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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • BAKHMUT: Indications are growing that Russian forces are using ‘mothership’ drones across the frontline, allowing them to deploy first-person view (FPV) drones at ever greater ranges, threatening Ukrainian logistics and civilian centres
  • DONETSK: The absence of reported Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector in recent days likely indicates preparations for a wider offensive push in the coming weeks
  • AID: The US House of Representatives passed a USD 892.6 bn defence policy bill, which would authorise USD 400 m for Ukraine aid, confirming that there are still elements of bipartisan support for arming Ukraine
  • FORECAST: Overnight on 9-10 September, multiple Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace ahead of joint Russian-Belarusian military drills, likely marking a deliberate (and the most significant to date) test of NATO responses by Russia
  • BAKHMUT: A Ukrainian soldier reported on 8 September that Russian forces are now conducting first-person view (FPV) drone attacks against the T-2122 highway running between Barvinkove and Izyum (both Kharkiv oblast), around 25-31 miles (40-50km) from the frontline near Siversk (Donetsk oblast). The soldier indicated that Russian forces are using drone ‘motherships’, which deploy FPV drones further behind the lines; this aligns with wider indications in Zaporizhzhia oblast that we reported on last week. Such innovation will threaten Ukraine’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs) ever farther from the frontline, compounding the already significant pressure on Ukrainian logistics and troop rotation operations. Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 8 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced marginally north of Hryhorivka, located around three miles (5km) to the north of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk).
  • BAKHMUT: Further south, geolocated footage from 9 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have made minor advances north-west of Toretsk, in the northern sectors of Katerynivka, located under six miles (9km) to the south of Kostiantynivka (all Donetsk).
  • DONETSK: The absence of reported Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector in recent days likely indicates preparations for a wider offensive push in the coming weeks. Over the past 24 hours, Russian forces have nevertheless reportedly launched 57 attacks in the area but have failed to make territorial gains. Earlier on 11 September, a Ukrainian media outlet reported that Russia has concentrated around 150,000 troops near Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). According to the same report, these include five Russian naval infantry and airborne brigades, a tank regiment, an infantry regiment and two motor rifle brigades that have redeployed (or are in the process of redeploying) from Sumy oblast to the sector around Pokrovsk. If confirmed, these reinforcements would increase the likelihood of a major Russian offensive push in the coming weeks or months. Pokrovsk is a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces in Donetsk, and its loss would undermine Ukraine’s defensive posture in the region.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: On 8 September, a prominent Ukrainian milblogger with connections to the military claimed that Ukrainian forces have liberated Bezsalivka, a settlement located just south of the international border and over 28 miles (45km) to the north-west of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). While we cannot confirm this, the Russians have likely lost control of the town; however, fighting could well be ongoing, making the settlement a contested space.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Lyman direction, Zarichne remains highly contested, with intense fighting taking place in and around the settlement. Geolocated footage from 8 September shows recent Ukrainian advances in eastern Zarichne, located to the east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, footage from 10 September shows Russian forces operating in northern Zarichne, suggesting they have likely advanced in the area. On 8 September, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed to have captured the settlement. However, according to Ukrainian military intelligence sources operating in the sector, Russian forces have re-entered Zarichne by concealing themselves among the civilian population and dressing in civilian clothes. These tactics form part of Russia’s broader infiltration strategy, which it has increasingly relied upon across the frontline; however, this would amount to perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention, if confirmed.
  • SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 9-10 September, Russia launched a large-scale attack involving 415 drones, 42 Kh-101/Kalibr/Kh-59(69) cruise missiles and one Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missile. Some of the drones penetrated Poland’s airspace (see FORECAST). Ukraine intercepted 387 drones and 27 cruise missiles. The attack heavily targeted residential, commercial and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn and Zhytomyr oblasts. Strikes on other days were relatively smaller.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: On 10 September, the US House of Representatives passed a USD 892.6 bn defence policy bill, which would authorise USD 400 m for Ukraine aid. The new funds would be allocated under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), a programme which supplies arms to Kyiv through contracts with US defence companies. Although the New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukraine provision faced Republican opposition, the House rejected a proposal to stop funding Ukraine from Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene. Lawmakers also added a requirement that the Pentagon report to Congress on any plans to cancel or suspend military aid to Ukraine that Congress had already approved.
  • AID: The Senate is expected to complete considering its version of the bill in the near term; lawmakers from both chambers will likely have to negotiate to reach a final consensus, meaning that elements of the bill could realistically change. Nevertheless, the House vote underscores that there is still bipartisan support for arming Ukraine in Congress and that certain lawmakers seek more oversight for any possible future cases of aid for Kyiv being halted.
  • AID: Air defence will almost certainly remain one of the most vital forms of military aid over the coming months, with Ukraine said to be at risk of shortages due to slower US shipments. The Financial Times (FT) reported on 9 September that a Pentagon review in June had resulted in irregular and smaller shipments of air defence support in recent months. According to unspecified senior Ukrainian and US officials, the Pentagon first paused and then slowed down shipments of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defence systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defence systems, as well as over 100 Hellfire missiles and AIM missiles. Ukraine uses AIM missiles with NASAMs air defence systems and F-16 fighter jets. While we cannot confirm the extent of the risk of air defence shortages, weaker air defence capabilities will diminish Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian long-range strikes, increasing the lethality of strikes against civilian and military infrastructure in the coming months.
  • AID: Meanwhile, the EU is considering allocating EUR 6.6 bn (USD 7.7 bn) to buy US weapons for Ukraine. Ukrainian Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal announced this on 10 September, adding that the funds would be directed from the European Peace Facility (EPF). The bloc has used the EPF to reimburse member states for military assistance provided to Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, Hungary (which has one of the most Russia-friendly governments in the EU) has blocked EPF allocations for several months. It remains unclear how the proposed funding allocation would bypass any potential Hungarian attempts to block the use of such funds in the coming months.
  • ENERGY: Ukraine’s largest private energy firm, DTEK, has launched the country’s biggest battery storage facility; it will likely aid in bolstering energy security and resilience during the winter months. The company announced the development earlier on 11 September, adding that six battery storage systems have been connected to the power grid in the capital Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Those facilities have the capacity to store enough electricity to power 600,000 Ukrainian households for two hours, amounting to 400 Megawatts per hour (MVh). DTEK said the new systems will increase the security of the electricity supply and reduce the risk of outages.

FORECAST

DRONES: Overnight on 9-10 September, multiple Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported that 19 drones flew over Poland, of which four were shot down by NATO aircraft and air defences, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that as many as 24 drones entered Polish airspace. Other drones reportedly crashed. According to Tusk, the incursion lasted around seven hours, beginning at 2330hrs (local time) on 9 September and ending at 0630hrs on 10 September (see Sibylline Alert – 10 September 2025).

A senior Polish military official reported that some of the drones that entered Polish territory were likely Gerbera decoy drones, which are designed to mimic Shahed-type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and overwhelm Ukrainian air defences. Previous drone incursions into Polish airspace occurred during much smaller-scale Russian UAV strikes against neighbouring Ukraine. These incidents were often attributed to guidance malfunctions or navigational errors, which inadvertently led a small number of UAVs into NATO territory. In contrast, the latest incursion took place amid a massive strike package of 415 UAVs, significantly increasing the likelihood that multiple drones would intentionally or unintentionally cross into Poland.

However, the large number of drone incursions increases the likelihood that the incident was deliberately orchestrated by Russia in a bid to test NATO responses and a potential effort to conduct reconnaissance of air defences. The flight paths of some drones support this assessment. A German media outlet reported, citing an unnamed senior NATO official, that five drones were on a direct flight path toward a NATO base. Additionally, according to some reports, several drones flew in the direction of Rzeszów Airport (RZE, Podkarpackie voivodship), the most significant logistics hub for transporting military supplies to Ukraine. However, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte refused to confirm whether the incident was deliberate and stated that an assessment was ongoing.

The Russian MoD has not overtly denied that its drones entered Polish airspace, but it has claimed that there had been no plans to target facilities on Polish territory. The ministry reported that Russian forces had carried out large-scale strikes against Ukrainian military facilities in western Ukraine overnight on 9-10 September. The ministry also claimed that the drones used in the attack against Ukraine have a maximum flight range of nearly 435 miles (700km) and, therefore, could not have entered Polish airspace. However, it remains possible that Russia could have made upgrades to the UAVs to increase their range if Russia did indeed send these into Poland intentionally. The Russian MoD has said it is prepared to discuss the matter with the Polish side, though Poland and its allies will unlikely believe Russian explanations for the situation.

In July, Polish sources had claimed that Ukraine had discovered Russian UAVs with Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards; while we cannot confirm these claims, they could indicate preparations for penetrations of NATO airspace. As we reported as recently as 8 September, Russian drones have been known to use Ukrainian SIM cards to aid navigation and to obfuscate electronic warfare (EW) interference. While we cannot confirm this, it remains a realistic possibility that Russia could at least have experimented with the use of Polish SIM cards to test the technology and its ability to penetrate NATO airspace.

Belarus, Russia’s main ally, has attempted to absolve itself from involvement and portray itself as a responsible actor by communicating with regional countries. Belarusian Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveiko stated that Belarus shared information with Lithuania and Poland overnight on 9-10 September regarding drones approaching their borders. Muraveiko also said that Poland similarly notified Belarus concerning drones flying off course, allegedly from Ukraine. The Belarusian MoD also implied that Ukrainian EW may have been responsible for the drones entering Polish airspace; it also reported shooting down an unspecified number of drones over Belarusian territory. Poland has corroborated that Belarus had sent such alerts of incoming drones. While such communication channels likely aided in managing already-high regional tensions, we assess that the incident will nevertheless almost certainly sustain friction between regional countries over the foreseeable future.

The UN Security Council will convene over the drone incursions, though its response will likely be limited, given Russia’s veto powers. Poland’s Foreign Ministry announced earlier on 11 September that Warsaw had requested an emergency meeting on the matter, though it remains uncertain when this will take place. Poland has already activated NATO’s Article 4, which allows member states to start a formal discussion within the alliance about threats to their security. However, contrary to discussions within NATO, Russia (and possibly China) could theoretically veto any Security Council resolution on the matter.

The latest incident likely highlights capability gaps in NATO countries’ ability to counter inexpensive systems such as drones. Following the latest incident, Poland requested additional air defence systems and counter-drone technologies from its allies to strengthen its defences against Russian UAV incursions. While the recent interception of Russian drones demonstrated Poland’s and NATO’s readiness, the reliance on fighter jets to counter drones would not be sustainable in a high-intensity conflict; such reliance likely indicates a gap in cost-effective systems for addressing UAV threats, which is a significant issue for NATO capabilities on land, at sea and in the air.

The recent incursions have almost certainly reinvigorated concerns regarding the security of NATO’s eastern flank and US commitment to ensuring the security of the alliance. Earlier on 11 September, lawmakers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (which all border Russia) urged the US Congress to reject a proposal that would cut about USD 200 m annually in defence support for the Baltic region. The Baltic Security Initiative (BSI) programme has supported the three countries’ defence investments by between USD 168m and USD 231m annually since 2018. Ultimately, a weakened, less-equipped Baltic region could realistically empower Russia to increase grey-zone and sabotage operations over the long term and impact regional countries’ abilities to respond. The US, meanwhile, has made no major announcement relating to the drone incursion, though a statement could realistically be made following Article 4 deliberations.

Despite recent developments, we have not adjusted our assessment on the forthcoming military drills in Belarus; the drills are highly unlikely to be cover for a full-scale attack against Poland and/or other NATO neighbouring countries (such as Latvia and Lithuania), or indeed another invasion of northern Ukraine. The joint military exercises between Russia and Belarus, Zapad-2025, will take place on 12 and 16 September. The recent incursions have almost certainly further elevated regional tensions; the risk of direct Russian conflict with NATO remains low, but is steadily increasing.

Regional countries have taken precautions to improve their security during these exercises. Poland is closing its border with Belarus at 0000hrs (local time) on 12 September. Meanwhile, Latvia has closed its airspace along its eastern border until at least 18 September. However, these closures are unlikely to result in significant disruption. Poland has already closed most of its border with Belarus, while the EU closed its airspace to Russia in the days after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Sep 08.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • SOUTHERN: Russian sources have claimed that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones are operating inside Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast) for the first time, using new innovative tactics, though we cannot confirm this
  • STRIKES: Following the largest combined strike of the war to date on 6-7 September, official buildings and the premises of foreign businesses in Ukraine will remain at increasing risk during large-scale strikes
  • GUARANTEES: Following the Coalition of the Willing summit in Paris (France), Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia would regard Western troops deployed to Ukraine as ‘legitimate targets’
  • FORECAST: US President Donald Trump has implied that he is ready to increase sanctions pressure against Russia, but it remains unclear whether further sanctions will be imposed amid discussions around Europe’s own energy imports
  • BAKHMUT: On 5 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had seized the village of Markove, located four miles (7km) to the north of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). However, we cannot confirm this. Otherwise, there has been little confirmed movement around Kostiantynivka (Donetsk) in recent days.
  • DONETSK: On 7 September, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces lost two square miles (5 sq km) but regained control of ten square miles (26 sq km) near Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) in August. Syrskyi added that a similar ratio of territory lost and regained was observed near Dobropillia, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk and where Russian forces attempted a penetration in August. Ukrainian gains in the sector are possibly correlated to a slowdown of the Russian offensive, indicating that Moscow is preparing for a renewed push in the Pokrovsk area.
  • DONETSK: Ukrainian military officials recently reported that Russia has deployed experienced naval infantry units to the sector, where they are attempting to secure new positions. Ukrainian units also reported that Russia is concentrating troops and equipment in preparation for a potential renewed offensive push. Russian tactics have largely involved deep infiltration into the city while avoiding direct clashes with Ukrainian forces. Concurrently, Russian forces have intensified airstrikes. We assess that Russia’s heavy use of infiltration tactics and intensified strikes is likely intended to prepare the ground for such a push by identifying weak points and targeting military assets and logistical routes, though it remains unclear how significant any renewed Russian offensive will be.
  • DONETSK: Geolocated footage published on 5 and 6 September shows recent Russian gains in south-western and north-western Udachne, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Last week, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had recaptured Udachne. Reports of the latest minor Russian advances underscore efforts to contest Ukraine’s control over the settlement. Russian forces also made marginal progress north of Myrolyubivka, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, as of 6 September.
  • KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 7 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced on the south bank of the Vovcha River and taken up new positions in the Vovchansk Oil Extraction Plant. Overall, Russian progress in Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast) has remained extremely slow over the last year, with recent Ukrainian counter-attacks pushing them back in the centre of the city.
  • KURSK-SUMY: Russian sources affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces have reported that North Korean forces have now arrived in Kursk oblast, near Guyevo. The source claims that this is to strengthen the border region with Ukraine, with reports indicating that the deployment of North Korean troops will facilitate the withdrawal of Russian conscripts to rear areas and other Russian bases. Russian conscripts do not fight in the ‘special military operation’ inside Ukraine; as such, North Korean forces will likely take up positions in more dangerous areas of the international border to free up conscripts. However, it remains unclear whether North Korean forces will be used in offensive operations inside Ukraine.
  • KURSK-SUMY: Meanwhile, inside neighbouring Sumy oblast, geolocated footage published on 4 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the south of Yablunivka, located around 16 miles (26km) to the north-east of Sumy city. Meanwhile, footage from 5 September indicates minor Ukrainian advances further to the west, near Kindrativka, located 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Following recent infiltration efforts, Russian forces have likely established forward positions in north-western Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Last week, the Russian MoD released footage showing Russian troops holding positions in four parts of the settlement, located in northern, north-western and western Kupiansk. The latest geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces are currently operating mainly in north-western Kupiansk, with little wider evidence indicating Russian control elsewhere in the city.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Lyman direction, both sides have made confirmed advances. On 8 September, the Ukrainian General Staff reported the capture of Zarichne, located to the north-east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), following earlier indications of Ukrainian advances in the settlement. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 5 September shows Russian advances in southern Shandryholove and north-west of Stavky, located to the north-west and north of Lyman, respectively.
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to make slow advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast order, taking several small settlements in the latter in recent days. Geolocated footage from 4 September indicates that Russian forces have taken the village of Novoselivka, located around 15 miles (25km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka, notably inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Meanwhile, footage from 5 September indicates Russian advances in eastern Sichneve, located to the east of Novoselivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely not yet consolidated the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) running west into Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
  • SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 6 and 7 September that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones are operating inside Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast) for the first time, using new innovative tactics. The sources claimed that Russian forces used a drone mothership, equipped with FPVs, which flew towards the city; drone operators then controlled the decoupled FPV drones using a SIM card once the drone entered the coverage of the mobile operator. Russian forces have been experimenting with using Ukrainian SIM cards and telecommunications systems to their advantage; if accurate, this would be the latest innovation allowing Russian forces to hit targets at much further range. Meanwhile, further south along the Zaporizhzhia frontline, geolocated footage from 5 September indicates minor Russian advances in southern Prymorske, located around 14 miles (23km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city.
  • STRIKES: Following the largest combined strike of the war to date on 6-7 September, official buildings and the premises of foreign businesses in Ukraine will remain at risk during large-scale strikes. The attack involved 810 drones, nine Iskander-K cruise missiles and four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles. Ukrainian air defences achieved a high interception rate, downing 747 drones and four cruise missiles; however, the remaining projectiles struck 33 locations, causing significant damage, including in the capital Kyiv, which was heavily targeted.
  • STRIKES: For the first time since the war began, the Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv was hit. It remains unclear whether this strike was deliberate. Sites in central Kyiv are rarely hit due to the density of air defences. However, in recent months, amid intensified Russian bombardment, other official buildings have also been struck, including the EU representation in Ukraine and the British Council. This underscores the ever-increasing threat posed by long-range strikes, as well as the pressure Ukrainian air defences are under amid Russia’s innovation and expansion of its long-range strike capabilities. Smaller-scale attacks have also inflicted damage on critical infrastructure this week, such as early on 8 September, when strikes damaged energy facilities.
  • STRIKES: Russia’s ability to mass-produce drones and missiles will sustain the risk of frequent, large-scale combined strikes. On 7 September, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that Russia plans to manufacture up to 2,500 high-precision missiles in 2025, including cruise, ballistic and hypersonic systems. On 5 September, GUR spokesperson Andrii Yusov also noted that Russia can produce as many as 2,700 Shahed-type drones each month, in addition to unknown numbers of (much cheaper and easier to produce) decoy drones. Reports of steadily expanding production capacity suggest that Moscow will be able to continue its strike campaign at the current tempo into the winter heating season, when the intensity of strikes traditionally increases.
  • STRIKES: Russia is also modernising its drones and missiles while deploying more sophisticated strike tactics. According to GUR, instead of flying to their targets directly, Russian drones now circle for several hours and vary their altitude. This likely complicates Ukrainian detection and interception efforts. Such circling patterns increase the complexity of drone flights, thereby reducing the predictability of strikes.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued to strike Russian oil infrastructure, targeting several facilities on 5 September. The attacks hit the Rosneft refinery in Ryazan (Ryazan oblast, Russia) and an oil depot in occupied Luhansk oblast. The Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest oil refineries in Russia. On 5 September, Ukrainian forces struck an S-400 air defence system in Kaluga oblast (Russia). On 7 September, Ukraine also struck the Druzhba oil pipeline in Russia’s Bryansk oblast. The pipeline delivers Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia; the attack will highly likely spark renewed tensions with both countries, which have already adopted an anti-Ukraine stance.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • GUARANTEES: Russia would regard Western troops deployed to Ukraine as ‘legitimate targets’, according to President Vladimir Putin. On 5 September, Putin implied that any security guarantees that would involve troops on Ukrainian soil would violate Moscow’s objections to NATO troops in Ukraine. Putin also stated that their deployment would not be necessary if a peace deal is reached, claiming that Russia would comply with any agreements in full. The statement follows a meeting of European leaders in Paris (France) on 4 September, whereafter French President Emmanuel Macron stated that 35 states agreed to form a ‘reassurance force’ as part of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, including potential deployments to Ukraine.
  • GUARANTEES: We have repeatedly assessed that the deployment of Western troops (especially those from NATO countries) will highly likely remain a non-starter for Moscow. Meanwhile, Putin’s comments will almost certainly provide no real reassurance for Kyiv, given that Russia has violated numerous previous agreements with Ukraine. Putin’s comments further reinforce our assessment, and such remarks are highly likely aimed at deterring countries willing to send troops from doing so by warning that they could be military targets. Italy, for example, has already ruled out deploying its troops within Ukraine, instead supporting a reassurance force outside of Ukraine. Other states will likely resist deployments internally, even far from the frontline, given Moscow’s clear opposition, which is highly unlikely to change. We continue to assess that any major NATO deployment inside Ukraine will likely indicate an absence of a peace treaty with Russia, rather than being part of a strategic settlement to end the war, given Russia’s war goals.
  • RECRUITMENT: Ukrainian estimates indicate that Russia continues to successfully attract manpower to sustain the war; Russia has reportedly recruited around 280,000 contract soldiers in 2025 thus far. According to the Deputy Head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Vadym Skibitskyi, this figure is current as of 1 September; Russia is believed to enlist at least 35,000 soldiers per month. Skibitskyi attributed Russian recruitment success to lucrative financial incentives and propaganda campaigns. Ultimately, both Russian and Ukrainian sources indicate that Russia is successfully recruiting to not only offset their losses, but also slowly increase the overall size of the armed forces and their commitment inside Ukraine.
  • RECRUITMENT: Nearly 700,000 Russian military personnel are now deployed in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian assessments. A spokesperson of Ukraine’s GUR, Andriy Yusov, shared these figures on 5 September, adding that this number includes National Guard (Rosgvardia) personnel, special forces and support units, and is a notable increase on estimates from earlier this year. According to Yusov, most Russian service members are deployed in Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast, which Yusov stated shows Russia’s priorities. Ukraine’s military consists of almost 900,000 service members; however, Russia clearly holds a numerical advantage in certain parts of the frontline, due to the allocation of manpower, and has a much larger pool of personnel to draw from.
  • PROTESTS: Meanwhile, continued attempts to introduce controversial legislation will possibly reduce the willingness of Ukrainians to enlist in the war over the coming months, following modest protests. On 5 September, hundreds of demonstrators gathered on Kyiv’s Independence Square to protest draft laws that would impose tougher criminal penalties on soldiers for disobedience. One of those bills effectively reinstates criminal liability for soldiers using ‘illegal’ weapons, while the other increases liability for military personnel who disobey orders. The protests come after large-scale demonstrations in July across Ukraine (including in Kyiv) to decry legislation targeting two key anti-corruption agencies. We assess that those protests will highly likely set the precedent for future war-time protests and attempts to challenge the government.
  • BORDER: On 6 September, Polish farmers staged another temporary blockade along part of Poland’s shared border with Ukraine. The demonstration began at 1250hrs (Kyiv time) at the Medyka-Shehyni border point and was expected to last at least six hours; however, protesters stopped blocking truck traffic at 1530hrs and the blockade ended fully at 1700hrs. Polish farmers and truckers have periodically blocked traffic along the Polish-Ukrainian border since 2023, typically to protest what they see as unfair competition. We assess that similar future protests along the border are possible over the coming months, which will likely precipitate moderate (but temporary) supply chain disruption.

FORECAST

SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump has implied that he is ready to increase sanctions pressure against Russia after its largest aerial bombardment of Ukraine since the beginning of the war. On 7 September, Trump stated that he is ready to transition into a ‘second phase’ of sanctions against Moscow. However, he did not provide any additional details of what this would involve or offer a timeline of when the US could impose new sanctions. That said, Trump has previously announced deadlines for increasing pressure on Russia without following through on such threats.

Trump also claimed that he will speak with Putin ‘over the next couple of days’ and expressed confidence that the US would be able to help resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, the US president did not provide any further insight into what could realistically lead him to impose additional sanctions on Russia. So far, Trump’s administration has been reluctant to increase sanctions pressure against Moscow over concerns that this could deteriorate the limited progress made in the pursuit of peace.

If Trump does indeed threaten to issue new punitive measures targeting Russia and/or its trading partners during his expected forthcoming call with Putin, this will unlikely encourage Russia to change its course of the war. It remains our assessment that sanctions have done very little to influence Kremlin decision-making or foreign policy; this is unlikely to change in the short-to-medium term. Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated earlier on 8 September that no sanctions could force Moscow to change its position on Ukraine. We assess that Russia is highly likely willing to endure significant economic hardship over the coming months in order to achieve its war goals in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has signalled that the US is open to working with European partners to ‘collapse’ the Russian economy. On 7 September, Bessent said the US is ready to increase pressure on Russia, but that Europe must also be ready to follow suit. According to him, this includes issuing more sanctions and secondary tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil. This broadly aligns with what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has called for following the large-scale attack against Ukraine on 6-7 September. Zelensky advocated for additional sanctions against Russia and individuals associated with Russia, strong tariffs and other trade restrictions with Moscow.

Notably, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright indicated that European countries should also stop buying Russian oil and gas if they want the US to further tighten sanctions on Russia. According to Ember, Russian gas accounted for 14% of the EU’s overall imports of fossil fuels in 2024, up by 28% compared to 2023. The EU is currently drawing up legislation to phase out Russian oil and gas by 2028; however, the fact that the bloc still imports notable quantities of Russian energy will likely reinforce Washington DC’s reticence to impose secondary sanctions on other states that purchase Russian energy in large quantities. The US has already done so against India, but Wright seemed to imply that further European divestment away from Russian energy (and purchasing US oil and gas in its place) would encourage the White House to proceed with further sanctions against Russia.

Several European officials are expected to visit the US Treasury in Washington DC later on 8 September to discuss ways to exert more pressure on Russia economically. While details on the matter are limited, the unspecified members of the European team reportedly have a focus on energy, financial services, sanctions and trade. This could realistically indicate which sectors could be targeted under any new sanctions. The meeting underscores the US’ preparedness to work with Europe to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, which would ultimately increase alignment between Ukraine’s primary partners and improve sanctions enforcement. However, it remains to be seen how far the US is willing to go to increase punitive measures against Russia, with the EU likely more prepared to escalate sanctions pressure than Washington DC.

  • Intensifying Russian large-scale strikes will increase risks of significant damage in capital. Overnight on 6-7 September, Russia launched its largest long-range strike to date, involving 810 drones, nine cruise missiles and four ballistic systems. Ukrainian air defences achieved a high interception rate, suppressing 747 drones and four cruise missiles. The remaining projectiles struck 33 locations, causing significant damage, including in the capital Kyiv, which was heavily targeted. Notably, for the first time since the start of the war, the Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv was hit. Sites in central Kyiv are rarely hit due to the density of air defences. However, in recent months, amid intensified Russian bombardment, other official buildings have also been damaged, including the EU delegation in Ukraine and the British Council. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) has noted that Russian forces are employing increasingly sophisticated strike tactics and modernised equipment to enhance the lethality of their operations. We assess that Russia will likely maintain its current tempo of high-intensity combined strikes as part of its pressure campaign against Ukraine. Frequent, large-scale attacks will continue to pose elevated security risks to urban centres nationwide, including Kyiv. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Sep 25. Groundbreaking Ukraine tech sharing agreement to deliver drones and support jobs.  ‘First of its kind’ industrial partnership allows the UK and Ukraine to share detailed designs for cutting-edge air defence drones and other equipment.  The UK will manufacture and jointly develop cutting-edge military equipment with Ukrainian industry through a groundbreaking new technology sharing agreement which will support British jobs and strengthen both UK and Ukrainian national security. The first joint project, to be announced at the DSEI trade show in London tomorrow (Thursday), is an advanced new air defence interceptor drone, named Project OCTOPUS, which will be mass produced in the UK, with a target to produce thousands per month to provide to Ukraine to support its ongoing fight for freedom against Putin’s illegal full-scale invasion.

Interceptor drones are considerably cheaper than regular air defence missiles and are proving to be highly effective in countering the waves of one-way attack drones Russia continues to launch at Ukraine’s cities. They fly quickly to intercept incoming drones and missiles, destroying them before they reach their targets. They will help Ukraine defend against aerial attacks such as Russia’s reckless overnight attack against western Ukraine, which saw Poland and NATO scramble to intercept Russian drones that entered Polish airspace. The Prime Minister and Defence Secretary both condemned Russia’s attack, voicing support for Poland. The new tech sharing agreement has been made possible as a result of the growing industrial partnership between the UK and Ukraine, announced by the Prime Minister after meeting President Zelenskyy this summer. Last week, Defence Secretary John Healey visited Kyiv and signed an expansion to the partnership, allowing sharing and joint development of intellectual property.

The technology sharing arrangement is among the first of its kind signed with Ukraine, allowing for unprecedented collaboration between British and Ukrainian companies, in a move that provides options to expand industrial capacity and harness defence as an engine for growth – supporting investment and delivering on the government’s Plan for Change.

It comes as the government announced hundreds of ms of pounds of new investment through the Defence Industrial Strategy this week to make defence an engine for growth, with £250 m of new funding to for new defence growth deals across the UK, and £182m to fund a new skills package to be delivered by five new defence technical excellence colleges, to train and upskill thousands of workers.

The drone developed under Project OCTOPUS was designed by Ukraine with support from UK scientists and technicians and has already proved successful on the battlefield, proving highly effective against the Shahed one-way attack drone variants used by Russia – despite costing less than 10% to produce than the drones they are designed to intercept.

The Defence Secretary has hosted his Ukrainian counterpart, Denys Shmyhal, and other European Defence Ministers in London this week for the latest meeting of the 50-nation strong group dedicated to providing military support for Ukraine, co-led by the UK and Germany. During the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting, he confirmed the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine had surpassed £2 bn in funding commitments from the UK and 11 other countries.

The growing industrial collaboration delivers on the 100-Year Partnership signed between the UK and Ukraine in January, while supporting the priorities set out by the Defence Secretary to ensure Ukraine is supported to defend itself against Putin’s illegal invasion now, as well as to deter against threats in the future.

The Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have both highlighted how supporting Ukraine is essential to the security of Europe and the UK, with national security acting as a foundation of the government’s Plan for Change.

The UK remains fully committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and is engaging with key allies in support of this effort, which is why £4.5bn is being spent on military support to Ukraine this year, the largest amount provided to date. Last month on Ukrainian Independence Day, the Defence Secretary confirmed the UK’s world-leading programme of training for Ukrainian recruits would continue through 2026.

In March, the Prime Minister announced a historic £1.6 bn deal to provide more than five thousand air defence missiles for Ukraine – creating 200 new jobs and supporting a further 700. The UK will also invest a record £350m this year to increase the supply of drones to Ukraine from a target of 10,000 in 2024 to 100,000 in 2025.

The government’s new Defence Industrial Strategy will equip the UK workforce with the expertise needed to meet the new era of threat set out in the Strategic Defence Review and the demands of a rapidly evolving defence sector to innovate at a wartime pace. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

12 Sep 25. Cuashub.com said today that Rheinmetall to supply Ukraine with Skyranger Mobile Air Defense Systems. Rheinmetall will deliver Skyranger mobile air defense systems to Ukraine under a contract valued at “hundreds of ms of euros,” company CEO Armin Papperger told German media on Sept. 8. The deal is scheduled to be signed in London on Sept. 10, with the first units expected to arrive in Ukraine by the end of the year. The Skyranger system can be mounted on platforms such as Leopard tanks and is designed to defend areas of up to four square kilometers against drone threats. It combines advanced tracking sensors with a rapid-fire revolver cannon, capable of firing specialized airburst ammunition that detonates near targets to increase interception rates. Rheinmetall says this provides a lower-cost alternative to missile-based systems, which are often too expensive to use against mass drone attacks.

Ukraine has struggled to keep pace with Russia’s escalating use of Iranian-designed Shahed drones. According to Ukrainian figures, more than 6,000 launches were recorded in July 2025, a 14-fold increase compared to the same month last year. While Ukraine has employed systems such as NASAMS, IRIS-T and Patriot to shoot down drones, the high cost of interceptor missiles makes this approach unsustainable against swarms of inexpensive targets.

The Skyranger builds on the same technology as Rheinmetall’s Skynex system, a larger modular platform already delivered to Ukraine. By offering a mobile, short-range option, Rheinmetall says the Skyranger is suited to countering saturation attacks while reducing overall costs. Each interception is estimated at around $4,000, compared to hundreds of thousands or even ms for missile-based defenses.

Germany has been one of Ukraine’s largest defense supporters in Europe, with Rheinmetall supplying tanks, artillery rounds, mortar shells and surveillance drones under government contracts. The addition of the Skyranger is expected to strengthen Ukraine’s layered air defense network as it faces growing pressure from Russian drone and missile strikes. (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

09 Sep 25. Ukraine’s chief arms producer and Thales register joint venture in Ukraine. Ukraine’s state-owned defence conglomerate UkrOboronProm has registered a joint venture with French defence company Thales (TCFP.PA), a Ukrainian official said on Tuesday. The Ukrainian government is seeking help from its foreign partners to scale up its domestic defence industry as it fends off a bigger and better equipped Russian army in the fourth year of war. The registration took place at the beginning of July, UkrOboronProm director Herman Smentanin said on the Telegram messaging app during a visit to London. He said the joint venture would work on creating “advanced technological solutions” in air defence, radar systems, electronic warfare and tactical communications. (Source: Reuters)

 

10 Sep 25. Poland shoots down drones in its airspace during Russian attack on Ukraine.

  • Summary
  • Poland’s army calls violation of airspace an “act of aggression”
  • Poland says allied weapons also used to ‘neutralise’ drones
  • Poland closes airports amid drone threat, FAA reports
  • Senator Durbin warns Putin testing NATO resolve

Poland said it scrambled its own and NATO air defences to shoot down drones on Wednesday after a Russian air attack on western Ukraine, the first time in the Ukraine war that Warsaw has engaged assets in its airspace.

Poland’s military command said drones repeatedly violated Polish airspace during the Russian attack across the border in Ukraine, and the defence minister said NATO command had been briefed. (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Sep 25. Zelenskiy says nearly 60% of Ukrainian arms home-produced. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Saturday that nearly 60% of weapons used by Ukraine’s military were domestically produced, already exceeding a target he set two months ago.

“During this war, Ukraine has reached the point where nearly 60% of the weapons we have, the weapons in the hands of our soldiers, are Ukrainian-made,” Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address. (Source: Reuters)

 

11 Sep 25. Pearson Engineering partners with Ukrainian system integration company to develop maintenance, training and equipment in-country. North East defence engineering leader Pearson Engineering has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ukrainian defence company Ukrainska Bavovna. The agreement will develop the provision of high-quality repair and maintenance service for systems already delivered to Ukraine, training users of engineering equipment, and will explore production of Pearson Engineering’s life-saving equipment in Ukraine as part of the significant efforts in both the current military campaign and also to restore land for domestic and agricultural purposes.

Pearson Engineering has a proud history of delivering systems that protect lives and mobility on the battlefield. Its equipment has played an important role in post-conflict recovery. In 2024, the company exported nearly £60m worth of equipment globally, including supplying specialist mine clearance equipment to Ukraine to support humanitarian demining, making civilian areas safer and enabling reconstruction. Ukrainska Bavovna is a Ukrainian defence system integration company providing support and organisational services to enhance the capabilities and efficiency of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Speaking following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, Pearson Engineering Group Chief Executive Officer Ian Bell commented: “Pearson Engineering technology delivers groundbreaking opportunities – on the battlefield and in restoring post-conflict terrain to safety. This agreement works in the interests of a safer and more secure environment for the people of Ukraine in future”.

A UB Spokesperson added: “This collaboration with Pearson Engineering on testing, research and development of minefield clearance equipment will bolster both our Armed Forces’ capability to manoeuvre and our civilian emergency services’ demining capabilities. Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world and we need the mobility support that Pearson Engineering’s equipment provides. As this equipment is so important we want to build the capacity in-country for future manufacturing, maintenance and training.”

About Ukrainska Bavovna:

Ukrainska Bavovna Ltd is a Ukrainian defence system integration company, which combines subsystems created by different manufacturers into one larger system to meet clients’ requirements. It integrates and combine components (including software) from multiple manufacturers from different countries at the customer’s request; manufactures military or double-use products in Ukraine with quality control; organises field and battlefield testing of any product with proper reporting and signing of end-user certificates and license agreements; and teaches the end-user to use the provided product and create a program of instructions for every member of the battle unit to use the product most efficiently on the battlefield.

 

09 Sep 25. £2bn of military support for Ukraine secured through UK-led initiative. The International Fund for Ukraine has delivered thousands of drones, missiles, and radars for Ukraine. More than £2bn of military support for Ukraine has now been secured through the UK-led international fund for priority military equipment to support the most urgent requirements of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.  It comes as the Defence Secretary hosted NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, along with Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Denys Shmyhal, and Germany’s Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius, for the 30th meeting of the 50-nation strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group dedicated to providing military support to Ukraine. This follows the Defence Secretary’s fifth visit to Ukraine last week where he chaired a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing Defence Ministers from Kyiv.

As Russia’s war in Ukraine intensifies – with the largest wave of Russian air strikes on Ukraine over the weekend since the illegal invasion began – the Defence Secretary said that Putin’s attacks were only strengthening nations’ unity for Ukraine and said that countries must “go further and go faster” in surging the right support into the hands of Ukrainian fighters.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “Putin is escalating his attacks on Ukraine, so we must go further and go faster to surge vital military kit into the hands of Ukraine’s war fighters. After my fifth visit to Ukraine last week, it was a pleasure to host Minister Shmyhal, Minister Pistorius, and NATO’s Secretary General at the Ministry of Defence in London for the 50-nation strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group. We see Putin’s aggression increasing, but this only strengthens our unity and our determination to step up military support for Ukraine.

This £2bn funding milestone from the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine is symbolic of unity, with 11 countries working together with the UK to ensure Ukraine receives the urgent support it needs to fight today, while the countries of the Coalition of the Willing continue work towards securing a just and lasting peace in the future.”

The Defence Secretary announced that the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) has delivered equipment including more than 1,000 air defence systems, more than 600 uncrewed aerial systems, electronic warfare systems, and air defence radars – with further deliveries due in the coming weeks.

Deliveries over the summer focused on equipment including tactical boats to help build up Ukraine’s maritime forces to defend coastal and inland waterways, along with more air defence radars and vital artillery ammunition for the frontline. Supporting Ukraine’s defence benefits wider European security, reducing economic uncertainty and supporting the Government’s Plan for Change.

One-way attack drones also continue to be vital for Ukraine’s defence. Over the next 12 months, the UK will fund the delivery of thousands of long-range one-way attack drones, built in the UK, and supporting our 100-year partnership with Ukraine.

The Defence Secretary will then host Defence Ministers from France, Germany, Italy, and Poland tomorrow (10 September) in London for the next meeting of the E5 group of countries, with Ukraine’s Minister of Defence also due to attend. Discussions will focus on the situation in Ukraine, wider European security developments, nuclear cooperation, and investment in vital European defence industry.

The International Fund for Ukraine is administered and led by the UK Ministry of Defence to procure equipment using funds provided by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.

Both the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine. The UK remains committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, with £4.5 bn being spent on military support to Ukraine this year – the UK’s highest ever level. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

09 Sep 25. Ukraine weighs lifting arms-export ban to make drones in Europe. Ukrainian officials are exploring a mechanism to ease weapons export restrictions in sectors such as drone production, paving the way for cooperation with Baltic and Scandinavian countries as well as the U.K. and the Netherlands, according to a Ukrainian official. Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has implemented an embargo on arms exports in an attempt to direct all supplies to its defensive efforts. Lawmakers have been pondering recently how some constraints could be lifted to generate revenue that could then flow back into the local arms industry.

“The embargo remains in place, but we are working on a formula that would allow it to be lifted for certain industries, including drones, for possible cooperation and production with Joint Expeditionary Force [JEF] countries,” Ihor Brusylo, foreign policy adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy toldDefense News in an interview.

The JEF is a U.K.-led coalition of ten countries, including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway.

Brusylo added that the framework being assessed would entail an understanding along the lines of “so long as the war continues, all the production would be sent back to Ukraine for use by our troops, but once the situation stabilizes and the war is over, production would be split 50-50.”

Although the JEF is not a stand-alone army, it was designed to be an agile defense force that can deploy troops swiftly in response to crises and assist in international operations led by NATO, the United Nations or other organizations.

Despite being granted “enhanced partnership” status in May, Ukraine is still pushing for full membership in the JEF, a goal it hoped to achieve this year but has yet to realize, according to Brusylo.

“Becoming a full-fledged member of the JEF was a goal we had for this year, which unfortunately has not yet materialized as some countries still had some reservations. … I am hopeful Ukraine will gain membership in the next year,” he said.

Joining the alliance, he said, would allow broader opportunities for Ukraine to not only observe but actively join JEF exercises, improve interoperability and knowledge-sharing and would send a message that Ukraine’s future lies with Europe.

He added that it would be a necessary step towards “enhancing deterrence without JEF countries needing to join the hostilities of the war.” Countries could also leverage Kyiv’s battlefield experience against Russia to improve their own capabilities.

In June, officials from eight Northern European countries, including the U.K. and Nordic-Baltic states, called for Ukraine to become a full participant in the defense framework. In a letter co-authored by eight lawmakers representing these countries, they argued that “if NATO cannot take further steps towards Ukraine’s inclusion, the JEF should do just that.”

Ukraine’s prospects of obtaining NATO membership have recently stalled. As of last year, at least seven countries were against the country immediately joining the military alliance, which included Germany, the U.S., Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain, according to a report from Politico. Brusylo said that while NATO remains Ukraine’s ultimate goal, full participation in the JEF would be a welcome short-term step. (Source: Defense News)

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