30 Oct 14. Defence Committee. FUTURE FORCE 2020, Wednesday 5 November 2014. The Grimond Room, Portcullis House
Witnesses:
At 2.30 pm
* Admiral Sir George Zambellas, Chief of Naval Staff/First Sea Lord
* General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff
* Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford, Chief of Air Staff
* General Richard Barrons, Commander, Joint Forces Command
This is the second session for this inquiry. On 2 July 2014 the Defence Committee announced a new inquiry into Future Force 2020. This followed the Committee’s earlier work looking at the Future Army 2020. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review set out the Government’s plans for the Armed Forces called Future Force 2020. The Committee is particularly concerned about the relevance, size and quality of the Armed Forces. The Committee is particularly interested in examining.
* The impact on the plans for Future Force 2020 of the challenging global political and security context, including in Ukraine, the Middle East and Africa and the changing size, structures and priorities of other international forces including those of the UK’s usual allies.
* Whether the implementation of Future Force 2020 will provide the flexible, agile and operationally capable force required
* The impact of the Levene Reforms on the Armed Forces, in particular, how the Joint Forces Command (JFC) will operate with the other three Services on operations and in providing contingent capability and the effect of the delegation of budgets to the three Services and JFC for equipment and other expenditure.
* The costs of the reforms.
30 Oct 14. Defence Committee. Call for Written Evidence: The situation in Iraq and Syria and the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Defence Committee announced the terms of reference for its inquiry into the situation in Iraq and Syria and the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Committee is looking to take evidence to address the following questions:
* What are the threats represented by ISIL, other militant groups and the Assad regime, politically, ideologically and militarily in Iraq and Syria? How might they evolve?
* What are the objectives which form the basis for the UK’s participation in the international coalition’s strategy in a) Iraq, b) Syria, and c) the region?
* What should the UK Government’s goals be for domestic and regional security, humanitarian assistance and political stability in Iraq and Syria?
* What alternatives are there to the UK Government’s current responses and the declared strategy of the international coalition in Iraq and Syria?
* Is the UK able to deploy sufficient, sustainable military, diplomatic and other resources to carry out its declared objectives?
* What are the implications of long term involvement in Iraq, Syria and the region for the next NSS and SDSR?
The Committee intends to consider a number of questions during its inquiry. These questions include:
* What is Government and international coalition strategy in Iraq and/or Syria?
* What are the objectives, why and how is the UK planning to achieve them?
* What would be the case for extending UK military operations to Syria?
* What are the different political, humanitarian and military options available?
* The Government has emphasised that military action is dependent on an internal political solution and a regional solution involving other states. What are the components of this solution, how can the Government work to achieve them and what is the likelihood of success?
* How would the absence of a political or regional solution affect the case for military action?
* What are the advantages and disadvantages of deploying ground troops?
* Are current UK force structures and resources suitable for this type of undertaking and what are the implications for the next NSS and SDSR and the timing of these reviews?
* Are the current military operations sustainable in the

