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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 08.

  • Ukraine: Cyber operation highlights sustained security risks for defence sector. On 7 August, international news outlets reported that a threat group (‘UAC-0099’) is conducting a cyber operation against the defence sector in Ukraine. The group distributes phishing emails to trick victims into clicking on an embedded link. The link then redirects the victim to a legitimate file-hosting service containing a malicious script that downloads a malware loader (‘MATCHBOIL’). The loader subsequently executes two payloads (‘MATCHWOK’ and ‘DRAGSTARE’) to maintain persistence. It then collects sensitive information (including archives, cookies and login credentials), highlighting the continuous development of the group’s toolset. MATCHWOK also displays several anti-analysis features and avoids and/or terminates its execution if security tools are detected, underscoring its stealth capabilities. While UAC-0099 has not been attributed to any state, it has targeted Ukrainian organisations since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. We assess that this highlights the long-term security risks facing the Ukrainian defence sector.

Aug 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia is accelerating its mobilisation efforts, meaning Ukraine will have no alternative but to continue its own mobilisation drive
  • STRIKES: There has been a marked decrease in the intensity of Russian long-range strikes ahead of the US’ 8 August deadline; another moratorium on long-range strikes is possible in the coming weeks
  • AID: The first batch of US weapons supplied to Ukraine via NATO is expected to arrive in the coming weeks, amid an ostensible US strategy to increase pressure on Moscow to agree to end the war
  • FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump are set to meet in the coming days as the latter seeks to increase pressure on Moscow to end the war; a breakthrough is unlikely
  • OFFENSIVES: On 5 August, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russia is accelerating its mobilisation efforts; if true, this means that Ukraine will have no alternative but to continue with its own mobilisation drive. According to Syrskyi, Russian forces plan to form ten new military divisions by the end of the year, of which two have already been established. In terms of personnel, Russia’s advantage over Ukraine is only widening, which represents just one reason why it remains highly unlikely that Moscow will agree to end the war, despite the impending US deadline of 8 August (see FORECAST below for further analysis).
  • OFFENSIVES: Under current recruitment and expansion efforts, Syrskyi estimates that Russian forces are adding around 9,000 additional troops to their numbers every month, despite heavy losses. This aligns with our long-standing assessment that Russia is substantially increasing the size of its forces inside Ukraine, while also facilitating wider reconstitution efforts, such as the expansion of the newly formed Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD); the former is likely to be positioned against NATO forces in the Baltics.
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to make slow advances to the north and north-west of Toretsk, maintaining the current high pressure on Ukrainian positions defending the southern approaches to Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage from 4, 5 and 6 August indicate advances to the north of Toretsk, around the village of Dyllivka, as well as near Rusyn Yar, located around ten miles (16km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka.
  • BAKHMUT: Further to the north-east, Ukrainian forces have been counter-attacking along the southern flank of Chasiv Yar, where they have made several gains. Geolocated footage published on 4 and 6 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced in a forested area and along the T-0504 highway, located around 3.5 miles (6km) and 1.7 miles (3km) to the south-east of Chasiv Yar, respectively.
  • DONETSK: Russian offensive operations around Pokrovsk remain centred on encircling the key logistical hub of Pokrovsk. In an interview with a Ukrainian media outlet, military expert Ivan Stupak warned that Russian forces are currently focusing on creating a pocket around the city. According to Stupak, such Russian efforts could render withdrawal a necessity, as was the case during the final stages of the Battle of Vuhledar which precipitated a Ukrainian withdrawal. While it remains unclear if (or when) the Ukrainian High Command will deem it necessary to withdraw, pressure is rising along the southern, eastern and northern flanks, with Russian forces still likely operating inside the city. Geolocated footage from 6 August also shows recent Russian advances along the T-0509 Fedorivka-Novoekonomichne highway in north-eastern Fedorivka, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Additional footage from the same day confirms that Russian forces recently advanced in western Chunyshyne, located to the south of Pokrovsk.
  • KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 6 August indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances at the Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast). Various Russian sources claimed on 5 August that their forces have now taken the entirety of northern Vovchansk (located to the north of the Vovcha River), though this is unconfirmed.
  • KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past few days, Russian forces have secured positions in the north-western outskirts of Kupiansk, threatening Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the city. Geolocated footage from 6 August shows that Russia has likely captured Sobolivka, located immediately to the west of Kupiansk and just to the north of the crucial P-07 highway, which is the main GLOC supplying Ukrainian forces in Kupiansk. Cutting off this logistical route will significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to defend the town.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, along the southern sector of the frontline, geolocated footage from 5 August indicates that Russian forces made limited gains to the north of Novomykhailivka, which is itself located to the north-east of Lyman. To the north-west of Lyman, Russian forces also advanced to the north-east of Serednie, as of 6 August.
  • SOUTHERN: On 4 August, Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn assessed that Russian forces are currently regrouping in preparation for renewed assaults across Zaporizhzhia oblast. While he did not specify where he expects these attacks to fall (or when), Russia has been making slow gains at various points along the southern axis over the past two months. Most notably, geolocated footage from 6 August confirms that Russian forces have advanced to the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk, which is located just to the north of Kamianske.
  • STRIKES: Russian strikes over the past few days have comprised relatively smaller drone barrages (fewer than 100), occasionally accompanied by a limited number of missiles. Hits were recorded in various Ukrainian oblasts, including Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odesa. While the recent reduction in the intensity of long-range strikes possibly merely reflects Russian efforts to stockpile missiles and drones following unprecedently intense strikes this summer, they possibly also reflect Russia’s readiness to agree to a moratorium on long-range strikes as part of ongoing negotiations with the US (see the FORECAST below).
  • STRIKES: Ukraine continues to strike Russian oil infrastructure in a bid to disrupt Russia’s oil production. On 7 August, Ukrainian forces reported that a drone struck the Afipskiy oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai (south-western Russia). The refinery, located roughly 124 miles (200km) from the frontline, serves as a strategic logistics hub for diesel fuel and aviation kerosene used by Russian troops. Over the past week, Ukraine has carried out similar strikes against multiple oil facilities, including major infrastructure.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: The first batch of US weapons supplied to Ukraine via NATO is expected to arrive in the coming weeks. An unspecified NATO official revealed details of the incoming military assistance on 6 August, which includes components and missiles for Ukraine’s arsenal of Patriot air defence systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 5 August that European members of the military alliance have pledged more than USD 1 bn in two days for the purchase of US weapons. Meanwhile, the US has approved foreign military sales for Ukraine worth over USD 200m, which includes equipment, repairs and technical support for M777 howitzers. According to Ukrainian Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal, unspecified ‘partner countries’ are entirely funding the assistance. Ultimately, the arms sales are likely part of the US’ strategy to increase pressure on Russia by increasing military support for Kyiv and also by issuing threats of new economic penalties against Moscow (see FORECAST below). This initiative will also offset the impending munitions shortages caused by the cessation of Biden-era military transfers.
  • OIL: Starting 3 September, the EU will implement a new dynamic price cap on Russian oil as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Under the measures, the EU will set a new price cap for exports of Russian seaborne oil calculated at 15% below the average global price over the previous three months. As of now, that equates to USD 47.60 per barrel (pb) compared to the G7’s previously fixed USD 60 pb. The UK has also supported the EU’s revised price cap. While the extent to which the new limit will undermine Russia’s ability to generate revenue from its oil imports remains to be seen, the move is the latest in an increasingly co-ordinated Western approach targeting Russian oil revenues. For further analysis on the 18th sanctions package, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 June 2025.
  • OIL: The Financial Times reported on 5 August that the US is considering the imposition of additional sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet if Moscow does not agree to a ceasefire by 8 August. Such action would mark the first time that the US has imposed sanctions on Russia since US President Donald Trump resumed the presidency in January. It remains unconfirmed whether the Trump administration will impose these measures; the decision to do so will likely depend on the outcome of the upcoming summit (see FORECAST below). Nevertheless, doing so would likely allow the US to present itself as taking a tougher stance against Russia without completely eroding the limited progress made thus far to engage with Moscow.
  • CORRUPTION: On 6 August, the Ukrainian government appointed Oleksandr Tsyvinsky as head of the Economic Security Bureau (ESB). The IMF had given Ukraine a deadline of 31 July to appoint a new chief of the bureau; Kyiv had previously pledged to find a replacement as part of the requirements outlined by the IMF and EU. The ESB is responsible for investigating economic crimes in Ukraine, including tax evasion and goods smuggling. Ultimately, Tsyvinsky’s appointment will possibly increase confidence in the Ukrainian government’s commitment to reforms after the swift reversal of controversial legislation that had undermined the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. However, missing the original 31 July deadline in tandem with the controversial legislation has likely elevated concerns about future delays to corruption reforms.
  • CORRUPTION: Trust in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has since dropped following recent developments, which we previously assessed was likely. According to polling data published on 6 August by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), trust in Zelensky has fallen to 58% compared to 65% in early June. However, this is still a healthy approval rating and does not indicate increased government instability. For further analysis on corruption in Ukraine and the implication of the controversial bill, see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025.
  • FORECAST

DIPLOMACY: Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump are set to meet in the coming days as the latter seeks to increase pressure on Moscow to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Earlier on 7 August, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov detailed that the place of the meeting has been agreed upon in principle, though he did not offer further clarification on the date and location. Should a Putin-Trump summit take place in the coming days, it will be the first face-to-face meeting between both presidents since June 2021 and the first Putin-Trump summit since the Helsinki Summit in 2018.

The upcoming summit likely points to a de facto extension of the 8 August deadline and possible postponement of the threatened tariffs and further secondary sanctions if no peace is agreed by this date. However, an unspecified White House official disclosed on 6 August that secondary sanctions are still expected to be implemented despite a meeting earlier that day between Putin and Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff. The Kremlin and the White House both described that meeting (which lasted around three hours) as positive. However, just hours after the meeting, the US announced additional secondary tariffs on India, underscoring the possibility of further US punitive measures.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio disclosed on 6 August that Trump will decide whether or not to impose ‘secondary sanctions’ on Russia’s trading partners in the next 24-36 hours. Nevertheless, on 6 August, Trump issued an executive order to implement additional 25% tariffs on India due to its purchase of Russian oil. The White House stated that the tariffs aim to deter countries from supporting Russia’s economy through oil imports and to ‘impose serious economic consequences’ for its war in Ukraine. Russia supplies over one third of India’s oil imports; before Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India sourced approximately 0.2% of its oil from Russia.

Trump has warned that more countries purchasing Russian oil will be subject to secondary sanctions, meaning that China and Turkey will possibly face new tariff hikes in the near term. That said, it is possible that the Putin-Trump meeting could delay the US’ imposition of such measures against China, particularly as trade talks between Washington DC and Beijing are in a critical phase. In a similar vein, the expected meeting will possibly encourage the US to postpone the introduction of tariffs against Russia. As we have previously assessed, trade between Russia and the US has fallen to a significantly low level since the former’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; tariffs would therefore highly likely entail a limited impact. In the meantime, Russia likely views its agreement to a bilateral meeting as something it can offer to feign commitment to the peace process without having to make more meaningful concessions to end the war in a bid to avoid economic penalties. It remains our assessment, however, that even the prospect of tariffs and further secondary sanctions will not deter Moscow from continuing its war in the medium term.

Despite the willingness of Putin to meet with Trump, a face-to-face meeting between the Russian president and Zelensky is unlikely in the near term. Trump reportedly aims to hold a trilateral summit with Putin and Zelensky shortly after his engagement with Putin without any European representatives present. Although Kyiv has called for a meeting between Zelensky and Putin on numerous occasions, Moscow has so far refused. Earlier on 7 August, Putin stated that a meeting with Zelensky is possible, but that the right ‘conditions’ had to be made for this to happen. While Putin’s remarks were vague, they highly likely reflect Russia’s long-standing position that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky should only take place when an agreement has already been signed – pushing the prospect of such a meeting far into the future.

Despite the impending summit, our assessment remains that Russia is highly unlikely to be willing to end the war, especially as its forces continue to make gains on the battlefield. Citing unspecified Kremlin insiders, Reuters reported on 5 August that threats of sanctions are not ‘catastrophic’ and that Moscow perceives there is ‘not much more’ the West can do to inflict economic pain on Russia. Meanwhile, the sources also assessed that Putin’s war goals take precedence over concerns that his actions may be jeopardising the prospect of improving Russia’s relations with the West – which aligns with our own assessment.

Although a major breakthrough towards peace is unlikely to be announced when Putin and Trump meet, smaller gestures that both sides are able to present to domestic and international audiences as a ‘win’ are possible. On 6 August, President Zelensky claimed that Russia now seems to be more inclined towards a ceasefire and that US efforts to pressure Moscow are working. However, Zelensky did not specify why he was of this opinion, nor whether he believed as much after Trump informed him of developments concerning Witkoff’s meeting with Putin.

Partial ceasefires, such as a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes, remain possible in a bid to stave off US economic measures; however, we have seen no substantive change in the Kremlin’s approach to its war (or objectives). As we reported earlier this week, Putin and the wider Russian government have reiterated their long-standing demands and objectives in Ukraine, which include at the very least the complete conquest of the four annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia). Nevertheless, and as was the case during periods of intense US diplomacy earlier this year, temporary and partial ceasefires could be more palatable options for Russia than a comprehensive or full ceasefire, given Moscow highly likely wishes to continue its war for the foreseeable future.

Aug 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONETSK: Reports from the end of July indicate that Russian forces have penetrated the defences of Pokrovsk, advancing to its centre from the south, underlining growing pressure on the pocket
  • NUCLEAR: US President Donald Trump reportedly ordered two nuclear submarines to deploy closer to Russia in response to nuclear threats from former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, though a serious nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely
  • AID: On 1 August, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius confirmed that Berlin will supply Kyiv with additional US Patriot air defence batteries within two to three months, but will provide additional launchers within days
  • FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin has underscored Russia’s unchanging position on Ukraine ahead of Trump’s impending 8 August deadline to reach a peace deal, which is likely to elapse without a deal
  • BAKHMUT: A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), Ivan Petrychak, reiterated Ukraine’s position on 2 August that Russian forces have not captured the town. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces took control of Chasiv Yar on 31 July (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 31 July 2025). However, there have been no confirmed advances by either side in recent days; geolocated footage of Russian forces operating in the western outskirts of the town will be a key indicator that they have fully captured it. In any case, the Russians are almost certainly in control of the majority of the settlement.
  • BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, Russian forces have continued to advance on the flanks of the largely Russian-controlled city of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) as they continue efforts to advance in the direction of Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage posted on 24 and 28 July indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Dyliivka, which is located to the north of Toretsk. Additional geolocated footage posted on 2 August indicates Russian forces have advanced north of Oleksandro-Kalynove, which is located to the north-west of Toretsk.
  • BAKHMUT: Further to the north, Russian forces also recently advanced in the direction of Siversk (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage circulated on 31 July and 1 August indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the Donetska railway (which is located to the north-east of Siversk) as well as north-west of Ivano-Darivka (which is located to the south-east of Siversk). A prominent Russian milblogger stated on 1 August that, if Russian forces capture Serebryanka (located to north-east of Toretsk), the conditions for a direct assault on Siversk itself will be set.
  • DONETSK: Russian offensive operations heavily rely on sabotage and reconnaissance activities as part of an ongoing effort to infiltrate Ukrainian defences in the Pokrovsk sector. On 2 August, Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, noted that the Pokrovsk area remains the most difficult hotspot for Ukrainian forces. Syrskyi highlighted that Russian forces are intensifying efforts to capture key settlements and probe Ukrainian defences for vulnerabilities in addition to stepping up sabotage operations as part of a ‘total infiltration’ strategy aimed at penetrating Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: Reports from the end of July indicated that Russian forces had already penetrated the defences of the city, advancing to its centre from the south. However, Syrskyi claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully repelling these infiltration attempts, particularly through the deployment of anti-sabotage reserves and the reinforcement of defensive fortifications. On 31 July, the Telegraph reported that Russia’s extensive use of fibre-optic drones is supporting its advances near Pokrovsk. Drone swarms are creating breaches in Ukraine’s anti-drone netting and loitering near tunnel exits. In response, according to Syrskyi, Ukrainian forces are working to strengthen anti-drone tunnels to mitigate these threats.
  • DONETSK: According to the UK Defence Intelligence report from 2 August, Russia is concurrently attempting to envelop Pokrovsk, making gains north-east of the settlement in an effort to cut off Ukraine’s critical logistical routes and ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian drone company commander reported that Russian forces are using drones to place mines along these GLOCs. Rodynske, a settlement located approximately four miles (6km) to the north of Pokrovsk, remains a hotspot for such operations; Russian forces are employing similar infiltration tactics as those used against Pokrovsk. The status of Rodynske remains contested, with the Ukrainian authorities denying recent claims that it has fallen under Russian control as of 31 July. Nevertheless, Russian forces are making progress to the north of the town, which is placing mounting pressure on the entire Pokrovsk pocket. Meanwhile, to the south of Pokrovsk, geolocated footage published on 3 August likely shows that Russian forces have recently captured Novoukrainka.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces have continued to push back Russian forces in Sumy oblast in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 31 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north-west of Andriivka, which is located to the north of Sumy city. Commentary from Russian milbloggers indicates that Ukrainian forces are contesting Russian positions at various points across Sumy oblast.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over recent days, Russian forces made confirmed gains along the Oskil-Kreminna line; however, localised Ukrainian counter-attacks in the Borova and Lyman directions are likely contesting Russian advances. Geolocated footage from 1 August shows recent Russian advances along the P-07 Kupiansk-Shevchenkove highway south-west of Stepova Novoselivka, a settlement located to the south-east of Kupiansk. Further south, geolocated footage posted on 31 July confirms that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Hrekivka, located to the south-east of Borova. Similarly, Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed gains in the eastern outskirts of Torske as of 1 August, located to the east of Lyman. Footage from 2 August shows Russian forces having progressed in southern Torske. The latest developments likely indicate that Torske remains highly contested.
  • SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces have achieved marginal advances in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts in recent days, likely as Russian offensive operations have provided opportunities for counterattacks. Geolocated footage circulated on 2 August indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Plavni and northern Kamyanske, which are located to the west and south-west of Orikhiv, respectively. Further to the east in Zaporizhzhia oblast, geolocated footage circulated on 31 July indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Temyrivka, which is located to the north-east of Huliapole. To the north-east  (in Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Ukrainian forces have similarly achieved confirmed advances. Geolocated footage posted on 31 July indicates that Ukrainian forces likely recently recaptured the settlement of Maliivka, which is located to the south-east of Velykomykhailivka.
  • STRIKES: Russian strikes over the past few days were generally of moderate intensity but continued to inflict damage and cause casualties. The attack launched overnight on 2-3 August; it included one Iskander-M ballistic missile, five S-300/400 missiles and one Kh-22 cruise missile, along with 72 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Six missiles were intercepted, most likely cruise systems. The Ukrainian authorities reported that a missile, most likely the ballistic projectile, targeted Mykolaiv City (Mykolaiv oblast), damaging infrastructure and injuring at least seven people. Regions under attack in recent days include Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa oblasts.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, it remains likely that Russian forces are preparing airbases inside occupied Ukraine to launch drone attacks from much closer range. According to Ukrainian sources, satellite imagery published in July indicates that Russia has partially removed fortifications on the runway of the airport in northern occupied Donetsk City (Donetsk oblast). The imagery reportedly shows that the Russian authorities are constructing closed storage areas near the destroyed airport terminal and are preparing manual drone control points, warhead unloading areas, air surveillance posts, as well as a runway. This likely reflects Russia’s attempt to increasingly launch long-range drones against Ukraine from sites closer to the frontline, which would highly likely reduce reaction time for Ukrainian air defences. Moreover, the multiplication of launch points would likely allow Moscow to diversify strike paths, further complicating Ukrainian interception efforts.
  • STRIKES: On 1 August, Business Insider reported that Ukrainian mobile fire teams and domestically produced interceptors are likely struggling to counter Russia’s new Geran-3 drone. Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Geran-3 is equipped with a high-power jet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of up to 497mph (800kph). It also allows the drone to function like a cruise missile in its ability to evade air defences. On 30 July, Ukrainian forces reported that Russia had launched eight jet-powered drones, possibly referring to Geran-3 UAVs, though it remains unclear whether any were intercepted. The inclusion of jet engines has increased the drones’ lethality; Russia is likely to expand the use of such engines, posing a growing challenge for Ukrainian air defences.
  • STRIKES: Ukraine has in recent days conducted a series of long-range strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure. Overnight on 1-2 August, Ukrainian forces confirmed a strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan city (Ryazan oblast). The attack reportedly caused a fire at the plant, resulting in significant damage. The facility reportedly produces 840,000 tonnes of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year (8.4% of Russia’s total TS-1 production) and up to 17 m tonnes of oil per year (6.1% of Russia’s total oil refining). The attack also hit the Novokuibyshevsk plant in Samara oblast and an oil depot in Voronezh oblast. Ukrainian media outlets reported that drones also targeted a power substation in Rostov oblast.
  • STRIKES: On 2 August, Ukrainian forces also struck various defence-related targets such as the Elektropribor plant in Penza City (Penza oblast). The plant reportedly manufactures equipment for Russian military digital networks. Other targets included drone launch sites at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base in Krasnodar krai.
  • STRIKES: The Kyiv Post, quoting sources within Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), reported that an explosion on 2 August disabled a section of Gazprom’s Central Asia-Centre pipeline in Volgograd oblast. The cause of the explosion remains unknown. The pipeline transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Russia and reportedly supplies Russian defence industrial enterprises. Ukraine’s General Staff also reported a successful drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot at Sochi International Airport (AER) in Krasnodar krai on 3 August. The latest attacks on energy infrastructure form part of Kyiv’s co-ordinated strategy aimed at undermining energy supplies to Moscow’s frontlines and defence industry.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian ongoing strikes against Russian military aviation assets continue to underscore persistent deficiencies in the defences of such infrastructure. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that it conducted a drone strike on the Saky military airfield in occupied Crimea. The SBU claimed to have hit a weapons depot and destroyed one Su-30SM aircraft; it also damaged another Su-30SM and three Su-24 aircraft. A Su-30SM, according to the SBU, costs between USD 35 and 40 m. However, we cannot confirm this.
  • STRIKES: On 1 August, Alexander Maksimtsev, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), announced that Moscow is developing a new generation of Voronezh early-warning radar capable of tracking ballistic missiles on any trajectory. Maksimtsev also reported ongoing efforts to equip all Russian airports and air bases with shelters to protect aircraft. His statements underscore Moscow’s attempts to address the vulnerability of its military aviation assets to Ukrainian strikes.POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
  • NUCLEAR: On 31 July, Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US administration’s 8 August deadline for Russia to reach a peace deal. He stated that Russia will continue along its own path, while alluding to Russia’s semi-automatic nuclear control system. Medvedev regularly threatens the nuclear annihilation of Russia’s enemies and adversaries, often on his English-language Telegram account.
  • NUCLEAR: On 1 August, US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines (either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed) closer to Russia in ‘the appropriate regions’ in direct response to Medvedev’s ‘highly provocative’ statements. Trump also warned Medvedev that he was ‘entering very dangerous territory’. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio commented on 31 July that Medvedev’s statements cannot be ignored. Rubio assessed that Medvedev is not a ‘relevant decision maker’, but due to his role in the Russian government, ‘his words are going to have impact’. This aligns with our long-standing assessment that Medvedev does not remain a significant centre of political gravity in the Kremlin.
  • NUCLEAR: The Kremlin likely sees Medvedev’s often outlandish threats as a useful vehicle to remind the world of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, but he ultimately retains very little influence in the Kremlin. Indeed, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated earlier on 4 August that Moscow is ‘very cautious’ about statements regarding nuclear issues and that Medvedev has his own point of view, indicating a limited effort to distance the official Kremlin line. Despite this, Medvedev’s statement was likely part of a co-ordinated Kremlin-led strategic communications effort to deter the US from imposing punitive measures.
  • NUCLEAR: On 1 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a joint event with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, at which the latter criticised Trump’s threats to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions and effectively reiterated implied and indirect nuclear threats. Lukashenka stated that it is not for Trump to ‘dictate the rules’ around the ongoing war in Ukraine, ‘especially to a nuclear power’ like Russia, and that Trump must proceed ‘carefully’. Despite the uptick in nuclear rhetoric, we have not adjusted our worst-case nuclear escalation scenario likelihood, which remains highly unlikely. Further nuclear sabre-rattling, posturing and indirect threats will be likely in the coming weeks and months, but we do not anticipate a significant escalation. For further analysis on the 1 August press conference, see FORECAST below.
  • AID: On 1 August, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius confirmed that Berlin will supply Kyiv with additional US Patriot air defence batteries within two to three months, but will provide additional launchers within days. Pistorius stated that his government had reached a deal with the US to backfill its own supply of air defences and jump the queue for US export replacements. While Pistorius did not confirm the number of new batteries, Germany will likely supply two to Ukraine (with Norway possibly providing a third). A complete battery is made up of an antenna mast, a control station, a power plant, a radar unit, multiple launchers, as well as the interceptor missiles themselves.
  • AID: Ukraine is understood to currently have six operational Patriot batteries (three of which were supplied by Germany). Additionally, on 31 July, the US Department of Defense confirmed that it will sell Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to Ukraine under a contract worth USD 3.5 bn. These latest announcements are significant milestones in offsetting the increasing frequency, intensity and lethality of Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine. However, the production timelines for Patriot systems (which take about two years to produce) and growing worldwide shortages of air defence munitions mean Ukraine’s chronic air defence shortages will highly likely continue for the foreseeable future.
  • RECOGNITION: On 31 July, the co-presidents of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo wrote an open letter to Putin stating their government’s readiness to recognise Russia’s annexation of four oblasts in Ukraine (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia). Nicaragua is one of Russia’s staunchest supporters and regularly votes alongside Moscow at the UN. While not yet enacted, the proposal would make Nicaragua the first country in the world to recognise the territories, and the timing of the open letter is notable, coming just days before Trump’s 8 August deadline. The number of states likely willing to recognise the annexations remains low (chief among them are Belarus, Cuba and North Korea). However, once a state formally recognises the annexations, it will serve as a precedent for states seeking to normalise relations with Moscow.

FORECAST

On 1 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin held an event with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, during which the two leaders underscored Russia’s unchanging position on Ukraine ahead of Trump’s impending 8 August deadline to reach a peace deal. Putin notably stated in response to Trump’s reported disappointment in Russia for not reaching a deal that ‘all disappointments arise from excessive expectations’. This is the latest indication that any shift in Russian policy is highly unlikely.

Putin also stated that the conditions he laid out for peace in Ukraine in June 2024 ‘certainly’ remain the same. This strongly indicates that Moscow remains unwilling to countenance serious compromises and concessions that would facilitate an end to (or even a temporary freezing of) the war. Putin’s 2024 terms included the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from all four annexed regions (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) and the official abandonment of Ukraine’s NATO ambitions as preconditions for a ceasefire and the beginning of serious peace negotiations. Putin reiterated that ‘the main thing’ in the peace process will be to eradicate the ‘root causes’ of the war, which has remained a long-standing and unchanging Russian position.

As the 8 August deadline approaches, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on 31 July that Washington DC has not seen any progress or ‘sincere interest’ from Moscow in ending the war. Putin nevertheless attempted to characterise the peace process as developing ‘positively overall’, highlighting recent prisoner of war (POW) exchanges as recent successes. He also stated that peace negotiations must happen in detail behind the scenes and ‘off-camera’, though he stated that three working groups have not yet begun this process. Such behind-the-scenes negotiations will highly likely take place at intervals over the coming months. Nevertheless, it highly likely remains in Moscow’s interests to obfuscate the negotiating process; claims of behind-closed-doors negotiations will likely be used to deflect criticism regarding a lack of progress.

In the meantime, both Putin and Lukashenka underscored Russia’s determination to continue military operations in Ukraine despite the impending deadline, highlighting recent advances in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). Putin stated that his forces would ‘return’ the fortress belt of Ukrainian cities to the west and north-west of Chasiv Yar, as he claims these are Russian territory. We assess that this includes Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk (all Donetsk oblast). It remains our assessment that the Kremlin wishes to continue the war for as long as its forces continue to advance on the battlefield. With the recent (unconfirmed) seizure of Chasiv Yar and the building encirclement of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), it therefore remains highly unlikely that Russia will heed Trump’s demands and end the war before these objectives are secured.

Despite the unlikelihood of a peace agreement, it remains unclear if Trump will follow through with his threats to impose direct tariffs and (crucially) indirect secondary sanctions on Russia’s trading partners if no peace is agreed by 8 August. On 4 August, President Trump stated that ‘there will be sanctions [on Russia], but they seem to be pretty good at avoiding sanctions’. Additionally, on 3 August, US Congress members left for the summer recess without having passed a proposed sanctions bill against Russia. This has effectively provided the Executive branch with a decision on how to respond to Russia’s likely dismissal of the 8 August deadline. Trump has previously been reticent to impose economic measures on Russia. Moscow is still currently exempt from tariffs with the US, but numerous statements from him and his administration in recent weeks have indicated that his patience is wearing thin. Nevertheless, a flurry of diplomatic activity is likely in the coming week as Russia seeks to deter the US from imposing punitive measures. On 6 or 7 August, US special envoy Steve Witkoff will likely travel to Moscow for talks, though a last-minute breakthrough towards peace remains highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Aug 25. Ukraine Says Elite Unit Struck Russian Aircraft, Ammo Depot in Crimea. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said Monday that its special operations forces carried out a drone strike on Russia’s Saky military airfield in occupied Crimea. In a statement, the SBU said the overnight attack, conducted by its Special Operations Center “A,” destroyed one Su-30SM fighter jet, damaged another, and struck three Su-24 bombers. “The enemy suffered significant losses, as a single Su-30SM aircraft can cost between $35 and $50 m on average,” the agency noted. The strike also hit an aviation munitions depot located within the airfield, according to SBU.  The SBU described the strike as part of its broader strategy to erode Russia’s military capabilities in occupied territory. “The successful SBU operation in Saky is another step toward weakening the enemy’s ability to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine. The occupiers must remember: they will never feel safe on our land!” Saky airbase, located near Novofedorivka in western Crimea, is home to Russia’s 43rd Fighter Aviation Regiment and houses Su-30SM fighters, Su-24 bombers, and Orion drones. Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the airbase was operated by the Ukrainian military. The base has been targeted repeatedly since 2022. In August of that year, blasts at an ammunition depot destroyed at least eight Russian combat aircraft. The strike on the Saky airfield follows a major Ukrainian drone operation in June that targeted four Russian airbases.  According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff, the operation caused an estimated $7 bn in damage and disabled 34% of Russia’s cruise missile carrier fleet. More than 40 aircraft were damaged in the attack, including Tu-95 “Bear” nuclear bombers, Tu-22M3 “Backfire” bombers, and A-50 “Mainstay” airborne early warning aircraft. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

04 Aug 25. Ukraine Air Force aim to be part of Nato forces in 20-year strategy. If not officially, Ukraine’s Air Force aim to be a de facto part of alliance forces. Ukraine has devised a report detailing a 20-year development strategy for its military aviation units according to a statement from the president, and supreme commander-in-chief, Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 3 August 2025. The military will take new steps to empower all its aerial elements: combat aviation, anti-aircraft missile forces, and radio-technical forces. Ultimately, though, the wartime leader emphasised that “Our goal is the full and effective integration of the Air Force of Ukraine with Nato forces – something that will undoubtedly give Ukraine’s defense greater capabilities and, at the same time, make our country an even stronger part of Europe’s defense.” The precise details of what Zelenskyy says may be Ukraine’s “de facto” inclusion within Nato forces are unclear. One of the defining factors in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that neither side has aerial supremacy which has led to brutal fighting on the ground as Russian forces slowly make gains along the frontline. If Nato is amenable to Ukraine’s objectives then there will be questions around how far the alliance will contribute to the country’s aerial capabilities beyond the substantial commitments already made by Western partners. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

04 Aug 25. Ukraine sign anti-corruption and defence budgetting changes into law. President Zelenskyy makes a U-turn on anti-corruption and improves pay and downtime of military personnel. Pressured by protests at home and concerns abroad, Zelenskyy changed tack and restored the powers of the two agencies in a bill that passed through parliament with 331 votes. Credit: Office of the President of Ukraine. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that he signed two laws into effect on 31 July 2025, related to anti-corruption and defence expenditure. The former measure, though, is considered a political U-turn by the wartime leader, who had only a week before implemented a law curbing the powers of two independent anti-corruption bodies, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. What was particularly concerning were comments made by the European Union (EU) Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, who described the new measure as “a serious backstep” that could jeopardise the country’s accession into the EU. Pressured by protests at home and concerns abroad, Zelenskyy restored the powers of the two agencies in a bill that passed through parliament with 331 votes. In his statement, the president emphasised that Ukraine is a democracy, drawing an implicit parallel with Russia, whose invasion has reached more than three-and-a-half years now. “It is very important that the state listens to public opinion,” he maintained. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

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