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Military And Security Developments
Jul 17.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have achieved notable advances to the west and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days, providing opportunities for Russia to consolidate recent gains
• GOVERNMENT: The Ukrainian parliament has approved the appointment of the former economy minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, as the new prime minister as part of a wider reshuffle
• FINANCE: The European Commission has proposed doubling the Ukraine Facility, which allocates funds to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, for the period 2028-2034, reflecting the bloc’s long-term commitment to Ukraine
• FORECAST: Sources close to the Kremlin maintain that Putin is unfazed by Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions and tariffs and is resolved to continue fighting in Ukraine ‘until he gets what he wants’
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have achieved notable advances to the west and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage circulated on 15 July indicates that Russian forces recently captured the settlement of Novospaske, which is located to the west of Toretsk. Additional geolocated footage posted on 7 and 14 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and north-western Yablunivka as well as to the south-east of Rusyn Yar, which are both located to the north-west of Toretsk. Geolocated footage circulated on 9 July indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced to the north-west of Dachne, which is located north of Toretsk. These advances point to mounting pressure on the only remaining Ukrainian forces in the Toretsk direction (in the Shcherbynivka area to the west of town) and point to Russian efforts to consolidate control of the area to set conditions to increase pressure on Kostiantynivka to the north.
• BAKHMUT: Further north, Geolocated footage circulated on 14 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Serebryanske forest north-east of Hyhorivka, which is located north-east of Ukrainian-held Siversk (in north-east Donetsk oblast).
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russia has not achieved any confirmed gains in the Pokrovsk sector; however, it maintains its offensive focus to the north-east and east of the city. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Russian forces are currently focusing on advancing towards Shakhove, located 26 miles (42km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk, and are primarily relying on highly attritional infantry assaults. Meanwhile, further to the south-west, Russian forces recently captured Novokhatske as of 16 July, located six miles (10km) directly south-west of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).
• KHARKIV: Russian forces are likely consolidating their control of the northern banks of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast). Geolocated footage circulated on 16 July shows that Russian forces recently advanced in a forested area north-west of Vovchansk, as well as in the Oil Extraction plant in northern Vovchansk, which is located around 31 miles (50km) to the north-east of Kharkiv city.
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in Sumy oblast amid a likely reorientation of Russian forces away from Sumy to the primary Russian offensive effort in Donetsk oblast. Geolocated footage posted on 14, 15 and 16 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western and northern Kindrativka, which is located to the north of Sumy city. A prominent Ukrainian military observer reported earlier on 17 July that Russian forces will be forced to retreat from Kindrativka and that Ukrainian forces have surrounded advanced Russian units on the flanks of Andriivka; however, we cannot yet confirm these claims. Geolocated footage also indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in western Yunakivka, which is located to the north-east of Sumy city, indicating that the axis remains fiercely contested.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Russian forces have advanced along the Oskil–Kreminna frontline. Geolocated footage from 15 July shows recent Russian advances north-east of Hrekivka, located around 20 miles (32km) to the south-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Footage from 16 July shows Russian forces progressing to the south-east of Karpivka, a settlement situated around 20 miles (32km) to the north-west of Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
• SOUTHERN: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia oblast following the recent resumption of Russian offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage circulated on 14 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kamianske, which is located south-west of Orikhiv at the extreme western flank of the Zaporizhzhia frontline on the banks of the Dnieper River. However, Russian offensive operations have likely provided Ukrainian forces with the opportunity for counter-attacks and spoiling operations; geolocated footage posted on 13 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in north-western Kamianske. There was, nonetheless, a lull in fighting over the past 24 hours; the Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on 17 July that Russian forces did not carry out any offensive operations in the direction of Orikhiv over the past day.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 15-16 July, Russia launched 400 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile, primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The attack focused on Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts. President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the attack damaged energy infrastructure, causing power outages. Various civilian facilities, including energy infrastructure, were damaged in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. During this attack, a Polish-owned factory in the centre of Vinnytsia City (Vinnytsia oblast) was struck by drones. The Polish authorities described the attack as deliberate. The factory reportedly belongs to the Barlinek Group, a Polish manufacturer of wooden flooring. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the factory was not the intended target. The damage possible resulted from a miscalculation or a projectile veering off course.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of, in all, 126 Ukrainian drones early on 17 July; most of them were downed over Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. The authorities in Smolensk, Kaluga and Voronezh oblasts reported hits as a result of the attack.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• GOVERNMENT: On 17 July, the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, approved the appointment of the former economy minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, as the new prime minister as part of a wider government reshuffle. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has proposed various ministerial changes, which will almost certainly be voted through by the Rada without issue. Svyrydenko was notably the minister that oversaw the signing of the minerals deal with the US. Her elevation to the premiership is likely part of a wider effort to prioritise Ukraine’s improving relations with the US, as well as a consolidation of the influence of the head of the presidential administration Andriy Yermak, of whom Svyrydenko remains an ally.
• GOVERNMENT: Outgoing prime minister, Denys Shmyhal, will notably replace Rustem Umerov as the new defence minister. Shmyhal is Ukraine’s longest-serving prime minister, having headed Zelensky’s government as a technocratic administrator for over five years. His appointment at the head of arguably the single most important ministry in Ukraine reflects his continued central role in the wider administration. Shmyhal’s appointment will only increase his direct involvement in the war effort; he will likely bring significant technocratic experience in overseeing the single-largest budget in the government. Amid wider restructuring of the government, Zelensky also confirmed on 16 July that the Ministry of Strategic Industries will be merged into the Ministry of Defence, with the incumbent acting head of the outgoing ministry, Herman Smetanin, to be appointed head of the state-owned Ukroboronprom defence corporation. This only underscores the increasing centralisation and importance of the defence ministry.
• GOVERNMENT: Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olha Stefanishyna has also been appointed the new special envoy to the US, ahead of her likely approval as the next Ukrainian ambassador to the US. Stefanishyna is set to replace the outgoing ambassador, Oksana Markarova, whom members of the Trump administration have frequently accused of having sympathies for the opposition Democratic Party. As such, Markarova’s replacement by a senior cabinet member with years of experience in heading Ukraine’s western integration efforts will be seen as a notable opportunity to boost US-Ukraine relations. We will further assess the implications of the ongoing government reshuffle in an upcoming report.
• FINANCE: On 16 July, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced that she has proposed doubling the bloc’s Ukraine Facility, which allocates funds to support Ukraine’s economy and reconstruction, for the period 2028-2034. The current Ukraine Facility budget for 2024-2027 is EUR 50 bn (USD 58 bn), made up of EUR 33 bn (USD 38 bn) in loans and EUR 17 bn (USD 20 bn) in grants; a budget of EUR 100 bn (USD 115 bn) is proposed for the next period. While the proposal will need to be approved, it underscores the EU’s longer-term economic commitment to Ukrainian reconstruction and economic stabilisation, which will ease pressures on Ukraine’s budget and macro-economic stability.
FORECAST
AID: Reuters reported on 15 July that, according to sources close to the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unfazed by US President Donald Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions and tariffs and is resolved to continue fighting in Ukraine ‘until he gets what he wants’. The sources claimed that Putin believes Russia can endure any amount of economic pain imposed by the West. While the Russian economy is undoubtedly struggling, these latest developments support our ongoing assessment that the Kremlin is highly likely willing to endure ever-increasing economic costs to continue the war, given that it has highly likely committed to an attritional strategy.
While senior Russian officials have indicated that Trump’s 50-day ultimatum to reach a deal in Ukraine will not influence or change Russia’s prosecution of the war, the Kremlin will likely at least present itself as seriously considering a ceasefire in the coming weeks. Despite the Kremlin’s readiness to accept further economic pain, it will want to prevent the threatened tariffs from entering into force if it can, given the impact this could realistically have on Russia’s export-driven energy revenue. As such, Istanbul-format talks will likely restart in the coming months in some form. However, we continue to assess that a stable and permanent ceasefire (let alone a strategic settlement to end the war) will remain highly unlikely in the next 50 days.
On 15 July, Trump stated that almost all weapons the US is willing to sell to NATO for donation to Ukraine are ‘immediately available’ and that US Patriot missile systems are ‘already being shipped’ to Ukraine from Germany, though Berlin denies this. Germany’s defence ministry subsequently stated on 16 July that it had no knowledge of any Patriot systems currently en route to Ukraine, directly contradicting the claims made by the White House that the systems would arrive in Ukraine within days. Indeed, on 16 July, Reuters cited numerous European and US officials who indicated that other NATO member states were not briefed or consulted before Trump’s announcement, leading to confusion as to who will pay for the weapons. It is understood that an upcoming virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on 21 July, involving senior leaders from Ukraine’s Western partners, will help resolve outstanding confusion around which weapons will be shipped to Ukraine and when.
Beyond Patriot air defence systems, it remains unclear which weapons the US is willing to sell to NATO for export to Ukraine and whether this will involve ‘offensive capabilities’. As previously reported, members of the Trump administration have indicated the possibility of selling offensive weapons, as well as defensive weapons. This could be a negotiating tactic to pressure the Russians to enter talks. Alternatively, it could reflect a steady shift in US policy, which could ultimately aim at increasing Ukraine’s offensive fighting capabilities to stop Russian advances on the battlefield. In the meantime, the Washington Post reported on 15 July that Trump is considering sending Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles.
We assess that it is unlikely that Tomahawks will be provided, at least before the 50-day deadline runs out and even beyond that, given likely backlash from Trump’s own base (which generally opposes greater military support for Ukraine). There are also serious questions around US Tomahawk stockpile reserves, given low production rates and the recent uptick in Tomahawk usage against the Houthis and Iran. Nevertheless, Tomahawks would grant Ukrainian forces an unprecedented long-range strike capability, capable of hitting Moscow and St Petersburg (both Russia). As such, the Trump administration would likely only provide such systems if it fully commits to a maximum-pressure strategy against Russia, which at present does not seem to be the administration’s preference.
Irrespective of whether offensive weapons will be provided, Trump’s proposal to sell weapons to NATO for shipment to Ukraine will highly likely be funded and well-received by many members. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed that Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were ready to participate. Germany will also likely be a significant contributor to any US-NATO weapons agreement, having previously indicated its willingness to supply two Patriot batteries to Ukraine.
Notably, however, both France and Italy have reportedly opted out of the nascent agreement and will not contribute to purchasing US equipment for Ukraine, due to their preference for European suppliers to purchase equipment within the bloc. French President Emmanuel Macron has long pushed for greater European strategic autonomy, including military-industrial production, and has resisted wider enthusiasm within the EU to purchase US weapons systems for domestic use and export to Ukraine.
Jul 15.
• Russia-Ukraine: US tariff threats are unlikely to force Moscow to end war in coming weeks. Earlier on 15 July, Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev downplayed a recent announcement made by US President Donald Trump, during which Trump threatened economic penalties if a peace deal is not reached in 50 days. On 14 July, Trump announced new plans to send military aid to Ukraine and threatened ‘severe’ tariffs against Russia. An unspecified White House official later clarified that Trump intends to impose 100% tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on countries purchasing Russian oil, which likely include China and India. Trump’s announcement underscores the US’ attempts to force Russia to make peace using a dual strategy of increasing military aid to Kyiv while ramping up economic pressure on Moscow. Russia will possibly feign interest in reinvigorating direct talks with Ukraine in the coming days or weeks. However, we assess that the threat of additional economic penalties is unlikely to encourage Moscow to take serious steps to end its war in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term. For further analysis on Trump’s recent announcement.
• Ukraine: Government reshuffle is unlikely to undermine policy continuity in near term. On 14 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky nominated Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine’s next prime minister in the latest cabinet reshuffle. Zelensky also proposed that current Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal should replace Rustem Umerov as the country’s new defence minister. Shmyhal must now formally submit his resignation to the parliament (Verkhovna Rada), which must vote on Shmyhal’s request before voting on Svyrydenko’s appointment. Voting on ministerial resignations will take place as early as 16 July, with the appointments possibly following on 17 July. Given the ruling Servant of the People party’s parliamentary majority, the Verkhovna Rada is highly likely to approve Zelensky’s nominations. Svyrydenko played a key role in negotiations for the minerals deal with the US. Her appointment likely signals Zelensky’s intent to reinforce ties with US President Donald Trump’s administration. More broadly, the reshuffle is likely aimed at further strengthening the country’s ongoing war effort, with a focus on economic and defence resilience. Ultimately, we assess that this latest development is unlikely to increase government stability risks in the short term.
Jul 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: Russian President Vladimir Putin had reportedly told US President Donald Trump that he intends to intensify offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the next 60 days, which could have influenced a decision to possibly shift US policy on the war
• GOVERNMENT: President Zelensky has tapped Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko to be Ukraine’s next prime minister, with the move officially launching an expected government reshuffle
• NORTH KOREA: North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has pledged to support Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine ‘unconditionally’, ahead of a possible deployment of troops to Ukraine in the coming months
• FORECAST: President Donald Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on Russia if it does not reach a deal to end the war in Ukraine within 50 days, but this is highly unlikely to compel Russia to do so given that its forces continue to advance
• OFFENSIVES: Earlier on 14 July, Axios reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin had told US President Donald Trump that he intends to intensify offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the next 60 days. According to Axios, this was divulged during a conversation between Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron, after which Trump stated that Putin ‘wants to take all of it’ (likely referring to Ukraine). Earlier on 14 July, Trump announced that he will impose tariffs on Russia if a deal to end the war is not reached in 50 days, reflecting growing US frustration at Russia’s lack of willingness to engage in a nascent peace process. The latest reports align with our own assessment that Moscow will highly likely continue intensifying offensive operations in Ukraine for as long as its forces continue to advance; the ongoing summer offensive and long-range strike campaign show no signs of slowing down. For further analysis, see FORECAST below.
• OFFENSIVES: Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed on 13 July that Russia’s ongoing summer offensive has failed to achieve its objectives and has fallen short of the command’s expectations. Zelensky credited this with Ukrainian efforts to stymie Russian advances across the frontline. Russia’s rate of advance has increased in contrast to earlier phases of the year, with the Economist estimating on 9 July that Russian forces have seized an average of six square miles (15 sq km) of territory per day during the current summer offensive. The Economist further estimated that, under that current rate of advance (which is notably higher than other periods of the war), it would take the Russian forces some 89 years to seize all of Ukraine, or, more realistically, until February 2028 to take the entirety of the four annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia).
• OFFENSIVES: Additionally, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, assessed on 11 July that Russia will unlikely be able to take the remainder of Donetsk oblast by the end of the year. Budanov assessed the Russian objective as ‘not realistic’, noting that the Russian High Command has also tasked its forces with advancing into Dnipropetrovsk oblast and establishing a six-mile (10km) buffer zone along the border of the region. At present, the Russian forces are seemingly prioritising offensive efforts around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) as well as to the south-west along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, to which they are making slow but steady progress. Ultimately, it also remains our assessment that Russian forces will unlikely have the capability to seize the remainder of Donetsk oblast by the end of 2025, particularly given the strong Ukrainian defences along the so-called ‘fortress belt’ of towns running from Sloviansk through Kramatorsk and down to Kostiantynivka (all Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations continued to record steady gains along the T-0504 highway to the north-east of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing efforts towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 13 July confirms Russian advances to the south-east of Novotoretske, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk). Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, Viktor Trehubov, highlighted Russia’s continued efforts along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway. According to a Ukrainian military source, Russian offensive operations remain highly attritional in the sector and involve sending poorly equipped and poorly trained infantry units in initial assault waves. These attacks aim to divert and exhaust Ukrainian forces before deploying better-trained and better-equipped assault units to launch follow-up attacks and exploit any potential opportunities.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, on 13 July, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed the capture of Myrne, located 11 miles (18km) south of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Geolocated footage published on the same day confirmed Russia’s control over the settlement. This development underscores Moscow’s ongoing efforts to consolidate its presence in the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk area. Trehubov reported Russia’s continued attempts to cross the border and reinforce its presence in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. For further analysis, please see OFFENSIVES.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 12 July indicates that Russian forces have modestly expanded their foothold inside eastern Kharkiv oblast around the border village of Milove, located around 58 miles (92km) to the east of Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast). Russian forces have advanced in northern Milove and to the west. As previously assessed, such advances likely reflect Moscow’s orders to establish a buffer zone along the international border. These efforts likely eventually aim to support operations either in northern Kharkiv oblast (around Vovchansk) or along the northern Oskil-Kreminna line further to the south-east (around Kupiansk).
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage from 10 July indicates that Russian forces advanced in northern Myropollia, located around 20 miles (32km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast), though overall Russian progress across the northern Sumy frontline has slowed in recent weeks.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 11 July shows recent Russian advances east of Petropavlivka, located to the east of Kupiansk. Ukrainian forces had made confirmed advances east of Kindrashivka, located to the north-west of Kupiansk, as of 10 July.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to advance slowly across the southern axis in Zaporizhzhia oblast following the recent intensification of operations in the area. Geolocated footage from 11 July indicates Russian advances in southern Plavni, a village adjoining Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) to the north-west along the banks of the Dnieper River. Fighting remains intense in the area, with geolocated footage also from 11 July indicating that the Ukrainians struck a bridge over the nearby Karachokrak River directly south. This reflects Ukrainian efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and slow the accumulation of forces and momentum in this direction.
• STRIKES: On 12 July, Russia launched a significant, large-scale, high-intensity strike involving 623 aerial objects. The strike comprised 597 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 26 Kh-101 missiles. Ukraine’s air defences intercepted 319 UAVs (with 258 drones reported lost) and 25 missiles. Russia’s MoD stated that it had targeted Ukrainian military-industrial enterprises in Kharkiv, Lutsk (Volyn oblast), Lviv (Lviv oblast) and a military airbase in an unspecified location. Ukrainian authorities reported hits in Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, Sumy and Volyn oblasts. The recent strikes underscore an uptick in highly focused Russian strikes against targets in western Ukraine. Other strikes in the preceding and following days involved much smaller barrages, though confirmed hits were recorded.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, early on 11 July, Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s Voronin Aviation Plant in Lukhovitsy (Moscow oblast), according to the Ukrainian General Staff. The plant produces and modernises Russian MiG aircraft (including the MiG-29 and MiG-31), develops new models of combat aircraft and contributes to Shahed-type drone modernisation efforts. Ukrainian forces additionally struck the Shipunov Instrument Design Bureau in Tula (Tula oblast), which produces missiles for the Zenit missile and Zenit missile-gun anti-aircraft systems.
• STRIKES: These attacks underscore the persistent vulnerability of Russia’s defence assets and its ongoing shortcomings in addressing these issues. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) entity recently stated that Russia has constructed protective structures at some of its airbases following Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb on 1 June. The recently fortified airbases include the Khalino airbase in Kursk oblast and Saky airbase in occupied Crimea. We previously reported on such efforts, which will likely only moderately improve defences at strategic sites due to continued strains on defensive resources coupled with continued Ukrainian drone innovation, which will likely seek to circumvent these new protective structures.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• GOVERNMENT: President Zelensky has tapped Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko to be Ukraine’s next prime minister, with the move officially launching an expected government reshuffle. Zelensky stated that he had met with Svyrydenko earlier on 14 July and they discussed measures to bolster Ukraine’s economic potential, expand support programmes for Ukrainians and scale up domestic weapons production. We previously reported that Zelensky was expected to initiate a cabinet reshuffle in the near term, with Svyrydenko likely to replace current Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 9 July 2025).
• GOVERNMENT: Shmyhal must now formally submit his resignation to the parliament, which it must vote on first before voting on Svyrydenko’s appointment. According to unspecified insiders, voting will possibly take place between 15 and 17 July; we assess that the parliament will highly likely approve Zelensky’s nomination. Meanwhile, reports in Ukrainian media claim that Shmyhal could possibly be appointed minister of defence, though Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov is also being considered for this post. The incumbent Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov may become Ukraine’s ambassador to the US. In addition, the appointment of new healthcare and education ministers, as well as mergers of different ministries, will also be possible. We will continue to report on the evolving government reshuffle in the coming days.
• SANCTIONS: The EU is reportedly close to reaching a full agreement on its 18th sanctions package against Russia, which could realistically come as early as today (14 July). Unspecified EU insiders stated on 13 July that all elements of the latest tranche of punitive measures have been agreed. However, one unnamed member state still has a technical reservation concerning a reduction of the price cap on Russian oil imports. Slovakia was said to still be seeking reassurances about plans to phase out Russian gas supplies to the bloc, though it has agreed to the sanctions package otherwise. Formal approval of the 18th sanctions package could possibly take place on 15 July, when foreign ministers will meet in the Belgian capital Brussels. For further analysis on the latest measures, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 June 2025.
• NORTH KOREA: North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un pledged on 12 July to support Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine ‘unconditionally’. Kim made the comments during a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov while the latter was on a three-day official visit to North Korea. South Korean military intelligence estimates from 13 July claim that Pyongyang has provided over 12 m rounds of 152mm artillery shells to Moscow for use in Ukraine. According to the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, North Korea now supplies as much as 40% of Russia’s ammunition needs, while also sending ballistic missiles and artillery systems. In exchange, Russia provides financial support and technology to North Korea.
• NORTH KOREA: While we cannot confirm the intelligence estimates from South Korea and Ukraine, it is clear that North Korea is a significant provider of military support to Russia. Our assessment remains that Pyongyang and Moscow will likely continue to expand their relations over the coming months, which will highly likely include the provision of further military assistance and possibly additional manpower (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 26 June 2025). Aside from military assistance, the two countries will likely maintain frequent diplomatic contact, including through high-profile visits of officials to their respective countries.
FORECAST
AID: Earlier on 14 July, President Trump threatened Russia with new tariffs if Moscow does not reach a deal to end the war within 50 days, but the prospect of tariffs will highly unlikely force an end to the war in and of themselves. Trump first mentioned his plans to make a major announcement on Russia on 10 July. Trump stated that tariffs of ‘about 100%’ are possible, given that he remains ‘very unhappy’ with Moscow over its lack of progress on peace talks. The slight shift in US policy has been seemingly triggered by growing US frustration at Russia’s lack of interest in meaningful peace talks, as well as Russia’s determination to maintain its war goals and continue to expand its ongoing offensive (see OFFENSIVES above).
Trump has also announced a new ‘deal’ to sell weapons to NATO to support Ukraine, though we do not yet know which weapons. US Senator Lindsey Graham stated on 13 July that he expected Trump’s statement to precede an influx of US weapons bound for Ukraine in the coming days. Axios previously reported on 14 July that the Trump administration was considering selling offensive weapons. Two unnamed insiders familiar with the matter claimed that they believe the US could send long-range missiles capable of reaching targets deep inside Russia, including the capital Moscow. However, neither was aware of any final decision on sending such equipment.
While we cannot confirm the provision of long-range weapons, if true, it would mark a significant shift in the Trump administration’s policy, given it had only recently resumed paused aid to Ukraine. Additionally, in December 2024, Trump said he ‘vehemently disagrees’ with Ukraine conducting strikes into Russia using US-supplied long-range missiles, citing concerns about the war escalating. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Trump will send these unspecified long-range weapons at all, and if so, whether there will be restrictions on their usage concerning targets and/or locations. It is possible that the threat of the provision of such weapons is a negotiating tactic to place further pressure on Moscow to adhere to Washington DC’s peace plans.
Trump announced on 13 July that the US will send additional Patriots to Ukraine, but he did not specify whether he was referring to full Patriot air defence batteries or just their interceptor missiles. Trump stated that the EU would pay for the equipment, though details on the number and timelines for delivery remain unknown. The provision of additional batteries, possibly including two by Germany and one by Norway, would notably strengthen Ukraine’s ailing air defence network, particularly as Russian forces have dramatically intensified long-range strikes over the last two months. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 10 July 2025.
Reports have emerged in recent days that Trump is also considering authorising additional funding for Ukraine for the first time since returning to office in January. Reuters first reported on the matter on 10 July, specifying that Trump would use Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for this (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 11 July 2025). CBS Bews reported on 12 July that the source of the possible funding is unclear, though leftover PDA totalling USD 3.85 bn from his predecessor Joe Biden could possibly be mobilised. Additionally, Trump reportedly has the authority to seize around USD 5 bn in Russian assets and use them to provide aid to Ukraine. However, neither Trump nor former president Biden have used this power.
Trump’s possible policy shift highly likely reflects the culmination of growing frustration at Russia’s lack of willingness to end the war but could also form part of a negotiating tactic. After returning to the presidency in January, Trump and his administration initially attempted to reset ties with Russia and engage with its officials directly to end the war. However, this approach failed to yield tangible progress towards a robust ceasefire lasting longer than a few days, let alone a peace settlement. Trump has expressed increasing anger at Russia’s intensification of long-range strikes against Ukraine in public.
If Trump does switch to a strategy aimed at maximising pressure on Moscow to enter ceasefire talks (and eventually peace talks), it remains highly unlikely that even 100% tariffs will in and of themselves force Russia to end the war in the short-to-medium term. Russia (and Belarus) have so far been exempted from US tariffs, while Ukraine notably already faces 10% tariffs. However, the impact of any potential US tariffs on Russia will likely be very limited, given that US-Russian trade volumes are very low. They dropped from USD 36 bn in 2021 to just USD 3.5 bn in 2024.
The possible provision of long-range systems and other weapons to Ukraine will highly likely have a much more significant deterrent effect than tariffs (or even an expansion of sanctions). However, even these are unlikely to be sufficient to force Russia to end the war in the short term. In the meantime, it remains our assessment that the Kremlin is likely willing to endure even greater economic and military problems from the war due to its belief that it can outlast Western support for Ukraine in the medium-to-long term. As such, US (and European) support for Ukraine would likely have to ramp up significantly; specifically, Ukraine would have to be able to stop Russian forces from advancing before the Kremlin’s cost-benefit analysis is seriously influenced to the point that Russia sees an end (or more likely a pause) in the war to be in its interests. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Jul 25. Enter the kill zone: Ukraine’s drone-infested front slows Russian advance.
• Summary
• Ukraine has become more durable in its war with Russia
• Drones change nature of warfare, buying Ukraine time
• Both sides churning out ms of the machines a year
• ‘Kill zone’ at front line makes Russian advance tougher
“Drones, drones, drones. Only drones. A lot of drones.”
A weary Ukrainian platoon commander speaks to the transformed nature of modern warfare as he’s medically evacuated from the front lines.
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Kamikaze drones. Surveillance drones. Bomber drones. Drones that kill other drones.
These machines swarm the skies in vast numbers. They’re cheap, they’re deadly and they’re among the main reasons Ukraine believes it can hold out against advancing Russian forces this year and even beyond, according to a dozen Ukrainian commanders, officials and arms manufacturers involved in Kyiv’s defence. (Source: Reuters)
14 Jul 25. Trump announces novel plan to send weapons to Ukraine and gives Russia new deadline to make peace. When President Donald Trump won last year’s election, European officials quickly began discussing how to sustain US weapons shipments to Ukraine under a leader who had vowed to pull back American support. Eight months later, the results of that plan are coming into view, with Trump on board with a novel idea to sell US weapons to European nations that will then transfer them to Kyiv. The president announced the plan during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Monday. The president also laid out a new deadline for Russia — threatening trade consequences if no peace deal is reached with Ukraine within 50 days.
“We’re going to be doing very severe tariffs if we don’t have a deal in 50 days,” Trump said. “Tariffs at about 100% you’d call them secondary tariffs. You know what that means.”
A White House official clarified to CNN that when the president referred to “secondary tariffs,” he meant 100% tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on other countries that buy Russian oil.
As for the weapons, in addition to Patriot missile batteries — the top item on Kyiv’s wish list and one Trump said Sunday was vital to Ukraine’s defenses — the US could also sell short-range missiles, Howitzer rounds and medium-range air-to-air missiles to NATO members, which would then be transferred to Ukraine, a person familiar with the deliberations said.
The thinking behind Trump’s decision on weapons is multifold, officials said.
By selling weapons to European nations, rather than transferring them to Ukraine itself, Trump hopes to insulate himself from political criticism that he is reversing a campaign pledge to reduce the US role in the years-long war.
He is also expecting a financial windfall: each Patriot missile system costs roughly $1 bn and he has already touted the profits for the US as part of the scheme.
American officials also noted it would be quicker to get the Patriot systems to Ukraine if they are already in Europe as opposed to moving them from the United States or producing them new at a US factory.
And, at least in the view of some US officials, providing Ukraine with a surge in new weaponry could send a signal to Moscow that Trump is serious about his frustrations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who the US leader accused of peddling “bullshit” last week.
“He’s seriously frustrated with Putin,” a US official said. “He wants to show he’s serious about ending the war, and maybe this will show Putin it’s time to start negotiating.”
The plan was discussed in earnest around last month’s NATO summit in the Netherlands, where Trump met with European leaders and the Ukrainian president for talks described by people familiar as surprisingly productive.
But its origins actually came months earlier, after Trump won last year’s election — thrusting US support for Kyiv into fresh doubt. European officials, at that stage, began conceiving of a way to allow for continued weapons support to Ukraine even if Trump pulled back Washington’s role, as he had promised as a candidate.
For the last two weeks, officials in the US and Europe have been working on the details of how the plan would operate. NATO does not itself dispatch weapons to Ukraine, but rather acts as a clearinghouse, coordinating deliveries from individual countries.
The mechanism for transferring the weapons could include European nations transferring weapons already bought from the United States and backfilling them with new purchases. Or they could purchase new US weapons for immediate transfer to Ukraine.
Among the countries already on tap to participate are Germany and Norway. Officials said at least four other countries are likely to join.
(Source: CNN)
14 Jul 25. Ukraine’s deputy prime minister says battle drones should be controllable from any city. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov has told Ukrainian news agency RBC-Ukraine that battlefield drones should be “controlled from any city” and that “the future definitely belongs to unmanned aircraft”.
Fedorov spoke of the new technology alliance between the governments of Ukraine and the EU, which was presented at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome on July 11. BraveTech EU builds on Ukraine’s Brave1 defence technology initiative. It is a collaboration between startups, developers, investors and the military which will scale innovations and enable EU companies to test their technologies on the battlefield. Ukraine and the EU are each investing EUR 50 m in the initiative for the development, testing and implementation of technologies.
The first phase, or seed round, of the new initiative will begin later this year and Includes hackathons, establishing partnerships between Ukrainian and European companies and investors, R&D funding for Ukrainian and European startups, as well as testing for technology development in Ukraine for the needs of European defence companies.
Fedorov told RBC-Ukraine that BraveTech EU would most likely be “creating highly autonomous products, anti-guided aerial bombs, and anti-drone projects, such as those using fibre optics.”
“FPV drones and autonomous copters will evolve,” Fedorov told the news agency. “First, they’ll better identify and strike targets even under electronic warfare. Then, they’ll reach certain points without a connection. Eventually, drones will operate as a swarm in a shared network.”
When asked if Ukraine has a response to the barrage of drones launched by Russia, Fedorov said that interceptor drones are currently the most effective response. “I can only say what the President has already said – the solution has been found, it’s being scaled, and more than one company is working on it.” Meanwhile, companies that have reached certain solutions are already working on countering jet drones, figuring out how to operate in cloudy weather, etc.”
Fedorov told RBC-Ukraine that countering Shahed drones is a major challenge, adding that “Russia doesn’t have that problem; they have plenty of missiles and air defence systems” and “our air defences don’t reach their helicopters, but theirs do reach ours”.
Regarding remote drone operations, Fedorov said Ukraine will be launching a dedicated grant programme in this area. “We need to get UAV operators off the battlefield. Russia has created a Rubicon military unit that actively hunts our drone operators. So our mission is to enable remote operation as much as possible and eventually implement autonomy. That’s the next stage of warfare. The goal is for an operator to control a battlefield drone from any city in the country. Beyond that, full drone autonomy. But that’s probably a matter of years.”
For more information
RBC-Ukraine – Battlefield drones must be controllable from any city; https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/interview/battlefield-drones-must-be-controllable-from-1752478266.html (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)
14 Jul 25. Electric Motorbikes Avoid Drone Detection.
When Anton Wass founded Stark Future, his goal wasn’t to break into the defense industry — it was to build a better motorcycle.
“We started this company to create an electric motorcycle that outperforms the best gas bikes in every category,” Wass said.
However, the unintended outcome of that mission, designing lightweight, silent, high-performance bikes, has increasingly attracted the attention of military and defense professionals around the world.
“We’ve had a lot of special operations personnel reach out and buy bikes specifically for that purpose,” Wass said. “They’re already using motorcycles, but this one is lightweight, powerful, silent, and leaves no heat signature.”
According to Wass, the combination of speed, stealth, and off-road capability makes the company’s VARG line of electric off-road motorcycles a compelling option for tactical mobility.
“There’s no faster way to move through difficult terrain than with this kind of bike, and now you can do it without making noise or being seen on infrared.”
In this episode of Defense Disruptors, we talk to Wass about how a civilian tech firm ended up developing a defense-ready vehicle and how dual-use innovation is shaping the company’s future as more than just a motorcycle maker.
A Tactical Edge
As defense interest grew, Stark Future began customizing bikes for military use under the defense-focused “VARG Skugga” version.
Wass emphasized the simplicity and ease-of-use of the vehicle, claiming that “anyone who can ride a bicycle can ride this bike. There are no gears, no clutch. It’s fully automatic.”
For defense units that can’t afford lengthy training cycles, this accessibility has proven to be a major advantage.
The bike’s resilience also stands out. “It’s fully waterproof,” Wass noted. “You can drop it in a river, pick it up, and keep riding. Try doing that with a gas bike.”
Other features include the ability to function as a portable power source for radios, sensors, or other field electronics.
The bike’s battery system, which Wass said may be “the most energy-dense in the world,” allows for a range of up to 130 kilometers (81 miles) in challenging terrain.
From Racing Tracks to the Battlefield
Stark Future’s entry into the defense sector coincides with a broader shift in military investment trends. As geopolitical tensions rise and the role of electric and unmanned systems expands, venture capital is increasingly flowing into defense-focused startups.
Wass acknowledged this shift but said his company has not yet received direct investment from military institutions.
“We have a 40-m euro loan from the European Investment Bank, but it’s not tied to defense,” he said. “We only just publicly revealed the defense product in February.”
Still, the company’s orientation is clearly aligned with dual-use innovation.
“We’re not a motorcycle company, we’re a technology company,” Wass said. Of the firm’s roughly 300 employees, half work in production and half in the office. “But within the office, about 85 people are in R&D,” he noted. “That’s almost two-thirds of our white-collar team focused on innovation.”
According to Wass, Stark Future holds 10 patents related to the motorcycle’s design, including innovations in battery integration, power converters, and mechanical components.
“We love figuring out how to do things better. That’s in our DNA.”
Philosophy Behind the Brand
The company’s name, “Stark Future,” reflects Wass’s ambitions. “Stark means ‘strong’ in Swedish, so it’s really ‘Strong Future,’” he explained.
The VARG name (Swedish for wolf) symbolizes strength and dominance in rugged terrain. The company’s gold ring logo, he said, represents both victory and wholeness.
“It ties to our full-circle mentality. We want to think through every detail and deliver complete solutions.”
Though Wass couldn’t reveal details about upcoming projects, he confirmed that Stark Future is developing multiple new products.
“They’re not public yet, but every new product must create real value in the market,” he said. “We don’t want to make just another ‘me-too’ product.”
Where Innovation Meets Necessity
For Wass, the intersection between cutting-edge performance and defense application is not accidental; it’s the result of designing products that meet demanding real-world needs.
“The defense industry has historically driven a lot of innovation,” he noted. “Sometimes it’s easier to get investment there for technologies that push boundaries.”
Asked what makes Stark Future’s bikes uniquely attractive to defense customers, Wass pointed to three main factors: silence, simplicity, and mobility.
“Yes, the stealth aspect is huge,” he said. “But the ease of use is equally important. You can deploy it quickly, ride it through any terrain, and you don’t need special training.”
Whether or not the company becomes a major defense supplier, Wass believes that high-performance, sustainable transport is a frontier worth pushing.
“If the world is going to become sustainable, we have to offer alternatives that are not only greener but better in every way.”
(Source: UAS VISION/NextGenDefense)
15 Jul 25. Cuashub.com said today that, Ukraine deploys new counter-drone rifle rounds. As small drones play an increasingly central role on the frontlines of the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine has begun fielding a new type of ammunition designed specifically to counter them. The new counter-UAS rifle rounds, which can be fired from standard NATO assault rifles, aim to provide Ukrainian troops with an accessible and lightweight method for defending against drone attacks without the need for specialized equipment.
The development comes as both Russia and Ukraine lean heavily on small, low-cost drones for reconnaissance and strike missions, a trend that has significantly reshaped ground tactics over the past three years.
With large armored formations proving highly vulnerable to drone observation and attack, both sides have transitioned to more dispersed troop deployments. However, small infantry formations remain exposed to drone threats, often lacking adequate point-defense capabilities.
The new round appears to be Ukraine’s answer to this gap.
On June 30, Brave1, a Ukrainian defense tech initiative backed by the government, posted a video on social media showing soldiers firing at a small drone using the new ammunition.
According to the footage, the round is compatible with common Ukrainian service rifles like the M4 and CZ Bren. Rather than a traditional bullet, the round breaks apart mid-flight into several high-velocity pellets, creating a spread pattern similar to a shotgun blast.
While the exact specifications have not been released, Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reports that the round disperses into approximately five projectiles and is effective against drones at ranges of up to 50 meters. The design allows for rapid-fire engagement of low-flying drones without requiring specialized training or equipment.
In its post, Brave1 stated that production is ramping up, with the goal of supplying at least one magazine of the new rounds per soldier. The concept is simple: when a drone is detected, soldiers can switch from their standard ammunition to a magazine containing the counter-drone rounds, enabling a near-instant response without the need to deploy separate weapons systems.
This flexibility may prove especially valuable during Russia’s ongoing summer offensive. Moscow has increasingly relied on small drones to scout Ukrainian defensive positions ahead of infantry or armored advances, often replacing more expensive artillery spotting with real-time aerial surveillance. These drones, typically launched in swarms, can relay targeting information or drop munitions with relative impunity if unchallenged.
Ukrainian forces, facing resource constraints of their own, have often been forced to improvise solutions to drone threats. While electronic warfare remains a critical tool, it does not guarantee protection against all drones, especially those operating at short ranges or using hardened links. The new rounds represent a low-cost, scalable solution that aligns with Ukraine’s broader strategy of asymmetric defense.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-deploys-new-counter-drone-rifle-rounds/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
14 Jul 25. Trump says US will send Patriot missiles to Ukraine. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Sunday he will send Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine, saying they are necessary to defend the country because Russian President Vladimir Putin “talks nice but then he bombs everybody in the evening.” Trump did not give a number of Patriots he plans to send to Ukraine, but he said the United States would be reimbursed for their cost by the European Union. The U.S. president has grown increasingly disenchanted with Putin because the Russian leader has resisted Trump’s attempts to negotiate a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. Trump is expected to announce a new plan to arm Ukraine with offensive weapons in a sharp departure from his earlier stance, Axios reported on Sunday, citing two sources familiar with the matter. The White House did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment. Reuters couldn’t immediately verify the report.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has asked for more defensive capabilities to fend off a daily barrage of missile and drone attacks from Russia.
“We will send them Patriots, which they desperately need, because Putin really surprised a lot of people. (Source: Reuters)
11 Jul 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drones seize Russian position without infantry engagement. In what Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has called a historic first, unmanned systems have seized a fortified Russian position in Kharkiv Oblast and captured enemy soldiers, without the involvement of Ukrainian infantry during the assault. The operation, conducted by the NC13 drone unit of the 2nd Assault Battalion, used a combination of FPV drones and a ground-based kamikaze robot to neutralize Russian positions embedded in a treeline. The robotic assault forced a group of Russian soldiers to surrender, an unprecedented battlefield capitulation to unmanned platforms.
Drones lead the assault, infantry follows
According to statements and footage released by the brigade, the engagement unfolded without a single shot fired by Ukrainian infantry. Drone footage shared on the brigade’s Telegram channel shows a powerful FPV strike followed by the detonation of a kamikaze ground drone, reportedly loaded with three anti-tank mines, at the entrance to a Russian dugout. As a second ground robot approached for another strike, two Russian soldiers emerged with a cardboard sign that read “We want to surrender” in Russian. The video then shows Ukrainian drones guiding the surrendering troops safely toward Ukrainian lines.
A drone operator involved in the mission explained the sequence:
“The explosion with the three antitank mines – that was a very powerful blast. The dugout wasn’t fully destroyed, so we got the order to hit it again. We moved in, and they realized we were going to blow it up again… and they very quickly put the sign out.”
A small reconnaissance UAS then flew over to direct the surrendering soldiers.
“They followed the Mavic precisely and lay down in the ‘dolphin pose’ on the ground,” the operator added, referring to a prone posture adopted while surrendering.
Only after the surrender was confirmed did Ukrainian infantry move in to secure the position—an area that had previously resisted capture despite multiple attempts.
According to the brigade, the entire operation took approximately 15 minutes:
“That unit took over the dugout’s treeline in just 15 minutes. The entire strip was already ours, literally, and without any losses. You could say, not a single shot was fired.”
This marks the first publicly confirmed case in modern warfare where unmanned systems alone seized enemy-held ground and captured personnel without direct human combat. Ukrainian military officials and drone operators involved in the mission noted the significance of the event:
“Our example proved that with robotic platforms, it’s possible not only to storm positions but also to take prisoners.”
The robotic strike involved an FPV drone and a ground-based “NRK” (remotely controlled ground robotic complex) carrying 21 to 22.5 kilograms of TNT. The combination of aerial and ground strikes proved effective against fortified positions previously inaccessible to infantry.
While FPV drone attacks and kamikaze robots are now common in the war, this operation stands out for achieving strategic gains and capturing enemy soldiers through unmanned means alone.
The Kharkiv region, where the assault took place, remains one of the most active fronts in Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Ukrainian forces have intensified their use of drones in both offensive and reconnaissance roles in the area.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-drones-seize-russian-position-without-infantry-engagement/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
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