30 Jan 19. MoD Must Act Now On Unaffordable Equipment Plan.
– More than four-fifths of estimated £7bn shortfall occurs in Plan’s first four years
– Urgent need for Government to take decisions on its defence priorities – Industry must have confidence to invest in equipment and support required by Forces
REPORT SUMMARY
In May 2018 we reported that the Ministry of Defence (the Department) did not have enough money to buy and support the equipment it needs. Despite committing to tackle this problem, the Department has made little progress, continuing to delay the difficult decisions needed to make the Equipment Plan (the Plan) affordable, particularly around which programmes to stop, delay or scale back. It now estimates a most likely affordability gap between its budget and its forecast costs of £7bn across its Plan over the next ten years. It also estimates that the gap could widen to £14.8bn, but even this looks to be unlikely and overly optimistic. The escalating and continuing affordability issues have led to short-term decision making which has only worsened the longer-term affordability risks. As a direct result, there is uncertainty for both the Department and for industry which needs to be addressed. Coupled with our ongoing concerns over the Department’s ability to forecast costs and efficiencies accurately, we remain sceptical that the Department is close to reconciling what it says it needs with the funding it has available.
Comment From PAC Chair Meg Hillier MP: “In terms of poor financial planning, the Ministry of Defence is a repeat offender. The Department’s progress with addressing the concerns set out in our last report on the Defence Equipment Plan has been woeful.
“The MoD simply cannot afford everything it says it needs and it is not acceptable for officials to continue deferring decisions that have a bearing on its current affordability gap and longer-term risks. A department that is unwilling or unable to take the action required to help it live within its means is failing taxpayers, who rightly expect Government to deliver the best possible value for their money. We urge the MoD to act on our recommendations now, work with the Treasury to ensure its funding and planning models are fit for purpose, and bring some much-needed clarity to its priorities and costs.”
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Department’s Equipment Plan remains unaffordable as government continues to delay decisions on its priorities, and on whether to increase funding or stop, delay or scale back programmes. The Department estimates that 84% of its £7bn affordability gap falls in the first four years of its 10-year Plan, and it therefore urgently needs to decide how to make the Plan more affordable. It is alarming that the government has not yet made these decisions, with defence capability reviews continuing since July 2017. Back in March 2018, the Department committed to sharing emerging findings from the MDP in July 2018, with the cost information available in autumn 2018. However, with both a Spending Review and Strategic Defence and Security Review likely in the next two years, we can only see continuing uncertainty and delay. The Department now says that programme-related decisions will most likely be incorporated into the Spending Review 2019, but not reflected in the Equipment Plan until 2020. Any delay to the 2019 Comprehensive Spending Review would wreak havoc on the Department’s ability to take urgently-needed decisions on its transformation agenda. While the Department confirmed it was uncomfortable with the size of its current affordability gap, it said it would always expect there to be “a prudent level of over-programming”, although did not know what level this would be.
Recommendation: As soon as possible, government must produce an affordable Equipment Plan by:
– providing clarity on its priorities and the subsequent decisions made to stop, delay, and scale back areas of the defence programme to make the Equipment Plan affordable; and
– clarifying what it considers to be a prudent level of over-programming across the 10-years and why.
The Department’s inability to provide certainty on its equipment and support plans, risks reducing the confidence industry needs to invest in the equipment and support required by our Armed Forces. The Department recognises it needs to prioritise how it manages its suppliers and says that it is now having more open conversations with industry about future threats and requirements. The Department needs to ensure industry retains and maintains certain skills, particularly within the UK, such as for the development of fighter aircraft. The UK needs specialist skills which may require government support to be sustained; for example, a UK-based capability to develop complex radar, which the Department says it is discussing with industry. We are pleased to hear that the Department recognises the need to discuss industrial strategy in more depth across government, particularly around aerospace.
30 Jan 19. PACAC launches new inquiry examining Parliament’s role in authorising the use of military force. The deployment of armed forces has for centuries been a decision taken under the royal prerogative: initially by the Crown alone, and now in practice by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Whilst Parliament has no legal role in authorising the use of military force, it has nevertheless scrutinised and debated the issue extensively; notably in 2015 when it declined to approve the deployment of armed forces in Syria.
Committees of both the Commons and Lords have concluded that the right to authorise the use of military force should no longer reside solely in the hands of the Executive, and that parliamentary approval should also be required. Successive Prime Ministers have also indicated their support for such a stance, however, no resolutions or legislation have been brought forward to formally reflect a change to the convention.
In April 2018, the Royal Air Force was deployed in Syria during parliamentary recess, and Parliament was not recalled to debate the issue. The Government justified this by referring to its urgent humanitarian duty to prevent further loss of life, arguing there was not sufficient time available to recall Parliament.
The Committee therefore invites evidence on the issue of authorisation of the use of military force, addressing the following questions:
- To what extent is the deployment military force a necessary responsibility and function of Government?
- What are the conventions governing the deployment of military force?
- How has the use of the royal prerogative to authorise military force changed over time?
- Is the royal prerogative still the appropriate mechanism for deploying military force?
- Since 2003, how has the involvement of Parliament in authorising the use of military force affected the conventions governing its deployment?
- What role, if any, should Parliament have in the authorisation of military force?
- How should this role be assured?
- What can the UK learn from international comparators?
House of Commons and House of Lords Hansard Written Answers
Q
Asked by Jo Platt
(Leigh)
[N]
Asked on: 25 January 2019
Cabinet Office
Cybercrime: Ministerial Responsibility
212673
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, pursuant to the Answer of 24 January 2019 to Question 210691 on Cybercrime, if he will publish a list of the Ministers with responsibility for cybercime and what the responsibilities are of each Minister.
A
Answered by: Mr David Lidington
Answered on: 30 January 2019
I am accountable to Parliament for the National Cyber Security Strategy and the accompanying investment programme. I am also the lead Minister for the cyber resilience of the government sector. The Home Secretary leads on cyber security response, in addition to his responsibility to counter cyber crime. The Defence Secretary has overall responsibility for the development of the UK’s offensive cyber capability. The Foreign Secretary has statutory responsibility for the National Cyber Security Centre, as a part of GCHQ. The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport leads on digital matters, including the relevant growth, innovation and skills aspects of cyber security. These responsibilities are brought together under the National Security Council Strategic Defence and Security Review sub-committee (NSC SDSR) chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Q
Asked by Catherine West
(Hornsey and Wood Green)
[N]
Asked on: 25 January 2019
Ministry of Defence
USA: INF Treaty
212649
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what discussions he has had with his counterpart in the US administration on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty since the announcement by President Trump that the US intended to withdraw from that treaty.
A
Answered by: Gavin Williamson
Answered on: 30 January 2019
The UK maintains a close dialogue with the US at all levels on foreign and security policy questions, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The Treaty has been consistently raised at the Ministerial level between myself and my US counterpart. Ministry of Defence officials have also engaged at all levels with the US and NATO Allies. We have made our position clear to Russia, and continue to support US and NATO action to bring Russia back to verifiable compliance.
Q
Asked by Catherine West
(Hornsey and Wood Green)
[N]
Asked on: 25 January 2019
Ministry of Defence
USA: Nuclear Weapons
212650
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he has held discussions with his counterpart in the US administrations on the doomsday clock update published by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
A
Answered by: Gavin Williamson
Answered on: 30 January 2019
I have held no discussions with my US counterpart on the 2019 doomsday clock statement. However, Her Majesty’s Government has close and regular dialogue with the US Administration on all aspects of nuclear arms control and counter proliferation policy.