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13 Nov 24. UK defence spending to limp to 2.3% of GDP in 2025-26. The new Labour government has aspirations to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, but has not provided a timescale. UK defence expenditure will effectively flatline as a proportion of GDP through to the 2025-26 financial year, according to recently revealed figures by the new Labour government based on projections from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
Detailed in a short response to a parliamentary question, Maria Eagle, Minister for Defence Procurement, stated on 13 November that defence spending is currently expected to be 2.29% of the UK’s GDP in financial year (FY) 2024-25 and 2.30% in 2025-26.
“Future FYs’ figures are subject to the outcome of the second phase of the Spending Review,” Eagle stated.
This would mean virtually no increase in UK defence spending as a proportion of GDP for the first two years of the new Labour government, which theoretically still harbours the ambition to increase it to 2.5% of GDP, although have to-date declined to provide a timeline.
The former governing Conservative party, now in opposition after a crushing election defeat in July this year, had previously said they would increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by the end of the next parliament, effectively by 2030.
In a 28 October paper produced by the UK House of Lords into UK defence spending forecasts, it was stated that despite the Labour government’s commitment to raising the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP, it was “unclear over what time period that increase will occur”.
In addition, the paper outlined that ministers “have further indicated that difficult choices on defence spending may be required in light of current economic conditions”.
The Labour government has made sustained claims of a £22bn black hole in public funding, prompted concerns that the outcome of future Spending Reviews and the upcoming Strategic Defence Review, due to report in the first half of 2025, could include significant cuts in UK procurement programmes.
UK defence spending feeling the pinch
UK defence spending has endured a difficult decade as the impact of austerity, the Covid pandemic, a struggling economy and high levels of inflation all contributed to a degree of stagnation in military expenditure, relative to previous high points, such as the 2.47% in 2010.
Analysis cited by the UK House of Lords report into UK defence spending indicated that in the 2023/24 financial year, the UK spent £54.2bn ($68.8bn) on defence, with plans under the previous Conservative government to increase this to £57.1bn in 2024/25.
Previous spending reviews also provided multi-year settlements, including during the 2020 Spending Review, when an additional £16.5bn was allocated to the defence budget over 2020/21 to 2024/25. An additional £5bn was also committed to the spring budget in 2023 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while the new Labour government budget also provided a further £3bn in funding.
However, fiscal instability in recent years has reduced spending increases when analysed as a percentage of GDP, with the House of Lords report stating that, according to analysis from the House of Commons Library, projections of £11.2bn in additional defence spending in the final years of the recent Conservative government were closer to a rise of £4.4bn when adjusted for inflation.
According to Nato analysis of member states spending, the UK’s defence budget was estimated to reach 2.33% of GDP in 2024, a projection slightly at odds with the latest figures provided by the UK government, which were based on the OBR’s own economic forecasts.
Among Nato allies, the UK’s defence spending has increased only sightly as a proportion of GDP since 2014, somewhat against the trend of significant rises among other member states.
Poland’s defence spending as a proportion of GDP was projected to more than double from its 2024 figure of under 2% to more than 4.1% according to recent Nato figures, while Latvia’s military budget would increase from under 1% to around 3.15% in 2024. (Source: army-technology.com)
13 Nov 24. Poland hails opening of US missile base as sign of its security. The United States opened a new air defence base in northern Poland on Wednesday, an event the European nation’s president said showed the country was secure as a member of NATO even as Russia wages war in neighbouring Ukraine.
Situated in the town of Redzikowo near the Baltic coast, the base has been in the works since the 2000s.
At a time when Donald Trump’s election victory has caused jitters among some NATO members, Warsaw says the continued work on the base by successive U.S. presidents shows Poland’s military alliance with Washington remains solid whoever is in the White House.
“The United States… is the guarantor of Poland’s security,” President Andrzej Duda said.
He said the permanent presence of U.S. troops at the base showed that Poland, a communist state until 1989, was “not in the Russian sphere of influence”.
The Kremlin on Wednesday called the base a bid to contain Russia by moving American military infrastructure nearer its borders.
(Source: Google/Reuters)
11 Nov 24. Brussels is changing its spending policies to potentially redirect tens of billins of euros to defence and security, as Russia’s war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to the White House heap pressure on the EU to boost investment. The policy shift would apply to about a third of the bloc’s common budget, or some €392bn from 2021 to 2027, money that is aimed at reducing economic inequality between EU countries. Only about 5 per cent of these so-called cohesion funds have been spent to date, with the biggest beneficiaries, including Poland, Italy and Spain, spending even less. Under existing rules, these funds cannot be used to purchase defence equipment or directly fund the military, but investment in so-called dual-use products such as drones is allowed. Capitals of member states will be told in coming weeks that they will now have more flexibility under the rules to allocate cohesion funds to support their defence industries and military mobility projects such as reinforcing roads and bridges to allow the safe passage of tanks, according to EU officials. This will include permitting funding for boosting the production of weapons and ammunition, though the ban on using EU funds to purchase those weapons will remain. A spokesperson for the European Commission said cohesion funds could be used for the defence industry as long as they contributed to the “overall mission to enhance regional development”, including military mobility. Germany is the linchpin for European military mobility due to its location but its transport infrastructure is in poor shape. The Berlin economy ministry estimated in 2022 that the country needed to spend €165bn urgently on roads, rails and bridges. Germany is due to receive €39bn in cohesion funds through to 2027. (Source: FT.com)
08 Nov 24. British Army has under 19,000 troops able to fully deploy in combat. The British Army’s ability to deploy a combat division, as per its commitment to Nato, has been called into question by allies such as the United States.
The British Army has under 19,000 personnel who are trained and medically able to be deployed in a combat role without limitations, according to new figures released by the UK government, with the numbers representing a new five-year low.
Released on 8 November, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), in a publications of combat deployable troops across the three main services, that the British Army had just 18,398 personnel who were listed as being Medically Fully Deployable (MFD), according to the military’s medical deployability standard, as of 1 July 2024.
This is down by more than 1,000 personnel compared to the 19,489 who met the MFD standard at the same period in 2023. A total of 21,488 troops were listed as being MFD in a combat role as of 1 July 2021.
Even when including British Army serviceman and servicewomen who meet the Medically Limited Deployable (MLD) standard, of which 2,123 were categorised, the combined number of MFD and MLD troops able to be deployed into a combat role was just 20,521 personnel.
This too represents a four-year low, with the number of those categorised as MLD or MFD and able to be deployed into a combat role in 2021 standing at 23,762 personnel. (Source: army-technology.com)
07 Nov 24. Six active, nine in service – UK frigate availability static through 2024. At the end of October, the Royal Navy had six Type 23 frigates ready for operations, up only slightly from the five vessels available in April earlier in the year. The UK-led Carrier Strike Group amalgamates with the NATO Amphibious Task Group and additional Norwegian naval units for a PHOTEX 13 Mar 24. Aircraft participating in the flypast were six Finnish F18 and two Swedish JAS-39. Fifteen ships sailed in formation as follows: Front row: HMS Prince of Wales Row 2 (L-R): USS Paul Ignatius, ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon, Row 3 (L-R): HMS Portland, HNLMS Karel Doorman, HNOMS Magnus Lagabote, RFA Tidespring, HNOMS Olav Tyrggvason, ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi, FS Normandie Row 4 (L-R): RFA Mounts Bay, HNOMS Otto Sverdrup, HNOMS Gnist, Kv Bjornoya, FGS Bonn. The units are at sea for Exercise Nordic Response 24, a multi-domain exercise taking place in the northern Nordic region 3–14 March 2024. The CSG has been exercising F-35B strikes to simulate defence of allied territory, whilst simultaneously defending itself. The ATG has been exercising landing amphibious units ashore to retake allied territory. Exercise Nordic Response 24 is part of Exercise Steadfast Defender 24, the largest NATO exercise in decades.
Through 2024, the UK frigate availability has languished in the mid-single figures following the disclose that six of its Type 23 warships were available for operations as of 31 October, a level that was described as providing “sufficient assets” to cover global requirements.
This is only a slight increase over the five Type 23 frigates operational in April 2024, according to official figures from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD).
A reduced fleet of nine Type 23 frigates are still in service, although HMS Northumberland, entered the PGMU refit process in Q1 2024 and may not return to sea, and another vessel, HMS Kent, began PGMU in Q2 this year.
“Readiness is a priority for this government. Options to improve the readiness and availability of the Royal Navy surface fleet forms a key part of the ongoing Strategic Defence Review,” stated Luke Pollard, UK Minister for the Armed Forces, on 6 November.
The Chief of the UK Defence Staff and former First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin, has made increasing availability of platforms a mantra during this tenure, as the services bid to extract every last service hour from what are ageing inventories – particularly in the land and naval domains.
By comparison, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has approximately 140 frigates commissioned in service, comprised of around 50 Jiangkai-class frigates, which range from 112-133m in length, and the more modern Jiangkai II guided missiles frigates (FFG), with 40 operational vessels, according to the US Office for Naval Intelligence.
The PLAN also has 50 Jiangdao light frigates operational, which could be classified as corvettes, with a length of 90m. In addition, multiple Jiangkai Mod II and III FFGs are known to be under construction.
As a proportion, the total UK Royal Navy frigate fleet of nine Type 23 vessels represents just 6% of the PLAN’s corresponding frigate force.
Extracting service from the Type 23s
A total of four Type 23 frigates have been retired from service in recent years, these being HMS Monmouth (2021), HMS Montrose (2023), HMS Argyll (2024), and HMS Westminster (2024).
The potential sale of HMS Argyll to BAE Systems is still ongoing, while, despite having been removed from operational service, the disposal method of HMS Westminster has not been finalised.
The exact expected out-of-service dates (OSD) for the remaining Type 23 frigates is guarded by the UK MoD, although vessels were last known to be scheduled to leave service from 2024 (HMS Lancaster, currently deployed in the Middle East) through to 2035 (HMS St Albans, the newest Type 23, commissioned in 2002).
Each ship of the class was originally intended to have an 18-year service life before replacement, but this has been extended through a series of refits and recertifications.
With HMS Lancaster not due to leave service until 2025 at the earliest, the efforts being undertaken by the Royal Navy to sustain its frigate fleet beyond their planned OSD are increasingly clear. This includes the PGMU process, although as the vessels age, they are becoming more difficult to maintain.
According to 2023 data, from 2011-2017 each of the then 13 Type 23 frigates underwent a LIFEX or refit period, with the duration of each programme ranging from 12 months up to 36 months. From 2018 onwards this increased to between 37-49 months.
In line with vessel class certification rules, the OSD of warships can be extended for a maximum of six years following completion of each upkeep maintenance programme.
The cost to refit and maintain the ageing class is also a factor, with HMS Iron Duke’s 2023 refit costing more than £100m ($125m). By comparison, in the financial year 2023-24, £100m was allocated for Type 23 refits, according to official figures.
HMS Dauntless returns to operations
Meanwhile, in mid-October the Type 45 air defence destroyer HMS Dauntless left HMNB Devonport and returned to UK waters after the completion of its recertification period, which included the rectification of operational defects, installation of capability upgrades, and maintenance.
The Type 45 Daring-class destroyer is set to join Exercise Strike Warrior, an autumn training programme which involves the UK carrier strike group and international warships forming together for a myriad of tasks, according to the UK Defence Equipment & Support, an arm of the country’s MoD.
The exercise is considered a precursor for the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales’ deployment to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region in 2025.
In addition, just two of six Type 45 destroyers were “immediately available, or deployed” for operations, as of 31 October 2024, according to official figures.
The Type 45 class as a whole is undergoing a unique Power Improvement Programme (PIP) in a bid to solve long-standing propulsion issues faced by the class while on operations. (Source: naval-technology.com)
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