28 Jan 26. UK Defence Committee compares GCAP fighter with TSR failure
One Committee member compared the sixth generation fighter with a 1960s tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft which the UK could ill afford.
- Defence Committee member Calvin Bailey made the comparison between the GCAP fighter and the TSR-2 aircraft cancelled during the Cold War
- There is concern that the future fighter will similarly face significant cost overun and eventual cancellation
- This, Bailey maintained, is due to the programme entering an “unaffordable defence plan”, much like in April 1965 under another Labour government
It is not the first time that the UK put forward a novel aircraft programme without the funds to back its plans.
In a Defence Committee session on 27 January, one Defence Committee member, Calvin Bailey, had to remind the incumbent Defence Secretary, John Healey, of the significant cost overrun and subsequent cancellation of the British Aircraft Corporation’s TSR-2 aircraft in 1965 under his predecessor, Denis Healey. The warning comes amid fears that the UK Ministry of Defence cannot afford its new aerial pet project – the sixth generation Tempest fighter, the centrepiece of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Japan and Italy – nor all it has set out to deliver in the Strategic Defence Review. Yet this document was widely extolled last year for its astute reflection on the fragmented world order and the technologies Britain needs to navigate the new threat landscape. It does not help that the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Richard Knighton, recently stated that there will be “trade-offs” to come in the overdue Defence Investment Plan (DIP), now delayed until the Spring. The government have already allocated more than £2bn ($2.75bn) toward GCAP since 2021 and they have budgeted another £12bn for the next decade. But considering the growing spending deficit on defence equipment in previous years – the National Audit Office uncovered a £17bn shortfall in 2023 – and the woeful lack of transparency since the Labour government succeeded in July 2024, there is not a lot of confidence in the UK’s ability to finance programmes at present. TSR-2 was a Cold War tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft developed for the Royal Air Force in the late 1950s and early 60s. The fuselage was very long (89 feet), slim and incorporated a shoulder-mounted delta wing and turned down wing tips. The cost of the programme became a matter of political contention and at two cabinet meetings held on 1st April 1965, the government decided to cancel the programme. This was claimed to be on the grounds of rising costs, although some point more directly to a political option to acquire up to 110 F-111 Aardvark fighter-bombers from the United States. The decision was announced in the Budget Speech on 6 April 1965.
Fair comparison?
Given ongoing fiscal troubles and the government’s extended delay of the DIP, it is reasonable to draw parallels to the TSR-2 failure. But a tri-national programme brings with it “shared cost and political buy-in,” observed Daniel Meredith, defence R&A head at intelligence firm GlobalData. Unlike TSR-2, there is intended to be an incremental capability spiral, not a single leap with digital engineering / model-based design from day one. Export intent is also baked in. “Critically, the UK has no sovereign alternative once [the Eurofighter] Typhoon retires,” in 2040, Meredith reflected. There are still 159 jets in service according to GlobalData intelligence, and the radar system was upgraded recently to the ECRS Mk2. It is worth noting that the GCAP structure is also modelled on a legal treaty basis, designed to be more difficult to opt out of in the long term. To do so would risk the loss of one’s international reputation, commercial disputes and arguably future sovereign defence-industrial capability. Likewise, it would also be difficult for participants to amend the design with national alterations, a factor that historically contributed to growing costs in the Eurofighter programme.
“TSR-2 was easier to kill precisely because it was a national programme,” Meredith concluded. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
28 Jan 26. Defence and Public Accounts Committee Chairs: delay to DIP publication “risks sending damaging signals to adversaries . Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, and Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, have written a joint letter to the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Jeremy Pocklington, seeking clarity on when the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) will be published. The publication of the plan was due in Autumn 2025, as set out in the Strategic Defence Review, but has been repeatedly pushed back. Today’s letter highlights that further delay to the DIP publication “risks sending damaging signals to adversaries”. The letter states that “continued delays cannot be blamed on external events, which are unceasing. The difficult choices need to be made now”. The Committees warn that the MOD’s failure to publish Equipment Plans in 2023 and 2024, and now the absence of the DIP, has resulted in an unacceptable gap in Parliament and the public’s ability to scrutinise Defence spending.
28 Jan 26. New inquiry: Defence in the High North
Inquiry launch: Defence in the High North
Melting polar ice caps are increasing access to the Arctic and High North region, with significant defence and security implications for the UK, and recent weeks have seen increased global focus on the strategic importance of the region.
The Government’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review concluded that the Arctic Ocean will likely be ice free each summer by 2040. While the UK has no territory in the High North, it considers itself a “nearest neighbour” and its military activity in the region has grown, in large part to counter Russian efforts at militarisation.
Additionally, as accessibility increases in the High North, countries such as China may see economic and trade opportunities through the opening up of new shipping routes and access to potentially large reserves of natural resources.
The Defence Committee today launches a new inquiry into Defence in the High North. The inquiry will examine the current and emerging threats in the region. It will ask what the UK’s defence and security interests are, and whether we have the correct strategies, capabilities and alliances to counter these threats, particularly from Russia.
The deadline for submitting written evidence is Wednesday 25 March.
Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “As rising global temperatures melt the polar ice caps, the Arctic is set to transform from a region of low tension and activity, to one of key strategic importance for the UK, its Allies and partners and our collective interests. Increased access to the Arctic and High North poses both challenges and opportunities for the UK. For northern European nations, an exposed northern flank may introduce new threats. Russia’s efforts to exploit the changing climate in the north, consistently growing its military presence, are of particular concern. However, how well placed is the UK to operate effectively in the region, potentially without a US contribution? And, if threats increase, will the UK have the right capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat, a potential adversary in the harsh environment of the High North? Our inquiry will delve into the emerging threats in the region and ask whether the UK has what it needs to meet the challenges ahead.”
The Committee welcomes written evidence on the following:
- What are the UK’s defence and security interests in the High North, and what are the current and emerging threats relating to the region?
- Does the UK have clear and achievable defence and security policies for the region, including their relationship with those for adjacent regions – such as the Royal Navy’s Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield and Atlantic Strike concepts?
- How will the UK work with, and without, key allies and partners in the region, both within and outside NATO, including through the JEF, and how does this support or undermine the UK’s policies set out in ‘b’?
- Do UK Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities for sustained operations in the region now; and are appropriate plans in place to meet the needs of the future?
- To what degree can military capabilities developed for the High North be re-deployed for operations in other theatres, and vice versa?
- How does the UK’s defence and security strategy for the region align with the Government’s wider growth and defence exports agenda?
Each submission should be no longer than 3,000 words and contain a brief introduction about the author. Submissions should be in malleable format such as MS Word (not PDFs) with no use of colour, logos or photos. Further guidance is available on our Written Evidence Guidance.
23 Jan 26. Defence Committee Chair responds to President Trump’s “belittlement of the contribution of the UK and other NATO allies.” The Defence Committee has issued a statement responding to President Trump’s comments on the contribution of the UK and other NATO allies in Afghanistan. Chair of the Defence Committee, Tan Dhesi MP, said: “As our House of Commons Defence Committee fully appreciates, British troops fought valiantly in Afghanistan alongside the US and other NATO allies. To suggest otherwise is an utter insult to the memories of those who lost their lives, and to those who returned from battle with permanent injuries. President Trump’s belittlement of the contribution of the UK and other NATO allies, who went to Afghanistan in support of the US, when they needed us, is shameful.”