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Military And Security Developments
Jul 25.
IRAN
- Although Iran announced plans to meet with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), restrictions to nuclear monitoring will likely sustain regional tensions and undermine prospects for substantial progress towards a nuclear deal with the US.
- Reports of explosions and fires impacting strategic and residential infrastructure in Iran will elevate the risk of the security forces increasing scrutiny over individuals suspected of maintaining links to Israel, particularly foreign nationals and ethno-religious minorities.
- Iran continues to pursue deeper co-operation and ties with Russia, which likely underscores Tehran’s broader efforts to bolster its defence capabilities and nuclear development programme.
ISRAEL
- Efforts to enforce conscription orders issued to ultra-Orthodox men will increase the risk of anti-conscription protests and unrest in the coming weeks, as well as associated travel disruption.
- Pro-ceasefire protests are likely to intensify gradually in the coming days as domestic pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases increases.
- A suspected car-ramming attack in central Israel has underscored elevated ethno-religious tensions and the sustained risk of low-capacity attacks targeting public transport infrastructure.
- Increasing condemnation of Israel’s operations in Gaza and humanitarian conditions therein will elevate compliance, regulatory and reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- Israeli settler attacks continue in the West Bank, sustaining significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions and the risk of further violence.
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely intensify its operations in the West Bank in the coming weeks following the arrest of a high-profile bomber.
- Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly progressed, though the withdrawal of Israel’s delegation will likely delay further progress.
- Increasingly critical food security risks in Gaza will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns and threats to staff, while also increasing the risk of pro-Palestine protests worldwide.
IRAN
- Although Iran announced plans to meet with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), restrictions to nuclear monitoring will likely sustain regional tensions and undermine prospects for substantial progress towards a nuclear deal with the US. On 23 July, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with a US media outlet that Iran is not currently engaging in uranium enrichment activity and re-iterated that Iran’s nuclear programme is for ‘uniquely peaceful purposes’. The statement came after Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated that Iran would engage in discussions with the IAEA on ‘a new modality’ on relations between the agency and Tehran in the coming weeks. The announcement also came several weeks after Iran suspended co-operation with the IAEA, which later withdrew its staff from Iran due to security concerns (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 July 2025). The announcement is highly unlikely to indicate that international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programme will resume in the short term. Rather, Iran will likely seek to limit IAEA monitors’ access to sites and records of nuclear activity, sustaining regional concerns regarding oversight of possible re-construction and re-development efforts following the Iran-Israel war. In the coming weeks, Iran will highly likely aim to leverage restrictions on IAEA access to nuclear sites to gain broader concessions in nuclear negotiations with the US and E3 (France, Germany and the UK). However, continued restrictions vis-à-vis IAEA monitoring capabilities will likely undermine international confidence in Iran’s commitments during any such negotiations, moderating the prospects for productive engagement and progress towards a comprehensive nuclear agreement in the coming weeks.
- Reports of explosions and fires impacting strategic and residential infrastructure in Iran will elevate the risk of the security forces increasing scrutiny over individuals suspected of maintaining links to Israel, particularly foreign nationals and ethno-religious minorities. On 23 July, the New York Times reported that Iranian officials believe that a recent series of unexplained blasts across the country resulted from Israeli acts of sabotage. Since the Iran-Israel ceasefire came into force on 24 June, Iranian media has reported numerous explosions and fires in and around strategic infrastructure nationwide, including the Abedan oil refinery (Khuzestan province), as well as airports in Karaj (PYK; Alborz province), Mashhad (MHD; Razavi Khorasan province), Tabriz (TBZ; East Azerbaijan province) and the capital Tehran (THR; Tehran province). Large fires and explosions have also been reported in several residential and commercial areas in Arak (Markhazi province), Aran, Isfahan (both Isfahan province), Dezful (Khuzestan), Gheshm Island (Hormozgan province), Karaj, Mashad, Sanandaj (Kurdistan province), Tabriz, Tehran and Qom (Qom province). Although the Iranian authorities have publicly attributed the explosions to gas leaks, refuse fires, unexploded ordinance and ageing infrastructure, there is a realistic possibility that several incidents resulted from some form of Israeli operations within Iran. Even so, neither Israel nor Iran have commented on the allegations, likely reflecting efforts to moderate conflict-escalation risks. Further explosions and fires are highly likely in the coming weeks; the Iranian security and police forces are highly likely to continue with their efforts to identify and detain suspected Israeli operatives. This will likely increase the risk of arbitrary arrests, particularly for foreign nationals, ethno-religious minorities and Western-linked NGO personnel. We assess that the authorities are highly liable to employ aggressive and abusive interrogation techniques, compounding broader human rights concerns for targeted individuals.
- Iran continues with its efforts to develop its aerospace programme, underscoring its increasing drive to improve its security force capacity. On 21 July, Iranian state media announced that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force had conducted a suborbital test of the Qased space launch vehicle (SLV). This platform has launched at least three military satellites since 2020. The move highly likely reflects Iran’s efforts to develop SLVs capable of launching additional military satellites to bolster its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities following significant shortcomings during the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2025). Additionally, the test highly likely reflects Iranian efforts to develop and test technology that could also facilitate the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Efforts to develop such a munition would almost certainly increase regional tensions, particularly with the EU, Israel and the US, especially given concerns that Iran will attempt to leverage its potential development of an ICBM to expedite the creation of a delivery system for a nuclear munition. Continued weapons development and testing activity will significantly increase the risk of further EU and US sanctions targeting Iranian entities, exacerbating compliance concerns for regionally engaged shipping, technology and engineering firms. Such activity will also increase the risk of further Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian military and nuclear facilities in the coming months (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 30 June 2025).
- Iran continues to pursue deeper co-operation and ties with Russia, which likely underscores Tehran’s broader efforts to bolster its defence capabilities and nuclear development programme. On 21 July, Iran’s conventional and IRGC naval forces launched an annual naval exercise with the Russian navy in the Caspian Sea. As Iran operates separate naval forces in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, the exercise is unlikely to represent broader efforts to expand Iranian-Russian co-operation in regional waters or Iranian efforts to bolster Tehran’s posture around the Strait of Hormuz (or to restrict vessel transit therein). Rather, the exercise underscores continued efforts to bolster general Iranian-Russian co-operation, particularly as Iran seeks to re-constitute its air defence and radar systems, which include several Russian S-300 missile interception systems (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 July 2025). More broadly, numerous Iranian officials have met with their Russian counterparts in recent days to discuss defence and nuclear co-operation. On 20 July, Ali Larijani (a senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Tehran’s nuclear and defence programmes, while Iranian representatives also participated in trilateral talks with Chinese and Russian officials on 22 July to discuss Iran’s upcoming nuclear negotiations with the E3 (France, Germany and the UK). Despite these efforts, we assess that Iran is unlikely to secure sufficient international support to prevent the re-implementation of UN sanctions if nuclear negotiations with the US fail to progress demonstrably in the coming months. Additionally, broader strategic, military and supply chain considerations will likely undermine efforts to repair and re-constitute Iran’s air defences rapidly, sustaining the Islamic Republic’s substantial vulnerability to the possible resumption of Israeli strikes (see above).
ISRAEL
- Efforts to enforce conscription orders issued to ultra-Orthodox men will increase the risk of anti-conscription protests and unrest in the coming weeks, as well as associated travel disruption. On 22 July, the Israeli authorities arrested three ultra-Orthodox men for evading military conscription orders. The arrests triggered substantial unrest on 23 July; protests emerged in ultra-Orthodox population centres across Israel, including Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Beit Shemesh and several neighbourhoods in Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district). Thousands of protesters blocked key highways, including the Coca-Cola Junction along Highway 4 and the Chords Bridge Junction along Highway 1 (which also serves as an entrance to Jerusalem). Protesters in Jerusalem smashed a car windscreen with a hammer. Increasing protest violence prompted clashes with the police, who also employed excessive force. The events highlight the elevated risks of unrest associated with the detention of conscription evaders within the ultra-Orthodox community, particularly those from the Jerusalem sect. These risks will remain elevated in the coming weeks, in turn exacerbating travel disruption risks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. There is a realistic possibility of further violent clashes between protesters and the police, sustaining bystanders’ exposure to localised unrest near protest hotspots.
- Pro-ceasefire protests are likely to intensify gradually in the coming days as domestic pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases increases. On 24 July, pro-ceasefire protesters gathered in Habima Square in Tel Aviv, triggering the closure of several streets and throughfares and resulting in travel disruption. Protests are likely to increase in frequency and size in the coming days; they are also increasingly likely to materialise on weekdays, particularly in Tel Aviv. Additionally, on 21 July, a motorcyclist assaulted a pro-ceasefire protester along Menachem Begin Road in Tel Aviv, underscoring the elevated risk of altercations in protest hotspots. Increasingly frequent protests and resultant travel disruption will increase the risk of altercations and clashes, particularly along highways. Furthermore, while protests are unlikely to escalate rapidly into violent unrest, the risk of clashes between protesters and counter-protesters will remain elevated in the coming days, sustaining threats to proximate bystanders.
- A suspected car-ramming attack in central Israel has underscored elevated ethno-religious tensions and the sustained risk of low-capacity attacks targeting public transport infrastructure. Earlier on 24 July, a car ran over several individuals at a bus station near Kfar Yona (Central district), injuring 11 (nine of whom are soldiers). Following the incident, the perpetrator drove away and subsequently abandoned the vehicle. A manhunt is underway at the time of writing; the security forces suspect the driver is an Arab-Israeli citizen who resides in the Triangle, a concentration of Arab-Israeli population centres adjacent to the Green Line (the Israel-West Bank border). The incident comes amid elevated ethno-religious tensions between Arab-Israeli residents of the area and the Israeli security forces (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 July 2025). In the coming hours and days, the authorities will likely adopt an elevated posture in the area, triggering moderate travel disruption. There is a realistic possibility of imitation attacks in the coming days, increasing the risk of car-ramming attacks targeting bus stations and other public transport hubs, particularly along highways close to the West Bank.
- Increasing condemnation of Israel’s operations in Gaza and humanitarian conditions therein will elevate compliance, regulatory and reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel. On 21 July, a group of 25 Western countries, including Canada, France and the UK, issued a joint statement urging Israel to end the Israel-Hamas war. The statement criticised Israel’s ‘drip feeding’ of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and denounced the deaths of over 800 Palestinians near aid distribution sites overseen by Israeli forces in the past two months. Israel claimed that the statement failed to recognise Hamas’ role in the ongoing conflict. While the signatories are unlikely to sanction Israel immediately and unilaterally, the statement points to an increasing risk of co-operational suspension, arms license reviews and sanctions targeting Israel if the Israel-Hamas war continues at pace. The risk of such eventualities materialising will be particularly informed by developments regarding restrictions on aid deliveries and high civilian casualty incidents within Gaza. Such sanctions are likely to increase regulatory and reputational risks for international companies operating in Israel, either directly or through local subsidiaries or joint ventures.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- Israeli settler attacks continue in the West Bank, sustaining significantly elevated ethno-religious tensions and the risk of further violence. On 21 July, suspected Israeli settlers conducted arson attacks targeting Palestinian-plated vehicles in Beitin village (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). The attacks occurred after the IDF issued an order banning face covers in the West Bank as part of a broader effort to deter settler violence (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 July 2025). In the coming weeks, settler attacks targeting Palestinian civilians will likely continue; further such attacks will compound ethno-religious tensions, increasing radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population and sustaining the risk of violence. Attacks will likely include stones and Molotov cocktails being thrown along key roads in the West Bank; we assess there is also a realistic possibility of shooting attacks targeting Israeli-plated vehicles.
- The IDF will likely intensify its operations in the West Bank in the coming weeks following the arrest of a high-profile bomber. On 23 July, IDF and Shin Bet personnel arrested a militant in Nablus (Nablus governorate) who was responsible for a bombing attack targeting four buses in Israel in February (see Sibylline Alert – 21 February 2025). His arrest followed a 19-hour manhunt, which the IDF initiated after the individual caused an explosion at his residence (almost certainly accidentally), drawing the attention of the security forces. The manhunt’s duration indicates that the suspect likely received considerable support and training from militant elements within the West Bank. As such, the IDF will likely intensify its operations across the West Bank in the coming weeks, both to capture any accomplices and to dismantle explosive production labs. These operations are likely to focus on the northern West Bank, particularly Nablus governorate, though there is also a realistic possibility that they will increase in Hebron and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates. Such operations will increase the risk of clashes between the security forces and militants therein, particularly in built-up areas. The IDF will also likely establish additional checkpoints across the West Bank in the coming weeks, disrupting overland movement, particularly in proximity to large populations centres.
- Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly progressed, though the withdrawal of Israel’s delegation will likely delay further progress. Earlier on 24 July, a Hamas spokesperson stated that the group had responded to an Israeli ceasefire proposal, which would institute a 60-day ceasefire and a limited IDF withdrawal from Gaza in exchange for the release of 28 hostages. Although mediators have not disclosed the content of Hamas’ response at the time of writing, regional media reports indicate that the group has requested greater concessions regarding aid distribution in Gaza and more stringent guarantees on the transition from a temporary to a permanent ceasefire. However, reports also indicate that Hamas has yet to provide negotiators with a finalised list of hostages whom it will release during the ceasefire, and that it has increased its demands vis-à-vis prisoner releases from Israel. Also on 24 July, the office of Israel’s prime minister announced that Israel had withdrawn its delegation from Qatar for further ‘consultations’. Without broader clarity on hostage releases or direct engagement with mediators, negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming days, moderating the prospects for the rapid implementation of a ceasefire in the short term.
- Increasingly critical food security risks in Gaza will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns and threats to staff, while also increasing the risk of pro-Palestine protests worldwide. On 23 July, over 100 NGOs and aid agencies released a joint statement warning of ‘mass starvation’ in Gaza; the statement comes amid increasingly frequent reports from the Hamas-controlled health authorities of deaths from malnutrition, particularly among minors. Although the Israeli authorities have acknowledged a substantial decrease in aid supplies reaching Palestinian civilians in recent days, numerous officials, including President Isaac Herzog, have stated that these shortages stem solely from Hamas activity, NGO inefficiency and the resultant disruption to aid-distribution operations. Baring a significant increase in aid provision in the coming days, humanitarian conditions in Gaza will almost certainly continue deteriorating, with food security conditions becoming increasingly critical. Numerous NGOs have also indicated that their staff now face critical food shortages, underscoring the increasing threat to locally engaged personnel and the risk of disruption facing critical aid operations, particularly healthcare and food aid distribution. More broadly, the dissemination of media depicting deaths from malnutrition will also increase the risk of pro-Palestine protests and associated unrest in the region, particularly in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. We assess that the risk of pro-Palestine protest activity and targeted activism will also increase worldwide, particularly in major cities in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US. Such risks will be particularly acute in the vicinity of installations and locations associated with Israel, especially embassies, high-profile businesses and Jewish institutions.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Uncertainty regarding the disarmament of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will increase the likelihood of sporadic clashes and elevate policy risk. On 22 and 23 July, several Arabic media outlets reported that LH continues to refuse requests to hand over its weapons to the government, as per a US-backed proposal. The five-month disarmament plan was proposed earlier this month by the US envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barrack, as part of a wider political-security roadmap for the country. Although the Lebanese government responded to the proposal with a plan calling for a full Israeli withdrawal while dismantling LH’s arms, the Lebanese president reiterated his stance on transferring all weapons to the state’s control through a ‘carefully implemented’ plan. The increasingly palpable tensions between LH and the Lebanese government will increase the risk of domestic unrest within Shia communities in the coming months, as well as political tensions with LH, driving policy stagnation in the parliament. Although the government is likely to keep implementing the disarmament plan, a wide crackdown on LH’s weapons depots by the Lebanese army remains unlikely. Even so, there is a realistic possibility of limited raids on the group’s small arms caches in the capital Beirut and other major cities in the coming weeks, in turn elevating the risk of sporadic clashes therein. Alternatively, there is also a realistic possibility that LH will seek to implement a ‘phased disarmament’ in an attempt to avoid wider confrontation with the government. This would possibly include the surrender of part of its arsenal as a gesture of goodwill, including selected weapons depots in southern Lebanon. However, we assess that partial disarmament is highly likely to be contingent on demands for international guarantees of Israel’s full withdrawal from southern Lebanon and possibly a halt to Israeli attacks targeting the group, moderating the prospects for its implementation in the short term.
- Pro-Palestine sentiment will increase physical security risks for Israeli tourists, as well as operational disruption risks for the tourism and hospitality sectors. On 22 July, Greek pro-Palestine protesters prevented a cruise ship operated by the Israeli shipping firm Mano Maritime from docking at the port of the island of Syros (South Aegean region, Greece). The management of the cruise ship, which was carrying approximately 1,600 passengers, subsequently rerouted the ship to Cyprus. On 23 July, local media also reported that anti-Israel individuals carrying knives harassed and chased a group of Israeli tourists in the island of Rhodes (South Aegean). The developments underscore increasing pro-Palestine and anti-Israel sentiment in Greek tourist hotspots, which are typically frequented by Israeli tourists in the summer months. The incidents in Rhodes and Syros will possibly inspire similar protests and attack attempts targeting Israeli tourists on several Greek islands, particularly in August. Increasing protest activity will also undermine operational continuity for tourism companies, booking platforms, hotels and airlines associated with Israeli tourists in Greece over the coming months. These risks will also extend to similar companies operating in Italy and Spain, while the risk of targeted boycotts and activism will likewise rise.
Jul 24.
- Syria: Stalled integration will elevate risk of domestic unrest in Kurdish regions, security challenges. On 23 July, Syrian media reported that meetings between government representatives and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recently took place to advance the implementation of an integration deal signed in March. Both parties will reportedly meet again in Paris (France) on 25 July for talks mediated by the French and US governments. However, key flashpoints relating to the SDF’s position on military integration and its hopes of retaining a degree of command autonomy are likely to persist, hindering any prospective agreement in the coming weeks. Damascus is also unlikely to accept integrating the SDF’s all-female units within its new army. As such, stalled integration will elevate the risk of domestic unrest within Arabic tribes in Kurdish regions, driving the risk of mutiny among Arabic elements within the SDF. We assess there is a realistic possibility this would in turn result in clashes within SDF-held cities, including Raqqa city (Raqqa governorate), as well as bouts of intercommunal violence, driving displacement. Also, the ongoing deadlock in talks is likely to impact joint operations against Islamic State (IS), elevating the risk of the group’s resurgence in H2 2025.
- Jul 23.
- Israel-Syria: Threat of Israeli airstrikes will persist despite resumption in security talks. On 22 July, media outlets reported that Israel and Syria would resume security talks, which were temporarily halted following ethnic clashes in Suwayda governorate and Israeli airstrikes on the Syrian capital Damascus. These talks will likely take place in the Azerbaijani capital Baku in the coming days, backed by Turkey and the US. However, Arab fighters are still stationed in parts of the Suwayda countryside, and the fragility of the ceasefire will sustain the risk of a resumption in Israeli airstrikes against militias affiliated with the Syrian government. Nevertheless, while sporadic Israeli strikes in southern Syria are possible in the coming days, we assess it is unlikely that they will significantly impact the planned talks between the two countries. As such, a security agreement concerning southern Syria remains likely in H2 2025, possibly with international guarantees regarding the safety of Druze, demilitarisation of the border region and expelling radical elements from the Syrian army.
- Iran-Israel: Unexplained blasts will drive heightened security, threats to international personnel. Earlier on 23 July, reports indicated that Iranian officials believe a recent series of unexplained blasts across the country are acts of sabotage by Israel. The explosions, which Iran has publicly attributed to ageing infrastructure, hit commercial complexes, strategic infrastructure sites and residential buildings housing members of the judiciary. Israel has not responded to the allegations, and Iran has not publicly declared its position on the matter, underscoring efforts to moderate conflict escalation. As incidents of unexplained blasts will likely continue in Iran over the coming weeks, the authorities will almost certainly employ heightened security measures in attempts to foil sabotage and detain suspected Israeli operatives. We assess that this will likely increase the risk of arbitrary arrests, especially for international NGO and foreign national business personnel working in Iran. In turn, detainees will likely face elevated threats of physical harm due to aggressive interview tactics.
Jul 22.
- Global: Mobile spyware highlights security, surveillance risks from Iranian actors. On 21 July, the cyber security company Lookout reported that the Iranian state-sponsored group ‘MuddyWater’ is targeting English and Farsi speakers with a new version of the ‘DCHSpy’ Android spyware. The group distributes fake virtual private network (VPN) applications on the messaging platform Telegram to infiltrate targeted systems. The application deploys the spyware onto compromised systems, subsequently establishing communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure for data exfiltration. The new version introduces new features that enable MuddyWater to steal data from the messaging platform WhatsApp and scan files, underscoring the group’s continuous development of its cyber capabilities. MuddyWater reportedly started distributing the new version after the onset of the Israel-Iran war alongside its increased usage of other malware variants, highlighting Iran’s evolving cyber tactics to respond to recent events. As such, we assess that these developments will incur heightened security and surveillance risks amid ongoing regional hostilities.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Statement urging end of war highlights increasing risk of sanctions. On 21 July, a group of 25 Western countries, including Canada, France and the UK, issued a joint statement urging Israel to end the war in Gaza. The statement criticised Israel’s denial of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and denounced the death of over 800 Palestinians near aid distribution sites overseen by Israeli forces. Israel claimed that the statement failed to recognise Hamas’ role in the war. While immediate action against Israel remains unlikely, the move signals an increasing risk of sanctions facing Israel if the war continues, with restrictions on aid deliveries and high civilian casualty incidents likely to act as trigger points. Such sanctions are likely to increase regulatory risks for international companies operating in Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July). The statement is also unlikely to reduce the elevated armed conflict risks in Gaza, including around aid distribution centres, sustaining critical security threats to civilians and NGO staff. We assess this will drive reputational risks for international companies operating in Israel, while also threatening donor support for projects involving Israel and/or Israeli-affiliated companies.
Jul 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Despite forthcoming nuclear negotiations between Iran and the E3, efforts to mitigate against increasing sanctions will continue to depend on productive engagement with the US in the coming weeks.
- Despite claims that it has restored its air defence capabilities, Iran will remain extremely vulnerable to a possible resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, increasing pressure on nuclear negotiations with the US.
- Significant water shortages in Iran will increase operational disruption, energy security and domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks, including in the capital Tehran.
ISRAEL
- Security guards attacked three residents of Tayibe (Central district), highlighting elevated security risks for ethnic Arabic staff crossing into/from the West Bank.
- The removal of Yuli Edelstein from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) will reduce government stability risks; however, it will also elevate the risk of domestic unrest.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- An order banning face coverings in the West Bank will increase the risk of clashes between the security forces and Israeli settlers, as well as the Palestinian population, in turn elevating domestic unrest risks.
- The expansion of IDF ground operations into the Deir al-Balah area of central Gaza underscores continued efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas amid stalling ceasefire negotiations.
- A shooting incident near an aid convoy in northern Gaza underscores the sustained threats to life for locally engaged staff.
IRAN
- Despite forthcoming nuclear negotiations between Iran and the E3, efforts to mitigate against increasing sanctions will continue to depend on productive engagement with the US in the coming weeks. Earlier on 21 July, a spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry stated that Iranian delegates would meet with representatives from France, Germany and the UK (the E3) on 25 July for multilateral nuclear negotiations. The announcement comes after the German foreign ministry stated on 16 June that the E3 would consider initiating measures to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran unless nuclear negotiations with the US progress substantially by the end of August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Although Iran likely aims to affirm its intention to engage with the US, the E3 is unlikely to believe that such claims are credible unless the US or Iran announce plans to resume bilateral negotiations in the coming two-to-three weeks. Given long-standing incompatibilities regarding Tehran’s domestic uranium enrichment capabilities, negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming weeks, moderating the prospects for an agreement before the E3’s stated deadline. Barring significant and demonstrable progress before 31 August, the likelihood of the E3 triggering the snapback clause under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will increase substantially, compounding regional tensions and sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms.
- Despite claims that it has restored its air defence capabilities, Iran will remain extremely vulnerable to a possible resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, increasing pressure on nuclear negotiations with the US. On 20 July, the security force-aligned DEFA press outlet reported that Iran’s conventional military (Artesh) claims to have replaced the 120 air defence and radar systems that were damaged during the recent Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2025). The claim is highly likely inflated, as it is highly unlikely that Iran has secured sufficient deliveries of Chinese or Russian components and/or systems since 24 June. Although there is a realistic possibility that Iran has partially repaired damaged systems using domestically developed components, it is highly unlikely that this represents a broad improvement in Iran’s air defence capacity or broader deterrence capabilities. Consequently, Iran will likely remain extremely vulnerable to a resumption of Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear and military infrastructure in the coming months, sustaining regional tensions, as well as the pressure on Tehran to reach a nuclear agreement with the US before the expiration of the JCPOA in October.
- Significant water shortages in Iran will increase operational disruption, energy security and domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks, including in the capital Tehran. Earlier on 21 July, the Tehran Province Water Company announced that reservoirs supplying water to Tehran had reached record lows following five years of drought conditions. The authorities have called on civilians to decrease domestic water consumption substantially, while local reports indicate that the authorities have started to impose multi-hour water cut-offs in various Tehran suburbs due to severely restricted supply. Drought conditions are also particularly acute in Bushehr, Hormozgan, Khuzestan and Sistan and Baluchestan provinces, underscoring nationwide water security concerns. Water management is a recurrent issue in Iran, with routine shortages linked to meteorological changes compounded by mismanagement, corruption and ageing infrastructure. The authorities have also declared a public holiday in Tehran province on 23 July due to an ongoing heatwave, increasing labour flexibility and operational disruption risks, particularly for firms reliant on public sector services. Further heatwaves over the coming months will almost certainly compound water shortages nationwide, increasing pressure on energy infrastructure and likely triggering rolling blackouts and power cuts, including in Tehran. Water and electricity shortages will increase the risk of anti-government protests and unrest, particularly if the authorities restrict access to subsidised fuel at petrol stations. Security and police force personnel will almost certainly employ excessive force to disperse any demonstrations that do materialise, increasing bystanders’ exposure to clashes and localised unrest. More broadly, elevated temperatures and water shortages will increase pressure on healthcare facilities, possibly restricting access to non-emergency services in the coming weeks, particularly at public hospitals and clinics. Water shortages will also increase the risk of crop failure and decreased agricultural yields, elevating food security concerns and the risk of unrest in major agricultural throughput regions through Q3. In the long term, water shortages will also highly likely sustain bilateral tensions with Afghanistan vis-à-vis the management of Helmand River, increasing border dispute risks.
ISRAEL
- Security guards attacked three residents of Tayibe (Central district), highlighting elevated security risks for ethnic Arabic staff crossing into/from the West Bank. On 15 July, Israeli border guards at the Te’enim Checkpoint (also known as the Fig Crossing) were filmed violently attacking three residents of Tayibe (an Israeli city with an Arabic-Muslim majority population) while they were crossing back from the West Bank. In recent weeks, various other residents of Tayibe have reported similar treatment by security guards at the crossing. The incidents highlight the Israeli Arab population’s elevated exposure to security and human rights risks (and exposure to racially motivated discrimination), particularly at crossing points with the West Bank. An escalation in such activity in response to increasing attack risks emanating from the West Bank will likely exacerbate domestic unrest within Arab communities in Israel in the coming months, particularly communities near the West Bank. However, large-scale or violent unrest remains unlikely in the coming days.
- The removal of Yuli Edelstein from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (KFADC) will reduce government stability risks; however, it will also elevate the risk of domestic unrest. The ruling Likud party is set to meet on 23 July to discuss the ousting of Edelstein, the KFADC chair, following pressure from ultra-Orthodox parties who are threatening to resign from the coalition. In response, opposition leader Yair Lapid threatened that opposition members serving in the KFADC will resign in protest. This will increase the prospects for the passage of a controversial military draft bill that will grant thousands of ultra-Orthodox Yeshiva members military exemptions. This will almost certainly increase (significantly) anti-government sentiment, domestic unrest and ethno-religious tensions across Israeli society. If the bill is adopted, large protests are almost certain in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), where demonstrators are likely to block the Ayalon South Highway near the HaShalom Junction (close to Kaplan Street and Menachem Begin Road). Such action will likely cause substantial disruption; it will significantly increase the risk of the security forces using heavy-handed dispersal tactics against protesters, including mounted units and water cannons, elevating the risk of bodily harm facing bystanders. However, now that Edelstein has been removed, there is a realistic possibility that ultra-Orthodox parties will agree to amendments designed to moderate public anger over perceived inequality. In addition, further negotiations regarding the bill, together with the scheduled Knesset recess on 27 July, will likely delay the adoption of the law, reducing the risk of significant domestic unrest in the coming weeks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- An order banning face coverings in the West Bank will increase the risk of clashes between the security forces and Israeli settlers, as well as the Palestinian population, in turn elevating domestic unrest risks. On 17 July, General of the regional Central Command (Maj Gen Avi Bluth) issued an order forbidding the wearing of face coverings throughout Israeli-controlled territories in the West Bank, though exemptions are in place for coverings on religious grounds. The order comes against the backdrop of increasing Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank and apparent difficulties in identifying and arresting the perpetrators. Violations carry up to a six-month prison sentence (or up to two years if an individual wears a covering while conducting a crime). However, attempts to enforce the order, particularly during incidents of mass violence, will significantly increase the risk of clashes between Israeli settlers and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the new directive will be enforced disproportionately against the Palestinian population, compounding ethno-religious tensions and further driving the risk of attacks. Security risks will be particularly elevated near IDF checkpoints and near illegal (under Israeli law) Israeli settlements. Any clashes between IDF troops and Israeli settlers will likely evolve into domestic unrest near IDF bases in the West Bank (and possibly in Israel).
- The expansion of IDF ground operations into the Deir al-Balah area of central Gaza underscores continued efforts to maximise pressure on Hamas amid stalling ceasefire negotiations. On 20 July, the IDF issued evacuation orders for south-western parts of Deir al-Balah before deploying tanks to the area on 21 July. The IDF has not previously engaged in ground operations in Deir al-Balah, partially due to intelligence indicating that Hamas was holding hostages in the area. The deployment underscores sustained IDF efforts to maximise military pressure on Hamas to gain concessions during ceasefire and hostage-release negotiations. In the coming days, the IDF will likely continue to expand its ground operations in the central Gaza area, in addition to ongoing operations in northern and southern Gaza, sustaining significant conflict-exposure risks throughout the enclave. If ceasefire negotiations fail to progress in the short term, the IDF will attempt to increase military pressure on Hamas by imposing stricter movement restrictions in central, northern and southern Gaza, followed by intensive airstrikes and aerial support. Such operations will increase pressure on Hamas to agree to a temporary ceasefire agreement, though negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to deadlock, moderating the prospects for the implementation of an agreement in the coming days. In Israel, increasing concerns regarding the hostages’ wellbeing and a broader lack of progress in ceasefire negotiations will also likely bolster attendance at weekly hostage-release protests in major cities, increasing transport and operational disruption risks. Announcements relating to the hostages (particularly hostage casualties) will also increase the risk of anti-government protest activity, particularly in Tel Aviv, in the subsequent hours.
- A shooting incident near an aid convoy in northern Gaza underscores the sustained threats to life for locally engaged staff. On 20 July, IDF personnel discharged their firearms in close proximity to a UN World Food Programme aid convoy transiting through northern Gaza. The WFP stated that large crowds gathered around the multi-truck convoy after it passed through the Erez West border crossing (also known as the Zikim crossing) in northern Gaza before coming ‘under fire from Israeli tanks, snipers and other gunfire’. The Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry subsequently stated that the IDF had shot and killed approximately 80 civilians, though the IDF stated that its personnel had only fired warning shots and that the civilian casualty claims did not ‘align with existing information’. In the coming weeks, the risk of shooting incidents, fatal crushes and clashes in the immediate vicinity of aid convoys, storage facilities and distribution points will remain elevated, sustaining critical threats to life for civilians and NGO personnel engaged in Gaza. These risks will be particularly acute for staff engaged in the transport and distribution of aid, including for the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Recurrent shooting incidents will also sustain the risk of critical disruption to aid delivery and distribution operations, compounding food security and humanitarian concerns, particularly in northern Gaza. As conditions continue to deteriorate, the risk of pro-Palestine protest activity and targeted activism will also remain elevated, sustaining reputational and operational disruption risks for Israeli-linked firms worldwide.
RED SEA
- An IDF strike on Hudaydah port (al-Hudaydah governorate, Yemen) earlier on 21 July underscores the sustained security risks near Houthi ports and dual-use infrastructure, as well as the elevated risk of supply chain disruption. The IDF claims it targeted engineering tools used to restore the port’s infrastructure, as well as fuel tanks and vessels used for military activity. Further Israeli efforts to disrupt Houthi infrastructure and reconstruction facilities will sustain elevated security risks near Houthi-controlled dual-use infrastructure and ports, particularly Hudaydah port and other previously attacked sites (such as as-Salif and Ras Isa ports, both al-Hudaydah). Such strikes will further elevate energy and food security risks, as well as supply chain disruption. However, strikes are unlikely to degrade (significantly) the Houthis’ capacity to conduct attacks on Israel or Red Sea shipping, which we assess are likely to continue in the coming weeks.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Syria: A highly fragile ceasefire will sustain the possibility of a resumption in intercommunal clashes and Israeli airstrikes in southern Syria in the coming days. Earlier on 21 July, Druze factions affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri allowed the passage of hundreds of Bedouin families trapped in Suwayda city (Suwayda governorate, Syria) through a humanitarian corridor. The de-escalatory measure was mediated by the Syrian government as part of a wider deal between Druze and Arab militias following two days of sporadic clashes despite a US-backed ceasefire. However, the al-Hijri-affiliated militia still refuses to permit the deployment of the General Security Service (GSS) into the city and has blocked the movement of government aid convoys, likely driving a deterioration in humanitarian conditions inside the city. While the two warring parties are likely to implement steps towards a prisoner exchange (mediated by Damascus), there is also a realistic possibility that clashes will resume in the next 48 hours, as Arab fighters remain mobilised in large numbers in the Suwayda countryside near the city. These risks are exacerbated by Damascus’ lack of command and control over its tribal allies and its weakened capacity to restore order and security in southern Syria. Any resumption of intercommunal clashes in Suwayda will, in turn, increase the risk of Israeli airstrikes targeting the Arab fighters; there is a realistic possibility of such strikes expanding to government forces. This will broaden the scope of the conflict and increase the risk of a resumption of strikes against the capital Damascus
- Syria: Resumption of ethnic killings remains possible amid fragile ceasefire in Suwayda. Earlier on 21 July, Druze factions allowed the passage of hundreds of Bedouin families trapped in Suwayda city (Suwayda governorate) through a humanitarian corridor under a deal agreed with the Arab tribal fighters and mediated by the government. However, Druze factions affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri still refuse to permit the deployment of the General Security Service (GSS) and have blocked the movement of government aid convoys. This comes after two days of sporadic clashes between Druze and Arab fighters despite a US-backed ceasefire, underscoring the agreement’s fragility (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). As such, there is a realistic possibility that clashes will fully resume in the next 48 hours, as Arab fighters remain mobilised in large numbers in the Suwayda countryside near the city. Any resumption of such clashes in Suwayda will, in turn, increase the risks of Israeli airstrikes against the Arab fighters, with a realistic possibility of such strikes expanding to government forces. This will broaden the scope of the conflict and the risk of a resumption in strikes in the capital Damascus.
Jul 18.
- Iraq: Oil exports will reduce energy security risks, sustain operational disruption for businesses. On 17 July, Iraqi officials announced oil exports through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline to Turkey would resume following a two-year pause in operations. Baghdad said that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will immediately begin delivering 230,000 barrels per day (bpd) to the State Organisation for Marketing of Oil (SOMO). It comes after drones struck Iraqi Kurdistan oil fields for a fourth consecutive day on 17 July, for which no group has claimed responsibility. The attacks will likely continue to drive market fluctuation. The increased exports will likely mitigate energy security risks in Turkey, especially during summer months when energy consumption peaks. Political instability in the KRG, exacerbated by rifts between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), will likely sustain the risk of future disagreements with Baghdad, driving sporadic disruption to the export agreement. We assess that this will possibly drive operational disruption for oil companies in Kurdistan, elevating compliance risks for oil and sector-adjacent businesses.
- Syria: Ethnic clashes in Suwayda will extend in scope, intensity in next 24 hours, despite ceasefire. On 17 July, various groups of Arab and Bedouin tribal fighters clashed with Druze militias in Suwayda governorate despite the 16 July ceasefire (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 July 2025). The new offensive is highly likely retaliation for the reported ethnic killings of Bedouins in Suwayda, hours after the ceasefire came into effect, by Druze militias affiliated with the religious figure Hikmat al-Hijri. The Druze militias have refused any deal with the government. The ongoing clashes will possibly extend in scope and intensity through the coming hours. This will increase the threat of Israeli airstrikes targeting tribal fighters in Suwayda and their convoys advancing from Deir ez-Zor and other governorates. While several local groups in Suwayda called for the government forces to re-enter Suwayda and resolve the conflict, the persistent threat of Israeli strikes will likely postpone such a move. We assess that this will exacerbate risks of protracted intercommunal clashes. However, there is also a possibility that Damascus will reach an understanding with the Israeli government and the US to deploy limited General Security Service (GSS) forces in Suwayda in the next 48 hours to prevent total security collapse. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jul 25. Druze Fighters Retake Sweida After Week of Sectarian Clashes. Druze fighters regained control of Syria’s southern city of Sweida on Saturday after forcing out Bedouin tribal militias, according to the Syrian government and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). The withdrawal followed a U.S.-brokered ceasefire aimed at preventing further Israeli military intervention. Sweida was “evacuated of all tribal fighters, and clashes within the city’s neighbourhoods were halted,” Syria’s interior ministry spokesman Noureddine al-Baba wrote on Telegram. The SOHR also reported that “tribal fighters withdrew from Sweida city on Saturday evening” following a major offensive launched by Druze forces. The fighting began after kidnappings between Druze and Bedouin clans escalated into armed clashes across Sweida province. Bedouin tribes from Deir al-Zour and other regions joined the battle, backing local Sunni clans against Druze militias aligned with spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Syrian government forces later intervened, claiming their deployment was meant to stop the violence. Earlier this week, Israel, acting in support of the Druze community, launched airstrikes on Syrian forces in both Sweida and Damascus, aiming to pressure them into withdrawing. The strikes followed accusations that Syrian troops carried out summary executions and other abuses against Druze civilians during their brief deployment in the southern province. The Associated Press reported that the withdrawal of the Bedouins allowed aid deliveries to begin in the area. On Sunday, the Syrian Red Crescent sent 32 trucks loaded with food, medicine, water, fuel, and other supplies to help Sweida province, which has been struggling with power outages and shortages after the recent fighting. Syria’s state news agency SANA said the aid convoy reached Sweida but claimed that Sheikh al-Hijri and his armed Druze group blocked a government team that was accompanying a separate convoy. Al-Hijri did not directly address the accusations but released a statement saying he welcomes any assistance for Sweida and criticized what he described as smear campaigns against him. Meanwhile, the AFP reported that clashes continue in other parts of Sweida province, even though Druze fighters have retaken control of the city. According to SOHR, the death toll from the recent violence in Sweida has risen to 1,120 since last weekend.The casualties include 427 Druze fighters and 298 Druze civilians, 194 of whom were “summarily executed by defense and interior ministry personnel,” the observatory said. The toll also includes 354 government security personnel and 21 Sunni Bedouin, three of whom were “summarily executed by Druze fighters.” Additionally, 15 government troops were killed in Israeli airstrikes, according to SOHR. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Jul 25. Iran says it has replaced air defences damaged in Israel war. Iran has replaced air defences damaged during last month’s conflict with Israel, Iran’s Defah Press news agency reported on Sunday quoting Mahmoud Mousavi, the regular army’s deputy for operations. During the conflict in June, Israel’s air force dominated Iran’s airspace and dealt a heavy blow to the country’s air defences while Iranian armed forces launched successive barrages of missiles and drones on Israeli territory.
“Some of our air defences were damaged, this is not something we can hide, but our colleagues have used domestic resources and replaced them with pre-arranged systems that were stored in suitable locations in order to keep the airspace secure,” Mousavi said.
Prior to the war, Iran had its own domestically-made long-range air defence system Bavar-373 in addition to the Russian-made S-300 system. The report by Defah Press did not mention any import of foreign-made air defence systems to Iran in past weeks. Following limited Israeli strikes against Iranian missile factories last October, Iran later displayed Russian-made air defences in a military exercise to show it recovered from the attack. (Source: Reuters)
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