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29 May 25. SDSR on Monday. Sources close to BATTLESPACE suggest that the Strategic Defence Review (SDSR) will be announced on Monday. MoD officials are being tight lipped about the outcome. Some observers expect a fudge and damp squib? Watch this space! One possible outcome is more Boxer APCs including the RCH155 howitzer system being developed with Germany, taking the numbers to over 1000.
Commenting on the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, Professor Anthony King, Director of the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, said: “The release of the Strategic Defence Review has apparently been delayed by the Treasury, worried about the financial implications. It will demand increased defence spending. I anticipate; it will prioritise NATO and Trans-Atlantic defence; will call for an increase in resources and personnel; it will emphasise AI and lethal autonomy. This is sensible but the belief that AI and autonomous systems will replace mass is misconceived. In order to exploit AI effectively, the forces will have to be much bigger than they are now – and, in some areas, structured differently.”
Professor King is available on 07841426425
Please find below a commentary on the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review (SDR) by Matthew Savill, Director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
The SDR is Released from Purgatory
The much-discussed UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has recently been subject to a wearingly familiar succession of leaks and speculation, and now appears likely to be published in the week of 2 June. Through its gestation, the review has been dogged by concerns about delays caused by the changing global context, the level of its ambition, and the extent to which the government’s commitment on spending 2.5% of GDP would be enough to address the issues in Defence.
When the review was in its research phase, a trio of distinguished former UK officials set out a framework against which to judge it. Now the results of the review are imminent, how might it be read, and what should be examined as measures of success or challenge when it eventually sees the public light of day? In particular, how might its level of ambition for the ‘transformation’ of the UK’s Armed Forces be judged?
Schrodinger’s Review
The first area on which to evaluate the review is the manner of its presentation, particularly in its conclusions. The review is unusual in it is notionally independent, delivered by Lord Robertson as part of a trio of senior figures (Dr Fiona Hill and retired General Richard Barrons the other two), alongside a number of external experts and specialists, supported but not directed by a secretariat in the Ministry of Defence (MOD). They had free rein to make suggestions and propose ideas to change Defence, albeit they also have terms of reference – including a budget ceiling – within which to work.
These constrained the review, as did limited capacity (albeit bolstered by artificial intelligence summarising the thousands of submissions), but in the final analysis this should be a review less encumbered than previously by inter-service politics or the orthodoxy of the MOD. However, if media reporting is accurate, we can infer it was largely finished some time ago, but has been delayed until now by wrangling over how to implement it, what this means for the MOD’s finances, and how to present the subsequent work the MOD will need to do.
This was always the danger inherent in picking an independent team but running the review on behalf of the MOD: it could present politically difficult options. It is not feasible to only publish part of it, and cherry-picking will be obvious, leaving the alternative of watering it down. But if the report’s authors are lukewarm over the final results, or step away entirely, it will undermine its intellectual case, and lead to doubt about the government’s seriousness in approaching the issue.
A completely independent review would not need government ‘sign-off’ or ‘approval’ from the Treasury. Of course, the Government might not have liked the conclusions, but much like a report from a Select Committee, a government response could have then applied budgetary realism or an alternative perspective and then engaged in the resulting open and (hopefully) educational public debate about priorities. Instead, we are left with something like ‘Schrodinger’s Review’: both independent and dependent at the same time.
Strategy Requires Making Choices and Compromises
The second area for judgement is its utility as a ‘strategic’ document and whether the SDR is trying to be ‘a’ strategy or not. If so, it should be read as an attempt to achieve the cliched but necessary balancing of ‘ends, ways, and means’ for Defence: determining the purpose of the Armed Forces, how they should go about their business, and with what resources (inside a ceiling dictated to the authors).
The signs for this are not positive at the moment, given the previously-mentioned delay for discussions in the interval between the SDR’s conclusion and its publication. The terms for the review talk about prioritisation of objectives, investments and activity, which certainly sounds like important components for a strategy. But more recently, the Permanent Secretary of the MOD appeared to suggest details around investment decisions might not appear until the autumn in a separate, MOD-authored document, not least because the MOD is still trying to work out the shape of the revised Equipment Plan.
To be fair, it would be unreasonable to expect this work to both review all of Defence and perform the function of an MOD Budget Cycle in its totality. But given the challenges to the current structures and capabilities of the military, if it can’t even approach the level of detail of recent reviews in relation to capability choices (e.g. the 2010 and 2015 proposed future forces) then there is a danger it becomes too aspirational to be useful (or more cynically, too vague for the MOD to be held to account against it). We should therefore expect a ‘strategic’ review to be about prioritisation, assumptions and guidance for choices. This is also where it is possible to judge the ambition and scope of the review’s conclusions, particularly on the use of technology.
Money Alone is Not Transformational
This immediately brings up the most obvious cause for any caution about the short-term impact of the review. The spending target of 2.5% of GDP (which we now learn will also include money being spent to ‘lease’ Diego Garcia, albeit as a tiny fraction (0.2%) of the Defence Budget) is not so significant an increase as to be genuinely ‘transformational’ – at least, not given the current state of the Armed Forces. To be transformational, it will need to cut and significantly reshape the Armed Forces by taking risk in some areas to transform others.
The boost of several billion pounds a year should probably first be used to fill gaps: in ammunition and other weapons stockpiles; in infrastructure and housing; logistics and support functions; and in support to personnel conditions, pay and recruitment. To make radical, rather than incremental additions to military capability (for example in order to take advantage of new technologies) will therefore require some big choices on early retirement of capabilities or reductions in numbers.
Defence has been here before in terms of the promise of new capabilities being presaged by the early loss of others due to budget pressure: the cuts of November 2024 were just such a case and given the modest savings made over five years, were an indicator of just how tight in-year finances are at the MOD. Before that, the Integrated Review and related Defence Command Paper both promised investment in ‘advanced technologies’ would improve the forces – after a number of ‘legacy systems’ were cut to make room. We have had years of talk of ‘sunset and sunrise capabilities’ but rather than a planned and managed transition from older forces to new, the UK has instead been left with an eclectic mix of the cutting-edge sitting uneasily alongside the obsolete – for which replacements are often late, or, where weapons upgrades lag, new capabilities find their potential limited. This was not the planned ‘high-low mix’ as part of an ‘integrated force’ we were promised, but a classic British attempt to muddle through.
Implementation Needs to Move Beyond Experimentation
It is here the SDR could make a major mark. Never mind quibbling over the sufficiency of the 148 Challenger 3 tanks the UK will eventually have by 2030: given the experience of Ukraine does the SDR believe tanks have a future as currently envisaged? Are the Army’s expensive attack helicopters still worth it in a world where the front line is increasingly dominated by drone threats? If, as reported, the Navy wants to radically increase the number of uncrewed vessels for a variety of tasks, should it still be developing large surface combatants, and what role is envisaged for the aircraft carriers? And in air and space, might future surveillance capabilities be better provided by stealthy drones and space-based sensors rather than large, slow, vulnerable crewed aircraft such as the E-7 Wedgetail?
The UK has talked a good game on experimentation and trials, including on artificial intelligence (AI) and directed-energy weapons, but these have yet to translate into large-scale production of any new capabilities operating outside of niche organisations. New processes and structures such as a Defence Innovation Unit, and an Integrated Procurement Model are being introduced, but will take time to show their worth: the MOD already had an innovation unit alongside other innovation centres, and the IPM’s acceleration of the DragonFire laser weapon came after it had already spent seven years being developed. At least the recent announcement of the new StormShroud drone coming into service represents the first major implementation of the RAF’s Autonomous Collaborative Platforms Strategy and is a significant improvement on the RAF’s over-hyped ‘drone squadron’ which spent several years without conducting a drone trial.
Ambitious Targets for Change Are Needed
The SDR could help by making clear where the big bets could be made on technology – and where cold water needs to be poured on ideas that represent a triumph of optimism over reality. It could identify where ‘legacy’ items have outlived their usefulness and where technological solutions will enhance existing capabilities.
Moreover, it should identify where mass and depth remain vital to the creation of effective fighting power: the inexorable reduction of force sizes combined with the increasing cost of systems is unsustainable.
Some advice on where either the expansion of forces and stockpiles are required, or acceptance of limitations will be necessary alongside collaboration with allies and partners. On this last point, there should be some consideration of how to survive friction in the critical relationship with the US; a complete break is in neither’s interests, and tremendously expensive but given the unique extent of the UK’s intertwining with the US military – and thus its vulnerabilities – some additional insulation is required if the US is less reliable or (not unreasonably) expects a more prominent role for Europe in its own security.
To do all this it may be necessary to set ambitious, and crucially, measurable targets. For example, what proportion of RAF combat aircraft should be uncrewed and by what year should this target be achieved? What functions in the Royal Navy should be handed over to remote or autonomous systems, and by when? The Army has reportedly already identified a target for the proportion of its combat power to be provided by traditional crewed capabilities (20%), reusable uncrewed capabilities (40%), and disposable drones (40%). But it is not yet clear how this metric is calculated, and it is hard to believe the first category will only comprise a fifth of total budget or firepower.
Other goals could be about testing the Defence Secretary’s claim that the UK will be at the leading edge of innovation on AI; for example, the widescale adoption of AI to complete all initial analysis of imagery, thus accelerating intelligence analysis, or the use of software to do initial operational estimates.
Targets matter: although similar targets in the US have been missed, as has been pointed out, the fact they existed created a benchmark against which some aspects of modernisation could be measured. The statement by the Chief of the General Staff that he intends to double the Army’s combat power within three years is exactly the sort of target that focusses minds and could potentially be useful if they appear in the SDR, and can be measured (in this case defined as a brigade being capable of defeating a Russian Combined Arms Army).
And if the MOD disagrees with these, for example, because it has a different understanding of the risks, or the speed at which technology might develop, then it should be asked to set out its own analysis, such as the probability AI smarter than people (Artificial General Intelligence) will arrive, the point at which this becomes more likely than not, and if never then why. The briefing this week that the MOD will develop a ‘Digital Targeting Web’ to be in service in 2027 is a decent start, though if it is learning lessons from what Ukraine has been doing since 2022, and uses technology already available, is this fast enough?
None of this is to suggest the SDR should purely focus on being a technologist’s manifesto. It also needs to make judgements on the state of the UK’s industrial base, and effective use of the UK’s reserves, amongst many other issues. We have not even mentioned the expense of the nuclear deterrent, its longevity and other options to improve deterrence in Europe. But many of the developments in UK Defence since the end of the Cold War have inevitably justified shrinking forces on the back of more advanced capabilities. Given we are now seeing the speed of adaptation and counter-measures in the war in Ukraine, it is reasonable to ask how this review will cut through the hype and myths and make concrete recommendations, using its independence to force change at a pace the MOD has been unable to demonstrate on its own.
© RUSI, 2025.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.
UDSS Members Play Leading Role in Historic Strategic Defence Review
Universal Defence and Security Solutions (UDSS) is proud to announce the involvement of its members in the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR)—a landmark assessment of Britain’s defence posture, priorities, and capabilities, which is due for publication imminently.
The review was commissioned by the Prime Minister and led by Lord Robertson, General Sir Richard Barrons (UDSS Co-Founder and Co-Chair), and Dr Fiona Hill—marking the first time in UK history that such a review has been led by an external team.
“I am really proud of the contribution made by Universal Defence and Security Solutions members and the wider defence community to the Strategic Defence Review 2025. Their depth of experience and thoughtful, pragmatic input played a key role in shaping the review’s direction. I’m grateful for their commitment to applying hard-earned expertise in support of this important national effort.”
— General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, Co-Chair, Universal Defence and Security Solutions
Pre-register to receive the SDR in full upon its official release:
https://www.universal-defence.com/may-2025-pre-register-to-receive-a-copy-of-the-uk-sdr-2025
How the First Ever UK External Strategic Defence Review Was Designed and Executed
The decision to commission an externally led SDR—rather than an internal Whitehall-led exercise—was made by the then incoming Prime Minister and Defence Secretary to ensure a higher level of scrutiny and avoid consensus-driven limitations.
In preparation during the election period, the foundational narrative, methodology, and support structures were designed to enable immediate activation once a new government was formed.
Key features of the review process included:
- A clear overarching narrative, agreed at the outset, to guide scope, strategic alignment, and affordability.
- Leadership by three senior external reviewers, supported by six subject-matter experts—all personally approved by the Prime Minister.
- A collaborative approach: the review was conducted with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and wider government—not to them—with full MoD access, backed by a cross-government Secretariat.
- A broad engagement process including responses to 23 strategically crafted questions from industry, academia, civil society, and government—yielding thousands of submissions.
- Use of a bespoke AI tool (MoD-funded) to analyse responses, identify patterns, and pinpoint areas of alignment and dissonance.
- Scrutiny by senior external expert panels across each thematic area. For instance, in the maritime domain, propositions were presented by the First Sea Lord and reviewed in-depth.
- Iterative report drafting over five rounds, managed by a dedicated drafting team working closely with the Secretary of State for Defence.
- A parallel fiscal modelling process with MoD capability and finance teams, ensuring that all recommendations were realistic, prioritised, and affordable.
The final report was submitted to the Prime Minister via the Defence Secretary and will be released imminently through a coordinated publication campaign.
UDSS: A Practitioner-Led Defence and Security Partner
UDSS contributed substantially to the SDR through its network of over 700 former senior military, civil service, and security professionals—including former 4* commanders and experts in cyber, space, and strategic policy.
Working independently from government, UDSS delivers trusted, practitioner-led expertise across:
- Strategic defence and security reviews
- Cyber, digital, and space strategy
- Capability modernisation and procurement support
- Professional military education and leadership mentoring
- Border security, policing, and corruption interdiction
- Geospatial intelligence and catastrophic risk forecasting
- Civil and military space programme design
Relevance to Business and Government
The SDR outlines a defence landscape that is being reshaped by cyber warfare, digital integration, and global instability. With the announcement of a £1 billion investment in a new Cyber and Electromagnetic Command, including AI-driven targeting and offensive hacking capabilities, the Review sends a clear signal: the keyboard is now a weapon of war.
Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:
“Ways of warfare are rapidly changing – with the UK facing daily cyber-attacks on this new frontline.
The hard-fought lessons from Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine leave us under no illusions that future conflicts will be won through forces that are better connected, better equipped and innovating faster than their adversaries.
We will give our Armed Forces the ability to act at speeds never seen before – connecting ships, aircraft, tanks and operators so they can share vital information instantly and strike further and faster.
By attracting the best digital talent, and establishing a nerve centre for our cyber capability, we will harness the latest innovations, properly fund Britain’s defences for the modern age and support the government’s Plan for Change.”
For businesses operating in defence, technology, and critical infrastructure, the SDR carries significant implications.
UDSS stands ready to support with:
- Tailored SDR briefings for industry, investors, and government
- Defence market strategy development and positioning
- Bilateral/multilateral engagement strategy
- Commercial risk and security analysis
- Navigating opportunities within the UK’s modernised defence architecture
To arrange a briefing or explore how UDSS can support your organisation, contact:
29 May 25. Britain’s new defence pact with the EU. The United Kingdom and the European Union have signed an expansive new agreement to deepen security and defence cooperation across a broad range of areas, including Ukraine support, maritime security, and countering cyber threats. Published on 19 May, the document establishes a formal Security and Defence Partnership between the two sides—marking the most comprehensive framework for UK-EU defence coordination since Brexit. Officials say the pact reflects growing alignment on strategic threats such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and global cyber insecurity.
“The UK and the EU are committed to strengthening their partnership in security and defence,” the agreement states, citing the volatile security environment in Europe and beyond.
The agreement sets out a structure of regular consultations between the UK Foreign and Defence Secretaries and their EU counterparts. A dedicated annual Security and Defence Dialogue will also take place, with preparatory working-level meetings and thematic exchanges on cyber threats, disinformation, arms control, and crisis management. The UK will also be invited to EU high-level defence events, including the Schuman Security and Defence Forum, while EU officials may take part in UK-led meetings. A significant emphasis is placed on joint support for Ukraine. The UK’s Operation Interflex and the EU’s military assistance mission have collectively trained more than 120,000 Ukrainian troops. The partnership aims to maintain this cooperation while exploring additional collaboration in the Balkans, Indo-Pacific, and Sahel regions. The UK will also consider participating in future EU military or civilian missions on a case-by-case basis and may join the EU’s crisis response exercises. In turn, the EU would be invited to observe UK drills. The two parties commit to closer coordination at sea, including operations in contested waters like the Red Sea. This includes joint efforts against the so-called “shadow fleet” of sanctions-evading oil tankers, as well as coordination around the protection of subsea infrastructure and navigation routes.
“The UK and EU will hold regular exchanges on maritime security… with the aim of promoting a free and rules-based maritime security environment,” the agreement states.
On hybrid threats, the UK and EU will collaborate on countering foreign information manipulation, infrastructure resilience, and crisis preparedness—including disinformation campaigns and hostile cyber activity.
Officials say the deal will be reviewed regularly to ensure relevance and momentum. Talks will continue on UK participation in EU defence initiatives such as PESCO, and the possible formation of an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency.
The agreement positions the UK as a close strategic partner of the EU, even outside the bloc’s political structures. Both sides stress their shared interests in European security, NATO integration, and multilateral stability. (Source: ukdefencejournal.org.uk/)
28 May 25. EU unveils €150bn SAFE initiative. SAFE will enter into force on 29 May and address first list of priority areas outlined by the European Council on 6 March. The European Council has enacted a regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a new financial tool designed to back EU member states keen to invest in defence capabilities via collective procurement. SAFE is poised to underwrite significant and immediate investments within the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), aiming to enhance production capacities to ensure timely availability of defence equipment and to mitigate current capability shortfalls. The EU has earmarked as much as €150bn ($170.34bn) for SAFE, which will be allocated to participating member states based on requests and aligned with their national strategies. The funding will be provided through long-term loans at competitive rates, which will subsequently need to be repaid by the nations receiving the assistance. Additionally, the fund will enable the EU to extend support to Ukraine by incorporating its defence industry into the framework from inception. To promote scale economies and ensure interoperability while minimising EDTIB fragmentation, recipient member states are generally required to engage in joint procurements involving at least two countries to be eligible for the funding. SAFE will temporarily permit procurements by individual member states considering the pressing geopolitical climate and the critical need for substantial defence investment. In addition, SAFE heralds a novel phase in collaboration with non-EU countries, making Ukraine and European Economic Area – European Free Trade Association (EEA-EFTA) nations eligible equally with EU members. This includes not only participating in joint procurements but also offering their industrial goods for purchase. Moreover, SAFE extends participation in joint procurements to acceding nations, candidates, potential candidates, and countries with established Security and Defence Partnerships with the EU, such as the UK. Additionally, the instrument allows for the possibility of forming supplementary bilateral or multilateral agreements with these third-party states to broaden eligibility conditions. Funded activities through SAFE will address priority areas outlined by the European Council on 6 March 2025 and will fall into two categories of defence products namely ammunition and missiles as well as air and missile defence system. Products in air and missile defence system category will face more stringent eligibility criteria, necessitating contractors capable of managing product design decisions. For both product categories, procurement contracts must limit the cost of non-EU/EEA-EFTA/Ukraine components to no more than 35% of the end-product’s component costs. SAFE is set to be effective from the day after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, which is 29 May 2025. Recently, the UK agreed to additional negotiations towards accession to EU defence funds, although a roadmap is expected in a matter of weeks. (Source: army-technology.com)
24 May 25. British firepower deployed on NATO’s eastern flank in show of force. UK shores up NATO’s eastern flank with deployment to Finland. Hundreds of UK military personnel deployed to NATO’s eastern flank to add critical firepower to a major NATO exercise in Northern Finland. Exercise Northern Strike will see the UK Armed Forces join thousands of personnel from Finland and Sweden, NATO’s two newest Allies. The show of force and firepower reinforces the Alliance’s readiness, capability, and commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory. This is the latest demonstration of strong collaboration between the UK and our international partners as set out in the government’s Plan for Change. New British Army AH64E Apache attack helicopters will fire Hellfire missiles and 30mm guns simulating close support to allied combat forces on the ground, including British Army infantry units. Bringing their cutting-edge rocket systems to the battlefield, The British Army’s 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery will fire their Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) throughout and put their troops to the test during a field training exercise. MLRS has been proven in battle in the war in Ukraine and this will be the first time the British Army fire the system on European soil alongside AH64E Apache helicopters. Deepening partnerships with key Allies across the exercise is a key part of this Government’s NATO first policy, to ensure the UK is secure at home and strong abroad. Strengthening NATO by showcasing our capabilities and increasing interoperability assures our allies and deters our adversaries. Exercise Northern Strike is part of a wider operation to secure NATO’s eastern flank; Operation RAZOREDGE. RAZOREDGE is made up of 13 exercises involving 13 NATO allies across 6 countries. The UK has contributed assets across air, land and sea with over 6,000 UK personnel taking part alongside 16,500 allied troops. Operated by 4 Regiment, Army Air Corps, the Apache Helicopters also support jobs across the country at the Army Aviation Centre in Hampshire and Suffolk. UK industry also plays a key role with 75 British companies, including 33 SMEs also contributing a range of critical components to the aircraft. Keeping the country safe is the Government’s first priority, and an integral part of its Plan for Change. The work of the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force, is critical to the security and stability of the UK, supporting all of the Government’s five missions in its plan. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
25 May 25. Chinook crash families call for release of 100-year sealed file. Families of those killed in an RAF Chinook helicopter crash in 1994 have urged the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to release documents sealed for 100 years. Four crew and 25 passengers were killed when the helicopter went down in foggy conditions over the Mull of Kintyre in Scotland. The helicopter was carrying leading security personnel from RAF Aldergrove in Northern Ireland to a conference at Fort George near Inverness. Several families have written an open letter to the UK Government renewing calls for a public inquiry. The MoD says the incident was a “tragic accident”. The crash on 2 June 1994 remains one of the RAF’s worst peacetime losses of life. Two pilots accused of negligence over the disaster were exonerated 17 years later. Families have called for the full release of documents that were locked away until 2094 by the MoD. Andy Tobias, who was eight when his father Lt Col John Tobias, 41, was killed, said the “secrecy” raises questions about what really happened.
He told BBC Scotland News: “To give you an example, my young children aren’t likely, to even see these documents if they are sealed for 100 years.
“These sealed documents will outlive my children which is quite frankly a disgrace.”
Speaking publicly about the crash for the first time, he said he lost part of his childhood because his father was on a helicopter “that had been deemed unairworthy and should never have taken off”.
He said: “In my view, it’s nothing short of corporate manslaughter.
“I have tried for many years to put this crash, and my family’s unnecessary loss, behind me. But learning that the MoD has sealed away the archive until after all of us will be long gone seriously raises my concerns about what really happened.”
Flt Lt Richard Cook and Flt Lt Jonathan Tapper were eventually exonerated of blame for the crash After the crash, pilots Richard Cook and Jonathan Tapper, were accused of gross negligence, but this verdict was overturned by the UK Government 17 years later. A subsequent review by Lord Philip set out “numerous concerns” raised by those who worked on the Chinooks. The MoD’s testing centre at Boscombe Down in Wiltshire declared the Chinook Mk2 helicopters “unairworthy” prior to the crash.
Esme Sparks, who was seven years old when her father Major Gary Sparks lost his life, said it had been a “shock” to learn about the existence of the documents.
She said: “My whole family wants answers and action because my daddy was denied his right to life – put in danger by the MoD on an aircraft deemed not airworthy.
“We are furious that the Government and the MoD is refusing to listen or to meet us.”
The open letter states the Chinook Justice Campaign – which includes most of the bereaved families – formally requested a public inquiry on October 9 2024.
This was rejected by the minister for veterans and people Alistair Carns on December 17.
A spokesperson for the MoD said: “The Mull of Kintyre crash was a tragic accident and our thoughts and sympathies remain with the families, friends and colleagues of all those who died.” (Source: News Now/BBC.co.uk)
25 May 25. German chief of defence orders swift expansion of warfare capabilities.
- Summary
- Loosening of German debt brake can fund defence spending
- Priorities include strengthening air defences to intercept drones
- German army chief said Russian forces are rapidly gaining firepower
Germany’s Chief of Defence, Carsten Breuer, has ordered the German military to be fully equipped with weapons and other material by 2029, a document seen by Reuters on Sunday shows. By 2029, Russia may have reconstituted its forces sufficiently to attack NATO territory, according to estimates by Breuer and other senior military officials at NATO. The latest document, entitled “Directive Priorities for the Bolstering of Readiness”, which Breuer signed on May 19, said Germany will meet the goal with the help of funds made available by the loosening of the country’s debt brake in March. The defence ministry in Berlin did not immediately respond to requests for comment. In the directive, Breuer sets priorities for the weapons that should be acquired or developed most urgently, reflecting in part priorities NATO has previously laid out. Among them, Breuer lists the strengthening of Germany’s depleted air defences, in particular with a view to intercepting drones. Last year, sources told Reuters that NATO will request Berlin to at least quadruple its air defences, ranging from systems with a longer range, such as the Patriot, to short-range systems. Another priority is a capability to launch deep precision strikes, according to the document, effectively hitting targets at a distance of more than 500 kilometres (310 miles) and far behind enemy lines. In addition to pushing for Germany’s ammunition stocks to be replenished, Breuer also orders Germany to raise its stockpiling targets for all types of ammunition. Other priorities listed in the document are the swift expansion of Germany’s capabilities in electronic warfare and the establishment of a resilient system of “offensive and defensive capabilities” in space. In a speech in mid-May, Army Chief Alfons Mais said a large-scale social and industrial mobilisation meant Russian forces were rapidly gaining firepower.
“From 2029, at the latest, the Russian forces will be capable of a conventional aggression against NATO territory on a large scale,” he said. “But they can start testing us much sooner.” (Source: Reuters)
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