SDSR 2010 – REMINDERS OF A GRAVE ERROR OF JUDGEMENT
By Howard Wheeldon, FRAeS, Wheeldon Strategic Advisory Ltd.
17 Nov 14. Following on from a suggestion made some weeks ago that I might update and maybe revise my original ‘No Holiday from History – Dangers of Reducing Air Power’ paper written in October 2011, one year after SDSR 2010 was published, I am persuaded that with geo-political tensions increasing, particularly in Ukraine, Iraq and Syria, now might be an opportune moment to look back and remind ourselves of grave errors of judgement made in relation to air and maritime power and of what I said at the time. I now do this below in a slightly revised and updated form although one that stays absolutely loyal to what I said back then.
The weakness of overall UK air power capability and the clear lack of resilience remains as large a concern for those of us engaged in defence commentary as it had been when I had presented the original address under the same title ahead of SDSR 2010 publication and to what I remember being an extremely crowded fringe event at the Conservative Party Conference, Birmingham on October 5th 2010. Just a couple of weeks later, following actual publication of the National Security Policy and SDSR 2010, our worst fears were proved absolutely correct. With SDSR 2015 looming a year from now I hope that you find it of some interest:
Almost a year (now four years) since SDSR [Strategic Defence & Security Review] paper was published by the Coalition Government and little over a year (four years) since Air Marshal T.M (Timo) Anderson presented the 2010 Slessor Lecture entitled ‘The Royal Air Force in the 21st Century’ what follows may be a timely reminder reasoned in part by the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ that in terms of air power defence and deterrent capability there can be no holiday from history.
I am not alone in having condemned the manner in which the approach to SDSR 2010 was conducted or that the subsequent process threatened to condemn far too much UK defence capability to the scrapheap. Others with much greater entitlement than I expressed severe doubt about the whole process too using similarly harsh words to condemn what they feared could be devastating consequences for UK air and sea power capability. The warnings of what SDSR 2010 had been around for months but when the news finally came of the extent of the planned devastation suffice to say that all those engaged in defence be it within the military or in industry were shocked.
In his Slessor Lecture Air Marshal Anderson gave what was many us would conclude was the most serious warning to date of the danger of playing down the role of air power within the overall defensive capability of the UK. The message was as simple as it was also stark – play down national air power defence capability too far and the Royal Air Force might soon find itself unable to defend our air space, unable to counter threats from hostile states, to conduct foreign military campaigns either as part of our wide NATO commitment or maybe even to defend the rights of those in our overseas territories and elsewhere to whom we also have a duty of care to protect. The same of course could equally have been said for the Royal Navy and involvement of the Fleet Air Arm on the two remaining Invincible class aircraft carriers.
Since the speech was made the extent of planned devastation to air power capability has been made very clear. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force will lose Harrier force, the Royal Navy will lose HMS Ark Royal and while the two new planned carriers will be built the gap in true carrier strike capability could be as much as ten years. In addition the Royal Air Force will also see further cuts to its front line fast jet capability with planned Typhoon numbers being cut and Tornado Squadrons also being cut.
The Royal Navy would lose all three of its fine Type 22 frigates and the Royal Air Force would lose its Merlin helic