Analysis current as of 0730hrs (BST), 22 June 2025
EVENT
Earlier on 22 June, US President Donald Trump announced that the US had conducted airstrikes targeting three key nuclear facilities in Iran, destroying uranium enrichment facilities in Fordow (Qom province) and Natanz (Isfahan province), and another unspecified facility in Isfahan province. Iranian authorities have confirmed that US airstrikes targeted the facilities, though state media denied that the facilities have been ‘irreversibly damaged’.
SIGNIFICANCE
* The strikes mark a major escalation between the US and Iran and comes amid the ongoing Israel-Iran war (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). Trump stated that US military ‘worked as a team’ with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and that the strikes underscore the US’s support for Israel’s efforts to neutralise Iran’s nuclear programme.
* Trump stated that the US would conduct further strikes unless Iran ‘make[s] peace’. This almost certainly refers to Iran making significant concessions regarding its nuclear programme during negotiations with the US.
* At 0345hrs (local time), Israel’s Home Front Command raised the nationwide threat to ‘critical’ amid concerns of a major Iranian retaliation. This guidance bans all public gatherings and only allows essential businesses to operate.
* Iranian authorities have stated that all nuclear material had been removed from the targeted sites prior to US airstrikes, underscoring broader efforts to moderate risks of nuclear incidents or safety breaches amid continued strikes on enrichment and uranium stockpile facilities.
FORECAST
Iran will likely directly respond to US strikes by targeting US military installations in the region, increasing conflict escalation risks. In the coming hours, Iranian authorities will likely continue working to determine the impact of strike action on the facilities’ operationality and Iran’s nuclear programme; the extent of damage to the facilities will likely influence the intensity of Iran’s response to strike action. In the coming days, Iran will likely mobilise efforts to conduct strikes targeting US assets and installations in the region, substantially increasing regional tensions. Strike action will likely primarily target US installations in Iraq, particularly the Al-Asad Airbase (Al Anbar governorate) and Harir Air Base (Erbil governorate), while strikes targeting US positions in Syria such as the Abu Hajar airfield (al-Hasakah governorate) and the Al-Tanf garrison (Rif Dimashq governorate) are also possible. Though less likely, there is also a realistic possibility that Iran will retaliate against US strike action by targeting US assets and installations in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, increasing conflict spillover risks. If Iran attempts to target US assets and installations in the region, the US would highly likely conduct further strikes within Iran, possibly targeting military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) installations and assets, increasing risks of conflict escalation.
Iran is highly likely to mobilise its proxies to target US bases in the region, compounding security and bystander risks for proximate installations, as well as commercial vessels moving through the Red Sea. Iran is highly likely to call for proxy mobilisation in Iraq, with elements of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) likely resuming attacks targeting US bases and possibly resuming drone attacks targeting Israel in the coming days. Such attacks will increase risks of retaliatory US and Israeli strikes targeting locations associated with proxy activity, driving conflict escalation and ethno-religious tensions therein. The Yemen-based Houthis will also likely resume attacks on US and Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea in the coming days, significantly increasing security risks for vessels traversing the Bab el-Mandeb and sustaining significant pressure on global supply chains. However, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is unlikely to resume attacks on Israel in the coming weeks due to broader capacity limitations, moderating prospects for an escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border. Even so, Iran-backed militant groups and factions in Lebanon and Syria will possibly attempt to conduct low-capacity rocket attacks targeting northern Israel in the coming days, likely triggering Israeli airstrikes targeting infrastructure and locations associated with militant activity. A general escalation in proxy attacks targeting Israel and the US will increase risks of regional conflict escalation, while compounding security and bystander risks for locally engaged staff.
Amid escalating regional tensions, concerns that Iran will restrict movement through the Strait of Hormuz will likely trigger substantial volatility on global energy markets. Although Iran is unlikely to unilaterally close the Strait of Hormuz in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will attempt to restrict the passage of vessels through waterway to maximise economic pressure on the US and Israel and deter further airstrikes. The Strait is a critical maritime route through which approximately 25% of the world’s crude oil supply and 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade flow. Such a closure would severely disrupt crude oil exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, triggering global crude price surges, significant shocks across international energy markets and substantially undermining global supply chain continuity. Amid increasing concerns that Iran will restrict passage through the Strait, oil exporters will likely attempt to expedite shipments from the Gulf to receiving markets, increasing risks of bottlenecks and vessel collisions in the coming days.
In the coming days, Iranian hostilities towards Israel will likely intensify, with missile and drone attacks sustaining security risks in Israel and disrupting travel through regional airspace. By 0900hrs (local time) on 22 June, Iran had launched at least three missile barrages towards Israel; this marks a moderate increase in the frequency of missile attacks compared to recent days and almost certainly reflects Iranian efforts to retaliate against US strikes on nuclear facilities. In the coming days, Iran will likely attempt to intensify missile attacks targeting Israel, likely employing heavier munitions (including one-tonne missiles; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 June 2025) and cluster munitions to increase pressure on Israeli air defences. In response, Israel is highly likely to continue intensifying airstrikes within Iran, possibly increasing targeting of Iranian energy infrastructure and/or expanding the ongoing assassination campaign targeting nuclear scientists and military personnel to include high-ranking political figures. Such intensification will likely undermine prospects for diplomatic de-escalation, sustaining significant operational disruption in both Iran and Israel. Regional airspace closures and flight suspensions are also highly likely to remain in place in the coming days, restricting access to commercially available evacuation routes. Broader disruption to airline operations (including route diversions away from impacted airspace) will also sustain risks of delays to intercontinental flights, increasing travel costs and risks of supply chain disruption.
In the coming days, risks of anti-US demonstrations in the broader region will increase, driving risks of unrest and hostility to US-linked investment. In the coming days, risks of anti-US protests and unrest will increase throughout the region, particularly in Iraq and Yemen, as well as in Shia-majority areas in Lebanon and Syria. Demonstrations will likely target around US embassies and will possibly spread to also target entities associated with the US, including retail outlets, hospitality venues and NGOs, increasing risks of targeted unrest, violence and vandalism for locally engaged firms, particularly in Iraq. More broadly, risks of anti-US protests will also remain elevated in Algeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey and Venezuela, increasing risks of temporary travel and operational disruption in the immediate vicinity of protest sites. Anti-war protests are also highly likely to escalate in the coming days, particularly in the US, with large-scale demonstrations increasing localised transit and supply chain disruption risks in major urban centres including Chicago (Illinois), New York (New York), Los Angeles and San Francisco (California), Seattle (Washington) and the capital Washington DC.