www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
30 Jul 25. Readout of the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Joint Planning Committee (SJPC). Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell provided the following readout: The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia held the 9th Strategic Joint Planning Committee (SJPC), a key forum for the bilateral defense relationship, on July 29-30, 2025, at the Pentagon. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby led the U.S. delegation. The Assistant Minister of Defense His Excellency Dr. Khalid Biyari led the Saudi delegation. Under Secretary Colby expressed appreciation for the Kingdom’s leadership, underlined the Department’s commitment to strengthening the bilateral defense partnership under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth’s leadership, and encouraged rapid progress in implementing the $142bn Memoranda of Intent signed by Secretary Hegseth during President Trump’s May 2025 visit to Riyadh. Both leaders recognized U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation as a force multiplier for regional security, and reviewed opportunities to deepen cooperation. The delegations exchanged views on a range of national defense priorities and regional security challenges. Both delegations expressed sustained and steadfast support for the longstanding U.S.-Saudi partnership. Under Secretary Colby also welcomed Saudi efforts to strengthen its self-defense capacities and to make greater contributions toward achieving shared regional objectives. (Source: U.S. DoD)
31 Jul 25. Almost unanimous support for defence funding boost. Political parties and experts across the ideological and political spectrum are almost unanimous that South Africa’s defence budget needs to increase in order for the National Defence Force to carry out its functions. Earlier this month, following the defence budget vote debate, Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga told Newzroom Afrika that another R30 bn was needed for her department to meet its mandate. Motshekga is on record as saying “under-funding of the defence force has become critical”. Others in the more funding camp include defence analysts and commentators on defence issues as well as public representatives in both Houses of Parliament – the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). In addition to the EFF’s Carl Niehaus, other parliamentarians seeking better funding from National Treasury (NT) for General Rudzani Maphwanya’s SANDF are Malusi Gigaba, Phiroane Phala, Dakota Legoete (all African National Congress), Chris Hattingh, Maliyakhe Shelembe, Nicholas Gotsell (all Democratic Alliance) and Bantu Holomisa (United Democratic Movement and a deputy minister). Veteran defence analyst Helmoed Heitman told this publication in May Lieutenant General Lawrence Mbatha’s SA Army is 10 000 “warm bodies” short as a result of “under-funding and over-stretch”. African Defence Review Consultancy (ADRC) Director Darren Olivier has long advocated for another Defence Review and White Paper with Cape Town-based defence and military aviation authority Dean Wingrin also wanting to see more spent on the SANDF, enabling it to properly execute the tasks handed it by the Ramaphosa Government of National Unity (GNU) Cabinet. Included on this list are border protection and safeguarding (Operation Corona), the longstanding continental peacekeeping commitment to the United Nations (UN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Operation Mistral) and ad-hoc taskings assisting the SA Police Service (SAPS) (Operation Prosper), disaster support and humanitarian assistance (Operation Chariot) as well as search and rescue (Operation Arabella). Outside Parliament, the newest addition to those wanting Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana to loosen the purse strings for the SANDF is SA Navy (SAN) chief, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese. He told a July Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) meeting NT was “suffocating the SANDF”. National Treasury did not take kindly to Lobese’s allegations, issuing a statement to the effect that proper management of funding allocated is the responsibility of the department – in this instance defence and military veterans – receiving the money. Support for this approach comes from Songezo Zibi, Rise Mzanzi leader as well as chair of SCOPA (Standing Committee on Public Accounts). This month in a PoliticsWeb column he wrote “it’s a crying shame that the SANDF is under-funded” adding blame for this is “patently not up to Treasury”. He noted further “it is silly to suggest that Treasury is the sole decider” pointing out this responsibility is that of a budget sub-committee. In a May research document, Niehaus wrote that among others, there is a lack of strategic approach in the Department of Defence (DoD) to build a fit-for-purpose defence force. “The 2015 Defence Review, meant to guide SANDF modernisation, was never implemented, and the promised ‘Road to Greatness’ strategy, due in 2024, remains undelivered, leaving the DoD without a framework to prioritise spending. This necessitates an urgent national defence summit to revise the 2015 Defence Review and develop a 10-year modernisation plan.” In closing Niehaus maintains the 2025/2026 DoD budget of R57.207 bn (real-term cut of R717m) and the Department of Military Veterans’ (DMVs’) R906.5m (stagnant) reflect neglect of security and veterans. The unimplemented 2015 Defence Review and absent ‘Road to Greatness’ necessitate a national defence summit. “The EFF demands R114 bn (1.5% of GDP) for DoD and R2bn for DMV, creating 26, 250 jobs” with a parting shot that “the R2bn SAMIDRC withdrawal return is a travesty, prioritising debt over security and soldiers’ dignity”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
30 Jul 25. Pakistan: Disruption, security risks will be heightened in Bajaur amid counter-terror operation. Earlier on 30 July, the security forces launched ‘Operation Sarbakaf’ against militants in Lowi Mamund tehsil (Bajaur district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province); the operation included the use of artillery and gunship helicopters. A three-day curfew has been implemented in 16 areas of Lowi Mamund, restricting movement outside homes and on roads. Protests against the operation’s impact on the local population were held in War Mamund tehsil (Bajaur). Militant activity in Bajaur, which borders Afghanistan, has increased in recent months, with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members taking advantage of the porous border to launch attacks on the Pakistani security forces. Despite regular security operations in the area, the security forces have struggled to materially contain the threat. Consequently, we assess that elevated security risks will likely persist for the foreseeable future. This will undermine efforts to facilitate the development of Pakistan’s minerals sector, as Bajaur is home to deposits of chromite and manganese (Source: Sibylline)
30 Jul 25. South Sudan-Uganda: Long-standing border disputes will sustain risks of low-intensity clashes. On 29 July, a spokesperson for the South Sudanese security forces (SSPDF) announced that an exchange of small arms fire with the Ugandan security forces (UPDF) in Kangapo II (Central Equatoria state, South Sudan) killed five personnel on 28 July. A UPDF spokesperson subsequently stated that the clash emerged after SSPDF personnel entered Uganda’s West Nile region and refused to withdraw. Low-intensity clashes between SSPDF and UPDF personnel frequently occur along the South Sudan-Uganda border due to a lack of clear border demarcation and miscommunication between security force units. The incident is highly unlikely to escalate into further clashes in the coming days or undermine strong bilateral relations; both spokespeople emphasised ongoing efforts to resolve outstanding border disputes through a joint committee. Even so, we assess that long-standing border disputes and unclear demarcation will sustain risks of further clashes in the coming months, driving security threats to locally engaged staff, particularly NGO personnel engaged in rural development projects. Further clashes will also increase risks of temporary disruption to cross-border movement and supply chain continuity in southern Central Equatoria. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Jul 25. Côte d’Ivoire: Confirmation of president’s candidacy will elevate unrest risks. On 29 July, President Alassane Ouattara announced that he will seek re-election for a fourth term in October’s presidential election. Ouattara’s announcement follows endorsement from his Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) party. Although Ouattara’s candidacy was widely anticipated (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 June 2025), opposition leaders will likely characterise it as unconstitutional and attempt to mobilise anti-government demonstrations in the coming weeks. A pact between the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) and the African People’s Party – Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) will likely facilitate greater co-ordination and mobilisation of protests, bolstering attendance. This will increase risks of protest activity and related unrest in opposition strongholds such as Abidjan (Abidjan district), Daloa (Sassandra-Marahoué district) and the capital Yamoussoukro, triggering sporadic operational and travel disruption. Despite likely protest activity, however, we assess that Ouattara will likely win October’s election. This is due to substantial fragmentation within the opposition and the disqualification of several high-profile opposition leaders from contesting the poll, including Tidjane Thiam and the former president, Laurent Gbagbo. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jul 25. Bangladesh: Security force presence in Dhaka will highly likely increase following police directive. On 28 July, the Bangladesh Police’s Special Branch (SB) issued a directive to all police chiefs warning of an elevated risk of vandalism and disorder by ‘fascist forces’ from 29 July to 8 August. It noted that anti-government groups have been holding events nationwide to mark the one-year anniversary of the protests that led to the ousting of the former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina. The police will be on heightened alert throughout July and August. The interim government has warned that supporters of Hasina’s now banned Awami League (AL) party will possibly incite unrest or provoke clashes through co-ordinated online and offline campaigns during this period. We assess that an elevated security force presence is highly likely in the capital Dhaka over the coming two weeks, especially at transport hubs and outside political party offices. The police are likely to disperse any AL gatherings forcibly with water cannons and tear gas, which would in turn drive bystander risks. Arbitrary detention risks facing AL-linked figures will remain elevated in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jul 25. Azerbaijan-Russia: Moscow-backed info ops will likely drive already-elevated regional tensions. On 28 July, Azerbaijan’s Media Development Agency issued a warning regarding the circulation of fake artificial intelligence (AI)-generated videos on social media. The footage allegedly shows senior Azerbaijani officials apologising to Russia. The state media watchdog claims that the content is intended to mislead public opinion. Our assessment remains that Russian-backed threat actors are most likely responsible for disseminating such material as part of an information campaign targeting the Azerbaijani state amid ongoing bilateral tensions. While relations between the two countries have been strained since the end of 2024, the latest flare-up stems from a crackdown by the authorities on members of Russia’s Azerbaijani minority in late June. In response, Baku detained several Russian citizens in Azerbaijan, including staff from the local branch of the Russian state-owned media outlet Sputnik Azerbaijan. We assess that Moscow’s information operation is aimed at destabilising Baku and will further exacerbate tensions and tit-for-tat arrests. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jul 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Ceasefire will likely be observed, despite allegations of violations. Earlier on 29 July, regional commanders from Cambodia and Thailand met for discussions on de-escalation measures; these included an agreement not to deploy further troops along the disputed border. The talks proceeded despite Thailand having accused Cambodia of violating the ceasefire after it came into effect at midnight. The ceasefire was agreed on 28 July during a meeting in Malaysia, though heavy fighting at the border was reported up until the deal’s implementation. Since the ceasefire came into effect, the situation has reportedly calmed significantly, with only sporadic exchanges monitored. A General Border Committee (GBC) meeting is scheduled for 4 August in Cambodia, during which further high-level talks will take place. In the coming days, we assess that additional isolated violations are possible, though we also assess that both Bangkok and Phnom Penh will largely observe the ceasefire, easing several of the most pertinent security risks facing both countries’ border areas. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jul 25. Congo (DRC): Government reshuffle is unlikely to moderate government stability risks. Later on 29 July, President Félix Tshisekedi will formalise a government reshuffle as part of a process initiated in March to incorporate opposition figures into a unity government. The reshuffle likely reflects efforts to pre-empt a potential leadership challenge given eroding government support from within the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). On 15 July, the authorities arrested several high-ranking FARDC figures and Tshisekedi’s head of personal security due to their alleged involvement in a coup ‘plot’. While the veracity of the claim regarding a plot remains unclear, the arrests underscore the government’s heightened anxiety vis-à-vis its control of the country’s security apparatus. The reshuffle also comes amid intensifying criticism of the government from the opposition, though it is unlikely to include many (if any) opposition figures. Instead, it will likely elevate loyalist figures to key positions to consolidate support for Tshisekedi among his allies. As such, while the reshuffle will possibly moderate immediate threats to government stability, we assess that the exclusion of opposition figures and the narrowing of the government’s support base will sustain government stability risks in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jul 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Ceasefire will likely be observed, despite allegations of violations. Earlier on 29 July, regional commanders from Cambodia and Thailand met for discussions on de-escalation measures; these included an agreement not to deploy further troops along the disputed border. The talks proceeded despite Thailand having accused Cambodia of violating the ceasefire after it came into effect at midnight. The ceasefire was agreed on 28 July during a meeting in Malaysia, though heavy fighting at the border was reported up until the deal’s implementation. Since the ceasefire came into effect, the situation has reportedly calmed significantly, with only sporadic exchanges monitored. A General Border Committee (GBC) meeting is scheduled for 4 August in Cambodia, during which further high-level talks will take place. In the coming days, we assess that additional isolated violations are possible, though we also assess that both Bangkok and Phnom Penh will largely observe the ceasefire, easing several of the most pertinent security risks facing both countries’ border areas. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jul 25. SA arms exports under scrutiny amid calls for greater oversight and transparency. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) has raised pressing concerns about the transparency and accountability of South Africa’s conventional arms trade, following a presentation by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) on its 2025 Q1 and Q2 reports. While the NCACC outlined significant growth in the sector, opposition members of parliament (MPs) and civil society critics warned that a lack of verifiable end-user checks risks implicating South Africa in regional and international conflicts. Deputy Chairperson of the NCACC, Deputy Minister Andries Nel, standing in for the absent Chair, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, on Friday 25 July reported to Parliament that between January and June 2025 the NCACC approved:
90 new registration certificates
85 contracting permits worth R17.2bn
283 export permits for munitions totalling just under R5bn
79 export permits for dual-use items worth R287m
165 import permits worth R156m
First quarter exports included a single combat aircraft to Mozambique worth R163 m (likely a Paramount Mwari); R206m worth of ammunition to Estonia; R318 m worth of ammunition to Germany; and R112m worth of “air defence technology” to the UAE.
The second quarter of 2025 saw 91 armoured vehicles worth approximately R800m approved for export to 11 mostly African countries, with the largest order being from Kenya (26 vehicles worth R205m) followed by Malawi (15 vehicles worth R145m). Two aircraft worth R327m were approved for export to the Democratic Republic of Congo and one to Mozambique (R163 m) – almost certainly Mwaris. Also in the second quarter, R1bn worth of ammunition was authorised for sale to Germany, along with R640m worth of munitions to Turkiye and R279m to Australia. Electronic systems accounted for a substantial component of Q2 2025 exports, including R423m worth of electronic warfare systems to India (almost certainly from Saab Grintek Defence), and R71 m worth of EW/communications systems each to Bangladesh and Brazil. Australia was authorised to receive R279m worth of countermeasure/imaging equipment. The NCACC noted a 60% increase in company registrations in Q2, with a dramatic leap in munitions exports, rising from R907 m in Q1 to R4 bn in Q2. According to the committee’s own data, arms exports during this period were mainly directed to Europe (59% in Q1), with the Middle East and Asia also featuring. By Q2, Africa saw a sharp rise (35% of the total) in imports from South Africa, particularly for dual-use goods, which are civilian technologies with potential military application. In Q2, Europe accounted for 52% of exports. The NCACC insisted it operates within the National Conventional Arms Control Act (Act 41 of 2002), which obliges it to ensure arms are not sold to states engaged in repression, terrorism, or conflict. Committee members, particularly Carl Niehaus (EFF), challenged the NCACC’s assertion that it operates within strict oversight boundaries. Niehaus argued the lack of end-user inspections since 2015 leaves Parliament with no means of ensuring arms are not being re-exported to regimes involved in human rights violations, citing Israel and Ukraine as examples.
He referenced US defence reports and a Sudanese arms monitoring platform which alleged that South African-manufactured weapons, including white phosphorus munitions, had been used in Sudan and Gaza. Niehaus accused the NCACC of offering “only warm words and no verifiable data”, and likened the situation to the notorious 1994 arms scandal (assault rifles and ammunition sent to Yemen using forged end user certificates) that led to the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Edwin Cameron.
The deputy minister responded that the NCACC relies on interdepartmental scrutiny committees, comprising State Security, the South African Police Service, and DIRCO, for due diligence. While acknowledging that inspections abroad are difficult, he invited Members to submit actionable evidence to trigger specific investigations. Committee members were reminded that current law restricts public reporting of technical specifications or exact end-user data. Section 23 of the Act prohibits disclosure of classified material, allowing only broad disclosures of item type, value and destination country. However, growing pressure from Members suggests Parliament may seek legislative amendments. Supporters of the arms sector, including members of the ruling coalition, emphasised the industry’s economic value. Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM), South Africa’s largest arms manufacturer, directly employs over 2 600 workers and supports an estimated 45 000 indirectly. Calls were made to prioritise transformation, improve SME access to export markets, and increase transparency in permit backlogs. Concerns were also raised about public access to the Directorate of Conventional Arms Control (DCAC), located within a high-security defence complex, with one whistleblower reportedly barred after aiding MPs during an oversight visit. The committee chair and several members expressed frustration at receiving only high-level summaries, demanding clearer reporting mechanisms and swifter follow-ups on previous allegations. The NCACC committed to tabling more detailed reports in its annual submission and welcomed proposals for joint hearings with trade, innovation, and defence oversight committees. A follow-up response from the NCACC is expected, including answers to a 14-page letter of allegations submitted in April and a new list of 15 written questions tabled during the session. While the arms industry offers a vital economic lifeline, particularly in high-tech and manufacturing sectors, the NCACC faces mounting pressure to prove that growth is not coming at the cost of ethical conduct or compliance with international humanitarian norms. For now, Parliament remains unconvinced that oversight systems are watertight. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
29 Jul 25. Armscor deepens ties with African nations, dtic touts business in Turkiye. A stated Armscor aim to reposition the South African defence and security acquisition and project management company to leverage opportunities in Africa has to date seen contact with three African countries this year as well as Turkiye, where the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition also helped promote South African companies. Armscor’s first major continental exposure this year was to Côte d’Ivoire in the form of a mid-February delegation which visited a number of Armscor facilities and also heard from SA National Defence Force (SANDF) Chief General Rudzani Maphwanya. The visit was implemented in line with the requirements of the West African country such as drone technology, vessels, ammunition manufacturing and weapon systems. A follow-up meeting that month resulted in a letter of cooperation being signed by Armscor and Côte d’Ivoire defence ministry to explore potential business opportunities. In its latest newsletter, Armscor makes mention of its presence at the Burkina Faso Synergy Safety, Defence and Security (SYSDEF 2025) exhibition in May followed by the June Africa Security Symposium (ASEC 2025) in Ethiopia. The newsletter opines its attendance and presence at the events “are just but a few platforms that allows the Corporation to have meaningful engagements with key role players in the security and defence sector”.
“It is through these gatherings that Armscor is able to demonstrate its capabilities and forge strategic relationships with the intention to leverage on its expertise. Industry shows and exhibitions have over the years proven to be effective channels for collaborations and strengthening relationships aimed at providing key defence solutions.”
On the Burkina Faso exhibition, held from 8 to 10 May in Ouagadougou, the Armscor presence was part of its marketing and business development strategy to consolidate its regional presence in West Africa and its commitment to advancing innovation and fostering international collaboration.
Armscor was invited to share expertise, explore new opportunities for cooperation, and strengthen ties between Burkina Faso respective defence industries. It held several meetings with senior defence officers and prominent business leaders, “who expressed significant interest in collaborating with Armscor in supplying weapon systems to Burkina Faso. One of the significant meetings was with the Chief of General Staff of the Burkina Faso Armed Forces, Brig Gen Célestin Simporé, who requested Armscor to invite him to South Africa to have a follow-up discussion on how to improve business with South Africa.” Of its attendance at the 12th Africa Security Symposium in Addis Ababa in mid-June, the State-owned company (SOC) reports its “prominent visibility allowed Armscor to showcase the South African defence industry (SADI) and its capabilities, commitment to enhancing defence across Africa and to engage meaningfully with key stakeholders”.
IDEF 2025 a success for SA companies
More recently, Armscor was at the International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF) held in Istanbul, Turkiye, between 22 and 27 July. This attracted 122 000 visitors from 114 countries and 1 500 exhibitors from 49 countries. The South African pavilion at IDEF, facilitated by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (the dtic), generated “significant trade leads” with participating firms exploring opportunities to expand into new export markets and strengthen their global footprints. South African exhibitors at IDEF 2025 included SVI, Imperial Armour, Aerospace Maritime and Defence Export Council, FimmTech, Unipro Protective Wear, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), QP Drone Tech, Zebra Protection, Kimona Holdings, Bullet Proofing Technology, Redeployable Camp Systems SA, Swatek Defence and Aerospace, Armscor, Fuchs Electronics, Reutech, Etion Create, Dynateq International, and Reutech Communications.
Benny Jiyane, Executive Chairman of SVI Engineering, said his company had met prospective clients from Zambia and West Africa. “It is interesting because they are looking for solutions in Africa, made by Africans. Also from the South Asian side, we received enquiries from Indonesia. They are interested in following up and seeing whether we cannot collaborate with them,” he said.
Louisa Garland, International Sales Director and founder of Imperial Armour, said her company received over a dozen promising enquiries from prospective clients, including Turkiye. Garland said the company, which employs 30 people, currently supplies the ministries of defence in different countries including United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia.
The Group Marketing Manager of Canvas and Tent Group, Karen Coetzer, noted that the exhibition was highly encouraging, with the company already receiving inquiries from European firms interested in their field hospitals and military base camps. She added that her team had advanced to signing a non-disclosure agreement with a company and are optimistic that this will lead to a formal transaction. The dtic reported the Technical Manager of engineering company FimmTech, Kevin Mhlanga, as saying FimmTech engaged with counterparts from Türkiye, Canada, China and the United Arab Emirates. “We shared ideas in terms of solutions in command and control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance (C4ISR) and we are looking forward to expand on the engagements we had.”
“The exposure and networking opportunity has not only strengthened our position in the defence and protective apparel manufacturing sectors, but has also opened doors to potential export markets, just to mention a few, Lebanon, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, a distributor in the whole of the Middle Eastern countries and Switzerland,” said Kimona Holdings Managing Director Kim Bubu.
“In addition, there are more than 20 Turkish companies in the defence sector that are keen to collaborate with us,” Bubu said.
“We have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with a Turkish body armour manufacturer, which has a lot of clientele in Africa and looking to work with a South African company to service the market,” Managing Director of Unipro Protective Wear, Zama Ledidi, told the dtic. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
28 Jul 25. Romania: Deputy prime minister resignation underscores government stability, governance risks. On 27 July, Deputy Prime Minister Dragoș Anastasiu resigned, following reports revealing his involvement in a corruption scheme. Between 2009 and 2017, his company paid a tax inspector approximately EUR 170,000 (USD 198,500) in bribes, disguised as consultancy fees, to avoid inspections. The tax inspector was imprisoned in 2023. Anastasiu and his business partner had never been charged, underscoring persistent governance and supervision quality risks. There is a realistic possibility that the resurfacing of the scandal will undermine public confidence in the Bolojan government, which was appointed on 23 June with the key objective of reducing the country’s budget. Romania’s budget deficit reached 9.3% of GDP in 2024 (the EU limit is 3%). An austerity package (including public sector reforms, tax hikes and wage caps) has already triggered several protests; a large-scale protest has been scheduled for 1 August. Therefore, we assess that domestic unrest and government stability risks will remain elevated in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Jul 25. Pakistan-China: China’s security concerns highlight persistent security risks in Pakistan. On 24 July, Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his first visit to the country since the India-Pakistan conflict in May. During the meeting, Wangi Yi urged Islamabad to protect the safety of Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan. He stated that ‘China supports Pakistan in resolutely combating all forms of terrorism and hopes that the Pakistani military will continue to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals, projects and institutions’. Munir also met with China’s Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia. These comments come after recent years of attacks targeting Chinese nationals and investment in Pakistan, particularly those that are part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The comments also come as Pakistan is looking to attract foreign investment in its mineral sector (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 22 July 2025). We assess that security risks will remain a point of concern for China in the near future, particularly given the recent further deterioration of the security environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Additionally, China will likely renew its call to bring over private security for assets and personnel; this will likely be resisted by Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Jul 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Ceasefire will likely ease security risks near disputed border in short term. Earlier on 28 July, ceasefire negotiations commenced between Cambodia and Thailand in Malaysia, resulting in an ‘immediate and unconditional ceasefire’ to come into effect from midnight. Regional commanders from both sides will hold a meeting at 0700hrs (local time) on 29 July ahead of further bilateral talks. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stated that the meeting was ‘co-organised by the US and with the participation of China’. On 27 July, US President Donald Trump threatened that he would not sign a trade deal with either country while hostilities persisted. Military clashes broke out in several areas along the disputed border following an exchange of fire on 24 July (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 July 2025). At least 34 people have died; in addition, more than 200,000 people have been evacuated across both countries. Kinetic clashes had continued for a fifth day earlier on 28 July despite the onset of negotiations. The announcement of a ceasefire will ease security risks near the border in the immediate term. However, despite the ceasefire, we assess that a flare-up in tensions remains a realistic possibility for the foreseeable future, given the unresolved border dispute, heightened nationalist sentiment in both countries and an overall lack of trust. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Jul 25. African terror groups adapt to stay lethal Africa Defense Forum. Africa has by far the youngest population among the continents, with about 40% of its population — nearly 600 m people — 15 or younger. It’s the primary target audience for militant groups, and one of many reasons that experts say extremism in Africa has been so difficult to defeat.
“Terrorist groups are finding a vulnerable, impressionable population to target,” Professor Barend Prinsloo told Africa Defense Forum (ADF). “Attacks on villages often involve the murder of older individuals, while young people are either physically taken captive or mentally indoctrinated. This massive, youthful demographic provides a virtually endless supply of recruits.”
Prinsloo, program leader in international and national security at South Africa’s North-West University, described terror groups as opportunistic organizations that exploit any societal grievances they can find. In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, an Islamic State group (IS) affiliate has gained traction by taking advantage of political neglect of the region. In the restive eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, multiple extremist groups have posed as “liberation fighters.”
“In Somalia, al-Shabaab blends nationalistic ideas with its Islamist objectives,” Prinsloo said. “And in West Africa, jihadist groups find support by rejecting foreign influence, especially from former colonial powers.”
Caleb Weiss, an analyst for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Bridgeway Foundation, said violent extremist groups are resilient because they belong to an ideological movement. Their leaders are skilled at taking religious messages and directives intended for a global audience and adapting them to local contexts. Local grievances are easily co-opted to entice recruits.
“A lot of what jihadist groups do on the ground is essentially public relations campaigns, what they call da’wah (Arabic for invitation), which helps build public support and further ingrain themselves into local environments,” Weiss told ADF. “Pure counterterrorism campaigns can rarely kill their way out of this problem as a result.”
Prinsloo explained why a military-only approach to counterterrorism has struggled to win the hearts and minds of the people affected by terrorist groups.
“Terror groups rely on asymmetrical warfare, disregarding conventional rules of human rights, which causes terrorism in Africa to increasingly resemble a civil war,” he said. “This dynamic amplifies the extremist ideology it began with, turning the conflict into a deeply personal, morally charged struggle for many of these young fighters.”
Militant groups continue to evolve in how they are funded. Often their goals align with locals and groups involved in illicit trade and organized crime. All parties empower and enable each other to achieve their goals, Prinsloo said.
“Their motives often center on resources and funding — recruiting people, controlling commodities and, increasingly, holding territory while acting like a quasi government,” he said. “In this space, transnational organized crime syndicates become the suppliers and facilitators for these terror groups.”
African terrorist group financing sources have remained largely unchanged in recent years: illegal taxation, looting, extortion, front businesses, kidnappings for ransom and donations.
“Those are still incredibly commonplace,” Weiss said. “What has evolved is more the methods of laundering and moving money. Yes, the old tried-and-true hawala [money transfer] networks and mobile money accounts are still very active in moving the money, but stuff like cryptocurrencies has gained popularity.”
Aligning with bandit groups in central Nigeria has allowed a Boko Haram splinter group to remain relevant and operational. But kidnappings and attacks have revealed that financing is at the heart of the alliance. James Barnett, a Hudson Institute research fellow in Nigeria, said local people no longer can distinguish between bandits and terrorists.
“Given what is already known about the nature of banditry in Nigeria, it seems likely that the militant landscape along the Niger-Kaduna axis is somewhat fractured, involving multiple armed groups whose motivations might vary and whose alliances might shift,” Barnett wrote in an investigation for HumAngle, an Abuja-based online daily newspaper that focuses on insecurity.
A New Threat
After a regional workshop in Rwanda to counter terrorist activities on the internet, United Nations officials said that some terrorist groups have learned to exploit virtual space to their advantage. “With time, some have mastered it to create a sophisticated and sprawling online presence — to radicalize, recruit, ransom, and raise funds,” the U.N. said.
“Countering terrorist use of the internet is increasingly difficult as terrorists are migrating to more niche and hidden parts of the internet, making their activity harder to identify and disrupt,” said Charley Gleeson, open source intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, a global initiative. “Which is why it can only be done effectively with collaboration between the tech sector, governments, and civil society to ensure that human rights and democratic freedoms are upheld.”
Officials at the workshop said that regional cooperation will be necessary to fight cyberterrorism.
“The fight against the use of the internet for terrorist purposes could not be won by one single country,” said Isabel Kalinhangabo of the Rwanda Investigation Bureau.
Experts now warn that extremists are in the early stages of turning to cyberterrorism using computers and networks for political, ideological or other objectives. The extremists are employing advanced attacks to gain access to networks, where they can stay undetected to steal data. They use computer viruses, worms and malware to target IT systems, power grids, transportation systems and more. They use social engineering strategies and phishing campaigns to trick people into disclosing valuable information.
A 2024 study showed that developing nations, especially those in Africa, are being used as test beds for cyberattacks because of their relatively low levels of computer security. In 2023, the average number of weekly cyberattacks on African businesses grew 23% compared to previous years, the fastest increase worldwide, according to Interpol’s 2024 African Cyberthreat Assessment. Ransomware and business email compromise topped the list of serious threats.
Digital illiteracy, aging infrastructure and a lack of security professionals all present challenges to preventing economic loss due to cybercrime, according to a 2024 report by Access Partnership and the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria.
“Africa faces the most significant impact from cyber threats compared to any other continent,” said Nicole Isaac, vice president of global public policy for technology giant Cisco. The cybersecurity newsletter Dark Reading reported that she said nearly all financial leaders in Africa “consider cybercrime a significant threat along with macroeconomic conditions and political and social instability.”
Disturbing Data
At a 2024 counterterrorism summit in Abuja, African Union Chairperson Mousa Mahamat highlighted some sobering numbers — an average of eight incidents and 44 fatalities a day on the continent in 2023. There were more than 16,000 deaths, including more than 7,000 civilians and more than 4,000 security forces.
“Terrorism and violent extremism are the biggest evils of our time, spreading to all the five regions of Africa,” he said.
Threats posed by violent extremist organizations on the continent are constantly evolving, as the two most prominent — al-Qaida and the IS — exploit “a deficit in counterterrorism capabilities,” according to a 2024 report by a panel of U.N. experts. “The situation is becoming ever more complex with the conflation of ethnic and regional disputes with the agenda and operations of these groups,” they wrote.
During the summit, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed called on countries in and around Africa’s violent hot spots to work with the U.N. and other international organizations to address root causes of terrorism such as the lack of economic opportunities. She added that African governments must reestablish their “social contract” or connection with communities and people.
Professor Prinsloo is among the experts who believe opportunities for dialogue with extremist groups should be explored.
“Respectful, formal governmental engagement with certain terrorist groups may offer a pathway to reduce the personal grievances at the core of this violence, allowing us to focus more effectively on addressing the extremist ideology itself,” he said.
Terror Expands in Regional Hot Spots
In recent years, five regions in Africa have been the focus of extremist violence, according to an August 2024 report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS):
THE SAHEL: The region with the fewest deaths 10 years ago has had the most over the past three years.
“The 11,200 deaths in the Sahel [through June 30] in 2024 — a tripling since 2021 — now represent over half of all reported fatalities across the continent,” the center reported. “Security force violence against civilians has consistently been found to propel recruitment by violent extremist groups. The Sahelian military juntas and their militia allies have killed more civilians (2,430) in the past year than militant Islamist groups (2,050).”
U.N. experts point to “a deficit in counterterrorism capabilities,” which al-Qaida and Islamic State group (IS) affiliates continue to exploit.
SOMALIA: Al-Shabaab has endured for two decades and has made this struggling country the second-most active battlefield on the continent for the past three years. The 6,590 reported fatalities in 2024 are more than double that of 2020, the center wrote. Al-Shabaab remains an overwhelming presence in Somalia, as the IS-Somalia group accounted for less than 1% of terrorism in Somalia and Kenya in 2024.
Despite significant losses from airstrikes and military operations, al-Shabaab remains resilient. It has an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 fighters and collects $100 m a year, mostly from taxation in Mogadishu and southern Somalia, U.N. experts wrote.
LAKE CHAD BASIN: A decade ago, this region was the epicenter of terrorist violence in Africa with 67% of all deaths, or 13,670 annually, according to the ACSS. The basin comprises northeast Nigeria and the borderlands of Cameroon, Niger and Chad.
“Militant Islamist violence in the Lake Chad Basin has ebbed and flowed over the past decade,” the center said. “The past two years have seen an increase in violent events after a period of decline. However, annual fatalities linked to these events have remained relatively consistent, typically ranging from 3,500 to 3,800 deaths.”
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reports that the extremist insurrection in the Lake Chad Basin is mostly centered on Nigeria. Ansaru, an al-Qaida-affiliated group, and the IS-West Africa Province are the two dominant groups in the region. Attacks increasingly involve several nonextremist militias that take part in banditry, kidnapping and cattle rustling. The IISS says these militias “are now more lethal than jihadist groups.”
MOZAMBIQUE: The northern Cabo Delgado province has watched in horror as a local insurgency that emerged in 2017 has evolved into the deadly IS-Mozambique group. Multinational military operations have degraded the group’s capabilities, but violent events and fatalities have rebounded.
“The projected 250 events and 460 fatalities by the end of 2024 would represent a near doubling in violence over the previous year,” the ACSS wrote.
The IISS reports that northern Mozambique saw a new outbreak of militant activities in rural areas in 2022, after a decrease in violence after 2021 interventions by Rwandan and Southern African troops, who managed to push out militants from major towns in Cabo Delgado.
NORTH AFRICA: From June 30, 2014, to June 30, 2015, there were 3,650 fatalities from terrorism in North Africa, second most on the continent. Now, this region has the fewest reported deaths of the five.
“This year marks the first year there were no violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in Egypt since 2010,” the ACSS wrote. “The United Nations believes ISL (Islamic State-Libya) and al-Qaida still have fighters in the southern part of the country, though they appear to be focused on profiting from the illicit economy.”(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
26 Jul 25. Russia Uses New UMPB-5 Guided Bomb in Kharkiv Strike. Russian forces have used a newly developed precision-guided bomb in a strike on Ukraine for the first time, injuring dozens in the city of Kharkiv. According to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, two UMPB-5 aerial munitions were launched from a Su-34 bomber at approximately 11:00 a.m. on July 24, hitting infrastructure in the Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi districts. The bombs were reportedly released from an estimated distance of over 60 miles near the village of Stroitel in Russia’s Belgorod region, igniting fires. A total of 41 people were injured in the attack, including six children, local authorities confirmed. Among the wounded were a 10-year-old girl, a 28-day-old infant, a pregnant woman, and two 17-year-olds who suffered blast injuries. All victims are receiving medical treatment. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that people were present on the streets at the time of the attack. No fatalities were reported. The UMPB-5 is a newly modified glide bomb equipped with a 550-pound high-explosive warhead, similar in weight to previous munitions but with a reinforced casing. “The warhead of the UMPB-5 weighs 250 kilograms, the same as a high-explosive aircraft bomb,”a spokesperson for the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office said. “At the same time, it is made of thicker metal than in the UMPB D-30, which is why civilians were more seriously injured.”
Spartak Borysenko, a representative of the prosecutor’s office, said the strike confirms Russia’s continued use of Kharkiv as a test site for new air-launched munitions. “Russia is using Kharkiv as a testing ground. Today it’s the UMPB-5, before it was the D-30… These modified bombs cause greater destruction and lead to more civilian injuries,” Borysenko stated according to a report by Euromaiden Press.
The blast wave from the attack caused significant structural damage. According to official assessments, 20 residential buildings were hit, including 17 apartment blocks. More than 600 windows were shattered, and the blast created a large crater in the road. Seven cars were destroyed by fire, while 18 others were damaged. An industrial facility was also set ablaze, resulting in a large fire, Russian media claimed the industrial facility was a drone factory. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Jul 25. U.S. Forces Airdropped into Syria for Strike on ISIS Leadership. U.S. forces carried out a targeted raid early Friday morning in the northern Syrian town of al-Bab, killing senior ISIS leader Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani along with his two sons, Abdallah Dhiya al-Hardani and Abd al-Rahman Dhiya Zawba al-Hardani, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
The raid was conducted in coordination with the Syrian Interim Government and supported by coalition aircraft. CENTCOM stated that all three individuals were affiliated with ISIS and posed an active threat to U.S. and coalition forces as well as to Syria’s new administration.
“These ISIS individuals posed a threat to U.S. and Coalition Forces, as well as the new Syrian Government,” CENTCOM said in its official statement.
General Michael Erik Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command, added, “We will continue to relentlessly pursue ISIS terrorists wherever they operate. ISIS terrorists are not safe where they sleep, where they operate, and where they hide. Alongside our partners and allies, U.S. Central Command is committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS terrorists that threaten the region, our allies, and our homeland.”
According to local sources cited by Syrian media, U.S. special operations forces were airdropped into al-Bab by helicopter during the night. Social media posts and unconfirmed videos captured the sound of helicopters and aircraft over the town, though no visual confirmation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-