NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 19.

Recognition of Palestinian State.

Key points

• Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the UK are likely to recognise a Palestinian state in an official capacity at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) between 23 and 27 September.

• Various individual Western governments’ official recognition of a Palestinian state is highly unlikely to yield meaningful progress towards full UN recognition of said entity.
• The process will likely increase reputational risks (and possibly supply chain and operational disruption risks) for businesses operating in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
• Israel is likely to continue expanding settlements in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) and to continue restricting financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), increasing domestic unrest risks in the West Bank.

Context

On 22 September, France and Saudi Arabia will host a high-level conference at the UNGA in New York City (New York, US) that aims to advance the two-state solution. During the UNGA General Debate in the days following the conference, several Western countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the UK, are likely to recognise a Palestinian state in an official capacity. At the time of writing, reports indicate that the UK will possibly recognise a Palestinian state in the days preceding the UNGA.

The recognition of a Palestinian state by individual states is separate from UN recognition. Although the Palestinian Territories has been a UN non-member observer state since 2012, the UN Security Council (UNSC) must approve its application for full UN membership before it is considered by the UNGA, where a minimum of two-thirds support is required for the application to be approved. A UNSC resolution requires at least nine votes in favour out of the fifteen members, with no vetoes from the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US). The US has repeatedly vetoed UNSC resolutions to recognise a Palestinian state, most recently in 2024. The US authorities have withheld or revoked visas for Palestinian Authority (PA) officials who were due to attend the 2025 UNGA, underscoring elevated bilateral tensions.

Forecast

Increasing recognition of a Palestinian state is highly unlikely to yield meaningful progress towards UN recognition

We assess that the US will almost certainly veto any future UNSC resolutions to recognise a Palestinian state, rendering the prospect of said entity’s full UN recognition highly unlikely in the short term. During the French-Saudi conference and subsequent UNGA, the US will possibly issue a counter-statement denouncing its allies’ recognition of a Palestinian state, though this is unlikely to generate significant diplomatic tensions between these Western nations. Even so, diplomatic fallout between Israel and its Western partners is highly likely in the immediate aftermath of the conference. The Israeli government’s leadership will likely accuse Western governments and leaders of appeasing Hamas and ‘rewarding’ terrorism. Tit-for-tat diplomatic escalation will possibly ensue, especially in the context of Western opposition to the expansion of the Israel-Hamas war and the development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Unilateral recognition by Western states will increase reputational and operational disruption risks for businesses in Israel and/or their Israeli partners

As Western countries unilaterally recognise the sovereignty of a Palestinian state, the legal basis for governments to challenge Israeli actions within the Palestinian Territories will expand moderately; this includes the ability to impose both targeted and broader sanction regimes. Amid the ongoing intensification of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Western states will possibly move to sanction increasing numbers of Israeli entities and members of Israel’s coalition government in the coming weeks. An expansion of sanction regimes would possibly disrupt supply chain continuity for firms with a presence in Israel, increasing financial risks and disrupting business operations more broadly. Sanctions would compound already-heighted reputational risks for businesses operating in Israel and/or those Israeli firms with which they are partnered, including in the technology sector. In the medium term, increasing governance concerns and sanction-exposure risks will possibly reduce the appeal of the Israeli market to foreign direct investment (FDI), undermining socio-economic health conditions.

International businesses headquartered in countries that choose to recognise a Palestinian state will possibly face increased hostility towards foreign investment vis-à-vis their operations in Israel; various Israeli entities will likely choose to boycott popular brands, leading to reduced footfall and revenue. Israeli businesses reliant on supply chains from those countries that choose to recognise a Palestinian state will possibly consider diversifying their suppliers, impacting operations and creating additional financial risks. There is a realistic possibility of sporadic protests outside the Australian, Belgian, British, Canadian and French embassies in Israel between 22 and 27 September; any such gatherings would restrict access to targeted facilities and consular services for foreign nationals in Israel in the coming days.

Israel is likely to continue expanding settlements in the West Bank while cutting off PA funding, driving domestic unrest risks in the Palestinian Territories

It is highly unlikely that various Western countries’ recognition of a Palestinian state will prevent Israel from supporting the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, such as the recently approved development of the E1 settlement. This project involves building approximately 3,400 new housing units that would disrupt territorial continuity between Bethlehem and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates (West Bank). In the coming weeks, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich is likely to continue supporting applications for the construction of new and expanded settlements, while also delaying fiscal transfers to the PA as outlined in the Oslo Accords. Disrupted access to funds would likely exacerbate the PA’s ongoing fiscal crisis, as well as long-standing socio-economic health risks in the West Bank.

Increasing financial pressure on the PA would possibly limit its capacity to finance core functions, resulting in restricted access to public services and increasing the risk of operational disruption for firms reliant on permits, licenses and visa renewals to facilitate their operations in the West Bank. Such delays would also increase the risk of staff being exposed to petty corruption and entrenched clientelism within the PA’s broader bureaucratic structure, compounding governance concerns (particularly for locally engaged NGOs).

The risk of protests driven by socio-economic concerns will increase within major Palestinian population centres, elevating the risk of unrest and strike action in the coming weeks. Increasing socio-economic concerns will also exacerbate the risk of sole-perpetrator attacks and militant activity targeting Israeli security positions, settlements and civilians in the coming weeks. In response, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely reinforce its posture in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas, particularly during Jewish and Islamic religious holidays, compounding ethno-religious tensions (particularly in Jerusalem’s Old City).

• Egypt-Turkey: Joint navy drills will increase diplomatic, security tensions with Israel. On 18 September, the Turkish defence ministry announced that Turkey will conduct joint navy drills with Egypt in the eastern Mediterranean region between 22 and 26 September. The drills will include attack vessels, fighter jets, frigates and submarines; they will be the first joint drills between the two states in 13 years. The announcement comes days after the Egyptian president’s first official visit to Ankara (Turkey), underscoring the strengthening of bilateral ties since 2023, following years of strained relations. We assess that the drills will highly likely exacerbate the ongoing tensions between both countries and Israel, amid the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) continued military advance to capture Gaza City. While Turkey has severed its trade ties with Israel, the drills are unlikely to signal a significant risk to trade or gas deals between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, despite the heightened tensions, Israel and Egypt will likely sustain their security co‑ordination along their borders in the coming weeks.
• Israel-Yemen: Drone attack underscores security risks in Israel, strike risks in Houthi territory.On 18 September, a drone crashed near the Jacob Eilat Hotel (Eilat, Southern district), causing minor damage without casualties. Later that day, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack followed an earlier successful attack on Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district) on 7 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 September 2025). Together, these highlight the Houthis’ growing ability to evade detection in southern Israel, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel and assets across the area in the coming weeks. Israel will likely lower its threshold for sounding sirens in the coming days, increasing the frequency of sirens and elevating business disruption risks. In the coming days, Israel will likely intensify its strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, including in the capital Sanaa and against dual-use infrastructure such as ports and power stations. This will significantly elevate energy security risks, supply chain disruption and security risks for assets and personnel throughout Houthi-held territory.

Sep 18.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Iran has not met the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) conditions for extending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause, increasing the likelihood of the UN re-implementing sanctions in the coming weeks.
• The re-implementation of UN sanctions would substantially increase pressure on Iran’s economic stability, elevating the risk of hybrid retaliation targeting those nations that enforce sanctions.
• The US continues to expand sanctions targeting Iran’s ‘shadow banking’ network and oil exports, undercutting Chinese demand for Iranian crude.

ISRAEL

• The beginning of Israel’s major ground operation in Gaza City (Gaza, Palestinian Territories) will likely trigger significant protest activity; demonstrations will likely intensify ahead of 7 October.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has initiated its ground operation in Gaza City, significantly increasing security risks for civilians, despite the announcement of new evacuation routes.
• A shooting attack at the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) border crossing will likely disrupt cross-border mobility in the coming hours, as well as supply chains delivering aid to Gaza.

IRAN

• Iran has not met the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) conditions for extending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause, increasing the likelihood of the UN re-implementing sanctions in the coming weeks. On 17 September, the E3 and the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaya Kallas, spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to discuss the possible re-implementation of UN sanctions on Iran in the coming weeks. Germany, the EU and the UK subsequently released statements indicating that Iran has not met the E3’s conditions for securing a temporary extension of the JCPOA’s snapback clause. In the coming days, Iran is highly unlikely to meet these conditions; these include resuming nuclear negotiations with the US, allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to nuclear facilities and accounting for all enriched uranium stockpiles in its possession. As such, the E3 will highly likely move to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran in the coming weeks. Sanctions-exposure risks for regionally engaged financial and shipping firms will also increase, particularly those firms with operations and/or customers in or associated with Iran. In response, Iran is highly likely to withdraw from its agreement with the IAEA; it will also possibly withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This would highly likely compound concerns regarding the status and possible expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the medium-to-long term, increasing the risk of a resumption of Israeli strike action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities in the coming months (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025).
• The re-implementation of UN sanctions would substantially increase pressure on Iran’s economic stability, elevating the risk of hybrid retaliation targeting those nations that enforce sanctions. The implementation of sanctions would highly likely trigger a further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR) and undermine socio-economic conditions nationwide, increasing the risk of limited anti-government protests. The re-implementation of sanctions would also increase the risk of substantial supply chain disruption to imports, elevating the risk of both operational disruption for locally engaged firms and commodity shortages, including food staples, pharmaceuticals and electrical goods. Amid increasing fiscal pressure resulting from UN sanctions, Iran would possibly resume its hijacking campaign targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf to secure periodic sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets. Vessels associated with nations enforcing sanctions and carrying lucrative cargo (particularly oil) would face an elevated risk of targeting, increasing security threats to crew members, who would also likely face lengthy stints in Iranian detention facilities. The Iranian authorities would also possibly retaliate to the enforcement of sanctions by detaining foreign nationals associated with any enforcing countries, increasing human rights concerns and threats to locally engaged staff. In the medium-to-long term, Iran would also likely intensify its economically motivated cyber threat campaign targeting public and private sector firms. Such activity would increase the risk of ransomware attacks and exposure to cryptojacking, particularly for firms holding large amounts of sensitive data, as well as those operating high-value digital infrastructure or possessing large-scale computing resources.
• The US continues to expand sanctions targeting Iran’s ‘shadow banking’ network and oil exports, undercutting Chinese demand for Iranian crude. On 16 September, the US sanctioned four Iranian nationals, 13 UAE-based entities and one China-based entity for allegedly financing Iran’s security forces. The US will highly likely continue to expand and rigorously enforce sanctions targeting Iran’s ‘shadow banking’ networks in the coming months, increasing compliance concerns and due diligence requirements for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the oil, shipping and technology industries. Also on 16 September, Reuters reported that Iran has begun offering China deeper discounts on crude oil purchases due to softening demand. Iranian Light crude now trades for USD 6 below Brent Crude benchmark prices, compared to USD 3 below Brent Crude in March. Softening Chinese demand likely stems from decreasing government oil quotas, as well as rising oil stockpiles at domestic refineries and the suspension of operations at the Haiye oil products terminal in the Dongjiakou port area of Qingdao (Shandong province, China). This terminal serves as the primary handler for Iranian crude imports in China. The US sanctioned its operator, Qingdao Port Haiye Dongjiakou Oil Products, in August, whereupon the terminal subsequently suspended operations. The suspension and subsequent decrease in Iranian crude imports underscore the broader impact of intensifying US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports. In the coming months, the expansion of sanctions targeting Chinese entities will likely further soften demand, triggering additional price cuts for Iran, while also undermining access to critical export revenues and exacerbating broader socio-economic concerns (see above).

 

ISRAEL

• The beginning of Israel’s major ground operation in Gaza City (Gaza, Palestinian Territories) will likely trigger significant protest activity; demonstrations will likely intensify ahead of 7 October. On 16 September, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum declared a ‘state of emergency’ following the IDF’s initiation of ground operations in Gaza City (see below). The forum announced the establishment of a tent encampment outside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence on Gaza Street in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). It plans to hold daily protests at this location from 1900hrs (local time) onwards. In the coming days, protest activity will likely intensify across Israel, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While demonstrations will likely remain largely peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of sporadic altercations, particularly if the Israeli police employ heavy-handed dispersal measures, such as mounted units and water cannons. Increasing protest activity will moderately increase security risks for proximate installations and will likely disrupt localised travel and supply chain continuity.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• The IDF has initiated its ground operation in Gaza City, significantly increasing security risks for civilians, despite the announcement of new evacuation routes. On 16 September, the IDF confirmed that it had begun a ground operation in Gaza City (named Gideon Chariots 2). Three divisions are currently operating within the city – 36, 98 and 162 (Division 143 continues to operate in Khan Yunis and Rafah in southern Gaza). On 17 September, the IDF announced that it would open a temporary transit route through Salah al-Din Street to facilitate civilian movement southwards from 1200hrs on 17 September to 1200hrs on 19 September. As operations in the Gaza City area intensify in the coming weeks, the IDF will likely announce additional periods of civilian access to evacuation routes. However, this is highly unlikely to mitigate against security risks for personnel and civilians within Gaza City in the coming days.
• A shooting attack at the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) border crossing will likely disrupt cross-border mobility in the coming hours, as well as supply chains delivering aid to Gaza. On 18 September, a Jordanian national opened fire at the Allenby Bridge border crossing, killing two Israeli nationals. The security forces neutralised the perpetrator at the scene. According to initial investigations, the perpetrator was a truck driver operating a humanitarian aid truck bound for Gaza. The authorities subsequently shut the Allenby Bridge crossing; the facility will likely remain closed over the coming 48 hours. There is a realistic possibility that the Israeli authorities will close the other border crossings between Jordan and Israel in the coming hours due to wider security concerns. Additional restrictions to cross-border movement would increase the risk of travel and supply chain disruption in the coming days, impacting the movement of goods between Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. Further border closures would also increase the risk of temporary labour shortages for firms employing Jordanian nationals, undermining operational continuity, particularly in the West Bank and Eilat (Southern district, Israel). Following the attack, the IDF established a cordon and conducted search operations in the Jericho area (Jericho governorate, West Bank), located close to the Allenby Bridge crossing. These operations will continue over the coming 24 hours; an elevated security posture in the area will also exacerbate the risk of travel disruption in the coming days. Given the profile of the perpetrator, Israel will possibly impose new restrictions on aid deliveries bound for Gaza that transit Jordan, the West Bank and Israel. Such restrictions would increase the risk of critical disruption to aid delivery and distribution operations, undermining humanitarian conditions within Gaza. There is a realistic possibility that such a decision would also increase diplomatic tensions with Jordan and radicalisation risks among Jordanian nationals, though wider retaliation from Jordan remains unlikely.

Sep 17.

• Syria: Ethno-religious tensions will persist in south, despite new roadmap. On 16 September, Syria’s foreign ministry announced a US and Jordan-backed roadmap for reconciliation between the government and the Druze in Suwayda governorate. The roadmap includes launching a UN-backed investigation, in co-ordination with the pro-government Druze factions, into July’s clashes and the deployment of the government’s internal security forces in Suwayda. The deal would also increase the volume of humanitarian aid entering Suwayda and facilitate reconstruction efforts. However, in response, the Suwayda Supreme Legal Committee, headed by the Druze cleric, Hikmat al-Hijri, has rejected the plan and reiterated its calls for self-determination. Al-Hijri militias’ refusal to accept Damascus’s control will likely increase challenges and delays in implementing the roadmap, sustaining uncertainty regarding any timeline. Furthermore, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the new roadmap will increase risks of intra-Druze conflict inside Suwayda in the coming weeks, as well as the resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the region, exacerbating security instability in southern Syria.

Sep 16.

Israel-Palestinian Territories: Major offensive on Gaza City will worsen humanitarian environment. Earlier on 16 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that tens of thousands of troops had expanded ground operations overnight into Gaza City (Gaza, Palestinian Territories). This follows days of intense Israeli airstrikes. An IDF spokesperson has urged civilians to leave Gaza City; they claim that approximately 40% of the population has already done so, leaving around 600,000 people in the city. Hundreds of thousands of civilians will almost certainly face displacement; many will likely seek shelter at overcrowded informal sites in areas such as al-Mawasi in southern Gaza, worsening the already critical strain on aid and intensifying the humanitarian crisis. We assess that the operation will significantly exacerbate the direct threat of injury and death for NGO personnel and journalists on the ground. Furthermore, the offensive will almost certainly face international backlash due to the increased likelihood of harm to civilians and mass casualty events, heightening reputational risks for companies operating in Israel and/or with Israeli firms.

Sep 15.

IRAN

• Amid increasing concerns regarding Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s longevity, escalating political factionalism will drive long-term government stability and policy risks within Iran.
• While 16 September marks the three-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody, major unrest in Iran remains unlikely.

ISRAEL

• Tel Aviv’s stock exchange indexes decreased following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements regarding Israel’s political isolation, as well as the possible resultant harm to Israeli trade relations and the associated long-term socio-economic health risks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• The increased frequency and intensity of airstrikes indicates that Israel has entered the final preparation stages for its impending ground operation in Gaza City, elevating humanitarian and security risks therein.
• In the West Bank, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely intensify military operations in Tulkarm governorate following an increase in IED incidents.

IRAN

• Amid increasing concerns regarding Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s longevity, escalating political factionalism will drive long-term government stability and policy risks within Iran. On 12 September, the London-based IranWire outlet published a report outlining increasing factionalism among high-ranking members of Iran’s political echelon who are in line to succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. IranWire cites an unnamed Iranian diplomatic source, who alleges that Khamenei’s broad retreat from political engagements since the Iran-Israel war has resulted in a breakdown in communication between Iran’s ministerial bodies and the Supreme Leader’s office. This generally aligns with the significant reduction in the frequency of Khamenei’s public appearances following the conflict. In the coming months, increasing concerns regarding Khamenei’s longevity and potential succession will highly likely trigger growing competition between high-ranking political elites to consolidate their political influence during any potential succession period. The competition will likely be most acute between factions aligned with Ali Larijani, the leader of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and Mohammad Mokhber, a senior advisor to Khamenei. Any such competition would increase the risk of government instability in the event of Khamenei’s incapacitation or death. Additionally, Khamenei would possibly interpret increasing factionalism as a challenge to his authority, increasing the risk of political purges in the coming months, which would in turn drive longer-term policy continuity risks.
• While 16 September marks the three-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody, major unrest in Iran remains unlikely. Amini’s death triggered mass anti-government protests in 2022. The security forces engaged in broad and lethal crackdowns that resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests in the subsequent weeks. Despite a moderate uptick in protest activity on the anniversary in 2023, sustained repression deterred significant attendance in 2024; widespread demonstrations therefore remain highly unlikely in the coming days. Even so, the security forces will likely adopt an elevated posture in Bukan and Mahabad (both West Azerbaijan province), Rasht (Gilan province), Sanandaj and Saqqez (both Kurdistan province) and the capital Tehran. They will almost certainly detain individuals suspected of attempting to mobilise or attend anti-government protests. This posture will increase the risk of surveillance, harassment and detention for locally engaged staff, particularly female personnel, ethno-religious minorities and foreign nationals. The authorities will also likely increase their policing of digital platforms and communications services, possibly triggering service disruption and localised blackouts in the coming days. In Sistan and Baluchistan province, the security forces will also likely adopt and maintain an elevated posture in major cities to deter efforts to commemorate the 30 September 2022 Zahedan Massacre, when the police and security forces killed over 90 civilians attending an anti-government protest in Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchistan). Such a posture is likely to disrupt operational continuity within the province, compounding longer-term ethno-religious tensions and the risk of attacks by secessionist militants. Although the anniversary is unlikely to trigger mass protests and unrest within Iran, anti-government activists among Iran’s diaspora will likely call for demonstrations, consequently increasing the likelihood of peaceful protests in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK and the US; such gatherings will possibly emerge outside Iranian embassies and associated institutions.

ISRAEL 

• Tel Aviv’s stock exchange indexes decreased following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements regarding Israel’s political isolation, as well as the possible resultant harm to Israeli trade relations and the associated long-term socio-economic health risks. On 15 September, Netanyahu discussed Israel’s political isolation during the Accountant General’s Conference in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). He also underlined how this isolation will possibly force Israel to adopt greater economic self-sufficiency. Netanyahu’s comments came after 80 of Israel’s most senior economists signed an open letter, which was published on 15 September. The letter warns of the significant danger to the strength and stability of the Israeli economy due to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the government’s plan to occupy Gaza City. Following the publication of the letter and Netanyahu’s comments, the Tel Aviv stock exchange experienced a decline; the steepest drops were recorded among Israeli security and defence companies. While there is a realistic possibility that the stock exchange will bounce back in the coming days, we continue to assess that the ongoing war will elevate the risk of Israel’s economic isolation. Furthermore, the war will continue to elevate the long-term socio-economic health risks facing Israel’s education system, as well as its national infrastructure and various other government initiatives that aim to support businesses.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• The increased frequency and intensity of Israeli airstrikes indicates that the IDF has entered the final preparation stages for its impending ground operation in Gaza City, elevating humanitarian and security risks therein. In recent days, the IDF has intensified its airstrikes across Gaza City; it completed five waves of strikes against more than 500 targets in the past week. The intensification signals that a large ground mobilisation into the city is likely in the coming week. According to recent assessments by the Israeli security agencies, approximately 300,000 residents (of roughly 1 m) have already evacuated to humanitarian areas. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will continue to facilitate evacuations from the city amid the impending ground operations. This will significantly elevate misidentification and security risks for personnel present within Gaza City in the coming weeks; attacks by militant elements along evacuation routes also remain possible.
• In the West Bank, the IDF will likely intensify its military operations in Tulkarm governorate following an increase in IED incidents. On 15 September, the IDF discovered an IED attached to a vehicle that had returned from operational activity in Tulkarm. This follows an earlier event on 11 September in which militants threw an IED towards an IDF vehicle close to the border fence in Tulkarm, lightly injuring two soldiers. Following these events, the IDF is likely to intensify its operations in the northern West Bank, particularly in Tulkarm. These operations will likely increase mobility disruption risks throughout the northern West Bank in the coming days, as well as the risk of sporadic armed confrontations between militants and IDF soldiers (in turn elevating security risks for personnel and assets).

RED SEA

• The latest round of US sanctions targeting the Iranian-backed Houthis will elevate compliance risks and regional tensions. On 11 September, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 32 individuals and entities, as well as four vessels, for sanctions. The move aims to clamp down on the Houthis’ illicit revenue and procurement networks, signalling elevated compliance risks for companies, particularly shipping companies with operations in the Red Sea. While the sanctions do not signal an imminent risk of US military action against the Houthis, they indicate increasing US efforts to degrade the group financially and militarily. Over the coming months, these efforts will exacerbate tensions between the Houthis and the US, in turn raising the likelihood of Houthi attacks targeting US vessels (and possible US military retaliation).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Developments

• Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) has issued travel warnings for Israeli and Jewish travellers ahead of several upcoming religious holidays, underscoring the threat of targeted harassment and violence. On 14 September, the NSC issued a warning for Israeli and Jewish individuals travelling overseas during the upcoming ‘High Holidays’ (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October) and the anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attacks. The warning underscores the NSC’s concerns that Iran, Iranian-backed groups and various jihadist terror organisations operating across the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa regions will possibly attempt to conduct high-profile attacks against Israeli nationals and Jewish individuals during this time. The warning also advises individuals not to post online footage of their military service and/or operational activity in the Palestinian Territories, reflecting the growing risks of harassment, doxxing, legal exposure and prosecution for war crimes facing Israeli nationals travelling to states where courts retain universal jurisdiction (such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK). In the coming months, Israeli and Jewish travellers will highly likely continue to face elevated risks of targeted harassment and violence, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey, though more moderate risks of physical and verbal harassment are also present in Europe and North America.
• A meeting of Arab and Islamic officials in Qatar will likely increase diplomatic tensions between Israel and its neighbouring states. Earlier on 15 September, Qatar hosted an emergency summit of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the capital Doha aimed at condemning Israel’s airstrike on Hamas officials in the city’s Katara district on 9 September. During the meeting, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the attack; the head of the OIC also called on the UN Security Council (UNSC) to hold Israel ‘to account’. The gathering underscores the rising diplomatic tensions between not only Israel and its neighbouring states, but also its regional allies such as the UAE, which maintains relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. The airstrike and its subsequent condemnation are likely to delay the normalisation of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and also to stall the future expansion of the Abraham Accords to states such as Lebanon and Syria. Claims by Chinese and Iranian state-affiliated media that the US knew of (and participated in) the 9 September attack in Doha are unlikely to undermine US regional co-operation significantly. However, they will possibly sustain anti-US rhetoric among populations already espousing elevated levels of anti-West sentiment, including Iraq, increasing the risk of protests, domestic unrest and hostility to foreign investment therein.
• A flotilla carrying prominent international activists departed Tunisia for Gaza earlier on 15 September, increasing security concerns for crew members and possible reputational risks for businesses operating in Israel. The pro-Palestine Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF) departed from Bizerte (Bizerte governorate, Tunisia). The flotilla aims to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza and includes at least 20 vessels carrying dozens of pro-Palestine activists, including the high-profile Greta Thunberg. Thunberg previously participated in a failed attempted to penetrate the blockade in June. In recent weeks, security incidents – including suspected drone attacks against vessels harboured in Sidi Bou Said (Tunis governorate, Tunisia) – have delayed the GSF’s departure. Israel will highly likely attempt to prevent the vessels from reaching Gaza by seizing them in international waters, detaining their occupants in Israel and deporting them to their home countries. However, given the scale of the flotilla, Israel’s naval forces will possibly employ more forceful interception tactics, especially if smaller vessels go undetected and enter waters in the immediate vicinity of Gaza. Such action would significantly increase the likelihood of serious and potentially fatal incidents involving flotilla vessels. In any such scenario, reputational risks for Israeli and Israeli-affiliated businesses would increase.
• Israel is highly unlikely to withdraw military from southern Syria in the short term despite the Syrian president’s announcement of ongoing discussions. On 12 September, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that talks are ongoing with Israel in an effort to secure a security agreement. Such an understanding would involve Israel withdrawing from areas in southern Syria, which it has occupied since the fall of the al-Assad regime in December 2024. Israel continued to conduct military operations in the days following the statement, including a ground operation in Syria’s south-western Daraa governorate on 14 September. It is highly unlikely that Israel will agree to conditions that require it to withdraw from southern Syria (particularly Quneitra governorate) in the short term. Rather, al-Sharaa’s announcement likely aims to serve as a demonstration of his diplomatic ability in front of a domestic audience at a time when sectarian violence and political instability are increasing in Syria. Israel will almost certainly seek to maintain its presence in southern Syria due to concerns over the potential build-up of Iranian proxies along the Israel-Syria border and the risk of political collapse within Syria’s central government (which would likely lead to further sectarian conflict and increased security risks in southern Syria).
• Syria: Delay in parliamentary elections will elevate domestic unrest risks. On 14 September, Nawar Najma, spokesperson for the Higher Judicial Committee for Elections, announced that parliamentary elections will be delayed and will take place by the end of September instead of between 15 and 20 September. Najma confirmed that the committee is currently reviewing membership in the electoral bodies and preparing to finalise their lists, after which the committee will release a timeline for the electoral process. The delay highlights complications with the chosen hybrid electoral process, amid criticisms of minority exclusion and vague eligibility criteria (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 September 2025). As such, there is a realistic possibility that the election process will extend beyond the end of September. While large protests are currently unlikely, we assess that an extension will increase the risks of irregularities in the voting process and domestic unrest, particularly in large cities and governorates with limited minority participation, such as Al-Hasakah, Raqqa and Suwayda governorates. This will also elevate risks of sectarian violence and excessive use of force by the authorities near protest locations, elevating security risks for personnel and assets.
• Turkey: Adjournment of ruling on opposition leadership will moderate domestic unrest risks. Earlier on 15 September, a civil court in the capital Ankara adjourned a ruling on whether to annul the opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) 2023 congress over alleged procedural irregularities until 24 October. The court ruling could remove Özgür Özel from the party’s leadership. The adjournment followed protests in Ankara on 14 September, in which tens of thousands of people called for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s resignation. The ruling’s adjournment will likely moderate domestic unrest risks in the short term, with demonstrations over the weekend likely fuelled by fears of Özel’s immediate removal. However, we assess that sporadic anti-government protests will likely persist in the lead-up to the ruling in October, particularly in Ankara and Istanbul (Istanbul province), heightening proximate bystander security threats. Ongoing political instability will likely continue to influence Turkey’s markets, increasing investor hesitation and reducing foreign direct investment. Visitor travel to Turkey will possibly decrease in the coming months as security concerns grow, exacerbating financial risks for the hospitality and tourism sectors. (Source: Sibylline)

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