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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 01.

  • Global: Foreign embassies face sustained security, cyber espionage risks from Russia-linked groups. On 31 July, the technology company Microsoft reported that the Russia-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) group ‘Secret Blizzard’ has been targeting foreign embassies in Moscow in a cyber espionage operation since at least 2024. The group reportedly intercepts local internet service providers (ISPs) via an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack to infiltrate targeted systems. Secret Blizzard then displays a fake portal mimicking a connectivity check to covertly execute custom malware (‘ApolloShadow’) onto compromised systems before checking the system’s privileges. It subsequently tricks users with elevated privileges into granting the actors full control over their devices through a fake certificate installer. If the system’s privileges are low, ApolloShadow immediately establishes communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure for data exfiltration and payload execution, highlighting the malware’s dynamic and sophisticated nature. Russia-linked groups frequently target foreign entities in cyber espionage operations to collect strategic intelligence. We assess that this trend underscores sustained security and cyber espionage risks amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Jul 31.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • BAKHMUT: Moscow has claimed that its forces have taken control of Chasiv Yar, a highly important fortified town over which both sides have been fighting since April 2024, but Ukraine denies this
  • CORRUPTION: On 31 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law, passed by the parliament earlier that day, that restores the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies, marking a significant government U-turn
  • OIL: Russia is reportedly exporting less oil to global markets, which would make Moscow more vulnerable to potential US secondary sanctions on Russia’s largest energy customers if they go ahead next month
  • FORECAST: US President Donald Trump has reiterated his willingness to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions early next month if Russia fails to make meaningful progress towards ending its war in Ukraine
  • BAKHMUT: Earlier on 31 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces have taken control of Chasiv Yar, a highly important fortified town over which both sides have been fighting since April 2024. The MoD claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces seized the town, which is located less than five miles (8km) to the north-east of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, geolocated footage published on 28 July does indicate that Russian forces have advanced in two directions in south-western Chasiv Yar in recent days.
  • BAKHMUT: Ukraine has denied the Russian claims, however, and we cannot confirm whether the town has fallen. Over the last year, Russia’s MoD has generally provided accurate assessments when a settlement has been taken (though the ministry largely ignores subsequent Ukrainian counter-attacks, which may account for the conflicting reporting). This general accuracy stands in stark contrast to earlier phases of the war, when MoD claims regularly outpaced the reality on the ground. However, reforms since the appointment of new defence minister Andrei Belousov in May 2024 have likely improved the accuracy of reporting. Likely as part of this effort, the Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) in November 2024, reportedly for exaggerating Russian advances near Siversk (located to the north-east of Chasiv Yar).
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage will be required to confirm a Ukrainian withdrawal from Chasiv Yar. However, recent confirmed Russian advances in the centre of the town indicate that, at the very least, a Russian seizure of the remnants of the town will remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. That said, it equally remains possible that Ukrainian forces will launch a major counter-attack to prevent Russian forces from consolidating control over the key town. Earlier in 2025, other instances of Ukrainian counter-attacks delayed Russia’s ability to consolidate Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) and push north to Kostiantynivka for many months. Given the importance of Chasiv Yar, which sits at a significant height, Ukrainian forces will likely attempt to contest Russian control over the town in a bid to slow the eventual drive towards Kostiantynivka.
  • BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further south, Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued to advance west of Toretsk amid Russian efforts to secure the southern approaches to Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage from 27 July indicates that Russian forces have modestly advanced west of Poltavka, located around 12 miles (19km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka. Meanwhile, footage from 28 July indicates modest Ukrainian advances into the north-eastern sector of Yablunivka, a village located seven miles (11km) to the south-west of the outskirts of Kostiantynivka.
  • DONETSK: Russian forces are putting increasing pressure on Ukrainian defences in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) and the surrounding area, employing small-unit assaults and sabotage and reconnaissance tactics. A Ukrainian company commander operating on the Pokrovsk front, quoted by Ukrainska Pravda on 29 July, warned of growing encirclement risks near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (Donetsk). The source stated that Russian forces have expanded the salient along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis towards Dobropillia (Donetsk), now pushing over approximately six miles (10km) deep. According to both Russian and Ukrainian sources, Russian units are advancing in small assault groups, up to the size of a detachment, probing for weak points in Ukraine’s defensive lines. These efforts are supported by frequent sabotage and reconnaissance operations. A Russian military blogger claimed that similar tactics had been used in 2024 to capture Selydove, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: According to the Ukrainian company commander cited previously, fighting is currently ongoing near Rodynske, approximately four miles (6km) to the north of Pokrovsk. Russian forces have reportedly entered the eastern part of Chervonyi Lyman near Rodynske and are attacking a mine situated between Myrnohrad and the recently captured Novoekonomichne (both located to the east of Pokrovsk). Geolocated footage from 29 July shows recent Russian advances south-east of Volodymyrivka, located 17.2 miles (27.6km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk. According to additional footage from 29 July, Ukrainian forces recently progressed in northern Lysivka, located seven miles (11.4 km) to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, further to the south-west, Russian forces made confirmed progress in the fields north-west of Oleksiivka, located 13.3 miles (21.4km) to the south-east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), as of 29 July.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 30 July shows recent Russian gains south-west of Zelena Dolyna, located 11.5 miles (18.6km) to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). As of 28 July, Russian forces had made confirmed advances into northern Kolodyazi, located nine miles (14.5km) to the north of Lyman.
  • SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 29 July indicates that Russian forces have seized Ternyrivka and part of its sister village Obratne, located 12 miles (20km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast), just across the border into Zaporizhzhia oblast. However, to the north, Ukrainian forces have counter-attacked. Geolocated footage from 30 July indicates that they have raised a flag in western Maliivka – a village which Russian forces recently took, located approximately 11 miles (18km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka, inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
  • STRIKES: In recent days, Russia’s strike campaign has continued to comprise both large-scale combined attacks and smaller drone barrages, with a variable use of missiles. The strikes have consistently targeted civilian infrastructure, which has been a long-standing pattern in Russia’s campaign.
  • STRIKES: The attack in the early hours of 31 July involved 309 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and eight Iskandr-K cruise missiles. Despite a relatively high Ukrainian interception rate (288 drones and three missiles), the attack still achieved direct hits, including in the capital Kyiv, where a residential building was damaged. The 30 July strike involved 78 drones; among other targets, it damaged the railway station in Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), various enterprises within Dnipropetrovsk oblast and residential buildings in Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast). The 29 July strike (37 UAVs and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles) hit a hospital in Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), killing at least four people. These recent attacks clearly underscore Russia’s systematic targeting of civilian facilities. The UN has warned of a sharp increase in civilian casualties, which rose by 54% in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024.
  • STRIKES: Russian strikes also continue to target Ukrainian military training and enlistment facilities, as part of a deliberate campaign to disrupt Kyiv’s force generation capabilities. For example, the 29 July strike also hit a military training facility at an undisclosed location. Russia’s MoD claimed the attack killed or injured around 200 troops. Similarly, enlistment offices have been regularly targeted, likely to further instil fear among Ukrainians who are considering volunteering at the centres.
  • STRIKES: The recruitment of agents by Russia’s intelligence services will facilitate information gathering for strikes against force generation and other strategic facilities. On 30 July, Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) reported the detention of a Ukrainian Air Force major for collaborating with the enemy. The suspect reportedly collected information on airfields housing F-16s, Mirage 2000 and Su-24 aircraft to support Russian strikes against these facilities.
  • STRIKES: Amid an intensification of strikes, the Ukrainian authorities have introduced a new localised air raid alert system for Kyiv and the surrounding oblast to minimise disruption for civilians and businesses. The new system is a localised alert model, whereas the current system emits region-wide air alerts, even when the threat is distant. This has caused significant operational disruption and uncertainty for businesses, as many have a policy of suspending operations during air raid alerts, even when the threat does not materialise. According to the European Business Association, 41% of businesses reported operational disruption due to frequent region-wide alerts, with some losing up to 50% of their working hours. If successful, the system is expected to be rolled out across Ukraine.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • CORRUPTION: On 31 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law passed by the parliament earlier that day, which restores the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. The move effectively reverses original controversial legislation, which limited the autonomy of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). A total of 331 lawmakers approved the bill in two consecutive readings, with none voting against it. Although the public’s reception remains unclear, we assess that the swift U-turn on the original legislation will likely decrease domestic unrest and government stability risks in the short term. That said, the initial legislation and subsequent backtracking will likely have sown distrust in Zelensky and his administration, which will potentially manifest more prominently over the medium-to-long term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Special Report – Ukraine – 31 July 2025.
  • CORRUPTION: The restoration of the independence of the anti-corruption bodies will likely ameliorate concerns regarding Ukraine’s commitment to reform; this will mitigate risks to future funding. On 29 July, reports emerged that the EU had warned of certain financial assistance being halted until the Ukrainian government rectifies the original law. Nevertheless, recent developments underscore how concerns about backsliding on anti-corruption efforts can potentially harm funding from Ukraine’s Western allies. Additionally, the government’s U-turn on the legislation will also potentially moderately alleviate concerns from the private sector regarding investing in Ukraine in the post-war period. However, many will likely perceive that significant damage has already been done to the government’s credibility on reform issues.
  • CORRUPTION: Separately, on 30 July, Ukraine’s largest bank, Privatbank, won its UK lawsuit against its former oligarch owners over alleged fraud. Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and his business partner, Hennadiy Boholiubov, have been ordered to repay USD 1.9 bn for defrauding the institution. The bank was nationalised in 2016 as part of efforts to clean up Ukraine’s finance sector. We assess that Kyiv will highly likely see the ruling as a success, especially after the passing of legislation undermining NABU and SAPO called into question its commitment to tackling graft.
  • OIL: Russia is reportedly exporting less oil to global markets, according to ship-tracking by Bloomberg. The report published on 29 July claimed that, in the first seven months of 2025, Russia shipped 4% less crude oil than it did in the same period last year, which equates to approximately 30 m fewer barrels. Bloomberg’s data identified that Asian markets (particularly China and India) remain the primary destination for Russian oil, with exports steady at approximately 2.86 m barrels per day (bpd). However, Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions against countries purchasing Russian oil may realistically further reduce Russian oil exports (see FORECAST) below.
  • OIL: Meanwhile, the IMF forecasts that Russia’s economic growth will slow in 2025, in part due to falling global oil prices. In its July update, the IMF projected that Russia’s GDP will grow just 0.9% this year compared to 2024’s expansion of 4.1%. We previously assessed that the Russian economy will likely witness a slowdown in growth and that a modest recession remains a realistic possibility. Despite growing concern about the trajectory of the economy among some Russian officials, a possible recession would unlikely impact Russia’s ability to sustain its war in Ukraine over the coming months.

FORECAST

DEADLINE: On 29 July, US President Donald Trump reiterated his willingness to impose tariffs and secondary sanctions early next month if Russia fails to make meaningful progress towards ending its war in Ukraine. Trump stated that the US would begin imposing measures ‘ten days from today’, meaning no later than 8 August. However, Trump expressed doubts that such action would impact Russia and accused President Vladimir Putin of wanting to continue the war. For further analysis on Trump’s initial announcement to lower his previous truce timeline of 50 days. Earlier on 31 July, Trump warned Dmitry Medvedev, the hawkish deputy chairperson of Russia’s Security Council, to ‘watch his words’ after he criticised Trump’s decision to reduce the deadline. Medvedev accused Trump of playing an ‘ultimatum game’ on 28 July and warned that such attempts would not work on Russia. Rather, according to Medvedev, each new US ultimatum represents a threat and a step towards war with Russia. In response to his comments, Trump also advocated for minimising trade between Russia and the US. These remarks reinforce the shift in Trump’s approach to Moscow (given his administration was once open to increasing Russia-US trade) and suggest that he is increasingly willing to take a tougher stance on Russia. The Kremlin’s official response to Trump’s threat to reduce the deadline has been relatively cautious, but it has notably sought to portray Russia as resilient to sanctions pressure. This indicates that Moscow is prepared to face further punitive measures to continue the war. Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 29 July that the Kremlin has ‘taken note’ of recent developments; however, he also acknowledged that Russia remains committed to ensuring its own interests as the war continues. Meanwhile, on 30 July, Peskov stated that Russia has been facing a large number of sanctions for ‘quite a long time’ and has developed a ‘certain immunity’ as a result. These comments indicate that Russia is likely unfazed by the prospect of facing new economic penalties, as we have previously assessed. New threats (whether they materialise or not) are unlikely to encourage Moscow to make the concessions necessary to end the war for good in the near term. We assess that Russia is ready to endure increasing economic hardship as long as its forces continue to advance in Ukraine. As well as demonstrating increasing willingness to ramp up economic pressure on Russia, the US has indicated its readiness to target some of Russia’s key allies. On 30 July, Trump announced that the US will impose 25% tariffs on goods imported from India, ‘plus an unspecified penalty’ for buying Russian oil and weapons. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its subsequent economic isolation have pushed Moscow to seek closer economic relations with New Delhi. India has benefitted from discounted Russian oil and is the biggest purchaser of seaborne Russian crude. Nevertheless, on 30 July, Reuters reported that Indian state refiners had stopped buying Russian oil in the past week and cited unspecified industry insiders. While we cannot confirm this development, if true, it possibly indicates India’s concerns about the possibility of US penalties. As oil and gas account for almost a third of Russia’s state revenues, a sharp, continued decrease in sales could realistically weaken Russia’s ability to generate funds for its war effort. However, it remains unclear if and under what conditions such secondary sanctions will be imposed by the US. Amid the potential shift in US policy towards Russia, two senior Republican senators have outlined a plan that would allow other countries to fund US weapons supplies to Ukraine. According to a report from the Wall Street Journal on 30 July, the PEACE Act would create a fund at the US Treasury to accept money from Western allies. The Pentagon could then use the fund to pay contractors to replenish US stockpiles; the US could thus continue sending weapons to Ukraine without harming its own military preparedness. The bill’s supporters hope to attract USD 5-8bn in funding annually, with Germany and the UK seen as the most likely contributors. The White House is reportedly ‘largely receptive’ to the initiative. The bill will possibly be passed later this year as part of the annual defence policy bill. As such, if these timelines are correct, it would unlikely benefit Ukraine in the near term. Nevertheless, the development underscores the Trump administration’s growing willingness to assist Kyiv indirectly as long as its allies pay for it. This likely forms part of the US’ strategy to increase pressure on Russia, alongside economic penalties.

Anti-Corruption Probe

Executive summary

  • A controversial bill that removed the independence of two major anti-corruption institutions has triggered widespread backlash from the Ukrainian population and the international community.
  • Threats to Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions will highly likely remain, despite a government U-turn and the restoration of their nominal independence, given other measures undermining the credibility of the government’s commitment to rooting out corruption.
  • Although the reversal of the controversial bill will likely reduce domestic unrest risks, recent events have almost certainly weakened trust in the Ukrainian leadership and could drive further protests.
  • Russia will likely exploit discord in Ukraine to undermine Western backing for Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s government stability.
  • While the developments are unlikely to affect Western financial aid in the short term, failure to restore trust in anti-corruption efforts will likely discourage financial support and private sector investment in the long term; this will only weaken Ukraine’s already limited prospects of EU accession.

Context

On 22 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law (No. 12414) limiting the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies in Ukraine. The legislation grants the prosecutor general (appointed by the president) increased authority over investigations conducted by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Zelensky claimed the legislation aims to counter Russian influence, though critics argue that there is nothing in the law that targets supposed Russian agents in or outside the agencies. The law’s passage subsequently triggered the largest protests to take place across the country since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, as well as international condemnation. Zelensky has subsequently backtracked on the legislation and submitted a new bill to restore the independence of the two agencies, which parliament approved earlier on 31 July. The importance of the ongoing dispute and government U-turn reflects the centrality of anti-corruption efforts to Ukraine’s wider Euro-Atlantic aspirations. NABU and SAPO were created as part of anti-corruption reforms after the 2013-14 Maidan Revolution, which led to the ousting of Russia-backed president Viktor Yanukovych and solidified Ukraine’s pro-West path. Since 2014, Ukraine has made progress in reducing corruption within the country, though it nevertheless remains a pertinent issue – including during wartime. Tackling graft is also a key requirement for Ukraine as it seeks to join the EU; Ukraine remains reliant on funding from its Western allies, as well as international organisations, for defence and financial support.

  • Ukraine: Failure to implement reforms will threaten foreign funds, long-term socio-economic stability. On 30 July, the European Commission (EC) urged the Ukrainian government to appoint Oleksandr Tsyvinsky as head of the Economic Security Bureau (ESB), which investigates economic crimes. On 24 June, an independent commission selected Tsyvinsky, a former official of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), to lead the ESB. Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) set 31 July as the deadline to appoint the ESB’s head, the government reportedly refused to confirm Tsyvinsky’s appointment on 30 July. ESB, founded in 2021, has faced serious accusations of being used to put pressure on businesses, prompting calls for its overhaul. The development comes amid heightened domestic and international scrutiny of the government following its recent attempt to pass a bill that would undermine the independence of key anti-corruption bodies, including NABU; the bill is due to be revised by parliament later on 31 July. We assess that failure to appoint the new ESB head will reinforce the perception that the government is reluctant to pursue its reform efforts. This, in turn, will threaten crucial international funding, which would worsen the country’s deteriorating financing shortfalls.

Jul 29.

  • Russia-Ukraine-US: Reduced truce deadline is unlikely to push Moscow to make peace. On 28 July, US President Donald Trump shortened a deadline that he previously set for Russia to reach a peace deal to end its war in Ukraine (or face new economic penalties). Moscow’s new deadline is now within ‘ten or 12 days’, meaning 7 or 9 August. On 14 July, Trump issued a 50-day ultimatum to Russia to achieve an end to the war. Failure to do so will reportedly result in the US imposing 100% tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on those countries that purchase Russian oil. The reduced deadline underscores growing frustration at the lack of progress towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. While the imposition of 100% tariffs on Russia remains likely, the feasibility of imposing secondary sanctions on major world powers like China and India is uncertain. Nevertheless, we assess that the new threats (whether they materialise or not) are unlikely to encourage Moscow to make the concessions necessary to resolve the war once and for all in the near term, though a temporary ceasefire remains possible. We continue to assess that, as long as Russian forces advance on the battlefield, the Kremlin is highly likely to be willing to endure further economic strain stemming from Western sanctions in order to achieve its principal war objectives in Ukraine.
  • Russia: Large-scale cyber attack highlights heightened security risks from hacktivist groups. On 28 July, international news outlets reported that two pro-Ukraine and anti-Belarus hacktivist groups (‘Silent Crow’ and ‘Cyber-partisans’) conducted a large-scale cyber attack against Russia’s main state-owned airline earlier that day. The groups caused a mass outage to the company’s IT systems, resulting in delays and the cancellation of over 100 flights. The attack also disrupted some international flights to Armenia, Belarus and Uzbekistan alongside domestic flights, underscoring the spillover effect of such operations. The groups likely possess moderate cyber capabilities since they reportedly infiltrated the company’s systems at least a year before the attack and exfiltrated sensitive customer and internal data without being detected. Silent Crow has since threatened that it will start leaking data in the coming days, showcasing increased reputational risks. Subsequently, we assess that this incident indicates heightened security risks to Russian businesses amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Jul 28.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • DONETSK: Russia’s likely recent capture of Novoekonomichne, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, underscores the deteriorating operational situation in the area for Ukrainian forces
  • STRIKES: Recent long-range Russian strikes have involved a notable number of ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian air defences will continue to struggle to intercept
  • NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump announced earlier on 28 July that he will reduce the deadline for imposing sanctions and tariffs on Russia if no peace deal is reached to ‘ten or 12 days’ from now
  • FORECAST: On 31 July, Ukraine’s parliament will consider a new bill which reverses elements of a recent controversial law that undermines the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies
  • BAKHMUT: On 26 July, Russian forces launched a mechanised assault to the north-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast); they have made advances and are now within 1.5 miles (2km) of the outskirts of Siversk itself. Geolocated footage published on 26 July indicates that Russian forces have advanced in open fields to the north-east of Siversk, but that Ukrainian forces managed to halt the attack. On 26 July, elements of Ukraine’s 11th Corps (which has been reorganised to incorporate the now defunct Luhansk Grouping of Forces) took part in defending against the assault and reportedly halted the advance. According to the press service of the 11th Corps, the Russian attack involved over 150 personnel, over 40 motorcycles, six tanks and numerous armoured vehicles.
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to advance between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk (both Donetsk oblast), setting conditions for further advances in both directions. Geolocated footage published on 24 and 25 July indicates that Russian forces have seized Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka, two adjacent villages located to the north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). The seizure of these two villages is significant, as it will provide Russian forces with an opportunity to advance north to the junction between the key T-0514 and H-20 highways. The junction controls the south-western approaches to Kostiantynivka.
  • BAKHMUT: Taking Oleksandro-Kalynove in particular will also increase the pressure on Ukrainian forces fighting to the south-east in and around Shcherbynivka (located to the west of Toretsk). If Russian forces are able to consolidate their newly gained positions, further pushes to the north-east and east will increase the threat of encirclement for the small Ukrainian pockets still defending Shcherbynivka. To the west, Russian forces have also advanced around Popiv Yar, located 13 miles (21km) to the west of Kostiantynivka, which is further expanding Russia’s salient between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: Russia’s likely recent capture of Novoekonomichne, located over six miles (10 km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk, underscores the deteriorating operational situation in the area for Ukrainian forces. Geolocated footage from 25 July shows Russian forces operating in central Novoekonomichne, likely indicating that the settlement is now under Russian control. Russian milblogger sources claimed further advances in the area, including sabotage and reconnaissance operations in and around Pokrovsk, including on the outskirts of Myrnohrad, located just to the east of Pokrovsk. While such claims have not been visually corroborated, they underscore the uptick in Russian operations in the Pokrovsk sector in recent weeks. These operations are clearly part of Moscow’s ongoing effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the north. This was supported by Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, who stated on 27 July that Russia has concentrated a significant force of around 111,000 troops in the Pokrovsk sector.
  • DONETSK: In line with this assessment, on 27 July, the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group Frontelligence reported that Russian operations are placing growing pressure on Ukraine’s supply and troop rotation routes in the Pokrovsk area. In addition, Russia’s counter-drone measures are increasingly diminishing Ukraine’s drone advantage in the sector. Russia has deployed its elite Rubicon unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit to the area in recent months; this unit played a key role in Russia’s successful takeover of Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk oblast earlier this year. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are reportedly continuing to face personnel shortages, weakening their ability to fill gaps in the frontline. Frontelligence also noted that Ukraine has committed reserves to the Sumy region and the south-eastern front, which has limited its capacity to reinforce positions in the Pokrovsk area.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Ukraine’s Kursk Grouping of Forces reported on 27 July that their forces have retaken the village of Kindrativka, located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Various Russian sources have also corroborated the seizure of Kindrativka, with a number of Russian units reportedly withdrawing from the area and from nearby Oleksiivka to avoid encirclement. While we cannot confirm this, Ukrainian counter-attacks over the last month have slowly pushed the Russians back at multiple points along the north Sumy line.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Recent Russian gains north-west of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) are likely part of an effort to threaten key Western supply and rotation routes to the city. Geolocated footage from 25 July shows Russian advances south-west of Kindrashivka and south-west of Tishchenkivka, both located to the north-west of Kupiansk. According to Frontelligence, Russian forces are advancing through Moskovka and towards Sobolivka, also located to the north-west of Kupiansk. This offensive push threatens the H-26 (also known as the P-07) Kupiansk-Shevchenkove highway, a key logistical artery for Ukrainian forces defending Kupiansk. Cutting off this route would likely disrupt Ukraine’s ability to fall back to defensive positions west of Kupiansk along the Kupyanka River in the future. We assess that Russian gains in the sector do not indicate that Kupiansk will be captured in the short term.
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces are continuing to advance north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast) and have penetrated the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border in recent days. Geolocated footage from 25 July indicates that Russian forces seized Maliivka, a village located approximately 11 miles (18km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka; Maliivka is notably just inside the borders of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Similarly, geolocated footage from 26 July indicates that Russian forces advanced further to the north and have taken the village of Zelenyi Hai, located within the borders of Donetsk oblast, approximately ten miles (16km) to the north of Maliivka. The seizure of Zelenyi Hai underscores the recent successes Russian forces have had from slowly advancing to the Vovcha River, which forms the border between Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts in this area. Russian forces are now likely preparing an advance on Andriivka-Klevtsove, a town located to the west along the H-15 highway. Andriivka-Klevtsove is the last significant settlement east of the Russian side of the Vovcha River.
  • SOUTHERN: Further to the west, Russian forces are continuing to advance along the eastern banks of the Dnieper River to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Geolocated footage from 27 July indicates that Russian forces have now advanced north from Kamianske (Zaporizhzhia oblast) to the southern outskirts of the village of Stepnohirsk, located approximately 15 miles (25km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city.
  • STRIKES: Early on 28 July, Russia launched a large-scale aerial attack involving 331 aerial threats. The strike comprised 324 drones, four Kh-101 cruise missiles and three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that the attack heavily targeted Starokostiantyniv (Khmelnytskyi oblast), which hosts a key military airbase. Ukrainian forces intercepted 309 drones and two cruise missiles; they claimed that the ballistic missiles failed to reach their intended targets.
  • STRIKES: There was a similarly large-scale Russian attack on 26 July, which involved 235 aerial threats, including 208 drones and 27 missiles of various types. Notably, the strike featured 12 Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces reported intercepting 183 drones and 17 unspecified missiles. It remains highly unlikely that Iskandr-M missiles were intercepted in large numbers, given that ballistic projectiles are the hardest to shoot down. Russian milbloggers claimed that over half of the aerial threats were directed at specific industrial facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts, including the Dnipropetrovsk Electromechanical Plant in Yelyzavetivka, north-west of Dnipro city (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), and the HARTRON-ARKOS research and production enterprise in Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast).
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, the success of Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign continues to undermine Russia’s ability to shield its population from the impact of the war. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of 291 Ukrainian drones on 27 July. Head of Leningrad oblast Alexander Drozdenko stated that over ten UAVs were downed near St Petersburg. This caused major flight disruption at St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport (LED), which recorded more than 90 flight delays.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, citing security concerns, announced the cancellation of Russia’s annual Navy Day parade in St Petersburg, planned for 27 July. UK defence intelligence assessed that the celebrations were almost certainly cancelled across the country due to security concerns. This marks the first cancellation of the annual event since its inception in 2017. We assess that this was highly likely due to the drone threat, particularly following the latest Ukrainian attack, which caused significant flight disruption at Pulkovo Airport. These developments clearly undermine the Kremlin’s continued efforts to minimise the war’s impact on Russia’s population. However, it is unlikely to have a major impact on the Russian public due to widespread apathy.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump announced earlier on 28 July that he will reduce the deadline for imposing sanctions and tariffs on Russia if no peace deal is reached to ‘ten or 12 days’ from now. Trump had previously given 50 days; the old deadline was set to expire in early September (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 July 2025). The threat (irrespective of whether Trump acts on it in the coming days) reflects his growing frustration with Russia. On 26 July, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Trump is ‘losing his patience’ with Russia and that, despite having ‘very good interactions’ with Russian President Vladimir Putin, their engagement never results in a closer end to the war.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: However, the seeming US willingness to increase pressure on Moscow is unlikely to force it to end hostilities while its forces continue to advance on the battlefield. On 27 July, the Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov reiterated narratives emphasising Russia’s alleged need to accomplish its war goals. This implies that Moscow is highly unlikely to deviate from its already established demands or consider making meaningful concessions to bring the war closer to a conclusion in the near term.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: That said, on 25 July, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced that Russia and Ukraine have reached an ‘agreement in principle’ for their two presidents to meet in Turkey. Fidan did not specify when this meeting could take place, however, and we continue to assess that Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are unlikely to meet in the near-to-medium term. Both sides have different opinions on when their two leaders should meet, with Ukraine pushing for the two presidents to meet as part of the negotiations process. Meanwhile, the Russian side believes that Putin and Zelensky should meet only to seal a peace deal. This difference in opinions will highly likely prevent the two presidents from engaging in direct bilateral talks to end the war in the coming weeks, despite Trump’s new deadline.
  • STARLINK: On 24 July, Starlink suffered an outage which lasted approximately 2.5 hours; the outage was due to the failure of key internal software services that operate the core network. The commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, said the disruption lasted 150 minutes and was the longest so far throughout the war. Although the Ukrainian forces continued combat operations during this time and relied on different communication methods, the disruption has only highlighted Ukraine’s overreliance on Starlink services. Russian forces are also known to make widespread use of Starlink terminals to co-ordinate battlefield movements, but Ukraine remains much more heavily exposed to outages or policy changes from SpaceX.
  • STARLINK: The temporary outage comes as reports indicate SpaceX CEO Elon Musk allegedly ordered the shutdown of Starlink satellite coverage during Ukraine’s 2022 counter-offensive. According to a Reuters investigation published on 25 July, Musk’s order impacted parts of Donetsk oblast and Kherson oblast while Ukraine was trying to reclaim the administrative capital Kherson city (Kherson oblast) in late September 2022. As a result, Ukrainian forces failed to surround Russian soldiers in the town of Beryslav (Kherson oblast). Although Ukraine’s counter-offensive ultimately resulted in Ukraine reclaiming Beryslav, Kherson city and other territory, Musk’s alleged order (which SpaceX denies) underscores potential issues with Starlink services cutting out during critical moments. According to the report, Musk ordered the temporary shutdown due to fears that a significant Russian military defeat on the western banks of the Dnieper River would trigger a tactical nuclear response from Moscow.
  • STARLINK: It remains unknown when precisely Musk allegedly gave the order or how long the outage lasted. That said, it aligns with earlier reports that Musk commanded cutoffs of Starlink services near the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea in September 2022 (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 8 September 2023). Starlink has helped ensure connectivity for Ukrainian troops across the frontline throughout the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, the allegations outlined above have likely cast doubt over its safety from Musk’s alleged interference and how this can impact military operations.
  • ENERGY: As of 31 July, Ukraine’s maximum electricity prices will increase by 1.6 times for businesses between 1700 and 2300hrs (local time). However, price caps will remain at their current levels for all other times of day; households will not be impacted by the increases. The increases are likely aimed at ensuring that businesses purchase the electricity needed rather than overbuying. The price increases will possibly apply additional financial burden on companies, particularly those in electricity-intensive sectors and/or those requiring electricity throughout the day for operations.

FORECAST

CORRUPTION: On 31 July, Ukraine’s parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) will consider a new bill which reverses elements of a recent controversial law that undermines the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, who signed the controversial bill on 22 July, the new draft legislation would restore the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) by stripping the prosecutor general’s control over them. Despite the apparent U-turn, Zelensky’s standing with civil society, the population and the international community at large will likely be significantly affected. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 24 July 2025. The new legislation would also introduce new provisions Zelensky claims seek to eliminate supposed Russian influence within these institutions; this was the original justification for the initial law paring back NABU and SAPO’s independence. These safeguarding measures include mandated polygraph tests for the employees of NABU and SAPO, the Bureau of Economic Security (ESBU), the National Police (NPU) and the prosecutor general’s office who have access to state secrets. The new bill envisions that these should take place at least once every two years. It also envisions a ban on travel abroad for NABU employees during martial law, except for official assignments. NABU has said that polygraph testing is already an established practice inside the bureau; its employees undergo polygraphs during official investigations, appointments and reassignments.

Both NABU and SAPO were involved in drafting the new legislation, which they have endorsed; their approval will likely increase societal and political support for the bill. The two agencies have called on the parliament to adopt it, given they are confident that it restores all procedural powers and guarantees their independence. The speaker of Ukraine’s parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, has said he would urge parliament to adopt the bill ‘immediately and in its entirety’. This would stop the bill from having to undergo a second reading and eliminate the possibility of amendments being introduced, which would require additional consideration and run the risk of controversial terms being included with little notice. Zelensky’s Servant of the People (SN) party has a majority in parliament; additionally, several opposition figures have voiced support for the new legislation, which will increase the likelihood of its passage over the coming days.

While it is not certain whether the new legislation will fully halt anti-corruption protests over the coming days, they have nevertheless decreased in size since Zelensky announced his plans to overturn the original contentious bill. Protests occurred in the centre of the capital Kyiv on 27 July for a sixth consecutive day. Meanwhile, on 25 July, approximately 150 people demonstrated in the city of Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and protests took place in several other cities, including Lviv (Lviv oblast), Rivne (Rivne oblast), Ternopil (Ternopil oblast) and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast) the day prior. An activist who played a key role in promoting recent protests, Ihor Lachenkov, stated on 25 July that the next protest action should occur on the day of the vote (31 July). Lachenkov said a pause in protests is necessary to emphasise their goal and avoid them being used for propaganda purposes. A slight reduction in protest activity will possibly continue through to 31 July. That said, domestic unrest risks are unlikely to fully subside and will potentially increase depending on the outcome of the vote.

Ukraine’s main Western allies continue to express concern over the recent developments, which will possibly undermine Kyiv’s ability to attract much-needed external support over the short-to-medium term. On 27 July, European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen urged Zelensky to uphold the independence of NABU and SAPO, particularly in light of Ukraine’s pursuit of EU integration. Notably, the next tranche of financial assistance to Ukraine under the EU’s Ukraine Facility mechanism will be smaller than planned due to Kyiv’s failure to complete key reforms. EC spokesperson Guillaume Mercier announced this on 25 July; the unfulfilled reforms concern decentralisation, judicial appointments to the High Anti-Corruption Court and a law on amending the Asset Recovery and Management Agency. While not linked to recent developments, the timing is notable and underscores that concerns of Kyiv backsliding on corruption efforts could possibly hinder future assistance from the EU and/or other partners.

Jul 25.

Executive summary

  • In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will highly likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
  • On 14 July, US President Donald Trump threatened to impose new tariffs on Russia and secondary sanctions on states that trade with Russia if Moscow does not reach a deal to end the war within 50 days. The announcement likely marks a tentative policy shift aimed at increasing pressure on Moscow to take peace talks seriously. However, it is unlikely to force a diplomatic breakthrough in the short term. Nevertheless, the potential sale of weapons to Ukraine via NATO would offset impending munitions shortages for Ukraine as Biden-era aid packages begin to run out in the coming months.
  • On 17 July, the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, approved the appointment of the former economy minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, as the new prime minister amid a wider government reshuffle.
  • Ukraine’s government reshuffle coincided with a significant revision of key anti-corruption legislation, which triggered very rare anti-government protests in several major cities. On 22 July, an amendment was rushed through parliament and signed into law by President Volodymyr Zelensky. The amendment grants the Zelensky-appointed prosecutor general new powers to intervene and direct investigations undertaken by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). The move marks a major inflection in Ukraine’s anti-corruption trajectory and seriously undermines the independence of two of Ukraine’s most important institutions for reform. This will not only undermine Ukraine’s EU accession but could ultimately threaten international funding, which remains conditional upon governance transparency and reform progress.
  • Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in August include: announcements by the Trump administration on its plans to sell weapons to NATO for re-export to Ukraine, including potential offensive exports (which remain unlikely in the short term); and the Ukrainian government’s outline of a new anti-corruption plan following the passing of the controversial corruption bill, though statements from the EU, IMF and Ukraine’s other international partners will indicate whether the bill will irrevocably shake international and investor confidence in reform efforts.
  • France-Israel-Palestinian Territories: State recognition will drive diplomatic tensions, operation risks. On 24 July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France will recognise a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly meeting in September. Israel condemned the move, underscoring diplomatic tensions between the two countries, possibly limiting prospects of future shared initiatives and projects. Furthermore, the move will likely drive regulatory and compliance risks for French or affiliated entities operating in Israel, especially those within the defence and technology sectors. France’s move will likely put pressure on other states, notably the UK, to follow suit, elevating associated business operational risks and potential supply chain disruption for Israeli businesses reliant on Western supply chains. Furthermore, we assess that the move will possibly undermine any future trade talks between Israel and the UK, driving associated financial risks for Israeli businesses. The announcement, coupled with the prospect of broader recognition of a Palestinian state, will likely exacerbate anti-government protests in Israel in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline

 

31 Jul 25. EUR100K Donation to Prtyula Foundation Reinforces TEKEVER’s Ongoing Commitment to Ukraine. Investment will support the creation of the 15 SAR command post, which specialises in reconnaissance operations. TEKEVER, the European leader in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), is proud to announce that it has made a €100k contribution to the Prytula Foundation, a leading Ukrainian charity dedicated to strengthening Ukraine’s defence forces and providing assistance to the civilians affected by Russian invasion. The funding will be allocated to equip the operations centre for the 15 SAR Brigade, which specialises in reconnaissance operations. This vital support will enable the unit to conduct more reconnaissance missions, carry out targeted operations, and strengthen overall battlefield awareness. By enabling more effective operations, the support directly contributes to saving lives and increasing the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces at the frontline. Since 2022, TEKEVER has collaborated closely with the Ukrainian armed forces, deploying its AR3 and AR5 UAS systems to conduct long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. These systems have been critical in enhancing Ukraine’s ability to detect and neutralise threats. Reflecting its commitment to helping Ukraine bolster its defence capabilities, through a recently launched new entity in the region, TEKEVER is increasing its employee base on the ground, establishing a network of Ukrainian facilities focused on maintenance, engineering support, research and development for new capabilities, as well as training centres aimed at enhancing operational efficiency for Ukrainian collaborators. Today, through its donation, TEKEVER continues to cement its long-term support for the Ukrainian armed forces and the Ukrainian people. Its partnership with the Prytula Foundation will ensure Ukraine remains technologically supported in their fight for independence.

Ricardo Mendes, CEO of TEKEVER, commented: “European support for Ukraine is more vital now than ever, which is why we are proud to support not only with this donation, but additionally through our ongoing work alongside the Ukrainian armed forces. Having been on the ground in Ukraine since 2022, TEKEVER has seen firsthand the importance of innovative, resilient and resourceful talent driving successful defence efforts. We are pleased that our donation will allow for the cultivation of more of the exceptional talent needed to fight this war and defend Ukrainian sovereignty”.

“Command posts are a critical element of battle management: this is where intelligence is gathered, UAVs are monitored, and enemy movements are tracked. These centers are responsible for evaluating the effectiveness and feasibility of missions, forecasting risks, and making decisions at both tactical and strategic levels.

We thank our partners at TEKEVER for funding this center. Supporting our forces requires more than just supplying weapons and drones — covering operational costs is equally vital, as it enables effective action on the battlefield,” said Oleksandr Popov, Commander of the 15th Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade.

“Foreign companies, even those already helping Ukraine, don’t always manage to keep pace with the rapid changes on the battlefield. The tactical situation, threats, and technological solutions evolve almost weekly. The front line often demands unconventional solutions that go beyond ‘off-the-shelf’ products. That’s why direct donations for equipment make it possible to respond faster, more adaptively, and more precisely — without delays, logistical challenges, or multi-level approvals.

In 2025, supporting Ukraine is not just a humanitarian gesture, but a stance that shapes a company’s image in the eyes of clients, partners, and markets. Companies that aren’t afraid to directly support Ukraine’s defence capabilities are seen as part of the civilized world that does not stand aside.” — Andriy Shuvalov, Director of the Prytula Foundation.

“The effectiveness of aid depends on the speed of decision-making. Funds directed to trusted organizations with military expertise are used with high efficiency and have maximum impact in minimal time. This is a level of efficiency that’s hard to achieve through large bureaucratic channels. It’s important to demonstrate that the Western world believes in and supports Ukraine. That’s why the flow of foreign capital into domestic production is critically important. A donation is not just about ‘giving something.’ It’s a way to be involved in the process, to understand the reality of war, to see the impact of support, and to build trust with those on the front line,” said Bohdan Danyliv, Head of the Military Department at the Serhiy Prytula Foundation. (Source: ASD Network)

 

31 Jul 25. Ukrainian SOF Kill 7, Seize Russian-Held Positions in North-Slobozhanskyi. A recent operation by Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the North-Slobozhanskyi direction resulted in the deaths of at least seven Russian soldiers and the capture of Russian-held positions in the area. According to SOF’s Telegram post, the mission was executed by operators from the 73rd Marine Center in coordination with personnel from the 144th Special Operations Center. According to the report, Ukrainian operatives approached the Russian-held position and offered the enemy multiple chances to surrender. When the troops refused, the Ukrainian unit launched a swift and coordinated assault, eliminating the opposing forces. Documents and weapons were recovered from the site. One Ukrainian soldier was wounded during the operation but received medical treatment and is in stable condition. The SOF credited the success of the mission to meticulous planning, effective coordination, and the professionalism of all personnel involved. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

22 Jul 25. Ukraine’s United24 news outlet reports a ground-based robotic electronic warfare system known as Kvertus AD Berserk, designed to counter a range of enemy drone activities, has entered serial production in Ukraine. The announcement was made on July 21 by Yaroslav Filimonov, CEO of the defense technology company Kvertus, through official channels, said the report.

“The Berserk robot can disrupt control signals across all frequency bands used by FPV drones, multirotor drones, and aerial bombers. According to the manufacturer, the system has a 20 km operational range, can remain active for up to 12 hours, and is remotely controlled from a similar distance of up to 20 km.

The company said the platform will support: evacuation of wounded personnel from frontline positions; cover during demining operations; Protection of logistics routes.

“Kvertus has confirmed that multiple orders are already in progress, underscoring demand for the system’s battlefield-tested effectiveness,” said the report. “The firm also emphasized that its technologies are undergoing monthly upgrades, with engineers continuing to enhance performance in response to evolving threats. he Berserk system was developed on the basis of a nationally produced mobile platform and integrates high-capacity battery power, rugged terrain mobility, and multi-spectrum jamming systems.

For more information: https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraine-deploys-new-berserk-robot-to-jam-enemy-drones-protect-troops-at-front-10070 (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

22 Jul 25. Germany and Netherlands to boost Ukraine’s air defence. The Netherlands intends to make a “substantial contribution” to the US initiative to provide additional air defences to Ukraine, said Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans yesterday during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. “Much has already been done, but more is needed,” Brekelmans said. “Ukraine protects the front line against Russian aggression for all of Europe. If Russia is able to break through, it immediately poses a greater threat to the rest of Europe and NATO.” The Netherlands has already delivered a Patriot air defence system and missiles and is also providing Ukraine with drone detection radars and maritime vessels equipped with air defence equipment. The exact details of the new Dutch contribution will be decided soon, in coordination with NATO, the United States and other allies.  Germany’s Defence Minister Boris Pistorius also said yesterday that Germany would deliver five Patriot systems to Ukraine. It has previously provided three of the systems. Earlier this month, following a pause in military equipment support for Ukraine, the United States pledged to send additional Patriot systems to NATO for NATO to “distribute”.  The Patriot, short for Phased Array Tracking Radar for Intercept on Target, is manufactured by Raytheon Technologies. Each system typically comprises radar and control systems, a power unit, launchers and support vehicles. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

30 Jul 25. Ukraine Equips New Interceptor Drone With 6-Barrel Shotgun. Ukraine’s 3DTech has introduced the reusable drone interceptor “Predator Shooter” with a suspended unit of 12-gauge recoilless guns. The company’s founder, Oleksiy Zhulinsky, told the Military correspondent about the new development. At the Demo Days drone field tests, a Ukrainian company presented a drone designed to shoot down enemy drones, including fiber-optic ones, as well as to engage infantry. The suspension unit is equipped with six 12-gauge barrels that can be loaded with conventional shotgun shells. This can be shot, buckshot, or any other type of shell, as each one is equipped with a countercharge that compensates for the recoil of the shot.

“We have modified the cartridge in such a way that there is no recoil. Therefore, it can fire single shots, in automatic mode, or even in a volley from all barrels,” says the company founder.

A two-gun modification has also been developed for the interceptor to intercept high-speed targets, which has less weight and allows the interceptor to reach speeds of up to 150 km/h. The drone is currently being used by the Ukrainian military in a targeted manner, where it is undergoing testing and trials. Its primary targets are front-line drones such as the DJI Mavic. A six-barrel suspension unit for the Predator Shooter interceptor drone from 3DTech. Photo: Militarnyi Developers see potential in it as a means of destroying fiber-optic drones, which currently remain invulnerable to electronic suppression and reconnaissance equipment.

“ A fiber-optic drone is even easier to hit because it has several large modules, such as a fiber coil or batteries,” says Oleksiy Zhulinsky.

However, this is not the first interceptor drone with firearms. Previously, “Military” reported on the appearance of separate SICH suspended modules from the Ukrainian company Varta DroneHunter. Their developers are focused on integration with other existing FPV platforms from 7 to 15 inches. To do this, you only need to calibrate and fine-tune the drone software. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI)

 

28 Jul 25. US/Ukraine deepen ties with Ukraine drone export and Swift Beat deals. On July 24, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he has reached an agreement with U.S. President Donald Trump for the United States will purchase drones, many of them C-UAS intercept drones from Ukraine, according to Ukrinform. Zelensky said this while speaking to journalists on July 24.

“With America, with President Trump, we agreed that they will buy drones from us. That’s the agreement. I have tasked [NSDC Secretary] Umerov, [Defense Minister] Shmyhal, and [Advisor to President on strategic affairs] Kamyshin with handling this. It’s very important to prepare this contract — a serious contract worth USD10–20–30 bn,” Zelensky stated in the article.

This follows the signing of a memorandum between Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Swift Beat, LLC “which will enable scaling up the production of interceptor drones capable of shooting down large numbers of Shaheds,” according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in a presidential statement. Before the memorandum signing, the Head of State met with Swift Beat, LLC CEO Eric Schmidt to discuss increasing the production of modern drones for Ukraine. “This is a co-production document between Ukraine and the United States. It will involve several companies focusing on various types of drones. But the most important thing is this year and next year. This year – hundreds of thousands of drones. And next year – there will be an increase,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. The President emphasized that the main component of the document is the production of interceptor drones, which have already proven effective in Ukraine.

For more information: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/memorandum-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-amerikanskoyu-kompaniyeyu-swif-98817/https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/4018767-zelensky-us-agrees-to-buy-ukrainian-drones.html (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

26 Jul 25. Russia Uses New UMPB-5 Guided Bomb in Kharkiv Strike. Russian forces have used a newly developed precision-guided bomb in a strike on Ukraine for the first time, injuring dozens in the city of Kharkiv. According to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, two UMPB-5 aerial munitions were launched from a Su-34 bomber at approximately 11:00 a.m. on July 24, hitting infrastructure in the Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi districts. The bombs were reportedly released from an estimated distance of over 60 miles near the village of Stroitel in Russia’s Belgorod region, igniting fires.  A total of 41 people were injured in the attack, including six children, local authorities confirmed. Among the wounded were a 10-year-old girl, a 28-day-old infant, a pregnant woman, and two 17-year-olds who suffered blast injuries. All victims are receiving medical treatment. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that people were present on the streets at the time of the attack. No fatalities were reported. The UMPB-5 is a newly modified glide bomb equipped with a 550-pound high-explosive warhead, similar in weight to previous munitions but with a reinforced casing. “The warhead of the UMPB-5 weighs 250 kilograms, the same as a high-explosive aircraft bomb,”a spokesperson for the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office said. “At the same time, it is made of thicker metal than in the UMPB D-30, which is why civilians were more seriously injured.” Spartak Borysenko, a representative of the prosecutor’s office, said the strike confirms Russia’s continued use of Kharkiv as a test site for new air-launched munitions. “Russia is using Kharkiv as a testing ground. Today it’s the UMPB-5, before it was the D-30… These modified bombs cause greater destruction and lead to more civilian injuries,” Borysenko stated according to a report by Euromaiden Press. The blast wave from the attack caused significant structural damage. According to official assessments, 20 residential buildings were hit, including 17 apartment blocks. More than 600 windows were shattered, and the blast created a large crater in the road. Seven cars were destroyed by fire, while 18 others were damaged. An industrial facility was also set ablaze, resulting in a large fire, Russian media claimed the industrial facility was a drone factory. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

25 Jul 25. HENSOLDT strengthens Ukraine’s air defence.  Sensor solutions provider HENSOLDT has received a major order to supply radars to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence. As part of a comprehensive order package worth more than 340 m euros, TRML-4D high-performance radars and SPEXER 2000 3D MkIII short-range radars will be delivered.

“Our high-performance radars are urgently needed by Ukrainian air defence,” said HENSOLDT CEO Oliver Dörre. “A number of radars have been protecting Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression. We are proud to be supplying further systems. The radars are extremely important for protecting citizens.”

The TRML-4D is based on the latest AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar technology. It ensures the rapid detection and tracking of around 1,500 targets within a radius of up to 250 km. It is capable of quickly and reliably detecting, tracking and classifying all types of air targets – cruise missiles, drones, aircraft and helicopters. The SPEXER radar family offers surveillance radars for various ranges for the automatic detection and classification of ground, sea and low-flying air targets. The SPEXER 2000 is part of the new Skyranger 30 cannon-based air defence vehicle from Rheinmetall. It is also used in the German cUAS Feldlager (ASUL), qualified air defence, and HoWiSM (high-energy laser for drone defence). HENSOLDT has decades of experience with radar systems for air defence and is actively driving forward the further development of key technologies in this field. In addition to the TRML-4D and SPEXER, the company’s portfolio includes the Twinvis passive radar and radars for securing ship and air traffic. Both the TRML-4D and the SPEXER are part of the ‘Near and Very Short Range Air Defence System’ NNbS ordered by the German Armed Forces. (Source: ASD Network)

 

25 Jul 25. Zelenskiy says Ukraine has secured funds for three Patriot systems, looking to finance seven more. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy looks on during a visit to a military training area to find out about the training of Ukrainian soldiers on the Patriot missile system, at an undisclosed location in Germany. Ukraine has received confirmation from partners that they will provide funding for three Patriot missile defence systems and discussions are underway to finance seven more, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Thursday.

“I have officially received confirmation from Germany for two systems, and from Norway for one. We are currently working with Dutch partners,” he told reporters.

President Donald Trump announced earlier this month that bns of dollars of U.S. weapons would go to Ukraine, including Patriot missiles. This set off negotiations around which partners could contribute to the weapons purchasing scheme – a process that will determine the support Ukraine receives. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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