Parliamentary Questions

30 Apr 26. Armed Forces Bill Committee publishes special report on the Bill

The Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill has published its special report on the Armed Forces Bill.  The Committee welcomes the principle of the changes in the Bill spanning the Armed Forces Covenant, defence housing, the service justice system and reserve forces, and makes recommendations to ensure the implementation is effective in making a positive impact on our Armed Forces.

Clive Efford MP, Chair of the Committee, said: “Serving in the Armed Forces is a matter of national pride and it is vital that Parliament looks at the structure and operations of our defence system closely. The current Armed Forces Bill proposes important legislative changes which are welcome in principle. However, much will depend on how the legislation is delivered, and our report challenges the Government to make sure these changes make a real difference to our Armed Forces.

The expansion of the Armed Forces Covenant has potential to make a real difference to the lives of service personnel, their families and veterans. However, we heard during our scrutiny that the existing Covenant has not always been consistently implemented, and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) needs to make sure people subject to the Covenant duty are properly supported to deliver it.

The creation of a new Defence Housing Service is positive but needs to be accompanied by proper long-term investment in the defence estate. Further consideration also needs to be given to contractor performance, which the MOD has persistently struggled with in the past. The MOD needs to make contractors more accountable to make sure they provide service personnel and their families with the quality of housing they deserve.

The Bill also creates additional powers to protect victims from domestic abuse and sexual harm and proposes measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service Courts, which we welcome, but these need to be accompanied by proper training for Service Justice Personnel to make sure they have the desired effect.

We welcome the changes to recall liability for Reserves in the Bill, although their success will depend on the Government improving the way it manages and tracks reservists. We also note that the Bill’s measures focus on the Strategic Reserve and so do not in themselves achieve the ambition in the Strategic Defence Review of increasing the Active Reserve by 20%.

It has been a privilege to chair this Committee, and I would like to express my thanks to all members who participated, and to those who gave evidence to us as we carried out this detailed scrutiny of the Bill.”

Armed Forces Covenant

Clause 2 expands the scope of the Armed Forces Covenant. The Armed Forces Covenant is a commitment from the nation to the Armed Forces community that serving personnel, their families and veterans should not be disadvantaged in civilian life because of their service. The Committee welcomes the principle of the scope of the Armed Forces Covenant under Clause 2 of the Bill this expansion, recognising that it would better reflect the range of areas in which the Armed Forces community faces disadvantage. However, the Committee notes that implementation of the Covenant has not always been consistent in the past, and so clear guidance and proper resourcing are needed if the new duty is to be most effective.

The report also recommends that the Government should publish an evaluation, before the end of this Parliament, of how the Covenant duty is being implemented by local authorities, Whitehall departments and the devolved administrations.

Defence Housing

Clause 3 and Schedule 1 of the Bill establish a new non-departmental public body, the Defence Housing Service (DHS), with the aim of improving the quality of accommodation for service families. The Committee welcomes the new body and recognises that a 10-year costed plan with £9 billion investment to support the DHS’s delivery work is a positive outcome for Armed Forces families.

The Committee says that the DHS must be adequately resourced to achieve its purpose of fixing Defence housing. The report also recommends the DHS improve accountability for its contractors and should also trial using military personnel and veterans to fulfil the local housing officer roles, as they understand service life and can ensure independent oversight of maintenance and repair work and consistency of housing standards across the estate.

Service Justice System

The Service Justice System provides the legal framework to allow the Armed Forces to operate under a single justice system whether in the UK or overseas. Clauses 5 to 29 of the Bill relate to this and makes a number of substantive changes, such as creating additional powers to protect victims from domestic abuse and sexual harm introducing a new victims’ code of practice. The Committee welcomes these measures but says they must be accompanied by proper training if they are to be effective.

The Committee also includes measures to improve the information given to victims of serious offences when they are asked to express a preference over whether their cases are dealt with in the civilian or military justice systems. The Committee welcomes this change, although recommends that MOD commissions independent research into relative conviction rates in the two justice systems so that victims can have confidence in the information they receive.

Reserves

The Bill makes several changes aimed at making more flexible use of the Reserve Forces. The Committee fully supports the Bill’s intention to provide greater flexibility to Service personnel and to improve their ability to “zigzag” from the Regulars to the Reserves and vice versa. It also welcomes changes to recall liability that will raise the maximum age for recall to 65, which the Committee heard will help defence make better use of the skills and experience that exist in the Reserve. At the same time, the Committee notes that the measures in the Bill focus on the Strategic Reserve and so do not in themselves achieve the Strategic Defence Review’s ambition to increase the size of the Active Reserve by 20%.

 

30 Apr 26. AUKUS: Government must do more – and do it faster.

The UK Government must inject renewed impetus into AUKUS – a landmark defence partnership with Australia and the United States – if it is to deliver on its potential, a report by the Defence Committee has found.

The report, published today (28 April), warns that the scale and ambition of AUKUS means that it needs visible political leadership from the Prime Minister to counter the political drift that could see it derailed. Without this leadership, the Committee is not confident that the cross-government coordination, prioritisation and pace required to deliver AUKUS will be achieved.

The new submarine class to be built under “Pillar 1” of AUKUS – the SSN-AUKUS – will form the cornerstone of UK security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Timely investment in UK submarine build and investment facilities to support SSN-AUKUS is critical: failure risks jeopardising the UK’s defence and security, and damaging our relationships with our trilateral partners.

With progress in some areas having already fallen short, the Government must do more — and do it faster — to seize the opportunity that AUKUS presents and demonstrate the UK’s firm commitment to making it a success.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “AUKUS is a once-in-a-generation chance to deliver state-of-the-art military capabilities, bolster the UK’s defence industrial base and skills, and to strengthen the UK’s relations with its partners, the US and Australia.

“The opportunities AUKUS presents are great, but so are the challenges it poses. While the promise of AUKUS remains, our inquiry uncovered shortcomings and failings that place it under threat.

“Any undertaking of this scale requires committed, consistent political will and leadership. Unfortunately, we found that the UK’s political leadership on AUKUS has dwindled. AUKUS can’t be seen as just another defence programme; if it is to stay on track then leadership must come from the very top. The Prime Minister should be an advocate for AUKUS within Whitehall – he must play a much more visible role in promoting and driving it forward. Without this clear political direction, we have serious doubts that AUKUS can be delivered.

“AUKUS has already started to hit bumps in the road. Submarine availability is critically low. Without urgent infrastructure improvements at HMNB Devonport and HMNB Clyde the Government risks finding itself unable to meet its obligations under AUKUS. Likewise, Barrow-in-Furness is absolutely essential to the success of AUKUS, and more investment needs to be made in the area.

“We have deep concerns cracks are already beginning to show when it comes to funding. The investment pipeline has already faltered. This cannot be allowed to happen again. Even seemingly minor shortfalls and delays snowball over time, with potentially severe consequences for the UK and wider Euro-Atlantic security, and our standing with our trilateral partners.

“It is in all of our interests for AUKUS to be a success. Failure to show leadership and maintain momentum carries a heavy price.”

Shortcomings and failings in AUKUS delivery

The Committee’s inquiry found that there are signs that the investment pipeline that underpins the UK’s AUKUS commitment has already faltered, warning that this cannot be allowed to happen again.

Meeting the UK’s commitment to increase visits to Australia from its Astute-class SSNs will be essential to maintaining credibility with AUKUS partners, today’s report finds, but it comes at a time when UK submarine availability is already critically low, and against a backdrop of deepening concern about the readiness of the Royal Navy. The Government must deliver infrastructure improvements at HMNB Devonport in Plymouth and HMNB Clyde at pace to relieve pressure on the current fleet and prepare for SSN-AUKUS.

The town of Barrow-in-Furness is home to the UK’s only submarine build facility and plays an essential role in AUKUS, and the UK’s wider defence and security. With the success of AUKUS dependent on attracting and retaining a skilled workforce at BAE Systems’ site in Barrow, today’s report calls for more investment in Barrow from central Government: the town’s planned regeneration is too big to fail.

Strengthening cooperation with AUKUS partners

The Committee expresses deep concern over the Government’s failure to recognise the impact of barriers to workforce movement across the trilateral. It warns of bottlenecks; future backlogs and delays could threaten the delivery of SSN-AUKUS in the UK and Australia.

The Committee calls for the urgent removal of workforce mobility barriers, including considering an AUKUS visa.

Pillar 2 must restore credibility and deliver tangible results

“Pillar 2” of AUKUS will see the UK, US and Australia collaborate on advanced technologies such as hypersonics and AI, but the Committee finds that it faces an uphill battle to restore credibility after a disappointing start.

New capabilities must be delivered to the warfighter urgently if Pillar 2 is to succeed. The Committee also calls for a more joined-up approach to be taken within Whitehall to ensure that the UK maximises the potential prosperity benefits of Pillar 2.

27 Mar 26. MPs and Lords call for more clarity on Government’s plan for UK national security.

Report: The National Security Strategy

The Government must provide more clarity on its plans to protect the UK’s national security, MPs and Peers argue in a report published today.

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has today published a report examining the Government’s National Security Strategy, published in June 2025, which set out the Government’s ambitions to improve security at home, project strength abroad and develop ‘sovereign capabilities’.

In its report, the Joint Committee calls for credible funding arrangements to boost national resilience; more robust plans to develop sovereign capabilities; stronger civil resilience measures, including better use of reservists; and deeper engagement with industry on developing the domestic defence industrial base.

The Committee also highlights the scale of strategic dependence on the US in areas such as nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While the Committee recommends the UK continue to collaborate with the US, it also says that the Government should prepare, along with European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO and continue to develop partnerships with non-NATO allies around the world.

Other recommendations the Committee makes in the report include:

Strength abroad

The UK must invest in partnerships with other ‘middle powers’ such as Canada, Australia and India, the Committee says, to avoid being squeezed by competition between the United States and China.

Russia

As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine and carries out aggression against the UK and its allies, the Government must ensure that ever greater costs are imposed on it, the Committee says. The UK must take a lead on this within NATO and hasten work such as the Defence Investment Plan, the Defence Readiness Bill and the Rycroft Review.

China

The Committee raises concerns that the Government is not striking the right balance between security risks and the desire for closer economic ties with China. It calls for the Government to be more proactive and transparent about ensuring national security interests are prioritised in its dealings with China.

Nuclear context

The Committee says a credible, sustainable and independent UK nuclear deterrent is “integral” to UK national security and as a buffer against proliferation in an era of fast-changing nuclear risks. It calls for more clarity on how the UK plans to extend collaboration with France on nuclear issues.

Sovereign capabilities

While the NSS emphasises the importance of sovereignty in areas such as nuclear, emerging technology and steelmaking, the Committee notes a lack of clear definition about what the Government considers to be a sovereign capability. It calls for the Government to provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, agreed across Government and including different levels of sovereignty.

Defence industrial base

The Committee calls on the Government to publish the Defence Investment Plan as soon as possible. The Plan should detail how the Government will support firms, particularly SMEs, to revitalise the UK’s defence industrial base and avoid being acquired by foreign investors.

Resilience spending

The Government is planning to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027, in line with NATO targets. But the Committee criticises a lack of clarity over what new capability this investment will deliver.

The Committee calls for ministers to ensure that planned spending of 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 prioritises investments in long-term resilience and new capabilities.

Critical National Infrastructure

The Committee welcomes plans for greater use of military reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure, such as undersea cables and energy pipelines. It calls for the Government to provide more detail on how it will involve reserves, including how they will be deployed in a crisis.

Whole-of society security

It is not evident that the Government’s “whole-of-society” approach to security and resilience is getting through to the public, the Committee says. It calls for the Government to set out more detail on its “national conversation” on security and resilience.

The Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Matt Western MP, said:

“The conflict we currently see unfolding in the Middle East underscores just how important it is for the UK Government to chart a clear path in a very uncertain world. This report makes clear the tough choices the Government will have to make to keep UK citizens safe.

The post-war settlement has served the UK and its allies well for nearly a century. Our report calls on the Government to bolster that settlement by building strong partnerships with other countries likely to be squeezed in a new era of great power competition.

The unpredictability of the US relationship is a growing concern. The UK’s deep dependence on the US for security guarantees has a long history, and the partnership will outlast Prime Ministers and Presidents alike. But the UK needs a clear plan to move away from some areas of strategic reliance to ensure the UK can pursue its national interest.

Ministers are right to identify Russia as the most serious and urgent threat to our security. The UK must lead efforts to counter its hostile activity.

The UK’s policy towards China is more complicated. The Committee is concerned that the Government has not yet found the right balance between cooperation and challenge. Long-term security may well have short-term costs. The Government must be more proactive and transparent in exactly how it is addressing national security issues when it engages with Beijing.

Spending is a further issue. The Government must publish the Defence Investment Plan as soon as possible, with concrete details of how it will help firms to give new life to the UK’s defence industrial base.

It should also set out both how its spending plans for resilience will add capability beyond what the UK already has, and how it will deploy military reserves to protect the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in the event of a reasonable worst-case scenario. These plans must link to the overall vision for strengthening the UK’s resilience across industry and society.

Recent weeks and months have shown our current geopolitical environment to be dangerous and unpredictable. The National Security Strategy sets out a framework for handling a volatile world: the Government must now deliver.”

 

10 Mar 26.  Defence Committee statement: developments in the Middle East. In response to recent developments in the Middle East, the Defence Committee has issued the following statement:

“Members of the cross-party Defence Committee met this morning with senior civilian and military officials from the Ministry of Defence, for a secret briefing on operations in Iran and the wider region.

“Although we cannot comment on the substance of that discussion, those Members present were left satisfied that the UK’s decision making and preparedness measures in place ahead of the recent military activity were grounded in a coherent logic.

“We note, however, the considerable gap between some of the political rhetoric circulating internationally, and the reality of the UK’s support to the United States and regional partners.

“The situation has also underlined longstanding and grave concerns – which we share – about whether the Royal Navy has sufficient capacity and resilience to respond effectively to a crisis at a time of worsening global security.

“We therefore call upon the Government to urgently release the Defence Investment Plan and take steps to increase spending on defence to 3% of GDP during this Parliament.”

 

27 Mar 26.  Armed Forces Bill Committee begins line-by-line scrutiny of the bill. The Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill moves into the next phase of their work this week, and will begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Armed Forces Bill. This week’s sessions are likely to focus on aspects of the bill covering the Armed Forces Covenant and Defence housing.

Session will take place on:

• Tuesday 24 March, 09:25
• Tuesday 24 March, 14:00
• Thursday 26 March, 09:25

The evidence sessions will be broadcast on Parliament Live from their respective start times.

 

12 Feb 26. Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill formed and launches call for evidence. The House of Commons has launched the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, chaired by Clive Efford MP, which is inviting written evidence for its scrutiny of the Armed Forces Bill. The primary purpose of the bill is to renew the Armed Forces Act 2006, which serves as the basis for military law and discipline in the UK Armed Forces, for a further five years. Governments also use the Armed Forces Bill to legislate on other matters relating to the Armed Forces. For example, measures in the 2026 Bill include stablishing a new Defence Housing Service as a non-departmental public body, extending the Armed Forces Covenant and making changes to the Service Justice System aimed at better protecting victims. The Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill (2026) may go through the Bill and make amendments. It may also take formal oral and written evidence and make visits. As well as reporting the Bill to the House, the select committee may make a Special Report to the House of its findings and recommendations.

Clive Efford MP, Chair of the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, said: “I am honoured to be chairing the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill and look forward to working with colleagues on the Committee on scrutinising the Bill.

The Committee will work at pace to explore the provisions of the Bill, such as considering the creation of the Defence Housing Service and whether the Bill’s measures go far enough to support and ensure justice for victims of service offences.

We welcome evidence that will inform the scrutiny process and our final recommendations.”

Call for evidence

The Committee welcomes written evidence submissions on any or all the provisions within the Bill, and in particular views on any of the questions below. Due to the short timetable for considering the Bill, the Committee encourages contributors to share their evidence as soon as they’re able, and no later than Monday 2 March.

Armed Forces Covenant

• What is the expected impact of the changes to the Armed Forces Covenant on serving personnel, their families and veterans?
• Does the Bill extend the scope of the Armed Forces Covenant Legal duty in an appropriate way?

o Are there policy areas which should/should not have been included?

• What is the expected impact of the changes to the Armed Forces Covenant on serving personnel, their families and veterans?
• Does the Bill extend the scope of the Armed Forces Covenant Legal duty in an appropriate way?
• Are there policy areas which should/should not have been included?
• What impact will extending the scope of the Covenant Legal Duty have on service providers’ ability to deliver on their obligations?

o What are the resource implications of expanding the Covenant?

• What will be the impact of extending the Covenant Legal Duty to the Devolved Administrations?
• How far will the Bill improve implementation of the Armed Forces Covenant?
• Defence Housing
• To what extent will the Bill’s creation of the Defence Housing Service (DHS) help to improve housing for military families?
• Are the powers and functions provided to the DHS in the Bill appropriate?
• Does the Bill create suitable arrangements for how the DHS will be governed and held accountable for the service it provides?

Service Justice System

• To what extent will the Bill’s provisions on the Service Justice System help achieve the Government’s target of halving Violence Against Women and Girls within a decade?
• What is the expected impact of granting additional powers to Service Courts to make orders relating to sexual harm, domestic abuse, and stalking?
• Do the Bill’s measures go far enough to support and ensure justice for victims of service offences?
• How will the Service Policing Protocol improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service Justice System?
• Are the Bill’s measures relating to concurrent jurisdiction sufficient?
• Are the Bill’s measures granting additional powers to Commanding Officers appropriate?

Reserves

• To what extent will the Bill’s provisions on recall liability help achieve the Strategic Defence Review’s recommendation to increase the number of active reserves by 20% and increase UK Armed Forces Readiness?
• What will be the impact of the Bill’s measures which provide the Secretary of State with the power to authorise the call-out of the Strategic Reserve for “warlike operations”?
• Will the measures on the transfer of Service personnel between the regular and reserve forces have the desired outcome of enabling more flexible career pathing for Service personnel?
• What will be the impact of the creation of the new Reserve Forces and Cadets Association non-departmental public body?

Other issues

• Do you have comments on any other aspects of the Bill you would like to share with the Committee?

There is no requirement to address all the questions or topics above in your evidence.

The Committee welcomes written submissions from all interested parties. However, the Committee cannot intervene in individual cases and will be focusing on key issues in the Bill. Please do not include sensitive personal data in your submission, or comments which might influence ongoing court or court martial proceedings.

Each submission should be no longer than 3,000 words and contain a brief introduction about the author. Submissions should be in malleable format such as MS Word (not PDFs) with no use of colour, logos, or photos.

 

30 Jan 26. What is the future of warfare? Defence Committee holds session.  

Evidence session:  Future of warfare

From 10.30 on Tuesday 3 February 2026, Committee Room 5

Watch live or later on Parliamentlive.tv

The Defence Committee holds a session with expert witnesses exploring the future of warfare at 10.30am on Tuesday 3 February.

The session will explore the strategic context for future warfare. This will include the anticipated future trends, unpredictable variables and the implications for alliances, defence planning and the defence industry, and will draw on lessons from the past few years especially from Ukraine.

The future of the UK’s deterrence posture, the impact of technological developments (such as AI), the planned Integrated Force structure, and the vision for a ‘whole of society’ approach to Defence are likely to be examined. Members may also cover the implications for UK Defence of the recent US National Security Strategy and the new US Defense Strategy.

Witnesses:

10.30am

• Sir Hew Strachan – Wardlaw Professor of International Relations, University of St Andrews
• Air Marshal (retd) Edward Stringer CB CBE – Senior Fellow, Policy Exchange
• Dr Keith Dear – CEO and Founder, Cassi

 

28 Jan 26. UK Defence Committee compares GCAP fighter with TSR failure

One Committee member compared the sixth generation fighter with a 1960s tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft which the UK could ill afford.

• Defence Committee member Calvin Bailey made the comparison between the GCAP fighter and the TSR-2 aircraft cancelled during the Cold War
• There is concern that the future fighter will similarly face significant cost overun and eventual cancellation
• This, Bailey maintained, is due to the programme entering an “unaffordable defence plan”, much like in April 1965 under another Labour government

It is not the first time that the UK put forward a novel aircraft programme without the funds to back its plans.

In a Defence Committee session on 27 January, one Defence Committee member, Calvin Bailey, had to remind the incumbent Defence Secretary, John Healey, of the significant cost overrun and subsequent cancellation of the British Aircraft Corporation’s TSR-2 aircraft in 1965 under his predecessor, Denis Healey. The warning comes amid fears that the UK Ministry of Defence cannot afford its new aerial pet project – the sixth generation Tempest fighter, the centrepiece of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Japan and Italy – nor all it has set out to deliver in the Strategic Defence Review. Yet this document was widely extolled last year for its astute reflection on the fragmented world order and the technologies Britain needs to navigate the new threat landscape. It does not help that the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Richard Knighton, recently stated that there will be “trade-offs” to come in the overdue Defence Investment Plan (DIP), now delayed until the Spring. The government have already allocated more than £2bn ($2.75bn) toward GCAP since 2021 and they have budgeted another £12bn for the next decade. But considering the growing spending deficit on defence equipment in previous years – the National Audit Office uncovered a £17bn shortfall in 2023 – and the woeful lack of transparency since the Labour government succeeded in July 2024, there is not a lot of confidence in the UK’s ability to finance programmes at present. TSR-2 was a Cold War tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft developed for the Royal Air Force in the late 1950s and early 60s. The fuselage was very long (89 feet), slim and incorporated a shoulder-mounted delta wing and turned down wing tips. The cost of the programme became a matter of political contention and at two cabinet meetings held on 1st April 1965, the government decided to cancel the programme. This was claimed to be on the grounds of rising costs, although some point more directly to a political option to acquire up to 110 F-111 Aardvark fighter-bombers from the United States. The decision was announced in the Budget Speech on 6 April 1965.

Fair comparison?

Given ongoing fiscal troubles and the government’s extended delay of the DIP, it is reasonable to draw parallels to the TSR-2 failure. But a tri-national programme brings with it “shared cost and political buy-in,” observed Daniel Meredith, defence R&A head at intelligence firm GlobalData. Unlike TSR-2, there is intended to be an incremental capability spiral, not a single leap with digital engineering / model-based design from day one. Export intent is also baked in. “Critically, the UK has no sovereign alternative once [the Eurofighter] Typhoon retires,” in 2040, Meredith reflected. There are still 159 jets in service according to GlobalData intelligence, and the radar system was upgraded recently to the ECRS Mk2. It is worth noting that the GCAP structure is also modelled on a legal treaty basis, designed to be more difficult to opt out of in the long term. To do so would risk the loss of one’s international reputation, commercial disputes and arguably future sovereign defence-industrial capability. Likewise, it would also be difficult for participants to amend the design with national alterations, a factor that historically contributed to growing costs in the Eurofighter programme.

“TSR-2 was easier to kill precisely because it was a national programme,” Meredith concluded. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

28 Jan 26. Defence and Public Accounts Committee Chairs: delay to DIP publication “risks sending damaging signals to adversaries . Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, and Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, have written a joint letter to the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Jeremy Pocklington, seeking clarity on when the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) will be published.  The publication of the plan was due in Autumn 2025, as set out in the Strategic Defence Review, but has been repeatedly pushed back. Today’s letter highlights that further delay to the DIP publication “risks sending damaging signals to adversaries”.  The letter states that “continued delays cannot be blamed on external events, which are unceasing. The difficult choices need to be made now”.   The Committees warn that the MOD’s failure to publish Equipment Plans in 2023 and 2024, and now the absence of the DIP, has resulted in an unacceptable gap in Parliament and the public’s ability to scrutinise Defence spending.

 

28 Jan 26. New inquiry: Defence in the High North 

Inquiry launch: Defence in the High North

Melting polar ice caps are increasing access to the Arctic and High North region, with significant defence and security implications for the UK, and recent weeks have seen increased global focus on the strategic importance of the region.

The Government’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review concluded that the Arctic Ocean will likely be ice free each summer by 2040. While the UK has no territory in the High North, it considers itself a “nearest neighbour” and its military activity in the region has grown, in large part to counter Russian efforts at militarisation.

Additionally, as accessibility increases in the High North, countries such as China may see economic and trade opportunities through the opening up of new shipping routes and access to potentially large reserves of natural resources.

The Defence Committee today launches a new inquiry into Defence in the High North. The inquiry will examine the current and emerging threats in the region. It will ask what the UK’s defence and security interests are, and whether we have the correct strategies, capabilities and alliances to counter these threats, particularly from Russia.

The deadline for submitting written evidence is Wednesday 25 March.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said:  “As rising global temperatures melt the polar ice caps, the Arctic is set to transform from a region of low tension and activity, to one of key strategic importance for the UK, its Allies and partners and our collective interests.   Increased access to the Arctic and High North poses both challenges and opportunities for the UK. For northern European nations, an exposed northern flank may introduce new threats. Russia’s efforts to exploit the changing climate in the north, consistently growing its military presence, are of particular concern. However, how well placed is the UK to operate effectively in the region, potentially without a US contribution? And, if threats increase, will the UK have the right capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat, a potential adversary in the harsh environment of the High North?   Our inquiry will delve into the emerging threats in the region and ask whether the UK has what it needs to meet the challenges ahead.”

The Committee welcomes written evidence on the following:

1. What are the UK’s defence and security interests in the High North, and what are the current and emerging threats relating to the region?
2. Does the UK have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region, including their relationship with those for adjacent regions – such as the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts?
3. How will the UK work with, and without, key allies and partners in the region, both within and outside NATO, including through the JEF, and how does this support or undermine the UK’s policies set out in ‘b’?
4. Do UK Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now; and are appropriate plans in place to meet the needs of the future?
5. To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be re-deployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?
6. How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?

Each submission should be no longer than 3,000 words and contain a brief introduction about the author. Submissions should be in malleable format such as MS Word (not PDFs) with no use of colour, logos or photos. Further guidance is available on our Written Evidence Guidance.

 

23 Jan 26. Defence Committee Chair responds to President Trump’s “belittlement of the contribution of the UK and other NATO allies.” The Defence Committee has issued a statement responding to President Trump’s comments on the contribution of the UK and other NATO allies in Afghanistan. Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “As our House of Commons Defence Committee fully appreciates, British troops fought valiantly in Afghanistan alongside the US and other NATO allies. To suggest otherwise is an utter insult to the memories of those who lost their lives, and to those who returned from battle with permanent injuries. President Trump’s belittlement of the contribution of the UK and other NATO allies, who went to Afghanistan in support of the US, when they needed us, is shameful.”

15 Jan 26. Former Ministers to be questioned by MPs on Afghan data breach.

Evidence Session: Afghan Data Breach and Resettlement Schemes

Tuesday 20 January 2026, 10.15, Wilson Room

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

The Defence Committee will question former Secretaries of State for Defence Sir Ben Wallace and Sir Grant Shapps, and former Minister of State for the Armed Forces, James Heappey, as it continues its inquiry into the Afghan data breach on Tuesday 20 January, at 10.15.

The session will cover the circumstances leading to the data breach, as well as ministerial decision-making between August 2023 when the breach was discovered and the July 2024 general election. This is likely to include scrutiny of the decisions:

• to seek a global injunction, to extend repeatedly the super-injunction granted by the High Court, and to appeal the Court’s decision to lift the super-injunction
• to establish a secret route for the evacuation of thousands of Afghans put at risk by the data breach
• to brief – or not to brief – other politicians about the situation.

Tuesday 20 January, 10.15am:

• Rt Hon Sir Ben Wallace, former Secretary of State for Defence

11.00am:

• Rt Hon James Heappey, former Minister of State for the Armed Forces

11.45am:

• Rt Hon Sir Grant Shapps, former Secretary of State for Defence

 

09 Jan 26. Monday 12 January 2026, 14.00, Committee Room 16 

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

The Defence Committee will hear from the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, on issues ranging from the UK’s readiness for war to the recruitment and retention challenges faced by the Armed Forces at 14.00 on Monday, 12th January.

MPs on the cross-party Committee are likely to question Sir Richard on his priorities for reform across the Armed Forces and the likelihood of achieving those aims within current funding parameters.

Given recent events, the Committee could also consider whether the UK’s Armed Forces have the people, skills and technologies required to fulfil commitments to our allies, as well as defending the UK. MPs are also likely to examine the progress of the current Defence Reform programme and the implementation of the Strategic Defence Review.

This will be the Committee’s first opportunity to question Sir Richard in his role as the head of the Armed Forces, in which he will report directly to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defence.

Monday 12 January, 14.00:

• Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton KCB ADC FREng, Chief of Defence Staff, UK Armed Forces

 

08 Jan 26. Defence Committee statement: Ukraine. In response to recent developments relating to Ukraine, the Defence Committee Chair, Tan Dhesi MP has issued the following statement:

“This announcement from the Coalition of the Willing cements the UK’s position as a firm supporter and defender of Ukraine’s sovereign right to a secure future that must be free from Russian interference and aggression. Before any British troops are deployed however, details of the commitments made within this deal must be subjected to robust scrutiny by Parliament.

My Committee has previously raised serious concerns about the UK’s readiness for modern warfare. Although this announcement is welcome, it intensifies the very real challenges our armed forces are already facing. It also runs the risk of overstretching our armed forces and so calls into question the UK’s ability to sustain pre-existing commitments to our allies.   It is also crucial that we do not lose sight of the current needs of Ukraine. A peace deal has yet to be reached, and this announcement changes nothing about the current situation on the ground. The UK Government, in conjunction with its allies and partners, must continue to do all in its power to secure peace in the region, based on the sovereign rights of the people of Ukraine.”

09 Dec 25. Defence Committee Chair Comment. Responding to the news that a member of the UK armed forces has died in Ukraine, Defence Committee Chair Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi said:

“I am deeply saddened by the news that a member of the UK Armed Forces has lost their life in an accident in Ukraine. On behalf of the Defence Committee, I extend our heartfelt condolences to their family, friends and colleagues. This tragic incident is a stark reminder of the risks faced by those who serve our country, even when operating away from the front lines. I pay tribute to their professionalism and commitment.”

 

House of Commons and House of Lords Hansard Written Answers

 

Defence: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the answer of 27 November 2025 to question 93243 on Defence: Procurement, for what reason was Project Magenta cancelled.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

A routine programme review found Project Magenta was no longer viable in terms of cost or time. The review led to an alternate solution that was not available at the time of project approval.

 

Defence: Finance

Question for Ministry of Defence

Alex Easton

Independent

North Down

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department is taking to implement increased defence expenditure to improve the preparedness and readiness of the armed forces.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

As outlined in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review, Defence will increase expenditure to transform the Armed Forces into a more lethal integrated force, equipped for the future. On 25 February 2025, the Prime Minister announced the largest sustained increase to defence spending since the end of the Cold War—rising to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, and to 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow. We have already boosted defence by £5 billion this year. The Defence Investment Plan will set out how the Ministry of Defence will deliver the vision of the Strategic Defence Review including steps to improve preparedness and readiness of the Armed Forces.

 

Military Intelligence

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 16 June to Question 57673 on Military Intelligence, if he has a target date for the full implementation of the Digital Targeting Web.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

 

The Department aims to deliver the first elements of the Digital Targeting Web, or a ‘Minimum Viable Product’, in 2026. What these first deliverables will consist of is still being defined. Plans will be continually reviewed to respond to emerging threats and adjusted as necessary.

No target date has been established for the full implementation of the Digital Targeting Web.

 

Defence: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 10 March to Question 34903 on Defence: Procurement, how many staff will be employed as part of the Defence Small and Medium Enterprise Support Hub.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

Whilst the exact number of staff employed by the Office for Small Business Growth is still under development, it is anticipated that staffing levels will be adjusted to reflect demand placed upon its services. Funding for the Office, including staff costs, is included within the £770 million Government investment into the delivery of the Defence Industrial Strategy.

 

Defence: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 10 March to Question 34903 on Defence: Procurement, who will lead the Defence Small and Medium Enterprise Support Hub.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

I am pleased to confirm that Senior Civil Servant, Tim Ketton-Locke has been appointed to lead the office and took up post on 3 November 2025.

 

MOD Ashchurch: Vehicles

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to his Department’s press release entitled Storage facility for over 900 vehicles completed at MOD Ashchurch, published on 5 March 2025, if he has a target date for the demolition of 58 existing buildings as part of the Vehicle Storage and Support Programme.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

The Vehicle Storage and Support Programme (VSSP) remains on schedule and work at MOD Ashchurch will be completed in 2027.

Demolition of all 58 existing buildings as part of the VSSP, has been completed.

 

Navy: Electronic Warfare

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent progress he has made on the UK Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

The Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme (MEWP) comprises two constituent parts, the first of which, the Maritime Electronic Warfare Systems Integrated Capability (MEWSIC), has entered the final testing phase with installation at the Royal Navy’s Integration facility at Portsdown Technology Park underway. The other half of MEWP is the Electronic Warfare Countermeasure (EWCM) Project which will deliver a trainable decoy launcher designed to counter anti-ship missiles and enhance survivability. Critical Design Review for the project was conducted mid-November 25 as part of preparation for production readiness.

 

Unmanned Air Systems: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many TEKEVER AR3 uncrewed air platforms he has procured since 5 July 2024.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

For reasons of operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers of TEKEVER AR3 uncrewed air platforms procured by the Ministry of Defence.

 

Guided Weapons

Question for Ministry of Defence

Stuart Andrew

Conservative

Daventry

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the Government plans to publish a detailed roadmap for improving national missile defence capabilities, including timelines and funding commitments.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

The Strategic Defence Review announced up to £1 billion of investment in Integrated Air and Missile Defence. This announcement responds to the threat the UK faces and will shape our future Integrated Air and Missile Defence capability. Work to deliver the Strategic Defence Review recommendations, including on homeland Integrated Air and Missile Defence, will be prioritised appropriately against the assessed threat picture as part of the future Integrated Force and set out in the Defence Investment Plan to be published this year.

 

Warrior Vehicles: Decommissioning

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the timeline is for the Warrior disposal plan up to its out of service date in 2027.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

As of 8 December 2025, there are 388 Warrior vehicles in service in the active fleet and those yet to start the disposal process.

 

Warships: Repairs and Maintenance

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will list the Royal Navy vessels that have completed the Power Improvement Project upgrade.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 11 December 2025

As of December 2025, three Type 45 Destroyers have completed their Power Improvement Project (PIP) upgrades: HMS DAUNTLESS, HMS DARING, and HMS DRAGON, HMS DEFENDER and HMS DIAMOND are currently undergoing PIP upgrades. HMS DUNCAN is operational, pending the start of her PIP upgrade, which will run concurrently with her next docking period at HMNB Portsmouth.

We are unable to release further detailed information about the forward integrated PIP schedule and upkeep plans for the Type 45 Destroyers, as to do so could risk revealing future capability levels to our adversaries.

Completing the Type 45 PIP work is dependent on the availability of ships to undertake the upgrade, balanced against the Royal Navy’s (RN) current and future operational commitments. Class availability is now maximised to ensure that the RN has been able to fulfil all its operational commitments and PIP remains on target to have all six ships receive their conversions by 2028.

 

Unmanned Air Systems: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Written Statement of 27 November 2025 on MOD Security Review, HCWS1103, how much his Department has spent on Remote Piloted Aerial Systems since 5 July 2024.

 

Answer

Al Carns

Labour

Birmingham Selly Oak

Commons

Answered on 11 December 2025

Before April 2025 this information was not held centrally and could only be provided at disproportionate costs. I can, however, confirm that for this financial year we have approved £4.6 million on equipment, service and maintenance, and training on Remote Piloted Aerial Systems (RPAS) for the purpose of enhancing our base security as set out in the 27 November 2025 statement on MOD Security Review.

Initial training will commence in January 2026 with the first tranche of pilots completing their training by March 2026. The pilots will range in rank from non-commissioned officers to senior non-commissioned officers, and civilian equivalents. Those who will be trained to manage the safety risk of the systems will be officers and civilian equivalents.

We take security extremely seriously. This investment demonstrates our commitment to enhance our ability to deter and respond to threats.

 

Challenger Tanks

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many Challenger 2 tanks have now begun conversion to Challenger 3.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 11 December 2025

There are 285 Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks in service in the British Army. The Ministry of Defence does not break down equipment numbers further due to operational sensitivity.

Eight vehicles are allocated to Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) for the design, build and testing phase of Challenger 3 conversion. The manufacturing phase is yet to start.

 

Boeing P-8 and Type 26 Frigates: North Atlantic Ocean

Question for Ministry of Defence

James MacCleary

Liberal Democrat

Lewes

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many (a) Type 26 frigates and (b) P-8 Poseidon aircraft will be assigned to Atlantic Bastion and when will they begin operations as part of AB.

 

Answer

Al Carns

Labour

Birmingham Selly Oak

Commons

Answered on 11 December 2025

Atlantic Bastion (AB) is Defence’s plan to secure the North Atlantic for the UK and NATO against the persistent and growing underwater threat. AB is not an operation; it is a plan to transition to a hybrid Navy, combining both crewed and uncrewed underwater systems. The details of this ambition are subject to the Defence Investment Plan.

 

Ajax Vehicles: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

James MacCleary

Liberal Democrat

Lewes

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the Department has commissioned any further independent reviews of the Ajax programme since 2023.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 11 December 2025

We have three ongoing reviews into Ajax currently underway:

• Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB)
• Army Safety Investigation Team (ASIT)
• Ministerial-led Review

 

Global Combat Air Programme

Question for Ministry of Defence

Mr Gregory Campbell

Democratic Unionist Party

East Londonderry

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when regulatory approvals will be given to BAE Systems, Leonardo and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement to allow a joint venture for the Global Combat Air Programme to begin work.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 11 December 2025

All necessary regulatory approvals were in place ahead of the Edgewing incorporation in June.

 

Defence: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 10 March to Question 34903 on Defence: Procurement, if he will list the other sectors outside the defence sector who will be consulted on the Defence Small and Medium Enterprise Support Hub.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 10 December 2025

Development of the new Defence Office for Business Growth is well underway. It continues to consult a wide variety of stakeholders, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), prime contractors, Regional Defence and Security Clusters, and trade associations representing their members operating both within and outside of the defence sector.

The Office will also work with the Department for Business and Trade’s Business Growth Service, where relevant, to consult with the non-defence sectors included within the Modern Industrial Strategy.

05 Dec 25. What were the consequences for Afghans of the data breach and super-injunction? – MPs investigate

 Evidence Session: Afghan Data Breach and Resettlement Schemes

Tuesday 9 December 2025, 10.30, Committee Room 16

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

The Defence Committee will hear evidence from campaigners and experts on the impact of the data breach and super-injunction on Afghans on Tuesday, 9^th December. Witnesses will include the first journalist to have become aware of the breach.

The cross-party Committee will examine how well the Government handled communications around the super-injunction with affected Afghans, and the resulting repercussions.

MPs are also likely to consider the Rimmer review and the administration of the resettlement schemes more widely, including the experiences of Afghans who have come to the UK, and their challenges in finding suitable accommodation.

This session follows a private evidence session held with ‘Person A’, the person who first alerted the Ministry of Defence to the data breach. The transcript of that session is available on the publication page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 9 December, 10.30am: 

• Rafi Hottak, former interpreter
• Sara de Jong, Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of York
• David Williams, Journalist, Daily Mail

 

01 Dec 25.  Evidence Session: AUKUS 

Tuesday 2 December 2025, 15.00, Committee Room 15

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

Luke Pollard, the Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry will appear alongside Sir Chris Gardner and Air Marshal Tim Jones as the Defence Committee concludes its AUKUS inquiry on Tuesday 2nd December.

MPs are likely to question the witnesses on how geopolitical changes have impacted AUKUS and examine the effectiveness of the oversight and governance of the programme.

MPs could explore how communications around AUKUS feed into the wider national conversation on defence and security and examine if the UK has the right skills, equipment and sufficient funding to deliver the separate pillars of the programme.

MPs may also question the Minister on the recently reported continuation of issues with Ajax vehicles.

Witnesses, 15.00pm:

• Luke Pollard MP, Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry
• Sir Chris Gardner, Chief Executive Officer, Submarine Development Agency
• Air Marshal Tim Jones, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Force Development)

 

28 Nov 25. Defence Committee publishes further evidence related to Afghan Data Breach and Resettlement Schemes

The Defence Committee has today published the transcript of an evidence session held on 18 November. During the session MPs heard in private from the person who discovered the data breach and notified the Ministry of Defence of its existence.

The witness is referred to as ‘Person A’ in line with relevant court proceedings.

The Committee has also this week published letters from the Speakers of the House of Commons and House of Lords about the impact of the super-injunction on their areas of responsibility.

The Committee’s next public evidence session in the inquiry is scheduled for 10.30am on Tuesday 9 December, with witness details on the events page of the Committee’s website. Further details of the session will be announced in due course.

 

24 Nov 25. Defence Committee statement: Ukraine. In response to recent developments relating to a Ukraine peace deal, the Defence Committee has issued the following statement:

“The Defence Committee reaffirms that the United Kingdom must stand unequivocally with the people of Ukraine at this critical moment. Their struggle is not only for their own homeland, but also in defence of the security, stability and values of other parts of Europe.

We believe that any peace must be just, lasting, and above all acceptable to Ukraine itself. The international community cannot and must not endorse any settlement that merely reflects the demands of President Putin, or that rewards aggression, annexation, or the violation of the most basic norms of international law. As we stated last week in our major report on European Security “We must reject entirely the Russian concept of peace which includes Ukrainian sacrifice of territory and so-called neutrality.”

At this crucial time, the United Kingdom, together with its European allies, must show clear and determined leadership. Our Government and others across Europe must be prepared to step forward actively to support credible negotiations and security guarantees, to strengthen Ukraine’s position, and to ensure that the foundations of peace reflect justice, sovereignty, and the right of nations to choose their own paths.

Ukraine has shown extraordinary resilience. It deserves nothing less than our full moral, diplomatic, and practical support, including continued military aid, as it seeks a peace that secures its freedom and its future.”

 

24 Nov 25. The Defence Committee heard from representatives of Team Barrow on the role Barrow-in-Furness will play in delivering AUKUS as it continues its AUKUS inquiry on Wednesday 26 November.

26 November 2025, 10.15, Committee Room 16

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

 

Team Barrow is an initiative which brings together partners from national and local Government and industry with a focus on regenerating the town of Barrow-in-Furness, home to the UK’s only submarine construction shipyard.

MPs will use this session to explore the initiative’s aims and objectives and how it will support the AUKUS partnership.

The Committee are also likely to examine the challenges in regenerating the area of Barrow, and question if the scale of funding made available is adequate to overcome them. MPs may also explore potential impacts on the population of the area, and the wider lessons that can be learned from Team Barrow’s work.

Wednesday 26 November, 10.15am:

• The Rt Hon The Lord Case, Chair, Team Barrow
• Peter Anstiss, CEO, Team Barrow
• Nona Irvine-Buckley, Head of Team Barrow, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
• Angela Jones, Director of Thriving Places, Westmorland and Furness Council

 

13 Nov 25. Chair of Defence Committee comment: Armed Forces Sexualised Behaviours and Sexual Harassment Survey. In response to the Armed Forces Sexualised Behaviours and Sexual Harassment Survey, Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said:

“This Defence Committee and its predecessor in the last Parliament have been pressing since at least 2021 for the Ministry of Defence to run annual tri-Service surveys of sexual harassment. Today’s publication is welcome but long overdue.”

“It shows that sexualised behaviours and sexual harassment are clearly still a huge problem in the armed forces. Women in defence deserve much better. I have personally raised this issue on several occasions in Parliament. We must tackle this unacceptable, abhorrent behaviour, so that our service women can feel safe in their workplace.”

“My Committee will continue to press the MoD on it and will be asking serious questions about this early next year at our annual evidence session on women in the armed forces.”

 

12 Nov 25. Afghan data breach: MoD has not done enough to stop future similar incident, PAC warns.

– Verdict delivered on govt’s failure to enable effective Parliamentary scrutiny of data loss

– Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) failure to learn lessons from past breaches resulted in breach putting many thousands of lives at risk

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is not confident that the MoD has done enough to reduce the risk of future incidents like the 2022 Afghan data breach. In a new report, the PAC has delivered its verdict on the MoD’s actions relating to the breach, which put many thousands of Afghans at risk of reprisal from the Taliban, at a financial cost to the taxpayer that is still not fully known but is currently estimated at c.£850m (excluding legal and potential compensation costs).

The report finds that in setting up the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) to help Afghan citizens who were at risk because of their work with UK forces, the MoD knew the risks in how it was managing data on the scheme. Adequate systems were not in place to manage high volumes of sensitive personal information. MoD neither did enough to improve its processes, guidance and culture in response to this risk, nor to learn lessons from multiple data breaches over successive years. It was disclosed in August ’25 that there were 49 separate data breaches at the unit handling applications from Afghan citizens to relocate to the UK.

The MoD has fallen below the standards that the public and Parliament should expect in the handling of sensitive personal information, and the PAC’s report calls for a full list of actions it is now taking to prevent future data breaches. The report makes clear the lack of appropriate systems and controls in place in the MoD to manage personal data in a high-risk environment at the time of the breach. Instead of a casework system specifically designed to process high volumes of personal data, the MoD was inappropriately relying on Excel spreadsheets stored on a SharePoint site, amidst a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. This contributed to the 2022 breach, and the MoD must now confirm to the PAC that it is using a new casework system to manage all Afghan resettlement schemes. Following the breach, the report finds the MoD has not accurately identified and accounted for the cost of the Afghan Response Route (ARR), the resettlement programme put in place as a direct result of the breach. The MoD estimates that the ARR will cost around £850m in total, but the report notes this does not include legal costs or the potential cost of future compensation claims. MoD estimates that up to 27,278 people affected by the breach could be resettled in the UK; 3,383 people had arrived in the UK under the ARR by June 2025, according to Home Office data.

The PAC has asked for a six-monthly update on resettlement activity through the ARR, as well as for assurance that costs relating to the scheme will be captured accurately.

The report further lays out in detail the events behind MoD’s failure in its responsibility to enable effective scrutiny by not informing the Public Accounts Committee or the National Audit Office’s (NAO) Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG) about the data loss. An audit director at the NAO was told by MoD that there was a secret matter relating to a data breach that could not be shared, without any detail of the operational consequences, number of people affected, or likely cost. The director was told that they could not pass on this information to anyone else within NAO, which meant it was unable to do its job in supporting the C&AG to provide assurance to Parliament on the MoD’s use of public money. As a result, the report tells the MoD it should come to an agreement with the PAC and C&AG on how it will ensure they have sufficient and timely information to enable them to undertake their roles in the context of any similar situations in the future. The PAC’s inquiry heard that a proposal for a Parliamentary oversight committee looking at more sensitive aspects of defence work, particularly defence and the nuclear enterprise, was being considered at the highest level within government.  In the opinion of the PAC, this matter is moving far too slowly.

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, said: “It is the duty of this Committee to report on the farrago of errors and missteps that led to, and followed, the Afghan data breach. The Ministry of Defence knew what it was doing – it knew the risks of using inadequate systems to handle sensitive personal information as the security environment in Afghanistan deteriorated. Indeed, data breaches occurred in 2021 which were sufficiently serious to have to be reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office, giving a warning which MoD should have taken steps to heed. These risks crystallised into dozens of data breaches over years, and ultimately resulted in the 2022 breach, presenting a grave risk to thousands of lives and a cost to the taxpayer running into hundreds of ms of pounds, at least. I take no pleasure as Chair of this Committee in stating now that we lack confidence in the MoD’s current ability to prevent such an incident happening again.

“We have now taken evidence from the MoD on what happened, and other Parliamentary Committees are also scrutinising the incident. But raking through such details after the fact is of course not how Parliamentary scrutiny ought to function. Our inquiry has established the chain of events which led to the PAC and the National Audit Office being blocked from doing its work on behalf of the taxpayer. The frankly chaotic decision to tell a single director within the NAO that there was a secret matter that could not be shared, without informing the leadership of the NAO itself, is emblematic of the quality of the MoD’s decision-making.

“The MoD’s outgoing Permanent Secretary told our inquiry that this period of secrecy in how taxpayers’ money was being spent had been “deeply uncomfortable” for him. That is just as it should be, and we are glad to hear it – but as a consequence of elected representatives being prevented from holding government to account, it is not nearly sufficient, and he should never have been put in such a position by his minister. This Committee will continue to seek formal arrangements to allow proper scrutiny of sensitive defence spending, in order that no Permanent Secretary will ever have to face this type of situation again.”

Alongside the Committee’s report, the Chair of the PAC has also written to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence expressing disappointment at how frequently the MoD has failed to provide information requested or required to be notified to the PAC within reasonable timescales or by pre-agreed deadlines – that letter is attached to the release.

PAC report conclusions and recommendations

The Department’s poor management of personal information put the lives of many thousands of Afghans at risk. A significant data breach occurred in February 2022 which has led to an estimated 7,355 people becoming eligible to be resettled in the UK through the ARR. The Department set up this scheme to relocate those who were at high risk of being targeted by the Taliban because their personal information was included in the data breach, and their family members. An estimated further 16,108 people affected by the data breach were already eligible to be resettled through the ARAP because they or a family member worked with the UK government in Afghanistan in exposed or meaningful roles. In total, the Department has estimated that up to 27,278 people affected by the data breach could be resettled in the UK. According to Home Office immigration statistics published in August 2025, 3,383 people had arrived in the UK under the ARR by June 2025.

Recommendation 1. The Department should write to the Committee by March 2026 and every six months to provide an update on resettlement activity through the ARR.

The Department did not have appropriate systems and controls in place at the time of the February 2022 breach to manage personal data in a high-risk environment. The Department did not use a caseworking system designed to hold and process high volumes of sensitive personal information relating to the government’s Afghan resettlement schemes until May 2022, when it introduced the Defence Afghan Casework System. Instead, the Department relied on Excel spreadsheets stored in a Sharepoint site, which was neither appropriate nor adequate for handling thousands of lines of personal data. The Department was still managing its data in this way when it launched the ARAP in April 2021, amidst a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. The manner in which the Department was storing and accessing this data contributed to the February 2022 data breach. This is because the individual who sent the email inadvertently shared data on 18,700 people without knowing it was included in the spreadsheet. They thought they were sharing only information relating to 150 people, for a legitimate purpose to gather information about applicants’ eligibility.

Recommendation 2. The Department should provide confirmation to the Committee that it is now managing all Afghan resettlement schemes through its new caseworking system and provide us with assurance that this would prevent a recurrence of the February 2022 breach or similar.

The Department did not do enough to learn the lessons from previous data breaches. Before the February 2022 data breach, the Department had policies in place to protect against the loss of personal information. After three separate data breaches in autumn 2021 relating to the ARAP, the Department reviewed its data protection policies and guidance, and it worked with the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) to make targeted improvements to prevent similar incidents from recurring. Despite this, the Department continued to experience data breaches, including the significant data breach in February 2022. In August 2025, the Department disclosed that there had been 49 separate data breaches to date at the unit handling applications from Afghan citizens to relocate to the UK, seven of which met the threshold for disclosure to the ICO. The Department continues to work to reduce the risk of further data breaches, but it has not given us confidence that sufficient action has yet been taken.

Recommendation 3. Alongside its Treasury Minute response, the Department should write to the Committee to provide details of:

1. a) its policies, processes and guidance to prevent data protection breaches relating to personal information;
2. b) how the Department assures itself that these are being followed, including the level of attendance at related mandatory training; and
3. c) the changes to policies, processes and guidance the Department has made in response to previous data breaches.

The Department failed in its responsibility to enable effective scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office.  Ministers decided who should be informed about, or ‘read in to’, the super-injunction, balancing the need to know against further increasing the risk to the lives of those affected.  The data loss was not publicly disclosed in the House of Commons, nor reported in the Department’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2023-24. Nor did the Department inform the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee or the Comptroller and Auditor General in confidence.  The Department’s Permanent Secretary told us that, from an accounting officer perspective, the period in question had been “deeply uncomfortable”. The Department did brief the NAO audit director at the time of auditing the 2023-24 accounts that there was a secret matter that could not be shared, and it meant there was a data breach that had not been included in the governance statement in the accounts. There was no briefing of the NAO about the operational consequences, the number of people affected, or the likely cost. The audit director was told that they could not pass on any information to anyone else at the NAO.  This was not sufficient to enable the NAO to do its job, which is to support the C&AG to provide assurance to Parliament on the Department’s use of public money.

Recommendation 4.

1. a) The Department should agree with the Committee and the Comptroller and Auditor General how it will ensure they have sufficient and timely information to enable them to undertake their roles in the context of any similar situations in the future.
2. b) The Treasury Officer of Accounts should issue new guidance on how Accounting Officers should act in the event of super-injunctions.

The Department did not put in place a mechanism to accurately identify and account for the costs of resettling individuals who were at high risk due to the data breach.  The Department accounted for the costs of the ARR within its total spending on Afghan resettlement schemes, rather than identifying them separately, arguing that this was necessary to avoid breaching the terms of super-injunction. The Department now acknowledges that it could, in anticipation of the super-injunction being lifted and the resulting parliamentary scrutiny, have accounted for the costs of the ARR separately. Many elements of the ARR and the pre-existing ARAP, such as flights and accommodation, were the same and so it should have been perfectly possible for the Department to determine the costs of each scheme. The Department estimates that the ARR scheme – the additional programme put in place as a direct result of the data breach – will cost around £850 m in total, with around £400 m spent by July 2025. This estimate does not include legal costs, or the potential cost of future compensation claims against the Department from affected individuals. The Department has so far been unable to provided sufficient evidence to give the NAO confidence in its estimate. The Department anticipates being able to give the NAO more detailed information on costs as part of its next report on the Afghanistan resettlement schemes overall.

Recommendation 5. In its Treasury Minute response to this report, the Department should explain how it is ensuring that the resettlement costs related to the ARR are now being captured separately and accurately in its accounting system.

 

05 Nov 25. British F-35 role shifts from ‘Tier One’ to specialist ally. When people describe the UK’s role in the F-35 fighter programme, they often invoke its early status as a “level one” partner, once a badge of influence at the heart of the world’s most advanced combat aircraft project. Yet, as evidence to the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee showed last week, that position has changed.

Dr Sophy Antrobus of King’s College London told peers that the UK’s “level one partnership was for the systems development and demonstration part of the programme”, which no longer exists. “We are now equal partners in the production and in-service phases,” she said.

Even so, Britain’s early investment still carries weight. “Although we do not have that status anymore, it still contributes to our standing,” she noted, adding that 15 percent of every F-35 is built in the UK. Something heavily disputed. That foundation remains valuable, but the country’s leverage has slipped as other partners have expanded their orders. Dr Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute explained that “the tier one partner status was during the development process… at the time, we were buying by far the largest number of aircraft.” Britain once planned to buy 138 jets; it has ordered 48, with roughly 40 now in service. Meanwhile, other countries have moved ahead. “Italy, Japan, Norway and the Netherlands all operate more jets than we do,” Bronk said. “Our participation in many practical areas has fallen significantly short of where our initial commitments were.” The result, he argued, is a polite but unmistakable awareness in Washington that London’s influence no longer matches its rhetoric. The UK still holds a privileged position in some of the F-35’s most sensitive areas. Through the Australia Canada United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory, it can modify mission data and electronic warfare files, capabilities not granted to most other partners. Yet even that advantage is being eroded.

“Australia is increasingly competing with the UK for the most preferred partner spot,” Bronk observed. “It has more aircraft, flies them nearly twice as much, and is a constant presence in the Indo-Pacific.”

Britain remains a core ally, but its standing within the F-35 enterprise has evolved from prime mover to trusted contributor. The UK’s technical footprint endures, but its political and operational influence has thinned. (Source: News Now/https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/)

 

30 Oct 25.   Evidence Session: Afghan data breach and resettlement schemes 

Tuesday 4 November 2025, 10.30, Committee Room 16

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

A group of journalists involved in the court proceedings on the super-injunction that prohibited reporting of the Afghan data breach for nearly two years will give evidence to the Defence Committee, at 10.30 on Tuesday 4 November.

Holly Bancroft from the Independent, Larisa Brown from the Times, and Sam Greenhill from the Daily Mail, will appear together.

Members are likely to ask for the witnesses’ personal perspective on the unprecedented use of a super-injunction to protect those affected by the data breach, which also suppressed public debate and media and parliamentary scrutiny of the breach and the Government’s response to it.

The witnesses are also likely to be asked about the risk of Afghans who worked with UK forces being targeted for reprisals due to the data breach, as well as more generally.

This evidence session builds on a joint submission of written evidence by the witnesses.

Tuesday 4 November, 10.30:

• Holly Bancroft – Home Affairs Correspondent, The Independent
• Larisa Brown – Defence Editor, The Times
• Sam Greenhill – Chief Reporter, Daily Mail

 

29 Oct 25.  F-35 fighter jets’ wings clipped by complacent MoD’s short-termism, PAC report finds.

– Procurement and management of UK’s best-ever jet beset by significant problems

– PAC calls for more radical plan to address personnel shortages affecting plane’s ability to fly with questions over forecast cost of operating new nuclear-capable F-35A

The F-35 is the best fast jet the UK has ever had – but the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) cost-cutting approach has caused significant problems in its use. In a new report on the UK’s F-35 capability, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) calls for a more radical plan to address an unacceptable personnel shortage, while raising questions over the costs of introducing F-35As in their nuclear weapons role.

The PAC report lays out a pattern of short-term decision-making from MoD impacting the F-35’s capability, availability to fly and value for money, including:

• A delayed investment in the facility which assesses the F-35’s stealth capability. In the short-term £82m was saved by 2024-25, but inflation from building later will have cost MoD £16m more than that by 2031-32;
• In 2010, the MoD chose to delay the delivery of some aircraft to make short-term financial savings, reducing the number of aircraft available today – a situation exacerbated by a delay of seven aircraft by a year in 2020 for financial reasons;
• The delay of 809 Naval Air Squadron’s infrastructure, delivery of which MoD decided to put off till 2029 to save money, knowing it would cost more long-term and reduce capability. Costs here have now increased from £56m to a forecast £154m.

The programme suffers from an unacceptable shortage of engineers, which poses an obstacle to the jets flying more often. While this shortage reflects wider challenges across the armed forces, the MoD worsened the situation for F-35s by miscalculating how many engineers would be needed per plane, through failing to take into account staff taking leave and performing other tasks. Though this mistake has now been identified and new funding provided, it will still take several years to resolve.

There are also questions over the additional costs of operating nuclear-capable F-35As, and how long the necessary arrangements will take to prepare. Becoming certified for the NATO nuclear mission will add new requirements to training, personnel and possibly infrastructure, but discussions in this area are at an early stage, and no indication of forecast costs has been provided by MoD.

The report also highlights the substandard accommodation at RAF Marham, the F-35’s main operating base. The MoD accepted to the PAC’s inquiry that Marham’s living quarters are currently not good enough, with frontline personnel revealing that it is shabby, sometimes lacking hot water, and lacking bus access to a local town. Given already existing recruitment and retention issues in the programme, MoD should urgently look to prioritise investment to bring forward completion of improvements on a much earlier timescale than the currently-planned and very complacent date of 2034.

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, said: “Making short-term cost decisions is famously inadvisable if you’re a homeowner with a leaky roof, let alone if one is running a complex fighter jet programme – and yet such decisions have been rife in the management of the F-35. During our inquiry, the MoD told us that they viewed these kinds of decisions costing the taxpayer many ms more in the long-term than the money saved in the short term, as a “conventional consequence” of budget management. This is exactly the sort of attitude that our Committee exists to challenge.

“There are basic lessons here that MoD has been worryingly slow to learn. Its appraisal of the F-35’s whole-life cost is unrealistic, which it currently gives as at almost £57bn through to 2069. But this figure does not include costs for personnel, fuel and infrastructure, which the MoD will struggle to operate a successful programme without. Moreover, the MoD is due to declare the jet’s full operating capability, despite unresolved personnel shortages. It will also not have the ability to attack ground targets from a safe distance until the early 2030s – the aspect of the F-35’s capability which the Chief of the Defence Staff told us worried him most. The F-35 is the best fighter jet this nation has ever possessed. If it is to be wielded in the manner in which it deserves, the MoD must root out the short-termism, complacency and miscalculation in the programme identified in our report.”

 

29 Oct 25. Inquiry: Afghan data breach and resettlement schemes. Defence Committee announces next steps in Afghan data breach inquiry.     The Defence Committee has published written evidence received in response to its call for evidence on the Afghan data breach and resettlement schemes.  Additional submissions have been accepted in confidence, including personal accounts from individuals and a classified submission from the Ministry of Defence (MOD), of which a publishable version has been promised in due course.  Public evidence sessions will begin next week, hearing first from some of the journalists who were subject to the super-injunction. Further details will be announced shortly.  Early sessions in the inquiry are likely to focus on the impact on Afghans and others of the data breach, the use of a super-injunction and the Government’s resettlement policy.  The inquiry forms part of a broader programme of scrutiny of the MOD’s work. A further announcement on progress is likely early in 2026.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “On behalf of the Defence Committee, I would like to thank all those who have contributed written evidence to this inquiry.  We recognise the difficult lived experience that much of the evidence describes and appreciate the effort involved in preparing it.”

 

27 Oct 25. How can increased defence spending boost Scotland’s economy and jobs? MPs launch new inquiry. MPs have today launched a new inquiry exploring how Scotland’s economy and job market can benefit from increased defence spending.  The UK Government has committed to raise defence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027, and to 3% of GDP in the next Parliament. The Defence Industrial Strategy, published in September 2025, outlines plans to strengthen national security whilst boosting the economy through defence investment. As part of this, the UK Government announced five Defence Growth Deals, including one for Scotland, backed by a combined £250 m fund.

Scotland holds a significant position in the UK’s defence sector. The cross-party Scottish Affairs Committee will consider how Scotland can support the delivery of the Strategy, and how the economic benefits of increased defence investment can be kept within and spread across Scotland.

The inquiry could explore the Ministry of Defence’s engagement with Scottish SMEs, which make up 98.2% of Scotland’s private sector, to ensure Scottish businesses can benefit from new defence investment.

This inquiry is also likely to look at how this investment can create high-quality, highly skilled jobs in Scotland. Several skills gaps have been identified in Scotland’s defence industry, notably in STEM, welding and other technical disciplines; the committee may investigate the UK Government’s role in supporting the creation and retention of skilled jobs needed to grow the defence industry.

Full terms of reference are available on the committee website. Submissions can be made via the Committee’s website until 5pm on 12th December 2025.

Patricia Ferguson, Chair of the Scottish Affairs Committee, said:   “The UK Government has pledged to increase defence spending by the largest amount since the Cold War. Given Scotland’s key place in the UK’s defence sector, it’s crucial that we make sure it feels the economic benefits of increased defence investment.   The committee is keen to make sure that the increased defence investment, and Scotland’s Defence Growth Deal, can help create and retain skilled jobs. Not only will this drive Scotland’s economy and help communities across Scotland, but it’ll also plug vital gaps in Scotland’s defence industry that will be needed to help the UK’s military meet the UK and Europe’s modern defence needs.”

17 Oct 25. BAE Systems, Babcock and Rolls Royce to give evidence on AUKUS                                                                                                           

Evidence Session: AUKUS  

Tuesday 21 October 2025, 10.30, CR16

Watch on parliamentlive.tv 

The Defence Committee continues its inquiry into AUKUS, hearing from BAE Systems, Babcock and Rolls Royce, as well as trade bodies. The evidence session will be held on Tuesday 21 October at 10.30. 

During the first panel, Members will hear evidence from defence primes – BAE Systems, Rolls Royce and Babcock International Group – on AUKUS. The panel will likely cover trilateral collaboration between the UK, US and Australia and the challenges it poses. Members will likely ask about blockages created by security clearance restrictions and barriers to information sharing, as well as the potential for the introduction of an “AUKUS visa”. Witnesses may be asked whether the investment and funding are on track to deliver the UK component of Pillar 1’s SSN-AUKUS submarines in time. 

Trade bodies ADS Group, Make UK Defence and techUK will give evidence for the second panel. Members are likely to ask questions around the required uplift in the UK workforce to deliver AUKUS and the effectiveness of industry engagement by Government, including the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum.

Tuesday 21 October, 10.30:  

• Steve Timms – Managing Director at BAE Systems Submarines
• Steve Carlier – President at Rolls Royce Submarines Limited
• Harry Holt – Chief Executive Nuclear at Babcock International Group

11.30: 

• Samira Braund – Defence Director at ADS Group
• Andrew Kinniburgh – Director-General at Make UK Defence
• Matthew Evans – Chief Operating Officer and Director of Markets at techUK

19 Sep 25. Chair comment: Russian incursions into NATO airspace. Chair of the Defence Committee: Russian incursions “designed to bully, intimidate and divide NATO countries”  The Defence Committee has issued a response to the news of Russian incursions into Estonian airspace. Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “This brazen incursion into NATO territory is just the latest in a pattern of behaviour from Russia, designed to bully, intimidate and divide NATO countries. In the last couple of weeks, Russia has violated the airspace of Poland, Romania and Estonia. In response to Russia’s reckless ‘tests’, NATO must show strength and unity.”

 

House of Commons and House of Lords Hansard Written Answers

 

Defence Equipment: Manufacturing Industries

Question for Ministry of Defence

Max Wilkinson

Liberal Democrat

Cheltenham

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps he is taking with Cabinet colleagues to support defence companies.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 7 October 2025

The Defence Industrial Strategy is the defence sector plan for the Modern Industrial Strategy and underlines this Government’s commitment to making defence an engine for growth. The DIS outlines how the Government will back UK-based businesses by launching the offsets consultation, increase spending on SMEs, create a Defence Office for SME Growth, and provide additional support to companies to export. It announced an ambitious skills package of £182 m to enable industry to recruit and build the well-paid jobs that will keep the UK secure in the future. The DIS also outlines how the MOD will conduct early market engagement with industry to inform procurement decisions.

 

Typhoon Aircraft: National Income

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate he has made of the contribution of Typhoon jets to GDP.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 7 October 2025

The biggest contribution of defence to GDP is peace and security. My Department has made no estimate of the contribution to GDP of any individual programmes and capabilities. The Defence Industrial Strategy published on 8 September 2025 clearly set out how we are making defence an engine for growth – Investing more money in key defence areas and regions across the UK to create good jobs. This year my Department has announced further multi-year contracts with UK companies for the support of in-service Typhoon EJ200 engines and the continuing development of the ECRS Mk2 radar upgrade programme that will be embodied on the RAF fleet. A resilient UK industrial base strengthens Britain’s defence companies and supply chains to make us more secure and boost our economy, which will support making NATO stronger.

 

Global Combat Air Programme: Japan

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which elements of the Global Combat air programme are included within the scope of the Industrial Strategy partnership with the Japanese government agreed in March 2025.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 3 October 2025

The UK and Japan are pioneering an Industrial Strategy Partnership (ISP) focusing on green and digital transformation, economic security and inclusive regional growth. The ISP aims to deepen UK-Japan industrial and technology collaboration through programmes such as GCAP.

 

NATO

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to recommendation 2 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what recent progress he has made on establishing a roadmap for delivering deeper interoperability with NATO allies by January 2026.

 

Answer

Al Carns

Labour

Birmingham Selly Oak

Commons

Answered on 3 October 2025

The Strategic Defence Review is clear that our defence policy is ‘NATO First’. The Armed Forces must be capable of operating as part of a NATO force by design. We are taking this forward with and through NATO, which will produce an Interoperability Plan for the Alliance by the end of the year. The Military Strategic Headquarters has appointed an interoperability champion to support the implementation of this plan.

The UK’s own roadmap for delivering deeper interoperability with NATO allies will be developed alongside our Integrated Force Design. Officials within the Department meet regularly to discuss both initiatives, however, information regarding the total number of meetings is not held in the format requested.

 

Israel Defence Forces and Mossad: Royal College of Defence Studies

Question for Ministry of Defence

Lord West of Spithead

Labour

Life peer

Lords

To ask His Majesty’s Government how many members of the Israel Defence Forces and Mossad have attended the Royal College of Defence Studies in the past 25 years.

 

Answer

Lord Coaker

Labour

Life peer

Lords

Answered on 2 October 2025

28 places have been taken up by Israeli Defence Forces on the Royal College of Defence Studies since 2000. These places are offered to the Israel Defence Forces.

 

Arms Trade: Trade Fairs

Question for Ministry of Defence

Baroness Deech

Crossbench

Life peer

Lords

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the implications for the UK’s defence and intelligence capabilities of their not inviting Israeli officials to the 2025 Defence and Security Equipment International event.

 

Answer

Lord Coaker

Labour

Life peer

Lords

Answered on 2 October 2025

The Ministry of Defence carefully assessed the implications of not inviting Israeli officials to the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) UK 2025 conference. We do not comment publicly on operational matters. The Government of Israel’s decision to further escalate its military operation in Gaza is wrong, and, as a result, no Israeli government delegation was invited to attend DSEI UK 2025.

 

F-35 Aircraft: Finance

Question for Ministry of Defence

Clive Lewis

Labour

Norwich South

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department receives a share of funds from every F-35 sold to (a) foreign military sales customers and (b) Israel.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 2 October 2025

A key part of the overall funding approach for the F-35 is that all F-35 partners who contributed to development costs for the platform are able to recoup elements of the that original expenditure from foreign military sales, relative to their level of investment in programme development.

 

Defence Growth Board

Question for Ministry of Defence

James Cartlidge

Conservative

South Suffolk

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 3 April 2025 to Question 42299 on Defence Growth Board, whether the Defence Growth Board has met since 3 April 2025.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 2 October 2025

The purpose of the Defence Growth Board is to maximise Defence’s contribution to the government’s Growth Mission.

The Chancellor and Secretary of State for Defence meet regularly, including with representatives of the defence industry and financial sector, to ensure that this government is delivering for defence. The Board has met to build on this work.

 

Harland and Wolff: Shipbuilding

Question for Ministry of Defence

Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick

Labour

Life peer

Lords

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they made of the capability of the Harland and Wolff shipyard to construct Royal Navy defence warships before the contract for that project was awarded.

 

Answer

Lord Coaker

Labour

Life peer

Lords

Answered on 1 October 2025

Building on the success of the Type 31 Frigate competition, one of the main aims of the programme was to see British shipbuilders play a key role in the Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ship competition and for companies, including British firms, to tender for the design and build of the FSS ships. The competition sought to maximise the economic and social contribution shipbuilding can make in the UK, including encouraging investment in domestic shipyards, whilst balancing the need to deliver value for money and an overall compliant solution to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s needs.

The FSS ship contract was awarded to Navantia UK (NUK), with Harland & Wolff (H&W) as a strategic subcontractor and part of the winning consortium. The build strategy was, and remains, that all three ships will be assembled from blocks manufactured in H&W’s shipyards in the UK and Navantia’s shipyards in Spain. Final assembly, systems integration and testing of the ships is planned to take place in Belfast.

In order to deliver this build strategy, the contract required an investment of approximately £100 m in Belfast for recapitalisation of production facilities and investment in skills transfer, knowledge and technology.

Throughout the FSS ship’s competition procurement process all bidders were subject to economic and financial standing tests consistent with the relevant UK public procurement legislation and rules. On contract award, the Ministry of Defence’s assessment was that H&W were able to deliver their part of the programme. NUK are responsible for managing their subcontractors, including H&W, with protections ensured through the prime contractual arrangements.

Following H&W’s insolvency and NUK’s acquisition of the four H&W yards in January 2025, the works to recapitalise the Belfast shipyard have restarted; this investment will further strengthen UK capability, modernising the shipbuilding facilities in Belfast and leading to increased productivity and capacity.

 

Iron and Steel: Supply Chains

Question for Ministry of Defence

Baroness Redfern

Conservative

Life peer

Lords

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to strengthen domestic supply chains for steel following the publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy on 8 September (CP 1388).

 

Answer

Lord Coaker

Labour

Life peer

Lords

Answered on 26 September 2025

The UK steel sector provides vital support to the UK’s defence capabilities, including specialist cast and forged steel components for a range of UK defence programmes such as submarines, surface vessels and artillery barrels. Steel used in our major Defence programmes is generally sourced by our prime contractors from a range of UK and international suppliers. This Government is committed to creating the right conditions in the UK for a competitive and sustainable steel industry.

The National Security Strategy, Strategic Defence Review and Defence Industrial Strategy set out how a strong industrial base is critical for maintaining our national security infrastructure.

The Ministry of Defence is also involved in the development of a Government steel strategy that will set a long-term vision for a revitalised and sustainable industry and outline the actions needed to get there. The strategy will articulate what is needed to secure UK steel supply chains and create a competitive business environment in the UK.

 

National Armaments Director Group: Costs

Question for Ministry of Defence

Mr Mark Francois

Conservative

Rayleigh and Wickford

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate he has made of the costs of the design phase of the National Armaments Director Group; and when that phase is will conclude.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 24 September 2025

This Government is delivering the deepest defence reforms in over 50 years. On 31 March 2025 the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group was stood up – creating a new export to end acquisition system design to cut waste and fix the broken procurement system this Government inherited.

Andy Start was appointed interim NAD and had been acting as NAD since the NAD Group was stood up on 31 March 2025. He conducts, all of the responsibilities the Head of the NAD Group must, regardless of the fact he is an interim appointment.

To the end of August 2025, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) expended £4.2 m in workforce costs on the establishment of the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group. This expenditure was drawn from existing resource within MOD, and is not a net increase for the Department. This expenditure is broken down into Enabling Workstreams (£3.1 m) and Organisational Change (£1.1 m).

In addition, in the same period the Department spent £0.5 m on external assistance in support of the establishment of the NAD Group.

The NAD Group design phased is scheduled to conclude on 31 March 2026, at which point costing will be able to be confirmed.

The Department has incurred no additional cost as a result of operating the NAD Group under Andy Start.

 

National Armaments Director Group: Costs

Question for Ministry of Defence

Mr Mark Francois

Conservative

Rayleigh and Wickford

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate he has made of the costs of the design phase of the National Armaments Director Group; and when that phase is will conclude.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 24 September 2025

This Government is delivering the deepest defence reforms in over 50 years. On 31 March 2025 the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group was stood up – creating a new export to end acquisition system design to cut waste and fix the broken procurement system this Government inherited.

Andy Start was appointed interim NAD and had been acting as NAD since the NAD Group was stood up on 31 March 2025. He conducts, all of the responsibilities the Head of the NAD Group must, regardless of the fact he is an interim appointment.

To the end of August 2025, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) expended £4.2 m in workforce costs on the establishment of the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group. This expenditure was drawn from existing resource within MOD, and is not a net increase for the Department. This expenditure is broken down into Enabling Workstreams (£3.1 m) and Organisational Change (£1.1 m).

In addition, in the same period the Department spent £0.5 m on external assistance in support of the establishment of the NAD Group.

The NAD Group design phased is scheduled to conclude on 31 March 2026, at which point costing will be able to be confirmed.

The Department has incurred no additional cost as a result of operating the NAD Group under Andy Start.

 

Armed Forces: Communication

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what is the full scope of Project EVE.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 24 September 2025

Project EVE is an innovative Communications & Information Systems (CIS) network which digitally connects front-line Commando Forces and supporting elements within 3 Cdo Brigade to globally dispersed Command and Control (C2) elements. EVE will be fielded by the Army’s Very High Readiness forces under Project CAIN for 16X.

 

Type 83 Destroyers: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent progress has been made on the delivery of the future air superiority effectors programme.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 24 September 2025

The Future Air Superiority Effectors programme is currently in pre-concept phase, and work is actively underway to establish a concept phase.

 

Typhoon Aircraft: Procurement

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he plans to replace the remaining in-service Tranche 1 Typhoons.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 24 September 2025

The remaining in-service Tranche 1 Typhoons have a planned out of Service date of 2027. Upon Tranche 1 retirement, Typhoon will continue to serve as the backbone of the UK’s Combat Air Force until at least the 2040s.

To ensure it remains at the cutting edge of capability, the UK is planning significant investment in the Typhoon through-life equipment programme. This includes the delivery and integration of the advanced European Common Radar System Mark 2 (ECRS Mk2) radar, which will enhance the aircraft’s operational effectiveness.

 

Navy: Unmanned Marine Systems

Question for Ministry of Defence

Edward Morello

Liberal Democrat

West Dorset

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department is taking steps to integrate unmanned surface vehicles into Royal Navy operations.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 22 September 2025

Yes, the Royal Navy (RN) is transitioning to uncrewed autonomous systems for mine counter measures and has already introduced the first tranche of capabilities into service. For a number of years, the RN has also operated autonomous wave gliders to enhance the RN’s ability to collect oceanographic data. The Strategic Defence Review announced the Atlantic Bastion transformation programme, which should see the introduction of uncrewed surface vessels to support a wide variety of tasks for the Royal Navy.

 

Unmanned Air Systems: Testing

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the result of the trial drone against drone engagement using the APKWS precision-guided rocket conducted by BAE Systems Falconworks unit.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 19 September 2025

The trial referenced by the hon. Member was conducted by BAE Systems for a multi-rotor Uncrewed Air System (UAS) and the information on the trial can be found on the open internet.

The UK Armed Forces remain steadfast in their commitment to advancing their already strong capabilities. They continuously explore the potential adoption of new equipment, including drones, to ensure they remain at the forefront of operational effectiveness.

This Government launched the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) a path for the next decade and beyond to transform Defence. We are delivering our commitment to spend 2.6% of GDP on defence, accelerating it to 2027, and we have set the ambition to reach 3% in the next Parliament.

A key part of the SDR’s vision for UK defence is innovation driven by lessons from Ukraine – harnessing drones, data, and digital warfare to make our Armed Forces stronger and safer. The SDR recommends that the Royal Air Force should shift towards the greater use of uncrewed systems as an immediate priority.

As part of this transformation, uncrewed and autonomous systems will be incorporated into the Royal Air Force through a broad mix of capabilities to enhance operational effectiveness. This Government is investing an additional £2 bn this Parliament into autonomous systems, including drones, and will establish a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre at initial operating capability by February 2026.

The exact types of uncrewed systems to be procured and the associated investment will be determined as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

 

Military Aircraft

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the potential implications for his policies of the test flight of the General Atomics YFQ-42 drone.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 19 September 2025

 

This Government launched the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which set out the pathway for the next decade and beyond to transform Defence. A key part of the SDR’s vision for UK defence is innovation driven by lessons from Ukraine – harnessing drones, data, and digital warfare to make our Armed Forces stronger and safer. The SDR recommends that the Royal Air Force should shift towards the greater use of uncrewed systems as an immediate priority.

As part of this transformation, uncrewed and autonomous systems will be incorporated into the Royal Air Force through a broad mix of capabilities to enhance operational effectiveness. This Government is investing an additional £2 bn this Parliament into autonomous systems, including drones, and will establish a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre at initial operating capability by February 2026.

The exact types of uncrewed systems to be procured and the associated investment will be determined as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

 

Australia: Unmanned Air Systems

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

 

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the potential implications for his policies of the test flights of the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat (Block 1) for the Royal Australian Air Force.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 19 September 2025

This Government launched the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which set out the pathway for the next decade and beyond to transform Defence. A key part of the SDR’s vision for UK defence is innovation driven by lessons from Ukraine – harnessing drones, data, and digital warfare to make our Armed Forces stronger and safer. The SDR recommends that the Royal Air Force should shift towards the greater use of uncrewed systems as an immediate priority.

As part of this transformation, uncrewed and autonomous systems will be incorporated into the Royal Air Force through a broad mix of capabilities to enhance operational effectiveness. This Government is investing an additional £2 bn this Parliament into autonomous systems, including drones, and will establish a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre at initial operating capability by February 2026.

The exact types of uncrewed systems to be procured and the associated investment will be determined as part of the Defence Investment Plan.

 

Unmanned Air Systems

Question for Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty

Conservative

Huntingdon

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how does StormShroud function autonomously as part of the RAF’s Autonomous Collaborative Platforms.

 

Answer

Luke Pollard

Labour

Plymouth Sutton and Devonport

Commons

Answered on 18 September 2025

StormShroud supports RAF F-35B Lightning and Typhoon pilots by jamming enemy radars, which increases the survivability and operational effectiveness of our crewed aircraft. As StormShroud is the first Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) introduced into RAF service it does not currently function autonomously with other ACP as it is the first platform and no other ACPs exist yet to collaborate with yet. StormShroud may be directly controlled from a ground station or operate autonomously at range, where it confuses or jams adversary radar. However, I am withholding the exact nature of the autonomous behaviour as it would harm the security or effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

19 Sep 25. UK “too timid” in defending vulnerable undersea cables from attack, Committee finds.

Report: Undersea cables

The Government is “too timid” in defending its vulnerable undersea internet cables from attack, a cross-party Committee has found.

MPs and Peers on the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy warn that the UK’s undersea internet cable network represents a strategic vulnerability in the event of hostilities. The report criticises the inadequacy of security preparations.

The report argues for “more muscular deterrence” measures, with punitive consequences for malicious damage. Recommendations include scaling up monitoring schemes, speedier data sharing with law enforcement, legal sanctions, and a greater focus on “direct physical interdiction and prosecution” of suspicious vessels and crew. The Committee suggests that “an assertive approach might yield some success”, while highlighting the risk of retaliation.

The Committee concludes that the cable industry offers “commendable” resilience against moderate damage, and there is “no imminent threat to the UK’s national connectivity”. But it also cautions against adopting industry’s business-as-usual views to determine risks to national security. It notes the challenge that Russian aggression can escalate much faster than UK resilience measures could be upgraded: “we can no longer rule out the possibility of UK infrastructure being targeted in a crisis. We are also not confident that the UK could prevent such attacks or recover within an acceptable time period”.

Undersea cables are a hidden but vital part of global internet infrastructure. Around 570 cables, usually run by private companies, carry 95-99% of the world’s intercontinental telecommunications data. There has been growing concern about malicious reconnaissance and sabotage, including a recent incident involving the Russian spy ship Yantar loitering over UK subsea infrastructure.

The UK is a global hub for internet traffic, and almost entirely reliant on subsea cables to transmit its data to the outside world. A small number of high-capacity cables are expected to carry a growing proportion of internet data, driven by large technology firms seeking supply routes for their services. The report highlights concerns that these trends are creating a small set of high-value targets.

There are particular vulnerabilities around the UK’s outlying islands, military cables and the financial sector. While sabotaging these links may not cause national disruption, it would be “costly, provocative and hard to prevent”. The Committee estimates the impacts of more extensive attacks would cause catastrophic disruption, including failures in payment systems and supply chains, degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses, and unexpected cascading issues as online authentication applications are disrupted.

The report calls for more robust resilience plans, particularly in the financial sector, and updated contingency planning scenarios to account for damage to onshore landing stations.

The Committee also recommends that the Government acquires a cable repair ship by 2030, to address the lack of genuinely sovereign repair capacity. This vessel would be leased to industry during peacetime but made available to Government in a crisis. The report calls on the Royal Navy establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable repair skills, to ensure cables could be repaired in a conflict scenario.

Matt Western, Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, said: “Undersea cables are the invisible backbone of the internet. Everything from everyday WhatsApp messages to financial transactions worth billions of dollars are carried through this network. The scale of the UK’s strategic reliance needs to be taken more seriously. While our national connectivity does not face immediate danger, we must prepare for the possibility that our cables can be threatened in the event of a security crisis. Putin has shown every sign of wanting to test the soft underbelly of the NATO alliance. Our cables are sufficiently vulnerable to make them a target. Competent and farsighted preparation is essential. The past 25 years show that unlikely events can happen with surprising speed and frequency. Unintended escalation is a particular concern given events in Ukraine. The Government must raise its gaze. Focusing on fishing accidents and low-level incidents is no longer good enough. We need stronger physical protections, better options to impose genuine costs for malicious activity, and more comprehensive recovery plans. It is conceivable that the UK’s national resilience will be tested in the coming years. We need to be ready.”

 

16 Sep 25. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy to publish report on undersea cables. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy will publish the report of its inquiry into undersea cables at 00.01 on Friday 19th September 2025.  Embargoed copies of the report will be available on Wednesday 17th September. If you are in receipt of this email you will automatically receive a copy.

The Committee has been considering the UK’s ability to defend its undersea internet infrastructure and national resilience in the event of protracted disruption. More details on the inquiry are available on the Committee’s website.

 

 

12 Sep 25. DBT, MoD and FCDO ministers Sir Chris Bryant, Luke Pollard and Hamish Falconer to face questions on arms exports to Israel. On Monday 15 September the Committee will recall trade, defence and Foreign Office minsters for an update on the UK position on arms exports to Isreal since its previous hearing with ministers on 10 December 2024.

The Committee is seeking to understand:

• How the Government is ensuring it meets its obligations under the UN Arms Trade Treaty and other international obligations;
• Application of the UK Strategic Exports Licensing Criteria, in particular Criterion 1 and Criterion 2(c) in reaching its decisions;
• The exemption of the export of F-35 components (unless going directly to Israel) from the decision to suspend export licences.

On Monday 15 September 2025 at 1.30pm

• Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State at Department for Business and Trade
• Dr Rosemary Pratt, Director, Export Controls and Sanctions at Department for Business and Trade
• Luke Pollard MP, Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry at Ministry of Defence
• Keith Bethell CBE, Director – Fixed Wing, Defence, Equipment and Support at Ministry of Defence
• Mr Hamish Falconer MP, Minister for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan at Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
• Ciaran Morrisey, Official, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

 

08 Sep 25. Chair comment: Defence Industrial Strategy

Defence Industrial Strategy – Defence Committee responds

The Defence Committee has issued a response to the Defence Industrial Strategy, published today.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “I welcome today’s publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy. I’m pleased to see the Government’s clear acknowledgement that this heightened threat era we occupy requires renewed focus. We need to be able to deter threats, and the Ukraine war shows that a strong industrial base is essential.

“I am hopeful that this Strategy represents progress towards meeting the overall objectives set out in July’s Strategic Defence Review. Today’s strategy makes all the right noises. However, this must be backed by genuine urgency and action that matches the scale of the challenge ahead.”

 

07 Sep 25. PAC to question MoD on Afghan data breach and F-35 fighter jet programme.

Evidence Session

Monday 8th September, 3.30pm, Grimond Room, Portcullis House

The UK’s F-35 stealth fighter capability / The Afghanistan Response Route

Watch live or catch-up on Parliamentlive.tv

The National Audit Office (NAO) has published a report on the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) to support the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) scrutiny of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) will hold an evidence session with senior Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials on Monday 8 September.

The session will have two panels – the first will take place at 3.30pm. The PAC will take evidence on the ARR scheme, informed by the NAO’s factual account.

A second, separate panel will then be held at approx. 4.15pm on the UK’s F-35 fighter jet capability, also informed by the NAO’s equivalent report on the topic.

The ARR was set up by the MoD to mitigate the security risks arising from a data protection breach and the unauthorised disclosure of personal information about Afghan citizens which occurred in February 2022.

The NAO report found that the MoD does not know exact cost to date of the ARR scheme. HM Treasury (HMT) has also prepared a briefing note for the PAC on HMT’s understanding of rules and expectationsfor reporting the actual/estimated spending or contingency incurred following the data breach and in relation to spending on the ARR.

The second panel on the F-35 will take place at approx. 4.15pm. The NAO’s report found that the UK’s 37 F-35 jets significantly improve the armed forces’ warfighting capability. It also expressed the view that the capability achieved for the estimated £11bn spent to date is a disappointing return so far compared with MoD plans, even if other benefits have been significant.

The NAO found that, although the F-35 represents an upgrade on any previous UK aircraft, deliveries of it have been delayed by over a year; important capabilities such as the ability to attack ground targets from a safe distance have been delayed into the 2030s; and the aircraft are available to fly far less often than the MoD’s targets. The report further found that the MoD’s estimate of £18.8bn for whole life costs for the programme is likely a significant under-forecast, with NAO estimates putting it at £71bn at least. The PAC will explore how the MoD can better invest its resources in the F-35 programme, with other subject topics likely to include:

• Shortages of engineers, cyber workers, pilots and flying instructors;
• Slow maintenance and lack of spare parts driving the F-35’s availability issues;
• The delayed deliveries of the aircraft by over a year from the original plan.

Panel One on Afghan data breach (from 3.30pm)

• David Williams, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence (MoD)
• Dominic Wilson, Director General Transformation, MoD

Panel Two on F-35s (from approx. 4.15pm)

• David Williams, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence (MoD)
• Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton KCB ADC FREng, Chief of the Defence Staff
• Air Commodore Nick Lowe, Assistant Chief of Staff Combat Air and Senior Responsible Owner for F-35 capability

 

05 Sep 25. Defence Committee holds first AUKUS evidence session

Evidence Session: AUKUS

Tuesday 9 September 2025, 10.30, Committee Room 15

The Defence Committee holds its first session in its AUKUS inquiry, hearing from expert witnesses Sophia Gaston and Dr Sidharth Kaushal.

AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia.

This evidence session is likely to explore whether Pillar 1, which will see Australia acquire its first nuclear-powered submarines, is on track. Questions may focus on the announcement in the Strategic Defence Review that the UK will acquire up to 12 SSN-AUKUS submarines.

Members will also discuss Pillar 2, which facilitates broader cooperation on cutting-edge technological advancements. Questions are likely to focus on whether there is sufficient clarity around its delivery and funding. The session may also discuss Pillar 2’s role in countering the dominance of China

This evidence session will ask whether geopolitical changes since the launch of AUKUS in 2021 have impacted the partnership.

Tuesday 9 September, 10.30:

• Sophia Gaston – Senior Fellow at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
• Dr Sidharth Kaushal – Senior Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

03 Sep 25. Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, is available for interview on the report – all bids and queries to Ed Sheridan on / 07719 005551

House of Commons

Public Accounts Committee

Govt plans to boost military reserve and cadet forces lack detail and funding, PAC finds

– Network of reserve training sites and cadet huts in managed decline, according to Mo

Government lacks a realistic and appropriately funded plan to achieve its ambition of expanding the reserve forces and the cadets. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC), in its report on the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) oversight of the Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations (RFCAs), warns that the MoD’s targets for expansion of reserves and cadets face significant barriers and suffer from a lack of clarity.

The reserves are a key part of the UK’s defence capability, making up a little under a fifth of its total armed forces strength at the start of 2025. Ambitious plans were laid out for expanding the role of the reserves in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), including increasing active reserve forces by at least 20% “when funding allows”. According to the SDR this would “most likely” be by the 2030s – however, the MoD recognised to the PAC’s inquiry that investment would need to come in support of the reserves during this Parliament, so within the next 4 years. The MoD is also seeking as a priority to improve reserves’ management via a digital solution by early 2027 – a tight timescale to meet.

The report also covers the cadet forces, which the SDR wants to increase (currently 140,000) by 30% by 2030, aspiring to reach 250,000 cadets in the longer term. Cadet forces can enhance social mobility and give confidence and structure to the most disadvantaged young people, and the PAC’s inquiry heard that there was no lack of interest from young people wanting to join the cadets. However, the MoD is still working out how to address the shortage of adult volunteers who run the cadets, and the PAC believes it will require considerable effort to persuade young people to volunteer as cadets in such significantly increased numbers.

The PAC’s report is calling for the full enhancement and expansion plans for the reserves and cadets to be set out by 2026.

The enhanced roles of the reserves and cadets will also need to be supported by a modernised and fit-for-purpose volunteer estate of training sites and cadet huts. However, the PAC’s report finds that the estate has been in a state of managed decline, with too many sites (around 2,500), some of which are not in the right places. The MoD has begun a programme to dispose of some sites and consolidate others into super reserve centres, but has not yet secured future funding for this work while facing teething problems with an estate maintenance contract. The PAC’s report calls for MoD to give due consideration to the volunteer estate in forthcoming investment decisions.

Overall, the PAC finds inadequate arrangements for monitoring the financial performance of the RFCAs, which received £146m of public money in 2023-24. October 2024 saw a batch of three annual accounts published together, meaning that some information about the RFCAs’ financial performance was not publicly available until more than four years after it had occurred. An overall financial framework that complies with Treasury requirements is still not in place, and the PAC is calling for one to be implemented as a matter of urgency.

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, said: “The publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was greeted with great celebration from the top of government. It is of course welcome to see the high-level commitments to spending on our defence contained within it. What we still do not have, following an unacceptably long delay in proper scrutiny of defence spending through the lack of publication of an Equipment Plan, are granular details on specifically how these ambitions will be funded and delivered. This includes the lack of clarity our Committee has found around highly ambitious plans to expand our reserve and cadet forces. Our inquiry has found that the MoD will need to find funding in this Parliament to begin its massive 20% expansion of the reserves, rather than the SDR’s anticipation of some point in the 2030s. Similarly, the planned boost of the cadet forces by a third by 2030 will stumble if the lack of adult volunteers is not addressed. This is before one begins to grapple with the considerable challenge of persuading young people to join up in the numbers required. Our Committee welcomes the government’s aims. The reserves are the very grassroots of our armed forces and the cadets offer young people valuable life skills and opportunities. The managed decline of the infrastructure that supports them shows they are in sore need of attention. But as we have frequently found in scrutiny of this government, what is missing is a plan for how these aims will be achieved.”

The PAC’s June 2025 report on the future of the Equipment Plan found that the public still lacked a reliable assessment of whether government’s defence spending plans are affordable.

 

03 Sep 25. Inquiry launch: Afghan data breach and resettlement schemes. Defence Committee launches broad inquiry into MOD Afghan data breach and resettlement schemes.

Today the Defence Committee launches an inquiry into the Afghan data breach and the resettlement schemes.

In July 2025, the High Court lifted a ‘superinjunction’ that had been in place since September 2023, suppressing information about a data breach that had taken place in February 2022, involving the personal data of thousands of Afghan applicants for resettlement to the UK and their families, potentially putting these people at risk of reprisals.

In 2024-25, the Government secretly brought many of those affected by the data breach to the safety of the UK, including people whose initial applications for resettlement had been rejected.

The deadline for written evidence is Tuesday 14 October 2025. While lived experience can inform the Committee’s work, please be aware that the Committee does not consider or assist with individual cases.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “We were all shocked by the Government’s revelation in July that hundreds of ms of pounds of taxpayers’ money had been secretly committed to bringing to safety thousands of Afghans whose lives were jeopardised by a colossal data breach from the Ministry of Defence. We on the Defence Committee want to understand how this breach could have been allowed to happen, and, once it had happened, whether successive Governments took well-informed and sensible decisions under cover of an unprecedented super-injunction. We will be taking as much evidence as possible in public and on camera, to shine a light on events kept secret for nearly two years.

Was the Government right to use the courts for so long to prevent public debate on matters of public interest and controversy? What is to stop another catastrophic data breach or secret injunction? These and other questions will be at the heart of our inquiry.

Over four years on from the UK withdrawal, we will also take a broad look at the successes, failures and opportunity costs of the Afghan resettlement programme. We intend to identify the key issues for affected Afghans, Defence, public services, local communities and public trust, and reach a view on what the Government should do next.

“We want to hear from you. If you have insight into how these events unfolded, their personal impact or the wider questions they raise, please respond to the call for evidence that we have issued today.”

The Committee welcomes written evidence on the following:

Use of a legal injunction

1. Was the Government’s original application for an injunction appropriate in this case? Why were alternatives, such as use of the D-Notice process, not considered adequate?
2. Was it right for the Government to argue for the injunction to remain in place for as long as it did, and was it right for it to agree that it should be lifted when it was?
3. Is it reasonable for the Government to continue to argue that some information covered by the original injunction should not be released?
4. What were the implications of the injunction for public and parliamentary scrutiny, and for data protection regulation?
5. Did the Government take appropriate, well-informed, timely, effective action under cover of the injunction?
6. How did the change of Government following the 2024 general election impact on decision-making relevant to the injunction?
7. In what circumstances would it be appropriate for a Government to apply for such an injunction again?

Information security and risk management

1. How was it possible for the data breach to take place, especially in the context of the additional controls announced following previous data breaches in 2021?
2. What were the systemic, cultural and other factors that enabled the data breach?
3. How confident can we be that another serious data breach could not take place again today?
4. What has been the impact of the data breach and its handling on trust in Government, both within the UK and among overseas partners?
5. How far did the quantum of risk to those affected by the data breach change substantially between the discovery of the breach and the conclusion of the Rimmer Review, and how far did the Government’s risk assessment methodology change?
6. Following the lifting of the injunction, what is the risk to those individuals in the dataset who have not been resettled, and how has this risk been managed?
7. What is the risk to UK citizens whose data were part of the breach, and how has this risk been managed?

Planning and delivery

1. Were decisions on who to offer resettlement reasonably taken in light of the data breach?
2. Were decisions on who to offer resettlement in light of the data breach taken in a timely way? If not, why not?
3. How much will the data breach have cost the public purse? How reliable are the assumptions behind this cost estimate? What if anything is not being funded instead?

Resettlement

1. Has the Ministry of Defence and Government more widely made adequate arrangements for the resettlement of eligible Afghans in the United Kingdom?
2. What are the successes of the Afghan Resettlement Programme, and what are the key issues, for affected Afghans, Defence, public services, local communities and public trust? What are the opportunity costs?

Each submission should be no longer than 3,000 words and contain a brief introduction about the author. Submissions should be in malleable format such as MS Word (not PDFs) with no use of colour, logos or photos. Further guidance is available on our Written Evidence Guidance.

 

03 Sep 25. PAC to question MoD on Afghan data breach and F-35 fighter jet programme

Evidence Session   .

Monday 8th September, 3.30pm, Grimond Room, Portcullis House

The UK’s F-35 stealth fighter capability / The Afghanistan Response Route

Watch live or catch-up on Parliamentlive.tv

The National Audit Office (NAO) has published a report on the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) to support the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) scrutiny of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) will hold an evidence session with senior Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials on Monday 8 September.

The session will have two panels – the first will take place at 3.30pm. The PAC will take evidence on the ARR scheme, informed by the NAO’s factual account.

A second, separate panel will then be held at approx. 4.15pm on the UK’s F-35 fighter jet capability, also informed by the NAO’s equivalent report on the topic.

The ARR was set up by the MoD to mitigate the security risks arising from a data protection breach and the unauthorised disclosure of personal information about Afghan citizens which occurred in February 2022.

The NAO report found that the MoD does not know exact cost to date of the ARR scheme. HM Treasury (HMT) has also prepared a briefing note for the PAC on HMT’s understanding of rules and expectations for reporting the actual/estimated spending or contingency incurred following the data breach and in relation to spending on the ARR.

The second panel on the F-35 will take place at approx. 4.15pm. The NAO’s report found that the UK’s 37 F-35 jets significantly improve the armed forces’ warfighting capability. It also expressed the view that the capability achieved for the estimated £11bn spent to date is a disappointing return so far compared with MoD plans, even if other benefits have been significant.

The NAO found that, although the F-35 represents an upgrade on any previous UK aircraft, deliveries of it have been delayed by over a year; important capabilities such as the ability to attack ground targets from a safe distance have been delayed into the 2030s; and the aircraft are available to fly far less often than the MoD’s targets. The report further found that the MoD’s estimate of £18.8bn for whole life costs for the programme is likely a significant under-forecast, with NAO estimates putting it at £71bn at least. The PAC will explore how the MoD can better invest its resources in the F-35 programme, with other subject topics likely to include:

• Shortages of engineers, cyber workers, pilots and flying instructors;
• Slow maintenance and lack of spare parts driving the F-35’s availability issues;
• The delayed deliveries of the aircraft by over a year from the original plan.

Panel One on Afghan data breach (from 3.30pm)

• David Williams, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence (MoD)
• Dominic Wilson, Director General Transformation, MoD

Panel Two on F-35s (from approx. 4.15pm)

• David Williams, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence (MoD)
• Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton KCB ADC FREng, Chief of the Defence Staff
• Air Commodore Nick Lowe, Assistant Chief of Staff Combat Air and Senior Responsible Owner for F-35 capability

 

16 Jul 25. Chair comment: Afghanistan data protection breach 

Defence Committee reacts to disclosure of data protection breach relating to Afghanistan.

The Defence Committee has reacted to the Secretary of State for Defence’s statement on Afghanistan.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “The Secretary of State’s statement yesterday revealed not only a catastrophic data breach that jeopardised the safety of brave Afghans who served alongside British forces, but also the fact that this breach had been kept secret for years. These shocking events now deserve proper, thorough parliamentary scrutiny to ensure that lessons are learned. I have consulted my cross-party colleagues on the Defence Committee and we all agree that this is work we intend to lead. We expect to make a formal announcement at the earliest opportunity in September on how we will take this forward.”

09 Jul 25. Report: Defence in the Grey Zone. Chair of the Defence Committee Tan Dhesi is available for broadcast interviews.

Grey zone threats “bring war to the doorstep of each and every one of us”

A group of cross-party MPs has called for a “whole of society” approach to combatting grey zone threats and strengthening homeland resilience, in a report published today.

Grey zone activities are attacks below the threshold of war, encompassing a wide range of activities: sabotage, espionage, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. Recently, the speed, scale and intensity of grey zone threats in the UK has increased.

“Whole of society” approach to homeland defence

The Defence Committee’s report “Defence in the Grey Zone” urges the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to proactively engage with wider society – including businesses, schools and communities – to help generate an informed dialogue around grey zone threats to the UK and build consensus around a common response.

The MOD could pitch this ‘offer’ to society, in conjunction with building cyber skills and awareness – from protecting critical national industries, and preventing ransomware attacks, to teaching school children to stay safe online.

By sharing its crisis management expertise with other departments and wider society, the MOD can help strengthen long-term resilience planning and preparedness across the UK. This would also allow the Armed Forces to focus on their primary responsibility during any serious international conflict, deterring or defeating military threats, the report concludes.

To lead work across Government, the Committee calls for the appointment of a dedicated minister for homeland security.

Strengthening the Joint Expeditionary Force and protecting undersea cables

Today’s report underscores the role of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in combatting grey zone threats.

The report concludes that, if JEF is to protect critical seabed infrastructure and support extended military operations in the High North, it must possess credible, deployable capabilities.

The Committee calls on the MOD to consider reinforcing the bows of Royal Navy ships, including the future Type 83 Destroyers, to ensure they can operate for longer periods in the Arctic.

The report calls on the MOD to consider increasing the permanent presence of JEF in the Baltic to provide a more responsive deterrent against sabotage to undersea cables, and to protect shipping lanes used by UK troops to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank.

Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “Our adversaries have purposefully blurred the line between peace and war. Grey zone threats pose a particularly insidious challenge – they unsettle the fabric of our day-to-day lives and undermine our ability to respond. Grey zone threats bring war to the doorstep of each and every one of us. These attacks do not discriminate; they target the whole of our society and so demand a whole of society response, in which we all must play our part.  Today’s report calls on the Ministry of Defence to engage with the rest of government, with industry and with wider society to improve our resilience and strengthen our defences at home. This means working with businesses, schools and community groups, to increase awareness of grey zone threats and to help us all take the steps needed to protect ourselves, for example, from cyberattacks, or from disinformation. The MOD plays an important part in defending the nation from grey zone attacks, but it is only a part. We must now assume that any vulnerability will be exploited against us. The industries and technologies we rely on most are clear targets for hostile states. This is why, in today’s report, we are calling for a shoring up of our digital and cyber skills and protections. The damage repeatedly caused to undersea cables highlights the importance of protecting critical infrastructure. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force needs additional capabilities to provide further deterrence against Russian sabotage, and the MOD should consider increasing our military presence in the Baltic.”

 

04 Jul 25.  Minister for Armed Forces to face questions from the Defence Committee. Evidence Session: The UK contribution to European Security 

Tuesday 8 July 2025, 10.30, Committee Room 16, Palace of Westminster

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

The Defence Committee will question the Minister for Armed Forces, Luke Pollard MP, in what is expected to be the final session of its inquiry into the UK contribution to European Security on Tuesday 8 July.

At the 2025 NATO Summit, it was announced that the UK, along with other Allies, had signed a new defence investment pledge of 5% of GDP by 2035. Unlike previous commitments, this pledge included investing in strengthening homeland security and national resilience as well as adopting a ‘NATO first’ approach.

This announcement followed the publication of the Strategic Defence Review, which marked the start of a new era for UK defence as it moves towards warfighting readiness.

In this session, MPs are likely to question the Armed Forces Minister on how prepared the UK Government is to implement the ‘NATO-first’ recommendations of the Strategic Defence Review, whether the UK could increase its commitments to NATO if required and the role Defence is set to play in homeland defence and resilience.

The Committee could also consider how the Government will increase the capacity of the defence industry and ask if greater efforts are needed to improve the levels of cross-departmental working required to achieve its defence ambitions.

8 July, 10.30:

• Luke Pollard MP – Minister for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence

 

04 Jul 25. Defence Committee to publish report on grey zone threats. The Defence Committee will publish a report at 00.01 on Wednesday 9 July, following its inquiry into defence in the grey zone.

Copies of the report will be available under embargo Monday 7 July. If you are in receipt of this email, you will automatically receive a copy.

02 Jul 25. Defence Secretary to face questions from the Defence Committee.

Evidence Session: The Work of the Secretary of State for Defence

Wednesday 2 July 2025, 14.00, Room TBC

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

Coming immediately after the important NATO summit in The Hague, the Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey MP, will give evidence to the Defence Committee at 14.00 on Wednesday 2 July.

The session will cover a wide range of topics. Members are likely to discuss the latest developments in the conflict in the Middle East. The security breach at RAF Brize Norton and the importance of homeland defence are likely to be covered in the session. Other topics include the Strategic Defence Review, defence spending commitments, and the current situation in Ukraine.

Additional witnesses may be confirmed closer to the evidence session.

2 July, 14.00:

• Rt Hon. John Healey MP – Secretary of State for Defence
• David Williams – Permanent Secretary at Ministry of Defence

General Dame Sharon Nesmith – Vice Chief of the Defence Staff at Ministry of Defence

 

27 Jun 25. How can the UK unlock greater investment in defence? 

Evidence Session: The UK contribution to European Security

Tuesday 1 July 2025, 10.30, Committee Room 16

Watch on parliamentlive.tv

The Defence Committee will examine the defence industry’s ability to access investment as it continues its inquiry into the UK contribution to European Security at 10.30 on Tuesday, 1 July.

The UK Government’s pledge to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 reflects a general trend across NATO and other European countries to boost defence funding in response to an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment.

MPs will hear from think tanks and investors on the challenges and opportunities the defence industry faces when accessing finance and attracting investment from both traditional and alternative investors.

The Committee will likely explore how the defence sector’s industrial capacity could be increased both in the UK and across Europe as they consider if the Government is doing enough to mitigate the potential risk that increased defence spending could lead to inflation, rather than improving capacity.

10.30, Tuesday 1 July:

• Fenella McGerty – Senior Fellow for Defence Economics at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
• Nicholas Nelson – General Partner, Archangel VC Fund
• Rob Murray – CEO of the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) Development Group

 

25 Jun 25. Defence Secretary to face questions from the Defence Committee. 

Evidence Session: The Work of the Secretary of State for Defence

Wednesday 2 July 2025, 14.00, Room TBC

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Coming immediately after the important NATO summit in The Hague, the Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey MP, will give evidence to the Defence Committee at 14.00 on Wednesday 2 July.

The session will cover a wide range of topics. Members are likely to discuss the latest developments in the conflict in the Middle East. The security breach at RAF Brize Norton and the importance of homeland defence are likely to be covered in the session. Other topics include the Strategic Defence Review, defence spending commitments, and the current situation in Ukraine.

Additional witnesses may be confirmed closer to the evidence session.

2 July, 14.00:

• Rt Hon. John Healey MP – Secretary of State for Defence

 

24 Jun 25. National Security Strategy: JCNSS Chair welcomes “national resilience effort” set out today. The Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Matt Western MP, has responded to the Government’s publication of the National Security Strategy.

Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Matt Western, said: “I welcome today’s new strategy. It seeks to provide a wide-ranging assessment across defence and security, critical infrastructure, advanced technology, soft power, industry and trade – to name just a few of the topics it covers. Security is no longer something that happens ‘over there’ – it is an increasingly tangible feature of our lives. The Government notes that “for the first time in many years, we have to actively prepare for the possibility of the UK homeland coming under direct threat”, while addressing wider issues around international competition, technology and climate change. This requires a whole-of-society response. The strategy envisions a “new national resilience effort”, bringing the UK towards spending 5% of GDP on defence and security. This would require a major cultural shift, and I look forward to examining the Government’s plans to achieve this. I am also pleased the Government highlights the threats to undersea internet cables. Our ongoing inquiry is examining the extensive vulnerabilities across our subsea infrastructure, and how the Government can improve protections. However, there are a lot of strategies contained within this strategy; focusing on delivery will be key. Meanwhile, the Government has not provided many details about the trade-offs it will likely need to make to reach its goals. Its position on China is particularly unclear. My Committee will examine the Government’s new approach closely, and I look forward to probing these issues in forthcoming evidence sessions.”