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Military And Security Developments
Jul 24.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Recent Russian reconnaissance operations in Pokrovsk likely indicate an intensification of probing attacks against the city, alongside continued efforts to complete its encirclement
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 23 July, Russia and Ukraine held their third round of direct talks this year in Istanbul; however, as expected, they did not result in a breakthrough towards ending the war
• AID: President Trump announced on 23 July that the US has made a deal with the EU for the purchase of military aid, much of which will be sent to Ukraine
• FORECAST: On 22 July, President Zelensky signed a law limiting the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine, prompting significant domestic and international backlash
• BAKHMUT: To the north-west of Toretsk, Russian forces are attempting to advance northwards in a mutually reinforcing operation to support encirclements of both Pokrovsk (to the west) and Kostiantynivka (to the east, all Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage published on 21 July indicates that Russian forces have taken Popiv Yar, located around 13 miles (21km) west of Kostiantynivka, and are advancing to the north. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 22 July also indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the west of Toretsk, approaching the eastern outskirts of the satellite town of Shcherbynivka. Both sides have been fighting very heavily over the satellite town for months. It remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces will remain in the town, given that parts of it, particularly in the east, are under increasing threat of encirclement by Russian forces.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 22 July also confirms that Russian forces have taken Bila Hora, located around seven miles (11km) to the south of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). As previously assessed, this places the Russians just over four miles (7km) to the south-east of the southern outskirts of Kostiantynivka, underscoring Russia’s slowly tightening grip over the southern approaches to the town. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces are continuing to launch localised counter-attacks in a bid to slow Russia’s advance, with geolocated footage from 22 July indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced modestly along Zlahody Street in south-western Chasiv Yar.
• DONETSK: Recent Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations in Pokrovsk likely indicate an intensification of probing attacks against the city in the short term, alongside continued efforts to complete the encirclement of this key logistical hub. Geolocated footage from 21 July indicates that Russian forces are assaulting Ukrainian positions along the E50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in southern Pokrovsk. Footage from 21 July shows Russian forces advancing to the east of Zirove, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. We previously reported Russian reconnaissance forces attempting to enter the city and its outskirts last week. Ukrainian authorities previously claimed to have successfully repelled such attempts to penetrate the city.
• DONETSK: A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are experiencing a depletion of their reserves and a broader weakening of their defences in and around Pokrovsk. If true, Russian forces will likely seek to exploit such conditions to intensify attacks against Pokrovsk in the near future. The source’s claims about the state of Ukrainian defences remain unverified. However, we assess that Russia will likely continue assaults against Pokrovsk to probe defences in the short term and look for (and potentially help create) weaknesses to exploit, while intensifying attacks against the city’s outskirts as it progresses in its wider encirclement.
• DONETSK: Russian forces are continuing their attempts to encircle Pokrovsk from the north, with Rodynske likely to be a key focus of their operations in the coming weeks. Rodynske sits around four miles (6km) to the north of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian military observer has reported that the Russian command has redeployed elements to support offensive operations to the north and north-east of Pokrovsk, as part of efforts to interdict the Pokrovsk-Dobropillia highway (T-0515). Given that Rodynske is located along this highway, we assess that Russia’s encirclement plan likely requires the capture of the settlement. A Russian milblogger has also reported that Russian operations remain focused on reaching Rodynske and interdicting important logistical routes to Pokrovsk. Capturing Rodynske would highly likely facilitate Russia’s encirclement effort and set conditions for further assaults. These assaults would aim to force a Ukrainian withdrawal, preventing the need for an extremely costly and potentially long-drawn-out frontal assault.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces are fiercely contesting various villages in northern Sumy oblast after launching a number of localised counter-attacks, which have pushed the Russians back in the last couple of weeks. Ukrainian forces are understood to have pushed the Russians back in Kindrativka, located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city, and Andriivka, located to the south-east of Kindrativka (both Sumy oblast). However, these settlements likely remain contested grey zones, as geolocated footage published on 23 July indicates that Russian forces have advanced once again in central Kindrativka. Meanwhile, footage published on 21 July indicates that Russian forces have likely taken the village of Varachyne, located roughly 15 miles (24km) to the north-east of Sumy city. However, it remains unclear whether Russian forces have fully repulsed the Ukrainians from the settlement.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 22 July confirms that Russian forces have captured Lypove, located to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), and have advanced to the south-west of the settlement. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the sector noted that Ukrainian forces have also repelled a Russian assault involving tanks in the Lyman area. In recent months, Russia has only rarely launched assaults using armoured vehicles in this direction.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have continued to make advances along the southern axis in Zaporizhzhia oblast, underscoring the growing pressure on Ukrainian forces along this front. Geolocated footage published on 21 July indicates that Russian forces have made minor advances in eastern Mala Tokmachka (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Meanwhile, to the west, footage from 23 July confirms Russian advances into the centre of Plavni, a small village at the extreme western flank of the Zaporizhzhia line. The village sits on the eastern banks of the Dnieper River to the north-west of Kamianske, where Russian forces have recently advanced and are likely attempting to consolidate gains.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have involved relatively smaller packages of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than in previous attacks involving several hundred drones. That said, we continue to assess that the risk of significantly large strikes remains elevated for the foreseeable future.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 23 July, Russia and Ukraine held their third round of direct talks this year in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey); however, as expected, they did not result in a breakthrough towards ending the war. Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Rustem Umerov (who previously served as defence minister), said that the Ukrainian side had proposed a meeting before the end of August between the two countries’ presidents. However, Russia’s chief delegate, Vladimir Medinsky, insisted that the purpose of a meeting between the two presidents should be to sign an agreement to end the war, underscoring Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness at present to engage in direct talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Medinsky also offered Ukraine short ceasefires lasting between 24 and 48 hours to retrieve wounded and killed soldiers. In contrast, Ukraine continues to push for a full, comprehensive ceasefire without preconditions (as proposed by the US).
• NEGOTIATIONS: Although the two sides remain far removed on what steps to take next to cease hostilities, as well as the terms for doing so, the recent talks resulted in progress on returning prisoners of war (POWs). Russia and Ukraine agreed to a new large-scale prisoner swap of at least 1,200 people each. In addition, Zelensky announced on 23 July that Ukraine had returned another group of soldiers from Russia under a previously agreed exchange during the second round of peace talks on 2 June. Prisoner exchanges are highly likely aimed at building trust between the two sides to facilitate more serious talks at a later date. However, Russia highly likely regards POW exchanges as a small concession to give the impression that it is engaged in negotiations without having to make significant concessions in its war objectives that would facilitate an end to conflict.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The lack of significant progress towards ending the war underscores that Moscow is likely undeterred by US President Donald Trump’s threats of tariffs and sanctions facing Russia if no peace deal is signed by the start of September. Medinsky proposed the creation of three online working groups for humanitarian, military and political issues. While the suggestion is almost certainly aimed at portraying Russia as being a proactive participant in the negotiating process, the creation of separate working groups would fragment the composition of the respective negotiating teams and could realistically further delay any concrete progress, which could realistically be the objective of such a proposal from the Russian side. Aside from this, Russia did not offer Ukraine anything new in the latest round of talks, while Kyiv continues to push for a total ceasefire, as proposed by the US.
• AID: US President Donald Trump announced on 23 July that the US has made a deal with the EU for the purchase of military aid, much of which will be sent to Ukraine. Trump emphasised that the bloc would fully pay for the cost of the weapons, though he did not divulge any specifics about what equipment Kyiv could possibly receive. Nevertheless, on 23 July, the US announced the approval of a ‘possible Foreign Military Sale’ to Ukraine worth USD 172 m for a HAWK Phase III air defence system and equipment to sustain it. The US also announced the approval of a potential sale worth USD 150 m of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), including their maintenance and repairs. We assess that the developments underscore the Trump administration’s growing readiness to facilitate military equipment transfers to Ukraine, as long as Kyiv or its allies are paying for it.
FORECAST
CORRUPTION: On 22 July, President Zelensky signed a law limiting the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine, prompting significant domestic and international backlash. The new legislation grants the prosecutor general (appointed by the president) increased authority over investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).
Zelensky claims the legislation seeks to counter Russian influence within the institutions, though critics argue that there is nothing in the law that targets supposed Russian agents in or outside of the agencies. It is highly likely that Zelensky was referring to recent searches conducted at NABU and SAPO premises on 21 July that targeted alleged Russian moles. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) alleged on 21 July that a lead NABU detective, Ruslan Magamedrasulov, had helped his father trade with Russia illegally. The SBU also said it was working to establish whether Magamedrasulov had contacted Russian special services and shared classified information with them. While there are highly likely Russian assets across numerous Ukrainian government structures, critics of recent developments have raised concerns that the legislation marks a backsliding in democratic standards and fighting corruption.
Rare anti-government protests took place in major Ukrainian cities on 22 and 23 July and will highly likely continue over the coming days. Thus far, protests have attracted several thousand participants in major cities, including Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi oblast), Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast), the capital Kyiv, Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast), among others. The unrest is particularly significant given that protests are currently banned under martial law and, as such, reflects growing public anger with the government’s perceived efforts to undermine anti-corruption bodies. Although violence or escalation is unlikely, the authorities will possibly resort to heavy-handed tactics to disperse protests if they deem them to be unmanageable (though they will likely remain peaceful). However, if the security forces do resort to force, this could invigorate anti-government sentiment and accusations that the Zelensky government is shifting towards an authoritarian style of governance, despite the fact that protests are illegal under martial law.
In response to the protests, Zelensky announced earlier on 24 July that he had approved the text of a new draft law aimed at strengthening the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. He also promised to submit it to Ukraine’s parliament later today (24 July). However, it remains uncertain what the bill includes and whether it will adequately restore faith in the independence of anti-corruption agencies. By introducing a new law, Zelensky is almost certainly attempting to manage societal discontent, with recent developments sparking the biggest public display of criticism against him since the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Throughout the war, Zelensky has enjoyed a healthy level of support from Ukrainians; polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published in mid-June revealed that 65% of respondents trust him. Despite his relatively high approval rating, a separate survey from KIIS in June showed concerns about Ukraine sliding towards authoritarianism. Half (50%) of respondents believed that Ukraine was progressing closer to democracy, while 41% expressed concerns regarding a decline in democratic standards. We assess that Zelensky and his government’s response to criticism of the law, as well as the future handling of graft cases, will likely prove crucial in determining public approval and perceptions of Ukraine’s ability to tackle corruption. Although the government is now under intensified scrutiny, the risk of serious instability is low in the near term, particularly owing to wartime conditions and the increasing centralisation of power in Kyiv.
Besides domestic backlash, the recent developments will likely fuel long-standing narratives about the prevalence of corruption in Ukraine and why countries (predominantly in the West) should not offer military or financial support. US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has urged Kyiv to reconsider the law, given that ‘one of the most widely used talking points’ for terminating aid is corruption within Ukraine. Graham has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine within the Republican Party, whose members are generally more critical of US aid to Ukraine. Aside from concerns from Western countries that have aided Ukraine, the recent law will possibly discourage future aid and investment opportunities from the private sector. The OECD warned prior to the legislation’s passing that it could undermine Kyiv’s credibility among foreign partners. This will possibly negatively impact much-needed defence investment and reconstruction financing.
Lastly, the legislation’s passage has fuelled concerns about how this could potentially jeopardise Ukraine’s bid to join the EU. European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen has raised ‘strong concerns’ with Zelensky over the new law, according to EC spokesperson Guillaume Mercier. Mercier emphasised that, as a candidate country, Ukraine is expected to fully uphold the rule of law and the fight against corruption. The commissioner responsible for EU enlargement, Marta Kos, reportedly warned Ukraine’s new deputy prime minister for European integration, Taras Kachka, that the legislation would violate commitments linked to Ukraine’s candidate status and undermine preparations for formal accession talks. While our assessment remains that Kyiv is highly unlikely to join the EU in the long term, states against or sceptical of Ukraine’s prospective membership will almost certainly use recent developments to further justify their opposition to Ukrainian accession and efforts to block financing and military aid agreements.
*Ukraine: Diminishing trust in presidency will sustain risk of unrest, despite government pledge. On 23 July, anti-government protests against recent legislation regulating anti-corruption agencies continued for a second consecutive day. The protests attracted several thousand participants in major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv, Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi oblast), Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast), Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast), among others. The bill curtails the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) by granting the presidentially appointed prosecutor general the power to influence investigations conducted by these bodies. President Zelensky has justified the legislation as an attempt to curb Russian influence within NABU and SAPO. However, amid mounting domestic and international backlash, he has announced plans to introduce a new bill within the next two weeks aimed at strengthening the law enforcement system and safeguarding the independence of anti-corruption bodies. Nevertheless, we assess that recent developments have likely caused significant damage to public trust in Zelensky, which will remain a key driver of unrest and discontent in the coming weeks.
Jul 23.
• Ukraine: Curtailment of anti-corruption institutions will highly likely fuel anti-government sentiment. On 22 July, rare anti-government protests broke out in major Ukrainian cities in response to a law passed the same day that curtails the independence of key anti-corruption institutions. Demonstrations took place in the capital Kyiv, as well as in other major cities. The unrest is particularly significant given that protests are currently banned under martial law and, as such, reflects growing public anger with the government’s perceived efforts to undermine anti-corruption bodies. The new legislation, signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky on 22 July, grants the Prosecutor General (appointed by the president) increased authority over investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Zelensky claimed the measure was intended to counter Russian influence within the two institutions and follows State Security Service (SBU) raids against NABU staff over alleged collusion with Russia and other offences. We assess that the recent legislation has undermined the independence of NABU and SAPO; as such, it will highly likely fuel further protests and intensify anti-government sentiment in the coming weeks, though violence or an escalation is unlikely under current martial law conditions.
Jul 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Various Russian sources have claimed in recent days that their forces continue to make advances near the H-20 and T-0504 highways that run towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast)
• STRIKES: Russia’s strike campaign is increasingly targeting western cities, such as Ivano-Frankivsk, underscoring threats to areas with lower air defence coverage
• AID: The US is reportedly reshuffling and reprioritising deliveries of Patriot air defence systems to facilitate exports to Ukraine, which could free up batteries to be shipped from Germany to Ukraine in the coming months
• FORECAST: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on 19 July that Ukraine has proposed holding a new round of peace talks with Russia as early as this week, but a major breakthrough remains highly unlikely in the short term
• BAKHMUT: Various Russian sources, including the Ministry of Defence (MoD), have claimed in recent days that their forces continue to make advances to the north-west of Toretsk, including along the H-20 and T-0504 highways that run towards Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast). The MoD reported that Russian forces have taken the village of Popiv Yar, located 13 miles (21km) west of Kostiantynivka, while other sources claimed they have taken central Yablunivka, located eight miles (13km) east of Popiv Yar. While we cannot confirm either of these claims, both settlements remain heavily contested. Yablunivka in particular is an important point on the frontline, given its location alongside its sister village Oleksandro-Kalynove between the H-20 and T-0504 highways. Russian forces continue to assault Yablunivka from both the west and south-east (from Oleksandro-Kalynove). However, geolocated footage from 20 July indicates that Ukrainian forces are staging counter-attacks and have succeeded in pushing the Russians back in northern Oleksandro-Kalynove.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the north-east, the Russian MoD also claimed on 20 July that its forces had seized the village of Bila Hora, located around seven miles (11km) to the south of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, if accurate, it would indicate that Russian forces are tightening their grip on the southern approaches to Kostiantynivka, which remains the principal objective for Russian forces in the area.
• DONETSK: Recent Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations against Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) are unlikely to be indicative of an imminent frontal Russian assault on the city. On 18 July, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi praised Ukrainian forces for repelling Russian infantry attempts to break through defensive lines in Pokrovsk. Syrskyi highlighted the failure of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations aimed at penetrating the city. On 19 July, Ukraine’s Donetsk Operational Tactical Group reported similar unsuccessful sabotage attempts on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. In 2024, Russian forces had reportedly reached the outskirts of Pokrovsk from the south. However, instead of launching an assault against the city, they focused on operations in southern Donetsk, including in Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka and Vuhledar. As such, we assess that Russia will focus on efforts to encircle Pokrovsk and cut it off from critical logistical routes, before launching frontal assaults against the city.
• DONETSK: As such, Russian operations to the north-east of Pokrovsk remain intense, though have failed to achieve any gains recently, likely due to Ukrainian counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from July 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Mykolaivka, situated to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia group of forces, Viktor Trehubov, noted an intensification in Russia’s drone and glide bomb usage in the Pokrovsk sector, likely aimed at undermining Ukrainian defensive positions and facilitating further advances.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, further south-west, geolocated footage from 19 July shows recent Russian advances in north-eastern Voskresenka, located to the south-west of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Russian forces also made confirmed advances in eastern Zelenyi Hai, also located to the south-west of Novopavlivka.
• KHARKIV: The Russian MoD claimed on 17 July that its forces had seized the border village of Dehtyarne, located at the north-easternmost corner of Kharkiv oblast some 24 miles (38km) to the north-east of Vovchansk. While we cannot confirm whether Russian forces have taken the village, the MoD’s claim strongly indicates that Russian forces are further expanding efforts to cross the international border at multiple points, likely in an attempt to establish a buffer zone in Kharkiv oblast. Earlier this month, Russian forces crossed the border 22 miles (35km) to the south and seized the border town of Milove, further indicating efforts to increase pressure along the Kharkiv border.
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to contest areas in northern Sumy oblast, with both sides advancing over the last few days. Geolocated footage published on 20 July indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully counter-attacked in eastern Kindrativka, a village located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Ukrainian sources have reported in recent days that Ukrainian forces are pressing their advantage around the village and claim that they have successfully encircled a small force of Russian forces to the east, though this remains unconfirmed. Meanwhile, footage from 20 July similarly indicates that Russian forces have taken Yablunivka, a small village located about 16 miles (26km) north-east of Sumy city. Notably, the village sits only one mile (1.7km) to the north of the H07 highway that runs south-west towards Sumy city.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s strike campaign has continued to feature very large-scale attacks, such as those launched on 19 and 21 July, involving 379 and 450 aerial objects (drones and missiles) respectively. The 21 July attack heavily targeted the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and its wider region, as well as Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv oblasts. The mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk reported that it was the largest attack against the city since the start of the war. The massive barrage occurred shortly before the visit of the French foreign minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, to Ukraine. The 19 July attack primarily targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Sumy oblasts. Other attacks in recent days have involved relatively smaller barrages, mostly involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
• STRIKES: The current Russian strike campaign is increasingly focusing on Ukraine’s western regions, as well as Ukrainian mobilisation resources. The 21 July attack’s focus on Ivano-Frankivsk is the latest to target a western city with increasingly intensive and focused combined drone and missile strikes. Meanwhile, on 18 July, the Kyiv Independent noted that Russia targeted enlistment offices five times between 30 June and 7 July. The attacks are highly likely aimed at undermining Ukraine’s force generation efforts, particularly by deterring citizens from attending these facilities due to the fear of strikes. This is further evidence of the psychological effect sought by Russia through its strike campaign.
• STRIKES: The damage inflicted by recent Russian strikes highlights the growing success of Russia’s strike campaign, which is increasing the penetration rates of drones and missiles. Between April and June, 15% of Russian drones penetrated Ukrainian air defences, up from 5% in the first quarter of this year, according to the Ukrainian Air Force. Frequent large-scale drone attacks are overwhelming Ukrainian air defences, resulting in higher success rates. On 19 July, Major General Christian Freuding, head of the German Ministry of Defence planning and command staff, estimated that Moscow aims to further increase its drone production to be able to launch 2,000 drones in one attack against Ukraine. We assess that such an outcome remains likely at some stage and would likely allow Russia to further increase its overall drone penetration rate due to sheer volume.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its drone campaign against Russia, causing significant flight disruption – a deliberate strategy by Kyiv to increase pressure on Moscow. Russia’s MoD reported the interception of 230 drones since 19 July. Russian authorities also reported the cancellation of 140 flights over the weekend and the redirection of a further 130, including at airports in the capital Moscow. Causing flight disruption is a deliberate Ukrainian strategy aimed at increasing financial and psychological pressure on the Russian population.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• TRAVEL: Ukrainian lawmakers are considering whether to allow men aged between 18 and 24 to travel abroad, which would significantly ease current wartime restrictions. The speaker of Ukraine’s parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, disclosed details of the potential move on 19 July. Although Ukraine’s parliament is reviewing several proposals to liberalise exit rules, including establishing clear criteria and permitting certain categories of people to travel, no final decision has been made yet. Men aged 18 to 24 are not subject to mobilisation but are still barred from leaving Ukraine unless they qualify for exemptions, such as for medical or business reasons.
• TRAVEL: Discussions about easing restrictions for non-mobilised men to travel outside the country have been ongoing since 2023, though rules have not yet changed. As such, it is uncertain whether travel rules for Ukrainian men in this age bracket will be eased in the near-to-medium term. However, if such a decision were made, it would likely make it harder for the Ukrainian government to lower the conscription age in the future if this were deemed necessary to bolster Ukraine’s manpower. A relaxation of travel rules could also realistically encourage Ukrainian men to leave the country, which would further compound Ukraine’s demographic crisis. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update – 28 August 2024.
• RESHUFFLE: A presidential decree published on 19 July has unveiled the new composition of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council (RNBO) after a recent government reshuffle. The makeup of the council remains largely unchanged, though Rustem Umerov (who previously served as minister of defence) has been appointed its secretary. A new figure to the council is Oleksiy Sobolev, who was recently appointed to lead a new agency that combines the agriculture, ecology and economy ministries. The Ukrainian president determines who is a member of the RNBO, though it must include the prime minister, minister of defence, minister of internal affairs and the foreign minister. As such, the council’s updated composition is highly likely a formality, rather than indicative of a wider revamp.
• AID: The US is reshuffling and reprioritising deliveries of Patriot air defence systems to facilitate exports to Ukraine, according to reports on 18 July from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Unspecified US officials have claimed that Germany will receive the next available Patriot air defence systems ahead of Switzerland to allow Berlin to transfer the two Patriots it has in its arsenal to Kyiv. The Swiss government has confirmed that the US has decided to reprioritise deliveries. In addition, the Trump administration will reportedly reshuffle other planned future deliveries to give priority to other countries sending Patriots from their inventories to Ukraine.
• AID: Meanwhile, German media reports from 18 July claim that Ukraine will receive the first Patriot air defence system paid for by Germany, though not for at least six months. To help strengthen Ukraine’s air defence network more quickly, Germany is considering whether to hand over one of its existing Patriot systems, which the recent US decision may well facilitate. However, Berlin has already handed over three systems to Kyiv, and Germany only has three systems currently available for domestic air defence needs. While we cannot confirm what action Germany will take, the reports underscore the difficult decisions Ukraine’s allies will have to make in terms of prioritising national defence needs or providing military assistance to Ukraine, given production timelines.
• AID: Separately, the first group of 49 decommissioned M1A1 Abrams tanks from Australia is now in Ukraine after a nine-month delay. The Australian Department of Defence announced this on 19 July, adding that the Ukrainian military is now in possession of the majority of the tanks. The final delivery will occur in the coming months. Plans for Australia to transfer the tanks were announced in October 2024; the US had privately voiced objections to their transfer (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 19 May 2025).
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on 19 July that Ukraine has proposed holding a new round of peace talks with Russia as early as this week. Turkish media reported earlier on 21 July that the negotiations, which would be the third of their kind since May, will possibly take place on 23 or 24 July. Meanwhile, Russian-state media has claimed that the talks are expected at the end of this week.
Ukraine’s proposal is almost certainly aimed at presenting itself to the US and the wider international community as a proactive player seeking to advance peace efforts, in contrast to Russia. The possibility of new talks comes after US President Donald Trump threatened on 14 July to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions against Russia if no peace deal is reached within 50 days (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 July 2025). Meanwhile, on 18 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke via telephone. During their call, Erdoğan emphasised the importance of holding a new round of talks and offered Istanbul (where the previous negotiations took place) as a possible venue.
Although Russia will likely seek to demonstrate interest in holding another round of talks and attend the discussions, a major diplomatic breakthrough is highly unlikely in the short term. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 20 July that ‘the main thing’ for Russia is to achieve its war goals. As such, Russian officials will highly likely maintain Russia’s long-held war objectives and are highly unlikely to deviate from these for the foreseeable future, as long as Russian forces continue to advance on the battlefield. Moscow’s unwillingness to make significant compromises to end the war will highly likely continue to impede meaningful progress towards resolving the conflict over the coming weeks and months. This will increase the likelihood of not only US tariffs but potentially also further punitive measures, as well as additional weapons transfers for Ukraine.
Key points
• Increasingly aggressive Russian tactics to protect its ‘shadow fleet’ in European waters will increase risks of confrontation, tit-for-tat boarding and vessel detainment.
• Efforts to enforce sanctions and the expansion of Russia’s shadow fleet will increase operational disruption and compliance risks for the maritime industry.
• Likely Ukrainian sabotage of Russian shadow tankers will increase the risk of further spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian war into maritime domains, including both the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.
• Possible sabotage of undersea critical infrastructure beyond the Baltics will highly likely cause widespread operational disruption and increase compliance risks for the energy sector.
Context
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian activity in European waters has increased, including grey zone operations, particularly in the Baltic Sea. Russia is suspected of orchestrating deliberate acts of sabotage that have caused a series of disruptions to undersea cables and pipelines. In response, NATO initiated the ‘Baltic Sentry’ mission at the beginning of the year, expanding surveillance and maritime patrols to deter similar incidents. Littoral European countries have also intensified efforts to monitor and sanction the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, a group of ageing tankers with opaque ownership structures operating under flags of convenience to bypass Western sanctions on Russian oil exports. These developments have resulted in Russia adapting and escalating its maritime operations across the region, increasing operational and financial risks for commercial shipping companies, energy companies, insurance providers and port authorities, and driving wider supply chain risks for businesses throughout the region.
Forecast
Increasingly aggressive Russian tactics to protect its shadow fleet in European waters will increase risks of confrontation, tit-for-tat boarding and vessel detainment
Increased European scrutiny of suspected shadow fleet vessels in European waters has prompted Russia to start openly using its aerial and naval military forces to protect the vessels and deter efforts by European states to inspect them. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy’s Baltic Fleet reportedly completed a navigation safety exercise focused on escorting civilian ships and defending them from potential attacks. On 23 May, the Kremlin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia is ready to use ‘all means at its disposal’ to respond to incidents involving its tankers.
On 23 June, a Russian warship openly escorted sanctioned shadow fleet tankers in the English Channel for the first time, reflecting this growing escort strategy. This marks a notable shift in Russia’s posture, away from plausible deniability to open demonstration of force to secure safe passage for shadow fleet vessels. If European countries attempt to detain or redirect such escorted vessels, the risk of direct confrontation between Russian and NATO naval forces will increase significantly.
Russia is not only deploying naval vessels to escort its shadow fleet but is also leveraging air power. On 13 May, a Russian military jet briefly violated Estonian airspace after the Estonian Navy attempted to detain a Russia-bound oil tanker. On 18 May, likely in retaliation for the 13 May incident, Russia temporarily detained a Greek-owned oil tanker that was navigating Russian waters on its previously agreed route from Estonia to the Netherlands. The incident underscores the increasing risks of tit-for-tat boarding and detainment of commercial vessels operating near Russian territorial waters (including the exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea), even when they adhere to international protocols and previously agreed routes. Estonia has since rerouted tankers to avoid Russian waters; while such route readjustments modestly increase navigational complexity and costs, they will significantly lower the risk of interference.
Efforts to enforce sanctions and the expansion of Russia’s shadow fleet will increase operational disruption and compliance risks for the maritime industry
Despite EU and UK sanctions, Russia’s shadow fleet is estimated to have grown from fewer than 100 vessels in early 2022 to as many as 600 by early 2025. The increased presence of such vessels in European waters will further increase environmental, navigational and safety risks. The Finnish Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) estimates that over 72% of Russian shadow fleet vessels are over 15 years old, are poorly maintained and lack proper insurance. Many of them engage in high-risk practices such as ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in open waters and disabling Automatic Identification System (AIS) trackers, increasing the risk of maritime accidents. Moreover, on 10 July, the Swedish Maritime Administration warned of increased GPS interference in the Baltic Sea, possibly affecting air and boat traffic.
As a result, European countries, including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the UK, have intensified insurance and ownership documentation inspections; vessels that have not complied have already been sanctioned. This has increased the compliance risks and administrative burden on legitimate commercial shipping. We also assess that extensive checks increase the risk of delays, especially at chokepoints such as Fehmarn Belt, the Gulf of Finland (both Baltic Sea) and the Strait of Dover (English Channel). Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that insurance premiums will further increase, raising costs for companies using shipping lanes in the Baltic Sea, English Channel and North Sea.
Likely Ukrainian sabotage of Russian shadow tankers will increase the risk of further spillover of the Russo-Ukrainian war into maritime domains, including both the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas
Russian shadow fleet vessels and Russia’s wider maritime infrastructure will likely remain targets for Ukrainian sabotage, particularly involving explosive devices. This will increase security risks for commercial shipping operations in their vicinity. Since the beginning of the year, at least six oil and gas tankers associated with Russia’s shadow fleet have been damaged by explosions in the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Most recently, on 6 July, the Eco Wizard ammonia tanker sustained a major leak following a suspected engine-room explosion while docked at the Baltic Russian port of Ust-Luga (Leningrad oblast). Similar incidents have also occurred near Italy, Libya and Turkey.
In response, Russia will likely further increase naval protection of its shadow fleet, leading to further militarisation of maritime zones surrounding Europe and increasing regional tensions. The Russian Navy will likely struggle to expand escorting missions significantly (particularly in the Mediterranean Sea, where the future of its naval base in Tartus (Syria) remains uncertain). However, we assess that these developments will increase physical security risks for commercial shipping companies operating in these waters
The Ukrainian special forces have conducted several sabotage attacks against Russian military and naval assets on land in Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast in recent months, indicating their capability and willingness to prosecute the war in the Baltic. As such, we assess that it is likely that these maritime attacks are also being orchestrated by the Ukrainian intelligence and special operations forces. This is likely part of a broader campaign to disrupt oil and gas exports, which continue to fund Russia’s war in Ukraine. While this cannot be confirmed, we assess that the maritime domain remains an expanding arena of the war, as the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines clearly illustrated in 2022.
However, there is a realistic possibility that such incidents will act as trigger points for Russian retaliatory grey zone operations against neighbouring Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (including in the Baltic Sea), if Moscow’s perceives them to have facilitated the Ukrainian operations or acted as logistical hubs for Ukrainian attacks.
Possible sabotage of undersea critical infrastructure beyond the Baltics will highly likely cause widespread operational disruption and increase compliance risks for the energy sector
Russia will likely continue undersea reconnaissance operations across European waters, sustaining the realistic threat of (limited) undersea critical infrastructure sabotage. The number of incidents in the Baltic Sea has significantly decreased following NATO’s increased presence as part of the Baltic Sentry mission. However, there has been an increase in Russian naval and civilian vessels moving through the English Channel, Irish Sea, Mediterranean Sea and North Sea
The UK Royal Navy has detected covert Russian sensor devices near UK waters, suspected of monitoring nuclear submarines. Additionally, unmanned underwater vehicles have been detected near deep-sea communications cables, while the British Ministry of Defence reportedly has credible intelligence that superyachts owned by Russian oligarchs may have been used to conduct underwater reconnaissance. While cables are easier to destroy in the Baltic than in the North Sea due to geological differences, the North Sea is home to vital pipelines and fibre-optic routes. We do not anticipate an imminent threat of widespread sabotage. Nevertheless, isolated incidents as part of Russian preparations for the possibility of much larger escalation with NATO will sustain the risk of operational disruption for a range of sectors.
In response, several countries, including Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, have started exploring the potential dual use of offshore wind farms as platforms to help protect against maritime grey zone operations. This will likely bring opportunities for increased co-operation between the energy and the defence sectors. However, there is also a realistic possibility that energy operators will face increased compliance risks and financial burdens to co-fund surveillance infrastructure. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that embedding defence functions into commercial energy infrastructure will increase the risk of wind farms becoming the direct target of grey zone operations and increase espionage risks to the energy sector more broadly. For further analysis on Russian grey zone and sabotage threats.
• Ukraine: Searches targeting anti-corruption body employees indicate growing government tensions. Earlier on 21 July, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted at least 70 searches targeting 15 employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). SBU’s justification for the raids included employees’ involvement in road accidents and, in certain cases, alleged ties to Russia. Ukrainska Pravda, quoting SBU sources, reported that the raids were part of a special operation aimed at neutralising Russian influence within NABU. Certain inspectors at the anti-corruption agency have reportedly been accused of high treason, illegal trade with Russia and collusion with oligarchic interests. Due to conflicting reports, it remains difficult to verify either NABU’s or the SBU’s claims. Corruption remains pervasive across Ukraine’s state institutions, including within NABU. At the same time, the development follows recent NABU investigations into embezzlement schemes related to defence procurement, as well as a probe into Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, a close ally of President Volodymyr Zelensky. As such, if the searches were indeed conducted without court orders, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the operation reflects growing infighting between the government and NABU.
(Source: Sibylline)
22 Jul 25. Ukraine-made weapons to make up 50% of its inventory into 2026. Almost 40% of frontline needs are already met by the Ukrainian defence industry at present. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy set a goal of raising the nation’s share of sovereign weapon systems to comprise half of the armed forces’ inventory within the next six months.
Currently, around 40% of the weapons in Ukraine’s arsenal are produced domestically.
The wartime leader made the announcement earlier this month and reinforced the measure while welcoming the country’s new defence minister, Denys Shmyhal, replacing Rustem Umerov, who will now take on the role of National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) Secretary.
This latter position will still see Umerov continue to coordinate weapons procurement and manage the new array of production deals with Western suppliers. Some observers have suggested this move was a loyalty appointment; the role is said to encompass wider government control beyond the defence ministry.
Zelenskyy ordered that within ten days (by the end of July) the two ministers will report on the results of auditing agreements with partners regarding weapons supplies, joint production, and investment.
“This concerns everything: the Danish model, coalitions of capabilities, bilateral agreements, and especially agreements on building weapons factories on the territory of partners, as well as other joint projects. A clear timeline for implementation is needed,” the head of state emphasised.
Ensuring operational security
In doing so, Zelenskyy’s policy will tie Western companies intimately with Ukraine’s rapidly innovative defence industry.
“While Ukrainian innovators are constantly iterating new technologies and developing defence tech such as radars, this comes at a cost, and currently, Ukraine still relies on partners and cannot build all technology itself,” observed Andriy Dovbenko, founder of the UK-Ukraine TechExchange, a business support programme and forum for dialogue among British and Ukrainian agriculture and defence technology companies.
“Establishing more sovereign weapon systems is a capital-intensive endeavour that requires substantial investment,” Dovbenko continued. “Increased private funding, philanthropy, and international support are key ways in which Ukraine can achieve its desired objectives.”
Zelenskyy’s focus on sovereignty will cultivate permanent ties with global partners at a time when Russia’s full-scale invasion has reached three-and-a-half years, and as a growing number of conflicts around the world supplant Ukraine in the news cycles.
Critically, Denmark has recognised that Ukrainian system design is the key to uplifting European defence competitiveness with affordable and proven kit in its move to onshore Ukraine’s defence production, a policy announced during the Nato Summit in the Hague.
Similarly, British industry are striking deals with Ukrainian companies. Notably, a joint venture (JV) was recently established between Prevail Partners, based in Dorset, and Skyeton, based in Kyiv. The two will scale up production of the Raybird uncrewed air system; the JV is even considering establishing a manufacturing site in Wrexham, Wales.
“It is clear that Ukraine can produce almost anything when it comes to tactical warfare – from tethered drones to crucial electronic warfare capabilities that can jam enemy drones,” Dovbenko observed.
Ukraine’s policy and structural changes are also directed at the President of the United States, Donald Trump, whose warm ties with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, are under strain as the latter shows no sign of abating on the battlefield. Zelenskyy will attempt to secure as much US military assistance in the middle of this interpersonal drama as possible.
At the same time, Trump has withheld critical military intelligence from Ukraine before, and he has also redirected vital weapon systems to the Middle East at a moment’s notice.
In the end, global investment in Ukraine’s sovereign industrial might will maintain operational security when the war-torn nation can no longer lean on a fickle US administration. (Source: army-technology.com)
21 Jul 25. Australian Abrams battle tanks arrive in Ukraine. A first tranche of second-hand M1A1 AIM Abrams main battle tanks reached Ukrainian soil last week after being donated by the Australian government.
The U.S.-built tanks, still painted in their AusCam camouflage scheme, had been loaded onto a commercial cargo ship in Geelong, Australia, in early May before beginning the long trek to the war-torn nation of Ukraine.
Accompanied by Australian tank crewmen, the armored behemoths arrived in an unidentified port in Europe, possibly Poland, before being serviced for delivery to Ukraine.
Australia’s Department of Defence then said on July 19, “Ukraine has now taken possession of the majority of these tanks, with delivery of the final tranche to occur in the coming months.”
Australia pledged to give Kyiv 49 Abrams tanks that it recently retired. Vasyl Myroshnychenko, Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia, commented on X that “this powerful gesture of solidarity is more than military support – it’s a lifeline, a message that we’re not alone in our darkest hour.”
Valued at approximately A$245 m – around US$160 m – this gift comprises part of A$1.5 bn in assistance that Australia has promised since Moscow invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
The Abrams were modified for Ukrainian requirements before being shipped, with Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy noting that “these modified M1A1 Abrams tanks will deliver more firepower and more mobility to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.”
The M1A1 Abrams became available after the Australian Army started receiving batches of new M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks. Canberra ordered 75 of the latest Abrams variant in 2022.
Incidentally, the newer version of the tanks is enjoying a thorough workout in the ongoing Exercise Talisman Sabre, starting in Australia on July 13. One activity, demonstrating interoperability between Australia and the U.S., saw four M1A2 Abrams and an M88A2 recovery vehicle craned aboard an American landing craft. This activity took place in Townsville on July 19, with the U.S. Army landing craft USAV Paulus Hook moving the armored vehicles south to Gladstone port.
Asked about the importance of Australia rehearsing such amphibious movements, Lt. Eugene Lynch – who is a troop commander from D Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the Australian Army – told Defense News: “It’s extremely important. Our focus is on the Indo-Pacific region, and our near region is characterized by archipelagos and the littoral environment. So, it’s absolutely essential to our ability to project force into the region for defense.” Lynch said the M1A2 SEPv3 represented a significant upgrade over the M1A1, and Australian tankers were therefore “extremely excited” to get their hands on the new kit.
“We know it’s the best,” he enthused.
Asked whether tanks had become less relevant on contemporary battlefields, Lynch immediately alluded to Ukraine. “I think that the production runs in every single tank factory on Earth would disagree. When a tank shows up on the battlefield, it’s the highest-priority target.” (Source: Defense News)
21 Jul 25. UK ramps up Ukraine military support with £150m of vital air defence and artillery ammunition delivered in just two months. More than £150 m worth of air defence and artillery has been delivered to Ukraine in the last two months, as procurement of hundreds of air defence missiles and thousands of rounds of artillery to provide to Ukraine ramps up. At least £700m of this support is set to be spent this year on air defence and artillery ammunition including the £150 m already delivered – with other funding going towards procuring more drones, as well as critical contracts to maintain and repair UK weapons already provided to Ukraine, allowing damaged equipment to return to the frontline as quickly as possible. With Putin repeatedly targeting Ukraine’s cities in recent weeks with the most intense aerial bombardment since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the UK is joining the US and European nations in ramping up deliveries of vital air defence. The UK signed an agreement with Ukraine in May to provide an additional £2.26 bn worth of military support that will be repaid using funds raised from immobilised Russian assets, with more than two-thirds of the money allocated for procurement of weapons and munitions in just two months. The deal delivers on this Government’s Plan for Change, by spending more on defence and creating jobs we will keep the country safe and boost economic growth. The Defence Secretary will make the announcement at the 29th meeting of the 50-nation strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) which he will chair virtually on Monday alongside German Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius.
Opening the UDCG meeting, Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, is expected to say: Last week, President Trump announced a new plan for large scale NATO weapons transfers and committed to getting these “quickly distributed to the battlefield”.
The UK government backs this policy, and we will play our full part in its success to bolster Ukraine’s immediate fight and to support our own and wider European security.
Alongside this, the US has started the clock on a 50-day deadline for Putin to agree to peace or face crippling economic sanctions.
As members of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, we need to step up in turn with a “50-day drive” to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and force Putin to the negotiating table. It comes as the UK also completed delivery of nearly 50,000 military drones to Ukraine in under six months, in addition to 20,000 drones provided in the same period via the UK-Latvia co-led drone coalition, working closely with British defence companies to speed up procurement and delivery. The UK has committed £350 m this year to increase the supply of drones from 10,000 in 2024 to 100,000 in 2025. At the meeting, the UK and Germany will announce a new agreement to partner in providing critical air defence ammunition to Ukraine. Germany will provide more than 170 m Euros worth of funding, which the UK will use to rapidly procure air defence ammunition via the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine for delivery in the coming months. This supports the aims of the Integrated Air and Missile Defence Capability Coalition, co-led by Germany and France.
The UK’s military support for Ukraine this year is more than ever before, with £4.5 bn allocated for this financial year. In March, the Prime Minister announced a historic £1.6 bn deal to provide more than five thousand air defence missiles for Ukraine.
Last month, the Prime Minister announced a landmark agreement between the UK and Ukraine to share battlefield technology, boosting Ukraine’s drone production and linking up the UK’s defence industry with the cutting-edge technology being developed on the front lines in Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
21 Jul 25. US diverts Patriot systems from Switzerland to Ukraine. U.S. officials have told the Swiss government that Patriot air defense systems in the production pipeline for the alpine country would be diverted to help defend Ukraine, according to a Swiss announcement.
The July 17 statement by the Swiss, which said the notification from the United States arrived the prior day, illuminates some of the hasty mechanics behind Washington’s newfound emphasis on helping Ukraine repel near-constant Russian attacks with missiles and drones.
Switzerland ordered five Patriot systems, made by Ratheon, in 2022. Deliveries were set begin in 2026 and go through 2028.
The U.S. foreign military process, which governs the sale, makes the diversion of defense goods possible, the Swiss announcement notes. No information was available about how many systems would be affected and what the new timing for future deliveries would be.
Switzerland’s Patriot pick was part of a lengthy air-defense and air-policing review by the government that also led to an order of 36 U.S. F-35 fighter aircraft.
Last year, the United States told Switzerland that a batch of ordered PAC-3 MSE interceptors, the most advanced interceptors fireable with Patriot, would similarly be diverted to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Germany this week offered to buy two Patriot systems from the U.S. and give them to Ukraine. One Patriot setup costs roughly $1 bn, depending on the number of interceptors, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said during a visit to Washington on July 14.
Details for the purchase are now under discussion with the U.S. administration, Pistorius said following talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Outstanding questions surrounding the transaction are all “solvable,” he added.
Speaking at the LandEuro conference in Wiesbaden, Germany, on July 17, top NATO commander U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich signaled a new dynamic in supplying Kyiv with the defensive weapons.
Grynkewich said he would bring European nations together to work on delivering Patriot and other capabilities to Ukraine. The idea is to “look at what’s the art of the possible” in orchestrating the flow of new production equipment to Ukraine’s defense, he said. (Source: Defense News)
21 Jul 25. Ukrainian Drone Unit Destroys Rare Russian KOP-2 Electronic Warfare System. Ukraine’s 424th “Svarog” Battalion of the Armed Forces’ Unmanned Systems Forces has destroyed a rare Russian electronic warfare system known as the Detection and Suppression Complex-2 (KOP-2), according to a statement published on the battalion’s Telegram channel. Footage of the operation, shared by the battalion, shows Ukrainian drone operators locating and targeting the system in a two-stage attack. The exact time and location of the operation were not disclosed. The KOP-2 is an experimental system designed to detect and jam drones by scanning a broad radio frequency range and emitting targeted interference. Russian forces deploy it to shield critical assets.
“It’s a costly and rare piece of equipment, typically used to protect high-value targets, such as air defense systems,” the 424th Battalion said.
The operation follows recent Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russian air defense infrastructure. Ukraine has been expanding its use of drones and robotic systems on the battlefield to reduce troop exposure to frontline dangers.
In response to recent large-scale drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, Kyiv has stepped up its own drone operations against Moscow. This week, Ukraine launched dozens of drones toward the Russian capital and other regions. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
17 Jul 25. Satellite Communications Services Donated to Ukraine. On 14 July, Denmark – the EU Member State currently holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union – announced its donation of satellite communication services to Ukraine via the European Defence Agency. The donation includes solutions that increase Ukraine’s access to secure and stable satellite-based communications, such as receiver terminals that will contribute to the country’s ability to defend itself. These terminals will ensure robust and secure connectivity, which can be crucial for the conduct of military operations. Secure and stable satellite-based communications solutions remain in high demand by Ukraine. The framework provided by EDA can help diversify satellite communication service usage over Ukraine. Such a donation contributes to promoting both Ukraine’s and Europe’s technological strategic autonomy and freedom of action in space. Satellites play a crucial role in modern defence today. Other EU countries may be considering similar donations. (Source: ASD Network)
20 Jul 25. Kremlin says Putin is ready to discuss peace in Ukraine but wants to achieve goals. Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to move toward a peace settlement for Ukraine but Moscow’s main objective is to achieve its goals, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told state television in a clip published on Sunday. Peskov said that the world was now accustomed to U.S. President Donald Trump’s sometimes “harsh” rhetoric but pointed out that Trump had also underscored in comments on Russia that he would continue to search for a peace deal.
“President Putin has repeatedly spoken of his desire to bring the Ukrainian settlement to a peaceful conclusion as soon as possible. This is a long process, it requires effort, and it is not easy,” Peskov said told state television reporter Pavel Zarubin.
“The main thing for us is to achieve our goals. Our goals are clear,” Peskov said. (Source: Reuters)
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