21 Sep 16. The Defence Committee today publishes its Report into UK military operations in Syria and Iraq. The Report examines the nature of DAESH, the threat posed by DAESH affiliates and the role played by the UK military, diplomatic and aid efforts in achieving the International Coalition’s strategic goals.
The Report welcomes the progress made in terms of the land retaken from DAESH and the UK’s military training effort in Iraq. However, it raises concerns about the lack of progress of the political strategy in both the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts.
The Report provides a comprehensive assessment of the air effort in both Syria and Iraq. That work demonstrates that since December 2015, UK airstrikes have been predominately in Iraq (550) with a far smaller number in Syria (65). Furthermore, only a minority of the 65 UK air strikes in Syria appear to be in support of opposition forces on the ground.
Dr Julian Lewis, Chair of the Defence Committee, stated: “Whilst substantial progress in eliminating Daesh is clearly being achieved in Iraq, the situation in Syria is far more complex. Assuming Daesh is squeezed out of both countries, we have to focus too on what happens next—both in other countries to which Daesh may migrate, and in Syria especially where there is no shortage of other Islamist groups, just as dangerous, which are planning to take control”.
The Report also assesses the Syrian opposition groups identified by the UK Government as partners on the ground and the resultant difficulties of a military campaign based predominantly on air power. Despite extensive correspondence with the Ministry of Defence, the Committee was unable to obtain the Government’s list of which groups the UK was supporting in Syria. In the absence of an official list, we have had to rely on information provided by outside organisations. Whilst there was a degree of overlap in the groups identified in those lists, there was not a consensus on the political or religious motivations of those groups.
The Report questions whether the Government’s policy instruments are sufficiently integrated with the International Coalition’s strategy and whether the strategy has the flexibility to meet the changing nature of the conflict in the Middle East.
The Report concludes that the phenomenon of DAESH is indicative of a wider problem and recommends that the Government sets out how it intends to counter new threats—whether they manifest themselves as a DAESH affiliate in Africa or South East Asia or as another group entirely, such as the former Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fateh al Sham.
Among the Report’s recommendations are:
DAESH and the threat posed by DAESH affiliates
• “The UK and Coalition’s strategy to counter DAESH is predominately focused on Iraq and Syria; and relies on the removal of territory from DAESH in order to eliminate it. That is a necessary, but not sufficient, strategy. If DAESH transforms itself into an international movement or a network of affiliates—like al-Qaeda before it—which can survive the loss of territory, the UK Government approach will need to adapt. For example, if DAESH is defeated in the Middle East but then grows strong in Africa, the current strategy will require major revision.”
The UK military effort
• “It is disappointing that the MoD has been unable to provide us with the full statistical analysis of UK airstrikes in Syria which we requested. Their inability to do so for understandable reasons, nonetheless may tend to undermine the Government’s assertion that the bombing campaign in Syria is in support of credible moderate ground forces (apart from the Kurds) which was one of the key elements of its argument for extending the UK’s campaign against DAESH to that country.”
• “In Iraq it is clear that air operations have been effective in reclaiming territory, despite the adaptation of DAESH tactics to counter that threat. This is because of their role in supporting identifiable local ground forces which are a