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21 Aug 25. Taiwan: Proposed defence budget will face challenges to secure legislative backing. Earlier on 21 August, Taiwan’s Cabinet announced plans to spend approximately NTD 949.5bn (USD 31.1bn) on defence in 2026, which amounts to 3.32% of GDP. This would represent an approximately 23% increase relative to 2025; it would also include investments in fighter jets and naval assets. The announcement comes as China has stepped up military pressure on the island in recent years. However, the budget would need to be passed by the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan (LY; unicameral legislature). We assess that the proposed budget is unlikely to pass in its current form, and that there is a realistic possibility of substantial cuts and/or delays. Earlier this year, opposition lawmakers blocked parts of the 2025 budget. Regardless, China’s armed forces dwarf those of Taiwan; furthermore, the US will remain the main node of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait (see Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 24 March 2025). However, if Taiwan is unable to boost military spending significantly, we assess this would drive tensions with Washington DC, with which the island still hopes to achieve a better trade deal. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 25. Sudan: Increasing US engagement is unlikely to facilitate peace agreement, sustaining conflict risks. On 20 August, a team of US-led mediators claimed they were ‘appalled’ by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan and called for urgent de-escalatory measures amid increasing US engagement in peace negotiation efforts. This follows talks between US Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, and the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General Abdel al-Burhan, in Zurich (Switzerland) on 11 August. No substantive peace talks have taken place since the start of the conflict in April 2023, despite efforts by other regional mediators such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Regardless of increasing US efforts, neither side is likely to commit to negotiations until it is satisfied that it has achieved an optimal military position in the conflict. With the SAF looking to build on its capture of the capital Khartoum and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entrenched across the Darfur region, we assess that mediators are highly unlikely to devise a lasting peace agreement, sustaining the risk of protracted armed conflict into 2026 and driving the likelihood of further US-imposed sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 25. Russia needs a nuclear shield update to due to ‘colossal threats’, nuclear chief says. Russia’s nuclear shield should be strengthened in coming years due to the “colossal threats” facing the world’s biggest nuclear power, the head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation said on Thursday. Russia and the United States are upgrading their nuclear arsenals – including the systems used to detect and intercept incoming nuclear-armed missiles – just as China ramps up its own nuclear capability far beyond those of Britain and France. (Source: Reuters)
20 Aug 25. Congo (DRC): Contentious terms will likely prolong negotiation process, drive conflict, unrest risks. On 19 August, Qatari mediators confirmed that, despite the Congolese government and the M23 rebel group missing the 18 August deadline for a peace agreement, the two sides remain committed to the negotiation process. The M23 have confirmed it will send a team to the Qatari capital Doha in the coming days. However, progress is likely to remain slow, with both sides indicating dissatisfaction with a draft proposal. The draft envisions the creation of an interim special force to manage the area currently controlled by the M23, with 50% of the force comprising M23 members and the remainder filled by the Congolese police and local civilians. Despite current protestation by the Congolese state, an agreement that does not incorporate M23 personnel in the continued management of the territory is highly unlikely. Such an agreement will likely be subject to further delays, sustaining the risk of clashes between M23 forces and local pro-government militia and driving threats to life for locally engaged staff. We assess that agreement to such terms would likely be politically contentious, raising the risk of protests in the capital Kinshasa. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Aug 25. Mali: Likely jihadist attacks proximate to capital will increase threats to staff, government stability. Late on 19 August, reports claimed that the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attacked Kassela (Koulikoro region), approximately 31 miles (50km) to the east of the capital Bamako. While details of the attack are limited, JNIM has significantly expanded its presence in central and southern Mali in recent months; the attack underscores elevated jihadist threats around Bamako and the limited capacity of the Malian military (FAMa) to respond to such attacks. This is compounded by JNIM’s evolving capabilities, including the increased deployment of drones and sophisticated IEDs during attacks. While a high-capacity assault on Bamako remains unlikely in the short term, intensifying jihadist activity proximate to the city will increase risks of attacks targeting FAMa bases and checkpoints on the city’s outskirts. This will also likely elevate kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) risks during overland movement along highways connected to the city. We assess that further attacks proximate to Bamako will exacerbate anti-junta sentiment within the FAMa, thereby increasing the threat of internal challenges to President Assimi Goïta’s leadership. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 25. Venezuela-US: Naval deployment will significantly increase regional tensions. According to reports on 18 August, the US will deploy three Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyers off the coast of Venezuela in the next 36 hours. The USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham and USS Sampson will reportedly seek to counter threats from Latin American cartels designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). Reports also indicate that the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Group and multiple Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will join the destroyers. In total, around 4,000 sailors and marines will participate in the months-long deployment in international airspace and waters. A US official told Reuters, under conditions of anonymity, that in addition to intelligence and surveillance operations, the deployment will possibly also operate as a launching pad for targeted strikes in the event that any such decision is made. In response, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced the deployment of 4.5 m militia members across Venezuela. We assess there is a remote chance of US military action in Venezuela during the deployment. However, a heightened US military presence off the Venezuelan coast will significantly increase regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 25. South Korea-North Korea: Conciliatory gestures will have limited impact on tensions. Earlier on 18 August, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung instructed government ministries to pursue the ‘phased implementation of existing inter-Korean agreements’. Lee recently indicated that he would revive the landmark 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which aimed to reduce military activity near the border. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and Lee’s predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, withdrew from the agreement in 2023 and 2024, respectively. We assess that Lee (who came to office in June) will pursue diplomatic engagement to deter aggressive behaviour from North Korea, in contrast to Yoon’s more confrontational approach. For example, Seoul suspended cross-border loudspeaker broadcasts earlier this month. However, this strategy is highly unlikely to herald a major diplomatic breakthrough in the short term; North Korea is emboldened by its growing ties with Russia and has described efforts to improve ties as a ‘foolish dream’. As such, we assess that further flare-ups in tensions due to North Korean missile tests and joint US-South Korea military drills will be likely. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 25. Congo (DRC): Further ADF attacks will be likely in short term amid rise in violence targeting civilians. On 17 August, the Islamic State (IS)-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed nine civilians in an overnight raid in Oicha (North Kivu province), during which at least 20 homes were destroyed. The incident comes amid an upsurge in ADF attacks against civilians in recent weeks; 47 people were killed in the Lubero territory (North Kivu) and another four were killed across a series of attacks in the Banyari-Tchabi area (Ituri province) over the past week. The attacks come despite the active joint Congolese and Ugandan operations in the region. Over the coming weeks, further ADF attacks will be likely across southern Ituri and northern North Kivu provinces. This will elevate threats to local staff, particularly those based within rural communities and during overland movement, but also those based in the region’s larger towns and cities, within which the ADF has demonstrated capacity to conduct hit-and-run and bombing attacks. We assess there is a realistic possibility that Congolese and Ugandan forces will escalate operations in response, increasing exposure to artillery fire and small-arms crossfire; a possible proliferation of security checks would slow overland movement. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 25. Bolivia: Domestic unrest risks will be sustained ahead of second-round election. On 17 August, Bolivia held elections to choose a president, vice president, all 130 deputies and 36 senators. According to preliminary results, centrist Senator Rodrigo Paz received 31.7% of the vote for the presidency. Paz’s popularity surprised many, given that he was polling at approximately 6.4% voter intention prior to the election. Paz will face the right-wing former president Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga (2001–2002) in the second round of the presidential election on 19 October; Quiroga received 27.2% of the vote. Incumbent President Luis Arce (2019–present) celebrated the results, stating that ‘democracy has triumphed’, despite his left-wing Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) facing defeat after 19 years in power. The MAS presidential candidate garnered 3.2% of the vote. Reports indicate that approximately 19.1% of the ballots were null and void; influential former president Evo Morales (2006–2019) called on his supporters to vote null after his disqualification from running in the election. Ahead of the second-round vote, we assess that domestic unrest risks will be sustained as Morales’ supporters continue to protest, but government stability risks will decrease. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 25. US-Caribbean: US deployment of naval, air forces to Caribbean Sea will increase regional tensions. According to reports on 14 August, the US has ordered the deployment of naval and air forces to the southern Caribbean Sea. The deployment will seek to counter threats from Latin American cartels designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). The several-month-long deployment will reportedly involve multiple Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, at least one warship and at least one attack submarine. Reports indicate that the deployment will facilitate surveillance and intelligence operations. The deployment comes amid increasing US military involvement in combatting cartels under the Trump administration. On 13 August, a US Air Force drone conducted a two-hour reconnaissance flight over México state (Mexico) at the request of the Mexican authorities. Meanwhile, on 22 March, US Northern Command deployed the USS Spruance Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer to secure the US-Mexico border on the Pacific coast. The latest deployment will marginally decrease organised crime risks in the event of significant drug seizures and interceptions. Additionally, a heightened US military presence in the southern Caribbean Sea will increase regional tensions with Nicaragua and Venezuela. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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