future.
• RECOGNITION: On 31 July, the co-presidents of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo wrote an open letter to Putin stating their government’s readiness to recognise Russia’s annexation of four oblasts in Ukraine (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia). Nicaragua is one of Russia’s staunchest supporters and regularly votes alongside Moscow at the UN. While not yet enacted, the proposal would make Nicaragua the first country in the world to recognise the territories, and the timing of the open letter is notable, coming just days before Trump’s 8 August deadline. The number of states likely willing to recognise the annexations remains low (chief among them are Belarus, Cuba and North Korea). However, once a state formally recognises the annexations, it will serve as a precedent for states seeking to normalise relations with Moscow.

FORECAST

On 1 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin held an event with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, during which the two leaders underscored Russia’s unchanging position on Ukraine ahead of Trump’s impending 8 August deadline to reach a peace deal. Putin notably stated in response to Trump’s reported disappointment in Russia for not reaching a deal that ‘all disappointments arise from excessive expectations’. This is the latest indication that any shift in Russian policy is highly unlikely.

Putin also stated that the conditions he laid out for peace in Ukraine in June 2024 ‘certainly’ remain the same. This strongly indicates that Moscow remains unwilling to countenance serious compromises and concessions that would facilitate an end to (or even a temporary freezing of) the war. Putin’s 2024 terms included the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from all four annexed regions (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) and the official abandonment of Ukraine’s NATO ambitions as preconditions for a ceasefire and the beginning of serious peace negotiations. Putin reiterated that ‘the main thing’ in the peace process will be to eradicate the ‘root causes’ of the war, which has remained a long-standing and unchanging Russian position.

As the 8 August deadline approaches, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on 31 July that Washington DC has not seen any progress or ‘sincere interest’ from Moscow in ending the war. Putin nevertheless attempted to characterise the peace process as developing ‘positively overall’, highlighting recent prisoner of war (POW) exchanges as recent successes. He also stated that peace negotiations must happen in detail behind the scenes and ‘off-camera’, though he stated that three working groups have not yet begun this process. Such behind-the-scenes negotiations will highly likely take place at intervals over the coming months. Nevertheless, it highly likely remains in Moscow’s interests to obfuscate the negotiating process; claims of behind-closed-doors negotiations will likely be used to deflect criticism regarding a lack of progress.

In the meantime, both Putin and Lukashenka underscored Russia’s determination to continue military operations in Ukraine despite the impending deadline, highlighting recent advances in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). Putin stated that his forces would ‘return’ the fortress belt of Ukrainian cities to the west and north-west of Chasiv Yar, as he claims these are Russian territory. We assess that this includes Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk (all Donetsk oblast). It remains our assessment that the Kremlin wishes to continue the war for as long as its forces continue to advance on the battlefield. With the recent (unconfirmed) seizure of Chasiv Yar and the building encirclement of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), it therefore remains highly unlikely that Russia will heed Trump’s demands and end the war before these objectives are secured.

Despite the unlikelihood of a peace agreement, it remains unclear if Trump will follow through with his threats to impose direct tariffs and (crucially) indirect secondary sanctions on Russia’s trading partners if no peace is agreed by 8 August. On 4 August, President Trump stated that ‘there will be sanctions [on Russia], but they seem to be pretty good at avoiding sanctions’. Additionally, on 3 August, US Congress members left for the summer recess without having passed a proposed sanctions bill against Russia. This has effectively provided the Executive branch with a decision on how to respond to Russia’s likely dismissal of the 8 August deadline. Trump has previously been reticent to impose economic measures on Russia. Moscow is still currently exempt from tariffs with the US, but numerous statements from him and his administration in recent weeks have indicated that his patience is wearing thin. Nevertheless, a flurry of diplomatic activity is likely in the coming week as Russia seeks to deter the US from imposing punitive measures. On 6 or 7 August, US special envoy Steve Witkoff will likely travel to Moscow for talks, though a last-minute breakthrough towards peace remains highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)

04 Aug 25. Ukraine Says Elite Unit Struck Russian Aircraft, Ammo Depot in Crimea. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said Monday that its special operations forces carried out a drone strike on Russia’s Saky military airfield in occupied Crimea. In a statement, the SBU said the overnight attack, conducted by its Special Operations Center “A,” destroyed one Su-30SM fighter jet, damaged another, and struck three Su-24 bombers. “The enemy suffered significant losses, as a single Su-30SM aircraft can cost between $35 and $50 m on average,” the agency noted. The strike also hit an aviation munitions depot located within the airfield, according to SBU.  The SBU described the strike as part of its broader strategy to erode Russia’s military capabilities in occupied territory. “The successful SBU operation in Saky is another step toward weakening the enemy’s ability to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine. The occupiers must remember: they will never feel safe on our land!” Saky airbase, located near Novofedorivka in western Crimea, is home to Russia’s 43rd Fighter Aviation Regiment and houses Su-30SM fighters, Su-24 bombers, and Orion drones. Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the airbase was operated by the Ukrainian military. The base has been targeted repeatedly since 2022. In August of that year, blasts at an ammunition depot destroyed at least eight Russian combat aircraft. The strike on the Saky airfield follows a major Ukrainian drone operation in June that targeted four Russian airbases.  According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff, the operation caused an estimated $7 bn in damage and disabled 34% of Russia’s cruise missile carrier fleet. More than 40 aircraft were damaged in the attack, including Tu-95 “Bear” nuclear bombers, Tu-22M3 “Backfire” bombers, and A-50 “Mainstay” airborne early warning aircraft. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

04 Aug 25. Ukraine Air Force aim to be part of Nato forces in 20-year strategy. If not officially, Ukraine’s Air Force aim to be a de facto part of alliance forces. Ukraine has devised a report detailing a 20-year development strategy for its military aviation units according to a statement from the president, and supreme commander-in-chief, Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 3 August 2025. The military will take new steps to empower all its aerial elements: combat aviation, anti-aircraft missile forces, and radio-technical forces. Ultimately, though, the wartime leader emphasised that “Our goal is the full and effective integration of the Air Force of Ukraine with Nato forces – something that will undoubtedly give Ukraine’s defense greater capabilities and, at the same time, make our country an even stronger part of Europe’s defense.” The precise details of what Zelenskyy says may be Ukraine’s “de facto” inclusion within Nato forces are unclear. One of the defining factors in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that neither side has aerial supremacy which has led to brutal fighting on the ground as Russian forces slowly make gains along the frontline. If Nato is amenable to Ukraine’s objectives then there will be questions around how far the alliance will contribute to the country’s aerial capabilities beyond the substantial commitments already made by Western partners. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

04 Aug 25. Ukraine sign anti-corruption and defence budgetting changes into law. President Zelenskyy makes a U-turn on anti-corruption and improves pay and downtime of military personnel. Pressured by protests at home and concerns abroad, Zelenskyy changed tack and restored the powers of the two agencies in a bill that passed through parliament with 331 votes. Credit: Office of the President of Ukraine. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that he signed two laws into effect on 31 July 2025, related to anti-corruption and defence expenditure. The former measure, though, is considered a political U-turn by the wartime leader, who had only a week before implemented a law curbing the powers of two independent anti-corruption bodies, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. What was particularly concerning were comments made by the European Union (EU) Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, who described the new measure as “a serious backstep” that could jeopardise the country’s accession into the EU. Pressured by protests at home and concerns abroad, Zelenskyy restored the powers of the two agencies in a bill that passed through parliament with 331 votes. In his statement, the president emphasised that Ukraine is a democracy, drawing an implicit parallel with Russia, whose invasion has reached more than three-and-a-half years now. “It is very important that the state listens to public opinion,” he maintained. (Source: army-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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01 Aug 25.  UK bets big on defence SMEs, but can it change the country’s fortunes? The UK’s recent economic results have seen a contraction across multiple sectors amid a worsening business environment. Small and medium enterprises (SME) in the UK are being encouraged to explore potential opportunities in the country’s defence sector, following the publication of the government’s plan to support emerging industry players. Publishing its ‘Backing your business’ policy paper on 31 July 2025, the UK government has laid out what it considers a viable strategy that includes a long-term plan to support SME business. The SME sector is being tapped to revitalise a UK economy teetering on the edge of recession, amid a rapidly worsening business environment caused by the twin shocks of a rise in employer national insurance payments and a depressed job market. In a bid to prompt UK SMEs to engage with defence opportunities offered by the Ministry of Defence, the UK government has launched a new SME Procurement Education programme and formed a Defence SME Support Centre to simplify access. The SME Defence Centre will introduce a single point of access for smaller businesses with clear link to support services, the UK government stated. As part of a shift to encourage investment in emergent technologies, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is now tasked with spending 10% of its budget on innovation. It is unclear what the definition for innovative technologies allows for, although it is likely a call to promote the greater integration of SMEs in providing for military capability, an area where the MoD has historically been poor. Recent examples of this pivot by UK SMEs can be seen in with MGI Engineering which is transitioning from its Formula 1 and motorsport origins to producing loitering munitions, otherwise known as One-Way Effectors or suicide drones.

Fellow UK SME Perfect Bore Manufacturing has also moved into producing UK defence systems to produce 120mm mortar tubes, leveraging skillsets developed supplying other sectors.

Is the UK walking its defence SME talk?

According to UK government data, while direct SME spending rose to £3.52bn in 2023-24 across the country’s varied sectors, the overall share of procurement going to SMEs has declined over the past five years. Additional support includes expanding UK Export Finance to £20bn (£26.3bn) to enable SMEs to deal in overseas markets, creating 70,000 Start-Ups Loans, and a £3bn boost to the British Business Bank to help lenders offer more SME loans. It should be noted that such schemes are open to all SMEs regardless of sectors, although the UK government is pinning a great deal of hope on the defence sector in particular.

“There are particular opportunity areas for SMEs, such as the defence market,” the UK government stated on 31 July.

Preference for overseas kit contrary to public claims

While there should be opportunity for UK SMEs in defence with the country’s defence budget increasing, this will primarily benefit larger national, European, and US firms. However, the UK procures a significant proportion of its equipment from mainland Europe and the US, recently opting to acquire US-origin F-35A fighters instead of a top up buy of Eurofighter Typhoons, which would have offered far higher economic returns. In addition, UK parliamentary statements have confirmed that 40% of the value of each of the Challenger 3 main battle tank and Boxer mechanised infantry vehicle programmes is being  sourced from non-UK entities. While the UK retains, more or less, the ability (if not always the political will) to design, develop, and manufacture military platforms for the air and naval domains, this is not the case for land. All of its major land programmes, from the Challenger 3, Boxer, Ajax armoured vehicles, to the future RCH 155 artillery system, are being developed or led through European or US expertise. (Source: army-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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www.exensor.com

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30 Jul 25. Readout of the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Joint Planning Committee (SJPC). Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell provided the following readout: The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia held the 9th Strategic Joint Planning Committee (SJPC), a key forum for the bilateral defense relationship, on July 29-30, 2025, at the Pentagon. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby led the U.S. delegation. The Assistant Minister of Defense His Excellency Dr. Khalid Biyari led the Saudi delegation. Under Secretary Colby expressed appreciation for the Kingdom’s leadership, underlined the Department’s commitment to strengthening the bilateral defense partnership under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth’s leadership, and encouraged rapid progress in implementing the $142bn Memoranda of Intent signed by Secretary Hegseth during President Trump’s May 2025 visit to Riyadh. Both leaders recognized U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation as a force multiplier for regional security, and reviewed opportunities to deepen cooperation. The delegations exchanged views on a range of national defense priorities and regional security challenges. Both delegations expressed sustained and steadfast support for the longstanding U.S.-Saudi partnership. Under Secretary Colby also welcomed Saudi efforts to strengthen its self-defense capacities and to make greater contributions toward achieving shared regional objectives. (Source: U.S. DoD)

31 Jul 25. Almost unanimous support for defence funding boost. Political parties and experts across the ideological and political spectrum are almost unanimous that South Africa’s defence budget needs to increase in order for the National Defence Force to carry out its functions. Earlier this month, following the defence budget vote debate, Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga told Newzroom Afrika that another R30 bn was needed for her department to meet its mandate. Motshekga is on record as saying “under-funding of the defence force has become critical”. Others in the more funding camp include defence analysts and commentators on defence issues as well as public representatives in both Houses of Parliament – the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). In addition to the EFF’s Carl Niehaus, other parliamentarians seeking better funding from National Treasury (NT) for General Rudzani Maphwanya’s SANDF are Malusi Gigaba, Phiroane Phala, Dakota Legoete (all African National Congress), Chris Hattingh, Maliyakhe Shelembe, Nicholas Gotsell (all Democratic Alliance) and Bantu Holomisa (United Democratic Movement and a deputy minister). Veteran defence analyst Helmoed Heitman told this publication in May Lieutenant General Lawrence Mbatha’s SA Army is 10 000 “warm bodies” short as a result of “under-funding and over-stretch”. African Defence Review Consultancy (ADRC) Director Darren Olivier has long advocated for another Defence Review and White Paper with Cape Town-based defence and military aviation authority Dean Wingrin also wanting to see more spent on the SANDF, enabling it to properly execute the tasks handed it by the Ramaphosa Government of National Unity (GNU) Cabinet. Included on this list are border protection and safeguarding (Operation Corona), the longstanding continental peacekeeping commitment to the United Nations (UN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Operation Mistral) and ad-hoc taskings assisting the SA Police Service (SAPS) (Operation Prosper), disaster support and humanitarian assistance (Operation Chariot) as well as search and rescue (Operation Arabella). Outside Parliament, the newest addition to those wanting Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana to loosen the purse strings for the SANDF is SA Navy (SAN) chief, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese. He told a July Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) meeting NT was “suffocating the SANDF”. National Treasury did not take kindly to Lobese’s allegations, issuing a statement to the effect that proper management of funding allocated is the responsibility of the department – in this instance defence and military veterans – receiving the money. Support for this approach comes from Songezo Zibi, Rise Mzanzi leader as well as chair of SCOPA (Standing Committee on Public Accounts). This month in a PoliticsWeb column he wrote “it’s a crying shame that the SANDF is under-funded” adding blame for this is “patently not up to Treasury”. He noted further “it is silly to suggest that Treasury is the sole decider” pointing out this responsibility is that of a budget sub-committee. In a May research document, Niehaus wrote that among others, there is a lack of strategic approach in the Department of Defence (DoD) to build a fit-for-purpose defence force. “The 2015 Defence Review, meant to guide SANDF modernisation, was never implemented, and the promised ‘Road to Greatness’ strategy, due in 2024, remains undelivered, leaving the DoD without a framework to prioritise spending. This necessitates an urgent national defence summit to revise the 2015 Defence Review and develop a 10-year modernisation plan.” In closing Niehaus maintains the 2025/2026 DoD budget of R57.207 bn (real-term cut of R717m) and the Department of Military Veterans’ (DMVs’) R906.5m (stagnant) reflect neglect of security and veterans. The unimplemented 2015 Defence Review and absent ‘Road to Greatness’ necessitate a national defence summit. “The EFF demands R114 bn (1.5% of GDP) for DoD and R2bn for DMV, creating 26, 250 jobs” with a parting shot that “the R2bn SAMIDRC withdrawal return is a travesty, prioritising debt over security and soldiers’ dignity”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

30 Jul 25. Pakistan: Disruption, security risks will be heightened in Bajaur amid counter-terror operation. Earlier on 30 July, the security forces launched ‘Operation Sarbakaf’ against militants in Lowi Mamund tehsil (Bajaur district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province); the operation included the use of artillery and gunship helicopters. A three-day curfew has been implemented in 16 areas of Lowi Mamund, restricting movement outside homes and on roads. Protests against the operation’s impact on the local population were held in War Mamund tehsil (Bajaur). Militant activity in Bajaur, which borders Afghanistan, has increased in recent months, with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members taking advantage of the porous border to launch attacks on the Pakistani security forces. Despite regular security operations in the area, the security forces have struggled to materially contain the threat. Consequently, we assess that elevated security risks will likely persist for the foreseeable future. This will undermine efforts to facilitate the development of Pakistan’s minerals sector, as Bajaur is home to deposits of chromite and manganese (Source: Sibylline)

30 Jul 25. South Sudan-Uganda: Long-standing border disputes will sustain risks of low-intensity clashes. On 29 July, a spokesperson for the South Sudanese security forces (SSPDF) announced that an exchange of small arms fire with the Ugandan security forces (UPDF) in Kangapo II (Central Equatoria state, South Sudan) killed five personnel on 28 July. A UPDF spokesperson subsequently stated that the clash emerged after SSPDF personnel entered Uganda’s West Nile region and refused to withdraw. Low-intensity clashes between SSPDF and UPDF personnel frequently occur along the South Sudan-Uganda border due to a lack of clear border demarcation and miscommunication between security force units. The incident is highly unlikely to escalate into further clashes in the coming days or undermine strong bilateral relations; both spokespeople emphasised ongoing efforts to resolve outstanding border disputes through a joint committee. Even so, we assess that long-standing border disputes and unclear demarcation will sustain risks of further clashes in the coming months, driving security threats to locally engaged staff, particularly NGO personnel engaged in rural development projects. Further clashes will also increase risks of temporary disruption to cross-border movement and supply chain continuity in southern Central Equatoria. (Source: Sibylline)

30 Jul 25. Côte d’Ivoire: Confirmation of president’s candidacy will elevate unrest risks. On 29 July, President Alassane Ouattara announced that he will seek re-election for a fourth term in October’s presidential election. Ouattara’s announcement follows endorsement from his Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) party. Although Ouattara’s candidacy was widely anticipated (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 June 2025), opposition leaders will likely characterise it as unconstitutional and attempt to mobilise anti-government demonstrations in the coming weeks. A pact between the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and the African People’s Party – Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) will likely facilitate greater co-ordination and mobilisation of protests, bolstering attendance. This will increase risks of protest activity and related unrest in opposition strongholds such as Abidjan (Abidjan district), Daloa (Sassandra-Marahoué district) and the capital Yamoussoukro, triggering sporadic operational and travel disruption. Despite likely protest activity, however, we assess that Ouattara will likely win October’s election. This is due to substantial fragmentation within the opposition and the disqualification of several high-profile opposition leaders from contesting the poll, including Tidjane Thiam and the former president, Laurent Gbagbo. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. Bangladesh: Security force presence in Dhaka will highly likely increase following police directive. On 28 July, the Bangladesh Police’s Special Branch (SB) issued a directive to all police chiefs warning of an elevated risk of vandalism and disorder by ‘fascist forces’ from 29 July to 8 August. It noted that anti-government groups have been holding events nationwide to mark the one-year anniversary of the protests that led to the ousting of the former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina. The police will be on heightened alert throughout July and August. The interim government has warned that supporters of Hasina’s now banned Awami League (AL) party will possibly incite unrest or provoke clashes through co-ordinated online and offline campaigns during this period. We assess that an elevated security force presence is highly likely in the capital Dhaka over the coming two weeks, especially at transport hubs and outside political party offices. The police are likely to disperse any AL gatherings forcibly with water cannons and tear gas, which would in turn drive bystander risks. Arbitrary detention risks facing AL-linked figures will remain elevated in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. Azerbaijan-Russia: Moscow-backed info ops will likely drive already-elevated regional tensions. On 28 July, Azerbaijan’s Media Development Agency issued a warning regarding the circulation of fake artificial intelligence (AI)-generated videos on social media. The footage allegedly shows senior Azerbaijani officials apologising to Russia. The state media watchdog claims that the content is intended to mislead public opinion. Our assessment remains that Russian-backed threat actors are most likely responsible for disseminating such material as part of an information campaign targeting the Azerbaijani state amid ongoing bilateral tensions. While relations between the two countries have been strained since the end of 2024, the latest flare-up stems from a crackdown by the authorities on members of Russia’s Azerbaijani minority in late June. In response, Baku detained several Russian citizens in Azerbaijan, including staff from the local branch of the Russian state-owned media outlet Sputnik Azerbaijan. We assess that Moscow’s information operation is aimed at destabilising Baku and will further exacerbate tensions and tit-for-tat arrests. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Ceasefire will likely be observed, despite allegations of violations. Earlier on 29 July, regional commanders from Cambodia and Thailand met for discussions on de-escalation measures; these included an agreement not to deploy further troops along the disputed border. The talks proceeded despite Thailand having accused Cambodia of violating the ceasefire after it came into effect at midnight. The ceasefire was agreed on 28 July during a meeting in Malaysia, though heavy fighting at the border was reported up until the deal’s implementation. Since the ceasefire came into effect, the situation has reportedly calmed significantly, with only sporadic exchanges monitored. A General Border Committee (GBC) meeting is scheduled for 4 August in Cambodia, during which further high-level talks will take place. In the coming days, we assess that additional isolated violations are possible, though we also assess that both Bangkok and Phnom Penh will largely observe the ceasefire, easing several of the most pertinent security risks facing both countries’ border areas. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. Congo (DRC): Government reshuffle is unlikely to moderate government stability risks. Later on 29 July, President Félix Tshisekedi will formalise a government reshuffle as part of a process initiated in March to incorporate opposition figures into a unity government. The reshuffle likely reflects efforts to pre-empt a potential leadership challenge given eroding government support from within the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). On 15 July, the authorities arrested several high-ranking FARDC figures and Tshisekedi’s head of personal security due to their alleged involvement in a coup ‘plot’. While the veracity of the claim regarding a plot remains unclear, the arrests underscore the government’s heightened anxiety vis-à-vis its control of the country’s security apparatus. The reshuffle also comes amid intensifying criticism of the government from the opposition, though it is unlikely to include many (if any) opposition figures. Instead, it will likely elevate loyalist figures to key positions to consolidate support for Tshisekedi among his allies. As such, while the reshuffle will possibly moderate immediate threats to government stability, we assess that the exclusion of opposition figures and the narrowing of the government’s support base will sustain government stability risks in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Ceasefire will likely be observed, despite allegations of violations. Earlier on 29 July, regional commanders from Cambodia and Thailand met for discussions on de-escalation measures; these included an agreement not to deploy further troops along the disputed border. The talks proceeded despite Thailand having accused Cambodia of violating the ceasefire after it came into effect at midnight. The ceasefire was agreed on 28 July during a meeting in Malaysia, though heavy fighting at the border was reported up until the deal’s implementation. Since the ceasefire came into effect, the situation has reportedly calmed significantly, with only sporadic exchanges monitored. A General Border Committee (GBC) meeting is scheduled for 4 August in Cambodia, during which further high-level talks will take place. In the coming days, we assess that additional isolated violations are possible, though we also assess that both Bangkok and Phnom Penh will largely observe the ceasefire, easing several of the most pertinent security risks facing both countries’ border areas. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. SA arms exports under scrutiny amid calls for greater oversight and transparency. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) has raised pressing concerns about the transparency and accountability of South Africa’s conventional arms trade, following a presentation by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) on its 2025 Q1 and Q2 reports. While the NCACC outlined significant growth in the sector, opposition members of parliament (MPs) and civil society critics warned that a lack of verifiable end-user checks risks implicating South Africa in regional and international conflicts. Deputy Chairperson of the NCACC, Deputy Minister Andries Nel, standing in for the absent Chair, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, on Friday 25 July reported to Parliament that between January and June 2025 the NCACC approved:

90 new registration certificates

85 contracting permits worth R17.2bn

283 export permits for munitions totalling just under R5bn

79 export permits for dual-use items worth R287m

165 import permits worth R156m

First quarter exports included a single combat aircraft to Mozambique worth R163 m (likely a Paramount Mwari); R206m worth of ammunition to Estonia; R318 m worth of ammunition to Germany; and R112m worth of “air defence technology” to the UAE.

The second quarter of 2025 saw 91 armoured vehicles worth approximately R800m approved for export to 11 mostly African countries, with the largest order being from Kenya (26 vehicles worth R205m) followed by Malawi (15 vehicles worth R145m). Two aircraft worth R327m were approved for export to the Democratic Republic of Congo and one to Mozambique (R163 m) – almost certainly Mwaris. Also in the second quarter, R1bn worth of ammunition was authorised for sale to Germany, along with R640m worth of munitions to Turkiye and R279m to Australia. Electronic systems accounted for a substantial component of Q2 2025 exports, including R423m worth of electronic warfare systems to India (almost certainly from Saab Grintek Defence), and R71 m worth of EW/communications systems each to Bangladesh and Brazil. Australia was authorised to receive R279m worth of countermeasure/imaging equipment. The NCACC noted a 60% increase in company registrations in Q2, with a dramatic leap in munitions exports, rising from R907 m in Q1 to R4 bn in Q2. According to the committee’s own data, arms exports during this period were mainly directed to Europe (59% in Q1), with the Middle East and Asia also featuring. By Q2, Africa saw a sharp rise (35% of the total) in imports from South Africa, particularly for dual-use goods, which are civilian technologies with potential military application. In Q2, Europe accounted for 52% of exports. The NCACC insisted it operates within the National Conventional Arms Control Act (Act 41 of 2002), which obliges it to ensure arms are not sold to states engaged in repression, terrorism, or conflict. Committee members, particularly Carl Niehaus (EFF), challenged the NCACC’s assertion that it operates within strict oversight boundaries. Niehaus argued the lack of end-user inspections since 2015 leaves Parliament with no means of ensuring arms are not being re-exported to regimes involved in human rights violations, citing Israel and Ukraine as examples.

He referenced US defence reports and a Sudanese arms monitoring platform which alleged that South African-manufactured weapons, including white phosphorus munitions, had been used in Sudan and Gaza. Niehaus accused the NCACC of offering “only warm words and no verifiable data”, and likened the situation to the notorious 1994 arms scandal (assault rifles and ammunition sent to Yemen using forged end user certificates) that led to the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Edwin Cameron.

The deputy minister responded that the NCACC relies on interdepartmental scrutiny committees, comprising State Security, the South African Police Service, and DIRCO, for due diligence. While acknowledging that inspections abroad are difficult, he invited Members to submit actionable evidence to trigger specific investigations. Committee members were reminded that current law restricts public reporting of technical specifications or exact end-user data. Section 23 of the Act prohibits disclosure of classified material, allowing only broad disclosures of item type, value and destination country. However, growing pressure from Members suggests Parliament may seek legislative amendments. Supporters of the arms sector, including members of the ruling coalition, emphasised the industry’s economic value. Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM), South Africa’s largest arms manufacturer, directly employs over 2 600 workers and supports an estimated 45 000 indirectly. Calls were made to prioritise transformation, improve SME access to export markets, and increase transparency in permit backlogs. Concerns were also raised about public access to the Directorate of Conventional Arms Control (DCAC), located within a high-security defence complex, with one whistleblower reportedly barred after aiding MPs during an oversight visit. The committee chair and several members expressed frustration at receiving only high-level summaries, demanding clearer reporting mechanisms and swifter follow-ups on previous allegations. The NCACC committed to tabling more detailed reports in its annual submission and welcomed proposals for joint hearings with trade, innovation, and defence oversight committees. A follow-up response from the NCACC is expected, including answers to a 14-page letter of allegations submitted in April and a new list of 15 written questions tabled during the session. While the arms industry offers a vital economic lifeline, particularly in high-tech and manufacturing sectors, the NCACC faces mounting pressure to prove that growth is not coming at the cost of ethical conduct or compliance with international humanitarian norms. For now, Parliament remains unconvinced that oversight systems are watertight.  (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

29 Jul 25.  Armscor deepens ties with African nations, dtic touts business in Turkiye. A stated Armscor aim to reposition the South African defence and security acquisition and project management company to leverage opportunities in Africa has to date seen contact with three African countries this year as well as Turkiye, where the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition also helped promote South African companies. Armscor’s first major continental exposure this year was to Côte d’Ivoire in the form of a mid-February delegation which visited a number of Armscor facilities and also heard from SA National Defence Force (SANDF) Chief General Rudzani Maphwanya. The visit was implemented in line with the requirements of the West African country such as drone technology, vessels, ammunition manufacturing and weapon systems. A follow-up meeting that month resulted in a letter of cooperation being signed by Armscor and Côte d’Ivoire defence ministry to explore potential business opportunities. In its latest newsletter, Armscor makes mention of its presence at the Burkina Faso Synergy Safety, Defence and Security (SYSDEF 2025) exhibition in May followed by the June Africa Security Symposium (ASEC 2025) in Ethiopia. The newsletter opines its attendance and presence at the events “are just but a few platforms that allows the Corporation to have meaningful engagements with key role players in the security and defence sector”.

“It is through these gatherings that Armscor is able to demonstrate its capabilities and forge strategic relationships with the intention to leverage on its expertise. Industry shows and exhibitions have over the years proven to be effective channels for collaborations and strengthening relationships aimed at providing key defence solutions.”

On the Burkina Faso exhibition, held from 8 to 10 May in Ouagadougou, the Armscor presence was part of its marketing and business development strategy to consolidate its regional presence in West Africa and its commitment to advancing innovation and fostering international collaboration.

Armscor was invited to share expertise, explore new opportunities for cooperation, and strengthen ties between Burkina Faso respective defence industries. It held several meetings with senior defence officers and prominent business leaders, “who expressed significant interest in collaborating with Armscor in supplying weapon systems to Burkina Faso. One of the significant meetings was with the Chief of General Staff of the Burkina Faso Armed Forces, Brig Gen Célestin Simporé, who requested Armscor to invite him to South Africa to have a follow-up discussion on how to improve business with South Africa.” Of its attendance at the 12th Africa Security Symposium in Addis Ababa in mid-June, the State-owned company (SOC) reports its “prominent visibility allowed Armscor to showcase the South African defence industry (SADI) and its capabilities, commitment to enhancing defence across Africa and to engage meaningfully with key stakeholders”.

IDEF 2025 a success for SA companies

More recently, Armscor was at the International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF) held in Istanbul, Turkiye, between 22 and 27 July. This attracted 122 000 visitors from 114 countries and 1 500 exhibitors from 49 countries. The South African pavilion at IDEF, facilitated by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (the dtic), generated “significant trade leads” with participating firms exploring opportunities to expand into new export markets and strengthen their global footprints. South African exhibitors at IDEF 2025 included SVI, Imperial Armour, Aerospace Maritime and Defence Export Council, FimmTech, Unipro Protective Wear, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), QP Drone Tech, Zebra Protection, Kimona Holdings, Bullet Proofing Technology, Redeployable Camp Systems SA, Swatek Defence and Aerospace, Armscor, Fuchs Electronics, Reutech, Etion Create, Dynateq International, and Reutech Communications.

Benny Jiyane, Executive Chairman of SVI Engineering, said his company had met prospective clients from Zambia and West Africa. “It is interesting because they are looking for solutions in Africa, made by Africans. Also from the South Asian side, we received enquiries from Indonesia. They are interested in following up and seeing whether we cannot collaborate with them,” he said.

Louisa Garland, International Sales Director and founder of Imperial Armour, said her company received over a dozen promising enquiries from prospective clients, including Turkiye. Garland said the company, which employs 30 people, currently supplies the ministries of defence in different countries including United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia.

The Group Marketing Manager of Canvas and Tent Group, Karen Coetzer, noted that the exhibition was highly encouraging, with the company already receiving inquiries from European firms interested in their field hospitals and military base camps. She added that her team had advanced to signing a non-disclosure agreement with a company and are optimistic that this will lead to a formal transaction. The dtic reported the Technical Manager of engineering company FimmTech, Kevin Mhlanga, as saying FimmTech engaged with counterparts from Türkiye, Canada, China and the United Arab Emirates. “We shared ideas in terms of solutions in command and control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance (C4ISR) and we are looking forward to expand on the engagements we had.”

“The exposure and networking opportunity has not only strengthened our position in the defence and protective apparel manufacturing sectors, but has also opened doors to potential export markets, just to mention a few, Lebanon, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, a distributor in the whole of the Middle Eastern countries and Switzerland,” said Kimona Holdings Managing Director Kim Bubu.

“In addition, there are more than 20 Turkish companies in the defence sector that are keen to collaborate with us,” Bubu said.

“We have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with a Turkish body armour manufacturer, which has a lot of clientele in Africa and looking to work with a South African company to service the market,” Managing Director of Unipro Protective Wear, Zama Ledidi, told the dtic. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

28 Jul 25. Romania: Deputy prime minister resignation underscores government stability, governance risks. On 27 July, Deputy Prime Minister Dragoș Anastasiu resigned, following reports revealing his involvement in a corruption scheme. Between 2009 and 2017, his company paid a tax inspector approximately EUR 170,000 (USD 198,500) in bribes, disguised as consultancy fees, to avoid inspections. The tax inspector was imprisoned in 2023. Anastasiu and his business partner had never been charged, underscoring persistent governance and supervision quality risks. There is a realistic possibility that the resurfacing of the scandal will undermine public confidence in the Bolojan government, which was appointed on 23 June with the key objective of reducing the country’s budget. Romania’s budget deficit reached 9.3% of GDP in 2024 (the EU limit is 3%). An austerity package (including public sector reforms, tax hikes and wage caps) has already triggered several protests; a large-scale protest has been scheduled for 1 August. Therefore, we assess that domestic unrest and government stability risks will remain elevated in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

28 Jul 25. Pakistan-China: China’s security concerns highlight persistent security risks in Pakistan. On 24 July, Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his first visit to the country since the India-Pakistan conflict in May. During the meeting, Wangi Yi urged Islamabad to protect the safety of Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan. He stated that ‘China supports Pakistan in resolutely combating all forms of terrorism and hopes that the Pakistani military will continue to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals, projects and institutions’. Munir also met with China’s Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia. These comments come after recent years of attacks targeting Chinese nationals and investment in Pakistan, particularly those that are part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The comments also come as Pakistan is looking to attract foreign investment in its mineral sector (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 22 July 2025). We assess that security risks will remain a point of concern for China in the near future, particularly given the recent further deterioration of the security environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Additionally, China will likely renew its call to bring over private security for assets and personnel; this will likely be resisted by Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)

28 Jul 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Ceasefire will likely ease security risks near disputed border in short term. Earlier on 28 July, ceasefire negotiations commenced between Cambodia and Thailand in Malaysia, resulting in an ‘immediate and unconditional ceasefire’ to come into effect from midnight. Regional commanders from both sides will hold a meeting at 0700hrs (local time) on 29 July ahead of further bilateral talks. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stated that the meeting was ‘co-organised by the US and with the participation of China’. On 27 July, US President Donald Trump threatened that he would not sign a trade deal with either country while hostilities persisted. Military clashes broke out in several areas along the disputed border following an exchange of fire on 24 July (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 July 2025). At least 34 people have died; in addition, more than 200,000 people have been evacuated across both countries. Kinetic clashes had continued for a fifth day earlier on 28 July despite the onset of negotiations. The announcement of a ceasefire will ease security risks near the border in the immediate term. However, despite the ceasefire, we assess that a flare-up in tensions remains a realistic possibility for the foreseeable future, given the unresolved border dispute, heightened nationalist sentiment in both countries and an overall lack of trust. (Source: Sibylline)

28 Jul 25. African terror groups adapt to stay lethal Africa Defense Forum. Africa has by far the youngest population among the continents, with about 40% of its population — nearly 600 m people — 15 or younger. It’s the primary target audience for militant groups, and one of many reasons that experts say extremism in Africa has been so difficult to defeat.

“Terrorist groups are finding a vulnerable, impressionable population to target,” Professor Barend Prinsloo told Africa Defense Forum (ADF). “Attacks on villages often involve the murder of older individuals, while young people are either physically taken captive or mentally indoctrinated. This massive, youthful demographic provides a virtually endless supply of recruits.”

Prinsloo, program leader in international and national security at South Africa’s North-West University, described terror groups as opportunistic organizations that exploit any societal grievances they can find. In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, an Islamic State group (IS) affiliate has gained traction by taking advantage of political neglect of the region. In the restive eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, multiple extremist groups have posed as “liberation fighters.”

“In Somalia, al-Shabaab blends nationalistic ideas with its Islamist objectives,” Prinsloo said. “And in West Africa, jihadist groups find support by rejecting foreign influence, especially from former colonial powers.”

Caleb Weiss, an analyst for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Bridgeway Foundation, said violent extremist groups are resilient because they belong to an ideological movement. Their leaders are skilled at taking religious messages and directives intended for a global audience and adapting them to local contexts. Local grievances are easily co-opted to entice recruits.

“A lot of what jihadist groups do on the ground is essentially public relations campaigns, what they call da’wah (Arabic for invitation), which helps build public support and further ingrain themselves into local environments,” Weiss told ADF. “Pure counterterrorism campaigns can rarely kill their way out of this problem as a result.”

Prinsloo explained why a military-only approach to counterterrorism has struggled to win the hearts and minds of the people affected by terrorist groups.

“Terror groups rely on asymmetrical warfare, disregarding conventional rules of human rights, which causes terrorism in Africa to increasingly resemble a civil war,” he said. “This dynamic amplifies the extremist ideology it began with, turning the conflict into a deeply personal, morally charged struggle for many of these young fighters.”

Militant groups continue to evolve in how they are funded. Often their goals align with locals and groups involved in illicit trade and organized crime. All parties empower and enable each other to achieve their goals, Prinsloo said.

“Their motives often center on resources and funding — recruiting people, controlling commodities and, increasingly, holding territory while acting like a quasi government,” he said. “In this space, transnational organized crime syndicates become the suppliers and facilitators for these terror groups.”

African terrorist group financing sources have remained largely unchanged in recent years: illegal taxation, looting, extortion, front businesses, kidnappings for ransom and donations.

“Those are still incredibly commonplace,” Weiss said. “What has evolved is more the methods of laundering and moving money. Yes, the old tried-and-true hawala [money transfer] networks and mobile money accounts are still very active in moving the money, but stuff like cryptocurrencies has gained popularity.”

Aligning with bandit groups in central Nigeria has allowed a Boko Haram splinter group to remain relevant and operational. But kidnappings and attacks have revealed that financing is at the heart of the alliance. James Barnett, a Hudson Institute research fellow in Nigeria, said local people no longer can distinguish between bandits and terrorists.

“Given what is already known about the nature of banditry in Nigeria, it seems likely that the militant landscape along the Niger-Kaduna axis is somewhat fractured, involving multiple armed groups whose motivations might vary and whose alliances might shift,” Barnett wrote in an investigation for HumAngle, an Abuja-based online daily newspaper that focuses on insecurity.

A New Threat

After a regional workshop in Rwanda to counter terrorist activities on the internet, United Nations officials said that some terrorist groups have learned to exploit virtual space to their advantage. “With time, some have mastered it to create a sophisticated and sprawling online presence — to radicalize, recruit, ransom, and raise funds,” the U.N. said.

“Countering terrorist use of the internet is increasingly difficult as terrorists are migrating to more niche and hidden parts of the internet, making their activity harder to identify and disrupt,” said Charley Gleeson, open source intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, a global initiative. “Which is why it can only be done effectively with collaboration between the tech sector, governments, and civil society to ensure that human rights and democratic freedoms are upheld.”

Officials at the workshop said that regional cooperation will be necessary to fight cyberterrorism.

“The fight against the use of the internet for terrorist purposes could not be won by one single country,” said Isabel Kalinhangabo of the Rwanda Investigation Bureau.

Experts now warn that extremists are in the early stages of turning to cyberterrorism using computers and networks for political, ideological or other objectives. The extremists are employing advanced attacks to gain access to networks, where they can stay undetected to steal data. They use computer viruses, worms and malware to target IT systems, power grids, transportation systems and more. They use social engineering strategies and phishing campaigns to trick people into disclosing valuable information.

A 2024 study showed that developing nations, especially those in Africa, are being used as test beds for cyberattacks because of their relatively low levels of computer security. In 2023, the average number of weekly cyberattacks on African businesses grew 23% compared to previous years, the fastest increase worldwide, according to Interpol’s 2024 African Cyberthreat Assessment. Ransomware and business email compromise topped the list of serious threats.

Digital illiteracy, aging infrastructure and a lack of security professionals all present challenges to preventing economic loss due to cybercrime, according to a 2024 report by Access Partnership and the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria.

“Africa faces the most significant impact from cyber threats compared to any other continent,” said Nicole Isaac, vice president of global public policy for technology giant Cisco. The cybersecurity newsletter Dark Reading reported that she said nearly all financial leaders in Africa “consider cybercrime a significant threat along with macroeconomic conditions and political and social instability.”

Disturbing Data

At a 2024 counterterrorism summit in Abuja, African Union Chairperson Mousa Mahamat highlighted some sobering numbers — an average of eight incidents and 44 fatalities a day on the continent in 2023. There were more than 16,000 deaths, including more than 7,000 civilians and more than 4,000 security forces.

“Terrorism and violent extremism are the biggest evils of our time, spreading to all the five regions of Africa,” he said.

Threats posed by violent extremist organizations on the continent are constantly evolving, as the two most prominent — al-Qaida and the IS — exploit “a deficit in counterterrorism capabilities,” according to a 2024 report by a panel of U.N. experts. “The situation is becoming ever more complex with the conflation of ethnic and regional disputes with the agenda and operations of these groups,” they wrote.

During the summit, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed called on countries in and around Africa’s violent hot spots to work with the U.N. and other international organizations to address root causes of terrorism such as the lack of economic opportunities. She added that African governments must reestablish their “social contract” or connection with communities and people.

Professor Prinsloo is among the experts who believe opportunities for dialogue with extremist groups should be explored.

“Respectful, formal governmental engagement with certain terrorist groups may offer a pathway to reduce the personal grievances at the core of this violence, allowing us to focus more effectively on addressing the extremist ideology itself,” he said.

Terror Expands in Regional Hot Spots

In recent years, five regions in Africa have been the focus of extremist violence, according to an August 2024 report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS):

THE SAHEL: The region with the fewest deaths 10 years ago has had the most over the past three years.

“The 11,200 deaths in the Sahel [through June 30] in 2024 — a tripling since 2021 — now represent over half of all reported fatalities across the continent,” the center reported. “Security force violence against civilians has consistently been found to propel recruitment by violent extremist groups. The Sahelian military juntas and their militia allies have killed more civilians (2,430) in the past year than militant Islamist groups (2,050).”

U.N. experts point to “a deficit in counterterrorism capabilities,” which al-Qaida and Islamic State group (IS) affiliates continue to exploit.

SOMALIA: Al-Shabaab has endured for two decades and has made this struggling country the second-most active battlefield on the continent for the past three years. The 6,590 reported fatalities in 2024 are more than double that of 2020, the center wrote. Al-Shabaab remains an overwhelming presence in Somalia, as the IS-Somalia group accounted for less than 1% of terrorism in Somalia and Kenya in 2024.

Despite significant losses from airstrikes and military operations, al-Shabaab remains resilient. It has an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 fighters and collects $100 m a year, mostly from taxation in Mogadishu and southern Somalia, U.N. experts wrote.

LAKE CHAD BASIN: A decade ago, this region was the epicenter of terrorist violence in Africa with 67% of all deaths, or 13,670 annually, according to the ACSS. The basin comprises northeast Nigeria and the borderlands of Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

“Militant Islamist violence in the Lake Chad Basin has ebbed and flowed over the past decade,” the center said. “The past two years have seen an increase in violent events after a period of decline. However, annual fatalities linked to these events have remained relatively consistent, typically ranging from 3,500 to 3,800 deaths.”

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reports that the extremist insurrection in the Lake Chad Basin is mostly centered on Nigeria. Ansaru, an al-Qaida-affiliated group, and the IS-West Africa Province are the two dominant groups in the region. Attacks increasingly involve several nonextremist militias that take part in banditry, kidnapping and cattle rustling. The IISS says these militias “are now more lethal than jihadist groups.”

MOZAMBIQUE: The northern Cabo Delgado province has watched in horror as a local insurgency that emerged in 2017 has evolved into the deadly IS-Mozambique group. Multinational military operations have degraded the group’s capabilities, but violent events and fatalities have rebounded.

“The projected 250 events and 460 fatalities by the end of 2024 would represent a near doubling in violence over the previous year,” the ACSS wrote.

The IISS reports that northern Mozambique saw a new outbreak of militant activities in rural areas in 2022, after a decrease in violence after 2021 interventions by Rwandan and Southern African troops, who managed to push out militants from major towns in Cabo Delgado.

NORTH AFRICA: From June 30, 2014, to June 30, 2015, there were 3,650 fatalities from terrorism in North Africa, second most on the continent. Now, this region has the fewest reported deaths of the five.

“This year marks the first year there were no violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in Egypt since 2010,” the ACSS wrote. “The United Nations believes ISL (Islamic State-Libya) and al-Qaida still have fighters in the southern part of the country, though they appear to be focused on profiting from the illicit economy.”(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

26 Jul 25. Russia Uses New UMPB-5 Guided Bomb in Kharkiv Strike. Russian forces have used a newly developed precision-guided bomb in a strike on Ukraine for the first time, injuring dozens in the city of Kharkiv. According to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, two UMPB-5 aerial munitions were launched from a Su-34 bomber at approximately 11:00 a.m. on July 24, hitting infrastructure in the Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi districts. The bombs were reportedly released from an estimated distance of over 60 miles near the village of Stroitel in Russia’s Belgorod region, igniting fires.  A total of 41 people were injured in the attack, including six children, local authorities confirmed. Among the wounded were a 10-year-old girl, a 28-day-old infant, a pregnant woman, and two 17-year-olds who suffered blast injuries. All victims are receiving medical treatment. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that people were present on the streets at the time of the attack. No fatalities were reported. The UMPB-5 is a newly modified glide bomb equipped with a 550-pound high-explosive warhead, similar in weight to previous munitions but with a reinforced casing. “The warhead of the UMPB-5 weighs 250 kilograms, the same as a high-explosive aircraft bomb,”a spokesperson for the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office said. “At the same time, it is made of thicker metal than in the UMPB D-30, which is why civilians were more seriously injured.”

Spartak Borysenko, a representative of the prosecutor’s office, said the strike confirms Russia’s continued use of Kharkiv as a test site for new air-launched munitions. “Russia is using Kharkiv as a testing ground. Today it’s the UMPB-5, before it was the D-30… These modified bombs cause greater destruction and lead to more civilian injuries,” Borysenko stated according to a report by Euromaiden Press.

The blast wave from the attack caused significant structural damage. According to official assessments, 20 residential buildings were hit, including 17 apartment blocks. More than 600 windows were shattered, and the blast created a large crater in the road. Seven cars were destroyed by fire, while 18 others were damaged. An industrial facility was also set ablaze, resulting in a large fire, Russian media claimed the industrial facility was a drone factory. (Source: Sibylline)

26 Jul 25. U.S. Forces Airdropped into Syria for Strike on ISIS Leadership. U.S. forces carried out a targeted raid early Friday morning in the northern Syrian town of al-Bab, killing senior ISIS leader Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani along with his two sons, Abdallah Dhiya al-Hardani and Abd al-Rahman Dhiya Zawba al-Hardani, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

The raid was conducted in coordination with the Syrian Interim Government and supported by coalition aircraft. CENTCOM stated that all three individuals were affiliated with ISIS and posed an active threat to U.S. and coalition forces as well as to Syria’s new administration.

“These ISIS individuals posed a threat to U.S. and Coalition Forces, as well as the new Syrian Government,” CENTCOM said in its official statement.

General Michael Erik Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command, added, “We will continue to relentlessly pursue ISIS terrorists wherever they operate. ISIS terrorists are not safe where they sleep, where they operate, and where they hide. Alongside our partners and allies, U.S. Central Command is committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS terrorists that threaten the region, our allies, and our homeland.”

According to local sources cited by Syrian media, U.S. special operations forces were airdropped into al-Bab by helicopter during the night. Social media posts and unconfirmed videos captured the sound of helicopters and aircraft over the town, though no visual confirmation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 31.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Nuclear negotiations between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) are unlikely to progress substantially in the coming weeks, increasing regional tensions and the likelihood of UN sanctions.
• The US continues to expand sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports and smuggling networks, underscoring sustained compliance concerns for global energy, financial and shipping firms.

ISRAEL

• Israel has reportedly threatened to begin annexing parts of Gaza unless Hamas accepts a ceasefire proposal in the coming days; however, rapid annexation or settlement re-establishment remains unlikely.
• A march supporting the Israeli settlement of Gaza will elevate sanctions and reputational risks for Israeli-affiliated businesses and individuals in the coming months.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• The IDF’s planned restrictions on the funeral of a prominent Palestinian activist in the West Bank will increase domestic unrest risks in the coming days.
• US sanctions targeting officials in the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will drive compliance risks for affiliated businesses.
• Despite efforts to improve aid distribution in Gaza, reports of continued shooting incidents and looting underscore the critical threats to civilians and NGO staff.
• Canada, Malta, Portugal and the UK announced that they would move to recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming months, though conditions in the Palestinian Territories are unlikely to improve in the short term.

IRAN

• Nuclear negotiations between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) are unlikely to progress substantially in the coming weeks, increasing regional tensions and the likelihood of UN sanctions. On 28 July, a spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry indicated that Iran would not be willing to engage in nuclear talks that include discussions regarding limitations of its ‘defence capabilities’. The announcement comes after Iranian representatives met with the E3 on 24 July to discuss the possible re-implementation of UN sanctions in the coming months (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 July 2025). Following the talks, however, France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot stated that the E3 seeks to facilitate negotiations on a ‘more comprehensive’ multi-lateral nuclear agreement, which would include limitations to Iran’s missile development programme and support for regional proxies. The contrasting statements highlight increasing tensions between Iran and the E3, despite efforts to establish some form of agreement before the expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause in October (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Representatives for the E3 have repeatedly stated that the states would consider initiating measures to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran unless nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran progress substantially by the end of August. Disputes regarding the scope of negotiations will likely prevent demonstrable progress towards an interim agreement in the coming weeks, elevating risks of sanctions re-imposition and regional tensions significantly escalating in Q3.
• The US continues to expand sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports and smuggling networks, underscoring sustained compliance concerns for global energy, financial and shipping firms. On 30 July, the US sanctioned over 115 entities, individuals and vessels associated with Iran’s oil smuggling network. The sanctions apply to entities and vessels listed in states including Dominica, Iran, Iraq, India, Turkey, Singapore, Switzerland and the UAE, underscoring elevated compliance concerns and due diligence requirements for locally engaged firms, particularly in the global shipping and financial sectors. Sanctions exposure risks will also be particularly acute for firms engaged in Iraq’s oil and shipping industries, amid increasing US scrutiny of Iranian oil smuggling and blending in via Iraqi ports and pipelines. Over the coming weeks, the US will highly likely continue expanding sanctions on Iranian-linked entities and individuals as part of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, sustaining significant socio-economic health concerns within Iran. As in previous rounds of talks, the US will also highly likely continue enforcing and expanding sanctions targeting Iranian entities, regardless of potential re-engagement in nuclear negotiations, sustaining governance concerns and associated bilateral tensions.

ISRAEL 

• Israel has reportedly threatened to begin annexing parts of Gaza unless Hamas accepts a ceasefire proposal in the coming days; however, rapid annexation or settlement re-establishment remains unlikely. On 29 July, local media reported that Israel had delivered a document to ceasefire mediators in reply to Hamas’ response to a ceasefire proposal issued last week. The document reportedly details Israel’s red lines regarding troop withdrawal and prisoner releases during any potential ceasefire period. Israel has stated that it will not leave the Philadelphi corridor along the Egypt-Gaza border or the buffer zone established within the Gaza border area. Additionally, Israel will not allow the Rafah Crossing to open and will not agree to far-reaching concessions on prisoner releases. Reports also indicate that Israel has threatened to begin annexing parts of Gaza unless Hamas agrees to a ceasefire deal in the coming days. The reported threats come as far-right elements within the Israeli government and domestic society have progressively increased pressure to re-establish Israeli settlements within Gaza (see below). Despite this pressure, however, Israel is unlikely to begin annexing Gaza or re-establishing settlements in the immediate term. Such efforts would highly likely trigger significant international criticism and possible sanction implementation and would also likely increase tensions with the US. Even so, military occupation of territory in Gaza will remain a realistic possibility in the coming months in order to pressure Hamas into a ceasefire agreement (or in response to the collapse of such an agreement).
• A march supporting the Israeli settlement of Gaza will elevate sanctions and reputational risks for Israeli-affiliated businesses and individuals in the coming months. On 30 July, hundreds of ultra-nationalist pro-settlement activists began marching from Sderot (Southern district) towards Gaza’s northern border. The march was organised by the Nachala organisation, which advocates for the Israeli settlement of Gaza. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) blocked the march before it could reach Gaza’s border. The march comes amid increasingly vocal support from far-right ministers within Israel’s coalition government for such initiatives. Pro-settlement demonstrations and increased ministerial support will possibly embolden far-right, pro-settlement activists to engage in further marches or border infiltration attempts. This would increase the risks of clashes with IDF soldiers along the Israel-Gaza border. Escalating pro-settlement activism will also increase risks of sanctions targeting Israeli individuals and organisations (as well as associated businesses) in the coming months, driving reputational and compliance risks for locally engaged and affiliated firms.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• The IDF’s planned restrictions on the funeral of a prominent Palestinian activist in the West Bank will increase domestic unrest risks in the coming days. On 28 July, an Israeli settler shot Awdah Hathaleen, a Palestinian activist, during a clash between Israeli settlers and Palestinians near the Israeli settlement of Carmel (Hebron governorate). Hathaleen was evacuated to Soraka medical centre in Beersheba (Southern district), where he died of his wounds; his body remains in Israel. Since his death, the IDF has issued several ordinances limiting the number of attendees permitted at Hathaleen’s funeral and banning activities such as flying flags and chanting inciting statements during the event. The IDF has also mandated that the funeral take place in Umm al-Khair (Hebron governorate), rather than in territory over which there is a dispute between Palestinian communities and Israeli settlers in the area. Although the orders likely aim to mitigate radicalisation risks, they will likely compound ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest risks around Carmel and Umm al-Khair in the coming days. This will increase risks of further clashes and violence between Palestinians, Israeli settlers and the Israeli security forces, as well as risks of attacks targeting Israeli settlements and vehicles in the West Bank.
• US sanctions targeting officials in the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will drive compliance risks for affiliated businesses. On 31 July, the US announced it would sanction PA and PLO officials based on allegations that the organisations are undermining the peace process. The US alleges that the PA and PLO have violated prior bilateral agreements and commitments to adhere to UN Security Council resolutions relating to support for designated terror organisations and operatives. The sanctions target all members of the two organisations and deny them visas to travel to the US. The sanctions likely aim to pressure the PA to more actively address issues such as the incitement and glorification of violence targeting Israel (particularly through textbooks) and benefits payments to families of Palestinian militants. In the coming months, risks of the US issuing further sanctions targeting the organisation will increase, particularly targeting assets and banking facilities. Such sanctions will increase compliance risks for firms in the financial services sector that service the PA, PLO and associated organisations.
• Despite efforts to improve aid distribution in Gaza, reports of continued shooting incidents and looting underscore the critical threats to civilians and NGO staff. On 29 July, the UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) platform stated that two of three famine thresholds have been reached in Gaza. Yet despite Israel’s announcements regarding tactical military pauses and the designation of secure transit routes for aid convoys, security conditions within Gaza continue to undermine efforts to distribute aid rapidly and improve humanitarian conditions therein. Numerous aid agencies have stated that escalating food insecurity has also triggered a substantial escalation in looting against aid convoys, underscoring the threats to NGO staff, particularly drivers and security contractors. Additionally, the Hamas-run Civil Defence agency announced that a shooting incident near the Erez West (Zikim) border crossing involving IDF personnel resulted in the deaths of at least 50 civilians who approached an aid convoy on 30 July. The IDF stated that its personnel fired warning shots to disperse the crowds, but that it was ‘not aware of any casualties’. In the coming days, humanitarian conditions will likely continue to deteriorate; further looting and shooting incidents will sustain critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and disrupt broader aid-distribution operations. Conditions in Gaza will also likely continue to exacerbate regional tensions, increasing the risk of pro-Palestine demonstrations in the broader region, as well as in major cities across Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Israeli-linked firms also face increasing risks of targeted protests and activism in the coming weeks, particularly those engaged in the defence, shipping and construction sectors, elevating corporate governance and operational disruption risks.
• Canada, Malta, Portugal and the UK announced that they would move to recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming months, though conditions in the Palestinian Territories are unlikely to improve in the short term. On 29 July, the UK announced that it would move to recognise a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in September unless Israel ends the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, improves humanitarian conditions in Gaza, commits to refraining from annexing the West Bank and works to establish ‘a long-term, sustainable peace’ in the form of a two-state solution. On 30 July, Canada also announced that it would recognise a Palestinian state in September if the Palestinian Authority (PA) commits to substantial governance reforms. Malta and Portugal (both EU member states) also announced plans to recognise a Palestinian state in the coming months. The announcements highlight increasing efforts by Western states to pressure Israel into improving humanitarian conditions in Gaza and address escalating Israeli settler activity and violence in the West Bank. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has broadly characterised statements regarding the recognition of a Palestinian state as a ‘reward for Hamas terrorism’, while US President Donald Trump indicated that Canada’s announcement would possibly undermine ongoing trade negotiations. As such, statements regarding the recognition of a Palestinian state are unlikely to alter Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories, rendering demonstrable improvements to security and governance within Gaza and the West Bank highly unlikely in the short term. Rather, efforts to pressure Israel into pursuing a two-state solution are highly likely to exacerbate bilateral tensions (including those with the US), increasing operational disruption and compliance risks for locally engaged firms.

RED SEA 

• The Houthis’ capture of crew members underscores sustained kidnapping risks and increasing threats to vessels transiting the Red Sea. On 28 July, the Iranian-backed, Yemen-based Houthis published footage indicating that they had detained the ten missing crew members of the Greek-operated vessel Eternity C, which the group sank in the Red Sea earlier in July. The footage also featured interviews in which crew members called for an end to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. The announcement underscores elevated kidnapping and detention risks facing crew members working on vessels targeted by the Houthis (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 July 2025). This will also drive significant physical and psychological threats to staff. The announcement comes after the Houthis stated on 27 July that they would target any ships belonging to companies that do business with Israeli ports. Taken together, the announcements underscore the increasing threats to shipping in the Red Sea, which will particularly affect vessels associated with Israel through their ownership and/or operational structures. As Israeli military operations continue in Gaza, the frequency and intensity of Houthi attacks against vessels in the Red Sea will likely increase, sustaining global supply chain and operational disruption as well as financial risks for reliant businesses.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• Region: The Arab League has called for Hamas to disarm, but the move is unlikely to significantly impact the group’s engagement with regional mediators. On 29 July, the 22 members of the Arab League (including Egypt and Qatar), the EU and 17 other countries backed a declaration condemning the 7 October 2023 attacks and calling for Hamas to disarm and relinquish power in Gaza. The declaration also stated that governance, law enforcement and security competencies across all Palestinian territory must lie solely with the Palestinian Authority (PA), with international support. Notably, the signees also proposed the deployment of ‘a temporary international stabilisation mission’ under the aegis of the UN and upon invitation by the PA. Despite support for calls to disarm Hamas, the declaration is unlikely to undermine the group’s engagement with the Egyptian and Qatari mediators during the ceasefire and hostage release talks. Even so, the declaration also comes amid increasing tensions between Cairo and Hamas, as one of the latter’s senior officials blamed Egypt in part for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Nevertheless, the declaration also signals the political intent of regional powers to actively engage in post-war planning for Gaza. This will increase the risk of further tensions with Israel in the coming months, particularly regarding the PA’s potential engagement in governance functions.
• Tunisia: Union strike will increase transport disruption, security risks. On 30 July, the General Transport Union, under the umbrella of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), began a three-day strike, halting transport services across Tunisia. Strikers are demanding higher wages and improved working conditions. In the coming days, the strike will likely increase the use of private vehicles, driving congestion and transport disruption in major cities, including Sfax (Sfax governorate), Sousse (Sousse governorate) and the capital Tunis. Further strikes will be likely in the coming weeks, as the Ministry of Transport indicated it cannot meet the union’s demands. This week’s strike comes amid broader efforts by the UGTT to secure labour rights across multiple sectors, as Tunisia’s government adopts increasingly centralised measures to sideline union influence. As such, we assess that anti-government protests and heavy-handed responses from the authorities will likely increase in the coming weeks, driving risks of sporadic clashes and elevating security risks for proximate bystanders.
• Libya: Airstrikes will increase bystander, security risks in western districts. On 30 July, the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) announced that it would carry out precision airstrikes against criminal groups in Libya’s western region. Notably, the government did not specify the areas it would strike, though it urged residents to distance themselves from locations and organisations engaging in smuggling and human trafficking, which would be targeted in the air campaign. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the GNU will target organised crime hotspots in the desert and coastal areas close to the Tunisian border, as well as parts of the cities of Sabratha and Zawiya (both Zawiya district). This will significantly increase security and bystander risks in most areas west of the capital Tripoli over the coming days. Nevertheless, the airstrikes are unlikely to significantly disrupt mobility along the coastal highway linking Tripoli to the Tunisian border.

Jul 29.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: UN conference on two-state solution will increase compliance risks. On 28 July, foreign ministers attended the first meeting of a three-day UN conference in New York City (New York, US) convened by France and Saudi Arabia on advancing the two-state solution. Neither Israel nor the US are attending the conference, which will limit the prospects for formal progress. However, the conference will likely include statements condemning Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories) and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), increasing reputational risks for Israeli-linked firms. The conference will also likely call for states to sanction Israel due to deteriorating humanitarian conditions within Gaza, including through the suspension of trade and co-operation agreements. Any such moves made by Western states would almost certainly aggravate bilateral tensions with Israel, while increasing regulatory and compliance risks for businesses operating in Israel, especially in the defence and technology sectors. In the coming months, we assess that states such as Australia, Canada and the UK are likely to face increasing domestic and international pressure to recognise a Palestinian state, though formal progress remains unlikely as the ongoing Israel-Hamas war continues at pace.
• Yemen-region: Houthis’ capture of vessel crew underscores security risks gripping Red Sea area. On 28 July, the Iranian-backed and Yemen-based Houthis announced that they had rescued ten missing crew members from the Greek-operated vessel Eternity C (which the group sank in the Red Sea earlier in July). The group released footage that appeared to show militants pulling crew members from the water; it also featured interviews of crew members calling for an end to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. The announcement highlights the substantial kidnapping and detention risks facing crew members working on vessels targeted by the Houthis, compounding critical physical and psychological threats to staff. The announcement also comes after the Houthis stated on 27 July that they would target any ships belonging to companies that do business with Israeli ports. Taken together, the announcements underscore the increasing threats to shipping in the Red Sea, particularly those vessels associated with Israel through their ownership and/or operational structures. As Israeli military operations continue in Gaza, we assess that the frequency and intensity of Houthi attacks against vessels in the Red Sea will likely increase, significantly disrupting global supply chains and driving operational disruption and financial risks for reliant businesses.

Jul 28.

IRAN

• Iran announced earlier on 28 July that it would meet with a delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the next two weeks, though failure to engage in negotiations with the US will sustain the risk of the UN reimplementing sanctions.
• A separatist militant attack in Sistan and Baluchistan province has underscored the elevated security risks in eastern Iran; further attacks are likely to aggravate tensions with Pakistan.

ISRAEL

• The withdrawal of the Israeli delegation from negotiations signals that Israel is possibly preparing for a breakdown in ceasefire talks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• An Israeli settler attack on a Palestinian village and threats against another underscore the elevated intercommunal violence risks present throughout the West Bank.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced it would implement tactical pauses in Gaza amid a partial policy shift vis-à-vis humanitarian aid, though food security conditions will remain extremely sensitive to backsliding.
• France announced that it would recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming weeks; this comes amid broader efforts to accelerate global diplomatic engagement with the two-state solution.

IRAN

Iran announced earlier on 28 July that it would meet with a delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the next two weeks, though failure to engage in negotiations with the US will sustain the risk of the UN reimplementing sanctions. The announcement comes after Iran engaged in talks with the E3 (Germany, France and the UK) in Istanbul (Turkey) on 24 July, with the parties announcing they had agreed to further talks in the coming weeks. Reports suggest that the E3 indicated they would be willing to delay triggering the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause if Iran agrees to restore IAEA access to all nuclear sites and re-engages in negotiations with the US. However, Iran is unlikely to restore comprehensive IAEA access rapidly in the short term, sustaining international anxiety regarding oversight of Iran’s nuclear activity. Such concerns will increase the likelihood of the E3 triggering the clause, particularly as neither Iran nor the US have announced plans to re-engage in talks to date. Unless negotiations resume by mid-to-late August, the E3 will likely initiate efforts to trigger the snapback clause and reimplement UN sanctions. Such efforts would almost certainly increase regional tensions, while also compounding sanction-exposure risks and compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms, particularly those operating in the aviation, financial, shipping and technology sectors.

• A separatist militant attack in Sistan and Baluchistan province has underscored the elevated security risks in eastern Iran; further attacks are likely to aggravate tensions with Pakistan. On 26 July, the secessionist Sunni-Baloch militant group Jaish al-Adl (JaA) conducted a small arms attack against a courthouse in Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchistan). Militants killed at least six individuals and injured 28 others, marking the province’s highest casualty attack since October 2024. In the coming days, the Iranian security forces will likely initiate a significant crackdown on JaA activity in eastern Iran, increasing the risk of arbitrary detention for ethnic-Baloch civilians nationwide and disrupting operational and supply chain continuity in the province. The crackdown will possibly trigger an uptick in anti-government protests in Chabahar, Zabol and Zahedan (all Sistan and Baluchistan) in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of localised unrest. The Iranian authorities will likely claim that Israel is instigating unrest and facilitating JaA activity, which will in turn elevate the risk of surveillance, harassment and detention for individuals assumed to maintain connections with Israel and/or the US, such as foreign nationals, NGO staff and anti-government activists. Despite any such crackdown, JaA militants are highly likely to continue conducting ambush attacks targeting security and police force convoys in rural areas in the coming months. JaA will also likely attempt to launch higher-capacity attacks targeting state installations in major cities in October to mark the anniversary of the 2022 Zahedan Massacre (see Sibylline Extremism Watch – Baloch Militancy). Escalating JaA activity will possibly disrupt operations at the Chabahar free port (Sistan and Baluchistan); it will also likely aggravate bilateral tensions with Pakistan (though major and direct escalation remains unlikely at present).

ISRAEL 

• The withdrawal of the Israeli delegation from negotiations signals that Israel is possibly preparing for a breakdown in ceasefire talks. On 24 July, Israel withdrew its delegation from ceasefire negotiations in Qatar after Hamas issued another unsatisfactory response to the current ceasefire proposal put forward earlier that day. Hamas’ responses have been criticised by mediators (Egypt, Qatar and the US). Comments by both US President Donald Trump and US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff suggest they believe the group is acting in bad faith. These developments come after Israel agreed on 26 July to allow an increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza, including through aid drops. On 27 July, Israel also announced a daily tactical pause during its military operations in certain areas of Gaza (see below). Israel’s approval of these measures (both of which relate to key subjects within the ceasefire talks) likely signals that it wants to restore international credibility as a ‘good faith’ negotiator before a possible complete breakdown in talks (and the associated rise in military operations that would likely come thereafter). There is a realistic possibility that these actions, including Trump’s threatening comments, reflect a last-ditch brinkmanship effort designed to pressure Hamas into accepting the ceasefire proposal. As such, an agreement remains possible in the coming two weeks. However, if no breakthrough is achieved during this period, we assess the risk of a breakdown in negotiations will increase, in turn exacerbating the risk of armed conflict.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• An Israeli settler attack on a Palestinian village and threats against another underscore the elevated intercommunal violence risks present throughout the West Bank. Overnight on 27-28 July, Israeli settlers set fire to two Palestinian cars in Taybeh (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) and scrawled threatening graffiti in the nearby al-Mughayyir (Ramallah and al-Bireh). The incidents come against the backdrop of increasing Israeli settler violence targeting Palestinian villages in the West Bank and a continued failure by the Israeli security forces to investigate and prosecute those responsible. In the coming weeks, further clashes are likely to break out between Palestinian and Israeli settlers (as well as between the security forces and settlers) in the vicinity of al-Mughayyir. Furthermore, elevated ethno-religious tensions will increase radicalisation risks, driving the likelihood of attacks against Israeli targets (civilian and military) across the West Bank, particularly within Ramallah and al-Bireh. A heightened security force presence around al-Mughayyir is also likely, increasing travel disruption and arbitrary arrest risks along proximate roads in the coming days.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced it would implement tactical pauses in Gaza amid a partial policy shift vis-à-vis humanitarian aid, though food security conditions will remain extremely sensitive to backsliding. On 27 July, the IDF announced the launch of ‘local tactical pauses of military activity’ in densely populated areas of Gaza, including areas in al-Mawasi, Deir al-Balah and Gaza City (see Figure 2). The pauses will occur daily from 1000hrs to 2000hrs (local time) until further notice, during which time the IDF will not conduct airstrikes or ground operations in locations where ground troops are not already operating. The tactical pauses will likely improve security conditions within designated areas during daylight hours and facilitate humanitarian operations therein. The announcement comes after the IDF authorised the resumption of aid drops on 26 July, with Israel, Jordan and the UAE subsequently delivering several tonnes of aid by air. Also on 26 July, the IDF announced it would establish ‘secure routes’ within Gaza to facilitate aid deliveries by UN agencies; the routes will be designated between 0600hrs and 2300hrs and will likely ease critical logistical bottlenecks. The IDF has repeatedly stated that NGOs have failed to collect hundreds of aid pallets at the Erez West (Zikim) and Kerem Shalom border crossings in recent weeks. Conversely, NGOs have stated that convoys have been unable to take possession of aid supplies due to a lack of secure transit routes. If sustained, increased aid deliveries are likely to relieve acute food insecurity conditions in the immediate term. However, we assess that the IDF is highly likely to resume targeted operations and/or airstrikes within the designated zones and routes if it detects (or claims to detect) Hamas activity therein, particularly if Hamas attempts to launch rockets towards Israeli territory. This will sustain significant security and bystander-exposure risks for locally engaged staff, as well as the risk of further disruption to aid operations. Sustained disruption will likely trigger rapid backsliding into critical food insecurity, prolonging significant humanitarian concerns regarding conditions in Gaza.
• France announced that it would recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming weeks; this comes amid broader efforts to accelerate global diplomatic engagement with the two-state solution. On 24 July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would recognise an independent Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly meeting in September. The announcement reflects increasing bilateral tensions between France and Israel amid the deteriorating humanitarian conditions within Gaza. Macron characterised the announcement as part of France’s efforts to support regional de-escalation. The announcement is highly unlikely to impact conditions demonstrably within Gaza or to improve governance, security or socio-economic conditions within the West Bank. The announcement came ahead of a three-day UN ministerial conference convened by France and Saudi Arabia to discuss advancing the two-state solution, which began earlier on 28 July. Although the conference will likely trigger further statements from regional parties calling for progress towards the formation of a Palestinian state, neither Israel nor the US will attend, significantly limiting the prospects for formal progress. Nonetheless, the conference will possibly increase pressure on countries such as Australia, Canada and the UK to recognise a Palestinian state in the coming months; statements indicating support for such an initiative are likely to compound tensions with Israel. In the medium-to-long term, those states that announce any such recognition will possibly encounter reduced prospects for future bilateral initiatives and projects with Israel, while defence and technology firms will possibly face elevated regulatory and compliance risks. Nevertheless, Israel is highly unlikely to engage in broader negotiations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) amid its ongoing operations within Gaza, limiting the prospects for formal engagement and progress towards the formation of a Palestinian state in the short-to-medium term.

RED SEA 

• On 27 July, the Yemen-based Houthis launched the fourth phase of their naval blockade against Israel, expanding the risk of attacks in both the Red and Arabian seas. As part of this phase, the Houthis announced that they will now target any merchant ship belonging to companies that conduct business with Israeli ports, regardless of their destination and nationality. Despite claiming this to be a ‘new’ phase, the modus operandi outlined within the announcement matches our previous assessment in early July following two Houthi attacks in the Red Sea (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 July 2025). Even so, the official announcement made by the Houthis underscores that the group is ready to increase the frequency of its attacks against commercial shipping in the coming weeks. While attacks in the Red Sea are more likely, there is also a realistic possibility of the Houthis conducting attacks on vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.
• The detention of a livestock carrier by the Yemeni coast guard highlights the non-Houthi-related risks in the Red Sea against the backdrop of elevated tensions. On 24 July, the UK Maritime Trade Operations office confirmed that the Yemeni coast guard temporarily detained a Comoros-flagged and Greek-owned livestock carrier named Merinos Livestock. This came shortly after a wooden boat approached the vessel, approximately 35 nautical miles (65km) to the south-west of Hudaydah Port (al-Hudaydah governorate). According to reports, the small boat opened fire and instructed Merinos Livestock to proceed to Mokha (Taiz governorate), where the Yemeni coast guard briefly detained the vessel. Mokha is controlled by the internationally recognised government of Yemen, which has increased its efforts to intercept weapons shipments heading to the Houthis over the past month (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). The coast guard likely detained the ship because its automatic identification system (AIS) was turned off (likely in an effort to mitigate against the risk of Houthi attacks), which in turn would have prompted the authorities to suspect that the vessel was being used for smuggling. The incident highlights the elevated security and operating risks facing maritime vessels in the Red Sea, particularly those that turn off their AIS in an effort to avoid Houthi attacks. As such, further incidents involving arbitrary detention, misidentification and misfire (as well as longer delays and elevated fuel costs) remain possible in the coming weeks, sustaining the overall increased security risks in the Red Sea.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• A recent announcement concerning elections in Syria has underscored concerns over democratic processes, exacerbating security risks in the country’s southern and eastern governorates. On 27 July, Syria’s electoral commission announced that the country’s first parliamentary elections under the new administration are expected to go ahead between 15 and 20 September. The number of seats in the legislature will also increase from 150 to 210, with a third (70 seats) appointed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Officials stated that areas outside government control, including regions in eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Druze-majority Suwayda governorate, would continue to operate with seats that are allocated based on the population of those regions. Al-Sharaa stated that the international community and independent election monitors will be invited to oversee the polls, likely in response to concerns over their transparency and legitimacy. The announcement comes amid a surge in violence between Sunni Bedouin tribes and the Druze community in southern Syria, which prompted intervention by Israel (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). As the elections approach, ongoing tensions in the south and east of the country will likely act as flashpoints for further violence, possibly undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process. The displacement of thousands of Druze civilians will highly likely undermine voter registration and electoral planning in Suwayda, exacerbating sectarian divisions and increasing the risk of violence. This will elevate bystander security risks for business and NGO personnel in southern governorates, while increasing conflict risks arising from potential Israeli intervention. Meanwhile, in SDF-controlled areas in the east, particularly Deir ez-Zor (Deir ez-Zor governorate), tensions will possibly escalate between local governance structures, armed militias and the central government (the latter continues to allocate electoral seats despite enjoying limited influence in the region).
• Recent clashes in Iraq underscore the government’s limited control over militant groups; further clashes are likely in the run-up to November’s elections. On 27 July, armed clashes erupted between the Iraqi police and fighters from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in the capital Baghdad’s Karkh district. At least one police officer was killed, while several other people were wounded. The authorities claimed that militants stormed a Ministry of Agriculture building during the swearing-in of a new director and allegedly attempted to reinstate another official by force. The security forces arrested 14 members of the 45th and 56th brigades of the PMF that are associated with Kata’ib Hezbollah, a US-designated terror organisation. The group has stated that it does ‘not want to escalate’ the situation, moderating immediate conflict and security risks in the capital. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani has ordered an investigative committee to assess the incident, which has underscored the government’s limited control over PMF factions (many of which are aligned with Iran and operate outside full state authority). With national elections scheduled for November, rising sectarian and factional tensions will likely exacerbate existing political rifts, including within the PMF. As such, we assess that further violent confrontations between state security forces and PMF factions are likely in the coming months, driving security risks for NGO and business personnel, especially in Baghdad. Escalating violence will possibly drive international pressure on Baghdad to dismantle Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, sustaining the risk of sanctions (which would likely impact the logistics and banking sectors and drive operational disruption risks for the energy sector).
• Iran: Separatist attack underscores security risks in eastern provinces, tensions with Pakistan. On 26 July, the Baloch secessionist militant group Jaysh al-Adl (JaA) conducted a small arms attack on a courthouse in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan and Baluchistan province. Militants killed at least six individuals and injured 28 others, marking the province’s highest casualty attack since October 2024. The attack underscores JaA’s capacity to launch sporadic attacks targeting judicial, police and security force installations within the province’s major cities, despite a moderate decrease in attack frequency in recent months. In the coming weeks, JaA militants will highly likely continue conducting ambush attacks targeting security and police force convoys, increasing threats to staff during overland movement through rural areas. In October, JaA will also likely attempt to launch higher-capacity attacks targeting state installations in major cities to mark the anniversary of the 2022 Zahedan massacre (see Sibylline Extremism Watch – Baloch Militancy). We assess that escalating JaA activity will possibly disrupt operations at the Chabahar free port (Sistan and Baluchistan) and will also likely aggravate bilateral tensions with Pakistan, though major escalation remains unlikely at present.
• Iraq: Clashes underscore government’s limited control over militant groups; further clashes are likely. On 27 July, armed clashes erupted between the Iraqi police and fighters from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in the capital Baghdad’s Karkh district, killing at least one police officer. The authorities said militants stormed a Ministry of Agriculture building during the swearing-in of a new director. The security forces arrested 14 members of two PMF brigades associated with Kata’ib Hezbollah, which the US has designated as a terror organisation. The incident underscores the government’s limited control over PMF factions, many of which are aligned with Iran and operate outside full state authority. With national elections scheduled for November, rising sectarian and factional tensions will likely exacerbate existing political rifts, including within the PMF. As such, further violent confrontations between the state security forces and PMF factions are likely in the coming months, driving security risks for NGO and business personnel, especially in Baghdad. We assess that escalating violence will possibly drive international pressure on Baghdad to dismantle Iran-backed groups, sustaining the risk of sanctions against Iraq this year.

Jul 25.

• Yemen: Security risks to vessels will persist throughout coming months. On 24 July, the UK Maritime Trade Operations office confirmed that the Yemeni coast guard temporarily detained the Comoros-flagged and Greek-owned livestock carrier Merinos. This came shortly after armed men in a wooden boat fired at the vessel, 35 nautical miles (65km) south-west of Hudaydah Port (Al Hudaydah governorate). The ship was originally heading to the Saudi port of Jeddah but was rerouted towards the Yemeni port of Mokha (Taiz governorate) and later released by Yemeni naval forces. The coast guards likely detained the ship because its automatic identification system (AIS) tracking was turned off. It is still unclear whether the armed men who opened fire against the vessel are part of the coastal guard forces or local pirates. Nevertheless, the incident underscores persistent threats to vessels traversing Yemeni waters, including in non-Houthi-controlled regions. We assess that these risks are particularly high along alternative routes outside of the established maritime security corridor through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Furthermore, despite a decrease in Houthi hostilities against commercial vessels, risks of hijacking, misfire and collateral damage will remain elevated throughout the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jul 25. UK surrenders maritime security role in the Middle East. London recently acceded to the US-Bahrain C-SIPA agreement but will now reportedly reduce its presence in the Middle East. In mid-June, the UK formally acceded to the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), a framework aimed at fostering cooperation in the Middle East, with defence and security its first-listed priority. However, reports, including recently by The Telegraph, persist in claiming that the Royal Navy’s current forward-deployed Type 23 frigate in Bahrain, HMS Lancaster, will head back to UK waters following the completion of its deployment, without replacement. Would this be the case, it would bring to an end a decades-long presence of a major UK surface combatant in the region, first through the Armilla Patrol and latterly via Operation Kipion. In that eventuality, the UK Royal Navy’s presence in Bahrain and its function in the region, would have all but ended in a practical sense. The 2024 collision of two Royal Navy mine countermeasures vessels (MCMV) and subsequent withdrawal from Bahrain, and the departure of the landing platform dock RFA Cardigan Bay, has left the UK with a single vessel, the Hunt-class MCMV HMS Middleton, alongside at UK Maritime Component Command, the UK’s naval headquarters in the region. On the reported departure of HMS Lancaster from the region without replacement, a UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesperson told Naval Technology that Operation Kipion was the country’s “long standing presence in the Gulf”.

US Tariffs are shifting – will you react or anticipate?

Don’t let policy changes catch you off guard. Stay proactive with real-time data and expert analysis. In addition, the UKMCC “continues to be central” to UK military operations across the Middle East.

“We remain steadfast in our commitment to promoting stability and peace in the Middle East by working closely with our allies and partners to strengthen regional security through enhanced defence integration and interoperability,” the MoD spokesperson said.

What did UK warships do in the Middle East?

Usually a general-purpose variant, the deployment of a Type 23 frigate to the Middle East offered the UK the opportunity to interoperate with the US Fifth Fleet, also based in Bahrain, where the Royal Navy’s MCMV force was also highly valued by US commanders. Indeed, while it was accepted the US did not require the presence of a UK surface combatant in the region, the capability of the Royal Navy’s mine hunting force would see it take the lead in countering any action by Iran to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz via such means. Rather, the Type 23 served as a contributor for the Combined Maritime Forces in the region, a multinational structure performing a range of missions in the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. This includes drug busts, with HMS Lancaster performing two such intercepts during its deployment, destroying tens of ms of pounds worth of narcotics bound for the global market.

A secondary benefit was the frigate’s ability to conduct port visits in friendly GCC countries such as Oman, entertaining diplomatic guests on regular port visits.

Should HMS Lancaster return to UK waters without replacement, these combined hard and soft powers will be gone.

What is the C-SIPA?

According to the US State Department, the C-SIPA is intended to form a framework to bolster mutual deterrence against “external threats” and expand cooperation to advance security and stability in the region. Originally signed by the US and Bahrain in September 2023, C-SIPA provided the ability to add in new signatories, of which the UK became a party in June 2025. The US State Department, in a 17 July media note, stated the three parties of C-SIPA “reaffirmed their desire” to strengthen strategic cooperation under the agreement’s three pillars: defence and security; economic, commercial, and trade; and science, technology, and network security. The US, UK, and Bahrain would begin to form working groups to determine how best to fulfil the goals of the agreement. Sans a regional naval component, the UK could struggle to offer anything meaningful when it comes to maritime security. If the ending of major UK naval presence in the Middle East has been long planned, then the UK government’s December 2024 statement claiming to be a “reliable partner standing with the US and Bahrain” appears less than credulous.

Is the UK’s global influence finished?

However, the signing of C-SIPA by the UK comes at a time of diminishing military presence overseas and at home. The UK Armed Forces are at their smallest for hundreds of years, with the Royal Navy below the threshold for what was previously considered the minimum viable force. The British Army is similarly reduced, and recently revealed to have given up its entire AS90 155mm artillery force. Hundreds, potentially thousands, of military vehicles, including tanks, have also been gifted to Ukraine. Clearly, the UK’s defence and security contribution to C-SIPA, while only one part of the wider mission, has nearly vanished in the naval domain as vessels are called back to home waters for disposal or to prioritise homeland security tasks. Absent a clear indication from the UK about the future of composition of its naval deployment to the Middle East, London’s position as a viable partner for regional countries and US forces may well be called into question. (Source: naval-technology.com)

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 01.

• Global: Foreign embassies face sustained security, cyber espionage risks from Russia-linked groups. On 31 July, the technology company Microsoft reported that the Russia-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘Secret Blizzard’ has been targeting foreign embassies in Moscow in a cyber espionage operation since at least 2024. The group reportedly intercepts local internet service providers (ISPs) via an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack to infiltrate targeted systems. Secret Blizzard then displays a fake portal mimicking a connectivity check to covertly execute custom malware (‘ApolloShadow’) onto compromised systems before checking the system’s privileges. It subsequently tricks users with elevated privileges into granting the actors full control over their devices through a fake certificate installer. If the system’s privileges are low, ApolloShadow immediately establishes communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure for data exfiltration and payload execution, highlighting the malware’s dynamic and sophisticated nature. Russia-linked groups frequently target foreign entities in cyber espionage operations to collect strategic intelligence. We assess that this trend underscores sustained security and cyber espionage risks amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Jul 31.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• BAKHMUT: Moscow has claimed that its forces have taken control of Chasiv Yar, a highly important fortified town over which both sides have been fighting since April 2024, but Ukraine denies this
• CORRUPTION: On 31 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law, passed by the parliament earlier that day, that restores the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies, marking a significant government U-turn
• OIL: Russia is reportedly exporting less oil to global markets, which would make Moscow more vulnerable to potential US secondary sanctions on Russia’s largest energy customers if they go ahead next month
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump has reiterated his willingness to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions early next month if Russia fails to make meaningful progress towards ending its war in Ukraine
• BAKHMUT: Earlier on 31 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces have taken control of Chasiv Yar, a highly important fortified town over which both sides have been fighting since April 2024. The MoD claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces seized the town, which is located less than five miles (8km) to the north-east of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, geolocated footage published on 28 July does indicate that Russian forces have advanced in two directions in south-western Chasiv Yar in recent days.
• BAKHMUT: Ukraine has denied the Russian claims, however, and we cannot confirm whether the town has fallen. Over the last year, Russia’s MoD has generally provided accurate assessments when a settlement has been taken (though the ministry largely ignores subsequent Ukrainian counter-attacks, which may account for the conflicting reporting). This general accuracy stands in stark contrast to earlier phases of the war, when MoD claims regularly outpaced the reality on the ground. However, reforms since the appointment of new defence minister Andrei Belousov in May 2024 have likely improved the accuracy of reporting. Likely as part of this effort, the Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) in November 2024, reportedly for exaggerating Russian advances near Siversk (located to the north-east of Chasiv Yar).
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage will be required to confirm a Ukrainian withdrawal from Chasiv Yar. However, recent confirmed Russian advances in the centre of the town indicate that, at the very least, a Russian seizure of the remnants of the town will remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. That said, it equally remains possible that Ukrainian forces will launch a major counter-attack to prevent Russian forces from consolidating control over the key town. Earlier in 2025, other instances of Ukrainian counter-attacks delayed Russia’s ability to consolidate Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) and push north to Kostiantynivka for many months. Given the importance of Chasiv Yar, which sits at a significant height, Ukrainian forces will likely attempt to contest Russian control over the town in a bid to slow the eventual drive towards Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further south, Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued to advance west of Toretsk amid Russian efforts to secure the southern approaches to Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage from 27 July indicates that Russian forces have modestly advanced west of Poltavka, located around 12 miles (19km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka. Meanwhile, footage from 28 July indicates modest Ukrainian advances into the north-eastern sector of Yablunivka, a village located seven miles (11km) to the south-west of the outskirts of Kostiantynivka.
• DONETSK: Russian forces are putting increasing pressure on Ukrainian defences in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) and the surrounding area, employing small-unit assaults and sabotage and reconnaissance tactics. A Ukrainian company commander operating on the Pokrovsk front, quoted by Ukrainska Pravda on 29 July, warned of growing encirclement risks near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (Donetsk). The source stated that Russian forces have expanded the salient along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis towards Dobropillia (Donetsk), now pushing over approximately six miles (10km) deep. According to both Russian and Ukrainian sources, Russian units are advancing in small assault groups, up to the size of a detachment, probing for weak points in Ukraine’s defensive lines. These efforts are supported by frequent sabotage and reconnaissance operations. A Russian military blogger claimed that similar tactics had been used in 2024 to capture Selydove, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: According to the Ukrainian company commander cited previously, fighting is currently ongoing near Rodynske, approximately four miles (6km) to the north of Pokrovsk. Russian forces have reportedly entered the eastern part of Chervonyi Lyman near Rodynske and are attacking a mine situated between Myrnohrad and the recently captured Novoekonomichne (both located to the east of Pokrovsk). Geolocated footage from 29 July shows recent Russian advances south-east of Volodymyrivka, located 17.2 miles (27.6km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk. According to additional footage from 29 July, Ukrainian forces recently progressed in northern Lysivka, located seven miles (11.4 km) to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, further to the south-west, Russian forces made confirmed progress in the fields north-west of Oleksiivka, located 13.3 miles (21.4km) to the south-east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), as of 29 July.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 30 July shows recent Russian gains south-west of Zelena Dolyna, located 11.5 miles (18.6km) to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). As of 28 July, Russian forces had made confirmed advances into northern Kolodyazi, located nine miles (14.5km) to the north of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 29 July indicates that Russian forces have seized Ternyrivka and part of its sister village Obratne, located 12 miles (20km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast), just across the border into Zaporizhzhia oblast. However, to the north, Ukrainian forces have counter-attacked. Geolocated footage from 30 July indicates that they have raised a flag in western Maliivka – a village which Russian forces recently took, located approximately 11 miles (18km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka, inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s strike campaign has continued to comprise both large-scale combined attacks and smaller drone barrages, with a variable use of missiles. The strikes have consistently targeted civilian infrastructure, which has been a long-standing pattern in Russia’s campaign.
• STRIKES: The attack in the early hours of 31 July involved 309 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and eight Iskandr-K cruise missiles. Despite a relatively high Ukrainian interception rate (288 drones and three missiles), the attack still achieved direct hits, including in the capital Kyiv, where a residential building was damaged. The 30 July strike involved 78 drones; among other targets, it damaged the railway station in Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), various enterprises within Dnipropetrovsk oblast and residential buildings in Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast). The 29 July strike (37 UAVs and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles) hit a hospital in Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), killing at least four people. These recent attacks clearly underscore Russia’s systematic targeting of civilian facilities. The UN has warned of a sharp increase in civilian casualties, which rose by 54% in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes also continue to target Ukrainian military training and enlistment facilities, as part of a deliberate campaign to disrupt Kyiv’s force generation capabilities. For example, the 29 July strike also hit a military training facility at an undisclosed location. Russia’s MoD claimed the attack killed or injured around 200 troops. Similarly, enlistment offices have been regularly targeted, likely to further instil fear among Ukrainians who are considering volunteering at the centres.
• STRIKES: The recruitment of agents by Russia’s intelligence services will facilitate information gathering for strikes against force generation and other strategic facilities. On 30 July, Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) reported the detention of a Ukrainian Air Force major for collaborating with the enemy. The suspect reportedly collected information on airfields housing F-16s, Mirage 2000 and Su-24 aircraft to support Russian strikes against these facilities.
• STRIKES: Amid an intensification of strikes, the Ukrainian authorities have introduced a new localised air raid alert system for Kyiv and the surrounding oblast to minimise disruption for civilians and businesses. The new system is a localised alert model, whereas the current system emits region-wide air alerts, even when the threat is distant. This has caused significant operational disruption and uncertainty for businesses, as many have a policy of suspending operations during air raid alerts, even when the threat does not materialise. According to the European Business Association, 41% of businesses reported operational disruption due to frequent region-wide alerts, with some losing up to 50% of their working hours. If successful, the system is expected to be rolled out across Ukraine.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CORRUPTION: On 31 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law passed by the parliament earlier that day, which restores the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. The move effectively reverses original controversial legislation, which limited the autonomy of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). A total of 331 lawmakers approved the bill in two consecutive readings, with none voting against it. Although the public’s reception remains unclear, we assess that the swift U-turn on the original legislation will likely decrease domestic unrest and government stability risks in the short term. That said, the initial legislation and subsequent backtracking will likely have sown distrust in Zelensky and his administration, which will potentially manifest more prominently over the medium-to-long term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Special Report – Ukraine – 31 July 2025.
• CORRUPTION: The restoration of the independence of the anti-corruption bodies will likely ameliorate concerns regarding Ukraine’s commitment to reform; this will mitigate risks to future funding. On 29 July, reports emerged that the EU had warned of certain financial assistance being halted until the Ukrainian government rectifies the original law. Nevertheless, recent developments underscore how concerns about backsliding on anti-corruption efforts can potentially harm funding from Ukraine’s Western allies. Additionally, the government’s U-turn on the legislation will also potentially moderately alleviate concerns from the private sector regarding investing in Ukraine in the post-war period. However, many will likely perceive that significant damage has already been done to the government’s credibility on reform issues.
• CORRUPTION: Separately, on 30 July, Ukraine’s largest bank, Privatbank, won its UK lawsuit against its former oligarch owners over alleged fraud. Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and his business partner, Hennadiy Boholiubov, have been ordered to repay USD 1.9 bn for defrauding the institution. The bank was nationalised in 2016 as part of efforts to clean up Ukraine’s finance sector. We assess that Kyiv will highly likely see the ruling as a success, especially after the passing of legislation undermining NABU and SAPO called into question its commitment to tackling graft.
• OIL: Russia is reportedly exporting less oil to global markets, according to ship-tracking by Bloomberg. The report published on 29 July claimed that, in the first seven months of 2025, Russia shipped 4% less crude oil than it did in the same period last year, which equates to approximately 30 m fewer barrels. Bloomberg’s data identified that Asian markets (particularly China and India) remain the primary destination for Russian oil, with exports steady at approximately 2.86 m barrels per day (bpd). However, Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions against countries purchasing Russian oil may realistically further reduce Russian oil exports (see FORECAST) below.
• OIL: Meanwhile, the IMF forecasts that Russia’s economic growth will slow in 2025, in part due to falling global oil prices. In its July update, the IMF projected that Russia’s GDP will grow just 0.9% this year compared to 2024’s expansion of 4.1%. We previously assessed that the Russian economy will likely witness a slowdown in growth and that a modest recession remains a realistic possibility. Despite growing concern about the trajectory of the economy among some Russian officials, a possible recession would unlikely impact Russia’s ability to sustain its war in Ukraine over the coming months.

FORECAST

DEADLINE: On 29 July, US President Donald Trump reiterated his willingness to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions early next month if Russia fails to make meaningful progress towards ending its war in Ukraine. Trump stated that the US would begin imposing measures ‘ten days from today’, meaning no later than 8 August. However, Trump expressed doubts that such action would impact Russia and accused President Vladimir Putin of wanting to continue the war. For further analysis on Trump’s initial announcement to lower his previous truce timeline of 50 days. Earlier on 31 July, Trump warned Dmitry Medvedev, the hawkish deputy chairperson of Russia’s Security Council, to ‘watch his words’ after he criticised Trump’s decision to reduce the deadline. Medvedev accused Trump of playing an ‘ultimatum game’ on 28 July and warned that such attempts would not work on Russia. Rather, according to Medvedev, each new US ultimatum represents a threat and a step towards war with Russia. In response to his comments, Trump also advocated for minimising trade between Russia and the US. These remarks reinforce the shift in Trump’s approach to Moscow (given his administration was once open to increasing Russia-US trade) and suggest that he is increasingly willing to take a tougher stance on Russia. The Kremlin’s official response to Trump’s threat to reduce the deadline has been relatively cautious, but it has notably sought to portray Russia as resilient to sanctions pressure. This indicates that Moscow is prepared to face further punitive measures to continue the war. Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 29 July that the Kremlin has ‘taken note’ of recent developments; however, he also acknowledged that Russia remains committed to ensuring its own interests as the war continues. Meanwhile, on 30 July, Peskov stated that Russia has been facing a large number of sanctions for ‘quite a long time’ and has developed a ‘certain immunity’ as a result. These comments indicate that Russia is likely unfazed by the prospect of facing new economic penalties, as we have previously assessed. New threats (whether they materialise or not) are unlikely to encourage Moscow to make the concessions necessary to end the war for good in the near term. We assess that Russia is ready to endure increasing economic hardship as long as its forces continue to advance in Ukraine. As well as demonstrating increasing willingness to ramp up economic pressure on Russia, the US has indicated its readiness to target some of Russia’s key allies. On 30 July, Trump announced that the US will impose 25% tariffs on goods imported from India, ‘plus an unspecified penalty’ for buying Russian oil and weapons. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its subsequent economic isolation have pushed Moscow to seek closer economic relations with New Delhi. India has benefitted from discounted Russian oil and is the biggest purchaser of seaborne Russian crude. Nevertheless, on 30 July, Reuters reported that Indian state refiners had stopped buying Russian oil in the past week and cited unspecified industry insiders. While we cannot confirm this development, if true, it possibly indicates India’s concerns about the possibility of US penalties. As oil and gas account for almost a third of Russia’s state revenues, a sharp, continued decrease in sales could realistically weaken Russia’s ability to generate funds for its war effort. However, it remains unclear if and under what conditions such secondary sanctions will be imposed by the US. Amid the potential shift in US policy towards Russia, two senior Republican senators have outlined a plan that would allow other countries to fund US weapons supplies to Ukraine. According to a report from the Wall Street Journal on 30 July, the PEACE Act would create a fund at the US Treasury to accept money from Western allies. The Pentagon could then use the fund to pay contractors to replenish US stockpiles; the US could thus continue sending weapons to Ukraine without harming its own military preparedness. The bill’s supporters hope to attract USD 5-8bn in funding annually, with Germany and the UK seen as the most likely contributors. The White House is reportedly ‘largely receptive’ to the initiative. The bill will possibly be passed later this year as part of the annual defence policy bill. As such, if these timelines are correct, it would unlikely benefit Ukraine in the near term. Nevertheless, the development underscores the Trump administration’s growing willingness to assist Kyiv indirectly as long as its allies pay for it. This likely forms part of the US’ strategy to increase pressure on Russia, alongside economic penalties.

Anti-Corruption Probe

Executive summary

• A controversial bill that removed the independence of two major anti-corruption institutions has triggered widespread backlash from the Ukrainian population and the international community.
• Threats to Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions will highly likely remain, despite a government U-turn and the restoration of their nominal independence, given other measures undermining the credibility of the government’s commitment to rooting out corruption.
• Although the reversal of the controversial bill will likely reduce domestic unrest risks, recent events have almost certainly weakened trust in the Ukrainian leadership and could drive further protests.
• Russia will likely exploit discord in Ukraine to undermine Western backing for Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s government stability.
• While the developments are unlikely to affect Western financial aid in the short term, failure to restore trust in anti-corruption efforts will likely discourage financial support and private sector investment in the long term; this will only weaken Ukraine’s already limited prospects of EU accession.

Context

On 22 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law (No. 12414) limiting the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine. The legislation grants the prosecutor general (appointed by the president) increased authority over investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Zelensky claimed the legislation aims to counter Russian influence, though critics argue that there is nothing in the law that targets supposed Russian agents in or outside the agencies. The law’s passage subsequently triggered the largest protests to take place across the country since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, as well as international condemnation. Zelensky has subsequently backtracked on the legislation and submitted a new bill to restore the independence of the two agencies, which parliament approved earlier on 31 July. The importance of the ongoing dispute and government U-turn reflects the centrality of anti-corruption efforts to Ukraine’s wider Euro-Atlantic aspirations. NABU and SAPO were created as part of anti-corruption reforms after the 2013-14 Maidan Revolution, which led to the ousting of Russia-backed president Viktor Yanukovych and solidified Ukraine’s pro-West path. Since 2014, Ukraine has made progress in reducing corruption within the country, though it nevertheless remains a pertinent issue – including during wartime. Tackling graft is also a key requirement for Ukraine as it seeks to join the EU; Ukraine remains reliant on funding from its Western allies, as well as international organisations, for defence and financial support.

• Ukraine: Failure to implement reforms will threaten foreign funds, long-term socio-economic stability. On 30 July, the European Commission (EC) urged the Ukrainian government to appoint Oleksandr Tsyvinsky as head of the Economic Security Bureau (ESB), which investigates economic crimes. On 24 June, an independent commission selected Tsyvinsky, a former official of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), to lead the ESB. Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) set 31 July as the deadline to appoint the ESB’s head, the government reportedly refused to confirm Tsyvinsky’s appointment on 30 July. ESB, founded in 2021, has faced serious accusations of being used to put pressure on businesses, prompting calls for its overhaul. The development comes amid heightened domestic and international scrutiny of the government following its recent attempt to pass a bill that would undermine the independence of key anti-corruption bodies, including NABU; the bill is due to be revised by parliament later on 31 July. We assess that failure to appoint the new ESB head will reinforce the perception that the government is reluctant to pursue its reform efforts. This, in turn, will threaten crucial international funding, which would worsen the country’s deteriorating financing shortfalls.

Jul 29.

• Russia-Ukraine-US: Reduced truce deadline is unlikely to push Moscow to make peace. On 28 July, US President Donald Trump shortened a deadline that he previously set for Russia to reach a peace deal to end its war in Ukraine (or face new economic penalties). Moscow’s new deadline is now within ‘ten or 12 days’, meaning 7 or 9 August. On 14 July, Trump issued a 50-day ultimatum to Russia to achieve an end to the war. Failure to do so will reportedly result in the US imposing 100% tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on those countries that purchase Russian oil. The reduced deadline underscores growing frustration at the lack of progress towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. While the imposition of 100% tariffs on Russia remains likely, the feasibility of imposing secondary sanctions on major world powers like China and India is uncertain. Nevertheless, we assess that the new threats (whether they materialise or not) are unlikely to encourage Moscow to make the concessions necessary to resolve the war once and for all in the near term, though a temporary ceasefire remains possible. We continue to assess that, as long as Russian forces advance on the battlefield, the Kremlin is highly likely to be willing to endure further economic strain stemming from Western sanctions in order to achieve its principal war objectives in Ukraine.
• Russia: Large-scale cyber attack highlights heightened security risks from hacktivist groups. On 28 July, international news outlets reported that two pro-Ukraine and anti-Belarus hacktivist groups (‘Silent Crow’ and ‘Cyber-partisans’) conducted a large-scale cyber attack against Russia’s main state-owned airline earlier that day. The groups caused a mass outage to the company’s IT systems, resulting in delays and the cancellation of over 100 flights. The attack also disrupted some international flights to Armenia, Belarus and Uzbekistan alongside domestic flights, underscoring the spillover effect of such operations. The groups likely possess moderate cyber capabilities since they reportedly infiltrated the company’s systems at least a year before the attack and exfiltrated sensitive customer and internal data without being detected. Silent Crow has since threatened that it will start leaking data in the coming days, showcasing increased reputational risks. Subsequently, we assess that this incident indicates heightened security risks to Russian businesses amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Jul 28.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: Russia’s likely recent capture of Novoekonomichne, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, underscores the deteriorating operational situation in the area for Ukrainian forces
• STRIKES: Recent long-range Russian strikes have involved a notable number of ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian air defences will continue to struggle to intercept
• NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump announced earlier on 28 July that he will reduce the deadline for imposing sanctions and tariffs on Russia if no peace deal is reached to ‘ten or 12 days’ from now
• FORECAST: On 31 July, Ukraine’s parliament will consider a new bill which reverses elements of a recent controversial law that undermines the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies
• BAKHMUT: On 26 July, Russian forces launched a mechanised assault to the north-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast); they have made advances and are now within 1.5 miles (2km) of the outskirts of Siversk itself. Geolocated footage published on 26 July indicates that Russian forces have advanced in open fields to the north-east of Siversk, but that Ukrainian forces managed to halt the attack. On 26 July, elements of Ukraine’s 11th Corps (which has been reorganised to incorporate the now defunct Luhansk Grouping of Forces) took part in defending against the assault and reportedly halted the advance. According to the press service of the 11th Corps, the Russian attack involved over 150 personnel, over 40 motorcycles, six tanks and numerous armoured vehicles.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to advance between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk (both Donetsk oblast), setting conditions for further advances in both directions. Geolocated footage published on 24 and 25 July indicates that Russian forces have seized Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka, two adjacent villages located to the north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). The seizure of these two villages is significant, as it will provide Russian forces with an opportunity to advance north to the junction between the key T-0514 and H-20 highways. The junction controls the south-western approaches to Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Taking Oleksandro-Kalynove in particular will also increase the pressure on Ukrainian forces fighting to the south-east in and around Shcherbynivka (located to the west of Toretsk). If Russian forces are able to consolidate their newly gained positions, further pushes to the north-east and east will increase the threat of encirclement for the small Ukrainian pockets still defending Shcherbynivka. To the west, Russian forces have also advanced around Popiv Yar, located 13 miles (21km) to the west of Kostiantynivka, which is further expanding Russia’s salient between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Russia’s likely recent capture of Novoekonomichne, located over six miles (10 km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk, underscores the deteriorating operational situation in the area for Ukrainian forces. Geolocated footage from 25 July shows Russian forces operating in central Novoekonomichne, likely indicating that the settlement is now under Russian control. Russian milblogger sources claimed further advances in the area, including sabotage and reconnaissance operations in and around Pokrovsk, including on the outskirts of Myrnohrad, located just to the east of Pokrovsk. While such claims have not been visually corroborated, they underscore the uptick in Russian operations in the Pokrovsk sector in recent weeks. These operations are clearly part of Moscow’s ongoing effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the north. This was supported by Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, who stated on 27 July that Russia has concentrated a significant force of around 111,000 troops in the Pokrovsk sector.
• DONETSK: In line with this assessment, on 27 July, the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group Frontelligence reported that Russian operations are placing growing pressure on Ukraine’s supply and troop rotation routes in the Pokrovsk area. In addition, Russia’s counter-drone measures are increasingly diminishing Ukraine’s drone advantage in the sector. Russia has deployed its elite Rubicon unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit to the area in recent months; this unit played a key role in Russia’s successful takeover of Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk oblast earlier this year. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are reportedly continuing to face personnel shortages, weakening their ability to fill gaps in the frontline. Frontelligence also noted that Ukraine has committed reserves to the Sumy region and the south-eastern front, which has limited its capacity to reinforce positions in the Pokrovsk area.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukraine’s Kursk Grouping of Forces reported on 27 July that their forces have retaken the village of Kindrativka, located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Various Russian sources have also corroborated the seizure of Kindrativka, with a number of Russian units reportedly withdrawing from the area and from nearby Oleksiivka to avoid encirclement. While we cannot confirm this, Ukrainian counter-attacks over the last month have slowly pushed the Russians back at multiple points along the north Sumy line.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Recent Russian gains north-west of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) are likely part of an effort to threaten key Western supply and rotation routes to the city. Geolocated footage from 25 July shows Russian advances south-west of Kindrashivka and south-west of Tishchenkivka, both located to the north-west of Kupiansk. According to Frontelligence, Russian forces are advancing through Moskovka and towards Sobolivka, also located to the north-west of Kupiansk. This offensive push threatens the H-26 (also known as the P-07) Kupiansk-Shevchenkove highway, a key logistical artery for Ukrainian forces defending Kupiansk. Cutting off this route would likely disrupt Ukraine’s ability to fall back to defensive positions west of Kupiansk along the Kupyanka River in the future. We assess that Russian gains in the sector do not indicate that Kupiansk will be captured in the short term.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces are continuing to advance north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) and have penetrated the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border in recent days. Geolocated footage from 25 July indicates that Russian forces seized Maliivka, a village located approximately 11 miles (18km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka; Maliivka is notably just inside the borders of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Similarly, geolocated footage from 26 July indicates that Russian forces advanced further to the north and have taken the village of Zelenyi Hai, located within the borders of Donetsk oblast, approximately ten miles (16km) to the north of Maliivka. The seizure of Zelenyi Hai underscores the recent successes Russian forces have had from slowly advancing to the Vovcha River, which forms the border between Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts in this area. Russian forces are now likely preparing an advance on Andriivka-Klevtsove, a town located to the west along the H-15 highway. Andriivka-Klevtsove is the last significant settlement east of the Russian side of the Vovcha River.
• SOUTHERN: Further to the west, Russian forces are continuing to advance along the eastern banks of the Dnieper River to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Geolocated footage from 27 July indicates that Russian forces have now advanced north from Kamianske (Zaporizhzhia oblast) to the southern outskirts of the village of Stepnohirsk, located approximately 15 miles (25km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city.
• STRIKES: Early on 28 July, Russia launched a large-scale aerial attack involving 331 aerial threats. The strike comprised 324 drones, four Kh-101 cruise missiles and three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that the attack heavily targeted Starokostiantyniv (Khmelnytskyi oblast), which hosts a key military airbase. Ukrainian forces intercepted 309 drones and two cruise missiles; they claimed that the ballistic missiles failed to reach their intended targets.
• STRIKES: There was a similarly large-scale Russian attack on 26 July, which involved 235 aerial threats, including 208 drones and 27 missiles of various types. Notably, the strike featured 12 Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces reported intercepting 183 drones and 17 unspecified missiles. It remains highly unlikely that Iskandr-M missiles were intercepted in large numbers, given that ballistic projectiles are the hardest to shoot down. Russian milbloggers claimed that over half of the aerial threats were directed at specific industrial facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts, including the Dnipropetrovsk Electromechanical Plant in Yelyzavetivka, north-west of Dnipro city (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), and the HARTRON-ARKOS research and production enterprise in Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast).
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, the success of Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign continues to undermine Russia’s ability to shield its population from the impact of the war. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of 291 Ukrainian drones on 27 July. Head of Leningrad oblast Alexander Drozdenko stated that over ten UAVs were downed near St Petersburg. This caused major flight disruption at St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport (LED), which recorded more than 90 flight delays.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, citing security concerns, announced the cancellation of Russia’s annual Navy Day parade in St Petersburg, planned for 27 July. UK defence intelligence assessed that the celebrations were almost certainly cancelled across the country due to security concerns. This marks the first cancellation of the annual event since its inception in 2017. We assess that this was highly likely due to the drone threat, particularly following the latest Ukrainian attack, which caused significant flight disruption at Pulkovo Airport. These developments clearly undermine the Kremlin’s continued efforts to minimise the war’s impact on Russia’s population. However, it is unlikely to have a major impact on the Russian public due to widespread apathy.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump announced earlier on 28 July that he will reduce the deadline for imposing sanctions and tariffs on Russia if no peace deal is reached to ‘ten or 12 days’ from now. Trump had previously given 50 days; the old deadline was set to expire in early September (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 July 2025). The threat (irrespective of whether Trump acts on it in the coming days) reflects his growing frustration with Russia. On 26 July, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Trump is ‘losing his patience’ with Russia and that, despite having ‘very good interactions’ with Russian President Vladimir Putin, their engagement never results in a closer end to the war.
• NEGOTIATIONS: However, the seeming US willingness to increase pressure on Moscow is unlikely to force it to end hostilities while its forces continue to advance on the battlefield. On 27 July, the Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov reiterated narratives emphasising Russia’s alleged need to accomplish its war goals. This implies that Moscow is highly unlikely to deviate from its already established demands or consider making meaningful concessions to bring the war closer to a conclusion in the near term.
• NEGOTIATIONS: That said, on 25 July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced that Russia and Ukraine have reached an ‘agreement in principle’ for their two presidents to meet in Turkey. Fidan did not specify when this meeting could take place, however, and we continue to assess that Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are unlikely to meet in the near-to-medium term. Both sides have different opinions on when their two leaders should meet, with Ukraine pushing for the two presidents to meet as part of the negotiations process. Meanwhile, the Russian side believes that Putin and Zelensky should meet only to seal a peace deal. This difference in opinions will highly likely prevent the two presidents from engaging in direct bilateral talks to end the war in the coming weeks, despite Trump’s new deadline.
• STARLINK: On 24 July, Starlink suffered an outage which lasted approximately 2.5 hours; the outage was due to the failure of key internal software services that operate the core network. The commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, said the disruption lasted 150 minutes and was the longest so far throughout the war. Although the Ukrainian forces continued combat operations during this time and relied on different communication methods, the disruption has only highlighted Ukraine’s overreliance on Starlink services. Russian forces are also known to make widespread use of Starlink terminals to co-ordinate battlefield movements, but Ukraine remains much more heavily exposed to outages or policy changes from SpaceX.
• STARLINK: The temporary outage comes as reports indicate SpaceX CEO Elon Musk allegedly ordered the shutdown of Starlink satellite coverage during Ukraine’s 2022 counter-offensive. According to a Reuters investigation published on 25 July, Musk’s order impacted parts of Donetsk oblast and Kherson oblast while Ukraine was trying to reclaim the administrative capital Kherson city (Kherson oblast) in late September 2022. As a result, Ukrainian forces failed to surround Russian soldiers in the town of Beryslav (Kherson oblast). Although Ukraine’s counter-offensive ultimately resulted in Ukraine reclaiming Beryslav, Kherson city and other territory, Musk’s alleged order (which SpaceX denies) underscores potential issues with Starlink services cutting out during critical moments. According to the report, Musk ordered the temporary shutdown due to fears that a significant Russian military defeat on the western banks of the Dnieper River would trigger a tactical nuclear response from Moscow.
• STARLINK: It remains unknown when precisely Musk allegedly gave the order or how long the outage lasted. That said, it aligns with earlier reports that Musk commanded cutoffs of Starlink services near the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea in September 2022 (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 8 September 2023). Starlink has helped ensure connectivity for Ukrainian troops across the frontline throughout the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, the allegations outlined above have likely cast doubt over its safety from Musk’s alleged interference and how this can impact military operations.
• ENERGY: As of 31 July, Ukraine’s maximum electricity prices will increase by 1.6 times for businesses between 1700 and 2300hrs (local time). However, price caps will remain at their current levels for all other times of day; households will not be impacted by the increases. The increases are likely aimed at ensuring that businesses purchase the electricity needed rather than overbuying. The price increases will possibly apply additional financial burden on companies, particularly those in electricity-intensive sectors and/or those requiring electricity throughout the day for operations.

FORECAST

CORRUPTION: On 31 July, Ukraine’s parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) will consider a new bill which reverses elements of a recent controversial law that undermines the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, who signed the controversial bill on 22 July, the new draft legislation would restore the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) by stripping the prosecutor general’s control over them. Despite the apparent U-turn, Zelensky’s standing with civil society, the population and the international community at large will likely be significantly affected. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 24 July 2025. The new legislation would also introduce new provisions Zelensky claims seek to eliminate supposed Russian influence within these institutions; this was the original justification for the initial law paring back NABU and SAPO’s independence. These safeguarding measures include mandated polygraph tests for the employees of NABU and SAPO, the Bureau of Economic Security (ESBU), the National Police (NPU) and the prosecutor general’s office who have access to state secrets. The new bill envisions that these should take place at least once every two years. It also envisions a ban on travel abroad for NABU employees during martial law, except for official assignments. NABU has said that polygraph testing is already an established practice inside the bureau; its employees undergo polygraphs during official investigations, appointments and reassignments.

Both NABU and SAPO were involved in drafting the new legislation, which they have endorsed; their approval will likely increase societal and political support for the bill. The two agencies have called on the parliament to adopt it, given they are confident that it restores all procedural powers and guarantees their independence. The speaker of Ukraine’s parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, has said he would urge parliament to adopt the bill ‘immediately and in its entirety’. This would stop the bill from having to undergo a second reading and eliminate the possibility of amendments being introduced, which would require additional consideration and run the risk of controversial terms being included with little notice. Zelensky’s Servant of the People (SN) party has a majority in parliament; additionally, several opposition figures have voiced support for the new legislation, which will increase the likelihood of its passage over the coming days.

While it is not certain whether the new legislation will fully halt anti-corruption protests over the coming days, they have nevertheless decreased in size since Zelensky announced his plans to overturn the original contentious bill. Protests occurred in the centre of the capital Kyiv on 27 July for a sixth consecutive day. Meanwhile, on 25 July, approximately 150 people demonstrated in the city of Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and protests took place in several other cities, including Lviv (Lviv oblast), Rivne (Rivne oblast), Ternopil (Ternopil oblast) and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast) the day prior. An activist who played a key role in promoting recent protests, Ihor Lachenkov, stated on 25 July that the next protest action should occur on the day of the vote (31 July). Lachenkov said a pause in protests is necessary to emphasise their goal and avoid them being used for propaganda purposes. A slight reduction in protest activity will possibly continue through to 31 July. That said, domestic unrest risks are unlikely to fully subside and will potentially increase depending on the outcome of the vote.

Ukraine’s main Western allies continue to express concern over the recent developments, which will possibly undermine Kyiv’s ability to attract much-needed external support over the short-to-medium term. On 27 July, European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen urged Zelensky to uphold the independence of NABU and SAPO, particularly in light of Ukraine’s pursuit of EU integration. Notably, the next tranche of financial assistance to Ukraine under the EU’s Ukraine Facility mechanism will be smaller than planned due to Kyiv’s failure to complete key reforms. EC spokesperson Guillaume Mercier announced this on 25 July; the unfulfilled reforms concern decentralisation, judicial appointments to the High Anti-Corruption Court and a law on amending the Asset Recovery and Management Agency. While not linked to recent developments, the timing is notable and underscores that concerns of Kyiv backsliding on corruption efforts could possibly hinder future assistance from the EU and/or other partners.

Jul 25.

Executive summary

• In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will highly likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• On 14 July, US President Donald Trump threatened to impose new tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on states that trade with Russia if Moscow does not reach a deal to end the war within 50 days. The announcement likely marks a tentative policy shift aimed at increasing pressure on Moscow to take peace talks seriously. However, it is unlikely to force a diplomatic breakthrough in the short term. Nevertheless, the potential sale of weapons to Ukraine via NATO would offset impending munitions shortages for Ukraine as Biden-era aid packages begin to run out in the coming months.
• On 17 July, the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, approved the appointment of the former economy minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, as the new prime minister amid a wider government reshuffle.
• Ukraine’s government reshuffle coincided with a significant revision of key anti-corruption legislation, which triggered very rare anti-government protests in several major cities. On 22 July, an amendment was rushed through parliament and signed into law by President Volodymyr Zelensky. The amendment grants the Zelensky-appointed prosecutor general new powers to intervene and direct investigations undertaken by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). The move marks a major inflection in Ukraine’s anti-corruption trajectory and seriously undermines the independence of two of Ukraine’s most important institutions for reform. This will not only undermine Ukraine’s EU accession but could ultimately threaten international funding, which remains conditional upon governance transparency and reform progress.
• Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in August include: announcements by the Trump administration on its plans to sell weapons to NATO for re-export to Ukraine, including potential offensive exports (which remain unlikely in the short term); and the Ukrainian government’s outline of a new anti-corruption plan following the passing of the controversial corruption bill, though statements from the EU, IMF and Ukraine’s other international partners will indicate whether the bill will irrevocably shake international and investor confidence in reform efforts.
• France-Israel-Palestinian Territories: State recognition will drive diplomatic tensions, operation risks. On 24 July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France will recognise a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly meeting in September. Israel condemned the move, underscoring diplomatic tensions between the two countries, possibly limiting prospects of future shared initiatives and projects. Furthermore, the move will likely drive regulatory and compliance risks for French or affiliated entities operating in Israel, especially those within the defence and technology sectors. France’s move will likely put pressure on other states, notably the UK, to follow suit, elevating associated business operational risks and potential supply chain disruption for Israeli businesses reliant on Western supply chains. Furthermore, we assess that the move will possibly undermine any future trade talks between Israel and the UK, driving associated financial risks for Israeli businesses. The announcement, coupled with the prospect of broader recognition of a Palestinian state, will likely exacerbate anti-government protests in Israel in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline

31 Jul 25. EUR100K Donation to Prtyula Foundation Reinforces TEKEVER’s Ongoing Commitment to Ukraine. Investment will support the creation of the 15 SAR command post, which specialises in reconnaissance operations. TEKEVER, the European leader in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), is proud to announce that it has made a €100k contribution to the Prytula Foundation, a leading Ukrainian charity dedicated to strengthening Ukraine’s defence forces and providing assistance to the civilians affected by Russian invasion. The funding will be allocated to equip the operations centre for the 15 SAR Brigade, which specialises in reconnaissance operations. This vital support will enable the unit to conduct more reconnaissance missions, carry out targeted operations, and strengthen overall battlefield awareness. By enabling more effective operations, the support directly contributes to saving lives and increasing the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces at the frontline. Since 2022, TEKEVER has collaborated closely with the Ukrainian armed forces, deploying its AR3 and AR5 UAS systems to conduct long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. These systems have been critical in enhancing Ukraine’s ability to detect and neutralise threats. Reflecting its commitment to helping Ukraine bolster its defence capabilities, through a recently launched new entity in the region, TEKEVER is increasing its employee base on the ground, establishing a network of Ukrainian facilities focused on maintenance, engineering support, research and development for new capabilities, as well as training centres aimed at enhancing operational efficiency for Ukrainian collaborators. Today, through its donation, TEKEVER continues to cement its long-term support for the Ukrainian armed forces and the Ukrainian people. Its partnership with the Prytula Foundation will ensure Ukraine remains technologically supported in their fight for independence.

Ricardo Mendes, CEO of TEKEVER, commented: “European support for Ukraine is more vital now than ever, which is why we are proud to support not only with this donation, but additionally through our ongoing work alongside the Ukrainian armed forces. Having been on the ground in Ukraine since 2022, TEKEVER has seen firsthand the importance of innovative, resilient and resourceful talent driving successful defence efforts. We are pleased that our donation will allow for the cultivation of more of the exceptional talent needed to fight this war and defend Ukrainian sovereignty”.

“Command posts are a critical element of battle management: this is where intelligence is gathered, UAVs are monitored, and enemy movements are tracked. These centers are responsible for evaluating the effectiveness and feasibility of missions, forecasting risks, and making decisions at both tactical and strategic levels.

We thank our partners at TEKEVER for funding this center. Supporting our forces requires more than just supplying weapons and drones — covering operational costs is equally vital, as it enables effective action on the battlefield,” said Oleksandr Popov, Commander of the 15th Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade.

“Foreign companies, even those already helping Ukraine, don’t always manage to keep pace with the rapid changes on the battlefield. The tactical situation, threats, and technological solutions evolve almost weekly. The front line often demands unconventional solutions that go beyond ‘off-the-shelf’ products. That’s why direct donations for equipment make it possible to respond faster, more adaptively, and more precisely — without delays, logistical challenges, or multi-level approvals.

In 2025, supporting Ukraine is not just a humanitarian gesture, but a stance that shapes a company’s image in the eyes of clients, partners, and markets. Companies that aren’t afraid to directly support Ukraine’s defence capabilities are seen as part of the civilized world that does not stand aside.” — Andriy Shuvalov, Director of the Prytula Foundation.

“The effectiveness of aid depends on the speed of decision-making. Funds directed to trusted organizations with military expertise are used with high efficiency and have maximum impact in minimal time. This is a level of efficiency that’s hard to achieve through large bureaucratic channels. It’s important to demonstrate that the Western world believes in and supports Ukraine. That’s why the flow of foreign capital into domestic production is critically important. A donation is not just about ‘giving something.’ It’s a way to be involved in the process, to understand the reality of war, to see the impact of support, and to build trust with those on the front line,” said Bohdan Danyliv, Head of the Military Department at the Serhiy Prytula Foundation. (Source: ASD Network)

31 Jul 25. Ukrainian SOF Kill 7, Seize Russian-Held Positions in North-Slobozhanskyi. A recent operation by Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the North-Slobozhanskyi direction resulted in the deaths of at least seven Russian soldiers and the capture of Russian-held positions in the area. According to SOF’s Telegram post, the mission was executed by operators from the 73rd Marine Center in coordination with personnel from the 144th Special Operations Center. According to the report, Ukrainian operatives approached the Russian-held position and offered the enemy multiple chances to surrender. When the troops refused, the Ukrainian unit launched a swift and coordinated assault, eliminating the opposing forces. Documents and weapons were recovered from the site. One Ukrainian soldier was wounded during the operation but received medical treatment and is in stable condition. The SOF credited the success of the mission to meticulous planning, effective coordination, and the professionalism of all personnel involved. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

22 Jul 25. Ukraine’s United24 news outlet reports a ground-based robotic electronic warfare system known as Kvertus AD Berserk, designed to counter a range of enemy drone activities, has entered serial production in Ukraine. The announcement was made on July 21 by Yaroslav Filimonov, CEO of the defense technology company Kvertus, through official channels, said the report.

“The Berserk robot can disrupt control signals across all frequency bands used by FPV drones, multirotor drones, and aerial bombers. According to the manufacturer, the system has a 20 km operational range, can remain active for up to 12 hours, and is remotely controlled from a similar distance of up to 20 km.

The company said the platform will support: evacuation of wounded personnel from frontline positions; cover during demining operations; Protection of logistics routes.

“Kvertus has confirmed that multiple orders are already in progress, underscoring demand for the system’s battlefield-tested effectiveness,” said the report. “The firm also emphasized that its technologies are undergoing monthly upgrades, with engineers continuing to enhance performance in response to evolving threats. he Berserk system was developed on the basis of a nationally produced mobile platform and integrates high-capacity battery power, rugged terrain mobility, and multi-spectrum jamming systems.

For more information: https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraine-deploys-new-berserk-robot-to-jam-enemy-drones-protect-troops-at-front-10070 (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

22 Jul 25. Germany and Netherlands to boost Ukraine’s air defence. The Netherlands intends to make a “substantial contribution” to the US initiative to provide additional air defences to Ukraine, said Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans yesterday during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. “Much has already been done, but more is needed,” Brekelmans said. “Ukraine protects the front line against Russian aggression for all of Europe. If Russia is able to break through, it immediately poses a greater threat to the rest of Europe and NATO.” The Netherlands has already delivered a Patriot air defence system and missiles and is also providing Ukraine with drone detection radars and maritime vessels equipped with air defence equipment. The exact details of the new Dutch contribution will be decided soon, in coordination with NATO, the United States and other allies.  Germany’s Defence Minister Boris Pistorius also said yesterday that Germany would deliver five Patriot systems to Ukraine. It has previously provided three of the systems. Earlier this month, following a pause in military equipment support for Ukraine, the United States pledged to send additional Patriot systems to NATO for NATO to “distribute”.  The Patriot, short for Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept on Target, is manufactured by Raytheon Technologies. Each system typically comprises radar and control systems, a power unit, launchers and support vehicles. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

30 Jul 25. Ukraine Equips New Interceptor Drone With 6-Barrel Shotgun. Ukraine’s 3DTech has introduced the reusable drone interceptor “Predator Shooter” with a suspended unit of 12-gauge recoilless guns. The company’s founder, Oleksiy Zhulinsky, told the Military correspondent about the new development. At the Demo Days drone field tests, a Ukrainian company presented a drone designed to shoot down enemy drones, including fiber-optic ones, as well as to engage infantry. The suspension unit is equipped with six 12-gauge barrels that can be loaded with conventional shotgun shells. This can be shot, buckshot, or any other type of shell, as each one is equipped with a countercharge that compensates for the recoil of the shot.

“We have modified the cartridge in such a way that there is no recoil. Therefore, it can fire single shots, in automatic mode, or even in a volley from all barrels,” says the company founder.

A two-gun modification has also been developed for the interceptor to intercept high-speed targets, which has less weight and allows the interceptor to reach speeds of up to 150 km/h. The drone is currently being used by the Ukrainian military in a targeted manner, where it is undergoing testing and trials. Its primary targets are front-line drones such as the DJI Mavic. A six-barrel suspension unit for the Predator Shooter interceptor drone from 3DTech. Photo: Militarnyi Developers see potential in it as a means of destroying fiber-optic drones, which currently remain invulnerable to electronic suppression and reconnaissance equipment.

“ A fiber-optic drone is even easier to hit because it has several large modules, such as a fiber coil or batteries,” says Oleksiy Zhulinsky.

However, this is not the first interceptor drone with firearms. Previously, “Military” reported on the appearance of separate SICH suspended modules from the Ukrainian company Varta DroneHunter. Their developers are focused on integration with other existing FPV platforms from 7 to 15 inches. To do this, you only need to calibrate and fine-tune the drone software. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI)

28 Jul 25. US/Ukraine deepen ties with Ukraine drone export and Swift Beat deals. On July 24, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he has reached an agreement with U.S. President Donald Trump for the United States will purchase drones, many of them C-UAS intercept drones from Ukraine, according to Ukrinform. Zelensky said this while speaking to journalists on July 24.

“With America, with President Trump, we agreed that they will buy drones from us. That’s the agreement. I have tasked [NSDC Secretary] Umerov, [Defense Minister] Shmyhal, and [Advisor to President on strategic affairs] Kamyshin with handling this. It’s very important to prepare this contract — a serious contract worth USD10–20–30 bn,” Zelensky stated in the article.

This follows the signing of a memorandum between Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Swift Beat, LLC “which will enable scaling up the production of interceptor drones capable of shooting down large numbers of Shaheds,” according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in a presidential statement. Before the memorandum signing, the Head of State met with Swift Beat, LLC CEO Eric Schmidt to discuss increasing the production of modern drones for Ukraine. “This is a co-production document between Ukraine and the United States. It will involve several companies focusing on various types of drones. But the most important thing is this year and next year. This year – hundreds of thousands of drones. And next year – there will be an increase,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. The President emphasized that the main component of the document is the production of interceptor drones, which have already proven effective in Ukraine.

For more information: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/memorandum-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-amerikanskoyu-kompaniyeyu-swif-98817/https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/4018767-zelensky-us-agrees-to-buy-ukrainian-drones.html (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

26 Jul 25. Russia Uses New UMPB-5 Guided Bomb in Kharkiv Strike. Russian forces have used a newly developed precision-guided bomb in a strike on Ukraine for the first time, injuring dozens in the city of Kharkiv. According to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, two UMPB-5 aerial munitions were launched from a Su-34 bomber at approximately 11:00 a.m. on July 24, hitting infrastructure in the Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi districts. The bombs were reportedly released from an estimated distance of over 60 miles near the village of Stroitel in Russia’s Belgorod region, igniting fires.  A total of 41 people were injured in the attack, including six children, local authorities confirmed. Among the wounded were a 10-year-old girl, a 28-day-old infant, a pregnant woman, and two 17-year-olds who suffered blast injuries. All victims are receiving medical treatment. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that people were present on the streets at the time of the attack. No fatalities were reported. The UMPB-5 is a newly modified glide bomb equipped with a 550-pound high-explosive warhead, similar in weight to previous munitions but with a reinforced casing. “The warhead of the UMPB-5 weighs 250 kilograms, the same as a high-explosive aircraft bomb,”a spokesperson for the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office said. “At the same time, it is made of thicker metal than in the UMPB D-30, which is why civilians were more seriously injured.” Spartak Borysenko, a representative of the prosecutor’s office, said the strike confirms Russia’s continued use of Kharkiv as a test site for new air-launched munitions. “Russia is using Kharkiv as a testing ground. Today it’s the UMPB-5, before it was the D-30… These modified bombs cause greater destruction and lead to more civilian injuries,” Borysenko stated according to a report by Euromaiden Press. The blast wave from the attack caused significant structural damage. According to official assessments, 20 residential buildings were hit, including 17 apartment blocks. More than 600 windows were shattered, and the blast created a large crater in the road. Seven cars were destroyed by fire, while 18 others were damaged. An industrial facility was also set ablaze, resulting in a large fire, Russian media claimed the industrial facility was a drone factory. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

25 Jul 25. HENSOLDT strengthens Ukraine’s air defence.  Sensor solutions provider HENSOLDT has received a major order to supply radars to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence. As part of a comprehensive order package worth more than 340 m euros, TRML-4D high-performance radars and SPEXER 2000 3D MkIII short-range radars will be delivered.

“Our high-performance radars are urgently needed by Ukrainian air defence,” said HENSOLDT CEO Oliver Dörre. “A number of radars have been protecting Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression. We are proud to be supplying further systems. The radars are extremely important for protecting citizens.”

The TRML-4D is based on the latest AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar technology. It ensures the rapid detection and tracking of around 1,500 targets within a radius of up to 250 km. It is capable of quickly and reliably detecting, tracking and classifying all types of air targets – cruise missiles, drones, aircraft and helicopters. The SPEXER radar family offers surveillance radars for various ranges for the automatic detection and classification of ground, sea and low-flying air targets. The SPEXER 2000 is part of the new Skyranger 30 cannon-based air defence vehicle from Rheinmetall. It is also used in the German cUAS Feldlager (ASUL), qualified air defence, and HoWiSM (high-energy laser for drone defence). HENSOLDT has decades of experience with radar systems for air defence and is actively driving forward the further development of key technologies in this field. In addition to the TRML-4D and SPEXER, the company’s portfolio includes the Twinvis passive radar and radars for securing ship and air traffic. Both the TRML-4D and the SPEXER are part of the ‘Near and Very Short Range Air Defence System’ NNbS ordered by the German Armed Forces. (Source: ASD Network)

25 Jul 25. Zelenskiy says Ukraine has secured funds for three Patriot systems, looking to finance seven more. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy looks on during a visit to a military training area to find out about the training of Ukrainian soldiers on the Patriot missile system, at an undisclosed location in Germany. Ukraine has received confirmation from partners that they will provide funding for three Patriot missile defence systems and discussions are underway to finance seven more, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Thursday.

“I have officially received confirmation from Germany for two systems, and from Norway for one. We are currently working with Dutch partners,” he told reporters.

President Donald Trump announced earlier this month that bns of dollars of U.S. weapons would go to Ukraine, including Patriot missiles. This set off negotiations around which partners could contribute to the weapons purchasing scheme – a process that will determine the support Ukraine receives. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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31 Jul 25. Senate panel OKs plans for $852 bn in defense spending next year.  Senate appropriators advanced plans for roughly $852 bn in defense funding next fiscal year, a significant boost over White House goals and House lawmakers’ outlines for military spending in 2026. The appropriations measure advanced out of the Senate Appropriations Committee by a bipartisan 26-3 vote, with both Republican and Democratic leaders praising the plan as meeting the emerging needs of the armed forces.

“This bill addresses major funding gaps across the board,” said Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, chairwoman of the panel. “It invests in ship building … it expands critical munitions production, including air and missile defense interceptors, long range missiles and next generation hypersonic weapons. It funds drone and counter drone technologies, which are increasingly changing the nature of the battlefield. Finally, the bill invests in our most precious asset, the men and women of our armed forces. It shows our continuing commitment to their readiness, well being and mission success.”

The bill includes plans for a 3.8% pay raise for troops next January and an increase in overall military end strength in 2026, similar to plans adopted by House lawmakers earlier in July. But the measure also includes a 2% increase in base defense spending next fiscal year, about $20 bn above House approved spending levels and the White House’s request for defense spending. The White House for months has advocated for a generally flat defense budget next year coupled with about $150 bn in one-time defense spending approved in a budget reconciliation measure earlier this summer. Democratic lawmakers have objected to that strategy, saying it undermines oversight and long-term planning. Republicans on the committee backed the reconciliation measure but also expressed concern over the reliance on one-time funding for critical defense programming.

“I think not only the prior administration, but this administration as well, have underestimated the level of challenge that we have in defense,” said Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., chairman of the appropriations committee’s defense panel. “You’ve got authoritarian regimes coordinating with each other in North Korea, in Russia, Chinese and Iranian proxies. And one thing they have in common is that they hate us.”

Whether the plussed-up defense budget plan will survive congressional negotiations is unclear. The House has already recessed until September, and the Senate is expected to leave town at the end of this week. When both chambers return, they’ll have to approve funding for all federal spending past Sept. 30, either through a full-year appropriations package or a short-term budget extension. If neither is approved, the country could face a partial government shutdown starting Oct. 1, shuttering a host of federal offices and pausing some military paychecks. (Source: Defense News)

31 Jul 25.  Use of military for immigration enforcement will raise supervision quality, domestic unrest risks. On 30 July, the Trump administration authorised the deployment of National Guard units at immigration facilities, marking an escalation in the use of the military as part of President Donald Trump’s immigration crackdown. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) informed field offices that the National Guard would assist with ‘alien processing’. The troops will be deployed in 20 states with Republican governors, including Florida, Louisiana and Texas. The Constitution limits the use of the military for civilian law enforcement, though state governments maintain authority to keep order within their borders. Also on 30 July, 12 Democratic lawmakers sued the Trump administration for blocking their access to migrant detention facilities. These developments underscore increasing supervision quality risks and public concern over the use of the military on domestic soil. We assess that the allocation of personnel towards detention processing signals that enforcement and deportation raids will increase in frequency in the near term. Such operations are most likely to occur in Democrat-led cities with high migrant populations, raising domestic unrest risks. (Source: Sibylline)

25 Jul 25. Risky companies fall through the cracks as US speed up defence procurement. The procurement database provides little visibility into where materials and parts are manufactured and sourced. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has warned against dependence on ambiguously sourced materials and parts from foreign suppliers. While the public spending watchdog acknowledged that the government has implemented measures to increase supply chain visibility in defence, the GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DoD) coordinate these efforts in a report published on 24 July 2025. This geostrategic vulnerability comes at a time when the current administration is overhauling the defence apparatus in order to hasten the acquisition of lethal weapon systems. With a mandate to demolish all bureaucratic impediments, the GAO’s call for additional structures – including a new office – to increase visibility of the supply chain will doubtless go unheeded by the US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, whose doctrine contradicts these recommendations in practice. Nonetheless, the GAO discovered that the primary government-wide database for procurement – the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) – contains summary level contract information on goods. There is limited information about the countries of origin for these goods. Typically, the system does not explore the contribution of subcontractors, for example.

“These efforts are uncoordinated and limited in scope and provide little insight into the vast majority of suppliers, including those that provide raw materials and parts,” the independent reviewer found.

Contesting the figures

It is worth noting that the GAO report does not explicitly point to any specific foreign suppliers as a risk to US national security and defence but instead emphasises the risks already seeping into defence procurement. The GAO pointed to the F-35 Lightning II programme in which the FPDS considers the US as the country of origin for 114 out of 115 contracts related to the far-reaching fifth generation combat aircraft programme in fiscal years (FY) 2020 to 2024. In reality, F-35 is a global product behind which there are more than 290,000 jobs and 1,900 suppliers (1,000 of which are small businesses), spanning more than ten countries outside the US. The UK alone claims that approximately 15% of every F-35 jet is built in Britain. Furthermore, the DoD, through Lockheed Martin, found that magnets included on some F-35s originated from China, an adversary and military competitor whom the government considers a strategic rival on the world stage. In this backdrop, the US is also struggling to untangle an intricate web of military-civilian fusion. This is an underlying, predatory policy in China that will enhance the People’s Liberation Army by deriving innovation and knowledge from inside the US defence industrial base. Implausibly, FPDS even considers the US as the country of origin for approximately 96% of obligations for goods that the DoD procured between FY2020-24 based on dollar value. Likewise, according to GAO analysis, the FPDS identifies the US as the palce of manufacture and country of origin for nearly 100% electronic microcircuits worth $1.3bn in the same time period. However, DoD officials insist that 88% of the production and 98% of assembly, packaging, and testing of all microelectronics are performed overseas—primarily in Taiwan, South Korea, and China.

Burning bridges

“DoD recognizes that there are serious national security implications for not knowing where components of the goods it procures are manufactured,” the report accepts. “This potentially includes losing access to critical materials for weapon systems.”

Nevertheless, the current administration has take up a policy of protectionism to its own detriment. Since April, President Donald Trump has made negotiations on different levels of tariffs with countries around the world. Even the UK has come through scathed by a 10% tariff with some limited exceptions, such as Rolls Royce engines needed for various American defence platforms. Some companies have mitigated the impact of global tariffs by having a footprint in the United States industrial base. BAE Systems, a British-based prime, expects minimal impact because it is embedded within the defence procurement system. Likewise, the tactless diplomacy of the current administration, with threats to annex Canada and Greenland, will only impede US efforts to strengthen its defence supply chain. There are numerous critical minerals sourced responsibly from countries such as Canada, for example, including materials such as tungsten, a metal used for its hardness and heat resistance. (Source: army-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

www.exensor.com

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01 Aug 25. Chancellor backs jobs boost in Scottish defence and energy sectors. Chancellor Rachel Reeves will outline how the Spending Review will give Scotland a jobs boost, as she visits RAF Lossiemouth and St Fergus Gas Plant today (1 August).

• 18,000 North Sea jobs can be safeguarded through a £200m investment in the Aberdeen Acorn energy project whilst creating 15,000 new ones in Scotland’s clean energy transformation.
• Increase in defence spending will see more jobs added to the 26,100 skilled Scottish jobs already supported by UK Government defence investment, and three new E-7 Wedgetail aircraft will see even more jobs created by Boeing at RAF Lossiemouth.
• Defence and clean energy commitments, part of the UK Government’s Plan for Change, will provide jobs and build thriving communities from Aberdeen to the Clyde.

The UK Government is investing in defence and clean energy to protect existing jobs and create thousands more, while keep the UK secure. Increasing defence spending to 2.6%, could lead to around 0.3% higher GDP in the long run, equivalent to around £11 bn of GDP in today’s money, according to government estimates. RAF Lossiemouth shows how investment in defence delivers for ordinary families. The Moray base has undergone a huge transformation in recent years and military personnel and civilian workers now work together keep our fighter jets and sub-hunting aircraft in the air.  The addition of three new E-7 Wedgetail aircraft to the RAF’s fleet will see even more jobs created by Boeing at the base, where the Chancellor will meet with some of the over 200 Boeing teammates who work alongside RAF personnel.

Chancellor, Rachel Reeves said: “We’re seizing the huge potential and opportunities that Scotland has on offer. Whether it’s in defence to keep the UK safe, or clean energy to power all corners of the country, this government is backing Scotland with bns of pounds of investment to grow the economy and create jobs.”

Scottish Secretary, Ian Murray said: “The UK Government is investing in defence to ensure Britain’s security and deter our adversaries and drive economic growth.

This investment is a massive jobs opportunity for Scotland – this ‘defence dividend’ is good news for Scotland, where it will help create skilled jobs, drive economic growth and help tackle the critical skills gaps facing the country in sectors such as nuclear, construction, maritime and project management. The Spending Review also saw investments that will make Scotland the home of the UK’s clean energy revolution. While Acorn is still subject to final investment decision, this £200m is just the beginning to this government’s commitment to investing in Scotland and has the potential to safeguard 18,000 North Sea jobs whilst creating 15,000 new ones in Scotland’s clean energy transformation.

Great British Energy will also be headquartered in Aberdeen, to drive clean power generation across the UK. Boosting homegrown energy will also make the UK more secure.”

The Chancellor’s visit comes as defence spending rises to 2.6% of GDP and figures from 23/24 reveal that MOD spend maintains 26,100 skilled jobs across Scotland. The Spending Review also committed £250 m to secure the future of HMNB Clyde – the first stage of a multi-decade, multi-bn renewal project and all three Clyde shipyards are currently fulfilling contracts for the Royal Navy.

Further information:

• The Spending Review delivered a record settlement for Scottish public services, with the Scottish Government’s largest settlement, in real terms, since devolution in 1998. Scottish Government’s settlement is growing in real terms between 2024-25 and 2028-29. This translates into an average of £50.9bn per year between 2026-27 and 2028-29.

Maria Laine, President United Kingdom, Ireland & Nordic region, Boeing, said: “Boeing has a long-standing presence in Scotland including at RAF Lossiemouth, the home to the UK’s P-8 Poseidon fleet and where the E-7 Wedgetail will be based when it enters service. As a key partner of the UK Armed Forces, Boeing welcomes the defence spending increase and has seen first-hand how defence infrastructure investments, such as the £100 m Atlantic Building and new E-7 facilities at RAF Lossiemouth, can deliver for local jobs, suppliers and UK national security.”

Michelle Ferguson, Director, CBI Scotland, said: “Scotland’s energy and defence sectors are vital to our economy, driving investment and supporting thousands of skilled jobs. The Chancellor’s announcement of £200 m for the Acorn energy project is very encouraging, but businesses are eager for final approval to unlock its full potential and secure North Sea jobs. Increased defence spending will further boost Scotland’s skilled workforce and create growth opportunities across key supply-chain. Close collaboration between the Scottish and UK governments will be essential to fully realise these benefits, driving forward national security and Scotland’s transition to a resilient, low-carbon economy.”

Mark Sommerfeld, UK Director of the Carbon Capture and Storage Association, said: “The Chancellor’s visit to Acorn further highlights the importance of CCUS in securing the future of our foundational industries and delivering a secure low carbon power system – both in Scotland and across the UK. The Government’s commitment to CCUS means that thousands of skilled jobs will be protected, with thousands more created across our industrial heartlands – delivering economic growth and clean power.

To maintain global leadership in CCUS and realise the full benefits for our industrial communities, we need to see clear deployment pathways for both Acorn and Viking CCS, as well as other projects developing at pace across the UK. By doing so, the Government can deliver on its economic growth mission and climate goals.”

Katy Heidenreich, Offshore Energies UK Supply Chain and People Director said: “We share the Chancellor’s commitment to Scotland’s energy future. Our industry plays a vital role in delivering jobs, growth, and energy security through the production of homegrown energy.

Government support for projects like Acorn is crucial. The UK Government has committed £200 m in development funding to Acorn — Scotland’s flagship carbon capture and storage initiative — marking a major milestone in advancing the country’s decarbonisation strategy. The project is expected to support around 15,000 jobs during peak construction and repurpose 175 miles of pipeline infrastructure to transport CO₂ from central Scotland to storage. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

31 Jul 25. German armed forces see 28% surge in recruits in NATO defence boost. Germany’s armed forces reported a 28% surge in soldier recruits from January to late July, compared with the same period last year, bolstering plans to boost NATO defences in response to what it sees as an increased threat from Russia. The Defence Ministry said on Thursday more than 13,700 people had joined the Bundeswehr – the army, air force, navy and other forces – in that period, in what it said was the steepest rise for years. Germany wants to have 260,000 active soldiers by the 2030s, from 183,000 now, to meet new NATO force targets and strengthen its defences – part of a planned surge in military spending underpinned by this year’s decision to loosen budget constraints. Interest in joining the armed forces also rose, with initial consultations rising by 11% and applications by 8%, while civilian sector applications jumped by 31%, the ministry said. (Source: Reuters)

31 Jul 25. Portugal seeks to participate in EU’s SAFE defence funding mechanism. The Portuguese Ministry of National Defence (MND) on 29 July formally expressed interest in joining SAFE (Security Action for Europe), the European Commission’s (EC’s) financial instrument intended to help European Union (EU) member states increase their investment in common defence procurement and strengthen the European defence industrial base (DIB). SAFE is part of the EC’s Readiness 2030 plan, presented in March 2025, to ramp up defence investment, and will provide up to EUR150bn (USD171bn) in long-maturity loans raised on capital markets and backed by the EU budget for EU countries that ask for financial assistance for “urgent and large-scale procurement efforts”, according to the EC. Portugal was one of 18 EU member states that expressed interest in obtaining loans through the SAFE mechanism, totalling at least EUR127 bn in potential defence procurements, Andrius Kubilius, commissioner for defence and space, said in an EC statement on 30 July. The financial assistance takes the form of loans with terms of up to 45 years, grace periods of up to 10 years, the possibility of pre-financing of up to 15%, and value-added tax (VAT) exemption on concluded contracts, the MND said on 29 July. The Portuguese government created a SAFE Working Group to establish the technical development of its projects and prepare a formal request for financial assistance by 30 November, according to the MND. This request will be accompanied by a detailed investment plan for the European DIB, with a special focus on integrating the Portuguese DIB into future value chains promoted by projects financed through the SAFE instrument, the MND added. (Source: Janes)

24 Jul 25. Ireland raise defence spending to reach €1.7bn by 2030. Around 75% of telecom cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or near Ireland’s exclusive economic zone. Ireland will raise defence spending to €1.7bn ($2bn) by 2030 in line with new plans laid out in the National Development Plan which will invest €275bn across government. The funding will increase by €600m, or 55% on the previous baseline figure of €1.1bn. On the periphery of Europe, the nation has consistently spent the least on defence as a percentage of its gross domestic product (typically ranging between 0.2 and 0.3%) in the European Union. In this backdrop, the Irish Defence Forces must account for enduring capability gaps which lead to their inability to credibly deter let alone control their own waters. Nevertheless, the Irish Defence Forces are not without any capabilities. Just over a year ago, the Irish Air Corps inducted two Airbus C295 maritime patrol aircraft to tackle illegal fishing and organised crime. However, due to the rise of malign Russian activity beneath the surface of the sea, Ireland’s interests have grown extensively – at least indirectly. The Irish Naval Service appear to have recognised this with a multi-m euro contract for the acquisition of several towed array sonar systems from Thales in June 2025 to kit out its modest fleet of four offshore patrol vessels, two large patrol vessels, and two inshore patrol vessels. This capability will allow Ireland “to build a picture of our subsea, thus contributing to the important task of protecting our critical underwater infrastructure,” Harris said at the time. “This is one of many strands of work being progressed to address the threats in our maritime domain”. While the Department of Defence remain tight-lipped about its priority defence programmes it would be reasonable to suppose that Ireland may invest its new funds in areas of defence related to infrastructure. Although Ireland is not a Nato member, one notable takeaway from the alliance summit in the Hague in June 2025, was that defence spending now encompasses more than just military effects but the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. In fact, 1.5% of the 5% defence spending target agreed upon by allies is based on infrastructure. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already brought this new shift in perspective in the last three-and-a-half years. The Irish government have even recently contributed €100m in humanitarian and non-lethal assistance to the Ukraine earlier in July. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s First Deputy Minister of Defence also emphasised the critical military needs for Ukraine’s defence and protection; this is something, perhaps, the Irish Department of Defence must consider to be able to respond to transgressions whatever form they may take. (Source: army-technology.com)

29 Jul 25. US grants Poland $4bn loan guarantee for defence equipment. The FMF loan bolsters the national security of the US by enabling allies such as Poland to procure defence systems manufactured in the US. The US State Department announced a $4bn (14.9bn zlotys) foreign military financing loan guarantee for Poland to procure military equipment and advanced technologies for the Polish Army. This financial backing highlights Poland’s commitment to strengthen its defence capabilities and contributing to Nato’s collective security efforts. Poland Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said on X: “This will build the deterrence and strength of Poland, Europe, and Nato. We continue our modernisation path, based on domestic industry and strong cooperation with allies.” Poland has embarked on a military modernisation initiative since 2023. This includes the acquisitions of American-made defence systems such as Apache helicopters, airspace and surface radar reconnaissance system, HIMARS rocket systems, and Patriot missile defence units.

US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said in a press statement: “Today’s announcement reaffirms the United States’ commitment to strong bilateral partnerships based on mutual respect, shared investment, and strategic priorities. Working together, the United States and Poland are securing the future of Nato, deterring aggression, and standing firm for freedom, sovereignty, and peace in Europe.”

The FMF loan bolsters the national security of the US by enabling allies such as Poland to procure defence systems manufactured in the US. This, in turn, sustains employment in states like Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas, while fostering industry growth and technological advancement. The programme advocates for a robust defence posture, enabling US allies to maintain their own security with dependable systems produced by the world’s leading defence manufacturers, said the spokesperson. According to GlobalData report, Poland’s defence budget is $36.4bn for 2024. The nation’s defence spending is projected to expand with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) exceeding 4% from 2025 to 2029. In June 2025, Poland Deputy Minister of National Defence Paweł Bejda held talks with US defence contractor RTX CEO to explore strategic opportunities for collaboration. A primary focus of their discussions was the potential initiation of cable harness production for the Patriot missile system in Poland. (Source: army-technology.com)

25 Jul 25. Germany dispel doubt over commitment to FCAS, MGCS. The German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius maintained that European countries remain committed to several next generation defence projects, notably the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). During a visit from his French counterpart, Sébastian Lecornu, to Osnabrück, Pistorius’ hometown, after visiting Rheinmetall’s site in Unterlüß.

“We must move Europe forward to make it more secure,” Pistorius said, after the visit this week. This assurance comes at a time when certain projects are facing hurdles.

FCAS trouble

In particular, FCAS – in which France, Germany, and Spain work together to develop a combat aerial system-of-systems – face internal disputes among leading contractors. During the Paris Air Show in June 2025, Jean-Brice Dumont, head of air power at Airbus Defence and Space, briefly referred to contention over leadership with the French contractor, Dassault.

“There are naturally roles for all of us in the forum”, he said, adding that Airbus will “demonstrate our leading contribution”.

FCAS and other such projects represent Franco-German cooperation and partnership. “They do not represent national egoism,” hinted a release issued by the German Ministry of Defence.

Dumont also addressed “difficulties in execution” right now, at “the beginning of the end” of Phase 1B, in developing and testing demonstrators. We have to accelerate… because there’s war everywhere. “We have to consider that some areas of this major programme have to deliver products earlier” to meet the 2040 deadline.

MGCS confusion

Rheinmetall, together with other German-French industrial partners, is playing an important role in the development of innovative technologies for the MGCS. The project is also scheduled to launch in 2040. Pistorius similarly emphasised that everyone involved remains committed to the programme’s ambition. However, there is a lack of clarity, if not outright duplication, between MGCS and the more recent MARTE tank development programme. Both projects appear to be running side by side, with both led by Rheinmetall (alongside KNDS for MARTE). Moreover, it is unclear whether MGCS will develop a main battle tank (MBTs) or an armoured vehicle. Although, Hensoldt, a German defence supplier, has identified MGCS as a key strategic programme intended to develop a successor to the Leopard 2 and Leclerc MBTs, a gap that MARTE claims to fill. Critically, this lack of clarity may obstruct fiscal commitments in Europe, leading to an unclear vision for the future force structure in Europe. (Source: army-technology.com)

30 Jul 25. EU members eye €127bn in loans for defense procurement. European Union member states expressed interest in at least €127 bn ($146 bn) in EU-backed loans to pay for defense procurement, the bloc’s executive arm said on Wednesday. Eighteen countries including Italy, Poland, Spain and France expressed interest in accessing the loans under the Security Action for Europe financial instrument, or SAFE, the European Commission said in a statement. SAFE is part of EU plans to ramp up defense investment announced in March, and will provide up to €150 bn in “competitively priced,” long-maturity loans to EU countries that ask for financial assistance to invest in defense capabilities, according to the Commission.

“Delighted to see big interest of EU member states in SAFE loans,” EU Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius said in a social media post. “This is a major step towards achieving our defense goals quickly and decisively.”

The Commission said the early indication of interest will allow it to assess demand and prepare for raising funds on the capital markets. The deadline for formal submission of requests and the submission of national defense investment plans is end-November.

The loans seek to finance “urgent and large-scale procurement efforts,” according to the Commission. Projects will be based on common procurement, involving at least one member state that benefits from SAFE, together with another member state, Ukraine or the EEA-EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

“However, in light of current geopolitical realities, SAFE will also temporarily support procurements by individual member states to ensure timely delivery of critical assets,” the commission said.

Only EU countries can obtain SAFE loans, though countries that have signed security and defense partnerships with the EU can participate in common procurement, including the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, South Korea and Japan. Under the eligibility conditions for SAFE loans, procurement contracts have to ensure that no more than 35% of component costs comes from outside the EU, Ukraine or EEA-EFTA countries. For equipment including air and missile defense systems, maritime surface and underwater capabilities and strategic enablers such as air-to-air refueling, eligibility conditions for procurement contracts are more strict, including the ability for contractors to modify the equipment if necessary, without any non-EU restrictions. (Source: Defense News)

28 Jul 25. Rheinmetall expands local production in Romania and strengthens the Romanian defence industry – Focus on ammunition and Lynx infantry fighting vehicle. Rheinmetall has founded a comprehensive local production network in Romania, which includes both its own companies in the country and new partnerships with Romanian companies. The technology corporation is thereby expanding both, its presence in Romania and its status as a leading manufacturer and service provider for the Romanian armed forces. The provision of advanced turnkey solutions for the production of infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition and powder, as well as state-of-the-art training services, ought to strengthen the Romanian defence industry in the long term. The network includes Rheinmetall Automecanica, further local Rheinmetall activities as well as a new centre of excellence for training and further education. A cornerstone of Rheinmetall’s localisation efforts is the cooperation with key Romanian companies, including among others Uzina Automecanica Moreni, Interactive Software SRL and MarcTel-SIT. These partnerships will promote local procurement and assembly processes, and will foster the integration of Romanian expertise into the production chain. The initiative focuses on local production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle at Rheinmetall Automecanica, with a robust supply chain and a reduced dependency on external suppliers. Rheinmetall Munitions Romania will manufacture medium-calibre ammunition for infantry fighting vehicles and air defence, while Victoria Explosive Powder Factory will produce the propellants, for which Rheinmetall is providing expertise and technology for a propylene plant. Local service facilities will be responsible for the ongoing maintenance and support for military equipment, thus always ensuring operational readiness. The Rheinmetall Excellence Centre in Romania is to ensure the transfer of critical know-how to the local workforce. Equipped with cutting-edge simulators and comprehensive training programmes, the centre will provide Romanian employees with practical experience and technical expertise in the operation, maintenance and development of advanced defence technologies, particularly in relation to the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle. Rheinmetall’s investment in local production will make a significant contribution to the Romanian economy by creating hundreds of jobs in various sectors, including manufacturing, engineering and technical services. Cooperation with Romanian companies will also boost local supply chains, create additional business opportunities and promote industrial growth. With this strategic initiative, Rheinmetall Automecanica is not only improving Romania’s defence capabilities, but also laying the foundation for a sustainable and independent defence industry. By integrating advanced technologies and training, Rheinmetall is ensuring the future viability of Romania’s defence sector while further expanding its own global production network.

25 Jul 25. Baltic States Pledge to Meet NATO’s 5% GDP Military Target. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth held an enhanced honor cordon and quadrilateral meeting today at the Pentagon, welcoming Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur, Latvian Defense Minister Andris Sprūds and Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė.  During the meeting, the Baltic states pledged to meet the target of 5% of their gross domestic product for defense spending, which Hegseth said serves as a reminder to the entire NATO alliance of its responsibilities. The defense secretary thanked his counterparts from the Baltic states for their friendship, support and respect for U.S. troops, as well as their leadership by example.

“The United States remains fully committed to NATO, and together, we’re achieving peace through strength in Europe by setting the conditions for negotiated lasting peace in Ukraine, establishing sustainable deterrence and increasing ally capabilities and interoperability,” he said.

The United States has numerous obligations around the world, including defending the homeland and deterring war in the Indo-Pacific region, Hegseth said, adding that this is why European investment in its own conventional defense is more important than ever.

“Your efforts to modernize and invest in new military capabilities are critical to deterring attacks and building readiness,” he said.

The secretary also thanked the defense ministers for hosting multinational training exercises, which bolster collective readiness.

“I’m also glad that our deployed HIMARS have been able to help with your troops on training ahead of receiving your own HIMARS equipment,” he said, referring to the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.

“This cooperation accelerates our ability to defend countries with capable systems,” Hegseth added.

Pevkur said the meeting today was a testimony to the strong and trusted partnership between the Baltic states and the United States.

“We are allies who are willing to strengthen our common defense, and we are more than determined to continue this very close cooperation. We stand up for one another, and we defend each other when it’s needed. This is what brotherhood-in-arms truly means,” he said.

Sprūds agreed with his Estonian counterpart, adding that “In these challenging times, it is important that we are becoming much more efficient and lethal.”

The United States plays a key role in NATO’s Article 5, he said, which established the principle of collective defense.

Šakalienė said, “Every one — every single one — of United States troops is one of our own in Lithuania, and we do deeply care about them. We do deeply care about our friendship, and we consider them family.”

She also urged other NATO nations to follow the lead of the Baltic states in increasing their defense investment to meet the 5% of GDP military spending target. Lithuania, she said, has invested in U.S.-made systems, including HIMARS, Black Hawk helicopters, Switchblade loitering munitions, Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and Javelin missiles. (Source: U.S. DoD)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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25 Jul 25. Thailand, Cambodia exchange heavy artillery fire as fighting rages for second day.

• Summary
• Thailand says Cambodia using rocket systems
• U.S., ASEAN chair call for ceasefire
• Death toll in Thailand rises to 15
• Cambodian provincial official says 1 civilian killed

Thailand and Cambodia exchanged heavy artillery fire on Friday as their worst fighting in more than a decade stretched for a second day, despite calls from the region and beyond for an immediate ceasefire in an escalating border conflict that has killed at least 16 people. Thailand’s military reported clashes from before dawn in the Ubon Ratchathani and Surin provinces and said Cambodia had used artillery and Russian-made BM-21 rocket systems. Authorities said 100,000 people had been evacuated from conflict areas on the Thai side. (Source: Reuters)

24 Jul 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Security risks at border are currently elevated following major clashes. Earlier on 24 July, a shooting incident between Cambodian and Thai troops occurred near the disputed Ta Moan Thom temple along the shared border. Both sides have accused the other of shooting first. The incident comes after a landmine injured a Thai soldier along the border on 23 July, leading Thailand to recall its ambassador from Cambodia and to expel Cambodia’s emissary. Following the cross-border clash on 24 July, Thai F-16 fighter jets bombed military targets in Oddar Meanchey province (Cambodia), while Cambodia fired rockets and artillery shells into Thailand. Several civilian casualties have been reported in both countries. This marks a serious escalation in bilateral tensions, which have been heightened since a Cambodian soldier died during a cross-border clash in May (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 July 2025). Security risks along the border will remain elevated in the immediate term, particularly in Preah Vihear province (Cambodia) and Si Sa Ket province (Thailand). We assess that further skirmishes are highly likely along the border in the coming days; there is also a realistic possibility of further airstrikes targeting entities in the vicinity of the border. (Source: Sibylline)

23 Jul 25. Ecuador: Deployment of 2,000 soldiers to Manabí province will mitigate attacks, armed clashes risks. On 19 July, the Ministry of National Defence deployed 2,000 soldiers to Manabí province following a sharp increase in violent crime; the authorities registered 15 homicides in 12 hours. The authorities have attributed the uptick in violence to a conflict between the Choneros and Lobos organised crime groups (OCGs). The violence reportedly began after the Choneros assassinated a local leader of the Lobos in Manta (Manabí), triggering a cycle of revenge killings between the OCGs. The initial attack by the Choneros was possibly a display of strength amid the extradition of the OCG’s leader, Adolfo Macías (alias ‘Fito’), to the US. According to the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, the new deployment will bolster the security forces’ presence in conflict zones, key highways and ports, as well as residential and commercial areas. We assess that the deployment will mitigate the risk of attacks and armed clashes in the near term. However, heightened security force presence on highways will likely increase stop-and-searches and supply chain disruption. Heightened domestic military deployments underscore increasing risks pertaining to the militarisation of the security forces. (Source: Sibylline)

23 Jul 25. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Peace treaty will highly likely sustain societal polarisation in Armenia. New polling data released on 21 July by the International Republican Institute (IRI) revealed that 47% of Armenians support the signing of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, with 40% against it. Armenians who oppose its signing cited concerns regarding the ceding of territory to Azerbaijan, a lack of trust, perceptions that Baku dictated the terms of the agreement and the risk of renewed conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan finalised the terms of the peace treaty in March, though they have yet to sign it, as Baku has made additional demands for this to happen (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 March 2025). The polling reflects that the issue of signing the peace treaty will highly likely continue to drive polarisation within Armenian society over the medium-to-long term. We assess that these divisions (irrespective of whether the two sides eventually sign a peace treaty) will also likely elevate government stability and domestic unrest risks, specifically around the June 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections. (Source: Sibylline)

22 Jul 25. Pakistan: Drone use by militants underscores evolving security risks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On 22 July, reports emerged that militants have started using drones to target the security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The drones are reportedly powered by four rotors, which allow for vertical take-off and landing and enable the assets to use bombs and explosive devices against the security forces. Earlier in July, two quadcopters used by militants targeted a police station in Bannu district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), killing a woman and three children in a nearby house. At least eight such drone attacks have targeted the police in the past two and a half months in Bannu. While Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has not claimed responsibility for these drone attacks, it has reportedly stated that it is trying to acquire such technology. We assess that the use of drones will significantly increase the security risks in border regions, particularly amid the deteriorating security environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (as well as the underfunded and over-stretched provincial police force). Consequently, this will increase safety risks for bystanders, particularly in the vicinity of police stations and security facilities. (Source: Sibylline)

22 Jul 25. China, Russia, Terrorist Networks Destabilizing Africa. Africa, strategically positioned between the Atlantic Ocean and Indo-Pacific region, is increasingly at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism, said Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, during a nomination hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services today.  Anderson is being considered for promotion to general and commander of U.S. Africa Command.

“China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic influence to greater military and information operations. Russia’s actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to U.S. interests. Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces, posing a direct threat to our safety and security,” he said.

The general stated that China is investing in ports globally, adding, “I think it should be concerning to us, not only that they could potentially use those as dual-use military ports, but what access can they deny U.S. forces or U.S. commerce as necessary in time of conflict.”    Anderson noted that it would be especially concerning to national security if Chinese ports were opened on the Atlantic side of Africa, and it’s critical that the United States understands the national security vulnerabilities that this development may pose.   China is also expanding its information operations and communist propaganda across the African continent, he said, and they are increasing their military-to-military engagement, which Anderson described as “troubling.”  The United States can engage in the information domain to highlight some of these malign activities, he said, adding that small American investments in Africa will produce great returns. For example, the State Partnership Program can create long-term relationships, he said.  Navy Vice Adm. Frank M. Bradley, who testified to be promoted to admiral and become commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, said that on a strategic landscape where adversaries and competitors challenge the rules-based international order, Socom provides the agility, precision and nuance needed to confront and disrupt these threats and competition.

“Should the need arise, we are also ready to integrate into the joint force to respond to crisis and engage in high-end conflict, where the precise delivery of violence will be critical to shaping success on the battlefield,” the admiral said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

22 Jul 25. India’s cumulative defense spending to reach $543.1bn during 2026-30, driven by need for modernization, forecasts GlobalData. India has embarked on a comprehensive and multi-dimensional defense modernization initiative, driven by the need to enhance its qualitative edge over Pakistan and address capability gaps exposed during the recent Operation Sindoor, in which India targeted terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan. The operational challenges faced by the Indian military were further exacerbated by China’s alleged support for Pakistan in the form of military hardware, surveillance, and logistics during India’s operation. Against this backdrop, the country’s cumulative defense spending to reach $543.1bn during 2026-30 forecasts GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company. GlobalData’s latest report, “India Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2025-30,” reveals that of the projected India’s defense spending, the acquisition budget is estimated to account for approximately 31%. Additionally, in response to the need to replenish munitions expended during Operation Sindoor, the Indian government has sanctioned emergency funding of $6 bn (INR 500 bn). This funding is expected to be allocated for the urgent procurement of weapon systems, including ammunition, air defense systems, surveillance systems, missiles, and loitering munitions, among others. During the operation, the Indian Air Force reportedly suffered combat losses, compelling the country’s policymakers to reassess its military preparedness levels. The urgency to swiftly overcome these vulnerabilities, particularly in light of a potential two-front war with its hostile neighbors, has led India to significantly increase defense modernization funding. Abhijit Apsingikar, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “The persistent threat of cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistan has compelled India to take comprehensive measures to mitigate this risk. There will likely be an emphasis on acquiring relatively smaller yet more survivable surveillance platforms, and the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is expected to expand its initial order for six Netra Mk-1A airborne early warning and control (AEWC) aircraft and expedite their induction for wider deployment.

“The MoD is also anticipated to acquire another variant of this aircraft, namely the Netra Mk-2, over the next few years, which will feature a larger radar for conducting surveillance over a longer range. Similarly, the Indian government is likely to approve the acquisition of a dedicated electronic warfare aircraft capable of performing signals intelligence and communications intelligence roles. The expedited development of long-range stand-off missiles and munitions, particularly air-to-air missiles, is expected to be prioritized, with projects like the Astra MK-III receiving specific attention.”

Furthermore, the Indian MoD is in the process of approving a follow-on order for an additional 97 Tejas Mk-1A multirole fighter aircraft, in addition to the 83 already ordered in 2021. The MoD is also anticipated to accelerate the Super Sukhoi modernization program, with upgraded fighters receiving new GaN AESA radars, enhanced engines, new decoys, and stand-off jammers. (Source: GlobalData)

21 Jul 25. Hegseth, Philippine President Meet to Advance Deterrence in Indo-Pacific. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth hosted Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the Pentagon today, where the two leaders reaffirmed their commitments to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and discussed shared security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as recent advances in the long-standing U.S.-Philippines alliance.

“Our storied alliance has never been stronger or more essential than it is today,” Hegseth said. “Together, we remain committed to the mutual defense treaty. And this pact extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.”

The United States has identified the Asia-Pacific region as its priority theater, and Hegseth said the U.S. would work with the Philippines and other like-minded nations there to advance President Donald J. Trump’s peace through strength agenda.

“The United States is committed to achieving peace through strength, and willing to work with all nations who share this desire in the region,” he said. “We do not seek confrontation, but we are and will be ready and resolute.”

The Philippines has been a U.S. ally for seven decades now, and its position in the South China Sea makes it an ideal partner in the region.

“We’re proud to support our mutual economic vitality, including your efforts to … modernize your armed forces and collective defense,” Hegseth told Marcos. “We’ve made rapid progress enhancing real deterrence and upholding a free and open Asia-Pacific.”

The secretary noted the success of the most recent iteration of the Balikatan military exercise, which involved the Philippines, the U.S. and more than 20 other nations.

“We’ve made rapid progress enhancing real deterrence and upholding a free and open Asia-Pacific through deepening our interoperability and expanding joint exercises, including the largest and most sophisticated exercise — Balikatan — ever conducted,” he said.

Balikatan 2025, conducted April 21-May 9, was the 40th iteration of the annual exercise and involved more than 14,000 participants. The exercise assessed readiness across multiple domains, including air, land, sea, cyber, information and space.

But Hegseth noted that the U.S. and the Philippines are doing even more together.

“We’re also deploying new cutting-edge missiles and … unmanned systems, and revitalizing our defense industrial bases,” he said. “Together, we must forge a strong shield of real deterrence for peace, ensuring the long-term security and prosperity for our nations.”

The recent Balikatan exercise, Marcos said, has proven valuable, as evidenced by feedback from personnel within the Philippines military.

“When I see the officers who were involved, and I speak to the men and women who were involved, they say it was extremely useful,” Marcos said. “Essentially, we’ve achieved our purpose, because they say they have learned a lot about how to operate together — not only with American forces — but also with … forces around the Asia-Pacific and down to Australia and even to Canada and all of the other countries that have been involved.”

Marcos stated that he is pleased with how the U.S. and the Philippines are working together to modernize the Philippine military.

“I believe that our alliance … the United States and the Philippines, in terms of preserving the peace in terms of preserving the stability of the South China Sea,” he said. “But I would even go as far as to say in the entire Indo-Pacific region. And we are always very, very happy to continue to strengthen that relationship.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

18 Jul 25. Congo (DRC): Peace declaration is unlikely to mitigate critical security risks. On 19 July, the Congolese government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels signed a Qatar-brokered declaration of principles aimed at ending the conflict in eastern Congo (DRC), setting an 18 August deadline to finalise the peace agreement. The declaration follows a prior US-brokered agreement between the Congolese and Rwandan governments. However, the declaration of principles does not address several contentious issues, including the conditions for the M23’s withdrawal from conquered territory. The M23 (with enduring clandestine Rwandan support) remains highly unlikely to withdraw from eastern DRC (and thereby forfeit control over the lucrative minerals trade) without substantial political concessions from the Congolese government (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 7 July 2025). The presence of the M23 in eastern DRC will also likely sustain the risk of armed conflict between the group and government-aligned local militia forces (known as Wazalendo). As such, we assess that the declaration is unlikely to moderate critical security and human rights risks in eastern DRC. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 25.

IRAN

• Although Iran announced plans to meet with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), restrictions to nuclear monitoring will likely sustain regional tensions and undermine prospects for substantial progress towards a nuclear deal with the US.
• Reports of explosions and fires impacting strategic and residential infrastructure in Iran will elevate the risk of the security forces increasing scrutiny over individuals suspected of maintaining links to Israel, particularly foreign nationals and ethno-religious minorities.
• Iran continues to pursue deeper co-operation and ties with Russia, which likely underscores Tehran’s broader efforts to bolster its defence capabilities and nuclear development programme.

ISRAEL

• Efforts to enforce conscription orders issued to ultra-Orthodox men will increase the risk of anti-conscription protests and unrest in the coming weeks, as well as associated travel disruption.
• Pro-ceasefire protests are likely to intensify gradually in the coming days as domestic pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases increases.
• A suspected car-ramming attack in central Israel has underscored elevated ethno-religious tensions and the sustained risk of low-capacity attacks targeting public transport infrastructure.
• Increasing condemnation of Israel’s operations in Gaza and humanitarian conditions therein will elevate compliance, regulatory and reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Israeli settler attacks continue in the West Bank, sustaining significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions and the risk of further violence.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely intensify its operations in the West Bank in the coming weeks following the arrest of a high-profile bomber.
• Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly progressed, though the withdrawal of Israel’s delegation will likely delay further progress.
• Increasingly critical food security risks in Gaza will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns and threats to staff, while also increasing the risk of pro-Palestine protests worldwide.

IRAN

• Although Iran announced plans to meet with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), restrictions to nuclear monitoring will likely sustain regional tensions and undermine prospects for substantial progress towards a nuclear deal with the US. On 23 July, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with a US media outlet that Iran is not currently engaging in uranium enrichment activity and re-iterated that Iran’s nuclear programme is for ‘uniquely peaceful purposes’. The statement came after Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated that Iran would engage in discussions with the IAEA on ‘a new modality’ on relations between the agency and Tehran in the coming weeks. The announcement also came several weeks after Iran suspended co-operation with the IAEA, which later withdrew its staff from Iran due to security concerns (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 July 2025). The announcement is highly unlikely to indicate that international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programme will resume in the short term. Rather, Iran will likely seek to limit IAEA monitors’ access to sites and records of nuclear activity, sustaining regional concerns regarding oversight of possible re-construction and re-development efforts following the Iran-Israel war. In the coming weeks, Iran will highly likely aim to leverage restrictions on IAEA access to nuclear sites to gain broader concessions in nuclear negotiations with the US and E3 (France, Germany and the UK). However, continued restrictions vis-à-vis IAEA monitoring capabilities will likely undermine international confidence in Iran’s commitments during any such negotiations, moderating the prospects for productive engagement and progress towards a comprehensive nuclear agreement in the coming weeks.
• Reports of explosions and fires impacting strategic and residential infrastructure in Iran will elevate the risk of the security forces increasing scrutiny over individuals suspected of maintaining links to Israel, particularly foreign nationals and ethno-religious minorities. On 23 July, the New York Times reported that Iranian officials believe that a recent series of unexplained blasts across the country resulted from Israeli acts of sabotage. Since the Iran-Israel ceasefire came into force on 24 June, Iranian media has reported numerous explosions and fires in and around strategic infrastructure nationwide, including the Abedan oil refinery (Khuzestan province), as well as airports in Karaj (PYK; Alborz province), Mashhad (MHD; Razavi Khorasan province), Tabriz (TBZ; East Azerbaijan province) and the capital Tehran (THR; Tehran province). Large fires and explosions have also been reported in several residential and commercial areas in Arak (Markhazi province), Aran, Isfahan (both Isfahan province), Dezful (Khuzestan), Gheshm Island (Hormozgan province), Karaj, Mashad, Sanandaj (Kurdistan province), Tabriz, Tehran and Qom (Qom province). Although the Iranian authorities have publicly attributed the explosions to gas leaks, refuse fires, unexploded ordinance and ageing infrastructure, there is a realistic possibility that several incidents resulted from some form of Israeli operations within Iran. Even so, neither Israel nor Iran have commented on the allegations, likely reflecting efforts to moderate conflict-escalation risks. Further explosions and fires are highly likely in the coming weeks; the Iranian security and police forces are highly likely to continue with their efforts to identify and detain suspected Israeli operatives. This will likely increase the risk of arbitrary arrests, particularly for foreign nationals, ethno-religious minorities and Western-linked NGO personnel. We assess that the authorities are highly liable to employ aggressive and abusive interrogation techniques, compounding broader human rights concerns for targeted individuals.
• Iran continues with its efforts to develop its aerospace programme, underscoring its increasing drive to improve its security force capacity. On 21 July, Iranian state media announced that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force had conducted a suborbital test of the Qased space launch vehicle (SLV). This platform has launched at least three military satellites since 2020. The move highly likely reflects Iran’s efforts to develop SLVs capable of launching additional military satellites to bolster its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities following significant shortcomings during the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2025). Additionally, the test highly likely reflects Iranian efforts to develop and test technology that could also facilitate the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Efforts to develop such a munition would almost certainly increase regional tensions, particularly with the EU, Israel and the US, especially given concerns that Iran will attempt to leverage its potential development of an ICBM to expedite the creation of a delivery system for a nuclear munition. Continued weapons development and testing activity will significantly increase the risk of further EU and US sanctions targeting Iranian entities, exacerbating compliance concerns for regionally engaged shipping, technology and engineering firms. Such activity will also increase the risk of further Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian military and nuclear facilities in the coming months (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 30 June 2025).
• Iran continues to pursue deeper co-operation and ties with Russia, which likely underscores Tehran’s broader efforts to bolster its defence capabilities and nuclear development programme. On 21 July, Iran’s conventional and IRGC naval forces launched an annual naval exercise with the Russian navy in the Caspian Sea. As Iran operates separate naval forces in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, the exercise is unlikely to represent broader efforts to expand Iranian-Russian co-operation in regional waters or Iranian efforts to bolster Tehran’s posture around the Strait of Hormuz (or to restrict vessel transit therein). Rather, the exercise underscores continued efforts to bolster general Iranian-Russian co-operation, particularly as Iran seeks to re-constitute its air defence and radar systems, which include several Russian S-300 missile interception systems (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 July 2025). More broadly, numerous Iranian officials have met with their Russian counterparts in recent days to discuss defence and nuclear co-operation. On 20 July, Ali Larijani (a senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Tehran’s nuclear and defence programmes, while Iranian representatives also participated in trilateral talks with Chinese and Russian officials on 22 July to discuss Iran’s upcoming nuclear negotiations with the E3 (France, Germany and the UK). Despite these efforts, we assess that Iran is unlikely to secure sufficient international support to prevent the re-implementation of UN sanctions if nuclear negotiations with the US fail to progress demonstrably in the coming months. Additionally, broader strategic, military and supply chain considerations will likely undermine efforts to repair and re-constitute Iran’s air defences rapidly, sustaining the Islamic Republic’s substantial vulnerability to the possible resumption of Israeli strikes (see above).

ISRAEL 

• Efforts to enforce conscription orders issued to ultra-Orthodox men will increase the risk of anti-conscription protests and unrest in the coming weeks, as well as associated travel disruption. On 22 July, the Israeli authorities arrested three ultra-Orthodox men for evading military conscription orders. The arrests triggered substantial unrest on 23 July; protests emerged in ultra-Orthodox population centres across Israel, including Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh and several neighbourhoods in Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district). Thousands of protesters blocked key highways, including the Coca-Cola Junction along Highway 4 and the Chords Bridge Junction along Highway 1 (which also serves as an entrance to Jerusalem). Protesters in Jerusalem smashed a car windscreen with a hammer. Increasing protest violence prompted clashes with the police, who also employed excessive force. The events highlight the elevated risks of unrest associated with the detention of conscription evaders within the ultra-Orthodox community, particularly those from the Jerusalem sect. These risks will remain elevated in the coming weeks, in turn exacerbating travel disruption risks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. There is a realistic possibility of further violent clashes between protesters and the police, sustaining bystanders’ exposure to localised unrest near protest hotspots.
• Pro-ceasefire protests are likely to intensify gradually in the coming days as domestic pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases increases. On 24 July, pro-ceasefire protesters gathered in Habima Square in Tel Aviv, triggering the closure of several streets and throughfares and resulting in travel disruption. Protests are likely to increase in frequency and size in the coming days; they are also increasingly likely to materialise on weekdays, particularly in Tel Aviv. Additionally, on 21 July, a motorcyclist assaulted a pro-ceasefire protester along Menachem Begin Road in Tel Aviv, underscoring the elevated risk of altercations in protest hotspots. Increasingly frequent protests and resultant travel disruption will increase the risk of altercations and clashes, particularly along highways. Furthermore, while protests are unlikely to escalate rapidly into violent unrest, the risk of clashes between protesters and counter-protesters will remain elevated in the coming days, sustaining threats to proximate bystanders.
• A suspected car-ramming attack in central Israel has underscored elevated ethno-religious tensions and the sustained risk of low-capacity attacks targeting public transport infrastructure. Earlier on 24 July, a car ran over several individuals at a bus station near Kfar Yona (Central district), injuring 11 (nine of whom are soldiers). Following the incident, the perpetrator drove away and subsequently abandoned the vehicle. A manhunt is underway at the time of writing; the security forces suspect the driver is an Arab-Israeli citizen who resides in the Triangle, a concentration of Arab-Israeli population centres adjacent to the Green Line (the Israel-West Bank border). The incident comes amid elevated ethno-religious tensions between Arab-Israeli residents of the area and the Israeli security forces (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 July 2025). In the coming hours and days, the authorities will likely adopt an elevated posture in the area, triggering moderate travel disruption. There is a realistic possibility of imitation attacks in the coming days, increasing the risk of car-ramming attacks targeting bus stations and other public transport hubs, particularly along highways close to the West Bank.
• Increasing condemnation of Israel’s operations in Gaza and humanitarian conditions therein will elevate compliance, regulatory and reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel. On 21 July, a group of 25 Western countries, including Canada, France and the UK, issued a joint statement urging Israel to end the Israel-Hamas war. The statement criticised Israel’s ‘drip feeding’ of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and denounced the deaths of over 800 Palestinians near aid distribution sites overseen by Israeli forces in the past two months. Israel claimed that the statement failed to recognise Hamas’ role in the ongoing conflict. While the signatories are unlikely to sanction Israel immediately and unilaterally, the statement points to an increasing risk of co-operational suspension, arms license reviews and sanctions targeting Israel if the Israel-Hamas war continues at pace. The risk of such eventualities materialising will be particularly informed by developments regarding restrictions on aid deliveries and high civilian casualty incidents within Gaza. Such sanctions are likely to increase regulatory and reputational risks for international companies operating in Israel, either directly or through local subsidiaries or joint ventures.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• Israeli settler attacks continue in the West Bank, sustaining significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions and the risk of further violence. On 21 July, suspected Israeli settlers conducted arson attacks targeting Palestinian-plated vehicles in Beitin village (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). The attacks occurred after the IDF issued an order banning face covers in the West Bank as part of a broader effort to deter settler violence (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 July 2025). In the coming weeks, settler attacks targeting Palestinian civilians will likely continue; further such attacks will compound ethno-religious tensions, increasing radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population and sustaining the risk of violence. Attacks will likely include stones and Molotov cocktails being thrown along key roads in the West Bank; we assess there is also a realistic possibility of shooting attacks targeting Israeli-plated vehicles.
• The IDF will likely intensify its operations in the West Bank in the coming weeks following the arrest of a high-profile bomber. On 23 July, IDF and Shin Bet personnel arrested a militant in Nablus (Nablus governorate) who was responsible for a bombing attack targeting four buses in Israel in February (see Sibylline Alert – 21 February 2025). His arrest followed a 19-hour manhunt, which the IDF initiated after the individual caused an explosion at his residence (almost certainly accidentally), drawing the attention of the security forces. The manhunt’s duration indicates that the suspect likely received considerable support and training from militant elements within the West Bank. As such, the IDF will likely intensify its operations across the West Bank in the coming weeks, both to capture any accomplices and to dismantle explosive production labs. These operations are likely to focus on the northern West Bank, particularly Nablus governorate, though there is also a realistic possibility that they will increase in Hebron and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates. Such operations will increase the risk of clashes between the security forces and militants therein, particularly in built-up areas. The IDF will also likely establish additional checkpoints across the West Bank in the coming weeks, disrupting overland movement, particularly in proximity to large populations centres.
• Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly progressed, though the withdrawal of Israel’s delegation will likely delay further progress. Earlier on 24 July, a Hamas spokesperson stated that the group had responded to an Israeli ceasefire proposal, which would institute a 60-day ceasefire and a limited IDF withdrawal from Gaza in exchange for the release of 28 hostages. Although mediators have not disclosed the content of Hamas’ response at the time of writing, regional media reports indicate that the group has requested greater concessions regarding aid distribution in Gaza and more stringent guarantees on the transition from a temporary to a permanent ceasefire. However, reports also indicate that Hamas has yet to provide negotiators with a finalised list of hostages whom it will release during the ceasefire, and that it has increased its demands vis-à-vis prisoner releases from Israel. Also on 24 July, the office of Israel’s prime minister announced that Israel had withdrawn its delegation from Qatar for further ‘consultations’. Without broader clarity on hostage releases or direct engagement with mediators, negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming days, moderating the prospects for the rapid implementation of a ceasefire in the short term.
• Increasingly critical food security risks in Gaza will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns and threats to staff, while also increasing the risk of pro-Palestine protests worldwide. On 23 July, over 100 NGOs and aid agencies released a joint statement warning of ‘mass starvation’ in Gaza; the statement comes amid increasingly frequent reports from the Hamas-controlled health authorities of deaths from malnutrition, particularly among minors. Although the Israeli authorities have acknowledged a substantial decrease in aid supplies reaching Palestinian civilians in recent days, numerous officials, including President Isaac Herzog, have stated that these shortages stem solely from Hamas activity, NGO inefficiency and the resultant disruption to aid-distribution operations. Baring a significant increase in aid provision in the coming days, humanitarian conditions in Gaza will almost certainly continue deteriorating, with food security conditions becoming increasingly critical. Numerous NGOs have also indicated that their staff now face critical food shortages, underscoring the increasing threat to locally engaged personnel and the risk of disruption facing critical aid operations, particularly healthcare and food aid distribution. More broadly, the dissemination of media depicting deaths from malnutrition will also increase the risk of pro-Palestine protests and associated unrest in the region, particularly in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. We assess that the risk of pro-Palestine protest activity and targeted activism will also increase worldwide, particularly in major cities in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US. Such risks will be particularly acute in the vicinity of installations and locations associated with Israel, especially embassies, high-profile businesses and Jewish institutions.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• Uncertainty regarding the disarmament of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will increase the likelihood of sporadic clashes and elevate policy risk. On 22 and 23 July, several Arabic media outlets reported that LH continues to refuse requests to hand over its weapons to the government, as per a US-backed proposal. The five-month disarmament plan was proposed earlier this month by the US envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barrack, as part of a wider political-security roadmap for the country. Although the Lebanese government responded to the proposal with a plan calling for a full Israeli withdrawal while dismantling LH’s arms, the Lebanese president reiterated his stance on transferring all weapons to the state’s control through a ‘carefully implemented’ plan. The increasingly palpable tensions between LH and the Lebanese government will increase the risk of domestic unrest within Shia communities in the coming months, as well as political tensions with LH, driving policy stagnation in the parliament. Although the government is likely to keep implementing the disarmament plan, a wide crackdown on LH’s weapons depots by the Lebanese army remains unlikely. Even so, there is a realistic possibility of limited raids on the group’s small arms caches in the capital Beirut and other major cities in the coming weeks, in turn elevating the risk of sporadic clashes therein. Alternatively, there is also a realistic possibility that LH will seek to implement a ‘phased disarmament’ in an attempt to avoid wider confrontation with the government. This would possibly include the surrender of part of its arsenal as a gesture of goodwill, including selected weapons depots in southern Lebanon. However, we assess that partial disarmament is highly likely to be contingent on demands for international guarantees of Israel’s full withdrawal from southern Lebanon and possibly a halt to Israeli attacks targeting the group, moderating the prospects for its implementation in the short term.
• Pro-Palestine sentiment will increase physical security risks for Israeli tourists, as well as operational disruption risks for the tourism and hospitality sectors. On 22 July, Greek pro-Palestine protesters prevented a cruise ship operated by the Israeli shipping firm Mano Maritime from docking at the port of the island of Syros (South Aegean region, Greece). The management of the cruise ship, which was carrying approximately 1,600 passengers, subsequently rerouted the ship to Cyprus. On 23 July, local media also reported that anti-Israel individuals carrying knives harassed and chased a group of Israeli tourists in the island of Rhodes (South Aegean). The developments underscore increasing pro-Palestine and anti-Israel sentiment in Greek tourist hotspots, which are typically frequented by Israeli tourists in the summer months. The incidents in Rhodes and Syros will possibly inspire similar protests and attack attempts targeting Israeli tourists on several Greek islands, particularly in August. Increasing protest activity will also undermine operational continuity for tourism companies, booking platforms, hotels and airlines associated with Israeli tourists in Greece over the coming months. These risks will also extend to similar companies operating in Italy and Spain, while the risk of targeted boycotts and activism will likewise rise.

Jul 24.

• Syria: Stalled integration will elevate risk of domestic unrest in Kurdish regions, security challenges. On 23 July, Syrian media reported that meetings between government representatives and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recently took place to advance the implementation of an integration deal signed in March. Both parties will reportedly meet again in Paris (France) on 25 July for talks mediated by the French and US governments. However, key flashpoints relating to the SDF’s position on military integration and its hopes of retaining a degree of command autonomy are likely to persist, hindering any prospective agreement in the coming weeks. Damascus is also unlikely to accept integrating the SDF’s all-female units within its new army. As such, stalled integration will elevate the risk of domestic unrest within Arabic tribes in Kurdish regions, driving the risk of mutiny among Arabic elements within the SDF. We assess there is a realistic possibility this would in turn result in clashes within SDF-held cities, including Raqqa city (Raqqa governorate), as well as bouts of intercommunal violence, driving displacement. Also, the ongoing deadlock in talks is likely to impact joint operations against Islamic State (IS), elevating the risk of the group’s resurgence in H2 2025.
• Jul 23.
• Israel-Syria: Threat of Israeli airstrikes will persist despite resumption in security talks. On 22 July, media outlets reported that Israel and Syria would resume security talks, which were temporarily halted following ethnic clashes in Suwayda governorate and Israeli airstrikes on the Syrian capital Damascus. These talks will likely take place in the Azerbaijani capital Baku in the coming days, backed by Turkey and the US. However, Arab fighters are still stationed in parts of the Suwayda countryside, and the fragility of the ceasefire will sustain the risk of a resumption in Israeli airstrikes against militias affiliated with the Syrian government. Nevertheless, while sporadic Israeli strikes in southern Syria are possible in the coming days, we assess it is unlikely that they will significantly impact the planned talks between the two countries. As such, a security agreement concerning southern Syria remains likely in H2 2025, possibly with international guarantees regarding the safety of Druze, demilitarisation of the border region and expelling radical elements from the Syrian army.
• Iran-Israel: Unexplained blasts will drive heightened security, threats to international personnel. Earlier on 23 July, reports indicated that Iranian officials believe a recent series of unexplained blasts across the country are acts of sabotage by Israel. The explosions, which Iran has publicly attributed to ageing infrastructure, hit commercial complexes, strategic infrastructure sites and residential buildings housing members of the judiciary. Israel has not responded to the allegations, and Iran has not publicly declared its position on the matter, underscoring efforts to moderate conflict escalation. As incidents of unexplained blasts will likely continue in Iran over the coming weeks, the authorities will almost certainly employ heightened security measures in attempts to foil sabotage and detain suspected Israeli operatives. We assess that this will likely increase the risk of arbitrary arrests, especially for international NGO and foreign national business personnel working in Iran. In turn, detainees will likely face elevated threats of physical harm due to aggressive interview tactics.

Jul 22.

• Global: Mobile spyware highlights security, surveillance risks from Iranian actors. On 21 July, the cyber security company Lookout reported that the Iranian state-sponsored group ‘MuddyWater’ is targeting English and Farsi speakers with a new version of the ‘DCHSpy’ Android spyware. The group distributes fake virtual private network (VPN) applications on the messaging platform Telegram to infiltrate targeted systems. The application deploys the spyware onto compromised systems, subsequently establishing communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure for data exfiltration. The new version introduces new features that enable MuddyWater to steal data from the messaging platform WhatsApp and scan files, underscoring the group’s continuous development of its cyber capabilities. MuddyWater reportedly started distributing the new version after the onset of the Israel-Iran war alongside its increased usage of other malware variants, highlighting Iran’s evolving cyber tactics to respond to recent events. As such, we assess that these developments will incur heightened security and surveillance risks amid ongoing regional hostilities.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Statement urging end of war highlights increasing risk of sanctions. On 21 July, a group of 25 Western countries, including Canada, France and the UK, issued a joint statement urging Israel to end the war in Gaza. The statement criticised Israel’s denial of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and denounced the death of over 800 Palestinians near aid distribution sites overseen by Israeli forces. Israel claimed that the statement failed to recognise Hamas’ role in the war. While immediate action against Israel remains unlikely, the move signals an increasing risk of sanctions facing Israel if the war continues, with restrictions on aid deliveries and high civilian casualty incidents likely to act as trigger points. Such sanctions are likely to increase regulatory risks for international companies operating in Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July). The statement is also unlikely to reduce the elevated armed conflict risks in Gaza, including around aid distribution centres, sustaining critical security threats to civilians and NGO staff. We assess this will drive reputational risks for international companies operating in Israel, while also threatening donor support for projects involving Israel and/or Israeli-affiliated companies.

Jul 21.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Despite forthcoming nuclear negotiations between Iran and the E3, efforts to mitigate against increasing sanctions will continue to depend on productive engagement with the US in the coming weeks.
• Despite claims that it has restored its air defence capabilities, Iran will remain extremely vulnerable to a possible resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, increasing pressure on nuclear negotiations with the US.
• Significant water shortages in Iran will increase operational disruption, energy security and domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks, including in the capital Tehran.

ISRAEL

• Security guards attacked three residents of Tayibe (Central district), highlighting elevated security risks for ethnic Arabic staff crossing into/from the West Bank.
• The removal of Yuli Edelstein from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) will reduce government stability risks; however, it will also elevate the risk of domestic unrest.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• An order banning face coverings in the West Bank will increase the risk of clashes between the security forces and Israeli settlers, as well as the Palestinian population, in turn elevating domestic unrest risks.
• The expansion of IDF ground operations into the Deir al-Balah area of central Gaza underscores continued efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas amid stalling ceasefire negotiations.
• A shooting incident near an aid convoy in northern Gaza underscores the sustained threats to life for locally engaged staff.

IRAN

• Despite forthcoming nuclear negotiations between Iran and the E3, efforts to mitigate against increasing sanctions will continue to depend on productive engagement with the US in the coming weeks. Earlier on 21 July, a spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry stated that Iranian delegates would meet with representatives from France, Germany and the UK (the E3) on 25 July for multilateral nuclear negotiations. The announcement comes after the German foreign ministry stated on 16 June that the E3 would consider initiating measures to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran unless nuclear negotiations with the US progress substantially by the end of August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Although Iran likely aims to affirm its intention to engage with the US, the E3 is unlikely to believe that such claims are credible unless the US or Iran announce plans to resume bilateral negotiations in the coming two-to-three weeks. Given long-standing incompatibilities regarding Tehran’s domestic uranium enrichment capabilities, negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming weeks, moderating the prospects for an agreement before the E3’s stated deadline. Barring significant and demonstrable progress before 31 August, the likelihood of the E3 triggering the snapback clause under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will increase substantially, compounding regional tensions and sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms.
• Despite claims that it has restored its air defence capabilities, Iran will remain extremely vulnerable to a possible resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, increasing pressure on nuclear negotiations with the US. On 20 July, the security force-aligned DEFA press outlet reported that Iran’s conventional military (Artesh) claims to have replaced the 120 air defence and radar systems that were damaged during the recent Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2025). The claim is highly likely inflated, as it is highly unlikely that Iran has secured sufficient deliveries of Chinese or Russian components and/or systems since 24 June. Although there is a realistic possibility that Iran has partially repaired damaged systems using domestically developed components, it is highly unlikely that this represents a broad improvement in Iran’s air defence capacity or broader deterrence capabilities. Consequently, Iran will likely remain extremely vulnerable to a resumption of Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear and military infrastructure in the coming months, sustaining regional tensions, as well as the pressure on Tehran to reach a nuclear agreement with the US before the expiration of the JCPOA in October.
• Significant water shortages in Iran will increase operational disruption, energy security and domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks, including in the capital Tehran. Earlier on 21 July, the Tehran Province Water Company announced that reservoirs supplying water to Tehran had reached record lows following five years of drought conditions. The authorities have called on civilians to decrease domestic water consumption substantially, while local reports indicate that the authorities have started to impose multi-hour water cut-offs in various Tehran suburbs due to severely restricted supply. Drought conditions are also particularly acute in Bushehr, Hormozgan, Khuzestan and Sistan and Baluchestan provinces, underscoring nationwide water security concerns. Water management is a recurrent issue in Iran, with routine shortages linked to meteorological changes compounded by mismanagement, corruption and ageing infrastructure. The authorities have also declared a public holiday in Tehran province on 23 July due to an ongoing heatwave, increasing labour flexibility and operational disruption risks, particularly for firms reliant on public sector services. Further heatwaves over the coming months will almost certainly compound water shortages nationwide, increasing pressure on energy infrastructure and likely triggering rolling blackouts and power cuts, including in Tehran. Water and electricity shortages will increase the risk of anti-government protests and unrest, particularly if the authorities restrict access to subsidised fuel at petrol stations. Security and police force personnel will almost certainly employ excessive force to disperse any demonstrations that do materialise, increasing bystanders’ exposure to clashes and localised unrest. More broadly, elevated temperatures and water shortages will increase pressure on healthcare facilities, possibly restricting access to non-emergency services in the coming weeks, particularly at public hospitals and clinics. Water shortages will also increase the risk of crop failure and decreased agricultural yields, elevating food security concerns and the risk of unrest in major agricultural throughput regions through Q3. In the long term, water shortages will also highly likely sustain bilateral tensions with Afghanistan vis-à-vis the management of Helmand River, increasing border dispute risks.

ISRAEL 

• Security guards attacked three residents of Tayibe (Central district), highlighting elevated security risks for ethnic Arabic staff crossing into/from the West Bank. On 15 July, Israeli border guards at the Te’enim Checkpoint (also known as the Fig Crossing) were filmed violently attacking three residents of Tayibe (an Israeli city with an Arabic-Muslim majority population) while they were crossing back from the West Bank. In recent weeks, various other residents of Tayibe have reported similar treatment by security guards at the crossing. The incidents highlight the Israeli Arab population’s elevated exposure to security and human rights risks (and exposure to racially motivated discrimination), particularly at crossing points with the West Bank. An escalation in such activity in response to increasing attack risks emanating from the West Bank will likely exacerbate domestic unrest within Arab communities in Israel in the coming months, particularly communities near the West Bank. However, large-scale or violent unrest remains unlikely in the coming days.
• The removal of Yuli Edelstein from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) will reduce government stability risks; however, it will also elevate the risk of domestic unrest. The ruling Likud party is set to meet on 23 July to discuss the ousting of Edelstein, the KFADC chair, following pressure from ultra-Orthodox parties who are threatening to resign from the coalition. In response, opposition leader Yair Lapid threatened that opposition members serving in the KFADC will resign in protest. This will increase the prospects for the passage of a controversial military draft bill that will grant thousands of ultra-Orthodox Yeshiva members military exemptions. This will almost certainly increase (significantly) anti-government sentiment, domestic unrest and ethno-religious tensions across Israeli society. If the bill is adopted, large protests are almost certain in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), where demonstrators are likely to block the Ayalon South Highway near the HaShalom Junction (close to Kaplan Street and Menachem Begin Road). Such action will likely cause substantial disruption; it will significantly increase the risk of the security forces using heavy-handed dispersal tactics against protesters, including mounted units and water cannons, elevating the risk of bodily harm facing bystanders. However, now that Edelstein has been removed, there is a realistic possibility that ultra-Orthodox parties will agree to amendments designed to moderate public anger over perceived inequality. In addition, further negotiations regarding the bill, together with the scheduled Knesset recess on 27 July, will likely delay the adoption of the law, reducing the risk of significant domestic unrest in the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• An order banning face coverings in the West Bank will increase the risk of clashes between the security forces and Israeli settlers, as well as the Palestinian population, in turn elevating domestic unrest risks. On 17 July, General of the regional Central Command (Maj Gen Avi Bluth) issued an order forbidding the wearing of face coverings throughout Israeli-controlled territories in the West Bank, though exemptions are in place for coverings on religious grounds. The order comes against the backdrop of increasing Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank and apparent difficulties in identifying and arresting the perpetrators. Violations carry up to a six-month prison sentence (or up to two years if an individual wears a covering while conducting a crime). However, attempts to enforce the order, particularly during incidents of mass violence, will significantly increase the risk of clashes between Israeli settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the new directive will be enforced disproportionately against the Palestinian population, compounding ethno-religious tensions and further driving the risk of attacks. Security risks will be particularly elevated near IDF checkpoints and near illegal (under Israeli law) Israeli settlements. Any clashes between IDF troops and Israeli settlers will likely evolve into domestic unrest near IDF bases in the West Bank (and possibly in Israel).
• The expansion of IDF ground operations into the Deir al-Balah area of central Gaza underscores continued efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas amid stalling ceasefire negotiations. On 20 July, the IDF issued evacuation orders for south-western parts of Deir al-Balah before deploying tanks to the area on 21 July. The IDF has not previously engaged in ground operations in Deir al-Balah, partially due to intelligence indicating that Hamas was holding hostages in the area. The deployment underscores sustained IDF efforts to maximise military pressure on Hamas to gain concessions during ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations. In the coming days, the IDF will likely continue to expand its ground operations in the central Gaza area, in addition to ongoing operations in northern and southern Gaza, sustaining significant conflict-exposure risks throughout the enclave. If ceasefire negotiations fail to progress in the short term, the IDF will attempt to increase military pressure on Hamas by imposing stricter movement restrictions in central, northern and southern Gaza, followed by intensive airstrikes and aerial support. Such operations will increase pressure on Hamas to agree to a temporary ceasefire agreement, though negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock, moderating the prospects for the implementation of an agreement in the coming days. In Israel, increasing concerns regarding the hostages’ wellbeing and a broader lack of progress in ceasefire negotiations will also likely bolster attendance at weekly hostage-release protests in major cities, increasing transport and operational disruption risks. Announcements relating to the hostages (particularly hostage casualties) will also increase the risk of anti-government protest activity, particularly in Tel Aviv, in the subsequent hours.
• A shooting incident near an aid convoy in northern Gaza underscores the sustained threats to life for locally engaged staff. On 20 July, IDF personnel discharged their firearms in close proximity to a UN World Food Programme aid convoy transiting through northern Gaza. The WFP stated that large crowds gathered around the multi-truck convoy after it passed through the Erez West border crossing (also known as the Zikim crossing) in northern Gaza before coming ‘under fire from Israeli tanks, snipers and other gunfire’. The Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry subsequently stated that the IDF had shot and killed approximately 80 civilians, though the IDF stated that its personnel had only fired warning shots and that the civilian casualty claims did not ‘align with existing information’. In the coming weeks, the risk of shooting incidents, fatal crushes and clashes in the immediate vicinity of aid convoys, storage facilities and distribution points will remain elevated, sustaining critical threats to life for civilians and NGO personnel engaged in Gaza. These risks will be particularly acute for staff engaged in the transport and distribution of aid, including for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Recurrent shooting incidents will also sustain the risk of critical disruption to aid delivery and distribution operations, compounding food security and humanitarian concerns, particularly in northern Gaza. As conditions continue to deteriorate, the risk of pro-Palestine protest activity and targeted activism will also remain elevated, sustaining reputational and operational disruption risks for Israeli-linked firms worldwide.

RED SEA 

• An IDF strike on Hudaydah port (al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen) earlier on 21 July underscores the sustained security risks near Houthi ports and dual-use infrastructure, as well as the elevated risk of supply chain disruption. The IDF claims it targeted engineering tools used to restore the port’s infrastructure, as well as fuel tanks and vessels used for military activity. Further Israeli efforts to disrupt Houthi infrastructure and reconstruction facilities will sustain elevated security risks near Houthi-controlled dual-use infrastructure and ports, particularly Hudaydah port and other previously attacked sites (such as as-Salif and Ras Isa ports, both al-Hudaydah). Such strikes will further elevate energy and food security risks, as well as supply chain disruption. However, strikes are unlikely to degrade (significantly) the Houthis’ capacity to conduct attacks on Israel or Red Sea shipping, which we assess are likely to continue in the coming weeks.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• Syria: A highly fragile ceasefire will sustain the possibility of a resumption in intercommunal clashes and Israeli airstrikes in southern Syria in the coming days. Earlier on 21 July, Druze factions affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri allowed the passage of hundreds of Bedouin families trapped in Suwayda city (Suwayda governorate, Syria) through a humanitarian corridor. The de-escalatory measure was mediated by the Syrian government as part of a wider deal between Druze and Arab militias following two days of sporadic clashes despite a US-backed ceasefire. However, the al-Hijri-affiliated militia still refuses to permit the deployment of the General Security Service (GSS) into the city and has blocked the movement of government aid convoys, likely driving a deterioration in humanitarian conditions inside the city. While the two warring parties are likely to implement steps towards a prisoner exchange (mediated by Damascus), there is also a realistic possibility that clashes will resume in the next 48 hours, as Arab fighters remain mobilised in large numbers in the Suwayda countryside near the city. These risks are exacerbated by Damascus’ lack of command and control over its tribal allies and its weakened capacity to restore order and security in southern Syria. Any resumption of intercommunal clashes in Suwayda will, in turn, increase the risk of Israeli airstrikes targeting the Arab fighters; there is a realistic possibility of such strikes expanding to government forces. This will broaden the scope of the conflict and increase the risk of a resumption of strikes against the capital Damascus
• Syria: Resumption of ethnic killings remains possible amid fragile ceasefire in Suwayda. Earlier on 21 July, Druze factions allowed the passage of hundreds of Bedouin families trapped in Suwayda city (Suwayda governorate) through a humanitarian corridor under a deal agreed with the Arab tribal fighters and mediated by the government. However, Druze factions affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri still refuse to permit the deployment of the General Security Service (GSS) and have blocked the movement of government aid convoys. This comes after two days of sporadic clashes between Druze and Arab fighters despite a US-backed ceasefire, underscoring the agreement’s fragility (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). As such, there is a realistic possibility that clashes will fully resume in the next 48 hours, as Arab fighters remain mobilised in large numbers in the Suwayda countryside near the city. Any resumption of such clashes in Suwayda will, in turn, increase the risks of Israeli airstrikes against the Arab fighters, with a realistic possibility of such strikes expanding to government forces. This will broaden the scope of the conflict and the risk of a resumption in strikes in the capital Damascus.

Jul 18.

• Iraq: Oil exports will reduce energy security risks, sustain operational disruption for businesses. On 17 July, Iraqi officials announced oil exports through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline to Turkey would resume following a two-year pause in operations. Baghdad said that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will immediately begin delivering 230,000 barrels per day (bpd) to the State Organisation for Marketing of Oil (SOMO). It comes after drones struck Iraqi Kurdistan oil fields for a fourth consecutive day on 17 July, for which no group has claimed responsibility. The attacks will likely continue to drive market fluctuation. The increased exports will likely mitigate energy security risks in Turkey, especially during summer months when energy consumption peaks. Political instability in the KRG, exacerbated by rifts between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), will likely sustain the risk of future disagreements with Baghdad, driving sporadic disruption to the export agreement. We assess that this will possibly drive operational disruption for oil companies in Kurdistan, elevating compliance risks for oil and sector-adjacent businesses.
• Syria: Ethnic clashes in Suwayda will extend in scope, intensity in next 24 hours, despite ceasefire. On 17 July, various groups of Arab and Bedouin tribal fighters clashed with Druze militias in Suwayda governorate despite the 16 July ceasefire (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). The new offensive is highly likely retaliation for the reported ethnic killings of Bedouins in Suwayda, hours after the ceasefire came into effect, by Druze militias affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri. The Druze militias have refused any deal with the government. The ongoing clashes will possibly extend in scope and intensity through the coming hours. This will increase the threat of Israeli airstrikes targeting tribal fighters in Suwayda and their convoys advancing from Deir ez-Zor and other governorates. While several local groups in Suwayda called for the government forces to re-enter Suwayda and resolve the conflict, the persistent threat of Israeli strikes will likely postpone such a move. We assess that this will exacerbate risks of protracted intercommunal clashes. However, there is also a possibility that Damascus will reach an understanding with the Israeli government and the US to deploy limited General Security Service (GSS) forces in Suwayda in the next 48 hours to prevent total security collapse. (Source: Sibylline)

21 Jul 25. Druze Fighters Retake Sweida After Week of Sectarian Clashes. Druze fighters regained control of Syria’s southern city of Sweida on Saturday after forcing out Bedouin tribal militias, according to the Syrian government and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). The withdrawal followed a U.S.-brokered ceasefire aimed at preventing further Israeli military intervention. Sweida was “evacuated of all tribal fighters, and clashes within the city’s neighbourhoods were halted,” Syria’s interior ministry spokesman Noureddine al-Baba wrote on Telegram.  The SOHR also reported that “tribal fighters withdrew from Sweida city on Saturday evening” following a major offensive launched by Druze forces. The fighting began after kidnappings between Druze and Bedouin clans escalated into armed clashes across Sweida province. Bedouin tribes from Deir al-Zour and other regions joined the battle, backing local Sunni clans against Druze militias aligned with spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Syrian government forces later intervened, claiming their deployment was meant to stop the violence. Earlier this week, Israel, acting in support of the Druze community, launched airstrikes on Syrian forces in both Sweida and Damascus, aiming to pressure them into withdrawing. The strikes followed accusations that Syrian troops carried out summary executions and other abuses against Druze civilians during their brief deployment in the southern province. The Associated Press reported that the withdrawal of the Bedouins allowed aid deliveries to begin in the area. On Sunday, the Syrian Red Crescent sent 32 trucks loaded with food, medicine, water, fuel, and other supplies to help Sweida province, which has been struggling with power outages and shortages after the recent fighting. Syria’s state news agency SANA said the aid convoy reached Sweida but claimed that Sheikh al-Hijri and his armed Druze group blocked a government team that was accompanying a separate convoy. Al-Hijri did not directly address the accusations but released a statement saying he welcomes any assistance for Sweida and criticized what he described as smear campaigns against him. Meanwhile, the AFP reported that clashes continue in other parts of Sweida province, even though Druze fighters have retaken control of the city. According to SOHR, the death toll from the recent violence in Sweida has risen to 1,120 since last weekend.The casualties include 427 Druze fighters and 298 Druze civilians, 194 of whom were “summarily executed by defense and interior ministry personnel,” the observatory said. The toll also includes 354 government security personnel and 21 Sunni Bedouin, three of whom were “summarily executed by Druze fighters.” Additionally, 15 government troops were killed in Israeli airstrikes, according to SOHR. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

20 Jul 25. Iran says it has replaced air defences damaged in Israel war. Iran has replaced air defences damaged during last month’s conflict with Israel, Iran’s Defah Press news agency reported on Sunday quoting Mahmoud Mousavi, the regular army’s deputy for operations. During the conflict in June, Israel’s air force dominated Iran’s airspace and dealt a heavy blow to the country’s air defences while Iranian armed forces launched successive barrages of missiles and drones on Israeli territory.

“Some of our air defences were damaged, this is not something we can hide, but our colleagues have used domestic resources and replaced them with pre-arranged systems that were stored in suitable locations in order to keep the airspace secure,” Mousavi said.

Prior to the war, Iran had its own domestically-made long-range air defence system Bavar-373 in addition to the Russian-made S-300 system. The report by Defah Press did not mention any import of foreign-made air defence systems to Iran in past weeks. Following limited Israeli strikes against Iranian missile factories last October, Iran later displayed Russian-made air defences in a military exercise to show it recovered from the attack. (Source: Reuters)

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Military And Security Developments
Jul 24.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Recent Russian reconnaissance operations in Pokrovsk likely indicate an intensification of probing attacks against the city, alongside continued efforts to complete its encirclement
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 23 July, Russia and Ukraine held their third round of direct talks this year in Istanbul; however, as expected, they did not result in a breakthrough towards ending the war
• AID: President Trump announced on 23 July that the US has made a deal with the EU for the purchase of military aid, much of which will be sent to Ukraine
• FORECAST: On 22 July, President Zelensky signed a law limiting the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine, prompting significant domestic and international backlash
• BAKHMUT: To the north-west of Toretsk, Russian forces are attempting to advance northwards in a mutually reinforcing operation to support encirclements of both Pokrovsk (to the west) and Kostiantynivka (to the east, all Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage published on 21 July indicates that Russian forces have taken Popiv Yar, located around 13 miles (21km) west of Kostiantynivka, and are advancing to the north. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 22 July also indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the west of Toretsk, approaching the eastern outskirts of the satellite town of Shcherbynivka. Both sides have been fighting very heavily over the satellite town for months. It remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces will remain in the town, given that parts of it, particularly in the east, are under increasing threat of encirclement by Russian forces.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 22 July also confirms that Russian forces have taken Bila Hora, located around seven miles (11km) to the south of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). As previously assessed, this places the Russians just over four miles (7km) to the south-east of the southern outskirts of Kostiantynivka, underscoring Russia’s slowly tightening grip over the southern approaches to the town. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces are continuing to launch localised counter-attacks in a bid to slow Russia’s advance, with geolocated footage from 22 July indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced modestly along Zlahody Street in south-western Chasiv Yar.
• DONETSK: Recent Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations in Pokrovsk likely indicate an intensification of probing attacks against the city in the short term, alongside continued efforts to complete the encirclement of this key logistical hub. Geolocated footage from 21 July indicates that Russian forces are assaulting Ukrainian positions along the E50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in southern Pokrovsk. Footage from 21 July shows Russian forces advancing to the east of Zirove, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. We previously reported Russian reconnaissance forces attempting to enter the city and its outskirts last week. Ukrainian authorities previously claimed to have successfully repelled such attempts to penetrate the city.
• DONETSK: A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are experiencing a depletion of their reserves and a broader weakening of their defences in and around Pokrovsk. If true, Russian forces will likely seek to exploit such conditions to intensify attacks against Pokrovsk in the near future. The source’s claims about the state of Ukrainian defences remain unverified. However, we assess that Russia will likely continue assaults against Pokrovsk to probe defences in the short term and look for (and potentially help create) weaknesses to exploit, while intensifying attacks against the city’s outskirts as it progresses in its wider encirclement.
• DONETSK: Russian forces are continuing their attempts to encircle Pokrovsk from the north, with Rodynske likely to be a key focus of their operations in the coming weeks. Rodynske sits around four miles (6km) to the north of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian military observer has reported that the Russian command has redeployed elements to support offensive operations to the north and north-east of Pokrovsk, as part of efforts to interdict the Pokrovsk-Dobropillia highway (T-0515). Given that Rodynske is located along this highway, we assess that Russia’s encirclement plan likely requires the capture of the settlement. A Russian milblogger has also reported that Russian operations remain focused on reaching Rodynske and interdicting important logistical routes to Pokrovsk. Capturing Rodynske would highly likely facilitate Russia’s encirclement effort and set conditions for further assaults. These assaults would aim to force a Ukrainian withdrawal, preventing the need for an extremely costly and potentially long-drawn-out frontal assault.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces are fiercely contesting various villages in northern Sumy oblast after launching a number of localised counter-attacks, which have pushed the Russians back in the last couple of weeks. Ukrainian forces are understood to have pushed the Russians back in Kindrativka, located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city, and Andriivka, located to the south-east of Kindrativka (both Sumy oblast). However, these settlements likely remain contested grey zones, as geolocated footage published on 23 July indicates that Russian forces have advanced once again in central Kindrativka. Meanwhile, footage published on 21 July indicates that Russian forces have likely taken the village of Varachyne, located roughly 15 miles (24km) to the north-east of Sumy city. However, it remains unclear whether Russian forces have fully repulsed the Ukrainians from the settlement.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 22 July confirms that Russian forces have captured Lypove, located to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), and have advanced to the south-west of the settlement. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the sector noted that Ukrainian forces have also repelled a Russian assault involving tanks in the Lyman area. In recent months, Russia has only rarely launched assaults using armoured vehicles in this direction.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have continued to make advances along the southern axis in Zaporizhzhia oblast, underscoring the growing pressure on Ukrainian forces along this front. Geolocated footage published on 21 July indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances in eastern Mala Tokmachka (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Meanwhile, to the west, footage from 23 July confirms Russian advances into the centre of Plavni, a small village at the extreme western flank of the Zaporizhzhia line. The village sits on the eastern banks of the Dnieper River to the north-west of Kamianske, where Russian forces have recently advanced and are likely attempting to consolidate gains.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have involved relatively smaller packages of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than in previous attacks involving several hundred drones. That said, we continue to assess that the risk of significantly large strikes remains elevated for the foreseeable future.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 23 July, Russia and Ukraine held their third round of direct talks this year in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey); however, as expected, they did not result in a breakthrough towards ending the war. Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Rustem Umerov (who previously served as defence minister), said that the Ukrainian side had proposed a meeting before the end of August between the two countries’ presidents. However, Russia’s chief delegate, Vladimir Medinsky, insisted that the purpose of a meeting between the two presidents should be to sign an agreement to end the war, underscoring Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness at present to engage in direct talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Medinsky also offered Ukraine short ceasefires lasting between 24 and 48 hours to retrieve wounded and killed soldiers. In contrast, Ukraine continues to push for a full, comprehensive ceasefire without preconditions (as proposed by the US).
• NEGOTIATIONS: Although the two sides remain far removed on what steps to take next to cease hostilities, as well as the terms for doing so, the recent talks resulted in progress on returning prisoners of war (POWs). Russia and Ukraine agreed to a new large-scale prisoner swap of at least 1,200 people each. In addition, Zelensky announced on 23 July that Ukraine had returned another group of soldiers from Russia under a previously agreed exchange during the second round of peace talks on 2 June. Prisoner exchanges are highly likely aimed at building trust between the two sides to facilitate more serious talks at a later date. However, Russia highly likely regards POW exchanges as a small concession to give the impression that it is engaged in negotiations without having to make significant concessions in its war objectives that would facilitate an end to conflict.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The lack of significant progress towards ending the war underscores that Moscow is likely undeterred by US President Donald Trump’s threats of tariffs and sanctions facing Russia if no peace deal is signed by the start of September. Medinsky proposed the creation of three online working groups for humanitarian, military and political issues. While the suggestion is almost certainly aimed at portraying Russia as being a proactive participant in the negotiating process, the creation of separate working groups would fragment the composition of the respective negotiating teams and could realistically further delay any concrete progress, which could realistically be the objective of such a proposal from the Russian side. Aside from this, Russia did not offer Ukraine anything new in the latest round of talks, while Kyiv continues to push for a total ceasefire, as proposed by the US.
• AID: US President Donald Trump announced on 23 July that the US has made a deal with the EU for the purchase of military aid, much of which will be sent to Ukraine. Trump emphasised that the bloc would fully pay for the cost of the weapons, though he did not divulge any specifics about what equipment Kyiv could possibly receive. Nevertheless, on 23 July, the US announced the approval of a ‘possible Foreign Military Sale’ to Ukraine worth USD 172 m for a HAWK Phase III air defence system and equipment to sustain it. The US also announced the approval of a potential sale worth USD 150 m of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), including their maintenance and repairs. We assess that the developments underscore the Trump administration’s growing readiness to facilitate military equipment transfers to Ukraine, as long as Kyiv or its allies are paying for it.
FORECAST
CORRUPTION: On 22 July, President Zelensky signed a law limiting the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine, prompting significant domestic and international backlash. The new legislation grants the prosecutor general (appointed by the president) increased authority over investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).
Zelensky claims the legislation seeks to counter Russian influence within the institutions, though critics argue that there is nothing in the law that targets supposed Russian agents in or outside of the agencies. It is highly likely that Zelensky was referring to recent searches conducted at NABU and SAPO premises on 21 July that targeted alleged Russian moles. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) alleged on 21 July that a lead NABU detective, Ruslan Magamedrasulov, had helped his father trade with Russia illegally. The SBU also said it was working to establish whether Magamedrasulov had contacted Russian special services and shared classified information with them. While there are highly likely Russian assets across numerous Ukrainian government structures, critics of recent developments have raised concerns that the legislation marks a backsliding in democratic standards and fighting corruption.
Rare anti-government protests took place in major Ukrainian cities on 22 and 23 July and will highly likely continue over the coming days. Thus far, protests have attracted several thousand participants in major cities, including Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi oblast), Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast), the capital Kyiv, Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast), among others. The unrest is particularly significant given that protests are currently banned under martial law and, as such, reflects growing public anger with the government’s perceived efforts to undermine anti-corruption bodies. Although violence or escalation is unlikely, the authorities will possibly resort to heavy-handed tactics to disperse protests if they deem them to be unmanageable (though they will likely remain peaceful). However, if the security forces do resort to force, this could invigorate anti-government sentiment and accusations that the Zelensky government is shifting towards an authoritarian style of governance, despite the fact that protests are illegal under martial law.
In response to the protests, Zelensky announced earlier on 24 July that he had approved the text of a new draft law aimed at strengthening the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. He also promised to submit it to Ukraine’s parliament later today (24 July). However, it remains uncertain what the bill includes and whether it will adequately restore faith in the independence of anti-corruption agencies. By introducing a new law, Zelensky is almost certainly attempting to manage societal discontent, with recent developments sparking the biggest public display of criticism against him since the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Throughout the war, Zelensky has enjoyed a healthy level of support from Ukrainians; polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published in mid-June revealed that 65% of respondents trust him. Despite his relatively high approval rating, a separate survey from KIIS in June showed concerns about Ukraine sliding towards authoritarianism. Half (50%) of respondents believed that Ukraine was progressing closer to democracy, while 41% expressed concerns regarding a decline in democratic standards. We assess that Zelensky and his government’s response to criticism of the law, as well as the future handling of graft cases, will likely prove crucial in determining public approval and perceptions of Ukraine’s ability to tackle corruption. Although the government is now under intensified scrutiny, the risk of serious instability is low in the near term, particularly owing to wartime conditions and the increasing centralisation of power in Kyiv.
Besides domestic backlash, the recent developments will likely fuel long-standing narratives about the prevalence of corruption in Ukraine and why countries (predominantly in the West) should not offer military or financial support. US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has urged Kyiv to reconsider the law, given that ‘one of the most widely used talking points’ for terminating aid is corruption within Ukraine. Graham has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine within the Republican Party, whose members are generally more critical of US aid to Ukraine. Aside from concerns from Western countries that have aided Ukraine, the recent law will possibly discourage future aid and investment opportunities from the private sector. The OECD warned prior to the legislation’s passing that it could undermine Kyiv’s credibility among foreign partners. This will possibly negatively impact much-needed defence investment and reconstruction financing.
Lastly, the legislation’s passage has fuelled concerns about how this could potentially jeopardise Ukraine’s bid to join the EU. European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen has raised ‘strong concerns’ with Zelensky over the new law, according to EC spokesperson Guillaume Mercier. Mercier emphasised that, as a candidate country, Ukraine is expected to fully uphold the rule of law and the fight against corruption. The commissioner responsible for EU enlargement, Marta Kos, reportedly warned Ukraine’s new deputy prime minister for European integration, Taras Kachka, that the legislation would violate commitments linked to Ukraine’s candidate status and undermine preparations for formal accession talks. While our assessment remains that Kyiv is highly unlikely to join the EU in the long term, states against or sceptical of Ukraine’s prospective membership will almost certainly use recent developments to further justify their opposition to Ukrainian accession and efforts to block financing and military aid agreements.
*Ukraine: Diminishing trust in presidency will sustain risk of unrest, despite government pledge. On 23 July, anti-government protests against recent legislation regulating anti-corruption agencies continued for a second consecutive day. The protests attracted several thousand participants in major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv, Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi oblast), Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast), Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast), among others. The bill curtails the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) by granting the presidentially appointed prosecutor general the power to influence investigations conducted by these bodies. President Zelensky has justified the legislation as an attempt to curb Russian influence within NABU and SAPO. However, amid mounting domestic and international backlash, he has announced plans to introduce a new bill within the next two weeks aimed at strengthening the law enforcement system and safeguarding the independence of anti-corruption bodies. Nevertheless, we assess that recent developments have likely caused significant damage to public trust in Zelensky, which will remain a key driver of unrest and discontent in the coming weeks.
Jul 23.
• Ukraine: Curtailment of anti-corruption institutions will highly likely fuel anti-government sentiment. On 22 July, rare anti-government protests broke out in major Ukrainian cities in response to a law passed the same day that curtails the independence of key anti-corruption institutions. Demonstrations took place in the capital Kyiv, as well as in other major cities. The unrest is particularly significant given that protests are currently banned under martial law and, as such, reflects growing public anger with the government’s perceived efforts to undermine anti-corruption bodies. The new legislation, signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky on 22 July, grants the Prosecutor General (appointed by the president) increased authority over investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Zelensky claimed the measure was intended to counter Russian influence within the two institutions and follows State Security Service (SBU) raids against NABU staff over alleged collusion with Russia and other offences. We assess that the recent legislation has undermined the independence of NABU and SAPO; as such, it will highly likely fuel further protests and intensify anti-government sentiment in the coming weeks, though violence or an escalation is unlikely under current martial law conditions.
Jul 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Various Russian sources have claimed in recent days that their forces continue to make advances near the H-20 and T-0504 highways that run towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast)
• STRIKES: Russia’s strike campaign is increasingly targeting western cities, such as Ivano-Frankivsk, underscoring threats to areas with lower air defence coverage
• AID: The US is reportedly reshuffling and reprioritising deliveries of Patriot air defence systems to facilitate exports to Ukraine, which could free up batteries to be shipped from Germany to Ukraine in the coming months
• FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on 19 July that Ukraine has proposed holding a new round of peace talks with Russia as early as this week, but a major breakthrough remains highly unlikely in the short term
• BAKHMUT: Various Russian sources, including the Ministry of Defence (MoD), have claimed in recent days that their forces continue to make advances to the north-west of Toretsk, including along the H-20 and T-0504 highways that run towards Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast). The MoD reported that Russian forces have taken the village of Popiv Yar, located 13 miles (21km) west of Kostiantynivka, while other sources claimed they have taken central Yablunivka, located eight miles (13km) east of Popiv Yar. While we cannot confirm either of these claims, both settlements remain heavily contested. Yablunivka in particular is an important point on the frontline, given its location alongside its sister village Oleksandro-Kalynove between the H-20 and T-0504 highways. Russian forces continue to assault Yablunivka from both the west and south-east (from Oleksandro-Kalynove). However, geolocated footage from 20 July indicates that Ukrainian forces are staging counter-attacks and have succeeded in pushing the Russians back in northern Oleksandro-Kalynove.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the north-east, the Russian MoD also claimed on 20 July that its forces had seized the village of Bila Hora, located around seven miles (11km) to the south of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, if accurate, it would indicate that Russian forces are tightening their grip on the southern approaches to Kostiantynivka, which remains the principal objective for Russian forces in the area.
• DONETSK: Recent Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations against Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) are unlikely to be indicative of an imminent frontal Russian assault on the city. On 18 July, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi praised Ukrainian forces for repelling Russian infantry attempts to break through defensive lines in Pokrovsk. Syrskyi highlighted the failure of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations aimed at penetrating the city. On 19 July, Ukraine’s Donetsk Operational Tactical Group reported similar unsuccessful sabotage attempts on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. In 2024, Russian forces had reportedly reached the outskirts of Pokrovsk from the south. However, instead of launching an assault against the city, they focused on operations in southern Donetsk, including in Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka and Vuhledar. As such, we assess that Russia will focus on efforts to encircle Pokrovsk and cut it off from critical logistical routes, before launching frontal assaults against the city.
• DONETSK: As such, Russian operations to the north-east of Pokrovsk remain intense, though have failed to achieve any gains recently, likely due to Ukrainian counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Mykolaivka, situated to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia group of forces, Viktor Trehubov, noted an intensification in Russia’s drone and glide bomb usage in the Pokrovsk sector, likely aimed at undermining Ukrainian defensive positions and facilitating further advances.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, further south-west, geolocated footage from 19 July shows recent Russian advances in north-eastern Voskresenka, located to the south-west of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Russian forces also made confirmed advances in eastern Zelenyi Hai, also located to the south-west of Novopavlivka.
• KHARKIV: The Russian MoD claimed on 17 July that its forces had seized the border village of Dehtyarne, located at the north-easternmost corner of Kharkiv oblast some 24 miles (38km) to the north-east of Vovchansk. While we cannot confirm whether Russian forces have taken the village, the MoD’s claim strongly indicates that Russian forces are further expanding efforts to cross the international border at multiple points, likely in an attempt to establish a buffer zone in Kharkiv oblast. Earlier this month, Russian forces crossed the border 22 miles (35km) to the south and seized the border town of Milove, further indicating efforts to increase pressure along the Kharkiv border.
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to contest areas in northern Sumy oblast, with both sides advancing over the last few days. Geolocated footage published on 20 July indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully counter-attacked in eastern Kindrativka, a village located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Ukrainian sources have reported in recent days that Ukrainian forces are pressing their advantage around the village and claim that they have successfully encircled a small force of Russian forces to the east, though this remains unconfirmed. Meanwhile, footage from 20 July similarly indicates that Russian forces have taken Yablunivka, a small village located about 16 miles (26km) north-east of Sumy city. Notably, the village sits only one mile (1.7km) to the north of the H07 highway that runs south-west towards Sumy city.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s strike campaign has continued to feature very large-scale attacks, such as those launched on 19 and 21 July, involving 379 and 450 aerial objects (drones and missiles) respectively. The 21 July attack heavily targeted the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and its wider region, as well as Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv oblasts. The mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk reported that it was the largest attack against the city since the start of the war. The massive barrage occurred shortly before the visit of the French foreign minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, to Ukraine. The 19 July attack primarily targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Sumy oblasts. Other attacks in recent days have involved relatively smaller barrages, mostly involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
• STRIKES: The current Russian strike campaign is increasingly focusing on Ukraine’s western regions, as well as Ukrainian mobilisation resources. The 21 July attack’s focus on Ivano-Frankivsk is the latest to target a western city with increasingly intensive and focused combined drone and missile strikes. Meanwhile, on 18 July, the Kyiv Independent noted that Russia targeted enlistment offices five times between 30 June and 7 July. The attacks are highly likely aimed at undermining Ukraine’s force generation efforts, particularly by deterring citizens from attending these facilities due to the fear of strikes. This is further evidence of the psychological effect sought by Russia through its strike campaign.
• STRIKES: The damage inflicted by recent Russian strikes highlights the growing success of Russia’s strike campaign, which is increasing the penetration rates of drones and missiles. Between April and June, 15% of Russian drones penetrated Ukrainian air defences, up from 5% in the first quarter of this year, according to the Ukrainian Air Force. Frequent large-scale drone attacks are overwhelming Ukrainian air defences, resulting in higher success rates. On 19 July, Major General Christian Freuding, head of the German Ministry of Defence planning and command staff, estimated that Moscow aims to further increase its drone production to be able to launch 2,000 drones in one attack against Ukraine. We assess that such an outcome remains likely at some stage and would likely allow Russia to further increase its overall drone penetration rate due to sheer volume.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its drone campaign against Russia, causing significant flight disruption – a deliberate strategy by Kyiv to increase pressure on Moscow. Russia’s MoD reported the interception of 230 drones since 19 July. Russian authorities also reported the cancellation of 140 flights over the weekend and the redirection of a further 130, including at airports in the capital Moscow. Causing flight disruption is a deliberate Ukrainian strategy aimed at increasing financial and psychological pressure on the Russian population.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• TRAVEL: Ukrainian lawmakers are considering whether to allow men aged between 18 and 24 to travel abroad, which would significantly ease current wartime restrictions. The speaker of Ukraine’s parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, disclosed details of the potential move on 19 July. Although Ukraine’s parliament is reviewing several proposals to liberalise exit rules, including establishing clear criteria and permitting certain categories of people to travel, no final decision has been made yet. Men aged 18 to 24 are not subject to mobilisation but are still barred from leaving Ukraine unless they qualify for exemptions, such as for medical or business reasons.
• TRAVEL: Discussions about easing restrictions for non-mobilised men to travel outside the country have been ongoing since 2023, though rules have not yet changed. As such, it is uncertain whether travel rules for Ukrainian men in this age bracket will be eased in the near-to-medium term. However, if such a decision were made, it would likely make it harder for the Ukrainian government to lower the conscription age in the future if this were deemed necessary to bolster Ukraine’s manpower. A relaxation of travel rules could also realistically encourage Ukrainian men to leave the country, which would further compound Ukraine’s demographic crisis. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update – 28 August 2024.
• RESHUFFLE: A presidential decree published on 19 July has unveiled the new composition of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council (RNBO) after a recent government reshuffle. The makeup of the council remains largely unchanged, though Rustem Umerov (who previously served as minister of defence) has been appointed its secretary. A new figure to the council is Oleksiy Sobolev, who was recently appointed to lead a new agency that combines the agriculture, ecology and economy ministries. The Ukrainian president determines who is a member of the RNBO, though it must include the prime minister, minister of defence, minister of internal affairs and the foreign minister. As such, the council’s updated composition is highly likely a formality, rather than indicative of a wider revamp.
• AID: The US is reshuffling and reprioritising deliveries of Patriot air defence systems to facilitate exports to Ukraine, according to reports on 18 July from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Unspecified US officials have claimed that Germany will receive the next available Patriot air defence systems ahead of Switzerland to allow Berlin to transfer the two Patriots it has in its arsenal to Kyiv. The Swiss government has confirmed that the US has decided to reprioritise deliveries. In addition, the Trump administration will reportedly reshuffle other planned future deliveries to give priority to other countries sending Patriots from their inventories to Ukraine.
• AID: Meanwhile, German media reports from 18 July claim that Ukraine will receive the first Patriot air defence system paid for by Germany, though not for at least six months. To help strengthen Ukraine’s air defence network more quickly, Germany is considering whether to hand over one of its existing Patriot systems, which the recent US decision may well facilitate. However, Berlin has already handed over three systems to Kyiv, and Germany only has three systems currently available for domestic air defence needs. While we cannot confirm what action Germany will take, the reports underscore the difficult decisions Ukraine’s allies will have to make in terms of prioritising national defence needs or providing military assistance to Ukraine, given production timelines.
• AID: Separately, the first group of 49 decommissioned M1A1 Abrams tanks from Australia is now in Ukraine after a nine-month delay. The Australian Department of Defence announced this on 19 July, adding that the Ukrainian military is now in possession of the majority of the tanks. The final delivery will occur in the coming months. Plans for Australia to transfer the tanks were announced in October 2024; the US had privately voiced objections to their transfer (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 19 May 2025).
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on 19 July that Ukraine has proposed holding a new round of peace talks with Russia as early as this week. Turkish media reported earlier on 21 July that the negotiations, which would be the third of their kind since May, will possibly take place on 23 or 24 July. Meanwhile, Russian-state media has claimed that the talks are expected at the end of this week.
Ukraine’s proposal is almost certainly aimed at presenting itself to the US and the wider international community as a proactive player seeking to advance peace efforts, in contrast to Russia. The possibility of new talks comes after US President Donald Trump threatened on 14 July to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions against Russia if no peace deal is reached within 50 days (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 July 2025). Meanwhile, on 18 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke via telephone. During their call, Erdoğan emphasised the importance of holding a new round of talks and offered Istanbul (where the previous negotiations took place) as a possible venue.
Although Russia will likely seek to demonstrate interest in holding another round of talks and attend the discussions, a major diplomatic breakthrough is highly unlikely in the short term. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 20 July that ‘the main thing’ for Russia is to achieve its war goals. As such, Russian officials will highly likely maintain Russia’s long-held war objectives and are highly unlikely to deviate from these for the foreseeable future, as long as Russian forces continue to advance on the battlefield. Moscow’s unwillingness to make significant compromises to end the war will highly likely continue to impede meaningful progress towards resolving the conflict over the coming weeks and months. This will increase the likelihood of not only US tariffs but potentially also further punitive measures, as well as additional weapons transfers for Ukraine.
Key points
• Increasingly aggressive Russian tactics to protect its ‘shadow fleet’ in European waters will increase risks of confrontation, tit-for-tat boarding and vessel detainment.
• Efforts to enforce sanctions and the expansion of Russia’s shadow fleet will increase operational disruption and compliance risks for the maritime industry.
• Likely Ukrainian sabotage of Russian shadow tankers will increase the risk of further spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian war into maritime domains, including both the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.
• Possible sabotage of undersea critical infrastructure beyond the Baltics will highly likely cause widespread operational disruption and increase compliance risks for the energy sector.
Context
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian activity in European waters has increased, including grey zone operations, particularly in the Baltic Sea. Russia is suspected of orchestrating deliberate acts of sabotage that have caused a series of disruptions to undersea cables and pipelines. In response, NATO initiated the ‘Baltic Sentry’ mission at the beginning of the year, expanding surveillance and maritime patrols to deter similar incidents. Littoral European countries have also intensified efforts to monitor and sanction the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, a group of ageing tankers with opaque ownership structures operating under flags of convenience to bypass Western sanctions on Russian oil exports. These developments have resulted in Russia adapting and escalating its maritime operations across the region, increasing operational and financial risks for commercial shipping companies, energy companies, insurance providers and port authorities, and driving wider supply chain risks for businesses throughout the region.
Forecast
Increasingly aggressive Russian tactics to protect its shadow fleet in European waters will increase risks of confrontation, tit-for-tat boarding and vessel detainment
Increased European scrutiny of suspected shadow fleet vessels in European waters has prompted Russia to start openly using its aerial and naval military forces to protect the vessels and deter efforts by European states to inspect them. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy’s Baltic Fleet reportedly completed a navigation safety exercise focused on escorting civilian ships and defending them from potential attacks. On 23 May, the Kremlin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia is ready to use ‘all means at its disposal’ to respond to incidents involving its tankers.
On 23 June, a Russian warship openly escorted sanctioned shadow fleet tankers in the English Channel for the first time, reflecting this growing escort strategy. This marks a notable shift in Russia’s posture, away from plausible deniability to open demonstration of force to secure safe passage for shadow fleet vessels. If European countries attempt to detain or redirect such escorted vessels, the risk of direct confrontation between Russian and NATO naval forces will increase significantly.
Russia is not only deploying naval vessels to escort its shadow fleet but is also leveraging air power. On 13 May, a Russian military jet briefly violated Estonian airspace after the Estonian Navy attempted to detain a Russia-bound oil tanker. On 18 May, likely in retaliation for the 13 May incident, Russia temporarily detained a Greek-owned oil tanker that was navigating Russian waters on its previously agreed route from Estonia to the Netherlands. The incident underscores the increasing risks of tit-for-tat boarding and detainment of commercial vessels operating near Russian territorial waters (including the exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea), even when they adhere to international protocols and previously agreed routes. Estonia has since rerouted tankers to avoid Russian waters; while such route readjustments modestly increase navigational complexity and costs, they will significantly lower the risk of interference.
Efforts to enforce sanctions and the expansion of Russia’s shadow fleet will increase operational disruption and compliance risks for the maritime industry
Despite EU and UK sanctions, Russia’s shadow fleet is estimated to have grown from fewer than 100 vessels in early 2022 to as many as 600 by early 2025. The increased presence of such vessels in European waters will further increase environmental, navigational and safety risks. The Finnish Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) estimates that over 72% of Russian shadow fleet vessels are over 15 years old, are poorly maintained and lack proper insurance. Many of them engage in high-risk practices such as ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in open waters and disabling Automatic Identification System (AIS) trackers, increasing the risk of maritime accidents. Moreover, on 10 July, the Swedish Maritime Administration warned of increased GPS interference in the Baltic Sea, possibly affecting air and boat traffic.
As a result, European countries, including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the UK, have intensified insurance and ownership documentation inspections; vessels that have not complied have already been sanctioned. This has increased the compliance risks and administrative burden on legitimate commercial shipping. We also assess that extensive checks increase the risk of delays, especially at chokepoints such as Fehmarn Belt, the Gulf of Finland (both Baltic Sea) and the Strait of Dover (English Channel). Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that insurance premiums will further increase, raising costs for companies using shipping lanes in the Baltic Sea, English Channel and North Sea.
Likely Ukrainian sabotage of Russian shadow tankers will increase the risk of further spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian war into maritime domains, including both the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas
Russian shadow fleet vessels and Russia’s wider maritime infrastructure will likely remain targets for Ukrainian sabotage, particularly involving explosive devices. This will increase security risks for commercial shipping operations in their vicinity. Since the beginning of the year, at least six oil and gas tankers associated with Russia’s shadow fleet have been damaged by explosions in the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Most recently, on 6 July, the Eco Wizard ammonia tanker sustained a major leak following a suspected engine-room explosion while docked at the Baltic Russian port of Ust-Luga (Leningrad oblast). Similar incidents have also occurred near Italy, Libya and Turkey.
In response, Russia will likely further increase naval protection of its shadow fleet, leading to further militarisation of maritime zones surrounding Europe and increasing regional tensions. The Russian Navy will likely struggle to expand escorting missions significantly (particularly in the Mediterranean Sea, where the future of its naval base in Tartus (Syria) remains uncertain). However, we assess that these developments will increase physical security risks for commercial shipping companies operating in these waters
The Ukrainian special forces have conducted several sabotage attacks against Russian military and naval assets on land in Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast in recent months, indicating their capability and willingness to prosecute the war in the Baltic. As such, we assess that it is likely that these maritime attacks are also being orchestrated by the Ukrainian intelligence and special operations forces. This is likely part of a broader campaign to disrupt oil and gas exports, which continue to fund Russia’s war in Ukraine. While this cannot be confirmed, we assess that the maritime domain remains an expanding arena of the war, as the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines clearly illustrated in 2022.
However, there is a realistic possibility that such incidents will act as trigger points for Russian retaliatory grey zone operations against neighbouring Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (including in the Baltic Sea), if Moscow’s perceives them to have facilitated the Ukrainian operations or acted as logistical hubs for Ukrainian attacks.
Possible sabotage of undersea critical infrastructure beyond the Baltics will highly likely cause widespread operational disruption and increase compliance risks for the energy sector
Russia will likely continue undersea reconnaissance operations across European waters, sustaining the realistic threat of (limited) undersea critical infrastructure sabotage. The number of incidents in the Baltic Sea has significantly decreased following NATO’s increased presence as part of the Baltic Sentry mission. However, there has been an increase in Russian naval and civilian vessels moving through the English Channel, Irish Sea, Mediterranean Sea and North Sea
The UK Royal Navy has detected covert Russian sensor devices near UK waters, suspected of monitoring nuclear submarines. Additionally, unmanned underwater vehicles have been detected near deep-sea communications cables, while the British Ministry of Defence reportedly has credible intelligence that superyachts owned by Russian oligarchs may have been used to conduct underwater reconnaissance. While cables are easier to destroy in the Baltic than in the North Sea due to geological differences, the North Sea is home to vital pipelines and fibre-optic routes. We do not anticipate an imminent threat of widespread sabotage. Nevertheless, isolated incidents as part of Russian preparations for the possibility of much larger escalation with NATO will sustain the risk of operational disruption for a range of sectors.
In response, several countries, including Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, have started exploring the potential dual use of offshore wind farms as platforms to help protect against maritime grey zone operations. This will likely bring opportunities for increased co-operation between the energy and the defence sectors. However, there is also a realistic possibility that energy operators will face increased compliance risks and financial burdens to co-fund surveillance infrastructure. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that embedding defence functions into commercial energy infrastructure will increase the risk of wind farms becoming the direct target of grey zone operations and increase espionage risks to the energy sector more broadly. For further analysis on Russian grey zone and sabotage threats.
• Ukraine: Searches targeting anti-corruption body employees indicate growing government tensions. Earlier on 21 July, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted at least 70 searches targeting 15 employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). SBU’s justification for the raids included employees’ involvement in road accidents and, in certain cases, alleged ties to Russia. Ukrainska Pravda, quoting SBU sources, reported that the raids were part of a special operation aimed at neutralising Russian influence within NABU. Certain inspectors at the anti-corruption agency have reportedly been accused of high treason, illegal trade with Russia and collusion with oligarchic interests. Due to conflicting reports, it remains difficult to verify either NABU’s or the SBU’s claims. Corruption remains pervasive across Ukraine’s state institutions, including within NABU. At the same time, the development follows recent NABU investigations into embezzlement schemes related to defence procurement, as well as a probe into Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, a close ally of President Volodymyr Zelensky. As such, if the searches were indeed conducted without court orders, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the operation reflects growing infighting between the government and NABU.
(Source: Sibylline)

22 Jul 25. Ukraine-made weapons to make up 50% of its inventory into 2026. Almost 40% of frontline needs are already met by the Ukrainian defence industry at present. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy set a goal of raising the nation’s share of sovereign weapon systems to comprise half of the armed forces’ inventory within the next six months.
Currently, around 40% of the weapons in Ukraine’s arsenal are produced domestically.
The wartime leader made the announcement earlier this month and reinforced the measure while welcoming the country’s new defence minister, Denys Shmyhal, replacing Rustem Umerov, who will now take on the role of National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) Secretary.
This latter position will still see Umerov continue to coordinate weapons procurement and manage the new array of production deals with Western suppliers. Some observers have suggested this move was a loyalty appointment; the role is said to encompass wider government control beyond the defence ministry.
Zelenskyy ordered that within ten days (by the end of July) the two ministers will report on the results of auditing agreements with partners regarding weapons supplies, joint production, and investment.
“This concerns everything: the Danish model, coalitions of capabilities, bilateral agreements, and especially agreements on building weapons factories on the territory of partners, as well as other joint projects. A clear timeline for implementation is needed,” the head of state emphasised.
Ensuring operational security
In doing so, Zelenskyy’s policy will tie Western companies intimately with Ukraine’s rapidly innovative defence industry.
“While Ukrainian innovators are constantly iterating new technologies and developing defence tech such as radars, this comes at a cost, and currently, Ukraine still relies on partners and cannot build all technology itself,” observed Andriy Dovbenko, founder of the UK-Ukraine TechExchange, a business support programme and forum for dialogue among British and Ukrainian agriculture and defence technology companies.
“Establishing more sovereign weapon systems is a capital-intensive endeavour that requires substantial investment,” Dovbenko continued. “Increased private funding, philanthropy, and international support are key ways in which Ukraine can achieve its desired objectives.”
Zelenskyy’s focus on sovereignty will cultivate permanent ties with global partners at a time when Russia’s full-scale invasion has reached three-and-a-half years, and as a growing number of conflicts around the world supplant Ukraine in the news cycles.
Critically, Denmark has recognised that Ukrainian system design is the key to uplifting European defence competitiveness with affordable and proven kit in its move to onshore Ukraine’s defence production, a policy announced during the Nato Summit in the Hague.
Similarly, British industry are striking deals with Ukrainian companies. Notably, a joint venture (JV) was recently established between Prevail Partners, based in Dorset, and Skyeton, based in Kyiv. The two will scale up production of the Raybird uncrewed air system; the JV is even considering establishing a manufacturing site in Wrexham, Wales.
“It is clear that Ukraine can produce almost anything when it comes to tactical warfare – from tethered drones to crucial electronic warfare capabilities that can jam enemy drones,” Dovbenko observed.
Ukraine’s policy and structural changes are also directed at the President of the United States, Donald Trump, whose warm ties with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, are under strain as the latter shows no sign of abating on the battlefield. Zelenskyy will attempt to secure as much US military assistance in the middle of this interpersonal drama as possible.
At the same time, Trump has withheld critical military intelligence from Ukraine before, and he has also redirected vital weapon systems to the Middle East at a moment’s notice.
In the end, global investment in Ukraine’s sovereign industrial might will maintain operational security when the war-torn nation can no longer lean on a fickle US administration. (Source: army-technology.com)

21 Jul 25. Australian Abrams battle tanks arrive in Ukraine. A first tranche of second-hand M1A1 AIM Abrams main battle tanks reached Ukrainian soil last week after being donated by the Australian government.
The U.S.-built tanks, still painted in their AusCam camouflage scheme, had been loaded onto a commercial cargo ship in Geelong, Australia, in early May before beginning the long trek to the war-torn nation of Ukraine.
Accompanied by Australian tank crewmen, the armored behemoths arrived in an unidentified port in Europe, possibly Poland, before being serviced for delivery to Ukraine.
Australia’s Department of Defence then said on July 19, “Ukraine has now taken possession of the majority of these tanks, with delivery of the final tranche to occur in the coming months.”
Australia pledged to give Kyiv 49 Abrams tanks that it recently retired. Vasyl Myroshnychenko, Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia, commented on X that “this powerful gesture of solidarity is more than military support – it’s a lifeline, a message that we’re not alone in our darkest hour.”
Valued at approximately A$245 m – around US$160 m – this gift comprises part of A$1.5 bn in assistance that Australia has promised since Moscow invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
The Abrams were modified for Ukrainian requirements before being shipped, with Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy noting that “these modified M1A1 Abrams tanks will deliver more firepower and more mobility to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.”
The M1A1 Abrams became available after the Australian Army started receiving batches of new M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks. Canberra ordered 75 of the latest Abrams variant in 2022.
Incidentally, the newer version of the tanks is enjoying a thorough workout in the ongoing Exercise Talisman Sabre, starting in Australia on July 13. One activity, demonstrating interoperability between Australia and the U.S., saw four M1A2 Abrams and an M88A2 recovery vehicle craned aboard an American landing craft. This activity took place in Townsville on July 19, with the U.S. Army landing craft USAV Paulus Hook moving the armored vehicles south to Gladstone port.
Asked about the importance of Australia rehearsing such amphibious movements, Lt. Eugene Lynch – who is a troop commander from D Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the Australian Army – told Defense News: “It’s extremely important. Our focus is on the Indo-Pacific region, and our near region is characterized by archipelagos and the littoral environment. So, it’s absolutely essential to our ability to project force into the region for defense.” Lynch said the M1A2 SEPv3 represented a significant upgrade over the M1A1, and Australian tankers were therefore “extremely excited” to get their hands on the new kit.
“We know it’s the best,” he enthused.
Asked whether tanks had become less relevant on contemporary battlefields, Lynch immediately alluded to Ukraine. “I think that the production runs in every single tank factory on Earth would disagree. When a tank shows up on the battlefield, it’s the highest-priority target.” (Source: Defense News)

21 Jul 25. UK ramps up Ukraine military support with £150m of vital air defence and artillery ammunition delivered in just two months. More than £150 m worth of air defence and artillery has been delivered to Ukraine in the last two months, as procurement of hundreds of air defence missiles and thousands of rounds of artillery to provide to Ukraine ramps up. At least £700m of this support is set to be spent this year on air defence and artillery ammunition including the £150 m already delivered – with other funding going towards procuring more drones, as well as critical contracts to maintain and repair UK weapons already provided to Ukraine, allowing damaged equipment to return to the frontline as quickly as possible. With Putin repeatedly targeting Ukraine’s cities in recent weeks with the most intense aerial bombardment since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the UK is joining the US and European nations in ramping up deliveries of vital air defence. The UK signed an agreement with Ukraine in May to provide an additional £2.26 bn worth of military support that will be repaid using funds raised from immobilised Russian assets, with more than two-thirds of the money allocated for procurement of weapons and munitions in just two months.  The deal delivers on this Government’s Plan for Change, by spending more on defence and creating jobs we will keep the country safe and boost economic growth. The Defence Secretary will make the announcement at the 29th meeting of the 50-nation strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) which he will chair virtually on Monday alongside German Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius.
Opening the UDCG meeting, Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, is expected to say: Last week, President Trump announced a new plan for large scale NATO weapons transfers and committed to getting these “quickly distributed to the battlefield”.
The UK government backs this policy, and we will play our full part in its success to bolster Ukraine’s immediate fight and to support our own and wider European security.
Alongside this, the US has started the clock on a 50-day deadline for Putin to agree to peace or face crippling economic sanctions.
As members of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, we need to step up in turn with a “50-day drive” to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and force Putin to the negotiating table. It comes as the UK also completed delivery of nearly 50,000 military drones to Ukraine in under six months, in addition to 20,000 drones provided in the same period via the UK-Latvia co-led drone coalition, working closely with British defence companies to speed up procurement and delivery. The UK has committed £350 m this year to increase the supply of drones from 10,000 in 2024 to 100,000 in 2025. At the meeting, the UK and Germany will announce a new agreement to partner in providing critical air defence ammunition to Ukraine. Germany will provide more than 170 m Euros worth of funding, which the UK will use to rapidly procure air defence ammunition via the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine for delivery in the coming months. This supports the aims of the Integrated Air and Missile Defence Capability Coalition, co-led by Germany and France.
The UK’s military support for Ukraine this year is more than ever before, with £4.5 bn allocated for this financial year. In March, the Prime Minister announced a historic £1.6 bn deal to provide more than five thousand air defence missiles for Ukraine.
Last month, the Prime Minister announced a landmark agreement between the UK and Ukraine to share battlefield technology, boosting Ukraine’s drone production and linking up the UK’s defence industry with the cutting-edge technology being developed on the front lines in Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

21 Jul 25. US diverts Patriot systems from Switzerland to Ukraine. U.S. officials have told the Swiss government that Patriot air defense systems in the production pipeline for the alpine country would be diverted to help defend Ukraine, according to a Swiss announcement.
The July 17 statement by the Swiss, which said the notification from the United States arrived the prior day, illuminates some of the hasty mechanics behind Washington’s newfound emphasis on helping Ukraine repel near-constant Russian attacks with missiles and drones.
Switzerland ordered five Patriot systems, made by Ratheon, in 2022. Deliveries were set begin in 2026 and go through 2028.
The U.S. foreign military process, which governs the sale, makes the diversion of defense goods possible, the Swiss announcement notes. No information was available about how many systems would be affected and what the new timing for future deliveries would be.
Switzerland’s Patriot pick was part of a lengthy air-defense and air-policing review by the government that also led to an order of 36 U.S. F-35 fighter aircraft.
Last year, the United States told Switzerland that a batch of ordered PAC-3 MSE interceptors, the most advanced interceptors fireable with Patriot, would similarly be diverted to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Germany this week offered to buy two Patriot systems from the U.S. and give them to Ukraine. One Patriot setup costs roughly $1 bn, depending on the number of interceptors, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said during a visit to Washington on July 14.
Details for the purchase are now under discussion with the U.S. administration, Pistorius said following talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Outstanding questions surrounding the transaction are all “solvable,” he added.
Speaking at the LandEuro conference in Wiesbaden, Germany, on July 17, top NATO commander U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich signaled a new dynamic in supplying Kyiv with the defensive weapons.
Grynkewich said he would bring European nations together to work on delivering Patriot and other capabilities to Ukraine. The idea is to “look at what’s the art of the possible” in orchestrating the flow of new production equipment to Ukraine’s defense, he said. (Source: Defense News)

21 Jul 25. Ukrainian Drone Unit Destroys Rare Russian KOP-2 Electronic Warfare System. Ukraine’s 424th “Svarog” Battalion of the Armed Forces’ Unmanned Systems Forces has destroyed a rare Russian electronic warfare system known as the Detection and Suppression Complex-2 (KOP-2), according to a statement published on the battalion’s Telegram channel. Footage of the operation, shared by the battalion, shows Ukrainian drone operators locating and targeting the system in a two-stage attack. The exact time and location of the operation were not disclosed. The KOP-2 is an experimental system designed to detect and jam drones by scanning a broad radio frequency range and emitting targeted interference. Russian forces deploy it to shield critical assets.
“It’s a costly and rare piece of equipment, typically used to protect high-value targets, such as air defense systems,” the 424th Battalion said.
The operation follows recent Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russian air defense infrastructure. Ukraine has been expanding its use of drones and robotic systems on the battlefield to reduce troop exposure to frontline dangers.
In response to recent large-scale drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, Kyiv has stepped up its own drone operations against Moscow. This week, Ukraine launched dozens of drones toward the Russian capital and other regions. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

17 Jul 25. Satellite Communications Services Donated to Ukraine. On 14 July, Denmark – the EU Member State currently holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union – announced its donation of satellite communication services to Ukraine via the European Defence Agency. The donation includes solutions that increase Ukraine’s access to secure and stable satellite-based communications, such as receiver terminals that will contribute to the country’s ability to defend itself. These terminals will ensure robust and secure connectivity, which can be crucial for the conduct of military operations. Secure and stable satellite-based communications solutions remain in high demand by Ukraine. The framework provided by EDA can help diversify satellite communication service usage over Ukraine. Such a donation contributes to promoting both Ukraine’s and Europe’s technological strategic autonomy and freedom of action in space. Satellites play a crucial role in modern defence today. Other EU countries may be considering similar donations. (Source: ASD Network)

20 Jul 25. Kremlin says Putin is ready to discuss peace in Ukraine but wants to achieve goals. Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to move toward a peace settlement for Ukraine but Moscow’s main objective is to achieve its goals, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told state television in a clip published on Sunday. Peskov said that the world was now accustomed to U.S. President Donald Trump’s sometimes “harsh” rhetoric but pointed out that Trump had also underscored in comments on Russia that he would continue to search for a peace deal.
“President Putin has repeatedly spoken of his desire to bring the Ukrainian settlement to a peaceful conclusion as soon as possible. This is a long process, it requires effort, and it is not easy,” Peskov said told state television reporter Pavel Zarubin.
“The main thing for us is to achieve our goals. Our goals are clear,” Peskov said. (Source: Reuters)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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24 Jul 25. Navy Aims to Harness Innovation, Modernize Fleet Capabilities. Years of shrinking fleet size, diminished shipbuilding capacity and on-time repair delivery are persistent challenges for the Navy and the nation, said Navy Adm. Daryl L. Caudle, who spoke today at a Senate Armed Services Committee nomination hearing for his reappointment to admiral and to become chief of naval operations.

“As China continues to grow its naval strength and the potential for peer naval conflict grows at a steady pace each passing day, the veil is slowly lifting on the impacts of poor choices made decades ago,” Caudle said.

These poor choices, he continued, “leveraged a perceived myopic peace dividend and now pressurizes and oversubscribes our decision space for the choices we face today.”  The admiral said maritime forces must continue to be lethal, resilient, agile and globally present — capable of deterring conflict and, when called upon, achieving decisive victory — delivering peace through strength derived from the Navy’s credible and persistent combat power.  To achieve this, Caudle said he will “relentlessly” pursue full-spectrum readiness while modernizing the fleet’s capabilities, scaling readiness capacity and aggressively forging resilient and resourceful sailors.

“I also plan to deepen integration across all domains, from sea, air, cyberspace and undersea like never before, massing effects from multiple vectors, platforms and environments, seamlessly integrating these effects with the joint force, along with our allies and partners,” he said.

To outpace adversaries, Caudle said the Navy must harness innovation, expedite processes and rely on the ingenuity, skill and brilliance of the industrial base to build modern, modular and scalable platforms while simultaneously integrating capabilities across all domains.

“My sights are locked in on a Navy that is not only lethal and survivable but also adaptable and sustainable, ready to fight and win for decades to come, securing freedom of navigation and projecting power where and when it matters most,” he said.  (Source: U.S. DoD)

23 Jul 25. DOD Seeks to Deliver Innovative Capability at Speed, Scale. The Defense Department is at a critical juncture. It must transform how it delivers integrated capabilities to warfighters with speed, scale and operational relevance, said Michael P. Duffey, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, who testified today at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on acquisition reform.  Duffey said the department’s priorities include rebuilding a more resilient defense industrial base, utilizing rapid and flexible contracting authorities, utilizing multiyear contracts for things like munitions, cutting bureaucratic delays, reforming outdated processes and empowering the acquisition workforce to operate with agility and confidence.  Reform means encouraging early industry engagement and accelerating the path from requirement to contract, Duffey explained, adding that DOD also seeks to tap into a broader array of companies, including startups and non-traditional vendors, to fuel competition and innovation.  The department plans to utilize Title III of the Defense Production Act and the Defense Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program to strengthen sectors such as microelectronics, energetics and critical minerals, Duffey said.  Energetics include propellants, explosives, pyrotechnics and other energy-releasing materials.

“The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. We are no longer in an environment where flexible timelines and risk avoidance are acceptable. What once took a decade must now be delivered in months or weeks to stay ahead of the threat,” Duffey said.

This work is not possible without the people who carry it out, he continued.

“Our 167,000 strong workforce is the connective tissue between strategy and execution. These professionals manage complex tradeoffs, direct bns in taxpayer dollars and ensure our warfighters are never outmatched,” Duffey said.

Also testifying were: William D. Bailey, performing the duties of assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics; Jason L. Potter, performing the duties of assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition; Maj. Gen. Stephen Purdy Jr., acting assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration; and Jesse D. Tolleson Jr., acting assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology. (Source: U.S. DoD)

18 Jul 25. House advances $832bn military budget plan for next fiscal year. House lawmakers advanced their $832bn defense appropriations plan for fiscal 2026 early Friday morning despite strong objections from Democrats over missing budgetary details and social issue fights. The bill’s passage — by a 221-209 margin, with only five Democrats backing the measure — sends the national security budget debate over to the Senate, where appropriators still have not unveiled the parameters of their spending plans for next year. The Defense Department is currently operating this fiscal year under a modified continuing resolution, with some additional funding for military programs and purchases. Lawmakers are hopeful that won’t happen again next year, but the slow pace of budget work thus far leaves only about six weeks of session work left before a possible partial government shutdown if the appropriations bills aren’t finalized. The House spending plan was largely drafted before Pentagon leaders unveiled their detailed budgetary requests for fiscal 2026 just last month. President Donald Trump has touted that outline as a “$1trn defense budget,” but that total includes additional one-time funds approved by Congress as part of a separate reconciliation measure. As such, the House plan for the base defense budget represents a small decrease over current fiscal year military spending, a point that Democrats and some Republican lawmakers have lamented. But Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Calif., the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee’s defense panel, praised the funding plan as “providing our men and women in uniform with the resources they need to keep America safe.” The bill supports a 3.8% pay raise for servicemembers next year, matching the federal formula for the annual prescribed pay boost. It includes $2.6 bn for hypersonics programs and $13 bn for missile defense programs in support of Trump’s Golden Dome effort. The measure sets aside $8.5bn for 69 F-35 fighters, $3.8bn for B-21 procurement, $2.7bn for 15 KC-46s and $1.2bn for four E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft. Another $37bn would go to Navy shipbuilding efforts, including procurement of one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and two Virginia-class fast attack submarines. Under the plan, the Defense Department civilian workforce would be cut by about 45,000 individuals at a savings of $3.6bn, a provision that drew strong objections from Democratic lawmakers. Critics also attacked the bill’s social issue provisions, including language prohibiting military health care facilities from providing abortion services, bans on transgender medical care and surgeries, and elimination of diversity and equity programs.

“These poison pill riders will not go unnoticed by our troops,” said Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., ranking member on the appropriations committee’s defense panel. “They will impact recruitment and retention.”

Passage of the defense budget bill was delayed for much of the week by unrelated legislative floor fights in the House, and could be complicated in the Senate by similar, broader fights over federal spending and program cuts. House lawmakers are expected to shift focus in coming days to the annual defense authorization bill — legislation which sets Defense Department policy and spending priorities for the upcoming year, but does not actually appropriate the funds for those goals — but a full floor debate on that measure is unlikely to happen before the chamber’s August recess. (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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18 Jul 25. Supreme Allied Commander Europe Says NATO Looking to Innovate Like Ukrainians. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the Ukrainians have continuously innovated to find the kinds of equipment they need for defensive operations. The allies of NATO might study the work done there and find out how to do it themselves, said the supreme allied commander Europe.

“All of us who’ve studied warfare know that there’s nothing like combat operations to drive innovation; when your life depends on it, you change what you’re doing,” said Air Force Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich during a session yesterday at the 2025 LANDEURO symposium in Wiesbaden, Germany.

Until recently, with the invasion of Ukraine, Grynkewich said, he’d not seen how that need to innovate in conflict would look in a digital age that includes unmanned capabilities and additive manufacturing technologies.

“One of the lessons that I’ve taken away is we’ve got to figure out what mechanisms we can build in all of our militaries that allow that same pace of innovation that the Ukrainians have done so successfully,” he said, while addressing an audience of NATO military leaders and defense industry experts. “Down at the brigade level, they’re able to have a relationship with an industry partner that drives innovation — not in a matter of years, but in a matter of days.”

What the Ukrainians have done while defending themselves, he said, is something NATO military leaders could study, reflect on and incorporate into their own formations.   The general also spoke to military leaders and the defense industry, both in the U.S. and in Europe, letting them know NATO is now in the market for innovative technologies, that industry needs to step up and that defense leaders need to make it easier for industry to meet the needs of NATO military partners.

“We have a shopping list; the shopping list comes from our plans, and we can tell industry exactly what it is that we need,” Grynkewich said. “For all the leaders that are out there, it’s our job, I think, to hold industry accountable to deliver quickly and to hold ourselves accountable for giving industry the ability to deliver quickly through our acquisition processes.”

Equipping NATO with what it needs must happen fast, Grynkewich said.

“We need real capabilities, and we need them delivered as soon as possible,” he said. “We can’t afford to wait. Future pledges are no longer enough. We need things to start showing up in the armies and in the air forces and in the navies of the alliance as soon as they can.”

What that will require, Grynkewich said, is that the defense industry across the alliance, in both North America and Europe, will need to ramp up.

“To do this, the defense industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic going to have to become fully activated, in my view,” he said. “There’s plenty of work to go around, and it’s a false choice to think that we can only invest in one or the other. It needs to be one seamless industrial base that can deliver capability and capacity for the alliance.”

What NATO needs to accomplish its goals, Grynkewich said, is investment — and now it has that.

Last month, Grynkewich said, NATO allies agreed to spend 5% of their gross domestic product on contributing to their own defense, a “historic accomplishment.”

“This demonstrates will across the alliance and every single nation backing the military requirements we have with a commitment to getting those requirements into the field,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

21 Jul 25. Belgium to add F-35s, spend billions on anti-air in defense catch-up.  Belgium will buy more F-35s, a third frigate and spend bns of euros on air defense as part of an updated strategic plan approved by the government on Friday, with the country seeking to fix capability gaps after decades of being one of NATO’s lowest spenders on defense. Belgium’s military requires a “thorough transformation” to create a force fit to deter and for high-intensity warfare rather than expeditionary missions, Defence Minister Theo Francken wrote in a foreword to the 100-plus-page Strategic Vision 2025 report. In addition to more hardware, the plan calls for raising the number of military personnel by around a third by 2034.

“A country like Belgium can only remain free and sovereign by aligning itself with loyal and powerful partners,” Francken said. “And we can only count on their loyalty if we are prepared to show solidarity in their defense.”

The new Belgian government earlier this year agreed to lift defense spending to 2% of GDP, for a budget of €12.8bn (US$14.9bn) in 2025, breaking with decades lingering at the bottom of NATO’s defense-spending tables. The country allocated an estimated 1.29% of GDP to defense in 2024, with only Spain doing worse. As part of the strategic plan published on Friday, Belgium is budgeting €34.8bn in capacity commitments for 2026-2034, with €24.7 bn of the funds to be spent over the period.

“Through concrete commitments, the government aims to restore the country’s diplomatic credibility,” Francken said. “It’s against this backdrop that this new strategic vision has been approved by the government.”

The current defense budget can’t patch all the gaps left by years of under-investment, and Belgium will focus on priority areas, according to the report. Those include making its medium motorized brigade fully operational, creating layered air defenses, building up ammo supplies to ensure readiness, adding air-combat capability and expanding maritime surface-combat capacity. Planned purchases include an additional 11 F-35 fighters for a budget of €1.67bn, with orders planned next year. Belgium has already ordered 34 of the jets, with eight delivered so far and the entire fleet expected to be operational early 2031. High-intensity operations and new threats such as drones and hypersonic missiles make strengthening the air force component “absolutely necessary,” while the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for air power to avoid a stalemate, according to the report. Belgium currently lacks any ground-based missile defense, and will buy 10 NASAMS systems from Kongsberg for €2 bn, with orders in 2026, as a first step to gradually building up an anti-air capability. The aim will be to defend the entire territory, with a focus on sensitive infrastructure, according to the plan – Belgium is home to Europe’s second-busiest port in Antwerp as well as NATO headquarters in Brussels. The government also intends to buy three long-range air-defense systems, with a budget of €2bn and a first commitment planned in 2029. For the long-range systems, full interoperability with the air-defense capacities of the Netherlands “must absolutely be guaranteed.” While the report didn’t go into details, Belgium’s northern neighbor operates the U.S. Patriot system. The budget plans over the period also include €13.9bn for the country’s land motorized capability, of which €6bn are for combat maneuver. Belgium says it’s committed to providing NATO with a motorized medium brigade, a motorized light brigade and a joint motorized medium-combat reconnaissance battalion together with Luxembourg. The medium brigade will have around 7,800 troops and 2,700 vehicles of various types, with the goal of being able to field the completed brigade in 2030, particularly in a NATO context. To bolster the naval component of the armed forces, Belgium plans to buy a third anti-submarine warfare frigate, for a budget of €1.3bn. Belgium and the Netherlands each ordered two ASW frigates from Damen in 2023, with the Netherlands saying last year it would double its order as part of increased defense spending. The country also plans to order a third MQ-9B SkyGuardian drone in 2027 for a budget of €254m.

The Belgian government in April agreed to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP in 2025 and maintain that level through to 2033, before an increase to 2.5%. After the NATO meeting in June, where allies agreed on core defense spending of 3.5%, the government will “study the modalities” of a potential increase, Francken said. Based on the current plans and economic outlook, Belgian defense spending would rise gradually to €16.5 bn in 2033 before a jump to €21.3 bn in 2034, according to the strategy report. Belgium’s strategic goals for 2035 are to prepare for a high-intensity military conflict in a context of collective defense, protect its territory and to anticipate future warfare, according to the report. The government goal is to increase military personnel to 29,000 by the end of 2029 and rising to 34,500 personnel by the end of 2034, from 26,200 troops at the start of this year, while also more than tripling the number of civilian defense staff. Belgium additionally plans to expand its reserve force five-fold to 12,800 by the end of the planning period, as well as introduce a voluntary military service year for young adults in 2026, following the example of the Dutch service-year program started in 2023. Francken said the threat of war is now greater than at any time during the Cold War, and Belgium lacks readiness in all areas, including a population that is insufficiently informed and aware of the reality of military threats. The U.S. pivot to Asia means Europe is forced to assume a certain level of strategic autonomy, and Belgium argues for developing a European defense pillar within NATO, according to Francken. An end to the war in Ukraine could prompt Russia to test the solidarity of NATO, for example by invading a Baltic country or through a targeted missile attack on an alliance member, the latter of which could include Belgium, the strategy report said. (Source: Defense News)

19 Jul 25. Thousands of Airbus jobs at risk over MoD contract. One of Europe’s biggest defence companies has warned that thousands of jobs in Britain would be put at risk if the Government awards a military satellite deal to an American rival. Airbus has privately told the Ministry of Defence that a failure to secure a contract to build the next generation of Skynet 6 satellites could threaten £10bn worth of potential exports. The company is currently trying to secure work from the Japanese government and various Middle Eastern countries. However, this business relies on Airbus’s status as a trusted British partner and executives fear that a snub from London would sink the deals. That would in turn cause serious problems for the company’s UK space division, multiple people briefed on the situation said. Without the extra work, the future of the company’s flagship satellite facilities in Stevenage and Portsmouth – which employ a combined 3,000 people – would be put at risk. They are seen as the jewels in crown of the UK space industry, with Sir Keir Starmer taking German chancellor Friedrich Merz on a tour of the Stevenage site during a visit on Thursday. But at present, the UK division only has enough work to sustain it until the end of this decade. Ben Bridges, chairman of Airbus Defence and Space UK, has also previously warned that Britain’s sovereign ability to design and make satellites is critical to its status as a global “space power”. On Friday, a spokesman for Airbus declined to comment. The MoD is expected to put the latest Skynet contract out to tender as soon as next week, with Airbus and US defence giant Lockheed Martin the only two companies in the running. Airbus has built all of Britain’s Skynet satellites to date. The bus-sized devices orbit the Earth from more than 22,000 miles away and provide vital, secure communications used to keep troops connected with bases back in Britain, coordinate missile strikes or transmit targeting data. Airbus is facing a challenge from Lockheed, which has offered to set up a UK satellite manufacturing base. Ministry of Defence insiders say the American giant is also offering advanced capabilities that are not available from Airbus satellites.  (Source: News Now/https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/)

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 17.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Increasing tensions over stalled nuclear talks between the US and Iran will elevate risks of UN sanctions re-application, compounding regional tensions.
• Iran detained a vessel in the Gulf of Oman on charges of fuel smuggling, underscoring risks of vessel and crew detention for regionally engaged shipping firms.

ISRAEL

• The Knesset’s recess on 27 July will moderate government stability risks caused by ultra-Orthodox parties’ exit from the coalition government and cabinet.
• The EU’s decision not to sanction Israel underscores the bloc’s efforts to secure increased aid flows into Gaza; sanctions will remain possible in the coming months, elevating compliance risks for international businesses.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Settler attacks on reporters underscore increasing security risks for media staff and assets operating in the West Bank.
• There is a realistic possibility of progress in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas in the coming days, though talks will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock.
• A fatal crush at a Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) site highlights sustained threats to life for civilians in Gaza, amid broader humanitarian concerns.

IRAN

• Increasing tensions over stalled nuclear talks between the US and Iran will elevate risks of UN sanctions re-application, compounding regional tensions. On 16 July, a spokesperson for Germany’s Foreign Ministry stated that the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) have assessed that activating the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback clause is ‘an option’ if nuclear negotiations with Iran do not progress in the coming months. The snapback clause would facilitate the re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran in a 45-60 day period, during which time Iran would have 30 days to demonstrate its compliance with the JCPOA. After Iran submitted its evidence, the UN Security Council would vote on a resolution to continue lifting sanctions on Iran. This vote would not be subject to vetoes from the Permanent 5 (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) and would need nine votes from United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members to pass; if it does not pass, UN sanctions on Iran would be automatically re-imposed. The JCPOA snapback clause will expire on 18 October, meaning that the E3 would have to submit allegations of non-compliance by 3 September at the very latest. Consequently, if Iran and the US fail to make progress towards a nuclear agreement by mid-August, the risks of the E3 initiating efforts to trigger the snapback mechanism will substantially increase. On 15 July, Iranian state-affiliated media indicated that Iran would respond to efforts to re-impose UN sanctions by potentially withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and/or significantly advancing its nuclear programme. Such efforts would almost certainly increase regional tensions and possibly trigger further Israeli strike action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, sustaining risks of regional travel disruption and instability through Q3.
• Iran detained a vessel in the Gulf of Oman on charges of fuel smuggling, underscoring risks of vessel and crew detention for regionally engaged shipping firms. On 16 July, the Chief Justice of Hormozgan province announced that the authorities had seized a ‘foreign tanker’ in the Gulf of Oman for allegedly attempting to smuggle two m litres of fuel out of Iran. Although the authorities have not disclosed the name of the vessel, oil smuggling is widespread in Iran. Organised criminal elements are smuggling heavily subsidised fuel into neighbouring states via land and sea routes for resale at market rates. The Iranian authorities routinely detain fuel tankers based on allegations of fuel smuggling, most recently detaining two Tanzanian-flagged vessels (the Sea Ranger and the Salama) in April. In the coming months, Iran will likely sustain an elevated naval posture in the Strait of Hormuz to crack down on maritime oil smuggling amid sustained macro-economic pressure linked to US sanctions on key Iranian industries. This posture will drive increased exposure to regulatory scrutiny for regionally engaged firms, particularly shipping firms transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz. This will drive risks of vessel and crew detention, particularly for firms with weak inventory controls whose vessels are more vulnerable to co-option. Although vessel seizures will possibly temporarily increase bilateral tensions between Iran and the vessels’ registry countries, such efforts are unlikely to critically increase regional tensions. Even so, given the high volume of international shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, risks of vessel misidentification and detention will also remain elevated in the coming months, increasing temporary supply chain disruption risks for regionally engaged firms.

ISRAEL

• The Knesset’s recess on 27 July will moderate government stability risks caused by ultra-Orthodox parties’ exit from the coalition government and cabinet. Earlier on 17 July, ministers from the ultra-Orthodox Shas party began submitting their resignations to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The move followed the party’s decision late on 16 July to leave the Israeli cabinet over unmet demands to exempt yeshiva (seminary) students from mandatory military service. The party will, however, continue to support the coalition government. The development comes after another ultra-Orthodox party, United Torah Judaism (UTJ), exited the government on 14 July, leaving it with a slim majority of 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. Both parties are dissatisfied with Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) chair Yuli Edelstein’s proposed bill on ultra-Orthodox conscription. Shas’s decision to remain in government will moderate government stability risks in the coming weeks. However, Netanyahu will likely face pressure to remove Edelstein from his position in the coming days to appease Shas and avert a parliamentary no-confidence vote before summer recess on 27 July. In the likely event Netanyahu can sustain his government’s current majority until recess, it is highly unlikely the Knesset will be recalled for a no-confidence vote until after 27 October when parliament returns. This will reduce the prospect of early elections in 2025, possibly moderating a rise in anti-conscription, anti-government and pro-government protests in major cities.
• The EU’s decision not to sanction Israel underscores the bloc’s efforts to secure increased aid flows into Gaza; sanctions will remain possible in the coming months, elevating compliance risks for international businesses. On 15 May, the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas announced that the bloc has decided not to adopt punitive measures against Israel over its military conduct in Gaza. Kallas stated that the bloc’s foreign ministers will meet in two weeks to review Israel’s implementation of a series of steps agreed on 10 July to boost aid into Gaza. The EU has established a monitoring system to assess Israel’s compliance with the agreement, with reports expected every two weeks on Israel’s progress in reopening aid corridors and increasing the daily number of aid trucks entering the strip. The decision follows Kallas’s announcement on 20 May that the EU would review the EU-Israel Association Agreement, the basis for bilateral trade between the bloc and Israel. In the meantime, the EU will likely continue to call for Israel to engage in corrective measures or risk losing preferential market access in certain sectors (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 22 May 2025). In the event Israel fails to adhere to the conditionalities concerning aid distribution, the EU will possibly take steps to sanction Israel. This will likely lead to increased compliance and regulatory risks for international businesses operating in the country.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Settler attacks on reporters underscore increasing security risks for media staff and assets operating in the West Bank. On 13 July, according to CNN, Israeli settlers attacked one of its reporting teams on its way to Sinjil (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate, West Bank) to report on the death of a Palestinian-US dual national who was beaten to death by settlers on 11 July (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 July 2025). This development came days after two journalists from the German state broadcaster DW were attacked by settlers while covering a planned protest against settler violence in the West Bank. Amid a broader spike in settler violence over recent weeks, media companies are at increased risk of targeted violence in the West Bank. While the Israeli government or Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are not involved in the attacks, the lack of repercussions for settlers highlights the tacit and ongoing repression of press freedoms in the West Bank and elevates human rights risks for foreign reporters. In the coming weeks, settler violence against Palestinians will likely sustain ethno-religious tensions and drive risks of further clashes in the West Bank. This will incentivise the IDF to adopt a heightened security posture and elevate staff exposure to crossfire and misidentification risks, particularly impacting on-the-ground reporters and their teams.
• There is a realistic possibility of progress in ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas in the coming days, though talks will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock. On 16 July, US President Donald Trump stated that there would be ‘good news on Gaza’ in the coming days, indicating possible progress in ceasefire negotiations. The statement comes amid regional media reports indicating that Israel has softened its negotiating position on the extent of the IDF’s withdrawal from Gaza during a potential ceasefire period. Concessions possibly relate to the size of its military buffer zone and whether the IDF would maintain control of the Morag Corridor (located between Khan Yunis and Rafah). In the coming days, mediators will almost certainly sustain efforts to resolve outstanding incompatibilities to establish a ceasefire, increasing prospects for further progress. Despite these efforts, however, negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock, particularly regarding the potential transition from an initial, 60-day truce to a longer-term ceasefire.
• A fatal crush at a Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) site highlights sustained threats to life for civilians in Gaza, amid broader humanitarian concerns. On 16 July, the GHF stated that a crush at an aid distribution site in Khan Yunis killed at least 20 people. The GHF claims that the incident was instigated by armed Hamas operatives. Footage of the crush also shows GHF security contractors deploying tear gas, while GHP allege that Hamas militants had also fatally stabbed a medic during the crush. The incident underscores critical threats to life for civilians in Gaza, particularly those attempting to collect aid from GHF distribution sites, given broader crowd management and security concerns. Further crushes, shooting incidents and clashes in proximity to GHF facilities will also increase risks of disruption to aid distribution efforts, compounding food security concerns within Gaza. More broadly, firms associated with the GHF (particularly donors and service providers) and the IDF’s operations in Gaza will almost certainly continue facing elevated reputational concerns, as well as risks of targeted activism from pro-Palestine groups (see below).

RED SEA 

• The Iran-backed Houthis will likely continue ballistic missile strikes against Israel in the coming weeks, sustaining bystander security risks in major cities and increasing the likelihood of Israeli retaliation. On 16 July, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) successfully intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile allegedly targeting Ben Gurion Airport (TLV), with no reports of injuries or damage to infrastructure. The strike marks the 61st launch since the Houthis resumed their offensive against Israel on 18 March. Further missile attacks will be highly likely in the coming days and weeks, sustaining bystander security risks for personnel in major cities, including Eilat (Southern district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). These risks will likely be primarily caused by exposure to shrapnel from interceptions above its airspace and that of adjacent territories. The IDF will likely respond to the Houthis’ latest attack with airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, possibly against the ports of as-Salif, Hudaydah and Ras Isa (all al-Hudaydah governorate), as well as locations in the capital Sanaa. This will continue to increase energy and food security risks throughout Houthi-controlled territory, while sustaining heightened security risks for on-the-ground international NGO and business personnel.
• The Yemeni forces’ interception of Houthi munitions is unlikely to elevate diplomatic tensions but will moderately increase the risk of seizure for commercial vessels in the region. On 16 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF) intercepted over 750 tonnes of Iranian-supplied munitions and weaponry that were en route to the Iran-backed Houthi militia. The shipment allegedly included advanced anti-aircraft, anti-ship and cruise missiles, along with components for drones and air defence systems. While the exact location of the seizure remains unknown, it likely took place in waters close to Yemeni territory, possibly in the Red Sea. The seizure marks the first major naval interception by the NRF, a group aligned with the internationally recognised Yemeni government and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), based in Aden (Aden governorate). The shipment underscores continued Iranian efforts to arm the Houthis, who have recently resumed strikes on shipping in the Red Sea and continue to target Israel with ballistic missiles (see above). That said, the development is unlikely to materially impact relations between Iran and the US, amid efforts to restore nuclear discussions in the coming weeks and months. The NRF interception underlines moderately increasing risks of vessel boarding and seizures in the Red Sea and near Yemen, primarily as a result of misidentification.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• Despite the ceasefire, the threat of further Israeli strikes targeting Syrian government-affiliated forces will persist in the coming days, sustaining security volatility in southern Syria. On 15 and 16 July, the IDF conducted tens of airstrikes against the government forces and facilities across Syria. The majority of these strikes targeted concentrations of Syrian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and General Security Service (GSS) forces in Suwayda governorate, amid heavy clashes with Druze clans (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). On 16 July, the IDF significantly increased the intensity and scope of its strikes, targeting the presidential palace and the MoD quarters in the Syrian capital Damascus as a warning to stop the deployment of forces against Druze militias. Other sporadic strikes also took place in Daraa and Rif Dimashq governorates, targeting MoD convoys en route to Suwayda. Israeli strikes were partially halted later that day, following a ceasefire reached between the government and several local Druze factions (likely backed by the US) and the subsequent withdrawal of the MoD forces from Suwayda. However, as of 17 July, the ceasefire remains highly fragile, as the Druze militia figure Hikmat al-Hijri has rejected the ceasefire. As such, in the coming hours, there is a possibility that al-Hijri-affiliated militias will attempt to capitalise on the security vacuum in Suwayda and attack Sunni Bedouin tribes and other pro-government Druze clans, sustaining armed conflict risks in southern Syria. This will, in turn, sustain the threats of Israeli strikes in Suwayda and Daraa targeting local militias affiliated with the government, as well as any Arabic tribal militias from Deir ez-Zor governorate, who will possibly advance towards Suwayda to support the Bedouin tribes. This will sustain significant bystander risks in the proximity of checkpoints, government facilities and military bases in these regions. It will also likely trigger wide disruption across provincial highways connected to Damascus.
• Increasing government efforts to dismantle Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH) financial capabilities will continue to moderate risks of armed conflict on the Israel-Lebanon border. On 14 July, a circular from Lebanon’s central bank prohibited all licensed financial institutions operating in the country from interacting with unlicensed entities, including those associated with LH. The circular included specific reference to the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, which the US sanctioned in 2007 due to its association with LH. The move underscores pressure from the US on Lebanon to dismantle LH’s financial capabilities amid broader disarmament efforts. Non-compliance with the directive will increase risks of account suspension, asset freezes and licence revocation, increasing financial and operational disruption risks for locally engaged firms in the short term. The circular will also increase compliance and regulatory risks for businesses operating in Lebanon, including small businesses seeking interest-free loans. Nonetheless, these measures will reduce money laundering risks and help to constrain terrorist financing activities, moderately reducing conflict escalation risks between Israel and Lebanon. The move will also bolster prospects for greater Lebanese engagement with international markets, moderating long-term socio-economic health risks.
• A pro-Palestine car ramming attack targeting an Israeli-linked defence contractor highlights targeted activism risks. On 15 July, British police arrested three pro-Palestine activists after they drove a van into the perimeter fence of a factory in Edinburgh (Scotland) belonging to defence manufacturer Leonardo. The alleged perpetrators also vandalised the perimeter with white paint and hung up a Palestinian flag. A newly formed pro-Palestine activist group, ‘Shut Down Leonardo Edinburgh’, claimed responsibility for the attack. It has accused Leonardo of manufacturing laser targeting systems for F-35 fighter jets used by the IDF. The perpetrators were arrested under the Terrorism Act (2000), and Police Scotland’s Counter Terrorism Unit are investigating the incident. The tactics used closely resemble those employed by the Palestine Action (PA) group, which frequently targeted Leonardo’s Edinburgh facilities before UK authorities designated it as a terror organisation in July (see Sibylline Extremism Watch – 4 July 2025). While the act was possibly just inspired by the group, there is a realistic possibility that ‘Shut Down Leonardo Edinburgh’ serves as a proxy to conceal continued PA activity in the UK. Regardless, the incident underscores sustained vandalism and attack risks for Israeli-linked defence, manufacturing and technology firms in the UK and Europe,

• Syria: Security situation in southern region will remain highly unstable despite ceasefire. Earlier on 17 July, the Syrian Ministry of Defence Forces (MoD) withdrew from Suwayda governorate according to a ceasefire agreement, following days of heavy clashes with Druze militias and Israeli strikes against the government forces (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). The Druze militia affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri refused the ceasefire, but no new clashes have been reported since the deal was announced. This likely indicates internal pressure to suspend hostilities. Nevertheless, the security situation in Suwayda will remain very unstable in the coming days, increasing the risks of a resumption in clashes between Druze factions in the city. Similarly, despite the ceasefire, the threat of new Israeli airstrikes targeting weapon depots and military bases across Syria will likely persist in the coming days; however, the Syrian government is unlikely to retaliate. Furthermore, we assess that any delay in investigating the ethnic killings of the Druze by Jihadist elements in the government forces will likely increase the risks of domestic unrest in other regions with large Druze populations in Syria.

Jul 16.

• Syria: Clashes in Suwayda will likely expand in scope, intensity; armed conflict risks will be sustained. Earlier on 16 July, clashes persisted in Suwayda governorate between government forces and several Druze factions aligned with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri. This comes despite an earlier announcement of a ceasefire. Meanwhile, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its targeted strikes against gatherings of government forces inside Suwayda city (Suwayda). Earlier on 16 July, it also targeted the entrance of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the capital Damascus, likely to convey a warning message to the government. Local media also reported incidents of extrajudicial killings of Druze men carried out by government-aligned Islamists in retaliation for the execution of security force personnel who had surrendered. The ongoing clashes are likely to expand in intensity and scope in the coming 48 hours, as Syrian government forces (as well as their allied Islamist and Druze militias) seek to exert full control over the city. The involvement of rogue jihadist elements is likely, fuelling an ethno-religious dimension of the conflict and increasing risks to civilians. Furthermore, we assess that Israeli airstrikes against government forces in Daraa and Suwayda governorates will likely intensify. Additional Israeli ‘warning shots’ in Damascus remain possible, increasing bystander risks around military facilities therein over the coming 48 hours.
• Lebanon: New Central Bank rules will moderate terrorist financing, money laundering risks,On 14 July, a circular from Lebanon’s Central Bank prohibited all licensed financial institutions in the country from dealing with unlicensed entities, including those associated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH). They listed Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association as an example, which has been under US sanctions since 2007. The move underscores pressure from the US on Lebanon to dismantle LH’s financial capabilities amid broader disarmament efforts. Non-compliance with the directive will likely lead to legal repercussions, including license revocation, asset freezes and account suspensions, driving financial and operational disruption risks in the short term. The circular will also increase compliance and regulatory risks for companies in Lebanon, including small businesses seeking interest-free loans. Nonetheless, we assess that the new rules will reduce money laundering risks and help to constrain terrorist financing activities, moderately reducing conflict escalation risks between Israel and Lebanon. The move will also drive the prospects for greater international engagement with Lebanese markets, moderating long-term socio-economic health risks.

Jul 15.

Israel: Government will possibly lose majority over conscription issue, increasing risk of unrest. On 14 July, the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party announced it would exit Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government over unmet demands to exempt Yeshiva (seminary) students from mandatory military service. The move leaves Netanyahu’s government with a slim 61-seat majority in the 120-seat Knesset. The 11-seat Shas party has also threatened to withdraw, citing dissatisfaction with Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) Chair Yuli Edelstein’s bill on the conscription of Yeshiva students. The crisis will heighten government stability risks and undermine the coalition’s credibility. Negotiations over conscription reform will almost certainly intensify in the coming days, with Netanyahu possibly seeking Edelstein’s removal as the KFADC chair to consolidate ultra-Orthodox support. If an agreement is not reached in the coming days, we assess that the risk of Shas also withdrawing will increase. Under such conditions, another no-confidence vote is highly likely, raising the prospects of early elections and likely driving an escalation in anti-conscription, anti-government and pro-government protests (and therefore elevating operational disruption in major cities).

Iraq: Drone attacks underscore persistent threats near Kurdish oilfields, airports, military sites. Earlier on 15 July, an explosives-laden drone targeted the Sarsang oilfield (Duhok governorate) in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region (KRI), resulting in a fire and the temporary suspension of operations. The attack comes hours after another drone targeted the Khurmala oilfield near Erbil city (Erbil governorate). The two incidents are part of a series of unattributed drone attacks targeting various strategic facilities in Kurdistan this month, including Erbil International Airport (EIA), Kirkuk International Airport (KIK, Kirkuk governorate) and the Baiji oil refinery (Saladin governorate). While no group has yet claimed responsibility, it is possible that rogue Shia Islamist groups conducted these small-scale attacks in order to target Kurdish military installations and US troops stationed near Kurdish oil infrastructure. As such, we assess that security and bystander risks will remain elevated around airports, military bases, oilfields, refineries and government facilities across KRI over the coming month. Sporadic and temporary travel disruption, including flight delays and cancellations to and from EIA and KIK, also remain possible during this period.

Key points

• The Iran-Israel war resulted in substantial damage to Iran’s defensive and offensive capabilities; Tehran’s efforts to reconstitute its external security force capabilities are increasing regional tensions.
• The relative weakening of Iran’s domestic security and policing capabilities will increase the risk of anti-government protests, domestic unrest and separatist activity in the medium-to-long term amid elevated sensitivity to protest triggers.
• Israeli and US strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities likely resulted in substantial damage, moderating the prospects for their immediate repair. However, unless negotiations between Iran and the US progress in the coming weeks, efforts to re-develop these nuclear facilities will drive the risk of further Israeli strike action.

Context

Throughout the recent Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 13 June 2025), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel’s war goals included neutralising the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes to Israel’s national security. However, Netanyahu also repeatedly called for Iran’s population to engage in a popular uprising and to initiate regime change. Regardless, the war did not trigger an immediate uptick in anti-government protest activity, moderating imminent threats to government stability. Even so, the war likely significantly undermined Iran’s security and policing capacity, diluting its offensive, defensive and repressive capabilities both internationally and domestically.

Forecast

The Iran-Israel war resulted in substantial damage to Iran’s defensive and offensive capabilities; efforts to reconstitute Tehran’s external security force capabilities will likely raise regional tensions. Israel conducted extensive airstrikes targeting Iranian air defences, which severely degraded Iran’s defensive capabilities in western and central parts of the country, including around the capital Tehran. The airstrikes also highly likely undermined Iran’s offensive capabilities; the IDF estimates that it destroyed roughly 35% to 45% of Iran’s ballistic missile stocks and approximately 50% of its ballistic missile launchers. While these estimates are possibly inflated, they likely reflect substantial damage to Iran’s capacity to launch retaliatory strikes against Israel or to engage in sustained hostilities should Israeli strikes resume in the short-to-medium term. In addition, Israeli airstrikes targeting missile production facilities nationwide have likely substantially degraded Iran’s capacity to replenish (at pace) its stocks of medium-to-long-range ballistic missiles, moderating both its deterrent capabilities and capacity to continue transferring munitions to regional proxies. In response to these degraded capabilities, Iran will highly likely seek to reconstitute its air defences, missile production capabilities and general security force capacity through closer relations with China and/or Russia. While Iran will likely primarily seek Russian components to repair existing air defences and to replace non-operational systems, we assess that it will also likely increase imports of Chinese military technology in the coming years, particularly ballistic missile components, solid fuel mixers and fighter aircraft (such as the Chengdu J-10C fighter jet). Deepening relations between Beijing and Tehran are liable to increase compliance concerns for firms in associated sectors; any such warming of ties would possibly aggravate tensions between Beijing and Washington DC amid broader developments in the China-US trade war. More broadly, strikes targeting Iran’s conventional armed forces (Artesh) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also resulted in numerous casualties, while assassinations targeting high-ranking officials have likely undermined Iran’s security forces’ operational capacity in the short term. In response, the security forces will likely initiate a broader recruitment drive among younger males, increasing labour flexibility concerns for locally engaged firms. Additionally, the security forces (particularly the IRGC) will likely engage in efforts to maximise revenue by further dominating economic activity within Iran, particularly in the energy, metal processing, telecommunications and construction sectors. These efforts will likely compound economic transparency and inefficiency issues within Iran, entrenching sanctions and corruption-exposure risks.

The Iranian intelligence services will almost certainly continue to conduct far-reaching purges of government, security and intelligence service personnel suspected of maintaining links to Israel and/or the US. Foreign and dual nationals will almost certainly face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and detention. In the medium-to-long term, concerns of widespread penetration of Iran’s security services and communications networks will likely result in increasing inter-agency surveillance, departmental siloing and reduced reliance on technology and electronic communication, disrupting inter-agency collaboration. These trends are likely to reduce the effectiveness of Iran’s internal security services, leading to the duplication of their intelligence-collection efforts. However, they will also possibly confound penetration attempts by adversarial intelligence services. In the long term, this will possibly allow Iran to develop broader non-conventional security force capabilities, increasing its support for proxies, while sponsoring terror attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish institutions and broader organised criminal and militant elements worldwide amid its continued engagement in destabilisation and influence operations.

The Iran-Israel war resulted in substantial damage to Iran’s domestic security and policing capabilities, elevating the risk of anti-government protests, domestic unrest and separatist activity

The Israeli strikes against Basij militia positions, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) have likely undermined these forces’ capacity to deter, disperse and repress anti-government protests and unrest, particularly in Tehran. While an imminent uptick in widespread and destabilising unrest remains unlikely in the short term, a diminished security and police force capacity will increase the risk of broader unrest in the event of politically or economically sensitive flashpoints in the coming weeks and months. We assess that instances of fuel shortages and/or price increases, electricity shortages, water shortages, socio-economic concerns, commodity shortages and the deaths of high-profile opposition figures in police custody will act as particularly sensitive triggers for anti-government protests, unrest and industrial action in the coming months. The police and security forces are highly likely to respond to any such unrest with heavy-handed and indiscriminate repression, compounding human rights concerns. Escalating unrest in major cities, particularly violent unrest linked to socio-economic concerns, will sustain the risk of operational disruption and broader domestic instability, undercutting the government’s stability in the medium-to-long term. However, threats to government stability are unlikely to turn critical, barring a broader shift in regime dynamics, such as the death or incapacitation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

As the authorities continue to retain their primary focus on identifying possible Israeli penetration of the intelligence services and deterring destabilising unrest in major cities, separatist and autonomist movements will likely capitalise on lapses in the security forces’ capacity to increase activity and recruitment in Iran’s peripheral regions. Increased separatist activity (including militant activity) will likely be most pronounced in Sistan and Baluchistan province, where militant groups such as Ansar al-Fuqan and Jaish al-Adl routinely conduct attacks targeting the security and police forces (see Sibylline Extremism Watch – Baloch Militancy). Increasing militant activity will drive broader security risks for locally engaged staff and entities operating at port facilities in Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchistan), while also compounding bilateral tensions with Pakistan due to concerns over cross-border militant activity and border security. While they are less active, there is also a realistic possibility that separatist groups associated with Iran’s ethnic-Arab, -Azeri and -Kurdish populations will increase their activity levels. This would elevate the risk of domestic unrest and low-intensity separatist militancy in provinces accommodating significant ethno-religious minority populations, such as Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, West Azerbaijan and Zanjan provinces, as well as the wider region of Khorasan. In the medium-to-long term, such activity will possibly elevate bilateral tensions with neighbouring countries (particularly Azerbaijan and Iraq), as well as border security concerns, which would possibly constrain cross-border travel and supply chain continuity. Jihadist militant groups will also likely capitalise on the security forces’ diminished capacity to increase activity and recruitment, particularly via online platforms and informal networks. In the medium-to-long term, groups such as Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K) will possibly attempt to conduct higher-capacity and more frequent attacks targeting high-profile public events and locations, as witnessed in the 2024 bombing in Kerman city (Kerman province; see Sibylline Alert – 3 January 2024). This would increase international terrorism and attack risks, particularly in major cities during high-profile religious and state occasions.

Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear weapon has likely been heavily undermined; its re-development capabilities are also reduced; however, if Iran pursues this option, the risk of Israeli strikes will grow

During the Iran-Israel war, Israel conducted extensive strikes targeting facilities central to all stages of Iran’s potential nuclear weapons development; this included strikes targeting enrichment and conversion facilities in Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz, as well as centrifuge production facilities. Although Iran likely retains substantial stockpiles of low- and medium-enriched uranium, the strikes have highly likely limited Iran’s capacity to enrich (at pace) stockpiles into weapons-grade uranium in the coming months. Israel’s assassination campaign targeting high-ranking Iranian nuclear scientists will also likely delay potential efforts to repair and operationalise enrichment and conversion facilities, while also undermining potential efforts to convert enriched uranium into a functioning munition. Israeli strikes targeting Iranian missile and drone development, storage and launch facilities have also likely limited the feasibility of developing a delivery system for any potential nuclear munition in the short-to-medium term. As such, Israeli and US strikes on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities have highly likely created significant limitations vis-à-vis Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear weapon rapidly. The continued application of US sanctions on Iran, paired with the Israeli intelligence services’ continued efforts to infiltrate domestic and international supply chains, will likely compound these limitations, further extending the breakout time. If Iran attempts to re-constitute its nuclear programme at pace, the US will highly likely expand sanctions targeting adjacent industries, exacerbating sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the technology, defence, transport and chemical manufacturing industries. Israel’s intelligence penetration of supply chains will also highly likely increase exposure to espionage activity for regionally engaged firms, driving corporate governance and compliance concerns.

Iran’s capacity to re-develop its nuclear capabilities will also likely depend on the status of negotiations with the US. Despite initial US plans to resume negotiations with Iran following the strikes against the Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz facilities, talks have failed to materialise and regional tensions remain elevated. Although there is a realistic possibility that talks will resume in the coming weeks, progress will likely remain contingent on Iran’s willingness to make significant concessions regarding its domestic enrichment of uranium. If Iran fails to meet US demands vis-à-vis scaling back its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief, the US will highly likely continue to intensify the ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign by expanding sanctions targeting key sectors, including oil exports. This would escalate economic pressure on Iran, triggering a further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR) and compounding the country’s socio-economic health concerns. There is a realistic possibility that macroeconomic pressure will also limit Tehran’s financial capacity to invest in the rapid repair and expansion of its nuclear capabilities, further increasing the breakout time. Tehran will also possibly limit nuclear investment due to concerns over domestic unrest, particularly if said investment in its nuclear facilities restricts meaningful spending in critical domestic energy and water management systems (see above). Additionally, if Iran engages in reconstruction and expansion efforts (particularly of its enrichment facilities), the risk of Israel engaging in limited strike action against active nuclear sites will increase substantially. The threat of such strikes would possibly deter significant investment in reconstruction, and, if carried out, would likely further limit Iran’s practical capacity to reconstruct its nuclear programme in the short-to-medium term.

IRAN

• Despite stating it would ‘co-operate’ with international monitors, Iran’s continued ambiguity relating to its nuclear programme will sustain significant regional tensions and sanction-exposure risks.
• Allegations that Israel attempted to assassinate Iran’s president during the Iran-Israel war underscore the risk of further crackdowns on individuals associated with anti-government activity.

ISRAEL

• Pending charges against the prime minister’s advisor will drive government stability and domestic unrest risks across Israel in the coming days and weeks.
• The attorney general’s likely dismissal will compound domestic unrest risks; it also underscores democratic backsliding in Israel.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Settler violence against Palestinians will likely sustain ethno-religious tensions and drive further clashes in the West Bank.
• Despite renewed engagement, ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have failed to progress substantially, sustaining critical security threats within Gaza.

RED SEA

• The ongoing tensions in the Red Sea, as well as the persistent security risks facing crew members, are underscored amid the aftermath of a Houthi attack against a bulk carrier.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Israel-Syria: An IDF strike on government forces has increased armed conflict risks in southern Syria, which will possibly impact the ongoing security talks.
• Iran: Required approval for nuclear watchdog inspections will drive nuclear safety, sanctions risks. On 12 July, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that, while the country intends to maintain its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), any inspections of nuclear sites will require approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. This process will highly likely be subject to delays and limitations, compounding the IAEA’s restricted ability to access facilities targeted in last month’s bombing campaign by Israel and the US. This will undermine oversight of its nuclear programme and drive nuclear safety risks. We assess that monitoring constraints will increase the risk of the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) triggering snapback clauses, reimposing UN sanctions on Iran for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This will highly likely sustain significant economic pressure on Iran and exacerbate regulatory and compliance risks for regionally engaged businesses. The announcement also underscores Iran’s ambiguous nuclear policy following the bombings, likely aimed at balancing domestic hardline demands for stronger security guarantees with continued international diplomatic engagement. However, without greater engagement with the US regarding a nuclear agreement, this ambiguity will increase the risk of further Israeli strikes on its nuclear programme.
• Syria: Clashes in southern Syria will increase risks of wider armed conflict, domestic unrest. On 13 July, heavy clashes between local Bedouin tribal fighters and Druze militias killed at least 30 people and injured 100 others in the city of Suwayda (Suwayda governorate). The clashes were initially triggered by the abduction of a Druze merchant by an unknown group. This prompted Druze militias to encircle and occupy the eastern Suwayda neighbourhood of Maqwas, which is mainly inhabited by Bedouin tribes. The Ministry of Interior has already deployed its forces to Suwayda in a bid to resolve the conflict; however, clashes are still ongoing and uncontained. We assess that the clashes in the city and its suburbs will likely persist through at least the next 24 hours. This will significantly increase bystander and security risks across the governorate and increase the likelihood that provincial highways to the capital Damascus will be cut off. Given the high risk of misfire and misidentification, direct clashes between Druze fighters and the government forces remain possible. This will widen the current scope of armed conflict in the coming days and increase risks of unrest in Suwayda. (Source: Sibylline)

15 Jul 25. Israel Strikes Military Tanks in Southern Syria as Sectarian Violence Erupts. Israel’s military struck several Syrian tanks in Sweida province on Monday amid escalating violence in the region, where clashes between Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze fighters have left dozens dead. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released footage of the airstrike on X and said the operation was carried out to stop the tanks from advancing toward the scene of violent clashes in Sweida, a predominantly Druze city near the Israeli border.

“The presence of these assets in southern Syria could pose a threat to the State of Israel. The IDF will not allow the existence of a military threat in southern Syria and will act against it,” the IDF said.

Hours after the strike, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the operation was intended to send “a message and a clear warning to the Syrian regime. We will not allow harm to the Druze in Syria.” Syria’s Interior Ministry reported more than 30 deaths and nearly 100 injuries as violent clashes erupted between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribal fighters in Sweida province on Monday. The Defense Ministry said at least 18 of those killed were members of the security forces. Meanwhile, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported at least 99 dead, including 60 Druze locals, 18 Bedouin fighters, and 14 security personnel. Shortly after the clashes began, Syria’s Interior Ministry blamed the escalation on the “absence of relevant official institutions.” The ministry added that security forces, in coordination with the Defense Ministry, would “begin direct intervention in the area to end the conflict and impose order.” In a statement, UN’s Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, Najat Rochdi, expressed deep concern over the report and urged “the interim authorities [in Damascus] and local stakeholders to take immediate steps to protect civilians, restore calm, and prevent incitement.” She further stressed the urgent need for “genuine inclusion, trust-building, and meaningful dialogue” to advance Syria’s political transition.

The governor of Suweida, Mustapha al-Bakur, called on residents to “exercise self-restraint and respond to national calls for reform.” Several Syrian Druze spiritual leaders also appealed for peace. Israel has previously vowed to protect the Druze community in Syria. In March, during clashes in Jaramana—a Druze-majority town near Damascus—between Syrian government forces and local Druze gunmen, Katz declared: “Should the regime harm the Druze, it will be struck by us.”

“We are committed to our Druze brethren in Israel to do everything to prevent harm to their Druze brethren in Syria, and we will take all the steps required to guarantee their safety,” Katz added. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

15 Jul 25.  Israeli Reservists Capture Alleged IRGC Quds Force Cell in Southern Syria. Israeli troops have captured alleged operatives from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) during a covert cross-border raid in southern Syria, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said. The operation, conducted on July 7 by reservists from the Alexandroni Brigade and the Military Intelligence Directorate’s Unit 504, targeted Tel Kwdana in Syria’s Quneitra province, near the Israeli-Syrian border. The IDF released video footage of the mission, showing troops advancing into the area during the nighttime raid. The IDF said the suspects were arrested without resistance and later transferred to Israel for further questioning. The military did not specify how many individuals were detained. A report from the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that an Israeli raid in Quneitra on Monday “targeting several homes,” has “ended in the arrest of two brothers.” According to the IDF, the cell captured near Tel Kwdana was preparing attacks against Israeli troops stationed in the demilitarized buffer zone. Lt.-Col. Y, commander of the IDF’s 7012th Battalion, said the suspects had been under surveillance for months. “Iran has been building terror infrastructure across Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. There are still Iranian elements operating in the region, and it’s our responsibility to stop them,” he told Ynet. The raid marked Israel’s second operation in less than a week aimed at disrupting Iranian-backed activity near the Golan Heights. On July 2, Israeli troops captured another Iran-linked cell. The recent operation followed an earlier raid on June 12, when Israeli forces detained seven Hamas-linked individuals in southern Syria during a 12-day conflict with Iran. Since December, Israeli forces have expanded their presence in the Quneitra region and on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, citing the need to prevent Iranian-backed militias from filling the vacuum left by the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government. The United Nations has condemned Israel’s growing footprint in the buffer zone, calling it a violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement. Israel, however, contends that the accord is no longer enforceable due to the collapse of Syria’s central government. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

14 Jul 25. Reports say “explosive-laden drone shot down over Erbil Airport” this morning. The Times of India and some Iraq-based media are reporting this morning that an explosive-laden drone was shot down near Erbil International Airport earlier today. The airport is home to a base for US troops and has previously been targeted by drone attacks. A video shared by The Times of India shows an object in the skies near the airport, the object is intercepted and an “explosion” is heard.  Another report, by One India, says the “Iranian drone” was travelling towards the US Consulate. The counterterrorism services of the Kurdistan region said there were no casualties as a result of the action, according to media reports.  There has currently been no official statement from the US Department of Defense. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

11 Jul 25. Cuashub.com said today that Houthis resume use of explosive drones in Red Sea attacks. Houthi forces have resumed their use of explosive-laden drones in attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The recent use of sea drones to sink a commercial ship may mean the campaign that has already disrupted one of the world’s busiest trade routes is once again underway. The latest incident involved a Liberian-flagged merchant vessel, believed to be the Magic Seas, which was attacked Sunday night about 100 kilometers southwest of Hodeida, Yemen. The vessel came under fire from small arms and rocket-propelled grenades before being struck by at least two bomb-carrying drone boats, according to private security firm Ambrey. The crew later abandoned ship as it took on water and caught fire.

“This likely serves as a message that the Houthis continue to possess the capability and willingness to strike at strategic maritime targets regardless of diplomatic developments,” said Mohammad al-Basha, a Yemen analyst with the Basha Report.

The Houthis have since claimed responsibility for the attack, with their media releasing a video of the incident. Ambrey said the target matched the Houthis’ established profile for previous attacks. The group has targeted more than 100 merchant vessels with missiles and drones since November 2023, sinking two and killing four sailors. Maritime experts note that unmanned surface vessel (USV) technology allows for remote attacks at longer ranges and presents a challenge for shipboard defenses. While groups like the Somali pirates have also operated in the region, they have not used drone boats.  The use of USVs in Sunday’s attack follows a pause in Houthi maritime operations after U.S. and allied airstrikes in March. That campaign ended a Houthi-declared ceasefire and temporarily reduced attacks on Red Sea shipping. The recent assault, if confirmed as a Houthi operation, would be the first major use of drones in the red sea since then. The British military’s United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center said the ship was struck by “unknown projectiles” and was later abandoned by its crew. The U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet referred questions to U.S. Central Command, which said it was aware of the incident but provided no further details. https://cuashub.com/en/content/houthis-resume-use-of-explosive-drones-in-red-sea-attacks/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

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Military And Security Developments
Jul 17.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have achieved notable advances to the west and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days, providing opportunities for Russia to consolidate recent gains
• GOVERNMENT: The Ukrainian parliament has approved the appointment of the former economy minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, as the new prime minister as part of a wider reshuffle
• FINANCE: The European Commission has proposed doubling the Ukraine Facility, which allocates funds to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, for the period 2028-2034, reflecting the bloc’s long-term commitment to Ukraine
• FORECAST: Sources close to the Kremlin maintain that Putin is unfazed by Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions and tariffs and is resolved to continue fighting in Ukraine ‘until he gets what he wants’
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have achieved notable advances to the west and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage circulated on 15 July indicates that Russian forces recently captured the settlement of Novospaske, which is located to the west of Toretsk. Additional geolocated footage posted on 7 and 14 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and north-western Yablunivka as well as to the south-east of Rusyn Yar, which are both located to the north-west of Toretsk. Geolocated footage circulated on 9 July indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced to the north-west of Dachne, which is located north of Toretsk. These advances point to mounting pressure on the only remaining Ukrainian forces in the Toretsk direction (in the Shcherbynivka area to the west of town) and point to Russian efforts to consolidate control of the area to set conditions to increase pressure on Kostiantynivka to the north.
• BAKHMUT: Further north, Geolocated footage circulated on 14 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Serebryanske forest north-east of Hyhorivka, which is located north-east of Ukrainian-held Siversk (in north-east Donetsk oblast).
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russia has not achieved any confirmed gains in the Pokrovsk sector; however, it maintains its offensive focus to the north-east and east of the city. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Russian forces are currently focusing on advancing towards Shakhove, located 26 miles (42km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk, and are primarily relying on highly attritional infantry assaults. Meanwhile, further to the south-west, Russian forces recently captured Novokhatske as of 16 July, located six miles (10km) directly south-west of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).
• KHARKIV: Russian forces are likely consolidating their control of the northern banks of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast). Geolocated footage circulated on 16 July shows that Russian forces recently advanced in a forested area north-west of Vovchansk, as well as in the Oil Extraction plant in northern Vovchansk, which is located around 31 miles (50km) to the north-east of Kharkiv city.
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in Sumy oblast amid a likely reorientation of Russian forces away from Sumy to the primary Russian offensive effort in Donetsk oblast. Geolocated footage posted on 14, 15 and 16 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western and northern Kindrativka, which is located to the north of Sumy city. A prominent Ukrainian military observer reported earlier on 17 July that Russian forces will be forced to retreat from Kindrativka and that Ukrainian forces have surrounded advanced Russian units on the flanks of Andriivka; however, we cannot yet confirm these claims. Geolocated footage also indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in western Yunakivka, which is located to the north-east of Sumy city, indicating that the axis remains fiercely contested.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Russian forces have advanced along the Oskil–Kreminna frontline. Geolocated footage from 15 July shows recent Russian advances north-east of Hrekivka, located around 20 miles (32km) to the south-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Footage from 16 July shows Russian forces progressing to the south-east of Karpivka, a settlement situated around 20 miles (32km) to the north-west of Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
• SOUTHERN: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia oblast following the recent resumption of Russian offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage circulated on 14 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kamianske, which is located south-west of Orikhiv at the extreme western flank of the Zaporizhzhia frontline on the banks of the Dnieper River. However, Russian offensive operations have likely provided Ukrainian forces with the opportunity for counter-attacks and spoiling operations; geolocated footage posted on 13 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in north-western Kamianske. There was, nonetheless, a lull in fighting over the past 24 hours; the Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on 17 July that Russian forces did not carry out any offensive operations in the direction of Orikhiv over the past day.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 15-16 July, Russia launched 400 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile, primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The attack focused on Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts. President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the attack damaged energy infrastructure, causing power outages. Various civilian facilities, including energy infrastructure, were damaged in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. During this attack, a Polish-owned factory in the centre of Vinnytsia City (Vinnytsia oblast) was struck by drones. The Polish authorities described the attack as deliberate. The factory reportedly belongs to the Barlinek Group, a Polish manufacturer of wooden flooring. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the factory was not the intended target. The damage possible resulted from a miscalculation or a projectile veering off course.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of, in all, 126 Ukrainian drones early on 17 July; most of them were downed over Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. The authorities in Smolensk, Kaluga and Voronezh oblasts reported hits as a result of the attack.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• GOVERNMENT: On 17 July, the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, approved the appointment of the former economy minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, as the new prime minister as part of a wider government reshuffle. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has proposed various ministerial changes, which will almost certainly be voted through by the Rada without issue. Svyrydenko was notably the minister that oversaw the signing of the minerals deal with the US. Her elevation to the premiership is likely part of a wider effort to prioritise Ukraine’s improving relations with the US, as well as a consolidation of the influence of the head of the presidential administration Andriy Yermak, of whom Svyrydenko remains an ally.
• GOVERNMENT: Outgoing prime minister, Denys Shmyhal, will notably replace Rustem Umerov as the new defence minister. Shmyhal is Ukraine’s longest-serving prime minister, having headed Zelensky’s government as a technocratic administrator for over five years. His appointment at the head of arguably the single most important ministry in Ukraine reflects his continued central role in the wider administration. Shmyhal’s appointment will only increase his direct involvement in the war effort; he will likely bring significant technocratic experience in overseeing the single-largest budget in the government. Amid wider restructuring of the government, Zelensky also confirmed on 16 July that the Ministry of Strategic Industries will be merged into the Ministry of Defence, with the incumbent acting head of the outgoing ministry, Herman Smetanin, to be appointed head of the state-owned Ukroboronprom defence corporation. This only underscores the increasing centralisation and importance of the defence ministry.
• GOVERNMENT: Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olha Stefanishyna has also been appointed the new special envoy to the US, ahead of her likely approval as the next Ukrainian ambassador to the US. Stefanishyna is set to replace the outgoing ambassador, Oksana Markarova, whom members of the Trump administration have frequently accused of having sympathies for the opposition Democratic Party. As such, Markarova’s replacement by a senior cabinet member with years of experience in heading Ukraine’s western integration efforts will be seen as a notable opportunity to boost US-Ukraine relations. We will further assess the implications of the ongoing government reshuffle in an upcoming report.
• FINANCE: On 16 July, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced that she has proposed doubling the bloc’s Ukraine Facility, which allocates funds to support Ukraine’s economy and reconstruction, for the period 2028-2034. The current Ukraine Facility budget for 2024-2027 is EUR 50 bn (USD 58 bn), made up of EUR 33 bn (USD 38 bn) in loans and EUR 17 bn (USD 20 bn) in grants; a budget of EUR 100 bn (USD 115 bn) is proposed for the next period. While the proposal will need to be approved, it underscores the EU’s longer-term economic commitment to Ukrainian reconstruction and economic stabilisation, which will ease pressures on Ukraine’s budget and macro-economic stability.
FORECAST
AID: Reuters reported on 15 July that, according to sources close to the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unfazed by US President Donald Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions and tariffs and is resolved to continue fighting in Ukraine ‘until he gets what he wants’. The sources claimed that Putin believes Russia can endure any amount of economic pain imposed by the West. While the Russian economy is undoubtedly struggling, these latest developments support our ongoing assessment that the Kremlin is highly likely willing to endure ever-increasing economic costs to continue the war, given that it has highly likely committed to an attritional strategy.
While senior Russian officials have indicated that Trump’s 50-day ultimatum to reach a deal in Ukraine will not influence or change Russia’s prosecution of the war, the Kremlin will likely at least present itself as seriously considering a ceasefire in the coming weeks. Despite the Kremlin’s readiness to accept further economic pain, it will want to prevent the threatened tariffs from entering into force if it can, given the impact this could realistically have on Russia’s export-driven energy revenue. As such, Istanbul-format talks will likely restart in the coming months in some form. However, we continue to assess that a stable and permanent ceasefire (let alone a strategic settlement to end the war) will remain highly unlikely in the next 50 days.
On 15 July, Trump stated that almost all weapons the US is willing to sell to NATO for donation to Ukraine are ‘immediately available’ and that US Patriot missile systems are ‘already being shipped’ to Ukraine from Germany, though Berlin denies this. Germany’s defence ministry subsequently stated on 16 July that it had no knowledge of any Patriot systems currently en route to Ukraine, directly contradicting the claims made by the White House that the systems would arrive in Ukraine within days. Indeed, on 16 July, Reuters cited numerous European and US officials who indicated that other NATO member states were not briefed or consulted before Trump’s announcement, leading to confusion as to who will pay for the weapons. It is understood that an upcoming virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on 21 July, involving senior leaders from Ukraine’s Western partners, will help resolve outstanding confusion around which weapons will be shipped to Ukraine and when.
Beyond Patriot air defence systems, it remains unclear which weapons the US is willing to sell to NATO for export to Ukraine and whether this will involve ‘offensive capabilities’. As previously reported, members of the Trump administration have indicated the possibility of selling offensive weapons, as well as defensive weapons. This could be a negotiating tactic to pressure the Russians to enter talks. Alternatively, it could reflect a steady shift in US policy, which could ultimately aim at increasing Ukraine’s offensive fighting capabilities to stop Russian advances on the battlefield. In the meantime, the Washington Post reported on 15 July that Trump is considering sending Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles.
We assess that it is unlikely that Tomahawks will be provided, at least before the 50-day deadline runs out and even beyond that, given likely backlash from Trump’s own base (which generally opposes greater military support for Ukraine). There are also serious questions around US Tomahawk stockpile reserves, given low production rates and the recent uptick in Tomahawk usage against the Houthis and Iran. Nevertheless, Tomahawks would grant Ukrainian forces an unprecedented long-range strike capability, capable of hitting Moscow and St Petersburg (both Russia). As such, the Trump administration would likely only provide such systems if it fully commits to a maximum-pressure strategy against Russia, which at present does not seem to be the administration’s preference.
Irrespective of whether offensive weapons will be provided, Trump’s proposal to sell weapons to NATO for shipment to Ukraine will highly likely be funded and well-received by many members. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed that Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were ready to participate. Germany will also likely be a significant contributor to any US-NATO weapons agreement, having previously indicated its willingness to supply two Patriot batteries to Ukraine.
Notably, however, both France and Italy have reportedly opted out of the nascent agreement and will not contribute to purchasing US equipment for Ukraine, due to their preference for European suppliers to purchase equipment within the bloc. French President Emmanuel Macron has long pushed for greater European strategic autonomy, including military-industrial production, and has resisted wider enthusiasm within the EU to purchase US weapons systems for domestic use and export to Ukraine.
Jul 15.
• Russia-Ukraine: US tariff threats are unlikely to force Moscow to end war in coming weeks. Earlier on 15 July, Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev downplayed a recent announcement made by US President Donald Trump, during which Trump threatened economic penalties if a peace deal is not reached in 50 days. On 14 July, Trump announced new plans to send military aid to Ukraine and threatened ‘severe’ tariffs against Russia. An unspecified White House official later clarified that Trump intends to impose 100% tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on countries purchasing Russian oil, which likely include China and India. Trump’s announcement underscores the US’ attempts to force Russia to make peace using a dual strategy of increasing military aid to Kyiv while ramping up economic pressure on Moscow. Russia will possibly feign interest in reinvigorating direct talks with Ukraine in the coming days or weeks. However, we assess that the threat of additional economic penalties is unlikely to encourage Moscow to take serious steps to end its war in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term. For further analysis on Trump’s recent announcement.
• Ukraine: Government reshuffle is unlikely to undermine policy continuity in near term. On 14 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky nominated Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine’s next prime minister in the latest cabinet reshuffle. Zelensky also proposed that current Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal should replace Rustem Umerov as the country’s new defence minister. Shmyhal must now formally submit his resignation to the parliament (Verkhovna Rada), which must vote on Shmyhal’s request before voting on Svyrydenko’s appointment. Voting on ministerial resignations will take place as early as 16 July, with the appointments possibly following on 17 July. Given the ruling Servant of the People party’s parliamentary majority, the Verkhovna Rada is highly likely to approve Zelensky’s nominations. Svyrydenko played a key role in negotiations for the minerals deal with the US. Her appointment likely signals Zelensky’s intent to reinforce ties with US President Donald Trump’s administration. More broadly, the reshuffle is likely aimed at further strengthening the country’s ongoing war effort, with a focus on economic and defence resilience. Ultimately, we assess that this latest development is unlikely to increase government stability risks in the short term.
Jul 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: Russian President Vladimir Putin had reportedly told US President Donald Trump that he intends to intensify offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the next 60 days, which could have influenced a decision to possibly shift US policy on the war
• GOVERNMENT: President Zelensky has tapped Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko to be Ukraine’s next prime minister, with the move officially launching an expected government reshuffle
• NORTH KOREA: North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has pledged to support Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine ‘unconditionally’, ahead of a possible deployment of troops to Ukraine in the coming months
• FORECAST: President Donald Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on Russia if it does not reach a deal to end the war in Ukraine within 50 days, but this is highly unlikely to compel Russia to do so given that its forces continue to advance
• OFFENSIVES: Earlier on 14 July, Axios reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin had told US President Donald Trump that he intends to intensify offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the next 60 days. According to Axios, this was divulged during a conversation between Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron, after which Trump stated that Putin ‘wants to take all of it’ (likely referring to Ukraine). Earlier on 14 July, Trump announced that he will impose tariffs on Russia if a deal to end the war is not reached in 50 days, reflecting growing US frustration at Russia’s lack of willingness to engage in a nascent peace process. The latest reports align with our own assessment that Moscow will highly likely continue intensifying offensive operations in Ukraine for as long as its forces continue to advance; the ongoing summer offensive and long-range strike campaign show no signs of slowing down. For further analysis, see FORECAST below.
• OFFENSIVES: Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed on 13 July that Russia’s ongoing summer offensive has failed to achieve its objectives and has fallen short of the command’s expectations. Zelensky credited this with Ukrainian efforts to stymie Russian advances across the frontline. Russia’s rate of advance has increased in contrast to earlier phases of the year, with the Economist estimating on 9 July that Russian forces have seized an average of six square miles (15 sq km) of territory per day during the current summer offensive. The Economist further estimated that, under that current rate of advance (which is notably higher than other periods of the war), it would take the Russian forces some 89 years to seize all of Ukraine, or, more realistically, until February 2028 to take the entirety of the four annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia).
• OFFENSIVES: Additionally, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, assessed on 11 July that Russia will unlikely be able to take the remainder of Donetsk oblast by the end of the year. Budanov assessed the Russian objective as ‘not realistic’, noting that the Russian High Command has also tasked its forces with advancing into Dnipropetrovsk oblast and establishing a six-mile (10km) buffer zone along the border of the region. At present, the Russian forces are seemingly prioritising offensive efforts around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) as well as to the south-west along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, to which they are making slow but steady progress. Ultimately, it also remains our assessment that Russian forces will unlikely have the capability to seize the remainder of Donetsk oblast by the end of 2025, particularly given the strong Ukrainian defences along the so-called ‘fortress belt’ of towns running from Sloviansk through Kramatorsk and down to Kostiantynivka (all Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations continued to record steady gains along the T-0504 highway to the north-east of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing efforts towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 13 July confirms Russian advances to the south-east of Novotoretske, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk). Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, Viktor Trehubov, highlighted Russia’s continued efforts along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway. According to a Ukrainian military source, Russian offensive operations remain highly attritional in the sector and involve sending poorly equipped and poorly trained infantry units in initial assault waves. These attacks aim to divert and exhaust Ukrainian forces before deploying better-trained and better-equipped assault units to launch follow-up attacks and exploit any potential opportunities.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, on 13 July, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed the capture of Myrne, located 11 miles (18km) south of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Geolocated footage published on the same day confirmed Russia’s control over the settlement. This development underscores Moscow’s ongoing efforts to consolidate its presence in the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk area. Trehubov reported Russia’s continued attempts to cross the border and reinforce its presence in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. For further analysis, please see OFFENSIVES.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 12 July indicates that Russian forces have modestly expanded their foothold inside eastern Kharkiv oblast around the border village of Milove, located around 58 miles (92km) to the east of Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast). Russian forces have advanced in northern Milove and to the west. As previously assessed, such advances likely reflect Moscow’s orders to establish a buffer zone along the international border. These efforts likely eventually aim to support operations either in northern Kharkiv oblast (around Vovchansk) or along the northern Oskil-Kreminna line further to the south-east (around Kupiansk).
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage from 10 July indicates that Russian forces advanced in northern Myropollia, located around 20 miles (32km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast), though overall Russian progress across the northern Sumy frontline has slowed in recent weeks.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 11 July shows recent Russian advances east of Petropavlivka, located to the east of Kupiansk. Ukrainian forces had made confirmed advances east of Kindrashivka, located to the north-west of Kupiansk, as of 10 July.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to advance slowly across the southern axis in Zaporizhzhia oblast following the recent intensification of operations in the area. Geolocated footage from 11 July indicates Russian advances in southern Plavni, a village adjoining Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) to the north-west along the banks of the Dnieper River. Fighting remains intense in the area, with geolocated footage also from 11 July indicating that the Ukrainians struck a bridge over the nearby Karachokrak River directly south. This reflects Ukrainian efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and slow the accumulation of forces and momentum in this direction.
• STRIKES: On 12 July, Russia launched a significant, large-scale, high-intensity strike involving 623 aerial objects. The strike comprised 597 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 26 Kh-101 missiles. Ukraine’s air defences intercepted 319 UAVs (with 258 drones reported lost) and 25 missiles. Russia’s MoD stated that it had targeted Ukrainian military-industrial enterprises in Kharkiv, Lutsk (Volyn oblast), Lviv (Lviv oblast) and a military airbase in an unspecified location. Ukrainian authorities reported hits in Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, Sumy and Volyn oblasts. The recent strikes underscore an uptick in highly focused Russian strikes against targets in western Ukraine. Other strikes in the preceding and following days involved much smaller barrages, though confirmed hits were recorded.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, early on 11 July, Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s Voronin Aviation Plant in Lukhovitsy (Moscow oblast), according to the Ukrainian General Staff. The plant produces and modernises Russian MiG aircraft (including the MiG-29 and MiG-31), develops new models of combat aircraft and contributes to Shahed-type drone modernisation efforts. Ukrainian forces additionally struck the Shipunov Instrument Design Bureau in Tula (Tula oblast), which produces missiles for the Zenit missile and Zenit missile-gun anti-aircraft systems.
• STRIKES: These attacks underscore the persistent vulnerability of Russia’s defence assets and its ongoing shortcomings in addressing these issues. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) entity recently stated that Russia has constructed protective structures at some of its airbases following Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb on 1 June. The recently fortified airbases include the Khalino airbase in Kursk oblast and Saky airbase in occupied Crimea. We previously reported on such efforts, which will likely only moderately improve defences at strategic sites due to continued strains on defensive resources coupled with continued Ukrainian drone innovation, which will likely seek to circumvent these new protective structures.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• GOVERNMENT: President Zelensky has tapped Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko to be Ukraine’s next prime minister, with the move officially launching an expected government reshuffle. Zelensky stated that he had met with Svyrydenko earlier on 14 July and they discussed measures to bolster Ukraine’s economic potential, expand support programmes for Ukrainians and scale up domestic weapons production. We previously reported that Zelensky was expected to initiate a cabinet reshuffle in the near term, with Svyrydenko likely to replace current Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 9 July 2025).
• GOVERNMENT: Shmyhal must now formally submit his resignation to the parliament, which it must vote on first before voting on Svyrydenko’s appointment. According to unspecified insiders, voting will possibly take place between 15 and 17 July; we assess that the parliament will highly likely approve Zelensky’s nomination. Meanwhile, reports in Ukrainian media claim that Shmyhal could possibly be appointed minister of defence, though Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov is also being considered for this post. The incumbent Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov may become Ukraine’s ambassador to the US. In addition, the appointment of new healthcare and education ministers, as well as mergers of different ministries, will also be possible. We will continue to report on the evolving government reshuffle in the coming days.
• SANCTIONS: The EU is reportedly close to reaching a full agreement on its 18th sanctions package against Russia, which could realistically come as early as today (14 July). Unspecified EU insiders stated on 13 July that all elements of the latest tranche of punitive measures have been agreed. However, one unnamed member state still has a technical reservation concerning a reduction of the price cap on Russian oil imports. Slovakia was said to still be seeking reassurances about plans to phase out Russian gas supplies to the bloc, though it has agreed to the sanctions package otherwise. Formal approval of the 18th sanctions package could possibly take place on 15 July, when foreign ministers will meet in the Belgian capital Brussels. For further analysis on the latest measures, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 June 2025.
• NORTH KOREA: North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un pledged on 12 July to support Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine ‘unconditionally’. Kim made the comments during a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov while the latter was on a three-day official visit to North Korea. South Korean military intelligence estimates from 13 July claim that Pyongyang has provided over 12 m rounds of 152mm artillery shells to Moscow for use in Ukraine. According to the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, North Korea now supplies as much as 40% of Russia’s ammunition needs, while also sending ballistic missiles and artillery systems. In exchange, Russia provides financial support and technology to North Korea.
• NORTH KOREA: While we cannot confirm the intelligence estimates from South Korea and Ukraine, it is clear that North Korea is a significant provider of military support to Russia. Our assessment remains that Pyongyang and Moscow will likely continue to expand their relations over the coming months, which will highly likely include the provision of further military assistance and possibly additional manpower (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 26 June 2025). Aside from military assistance, the two countries will likely maintain frequent diplomatic contact, including through high-profile visits of officials to their respective countries.
FORECAST
AID: Earlier on 14 July, President Trump threatened Russia with new tariffs if Moscow does not reach a deal to end the war within 50 days, but the prospect of tariffs will highly unlikely force an end to the war in and of themselves. Trump first mentioned his plans to make a major announcement on Russia on 10 July. Trump stated that tariffs of ‘about 100%’ are possible, given that he remains ‘very unhappy’ with Moscow over its lack of progress on peace talks. The slight shift in US policy has been seemingly triggered by growing US frustration at Russia’s lack of interest in meaningful peace talks, as well as Russia’s determination to maintain its war goals and continue to expand its ongoing offensive (see OFFENSIVES above).
Trump has also announced a new ‘deal’ to sell weapons to NATO to support Ukraine, though we do not yet know which weapons. US Senator Lindsey Graham stated on 13 July that he expected Trump’s statement to precede an influx of US weapons bound for Ukraine in the coming days. Axios previously reported on 14 July that the Trump administration was considering selling offensive weapons. Two unnamed insiders familiar with the matter claimed that they believe the US could send long-range missiles capable of reaching targets deep inside Russia, including the capital Moscow. However, neither was aware of any final decision on sending such equipment.
While we cannot confirm the provision of long-range weapons, if true, it would mark a significant shift in the Trump administration’s policy, given it had only recently resumed paused aid to Ukraine. Additionally, in December 2024, Trump said he ‘vehemently disagrees’ with Ukraine conducting strikes into Russia using US-supplied long-range missiles, citing concerns about the war escalating. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Trump will send these unspecified long-range weapons at all, and if so, whether there will be restrictions on their usage concerning targets and/or locations. It is possible that the threat of the provision of such weapons is a negotiating tactic to place further pressure on Moscow to adhere to Washington DC’s peace plans.
Trump announced on 13 July that the US will send additional Patriots to Ukraine, but he did not specify whether he was referring to full Patriot air defence batteries or just their interceptor missiles. Trump stated that the EU would pay for the equipment, though details on the number and timelines for delivery remain unknown. The provision of additional batteries, possibly including two by Germany and one by Norway, would notably strengthen Ukraine’s ailing air defence network, particularly as Russian forces have dramatically intensified long-range strikes over the last two months. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 10 July 2025.
Reports have emerged in recent days that Trump is also considering authorising additional funding for Ukraine for the first time since returning to office in January. Reuters first reported on the matter on 10 July, specifying that Trump would use Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for this (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 11 July 2025). CBS Bews reported on 12 July that the source of the possible funding is unclear, though leftover PDA totalling USD 3.85 bn from his predecessor Joe Biden could possibly be mobilised. Additionally, Trump reportedly has the authority to seize around USD 5 bn in Russian assets and use them to provide aid to Ukraine. However, neither Trump nor former president Biden have used this power.
Trump’s possible policy shift highly likely reflects the culmination of growing frustration at Russia’s lack of willingness to end the war but could also form part of a negotiating tactic. After returning to the presidency in January, Trump and his administration initially attempted to reset ties with Russia and engage with its officials directly to end the war. However, this approach failed to yield tangible progress towards a robust ceasefire lasting longer than a few days, let alone a peace settlement. Trump has expressed increasing anger at Russia’s intensification of long-range strikes against Ukraine in public.
If Trump does switch to a strategy aimed at maximising pressure on Moscow to enter ceasefire talks (and eventually peace talks), it remains highly unlikely that even 100% tariffs will in and of themselves force Russia to end the war in the short-to-medium term. Russia (and Belarus) have so far been exempted from US tariffs, while Ukraine notably already faces 10% tariffs. However, the impact of any potential US tariffs on Russia will likely be very limited, given that US-Russian trade volumes are very low. They dropped from USD 36 bn in 2021 to just USD 3.5 bn in 2024.
The possible provision of long-range systems and other weapons to Ukraine will highly likely have a much more significant deterrent effect than tariffs (or even an expansion of sanctions). However, even these are unlikely to be sufficient to force Russia to end the war in the short term. In the meantime, it remains our assessment that the Kremlin is likely willing to endure even greater economic and military problems from the war due to its belief that it can outlast Western support for Ukraine in the medium-to-long term. As such, US (and European) support for Ukraine would likely have to ramp up significantly; specifically, Ukraine would have to be able to stop Russian forces from advancing before the Kremlin’s cost-benefit analysis is seriously influenced to the point that Russia sees an end (or more likely a pause) in the war to be in its interests. (Source: Sibylline)

17 Jul 25. Enter the kill zone: Ukraine’s drone-infested front slows Russian advance.
• Summary
• Ukraine has become more durable in its war with Russia
• Drones change nature of warfare, buying Ukraine time
• Both sides churning out ms of the machines a year
• ‘Kill zone’ at front line makes Russian advance tougher
“Drones, drones, drones. Only drones. A lot of drones.”
A weary Ukrainian platoon commander speaks to the transformed nature of modern warfare as he’s medically evacuated from the front lines.
The Reuters Tariff Watch newsletter is your daily guide to the latest global trade and tariff news. Sign up here.
Kamikaze drones. Surveillance drones. Bomber drones. Drones that kill other drones.
These machines swarm the skies in vast numbers. They’re cheap, they’re deadly and they’re among the main reasons Ukraine believes it can hold out against advancing Russian forces this year and even beyond, according to a dozen Ukrainian commanders, officials and arms manufacturers involved in Kyiv’s defence. (Source: Reuters)

14 Jul 25. Trump announces novel plan to send weapons to Ukraine and gives Russia new deadline to make peace. When President Donald Trump won last year’s election, European officials quickly began discussing how to sustain US weapons shipments to Ukraine under a leader who had vowed to pull back American support. Eight months later, the results of that plan are coming into view, with Trump on board with a novel idea to sell US weapons to European nations that will then transfer them to Kyiv. The president announced the plan during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Monday. The president also laid out a new deadline for Russia — threatening trade consequences if no peace deal is reached with Ukraine within 50 days.
“We’re going to be doing very severe tariffs if we don’t have a deal in 50 days,” Trump said. “Tariffs at about 100% you’d call them secondary tariffs. You know what that means.”
A White House official clarified to CNN that when the president referred to “secondary tariffs,” he meant 100% tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on other countries that buy Russian oil.
As for the weapons, in addition to Patriot missile batteries — the top item on Kyiv’s wish list and one Trump said Sunday was vital to Ukraine’s defenses — the US could also sell short-range missiles, Howitzer rounds and medium-range air-to-air missiles to NATO members, which would then be transferred to Ukraine, a person familiar with the deliberations said.
The thinking behind Trump’s decision on weapons is multifold, officials said.
By selling weapons to European nations, rather than transferring them to Ukraine itself, Trump hopes to insulate himself from political criticism that he is reversing a campaign pledge to reduce the US role in the years-long war.
He is also expecting a financial windfall: each Patriot missile system costs roughly $1 bn and he has already touted the profits for the US as part of the scheme.
American officials also noted it would be quicker to get the Patriot systems to Ukraine if they are already in Europe as opposed to moving them from the United States or producing them new at a US factory.
And, at least in the view of some US officials, providing Ukraine with a surge in new weaponry could send a signal to Moscow that Trump is serious about his frustrations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who the US leader accused of peddling “bullshit” last week.
“He’s seriously frustrated with Putin,” a US official said. “He wants to show he’s serious about ending the war, and maybe this will show Putin it’s time to start negotiating.”
The plan was discussed in earnest around last month’s NATO summit in the Netherlands, where Trump met with European leaders and the Ukrainian president for talks described by people familiar as surprisingly productive.
But its origins actually came months earlier, after Trump won last year’s election — thrusting US support for Kyiv into fresh doubt. European officials, at that stage, began conceiving of a way to allow for continued weapons support to Ukraine even if Trump pulled back Washington’s role, as he had promised as a candidate.
For the last two weeks, officials in the US and Europe have been working on the details of how the plan would operate. NATO does not itself dispatch weapons to Ukraine, but rather acts as a clearinghouse, coordinating deliveries from individual countries.
The mechanism for transferring the weapons could include European nations transferring weapons already bought from the United States and backfilling them with new purchases. Or they could purchase new US weapons for immediate transfer to Ukraine.
Among the countries already on tap to participate are Germany and Norway. Officials said at least four other countries are likely to join.
(Source: CNN)

14 Jul 25. Ukraine’s deputy prime minister says battle drones should be controllable from any city. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov has told Ukrainian news agency RBC-Ukraine that battlefield drones should be “controlled from any city” and that “the future definitely belongs to unmanned aircraft”.
Fedorov spoke of the new technology alliance between the governments of Ukraine and the EU, which was presented at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome on July 11. BraveTech EU builds on Ukraine’s Brave1 defence technology initiative. It is a collaboration between startups, developers, investors and the military which will scale innovations and enable EU companies to test their technologies on the battlefield. Ukraine and the EU are each investing EUR 50 m in the initiative for the development, testing and implementation of technologies.
The first phase, or seed round, of the new initiative will begin later this year and Includes hackathons, establishing partnerships between Ukrainian and European companies and investors, R&D funding for Ukrainian and European startups, as well as testing for technology development in Ukraine for the needs of European defence companies.
Fedorov told RBC-Ukraine that BraveTech EU would most likely be “creating highly autonomous products, anti-guided aerial bombs, and anti-drone projects, such as those using fibre optics.”
“FPV drones and autonomous copters will evolve,” Fedorov told the news agency. “First, they’ll better identify and strike targets even under electronic warfare. Then, they’ll reach certain points without a connection. Eventually, drones will operate as a swarm in a shared network.”
When asked if Ukraine has a response to the barrage of drones launched by Russia, Fedorov said that interceptor drones are currently the most effective response. “I can only say what the President has already said – the solution has been found, it’s being scaled, and more than one company is working on it.” Meanwhile, companies that have reached certain solutions are already working on countering jet drones, figuring out how to operate in cloudy weather, etc.”
Fedorov told RBC-Ukraine that countering Shahed drones is a major challenge, adding that “Russia doesn’t have that problem; they have plenty of missiles and air defence systems” and “our air defences don’t reach their helicopters, but theirs do reach ours”.
Regarding remote drone operations, Fedorov said Ukraine will be launching a dedicated grant programme in this area. “We need to get UAV operators off the battlefield. Russia has created a Rubicon military unit that actively hunts our drone operators. So our mission is to enable remote operation as much as possible and eventually implement autonomy. That’s the next stage of warfare. The goal is for an operator to control a battlefield drone from any city in the country. Beyond that, full drone autonomy. But that’s probably a matter of years.”
For more information
RBC-Ukraine – Battlefield drones must be controllable from any city; https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/interview/battlefield-drones-must-be-controllable-from-1752478266.html (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

14 Jul 25. Electric Motorbikes Avoid Drone Detection.
When Anton Wass founded Stark Future, his goal wasn’t to break into the defense industry — it was to build a better motorcycle.
“We started this company to create an electric motorcycle that outperforms the best gas bikes in every category,” Wass said.
However, the unintended outcome of that mission, designing lightweight, silent, high-performance bikes, has increasingly attracted the attention of military and defense professionals around the world.
“We’ve had a lot of special operations personnel reach out and buy bikes specifically for that purpose,” Wass said. “They’re already using motorcycles, but this one is lightweight, powerful, silent, and leaves no heat signature.”
According to Wass, the combination of speed, stealth, and off-road capability makes the company’s VARG line of electric off-road motorcycles a compelling option for tactical mobility.
“There’s no faster way to move through difficult terrain than with this kind of bike, and now you can do it without making noise or being seen on infrared.”
In this episode of Defense Disruptors, we talk to Wass about how a civilian tech firm ended up developing a defense-ready vehicle and how dual-use innovation is shaping the company’s future as more than just a motorcycle maker.
A Tactical Edge
As defense interest grew, Stark Future began customizing bikes for military use under the defense-focused “VARG Skugga” version.
Wass emphasized the simplicity and ease-of-use of the vehicle, claiming that “anyone who can ride a bicycle can ride this bike. There are no gears, no clutch. It’s fully automatic.”
For defense units that can’t afford lengthy training cycles, this accessibility has proven to be a major advantage.
The bike’s resilience also stands out. “It’s fully waterproof,” Wass noted. “You can drop it in a river, pick it up, and keep riding. Try doing that with a gas bike.”
Other features include the ability to function as a portable power source for radios, sensors, or other field electronics.
The bike’s battery system, which Wass said may be “the most energy-dense in the world,” allows for a range of up to 130 kilometers (81 miles) in challenging terrain.
From Racing Tracks to the Battlefield
Stark Future’s entry into the defense sector coincides with a broader shift in military investment trends. As geopolitical tensions rise and the role of electric and unmanned systems expands, venture capital is increasingly flowing into defense-focused startups.
Wass acknowledged this shift but said his company has not yet received direct investment from military institutions.
“We have a 40-m euro loan from the European Investment Bank, but it’s not tied to defense,” he said. “We only just publicly revealed the defense product in February.”
Still, the company’s orientation is clearly aligned with dual-use innovation.
“We’re not a motorcycle company, we’re a technology company,” Wass said. Of the firm’s roughly 300 employees, half work in production and half in the office. “But within the office, about 85 people are in R&D,” he noted. “That’s almost two-thirds of our white-collar team focused on innovation.”
According to Wass, Stark Future holds 10 patents related to the motorcycle’s design, including innovations in battery integration, power converters, and mechanical components.
“We love figuring out how to do things better. That’s in our DNA.”
Philosophy Behind the Brand
The company’s name, “Stark Future,” reflects Wass’s ambitions. “Stark means ‘strong’ in Swedish, so it’s really ‘Strong Future,’” he explained.
The VARG name (Swedish for wolf) symbolizes strength and dominance in rugged terrain. The company’s gold ring logo, he said, represents both victory and wholeness.
“It ties to our full-circle mentality. We want to think through every detail and deliver complete solutions.”
Though Wass couldn’t reveal details about upcoming projects, he confirmed that Stark Future is developing multiple new products.
“They’re not public yet, but every new product must create real value in the market,” he said. “We don’t want to make just another ‘me-too’ product.”
Where Innovation Meets Necessity
For Wass, the intersection between cutting-edge performance and defense application is not accidental; it’s the result of designing products that meet demanding real-world needs.
“The defense industry has historically driven a lot of innovation,” he noted. “Sometimes it’s easier to get investment there for technologies that push boundaries.”
Asked what makes Stark Future’s bikes uniquely attractive to defense customers, Wass pointed to three main factors: silence, simplicity, and mobility.
“Yes, the stealth aspect is huge,” he said. “But the ease of use is equally important. You can deploy it quickly, ride it through any terrain, and you don’t need special training.”
Whether or not the company becomes a major defense supplier, Wass believes that high-performance, sustainable transport is a frontier worth pushing.
“If the world is going to become sustainable, we have to offer alternatives that are not only greener but better in every way.”
(Source: UAS VISION/NextGenDefense)

15 Jul 25. Cuashub.com said today that, Ukraine deploys new counter-drone rifle rounds. As small drones play an increasingly central role on the frontlines of the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine has begun fielding a new type of ammunition designed specifically to counter them. The new counter-UAS rifle rounds, which can be fired from standard NATO assault rifles, aim to provide Ukrainian troops with an accessible and lightweight method for defending against drone attacks without the need for specialized equipment.
The development comes as both Russia and Ukraine lean heavily on small, low-cost drones for reconnaissance and strike missions, a trend that has significantly reshaped ground tactics over the past three years.
With large armored formations proving highly vulnerable to drone observation and attack, both sides have transitioned to more dispersed troop deployments. However, small infantry formations remain exposed to drone threats, often lacking adequate point-defense capabilities.
The new round appears to be Ukraine’s answer to this gap.
On June 30, Brave1, a Ukrainian defense tech initiative backed by the government, posted a video on social media showing soldiers firing at a small drone using the new ammunition.
According to the footage, the round is compatible with common Ukrainian service rifles like the M4 and CZ Bren. Rather than a traditional bullet, the round breaks apart mid-flight into several high-velocity pellets, creating a spread pattern similar to a shotgun blast.
While the exact specifications have not been released, Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reports that the round disperses into approximately five projectiles and is effective against drones at ranges of up to 50 meters. The design allows for rapid-fire engagement of low-flying drones without requiring specialized training or equipment.
In its post, Brave1 stated that production is ramping up, with the goal of supplying at least one magazine of the new rounds per soldier. The concept is simple: when a drone is detected, soldiers can switch from their standard ammunition to a magazine containing the counter-drone rounds, enabling a near-instant response without the need to deploy separate weapons systems.
This flexibility may prove especially valuable during Russia’s ongoing summer offensive. Moscow has increasingly relied on small drones to scout Ukrainian defensive positions ahead of infantry or armored advances, often replacing more expensive artillery spotting with real-time aerial surveillance. These drones, typically launched in swarms, can relay targeting information or drop munitions with relative impunity if unchallenged.
Ukrainian forces, facing resource constraints of their own, have often been forced to improvise solutions to drone threats. While electronic warfare remains a critical tool, it does not guarantee protection against all drones, especially those operating at short ranges or using hardened links. The new rounds represent a low-cost, scalable solution that aligns with Ukraine’s broader strategy of asymmetric defense.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-deploys-new-counter-drone-rifle-rounds/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

14 Jul 25. Trump says US will send Patriot missiles to Ukraine. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Sunday he will send Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine, saying they are necessary to defend the country because Russian President Vladimir Putin “talks nice but then he bombs everybody in the evening.” Trump did not give a number of Patriots he plans to send to Ukraine, but he said the United States would be reimbursed for their cost by the European Union. The U.S. president has grown increasingly disenchanted with Putin because the Russian leader has resisted Trump’s attempts to negotiate a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. Trump is expected to announce a new plan to arm Ukraine with offensive weapons in a sharp departure from his earlier stance, Axios reported on Sunday, citing two sources familiar with the matter. The White House did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment. Reuters couldn’t immediately verify the report.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has asked for more defensive capabilities to fend off a daily barrage of missile and drone attacks from Russia.
“We will send them Patriots, which they desperately need, because Putin really surprised a lot of people. (Source: Reuters)

11 Jul 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drones seize Russian position without infantry engagement. In what Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has called a historic first, unmanned systems have seized a fortified Russian position in Kharkiv Oblast and captured enemy soldiers, without the involvement of Ukrainian infantry during the assault. The operation, conducted by the NC13 drone unit of the 2nd Assault Battalion, used a combination of FPV drones and a ground-based kamikaze robot to neutralize Russian positions embedded in a treeline. The robotic assault forced a group of Russian soldiers to surrender, an unprecedented battlefield capitulation to unmanned platforms.
Drones lead the assault, infantry follows
According to statements and footage released by the brigade, the engagement unfolded without a single shot fired by Ukrainian infantry. Drone footage shared on the brigade’s Telegram channel shows a powerful FPV strike followed by the detonation of a kamikaze ground drone, reportedly loaded with three anti-tank mines, at the entrance to a Russian dugout. As a second ground robot approached for another strike, two Russian soldiers emerged with a cardboard sign that read “We want to surrender” in Russian. The video then shows Ukrainian drones guiding the surrendering troops safely toward Ukrainian lines.
A drone operator involved in the mission explained the sequence:
“The explosion with the three antitank mines – that was a very powerful blast. The dugout wasn’t fully destroyed, so we got the order to hit it again. We moved in, and they realized we were going to blow it up again… and they very quickly put the sign out.”
A small reconnaissance UAS then flew over to direct the surrendering soldiers.
“They followed the Mavic precisely and lay down in the ‘dolphin pose’ on the ground,” the operator added, referring to a prone posture adopted while surrendering.
Only after the surrender was confirmed did Ukrainian infantry move in to secure the position—an area that had previously resisted capture despite multiple attempts.
According to the brigade, the entire operation took approximately 15 minutes:
“That unit took over the dugout’s treeline in just 15 minutes. The entire strip was already ours, literally, and without any losses. You could say, not a single shot was fired.”
This marks the first publicly confirmed case in modern warfare where unmanned systems alone seized enemy-held ground and captured personnel without direct human combat. Ukrainian military officials and drone operators involved in the mission noted the significance of the event:
“Our example proved that with robotic platforms, it’s possible not only to storm positions but also to take prisoners.”
The robotic strike involved an FPV drone and a ground-based “NRK” (remotely controlled ground robotic complex) carrying 21 to 22.5 kilograms of TNT. The combination of aerial and ground strikes proved effective against fortified positions previously inaccessible to infantry.
While FPV drone attacks and kamikaze robots are now common in the war, this operation stands out for achieving strategic gains and capturing enemy soldiers through unmanned means alone.
The Kharkiv region, where the assault took place, remains one of the most active fronts in Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Ukrainian forces have intensified their use of drones in both offensive and reconnaissance roles in the area.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-drones-seize-russian-position-without-infantry-engagement/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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11 Jul 25. SASC version of defense policy bill adds $32bn to boost F-35, shipbuilding. Shipbuilding and munitions were the major beneficiaries of the $32.1bn added to the defense topline, with about $8.5bn added for shipbuilding and about $6bn added for munitions, according to a senior congressional official. The Senate Armed Services Committee has greenlit $913.9bn in defense spending for fiscal 2026, authorizing $32.1bn more than the Pentagon’s budget request in order to fund additional investments in F-35s, shipbuilding and munitions, according a summary of the policy bill released today. The committee’s version of the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act includes $878.7bn for the Defense Department and $35.2bn for defense programs within the Department of Energy. When combined with defense spending outside the jurisdiction of the NDAA, total national security spending would sit at $924.7bn — a sum that does not include $113bn in reconciliation funds that is slated to be spent in FY26.

SASC members voted the bill through committee in a 26-1 vote on July 9, the summary states.

Shipbuilding and munitions were the major beneficiaries of the $32.1bn added to the defense topline, with about $8.5bn added for shipbuilding and about $6bn added for munitions, according to a senior congressional official. Other additions included investments made for items included in services’ unfunded priority lists as well as certain military construction projects. (The official declined to go into which ship or munitions programs were specific winners, however.) One adjustment laid out in the summary document is an increase of  Air Force F-35 procurement from 24 to 34 jets — a sum that, if enacted, would take the department’s annual total to 57 jets. The bill also includes provisions that would require the Pentagon to develop a plan to establish a government-controlled open mission systems computing environment for the F-35, a development that could help to break vendor-lock on the jet’s software and mission systems enterprise.

Like its House counterpart, SASC made acquisition reform a central part of the bill, including language meant to unburden nontraditional defense firms and move the Pentagon to a portfolio-centric acquisition model where it has more freedom to buy items though commercial processes. The SASC bill also includes language underscoring the committee’s continued support for Ukraine. It extends the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative through 2028 and authorizes $500 m in additional funds — even more than the $300m included by House authorizers. Additionally, it prohibits a reduction of US forces in Europe or the Supreme Allied Commander Europe position unless the defense secretary assesses the impact on US and NATO interests, and directs an independent risk assessment of any such changes. A second senior congressional official said those provisions were meant to ensure that the administration communicates with Congress before going forward with any such changes. For Golden Dome, the bill codifies the position of Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America, establishes a test regime for the system’s development and directs the construction of “new missile defense telemetry collection vessels to enhance testing capabilities.”

SASC Chairman Roger Wicker, R-Miss., said that the bill prioritizes industrialization and reflects the most dangerous threat environment since World War II.

“The bill my committee advanced today is a direct reflection of the severity of that threat environment, as well as the rapidly evolving landscape of war,” he said. “Accordingly, we have set forth historic reforms to modernize the Pentagon’s budgeting and acquisition operations.”

The committee’s top Democrat, Sen. Jack Reed of New Hampshire, said that the NDAA makes needed investments in servicemembers and technology and is “a critical, bipartisan measure that ensures our military remains prepared to meet the growing and complex challenges of a dangerous world.”

Navy and Marine Corps:

While the bill summary does not lay out increases to shipbuilding accounts, the NDAA does have a host of provisions on Navy shipbuilding with the intent of inducing more cost and schedule discipline from the service on key shipbuilding programs. The bill authorizes procurement for up to five Columbia-class submarines and a block buy of up to 15 Medium Landing Ships. It limits funding for TAGOS ships used for ocean surveillance, requiring the Navy to provide additional information about the program alternative solutions for the mission. It also requires the Navy to use a “vessel construction manager” acquisition on the Medium Landing Ship and Light Replenishment Oiler programs, as well as to use commercial contracting and construction processes for those programs. The bill also exacts some oversight over amphibious ship numbers, limiting funding for the Navy secretary and defense secretary if the Pentagon’s 30 year shipbuilding plan does not comply with the statutory requirement for 31 amphibious ships — a provision that could force the administration to provide a 30-year shipbuilding plan this year, something department officials have hinted may not occur. For the Navy’s nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, the bill “accelerates development … and creates a supplementary parallel pathway for rapid fielding,” likely pointing to increased funds for the program.

Air Force and Space Force:

The committee swiped back at the Air Force’s plan to retire the remainder of its A-10 Warthog fleet in FY26, mandating that the service keep at least 103 A-10s around next fiscal year. It also extends the current prohibition on retiring the RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone to 2030. The NDAA “supports procurement of the MH-139 Grey Wolf,” signaling additional funding to buy more helicopters. In the world of nuclear modernization, the bill establishes a target date for the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system to become initially operational, as well as setting minimum inventory requirements for ICBMs and launch facilities. It also “clarifies the timing” for certification of the B-21 with the AGM181 Long Range Standoff Weapon. Finally, the bill requires a number of reports, including that the Air Force submit a bomber roadmap, an ISR roadmap, and a briefing on the service’s plan to develop air base defense capabilities for expeditionary operations. Meanwhile, the Space Force must complete a study on future heavy and super heavy space launch capacity.

Army:

One of the biggest changes is a mandate to transfer the Countering small Unmanned Aircraft Systems responsibility from the Army to the office of the Pentagon’s top acquisition official, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. A senior congressional official said that with the growing emphasis on counter-drone operations, the intent was to elevate that organization into a joint one that could benefit all services. The committee directed the Army to provide a list of reports fleshing out key elements of its modernization plans and ongoing reorganization. It requires the service to submit a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy alongside its 2027 budget request, as well as a separate briefing on its plan for fielding ground combat vehicles for its Stryker and Armored Brigade Combat Teams. It also mandates that the service brief the committee on its propositioned stocks program, specifically on what its doing to ensure the Army has optimized where its placing its equipment around the globe. Finally, it requests a report on the Army’s plan to combine Army Futures Command and Training and Doctrine Command. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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