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Military And Security Developments
Sep 18.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has stated that Russia is preparing for ‘two more heavy offensive campaigns’ this autumn
- STRIKES: Russian strikes over recent days have included relatively small barrages, including against railway infrastructure, with the largest attack on 17 September involving 172 drones
- DRILLS: Joint Belarus-Russia military drills (‘Zapad-2025’) concluded on 16 September without resulting in a significant provocation to neighbouring NATO countries, following the drone incursions into Poland
- FORECAST: The first batch of US military assistance for Ukraine under President Donald Trump’s administration, funded by allies, has arrived in Ukraine; aid packages will likely include air defence systems and missiles
- OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 16 September that Russia is preparing for ‘two more heavy offensive campaigns’ this autumn. While he did not provide details of where and when such operations could be launched, it remains likely that Russian offensive operations will continue throughout the autumn and into the winter, despite worsening weather conditions. There has been a shift away from mechanised and armoured assaults, towards dismounted infantry, infiltration and all-terrain vehicle (ATV) operations supported by drones. As such, ground conditions are less significant than earlier phases of the war; however, they will remain significant to logistics and both sides’ ability to rapidly reinforce areas of the frontline.
- OFFENSIVES: In the meantime, Ukrainska Pravda, citing two unnamed sources in the Ukrainian military, stated that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi had removed two army corps commanders. The commanders of the 17th and 20th corps had overseen defensive operations in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, where Russian forces have made slow but steady gains over the last two months. No official reason for their removal has been provided; however, there is a realistic possibility that they were removed due to their inability to prevent Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk oblast – which remains one of the few areas of the frontline in which Russian forces are slowly advancing at a regular pace. Ukrainian defences on this axis are likely less well-prepared than those on other, more long-lasting frontlines, which could realistically provide further opportunity for slow but steady Russian advances in the coming months.
- BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 16 September indicates that the Russians have continued to make modest advances in the south-eastern suburban outskirts of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, to the north-east around Chasiv Yar (Donetsk), footage from 15 and 16 September indicates that Russian and Ukrainian forces respectively advanced to the south-west of Chasiv Yar, suggesting that the south-western outskirts remain contested.
- DONETSK: Zelensky claimed earlier on 18 September that Ukrainian forces have retaken 60 square miles (160 sq km) in eastern Donetsk oblast during an ongoing ‘counteroffensive operation’. Zelensky reported that seven settlements have been retaken in the Dobropillia-Pokrovsk area – where the most intense fighting has taken place in recent weeks. We cannot confirm the precise amount of territory retaken; however, Ukrainian forces have been launching counter-attacks and pushing the Russians back since the tactical penetration east of Dobropillia resulted in Russia struggling to consolidate its position. In the meantime, on 15 September, a Ukrainian source claimed the recapture of Pankivka, located to the east of Dobropillia. Russian sources acknowledged this and the intense fighting taking place in the settlement, claiming it remains a grey zone area.
- DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 17 September shows that Russian forces recently captured Troyanda, located immediately to the south of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian military source operating in the sector noted that Russian command is committing significant troops to the area and has redeployed units from Kursk oblast and other operational areas. The source also reported that Russia is launching assaults supported by armoured vehicles on the eastern flank of Myrnohrad, located to the east of Pokrovsk.
- KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
- KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
- OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have expanded their presence within Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage from recent days shows that Russian forces have advanced in central Kupiansk. The push is from north of the town, possibly indicating that Russian forces have been able to transform their initial infiltration of the city into a more tactical offensive. Nonetheless, Ukrainian military sources operating in the area note that Russian troops are operating in small infantry groups that are poorly trained and equipped and are incurring heavy losses. In recent days, Russian forces have also made confirmed advances within Stepova Novoselivka, located to the south-east of Kupiansk.
- SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 15 September indicates that Russian forces have seized Olhivkse (Zaporizhzhia oblast), a village located around 15 miles (25km) to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Footage from 16 September similarly indicates Russian advances to the north, in the eastern sector of Novoivanivka, located 16 miles (26km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka. Novoivanivka notably sits on the main road between Velyka Novosilka and Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast); further advances westward would likely support further consolidation of the ground that Russian forces have taken inside neighbouring Dnipropetrovsk oblast as well.
- STRIKES: Russian strikes over recent days have included relatively small barrages, including against railway infrastructure, with the largest attack on 17 September involving 172 drones. The attack targeted railway infrastructure, causing delays to passenger trains in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported that Russia has intensified strikes against railway infrastructure since July. These strikes typically target power substations linked to railway infrastructure, locomotive depots and passenger stations. Such attacks mirror Ukraine’s strikes on similar Russian infrastructure and are aimed at degrading Ukraine’s ability to transport military equipment and reinforcements to frontline areas. The attacks also cause significant disruption for civilians, increasing logistical hurdles and undermining supply chains.
- STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russian oil producers are facing mounting operational pressure due to increasingly frequent Ukrainian strikes on oil processing infrastructure. In recent days, Ukrainian forces have continued attacks on oil infrastructure in Russia, targeting the Saratov oil refinery (Saratov oblast) on 16 September and a Gazprom oil plant in the Republic of Bashkortostan earlier on 18 September. On 16 September, Reuters reported that Russia’s oil pipeline monopoly Transneft is considering cutting oil output following Ukrainian drone strikes against strategic export ports and refineries. This information was shared with the media outlet by three industry sources; however, Transneft dismissed such reports, claiming they were Western disinformation.
- STRIKES: We previously reported on the increasing frequency of Ukrainian drone strikes against oil infrastructure since August. Such attacks have repeatedly targeted prominent refineries and are increasingly impacting oil output, causing fuel shortages in various regions. We assess that the Kremlin will prioritise exports due to their importance for state revenues; production cuts will mostly affect the domestic market.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- DRILLS: Joint Belarus-Russia military drills (‘Zapad-2025’) concluded on 16 September without resulting in a significant provocation to neighbouring NATO countries, following the drone incursions into Poland. The exercises were significantly scaled back compared to the last iteration in 2021, which had involved up to 200,000 personnel, likely due to Russia’s manpower and resource needs to sustain the Ukraine war. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Defence (MoD), around 7,000 troops were involved in the Zapad-2025 exercises – 6,000 of which were Belarusian personnel and 1,000 Russian soldiers. We previously assessed that an attack against a NATO member state or renewed invasion into northern Ukraine was highly unlikely during these exercises.
- DRILLS: The attendance of US officials at the Zapad-2025 exercises was particularly notable as it marks the first known presence of its kind at Russian military drills in recent years. The US Pentagon confirmed on 16 September that incoming and outgoing US defence attachés in the Belarusian capital Minsk had observed the drills the day prior. The Pentagon also disclosed that the US embassy in Minsk had accepted the invitation following recent ‘productive bilateral engagements’ between Belarus and the US. The presence of US observers at the drills further reflects the growing rapprochement between Belarus and the US, as evidenced by recent limited sanctions relief (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 September 2025). However, the US’ presence at these exercises will highly likely reinvigorate concerns among NATO member states bordering Belarus and Russia about the US’ commitment to aiding their security, particularly as the exercises took place days after Russian drone incursions into neighbouring Poland.
- TREATIES: On 17 September, the Ukrainian parliament ratified a 100-year partnership agreement with the UK. The treaty consists of ten main pillars, which are largely military and security-focused. These include strengthening defence capabilities, supporting Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO and maritime security partnership. According to the Ukrainian parliament, the treaty outlines that the UK will allocate at least GBP 3.6 billion (USD 4.9 billion) in military aid annually until the fiscal year 2030/2031 and thereafter as needed. The agreement includes other elements related to cultural, economic and energy co-operation. The UK parliament has yet to ratify the document but will almost certainly do so. This treaty underscores London’s willingness to be a crucial partner to Kyiv in the long term, especially amid concerns about traditional allies’ commitments to ensuring Kyiv’s long-term security. While the treaty does not represent a security guarantee, we assess that the UK is among the European states that are most likely to commit to Ukrainian security for the coming decades.
- POLITICS: A long-time associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin who had opposed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resigned, likely illustrating the consolidation of a pro-war consensus within the Kremlin. Russian news outlet RBC reported on 17 September that Dmitry Kozak will leave his position as the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff to possibly move into the private sector. Earlier in August, The New York Times reported that Kozak had lost his influence with President Putin because of his belief that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine had been a mistake. Kozak also reportedly presented the Russian president with a proposal to stop the war and hold peace negotiations and suggested outlines for domestic reforms earlier this year. It remains unclear whether opposition to the war was a driving factor in Kozak’s resignation. Nevertheless, we assess that Kozak’s departure from the Kremlin will likely consolidate support for continuing the war across the Russian state.
FORECAST
AID: The first batch of US military assistance for Ukraine under President Donald Trump’s administration, funded by allies, has arrived in Ukraine. Ukrainian media reported details of its arrival earlier on 18 September, citing an unspecified NATO representative. Until now, the Trump administration had only sold weapons to Ukraine or shipped military assistance that was approved under the former president, Joe Biden. The new initiative, the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), pools contributions from NATO members and allows them to purchase US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit.
President Zelensky disclosed on 17 September that Ukraine will receive missiles for Patriot air defence systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) in the first tranche of support. According to reports, the first two aid packages are worth USD 500 million each. Ukraine has so far secured over USD 2 billion for new weapons under the new mechanism, though Zelensky expects the total committed funds to reach USD 3.5 billion in October. Besides air defence support, it remains unclear which other forms of military assistance Ukraine could realistically receive in the near term. Nevertheless, air defences are crucial for protecting Ukrainian urban centres and infrastructure from Russian long-range strikes. The total number of air defence missiles Ukraine is set to receive remains uncertain, but the deliveries will likely moderately strengthen Ukraine’s strained air defence network.
Meanwhile, European governments are reportedly looking at how they can further expand the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine, with Germany said to be increasingly willing to use these funds. Bloomberg reported on 17 September that Berlin’s interest has grown, largely due to concerns that Germany would be expected to be Ukraine’s key supporter if US support wanes. These concerns are likely connected to the fact that Germany is Europe’s largest economy and the second-largest contributor of military assistance to Ukraine after the US (as per the Kiel Institute). While the outright confiscation of Russian frozen assets will remain unlikely in the short term due to legal issues, the EU is also reportedly considering options to access these funds for Ukraine. Nevertheless, any attempts to use frozen funds will highly likely increase the risk of Russia seizing Western assets in retaliation, which has already occurred several times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
Besides developments related to aiding Ukraine, the EU is seeking to increase pressure on Russia by expediting efforts to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Russian energy. On 16 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen disclosed plans to speed up the phaseout of Russian fossil fuel imports. Under its current plan, the bloc aims to end the import of Russian gas and oil entirely by the end of 2027; von der Leyen did not specify a potential new timeframe for abandoning Russian energy. Her suggestion followed a call with US President Donald Trump, who recently stated that Europe should cease purchasing Russian oil before the US placed new sanctions on Russia.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on 15 September that Washington DC will not impose new tariffs on Chinese goods to stop Beijing from purchasing Russian oil unless European countries first adopt their own measures. The US’ growing calls for European partners to increase sanctions have highly likely influenced the EU’s own sanctions agenda. For instance, Bloomberg reported on 16 September that the EU had delayed its 19th sanctions package, though the bloc will possibly present the new measures to member states as early as 19 September, according to new reports. As per Bloomberg, the EU is still considering imposing sanctions on companies in China and India that handle Russian oil, as part of its latest tranche of punitive measures. Although this would likely gain more support from member states than steep tariffs against China and India, given the importance of relations with these two countries, full agreement on such action is highly unlikely. However, it remains to be seen whether EU sanctions on Chinese and Indian companies would be sufficient for the US to increase sanctions pressure against Russia.
Sep 17.
- Ukraine: Russian strikes against railway will highly likely cause travel, supply chain disruptions. Earlier on 17 September, Russian forces struck railway infrastructure, causing delays to passenger trains in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts. The state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported delays to 46 trains. Ukrzaliznytsia head Oleksandr Pertsovskyi noted that Russia has intensified its attacks on railway infrastructure since July. While frontline regions such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts have been targeted, other regions, including Odesa and the more central Vinnytsia oblast, have also been affected. The strikes typically target power substations linked to railway infrastructure, locomotive depots and passenger stations. These attacks mirror Ukraine’s strikes on similar Russian infrastructure and are aimed at degrading Ukraine’s ability to transport military equipment and reinforcements to frontline areas. The attacks also cause significant disruption for civilians, increasing logistical hurdles and undermining supply chains. We assess that, despite contingency measures, repairs to critical railway infrastructure will likely be time-consuming and resource-intensive.
Sep 15.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made a series of advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border region north-west of Velyka Novosilka
- SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump has stated that he is ready to increase sanctions against Russia once NATO countries stop purchasing Russian oil, as he partially lifted sanctions on Belarus – a significant precedent
- NEGOTIATIONS: The Kremlin has stated that negotiations between Russia and Ukraine aimed at ending the war have ‘paused’
- FORECAST: NATO has announced the establishment of a new mission to bolster the alliance’s posture on its eastern flank after the unprecedented incursion of Russian drones into Poland, amid uncertainty over US commitment
- OFFENSIVES: Earlier on 15 September, the satellite internet provider Starlink confirmed a global outage of its service, impacting both Ukrainian and Russian forces that rely upon Starlink terminals for battlefield communications. Ukraine is more reliant upon Starlink than Russia, indicating that the temporary outage will likely have had a more significant impact on defensive operations. Nevertheless, Russian sources have also commented on their forces’ reliance upon Starlink; the prominent Russian source Rybar claimed that the outage impacted Russian forces for approximately thirty minutes.
- BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 13 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the south-eastern suburban outskirts of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast) for the first time. Russian forces have advanced along the O-0519 road that hugs the Naumykha River and are now operating in the city’s suburbs, though they have yet to reach the city proper.
- BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further to the west, geolocated footage from 12 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced south-east of the village of Sofiivka, located around 13 miles (21km) to the west of Kostiantynivka. These small advances continue to mutually reinforce advances towards Kostiantynivka in the east and the stabilisation of Russia’s salient north-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast); the latter remains vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-attacks, despite weeks of attempts to consolidate the area.
- BAKHMUT: A Russian source claimed on 12 September that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones have attacked Kramatorsk (Donetsk oblast) for the first time, indicating the ever-expanding range of Russian drones. While we cannot confirm this, it would be in line with wider indications that Russian forces have deployed FPVs at ever-greater ranges, threatening to bring much of the fortress belt of cities (including Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk) within drone range. Meanwhile, glide bomb attacks against Kramatorsk and other cities in the area remain heavy; reports from a Ukrainian brigade soldier indicate that Sofiivka alone was attacked by glide bombs 20 times in one day.
- DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have continued to launch multi-directional assaults against Pokrovsk, sustaining a high offensive tempo. On 14 September, a Ukrainian military spokesperson reported that Russian forces carried out a record number of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction last week. On 12 September, a Ukrainian unit operating in the sector noted that Russian forces were increasing pressure south of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Russian milbloggers reported that Russia has continued efforts to capture Krasnyi Lyman and Rodynske, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, as part of a broader attempt to encircle Myrnohrad, located immediately to the north-east of the city. Geolocated footage published on 14 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced in the fields east of Kozatske, situated to the east of Pokrovsk.
- DONETSK: Meanwhile, further to the north-east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces have continued to clear Russian positions near Dobropillia, where Russian troops conducted a penetration in August. The 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, known as ‘Azov’, which was deployed in the area to contain Russian advances, is reportedly retaking previously held territory. Earlier on 15 September, the unit reported the recapture of Pankivka, located to the east of Dobropillia.
- KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
- KURSK-SUMY: On 12 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russia’s offensive in Sumy oblast has been ‘completely thwarted’. Both Ukrainian and Russian sources continue to report on heavy fighting at various points along the northern Sumy line; however, Russian forces have made very little progress over the last two months, marking a notable reduction in the tempo of assaults and rate of advance compared to in the spring. Over the last week, additional Russian sources have reported a reduction in the number of relatively elite Russian forces, including naval infantry and airborne units, as well as elite Rubikon drone units; this indicates that Sumy has been deprioritised by the Russian High Command. Russian sources have also claimed that their forces in the area are struggling to fulfil orders due to reduced troop numbers, including the seizure of Yunakivka, which is reportedly the primary objective of Russian forces on this axis.
- OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk sector, Russian forces continue to rely on infiltration tactics to penetrate the town. On 12 September, Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group DeepState reported that Russian troops had infiltrated Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) via a gas pipeline from Lyman Pershyi, located to the north-east of the town. Russian forces reportedly reached Radkivka, on Kupiansk’s northern outskirts, and established positions for drone pilots within the town. The use of the pipeline reflects similar tactics employed earlier this year during Russia’s offensive to recapture Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk oblast. DeepState reported that Russian forces have continued to operate in Kupiansk as of 13 September, though Ukrainian forces have reportedly regained control of the pipeline’s exit.
- OSKIL-KREMINNA: Further south, Russian forces have also advanced in the Lyman sector (Donetsk oblast), where they are increasingly applying infiltration tactics. Geolocated footage posted on 11 September indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Stavky, located to the north of Lyman. Various Ukrainian military sources operating in the Lyman direction have reported on Russia’s growing reliance on infiltration tactics in the area.
- SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made a series of advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border region north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). Geolocated footage from 11 September in particular indicates a number of advances, including the seizure of Khoroshe, Oleksandrohrad, Sosnivka and Vorone, all located around 12 miles (20km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Geolocated footage from 12 and 13 September also indicates that Russian forces have seized Novomykolaivka and Ternove, located to the south of the villages mentioned above. While much of the frontline remains contested, these advances reflect Russian forces’ steady rate of advance into Dnipropetrovsk, though Ukrainian counter-attacks to the north along the Vovcha River continue to limit the rate of Russian advances south-west of Pokrovsk.
- SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, at the extreme western flank of the Zaporizhzhia axis, geolocated footage from 14 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into eastern Stepnohirsk, located approximately 15 miles (25km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
- STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have involved relatively smaller attacks, though Russian drones violated the airspace of NATO member Romania on 13 September (see FORECAST). Attacks in recent days have typically involved limited numbers of missiles and have continued to target Ukrainian infrastructure sites, including in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts.
- STRIKES: Ukraine is meanwhile intensifying strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, particularly oil facilities, which is causing increasing disruption and knock-on effects to Russia’s energy security and revenue. On 12 September, Ukrainian forces targeted Russia’s north-western Baltic Sea port of Primorsk (Leningrad oblast), a key export hub for Russian oil and the largest port facility in western Russia. The attack was reportedly carried out by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). An unnamed SBU source also claimed that the SBU had targeted pumping stations that feed crude oil to the port of Ust-Luga in Leningrad oblast, a major export hub for Russian energy in the Baltic.
- STRIKES: On 12 September, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (GUR) reportedly co‑ordinated a drone strike on the Bashneft-Novoufimsky refinery in Ufa, the capital of Russia’s Republic of Bashkortostan. The facility, located around 930 miles (1,500km) from Ukraine’s border, is one of Russia’s major oil refineries. Multiple powerful explosions were reported at the site, likely indicating that the strike caused significant damage. On 14 September, the regional authorities in Russia’s Leningrad oblast reported that drone debris had sparked a fire at the Kirishi oil refinery, another major oil processing facility that refines approximately 17 m tonnes of crude annually.
- STRIKES: Intensifying Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will moderately drive global oil price volatility, while likely increasing pressure on the Kremlin’s finances. Last week, global oil prices rose slightly amid Ukrainian attacks on major Russian oil refining facilities. We assess that such strikes will likely impact the supply of oil products and undermine Russia’s credibility as a reliable global oil supplier. We previously assessed that these strikes would cause domestic shortages; however, Russian military forces remain less affected by petrol shortages as they primarily rely on diesel. While these strikes demonstrate the growing assertiveness and effectiveness of Ukrainian drone operations, they are likely to trigger only moderate international backlash due to their impact on oil prices.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- SANCTIONS: On 13 September, US President Donald Trump stated that he is ready to increase sanctions pressure against Russia after NATO countries stop purchasing Russian oil. Trump has criticised NATO allies’ continued purchases of oil from Russia, arguing that this weakens bargaining power over Moscow. According to Trump, shunning Russian oil and imposing tariffs ranging from 50% to 100% on China until the war ends would help bring a conclusion to the conflict. Since returning to the presidency in January, Trump has made various threats about increasing sanctions pressure on Russia that have so far failed to materialise. Most recently, the Trump administration has spoken in favour of working with the EU to increase sanctions pressure against Russia, but this may well come with conditions (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 8 September 2025).
- SANCTIONS: Conditioning further Russian sanctions on all NATO countries ending Russian energy imports will likely seriously delay such sanctions, as the prospect for European (and wider NATO allies) to end all imports remains very slim in the coming year. Turkey was the third-largest importer of Russian crude oil and purchased the most Russian oil products in June, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian crude oil in that same time frame. Hungary and Slovakia (both of which are members of the EU and NATO) are significant importers of Russian oil and are currently resisting EU efforts to speed up the timeline for a ban on all Russian energy imports (currently set for 2027, though it could realistically be imposed later). These countries are highly unlikely to stop purchasing Russian oil in the near term. In addition, given their significant trade reliance upon China, it remains highly unlikely that European NATO members would agree to impose significant trade tariffs on China in exchange for US sanctions against Russia.
- SANCTIONS: The US’ decision to extend limited sanctions relief to Belarus likely indicates that the Trump administration’s ultimate goal is to relax punitive measures on both Belarus and Russia, rather than tighten them. On 11 September, the US partially eased sanctions on the Belarusian airline Belavia after the Belarusian authorities freed 52 political prisoners (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 September 2025). We initially assessed that this sets a significant precedent for sanctions relief and gradually resetting relations, with Belarus likely representing a test for easing sanctions against Russia in the future. US Vice President JD Vance stated in an interview published on 10 September that Trump does not believe Russia should be isolated economically beyond its war in Ukraine. Despite stalled progress in normalising US-Russia ties and brokering peace, we assess that the Trump administration is open to exploring commercial opportunities with Russia once the war ends, indicating that serious US sanctions are unlikely in the short term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 22 May 2025.
- NEGOTIATIONS: The Kremlin has stated that negotiations between Russia and Ukraine aimed at ending the war have ‘paused’. On 12 September, Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that while negotiators can use established channels to communicate with one another, discussions have reached an impasse ‘for now’. Peskov made similar comments earlier on 15 September and attributed the blame to the Ukrainian side, claiming that Kyiv is not demonstrating flexibility and readiness to begin serious negotiations on reaching a peace settlement. We continue to assess that Russia shows no genuine willingness to make concessions that would help end the war, with the Kremlin almost certainly considering that an end to the war is currently not in its military, political or strategic interests. Ultimately, the prospect of a revival (let alone a breakthrough) in peace negotiations is unlikely in the near term.
FORECAST
DRONES: NATO has announced the establishment of a new mission to bolster the alliance’s posture on its eastern flank after the unprecedented incursion of Russian drones into Poland. According to a readout published by NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on 12 September, ‘Eastern Sentry’ is expected to commence in the near future and continue for an undisclosed period of time.
Several NATO countries are expected to commit aircraft and naval assets as part of the mission. Denmark will contribute two F-16 fighter jets and an air defence frigate, with France committing three Rafale aircraft and Germany pledging four Eurofighters. The UK has also expressed its willingness to support, though the extent and type of any assistance remains unknown. The Operational Command of Poland’s armed forces stated on 13 September that the initiative sends a ‘clear message’ that NATO’s borders are ‘inviolable’ and that it demonstrates the alliance’s unity in taking steps to defend its frontiers. It remains our assessment, however, that this alone will not deter further Russian drone incursions in the future.
The drone incursion has almost certainly reinvigorated concerns about the US’ commitment to European security, despite the US pledging to protect NATO territory. The acting US ambassador to the UN, Dorothy Shea, told the UN Security Council on 12 September that the US would defend ‘every inch of NATO territory’ after the recent violation of Polish airspace. However, President Trump has yet to issue a strong condemnation of the recent incursion of Russian drones into Poland. Trump stated on 11 September that the incident ‘could have been a mistake’ and said that he was dissatisfied with ‘the whole situation’ regardless. Meanwhile, when asked about the incursion on 12 September, Trump emphasised that he was not going to ‘defend anybody’, raising serious questions about the US’ commitment to NATO.
We assess that Russia’s drone incursions were highly likely an intentional test of NATO and aimed to foment transatlantic divisions. Ultimately, the lack of a unified response between the US and its traditional European partners will realistically encourage Russia to further test boundaries with other grey zone activity in Europe over the medium-to-long term.
On 13 September, Romania’s defence ministry reported that it scrambled two of its fighter jets to monitor a drone in Romanian airspace during long-range Russian attacks against Ukraine. Romania did not shoot the drone down, with the UAV then returning to Ukrainian airspace. Although several stray Russian drone fragments have crashed in Romania’s territory during the war, the timing of the latest incident is notable following events in Poland. While we cannot confirm whether the Romanian incursion was deliberate, Romanian Defence Minister Ionuţ Moşteanu said that such airspace violations occur almost weekly. The frequency of these incidents therefore underscores the ever-present risk of conflict spillover in NATO countries neighbouring Ukraine. However, we reiterate our assessment that a major Russia-NATO direct military conflict remains highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term.
Clarification from Poland that it will practice downing drones with Ukraine on Polish territory, rather than inside Ukraine, will reduce the risk of direct escalation between NATO and Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had insinuated on 11 September that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk had agreed to send specialists to Ukraine for such purposes. Meanwhile, Reuters, citing an unspecified insider, stated that Polish military representatives would undergo training on shooting down UAVs, without specifying exactly where. If such training had gone ahead on Ukrainian territory, this would have represented an unprecedented step and would have highly likely put any involved personnel at risk of deliberate Russian long-range attacks. Russia has consistently opposed the presence of Western (NATO) forces in Ukraine; it would therefore highly likely regard them as legitimate military targets and would wish to ‘make a point’ by targeting any such deployment to deter a wider coalition of the willing presence in Ukraine. As such, the fact that the training will occur in Poland, rather than Ukraine, will reduce escalation risks and the threat of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, which we assess remains low. However, this threat will realistically steadily increase, especially if further airspace violations occur and subsequently increase the possibility for miscalculation.
- Ukraine: Likely mobile internet slowdown during drone strikes will increase operational disruption. On 14 September, Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Andriy Hnatov announced discussions on reducing the quality of mobile internet during Russian drone attacks. The move would aim to prevent Russian forces from using mobile networks to co-ordinate drone strikes. Hnatov explained that the authorities would reduce network quality rather than impose full-service blackouts in areas affected by strikes. Given the high frequency of Russian drone use, we assess that the measure remains likely, mirroring Russia’s own implementation of limited mobile and internet shutdowns to disrupt Ukrainian drone operations. There is a realistic possibility that Ukraine will resort to localised mobile internet blackouts if a slowdown proves insufficient to hinder Russia’s co-ordination of drone strikes. Ultimately, restrictions on mobile internet quality will likely increase operational challenges for businesses, which will likely be required to invest in backup communications, such as satellite links or landline alternatives, to reduce disruption. However, even these backups will remain prone to disruption, given the recent Starlink outage, for example, which also disrupted Ukrainian military operations. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Sep 25. Ukraine to receive missiles in first US weapon supply under new system, Zelenskiy says. Ukraine will receive missiles for Patriot air defence systems and HIMARS rocket launchers in the first batch of weapons being sent under a new funding programme agreed by the U.S. and Ukraine’s European allies, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Wednesday. The Trump administration’s approval of weapons aid packages for Kyiv on Tuesday. Ukraine has so far secured over $2 billion in financing for U.S.-produced weapons via a NATO-led mechanism called the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), according to Zelenskiy. He said he expected the total committed funds to reach $3.5bn in October. (Source: Reuters)
12 Sep 25. Sweden presents $985m military support package to Ukraine. The package includes the procurement of 18 Archer artillery systems, complete with ammunition, and long-range drones. The Swedish government has rolled out its 20th package of military aid to Ukraine, valued at approximately Skr9.2bn ($984.95m). The assistance is a response to the ongoing conflict with Russia and aims to address the specific needs conveyed by Ukraine. The package includes the procurement of 18 Archer artillery systems, complete with ammunition, and long-range drones, totalling around Skr3.6bn. Additionally, marine equipment such as coastal surveillance radar systems, tross boats fitted with grenade launchers, diving chambers, and crane lorries are part of the support, valued at around Skr2.1bn. For air defence and space capabilities, the package includes ammunition, sensors, and command and control systems for the Tridon anti-aircraft system previously supplied by Sweden. It also comprises equipment for airbase operations and sensors for drone and robotic system detection, amounting to approximately Skr3.5bn.
Sweden Defence Minister Pål Jonson said: “Sweden is now increasing its military support to Ukraine to put greater pressure on Russia. More Archers, drones, and ammunition will make a difference on the battlefield. Europe’s right to peace and freedom must be defended.”
The Swedish Armed Forces are also contributing material donations within this category, which will be replaced accordingly and include transportation costs. Looking ahead, the government has proposed in its 2026 Budget Bill an increased financial framework for military aid to Ukraine by an additional Skr31.5bn for that year and extending support into 2027.
With this proposal, military aid would reach a total of Skr40bn annually for both years. Furthermore, the budget bill outlines plans to raise ambition levels for development assistance to Ukraine. The government intends to allocate a minimum of Skr10bn per year from Sweden’s development assistance budget for civilian support in 2026–2027 and at least Skr10.5bn in 2028. Separately, the UK government has committed £142m ($193m) to assist Ukraine through the winter months and into the following year.
UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper disclosed the financial support on 12 September as she arrived in Kyiv for her inaugural visit since assuming office.
Of the total aid package, £100m is earmarked for humanitarian efforts to aid civilians in conflict zones, safeguard vulnerable groups, and provide emergency assistance in response to ongoing Russian hostilities.
Yvette Cooper said: “Through our ongoing military support, lifesaving funding announced today, the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership and our ongoing leadership of the Coalition of the Willing, we will be by Ukraine’s side to achieve a just and lasting peace, and in friendship for years to come.
“Putin’s bombardment of Ukrainian civilians, his stalling and delaying in internationally-backed peace talks, and his blatant disregard for human life must end.”
In a related development at DSEI 2025, UK Secretary of State for Defence John Healey announced a collaborative effort with British industry to produce interceptor drones for Ukraine.
Earlier in May 2025, the UK government allocated more than £1bn to enhance its armed forces’ capabilities, including new battlefield systems and cyber warfare advancements. (Source: army-technology.com)
15 Sep 25. Terma, a trusted defense partner to Ukraine, has strengthened its long-term commitment by establishing a fully owned subsidiary in Kyiv. With combat-proven solutions already deployed on the frontline, Terma’s technology is actively protecting lives, supporting sovereignty, and enhancing Ukraine’s defense every day. The milestone was marked on September 12 with a reception in Kyiv, where Terma CEO Henriette Thygesen joined Denmark’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, and Ukrainian partners to celebrate the opening of the new subsidiary. The event took place alongside official meetings underscoring Denmark’s broad political, civil, and military support for Ukraine.
“This is more than delivering advanced systems – it’s about standing shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine at a defining moment in history,” said Henriette Thygesen, CEO of Terma. “By establishing a permanent presence in Kyiv, we are sending a clear message: Terma is here for the long term.”
Terma’s systems are not aspirational – they are operational. Deployed across critical areas, they deliver measurable results where it matters most: on the battlefield. From enhancing force protection to enabling modern military capabilities, Terma’s technologies provide a real and immediate impact.
“Terma is bringing real combat power to the frontline. This is the difference between words of support and action that saves lives,” Henriette Thygesen added.
The Kyiv-based subsidiary will enable closer collaboration with Ukrainian authorities, defense forces, local industry, and international partners. It marks not a temporary engagement, but a long-term partnership grounded in trust, shared responsibility, and collective security.
“We are committed to Ukraine – today, in defense, and tomorrow, in rebuilding,” said Henriette Thygesen.
Establishing a local entity in Ukraine is both a practical step and a powerful symbol of solidarity. It reflects Terma’s values and our belief that technology must serve people – providing not just protection, but the time, space, and confidence to act.
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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