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Military And Security Developments
Sep 26.
Risk Forecast Executive summary
- In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
- US President Donald Trump stated on 23 September that, with the support of the EU and NATO, Ukraine can win the war against Russia and retake all of its territory. While this is nominally a significant pivot in the US’ position, it remains our assessment that this shift is likely an attempt to pressure European states to increase their support for Ukraine, rather than signalling growing US involvement or a dramatic shift in policy that aims to step up Ukraine’s offensive capability. Our assessment is informed by the fact that just days beforehand, Trump conditioned further sanctions on Russia while also taking the unprecedented step of partially easing sanctions on Belarus’ main airline. This likely indicates that the Trump administration still favours economic reproachment with Russia rather than embroilment in Ukraine.
- This month witnessed an unprecedented incursion of at least 19 Russian drones into NATO territory overnight on 9-10 September. The incident marked the first time NATO forces had intercepted Russian assets since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; it led to Poland invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Charter to deliberate with allies on the ‘next steps’. Subsequent aerial incursions in Estonia and suspected Russian drone activity in Denmark point to a broader pattern that we have routinely forecast; these incidents are highly likely part of a broader Russian test of NATO’s responsiveness and cohesion as an alliance. Further tests and interceptions are likely in the coming month.
Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in October include the possible setting of a bill before the Danish parliament; its approval would empower airports and ports to shoot down drones, a measure that would then possibly spread across Europe.
Sep 24.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Across Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian forces are innovating their drone tactics, relying on cheaper drones to conduct reconnaissance, which will only increase the saturation of Ukraine’s defences with drones
• BUDGET: Russia’s finance ministry has proposed raising value-added tax (VAT) from 20% to 22% starting in 2026, as Ukraine’s strikes against Russia’s oil refining capability have likely impacted revenues
• BILL: Lawmakers from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ruling Servant of the People (SN) party have registered a bill that would likely undermine media freedom and impact due diligence procedures
• FORECAST: On 23 September, US President Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could reclaim all its territory from Russia with EU support, though this is unlikely to reflect a dramatic pivot in US policy towards ramping up military support for Kyiv
• BAKHMUT: Russian troops continue to slowly encroach towards Siversk (Donetsk oblast), likely attempting to accumulate forces to support further offensive efforts. Geolocated footage published on 23 September indicates that Russian forces have taken Pereizne (Donetsk oblast), a village located approximately six miles (9km) south of Siversk. Meanwhile, footage from 24 September also indicated Russian advances to the north-east, with forces slowly advancing towards the eastern outskirts of Siversk. On 24 September, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Siversk reported that Russian forces are currently trying to target Ukrainian drone launch positions with small infiltration groups. This Russian initiative includes attacks on motorcycles and the use of anti-thermal imaging cloaks, which are designed to hide the infantry from drone operators. However, Russia’s efforts to accumulate forces are facing limits along frontlines, with Ukrainian forces broadly able to identify any concentrations of troops before attacks take place. This situation is informing Russia’s reliance upon small infiltration groups.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have continued to make slow and minor advances to the south of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast); Ukrainian defences are holding for the time being, slowing Russia’s rate of advance. Geolocated footage from 23 and 24 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Nelipivka (Donetsk oblast), a village located around four miles (6.5km) south of Kostiantynivka. On 23 September, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps reported that nearby Russian forces are focusing on improving their logistics and on rotating naval infantry units, likely in preparation for future intensified assaults towards Kostiantynivka.
• DONETSK: Across Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian forces are innovating their drone tactics, relying on cheaper equipment to conduct reconnaissance. The commander of a Ukrainian drone-interceptor battery recently noted that Russia is increasingly deploying Gerbera drones (frequently used as Shahed drone decoys) equipped with cameras for reconnaissance purposes. According to this official, these drones are highly cost-effective compared with high-end reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Orlan, Superkam and ZALA products. This shift likely underscores Moscow’s continued efforts to adapt and develop cost-effective technology for the frontline; it also reflects the overall increase in production rates of larger drones, including Gerbera decoys.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces continue to rely on small infantry groups to penetrate deep into Ukrainian positions and disrupt logistical routes. There are also some indications that Russia is slightly increasing its use of armoured vehicles in the area. However, according to a military intelligence officer, Ukrainian drone operators systematically target such incursions. Russian forces have made confirmed advances within western Udachne (Donetsk oblast), located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kozatske (Kherson oblast), located to the east of Pokrovsk; they have also moved into eastern Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), a town to the south of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in the Dobropillia sector (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 23 September shows Ukrainian troops progressing into southern Novotoretske and southern Boikivka (both Donetsk oblast), both located to the south-east of Dobropillia. Meanwhile, Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces have withdrawn from Zapovidne (Donetsk oblast), also situated to the south-east of Dobropillia.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the direction of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), Russian forces have continued to make gains, but at a high cost as they rely on poorly trained and equipped units. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian unit has reported that Russian offensives in the sector were mostly conducted by small infantry units that launched ground assaults. Another military official noted that while Russia maintains a high offensive tempo in the area, Russian units’ exposure will soon increase as natural cover disappears with the coming of autumn. This will likely prompt the Russian command to adjust its tactics. Geolocated footage posted on 22 September shows recent Russian advances north of Derylove and east of Shandryholove (both Donetsk oblast), two villages located to the north-west of Lyman. Meanwhile, to the east of Lyman, Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances north of Torske (Donetsk oblast) at the time of writing.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Russian strikes in recent days have involved over a hundred drones per attack, accompanied by a variable number of missiles. These attacks have continued to target energy facilities, including in Kharkiv oblast on 24 September and in Vinnytsia oblast earlier on 25 September. Russia is highly likely to increasingly target energy infrastructure in the coming weeks, ahead of the heating season. Other targets have included civilian sites as well as a Ukrainian training ground, which was hit by Iskander-M ballistic missiles on 24 September. We previously reported that Russia had intensified strikes against training grounds and recruitment centres. This trend is likely to continue, as both sides are struggling to concentrate their forces without being identified and consequently struck by each other. In response to these strikes’ targets, Ukrainian officials have pledged to reinforce the protective infrastructure of energy and civilian facilities, though we continue to assess that these sites are likely to remain vulnerable.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has continued its strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. A significant target is the ‘8-N’ oil pipeline control station (Bryansk oblast), which is crucial for supplying fuel to Russian forces. Other targets that have been hit in recent days include pipeline infrastructure across Samara oblast, a Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat petrochemical plant in the Republic of Bashkortostan and oil pumping stations in Belgorod and Volgograd oblasts.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• BUDGET: On 24 September, Russia’s finance ministry proposed raising value-added tax (VAT) from 20% to 22% in 2026 as part of the country’s new three-year budget. The slight increase would generate an estimated RUB 1.3 trillion (USD 15.5 billion) in revenue annually. Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously promised that there would be no further tax increases before 2030. However, Russia’s federal budget deficit reached RUB 4.88 trillion (USD 61.1 billion) between January and July, surpassing the government’s target for the full year.
• BUDGET: Ukrainian drone attacks on oil refineries have likely hindered Russia’s ability to generate revenue. Reports from 23 September claimed that strikes have pushed Russian diesel exports close to their lowest levels since 2020. According to the Financial Times, Ukraine has struck 16 of Russia’s 38 refineries since the beginning of August, with some facilities hit multiple times. Despite worsening economic indicators, we continue to assess that the Russian economy is unlikely to be on the brink of collapse in the coming months. Similarly, our assessment remains that the Kremlin is willing to endure significant economic hardship to sustain the war effort; this includes raising taxes, which is unlikely to generate significant societal backlash.
• BILL: On 21 September, lawmakers from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ruling Servant of the People (SN) party and those from the opposition registered a bill that would likely undermine media freedom in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian investigative media outlet Bihus.Info, the proposed legislation increases legal liability for publications that could be considered ‘critical’. The bill also suggests automatically labelling information as false if it has not been confirmed by a court ruling. It would also allow individuals to seek ‘moral compensation’ for criticism if they feel their dignity or reputation has been harmed.
• BILL: Aside from the likely adverse impact on media freedom and investigative journalism if the bill passes, we assess that certain provisions would likely render it harder to conduct due diligence procedures in Ukraine. Lawmakers have suggested allowing the removal of content (even if factually correct) if it is deemed outdated or ‘no longer of public interest’; however, these terms are not defined in the bill. If members of Ukrainian society perceive that the legislation undermines free speech and is detrimental to Ukraine’s media climate and fight against corruption, this could realistically increase protest risks in the coming weeks and months. We assess that controversial legislation and corruption-related developments will likely be triggers for domestic unrest following large-scale protests in July.
• POLITICS: On 23 September, Politico reported that Ukraine’s Western allies have expressed concerns regarding Zelensky’s apparent efforts to centralise power. This is according to three European envoys in Kyiv, who said that such criticism has not been voiced publicly so that Russia cannot use it for propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, in an interview on 24 September, Zelensky refuted the concerns raised in Politico’s report and stated that Ukraine is prepared to hold elections, even during a ceasefire, if partners can guarantee they can be held securely. However, holding elections under a ceasefire would face a myriad of organisational and security obstacles. It would be difficult to organise voting for Ukrainian refugees abroad and almost impossible to ensure a fair voting environment for soldiers and civilians in Russian-occupied regions. The threat of Russian sabotage and other subversive activity, as well as renewed military aggression by Moscow, would also be very credible security concerns.
• POLITICS: Growing domestic and international pressure likely contributed to Zelensky stating that he is prepared to step down once the war is ended. He made the comments in an interview with Axios published on 25 September. However, while it remains highly unlikely that that war will end in the short-to-medium term, the prospects of elections also remain very low.
FORECAST
US: On 23 September, US President Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could reclaim all its territory from Russia with EU support. He made these remarks during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Later, on social media, Trump reiterated that financial support from the EU and NATO would enable Ukraine to retake its territory, as well as potentially to expand into Russia.
We assess that such statements are unlikely to signal a major shift in President Trump’s stance on the war. Increasing Ukraine’s offensive capability to that extent would entail an unprecedented and substantial increase in aid. Trump did not indicate whether the US itself would be prepared to increase its support for Ukraine, only that the US will continue to supply weapons to NATO for the military alliance to use as it sees appropriate. In any case, increasing military aid to Ukraine and committing to helping Kyiv regain all its land controlled by Russia would almost certainly face resistance from Ukraine-sceptic members of Trump’s support base. Rather, we assess that Trump will likely maintain a transactional approach to supporting Ukraine and will condition assistance on EU and NATO allies purchasing US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. More broadly, Trump’s remarks appear aimed at pressuring European countries to deepen their security commitments and support for Ukraine, rather than at signalling increased US involvement.
Media reports have claimed that Trump’s comments may have been influenced by recent briefings regarding the current battlefield and the promise of a possible Ukrainian offensive that would require US intelligence assistance. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported this on 24 September, citing two unspecified insiders familiar with the matter. US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz and the special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, were reportedly among the officials briefing Trump. The briefing reportedly emphasised Russia’s failure to make significant territorial gains despite staging large-scale offensives across multiple regions of Ukraine. We cannot confirm whether these briefings influenced Trump’s recent comment and, if so, to what extent; however, Trump disparaged Russia’s military capabilities on social media and called Russia a ‘paper tiger’. The US president described Russia as having ‘been fighting aimlessly for three-and-a-half years’, adding his opinion that ‘a real military power’ would have won the war in less than a week.
Trump is highly likely attempting to increase pressure on Russia to take steps to end the war by simultaneously praising Ukraine’s military capabilities and signalling that more support for Kyiv is possible. Trump has historically emphasised Russia’s military might; since returning to office, he has sought to improve relations between Moscow and Washington DC. This week’s comments mark the most recent apparent policy shift on Ukraine. On 24 September 2024, Trump criticised his predecessor Joe Biden’s public policy of supporting Ukraine in its pursuit to reclaim all its territory and praised Russia’s historic military record. Nevertheless, recent comments from officials within his administration indicate that Trump is growing more frustrated with the lack of progress towards resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war; this could realistically be pushing him to change strategy in his attempts to influence the war’s outcome.
On 24 September, US Vice President JD Vance stated that Trump is growing ‘incredibly impatient’ with Russia, as Moscow refuses to make sufficient steps towards ceasing hostilities. Vance’s comments echo remarks made on 23 September by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who said that Trump’s patience is ‘not infinite’ and that he has options for imposing new sanctions against Moscow. However, Trump and officials in his administration have made similar comments when the peace process appeared to have reached an impasse in recent months. Ultimately, unless the US follows through on Trump’s comments with clear policy changes (namely ramping up sanctions and increasing military aid), we assess that his statements are mostly rhetorical and an attempt to influence the Kremlin and to push European governments to step up support for Ukraine.
• Europe region-US-Russia: US support for NATO allies to defend airspace will sustain regional tensions. On 23 September, US President Donald Trump announced Russian aircraft should be shot down by NATO allies if they enter their airspace. His comments follow the recent uptick in Russian jet and drone incursions along NATO’s eastern flank in Estonia, Poland and Romania. Additionally, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has not ruled out Russian involvement in the drone activity that temporarily closed the capital’s Copenhagen Airport (CPH) on 22 September. During a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), President Trump stated that US military support for a NATO member state engaging with Russian aircraft due to an airspace incursion would ‘depend on the circumstance’. However, President Trump also expressed ‘strong’ support for NATO members’ commitment to increasing defence spending from 2% to 5% of their gross national product (GDP). These comments highlight the Trump administration’s current hardening of its stance against Russia. This posture will likely embolden NATO allies (particularly in the Baltic region) to strengthen their air defences and deterrence posture. While any engagement with Russian jets would spike regional tensions if Russia continues to test NATO’s eastern flank, we assess that a major open NATO-Russia war remains highly unlikely.
• Ukraine-US: US is unlikely to significantly shift aid posture towards Ukraine. On 23 September, US President Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could reclaim all of its territory from Russia with EU support. He made these remarks during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Later, on social media, Trump reiterated that EU-NATO financial support would enable Ukraine not only to retake its territory but potentially to expand into Russia. We assess that such statements are unlikely to signal a major shift in President Trump’s stance on the war, as it would entail an unprecedented and substantial increase in aid to Ukraine. Rather, President Trump is likely to maintain a transactional approach to supporting Ukraine, conditioning assistance on EU and NATO allies purchasing US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. This was illustrated by the recently delivered US military assistance to Ukraine, as reported on 18 September. More broadly, President Trump’s remarks appear aimed at pressuring European countries to deepen their security commitments and support for Ukraine, rather than at signalling a growing US involvement.
Sep 23.
Denmark-Norway: Drone incursions will continue to drive operational disruption risks for aviation. On 22 September, detected drone activity near Copenhagen Airport (CPH, Denmark) and Oslo Airport (OSL, Norway) caused significant disruption. At least two or three ‘larger’ drones were observed at CPH at 2030hrs (local time). The police believe that a ‘capable’ threat actor was behind the incident based on the drones’ sizes and flying patterns. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called the incident ‘the most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date’. In Norway, at least two drone sightings prompted the closure of OSL at around midnight. Both airports have since reopened. However, flight delays and cancellations are likely until the end of 23 September. While the incidents are under investigation, there is a realistic possibility that they are part of Russian grey zone operations. In recent weeks, there have been multiple Russia-linked NATO airspace incursions in Europe. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO countries in the Baltic and North Sea regions have reported multiple drone sightings over strategic areas. We assess that further such incidents are likely, increasing operational risks for critical infrastructure operators.
Ukraine: Russian groups’ co-operation underscores long-term cyber espionage risks to organisations
On 19 September, the Slovakian cyber security company ESET reported that two Russian state-sponsored groups (‘Turla’ and ‘Gamaredon’) collaborated in several cyber espionage operations against Ukrainian entities between February and April. In the earlier stages of this collaboration, Gamaredon reportedly infiltrated several organisations and deployed multiple malware payloads before handing over access to compromised systems to Turla. Turla then installed a backdoor (‘Kazuar’) on four occasions to maintain persistence and enable remote control for espionage purposes. In March, Gamaredon started deploying Kazuar without Turla’s intervention, likely showcasing the evolution of the groups’ tactics and co-operation. Gamaredon has conducted opportunistic cyber attacks against multiple sectors in Ukraine since at least 2013; Turla has focused on targeting entities elsewhere. Consequently, we assess that Turla’s participation in Gamaredon’s attacks underscores the continuous development of Russia’s cyber strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine. This will sustain security and cyber espionage risks to Ukrainian organisations amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Sep 22.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces likely currently enjoy a significant personnel and equipment advantage along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, where Russian forces have made steady gains in recent weeks
• STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 September, Russia launched a large strike package including eight Iskandr-M/KM-23 ballistic missiles, 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles and 579 drones
• SANCTIONS: On 19 September, the EU presented its 19th package of punitive measures against Russia, which includes plans to ban imports of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) a year earlier than originally planned
• FORECAST: Recent Russian provocations in the Baltic region likely indicate continued attempts to test the readiness and resolve of NATO’s eastern flank, despite Donald Trump’s latest assurances that he would support eastern states
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 18 and 19 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the south of Oleksandro-Shultyne, a village located under four miles (6km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast).
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from recent days shows that Russian forces advanced in and to the west of Novoekonomichne, a highly contested town located to the north-east of Pokrovsk (both Donetsk oblast). We previously reported that Ukrainian forces had regained control of the settlement, after Russian forces initially held it in July. The latest developments suggest that the settlement remains highly contested, with Russia intensifying efforts to recapture it. Novoekonomichne is a tactically important satellite town for Russian operations surrounding Pokrovsk; its recapture would place significant pressure on Pokrovsk’s north-eastern flank. A Ukrainian military source operating in the area also confirmed that Russia has expanded its range of drone attacks in the area, adding significant pressure to Ukrainian defensive operations.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued to make gains around Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) while conducting infiltration attempts against Ukrainian defensive positions in the city. On 21 September, a prominent Ukrainian military observer reported that Russia had captured Kindrashivka, located to the north of Kupiansk. The observer stated that Russian troops were leveraging their numerical advantage to launch numerous infiltration attempts towards Kupiansk from several directions. While Russian forces are struggling to transfer heavy equipment across the Oskil River, they reportedly face no such difficulties in moving personnel.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have made tactical gains in recent days to the south towards Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 19 September shows Russian troops advancing along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in the Serebrianske forest area, to the south-east of Lyman. Footage from 20 September indicates further Russian gains in eastern Shandryholove, located to the north-west of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 20 September indicates that Russian forces have seized Berezove (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), a village located 15.5 miles (25km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian sources also reported on 21 September that Russian forces have taken Sichneve, located around six miles (10km) to the north-east of Berezove (both Dnipropetrovsk oblast), along the border with Donetsk oblast.
• SOUTHERN: A prominent Ukrainian milblogger with connections to the Ukrainian High Command assessed on 21 September that Russian forces likely currently enjoy a significant personnel and equipment advantage along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, where Russian forces have made steady gains in recent weeks. According to military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets, nearby Russian forces have three to four battalions for every Ukrainian defence battalion, though this ratio can increase to five or six battalions for each Ukrainian battalion in certain areas. This is reportedly impacting Ukraine’s ability to maintain an effective and continuous defensive line in the area, forcing Ukraine to focus on strongpoints, leaving what could prove to be significant gaps. We assess that similar dynamics exist elsewhere across frontlines, but that Russia’s steady gains on the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border likely indicate its advantage is sufficient to enable further advances.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 September, Russia launched a large strike package including eight Iskandr-M/KM-23 ballistic missiles, 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles and 579 drones. Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted 552 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), two ballistic missiles and 29 cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the attack targeted Dnipro City (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), where a missile equipped with cluster munitions reportedly struck a residential building. Other targeted oblasts included Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia. Earlier on 22 September, Russia conducted a smaller similar strike. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the attack targeted, among other sites, the Boryspil Reinforced Concrete Plant (Kyiv oblast). While Ukrainian sources have not corroborated damage to these facilities, we continue to assess that Russian forces will target businesses they deem associated with Ukraine’s war effort, including civilian-produced dual-use products and service providers.
• STRIKES: Ukraine continued to heavily strike Russia and Russian-occupied regions, reflecting Ukraine’s sustained capability to hit Russia’s rear. Russian authorities have reported the interception of 114 UAVs overnight on 21-22 September. The drones were shot down over Astrakhan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Rostov, Volgograd, Voronezh and Yaroslavl oblasts as well as Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea. In Krasnodar Krai, the attack caused a fire at an electrical substation. Previously, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that it struck two Be-12 ‘Chaika’ aircraft and one Mi-8 helicopter in occupied Crimea on 21 September. This is the first time that Ukraine has struck Be-12 aircraft, of which Russia retains only a small number. While old and designed for a different age of naval warfare (being from the 1960s), the Be-12s have likely played an important role in conducting maritime patrols and protecting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine’s uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NUCLEAR: Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed extending the only remaining nuclear treaty between Russia and the US for another year. President Putin made the offer earlier on 22 September as Russia’s Security Council convened for a meeting. President Putin said that prolonging the New Strategic Arms Reduction treaty (‘New START’), which is set to expire on 5 February 2026, would help maintain a ‘reasonable degree of predictability and restraint’. However, he stated that an extension would only be possible if the US reciprocates and refrains from actions that ‘would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence’. President Putin’s offer almost certainly aims to appeal to US President Donald Trump’s eagerness to make deals and be perceived as a peacemaker. The proposal also shows Russia’s attempts to negotiate and engage with the US on various issues outside of efforts to end the war in Ukraine, which President Trump has sought to resolve since resuming the presidency with limited success.
• SANCTIONS: On 19 September, the EU presented its 19th package of punitive measures against Russia, which includes plans to ban imports of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) a year earlier than originally planned. The EU seeks a full prohibition of Russian LNG supplies by January 2027, full transaction bans for Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Rosneft, as well as additional sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet. Previously, member states had aimed to phase out imports of Russian gas and oil by 2028, though the US has made its tightening of sanctions pressure conditional on the EU ending energy dependency on Russia. While Hungary and Slovakia will likely oppose the new sanctions, delaying the timeframe for their implementation, the EU will possibly incentivise them to eventually approve the measures.
• ASSETS: On 19 September, a bipartisan group of US senators introduced a bill to send frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. The Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Implementation Act 2.0 envisions sending at least USD 250 m worth of frozen Russian assets held in the US to Ukraine every 90 days. The legislation would also seek to encourage the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to persuade foreign allies to repurpose at least 5% (approximately USD 15 bn) in Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine’s benefit every 90 days. The majority of frozen Russian assets are held in Europe; in December 2024, the US previously gave USD 20 bn to Ukraine funded by the profits of seized Russian assets.
• ASSETS: The legislation would provide a way for the US to assist Ukraine without having to pay for such support, which would possibly make the bill more appealing to some Republicans sceptical about aiding the country. As the REPO Act 2.0 has bipartisan support and is based on previous legislation passed in 2024, this renders it more likely to pass in Congress. However, it is ultimately uncertain when the bill could be voted as it is unlikely in the near term. We assess that any such move to use frozen Russian funds will highly likely increase the prospect of Russia retaliating and seizing Western assets.
FORECAST
INCURSION: Recent Russian provocations in the Baltic region likely indicate continued attempts to test the readiness and resolve of NATO’s eastern flank. On 19 September, three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets entered Estonian airspace over uninhabited Vaindloo island (Lääne-Viru county) in the Gulf of Finland and remained there for 12 minutes. Separately, on 21 September, two German Eurofighter jets intercepted a Russian IL-20 reconnaissance aircraft flying unidentified over the Baltic Sea.
Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) denied violating Estonia’s airspace, though the growing trend of Russian airspace violations and the nature of the incident suggest that it was a deliberate incursion. According to the Russian MoD, the aircraft were conducting a routine flight from Russia’s Republic of Karelia (which borders Finland) to an airfield in Kaliningrad oblast, an exclave bordering Lithuania and Poland. Russia asserts that the jets flew over neutral waters in the Baltic Sea just under two miles (around 3km) from Vaindloo island. However, Estonia has disclosed that the jets did not have flight plans, had turned their transponders off and that the pilots did not communicate with air traffic control. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stated on 19 September that Russia has violated Estonia’s airspace four times in 2025, but described the most recent incursion as ‘unprecedentedly brazen’. We assess that the pilots’ conduct highly likely reaffirms that Russia sought to gauge the response of Estonia and the broader NATO alliance, as well as possibly to test escalation thresholds
The UN Security Council (UNSC) will convene later on 22 September to discuss the recent breach of Estonia’s airspace, though its response will highly likely be limited and will not deter further Russian action. Poland similarly requested an emergency meeting after Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace overnight on 9-10 September (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 September 2025). As a permanent member of the UNSC, Russia would be able to veto any hypothetical resolution on this matter. Estonia, like Poland, has invoked NATO’s Article 4 after the airspace incursion. However, as this provision enables holding consultations if a member state feels that the ‘territorial integrity, political independence or security’ of any member is believed to be under threat, Russia will highly unlikely be deterred by this move. Nevertheless, NATO’s North Atlantic Council will meet on 23 September to discuss the incident.
Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur claimed that the incident showed NATO was ready to respond with force as ‘the last resort’, though such a consensus within the alliance would be highly unlikely. NATO decisions require consensus, and there are Russia-friendly and Ukraine sceptic (Hungary and Slovakia) member states, while other members would be concerned about the risk of escalation. Nevertheless, such messaging is highly likely aimed at signalling strength and willingness to act in order to deter Russia from engaging in similar activity in the coming weeks and months. We continue to assess that Russia does not want a direct military confrontation with NATO at present, especially given its military embroilment in Ukraine. Rather, it is highly likely seeking to use such tests and violations to achieve its broader geostrategic objectives of pressuring NATO and increasing the threshold for escalation by effectively normalising such incursions, thereby undermining the alliance’s ability to respond to future (potentially more serious) incidents.
President Trump said that he would help Baltic countries and Poland if Russia continues to escalate provocations in the region, though it remains to be seen what action (if any) the US would take in the future. President Trump also appeared to express concern about escalation and warned that repeated incidents could ‘be big trouble’. However, this condemnation has not assuaged concerns among European partners. President Trump has threatened to sanction Russia numerous times since resuming the presidency, but failed to increase such pressure to encourage President Putin to end the war. Meanwhile, an unspecified White House official disclosed earlier in September that the US will end a long-standing security programme for countries bordering Russia. Ultimately, such precedents have highly likely caused doubts about the Trump administration’s willingness to support European partners in the face of growing Russian grey zone provocations.
On 20 September, Bloomberg cited numerous unnamed ‘people close to the Kremlin’ as claiming that President Putin is convinced that military escalation is the best way to force Ukraine to agree to talks favourable to Russia. According to these sources, the Alaska summit left President Putin convinced that President Trump has no interest in intervening in the conflict. Bloomberg assessed this approach in relation to Russia’s escalation of its strike campaign inside Ukraine (which has notably intensified in recent months, despite Trump’s efforts at diplomatic engagement). However, it remains likely that President Putin also views a limited and graduated escalation outside of Ukraine as to be in his interests, as illustrated by Russia’s recent actions.
It remains our assessment that Russia’s recent drone and aircraft incursions are in part testing US and European assurances to enforce NATO territorial sovereignty, which will help Moscow determine what assistance the US in particular would be willing to provide European states during a potential future escalation with Russia. While we continue to assess that Russia does not seek open war with NATO, it will highly likely continue to test its boundaries through grey zone operations below the threshold of war with the aim of raising that threshold with every such action against the alliance. Therefore, Russia will highly likely continue testing NATO’s eastern flank for the foreseeable future until such a time when either it is persuaded that the alliance will respond (thereby deterring further action), or that further action could weaken NATO and improve Russia’s future room for manouevre in eastern Europe.
• Estonia: Russian airspace incursion likely amounts to further testing of NATO response, readiness. On 19 September, three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets entered Estonian airspace near Vaindloo island (Lääne-Viru county), located in the Gulf of Finland, without permission. The incursion lasted approximately 12 minutes; according to Estonian defence forces, the jets were intercepted by Italian F-35 fighter jets based in Ämari (Harjumaa county) as part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. While unauthorised Russian aerial incursions occur on a semi-regular basis in the Baltic region, there has been a notable uptick in recent weeks. Alongside the unprecedented Polish airspace incursion by at least 19 Russian drones on 10 September (see Sibylline Alert – 10 September 2025), two German Eurofighter jets intercepted a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft flying unidentified over the Baltic Sea on 21 September. NATO’s North Atlantic Council will reportedly meet on 23 September to discuss Russia’s violation of Estonian airspace, which likely reflects enhanced Russian testing of NATO’s readiness and responses. We assess that an elevated NATO presence along its eastern flank is unlikely to deter further Russian grey zone activity in the coming months, sustaining the risk of temporary airspace closures and spikes in tensions as Russia continues to test the alliance.
• Ukraine: External financial assistance will remain crucial for long-term socio-economic resilience. On 19 September, Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko stated that Ukraine’s foreign financing needs under a new four-year programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) amount to between USD 150 and 170 bn. However, the IMF reportedly warned that Ukraine’s requirements appear to be between USD 10 and 20bn over the government’s estimate of USD 37.5 bn per year. These discrepancies have emerged as the IMF and Ukraine negotiate external financing needs for the years 2026 and 2027. Previously, the IMF urged Ukraine to raise taxes in order to increase revenues and to curb the shadow economy, which accounts for around 30% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Meanwhile, European partners are considering loan mechanisms backed by frozen Russian assets to offer Ukraine financial support, but several EU member states remain opposed to this idea. As Ukraine’s state revenues are primarily allocated to defence spending, the country continues to rely heavily on external financial support for other government expenditures. We assess that securing international financing will remain essential for Ukraine’s socio-economic outlook, particularly as the war is likely to continue in the long term.
• Moldova: Searches indicate elevated threat of Russian destabilisation before parliamentary elections. Earlier on 22 September, law enforcement officers conducted over 250 searches as part of an investigation into suspected preparations by Russian-linked entities aiming to carry out ‘mass riots and destabilisation’. According to Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate (IGP), law enforcement personnel conducted searches at the homes of individuals suspected of being involved in such preparations, as well as unspecified prisons. Igor Dodon, the former Moldovan president and current leader of the pro-Russia Socialist Party (PSRM), claimed that unspecified ‘colleagues’ in northern Moldova were targeted. The development comes ahead of parliamentary elections on 28 September, which will highly likely represent a flashpoint for Russian destabilisation efforts. Although limited and mostly non-violent pro-Russia protest activity is likely around the electoral period, we assess that the likelihood of large-scale riots is lower. The authorities will almost certainly remain proactive at identifying any potential Russian-linked destabilisation activity, though their resilience in fully countering such threats is limited. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Sep 25. Ukraine claim to liberate area around Pokrovsk despite Russian offensive. It is said that 160 sq km have been liberated, and over 170 sq km have been cleared of Russian forces.
• President of Ukraine says 160 square kilometres liberated in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia areas.
• Russian losses since the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive – in the Pokrovsk area alone, in these past weeks – are already more than 2,500.
• The counteroffensive checks Russian land grab ahead of future negotiations.
In a visit to the Donetsk region on 18 September 2025, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was briefed on the claimed success of Ukrainian military units stalling the Russian offensive, and even liberating a swathe of territory in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia areas.
The head of state presented awards to personnel on the frontlines for their achievements in battle. “The fighting is intense,” Zelenskyy said, “but we have inflicted significant losses on the Russians.”
Not only had Ukrainian military units stalled the Russian offensive in this long-contested locale, but since the start of the operation, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine has liberated 160 square kilometers (sq km) and over 170 sq km have been cleared of Russian forces entirely.
This area of the frontline in North West Donetsk formed a salient between the strategic cities of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad since the fall of Avdiivka early last year.
According to open source intelligence, Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on 18 September but did not make confirmed advances. Notwithstanding the the Russian force presence around the city, which is reportedly the largest since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
In this specific area, Zelenskyy stated that Russian losses since the start of this counteroffensive – in the Pokrovsk area alone, in the past few weeks – are already more than 2,500, of which over 1,300 Russians have been killed.
This loss of manpower remains a fundamental problem for the occupying forces. Both Ukraine and the UK claim that Russia has sustained more than one m combat casualties in the war, with London stating Russian military casualties in 2025 was in excess of 260,000 personnel.
In the backdrop of the Russian offensive, after the US-Russia summit in Alaska at the end of August, the Kremlin has dismissed the possibility of an early meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy, for which Trump has been pressing, as Russia tries to push the boundary as far as possible before coming to the negotiating table. (Source: army-technology.com)
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