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16 May 24. Tempest: The 6th Generation Fighter That May Never Fly.The UK’s Royal Air Force is developing the Tempest, a sixth-generation fighter jet, under the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, aiming for deployment by 2035. This ambitious initiative seeks to replace the aging Typhoon Eurofighter and includes advanced features like hypersonic weapons, drone swarm control, and modular weapons bays.
Summary: The UK’s Royal Air Force is developing the Tempest, a sixth-generation fighter jet, under the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, aiming for deployment by 2035. This ambitious initiative seeks to replace the aging Typhoon Eurofighter and includes advanced features like hypersonic weapons, drone swarm control, and modular weapons bays. However, Britain’s military faces significant challenges, including underfunding, recruitment issues, and operational constraints.
-While partnering with Japan and Italy in the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) aims to share costs, the UK’s ambition may outstrip its resources.
-The Tempest’s success hinges on securing additional international partners and overcoming deep-rooted military issues.
Tempest Fighter Jet: Will Britain’s Ambitious Sixth-Gen Plan Succeed?
Work is progressing steadily on the British Royal Air Force’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS). A sixth-generation warplane program that is slated to hit the unfriendly skies by 2035, this program represents a massive investment by the Ministry of Defense in replacing the aging Typhoon Eurofighter that has served as Britain’s primary air-superiority fighter for decades. The new sixth-generation birds are known as the “Tempest.”
If the RAF’s plans go accordingly, Britain could be deploying a truly next-generation warplane in the next decade.
The Tempest is the latest version of a sweeping military modernization campaign in Britain that has been underway since 2017-18. We have seen this modernization campaign play out within the Royal Navy, where the legendary service has acquired two brand new aircraft carriers, the HMS Queen Elizabeth and the HMSPrince of Wales.
Clearly, London desires to reclaim some of her lost imperial glory by revitalizing the ailing British Armed Forces and giving the dwindling military the weapons and platforms it needs to be a dominant and capable force in the 21st century.
Britain Can’t Meet Their Ambitious Goals Tempest Goals and Why it Matters
Despite what many British defense planners may think, however, their plans for modernization are far too ambitious. Great Britain’s military woes are far deeper than just throwing gobs of money at the problem to build cooler systems. In fact, the British military has been enduring a recruitment crisis for many years.
And while it’s true their equipment needs updating, successive British government have so badly underfunded the British military, that its capabilities from even a few decades ago have been severely minimized. In essence, British defense planners believe their military to be a global power. Britain is, at best, a middle or regional power in dire need of rebuilding its force from the ground-up.
As observers of Britain’s carrier program have seen, the Royal Navy was able to build their new carriers. But staffing them and supplying them with an airwing has been a routine problem. There have also been some technical issues that have troubled the warships, notably the HMS Queen Elizabeth.
These problems do not appear to be under control. Nor can they be placed under control because the cost of these platforms and the resource and time commitment for maintaining them is far greater than what the British Armed Forces can afford.
The Tempest Specs are Important
Similarly, the sixth-generation warplane that Britain is developing, while a technological marvel (at least as its concept drawings indicate), is going to break Britain’s budget. In terms of “wow” factor, on paper, the Tempest brings much to the table.
The Tempest can, in theory, serve in either a manned or unmanned capacity. What’s more, the plane’s designers intend for the Tempest to be a vehicle for launching hypersonic, and even laser weapons, at enemy targets. The Tempest will control drone swarms as well. Those drone swarms, by the way, will be controlled by artificial intelligence.
The weapons bay itself will have a modular design.
This will allow for the Tempest to carry a major punch in combat. Some weapons it will fly into battle with will include the Meteor long-range, air-to-air missile system. Complimenting that will be the SPEAR-3 cruise missile as well as the ambiguously titled “Deep Strike” missiles. It must be stressed, however, none of this has been built and tested in the real world. The Tempest remains an expensive concept.
Britain Tries to Get Foreign Funding for the Tempest
The Brits were smart in terms of trying to address the obvious unaffordability of these birds. Learning from their American partners in peace with the F-35 Lightning II project, the British government opened up the Tempest program to allied countries as well. Japan and Italy are part of the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) that is meant to burden-share the development of this advanced warbird.
The only problem facing Britain is that, unlike the American F-35 program, which has dozens of countries participating in the program—including the United Kingdom—is able to offset its cost with level of participation.
The Tempest Program has only Italy and Japan. For the program to have a shot at affordability and being made worth Britain’s investment, London needs to find many more partners than they currently have slated to join them in the GCAP.
Britain long ago abandoned their empire. With it, the tiny island-nation’s ability to punch above its weight in geopolitics disappeared as well. It is now on its own and it must learn to operate as a regional great power rather than constantly trying to develop platforms that are more relevant to a global superpower rather than a medium-sized power. (Source: News Now/https://nationalinterest.org)
16 May 24. Raising questions for Labour, polls on defence spending increase are divided. The Conservative plan to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP has provoked different views among Labour and Conservative voters. An Ipsos poll of 1,090 UK adults conducted between 3 and 5 May 2024, has shown a divide in views on Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s pledge to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP.
A plurality of 2019 Labour voters oppose the increase, while a clear majority of 2019 Conservatives show support for a £87bn increase to the defence budget by 2030.
This balance of opinions has important implications for Labour, who will be seeking to win back voters that sided with the Conservative Party at the last election.
On 23 April, Sunak announced a UK defence spending target of 2.5% of GDP by 2030, aiming towards £87bn, a move that followed a 12 April pledge from the Labour Party Leader Sir Keir Starmer to increase defence spending from 2.0% to 2.3% of GDP, in the event of a Labour victory in a forthcoming general election.
Labour has enjoyed an impressively large and sustained lead in the opinion polls, largely driven by dissatisfaction with the Conservative Party performance. The defence industrial base will be alert to new policy intentions from the Labour Party for the defence sector, in anticipation of a Labour victory.
Voters that supported the Labour Party at the 2019 General Election are divided on Sunak’s plans to increase defence spending, with many more opposing the rise in defence spending (34%) than supporting it (28%). Conservative voters from 2019 show a clearer picture, with many more of their voters supporting the policy (65%) than opposing the increase (11%).
Among all voting age Britons the support (42%) for the spending increase is almost twice as strong as the opposition (22%).
Both parties are on a campaign footing in anticipation of a General Election that must be called, at the latest, by January 2025, but the Labour leadership will face clearer trade-off in electoral support over the defence spending increase. Embracing a defence spending increase is a surer path through electoral calculations, but is out of alignment with the views of past Labour supporters.
When contacted about the Ipsos research, the Labour Party said it would not comment on polling.
Public opinion reflects government performance on defence spending
The research from Ipsos will still be unsettling for Conservatives making an effort to revamp their image as the party that is strong on defence, as a clear majority of Britons polled do not trust that Conservatives have the right policies on defence (61%), while less than half as many do trust them to have the right policies (30%).
By comparison, Labour’s standing with the public on defence is positive, with a fairly even split between those that do not trust the party on defence (48%), and those that do (41%).
When considering the substance of the proposal for additional funding to Defence budgets – an additional £20bn spent by 2030 funded via cutting 72,000 civil service jobs – those respondents who were given more context about how the extra spending would be funded gave slightly less support for the plan.
The UK Government’s pledge will see defence spending “steadily increase” to 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade, reaching £87bn by 2030. Through this metric, defence would receive an additional £75bn over six years or £12.5bn per year, maintaining the UK’s lead as the largest European defence spender.
Of the participants, 57% were not confident that the extra spending could be found without additional taxation, and 52% were not confident that the government would get good value for money from an increase in defence spending, indicating that public confidence in the plans may quickly run aground if difficulties arise during their implementation.
Based on the government’s recent record, such perspectives have some validity. At the end of 2023, the UK National Audit Office (NAO) released its analysis of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Equipment Plan for 2023-2033, finding it had exceeded the budget by £16.9bn, with costs estimated at £305.5bn as of March 2023, compared to a budget of £288.6bn. This marks a deterioration from the previous year’s Plan (2022-2032), where forecast costs were just £2.6bn under the budget.
The NAO’s November 2023 report stated that the MoD’s 2023-2033 Plan is unaffordable, citing that forecast costs have increased by £65.7bn (27%) compared to the previous plan, surpassing a budget increase of £46.3bn (19%). (Source: army-technology.com)
15 May 24. Finland may fast track reservist training for border security. The Finnish Government will consider amendments proposed to its Conscription Act – the latest move in a wider public discussion in Europe on conscription. Conscription remains a topic of vociferous, public debate across Europe with many countries making a strategic decision to implement halfway measures to set civil society on a greater war footing.
The latest country to do this is Finland, where the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has requested dialogue on amendments to the existing Conscription Act concerning continued support in bolstering its border security.
According to a new proposal, the Act would allow reservists placed in border troop units to be ordered to training faster than the currently set three months. Thus, the proposal concerns only a small proportion of reservists, specifically those positioned as border troops.
Currently, those liable for military service can only be ordered, through an accelerated procedure, to reservist training that aims to raise military readiness.
The new grounds for reservist training would be intended for situations where border security has been seriously compromised. Such situations could include, for example, rapidly developing disturbances in border security due to hybrid threats in the form of large-scale instrumentalised migration or a situation requiring intensified border control because of a major accident or pandemic.
Finland’s conscription model
Finland currently has a conscription model in which every male Finnish citizen aged 18-60 is liable to military service, and women can apply on a voluntary basis.
After completing military service, they are mustered out into the Finnish Defence Forces’ reserve.
Conscripts trained for rank-and-file duties serve for 165 days; those trained for rank-and-file duties requiring special skills and those completing unarmed service serve for 255 days; while conscripts trained to be officers, non-commissioned officers or for the most demanding special duties in the rank-and-file serve for 347 days. Non-military service lasts 347 days.
European conscription and halfway measures
Military readiness is beginning to touch civil society more than ever before following Russia’s aggressive full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began more than two years ago.
Nations with a more profound threat perception due to their proximity to Russia are, quite naturally, more prone to discussing and implementing measures to levy troops.
Finland shares an 830-mile border with Russia that it has a duty to maintain – even more so as a new member of Nato situated on the alliance’s eastern flank. Operating under the Ministry of the Interior, the Finnish Border Guard consists merely of 1,700 personnel, and that includes the Coast Guard.
Other countries on in the same region such as Lithuania have conscription too, for which the Baltic nation hopes to implement new legislation that will expand its current number from its stagnant level of 3,500 conscripts.
Other countries further away in Western Europe such as the UK are under less pressure in this regard. Britain ended conscription in 1960-3 and has had no obligatory service since then. However, stirred by Russian aggression, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, announced earlier this year that the UK has transitioned from a post-war society to a state of pre-war.
While this had been widely mistaken for a call to implement conscription, the picture Sanders painted had in fact raised a point about mobilising civil society in some ways that are currently undefined. This may come to look like the measures we see elsewhere on the Continent. For example, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland agreed to establish a military corridor across their respective territories. Their focus is primarily on the transport of troops, material and supplies from the deep-sea ports on the North Sea to the particularly exposed Nato eastern flank. (Source: army-technology.com)
15 May 24. Slovakia: shooting of Prime Minister. Earlier on 15 May, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico was shot while attending a government meeting in the town of Handlová (Trenčín region), approximately 112 miles (180km) north-east of the capital Bratislava. He was taken to hospital; the government has since confirmed that he is in a life-threatening condition.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The alleged perpetrator of the attack, who media reports claim to be a 71-year-old man in possession of a legal firearm, has been detained, indicating there is no longer an active threat.
- Fico has served his current term as prime minister since October 2023, though he previously held office between 2006-2010 and 2012-2018, rendering him one of Slovakia’s most prominent politicians.
- Fico is a highly polarising figure. The murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak in 2018 ultimately led to Fico’s resignation during his second term in office and has been a perennial source of opposition to Fico and wider polarisation in Slovakian society ever since.
FORECAST
The motive for the apparent assassination attempt remains unclear and the opposition has condemned the attack. However, the initial reaction from Fico’s populist Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD) party indicates that the government will use the incident to intensify pressure on the so-called ‘liberal media’ and opposition parties. Since taking office in 2023, the government has persistently rallied against the ‘political establishment’, the so-called ‘liberal media’ and NGOs. For instance, the government is in the process of introducing a law that would require NGOs that receive more than EUR 5,000 (USD 5,335) in foreign funding to register with the government and list their donors, which will drive regulatory risk to journalists and NGOs in particular. The proposed measure reflects a broader proliferation of Russian-style ‘foreign agent’ legislation across the region. The government’s efforts to push through the law, despite growing EU opposition, will possibly intensify as a result of the attack; they will likely be accompanied by greater hostility towards journalists among Fico supporters.
The incident will also possibly provide an increase in support for Fico and Smer-SD in the opinion polls ahead of the European Parliament elections on 6-9 June. Although Fico’s party has retained its lead in the polls since assuming office, the organisation’s popularity has slowly declined since. A possible spike in support would also likely serve to reinforce potential backlash against Smer-SD’s opponents.
There is a realistic possibility that the shooting will increase the risk of domestic unrest in Bratislava in the coming days and weeks, though any protests will likely remain peaceful. It is possible that the incident will, in the first instance, trigger pro-government demonstrations held in solidarity with Fico. However, given the government’s initial reaction and already high levels of social polarisation, opposition protests in defence of the media and civil society are also a realistic possibility. Opposition protests have occurred sporadically throughout 2024, particularly in response to the government’s plan to close down the country’s anti-corruption office. The risk of violent unrest in Slovakia is generally low. We assess that the shooting is unlikely to alter this trend substantially, though opposition protests would possibly be confronted with a firmer response by the security forces, driving greater violent clashes and bystander risks than are typical.
If Fico was to die or otherwise become incapacitated for a prolonged period, the Slovakian constitution stipulates that one of four vice presidents should take over the responsibilities of the prime minister. At present, the most likely candidate is the current deputy prime minister and defence minister Robert Kaliňák, who is also a member of Fico’s Smer-SD party. (Source: Sibylline)
14 May 24. Germany needs strong military recruitment, Scholz says in conscription debate. Germany must find ways to convince people to sign up for a career in the military, Chancellor Olaf Scholz said on Tuesday, as the country looks at conscription as a possible way to boost its long-neglected defences in the face of tensions with Russia.
“Ultimately it’s about how we can convince enough women and men to work in the Bundeswehr and find a job for themselves there,” Scholz said during a visit to Sweden, which reintroduced conscription in 2017 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, a member of Scholz’s Social Democrats, has tasked his ministry with exploring potential models for military conscription.
In Sweden, between 5,000-6,000 young men and women are selected for conscription each year but the government wants to increase that number to 10,000, which would mean about one in 10 youngsters will have to do the basic training.
The war in Ukraine prompted debate in Germany over reintroducing the system, as the Bundeswehr armed forces grapple with shrinking troop numbers at a time when Berlin has promised an unprecedented ramp-up in the nation’s defences. Germany has not had conscription since 2011.
The Christian Democrats (CDU), Germany’s main opposition party, has committed itself to reintroducing military service if it wins national elections next year.
Pistorius, whose ministry is yet to present its paper with proposed models, has previously described the Swedish system as a role model. Sweden trains conscripts but only uses as many volunteers as the professional army needs.
“No country has a perfect model and everybody respects different countries using different models for different historic reasons,” Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said following his talks with Scholz. (Source: Reuters)
15 May 24. Norway revises up 2024 defence budget in advance of 12-year overhaul. Norway will increase defence spending for 2024 by $1.2bn (Nkr12.91bn) in a revised national budget while a long-term plan is worked through parliament.
Norwegian Government proposed a revised national budget on 14 May, with $1.2bn boost to defence spending to take effect this year, supporting Norway’s operations through 2024 and offering support to Ukraine.
The revision has been proposed while Norway’s Parliament works to ratify a historic 12-year plan to increase Norway’s defence spending by $60bn, announced a month earlier, in April 2024.
The new funding will allow Norway to implement its long-term plans earlier than was previously possible, said Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram, citing the accelerated purchase of air defence systems.
The new budget for 2024 will result in increases to defence spending that take effect this year, with an increase of Nkr13bn, up to a total of Nkr104bn.
From the new funds, Nkr6bn will go to supporting Ukraine, while Nkr7bn will be spent on Norway’s own capabilities.
Ukraine will benefit from Norwegian spending on air defence systems and ammunition, intended to provide protection against Russian stand-off weapon barrages and provided resources for Ukrainian defence forces involved in counter-barrage operations.
Norway will spend Nkr5bn on its own ammunition, equipment, housing, barracks and other infrastructure, to pave the way for further long-term growth.
The remaining Nkr2bn increase in defence spending will go towards Norway’s own operational capabilities, including Nkr992m for operational activities by the armed forces, and to facilitate increased armed forces activity.
Nkr200m is proposed for the maintenance of the logistics vessel KNM Maud.
Funds will be available for the maintenance of P-8 maritime patrol aircraft.
Nkr37.5m will go towards manned security at the northernmost island of Andøya “in line with the government’s ambitions for further development of Andøya related to drones, space activities, and allied reception”, according to a release from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.
Norway’s 12-year defence spending increase plan
In April 2024, the Norwegian Government proposed a radical increase in defence spending to take place over the next 12 years, putting forward a plan for a Nkr600bn boost by 2036.
The new funding will increase stocks in material and munitions, and increase personnel figures in the services, adding 4,600 more conscripts, 13,700 more reservists and 4,600 more employees. The Army will expand from one brigade to three, with the home guard increasing to 45,000 soldiers. The Navy will undergo its largest investment to date, with five new frigates with anti-submarine helicopters, a minimum of five new submarines, up to ten new large vessels and up to eighteen new smaller vessels. NASAMS air defences will double in number under the new plan, with both the Ai Force and Army receiving new systems. (Source: army-technology.com)
14 May 24. Sweden agrees to US military presence in DCA. The agreement is said to build on the Nordic nation’s Nato accession and provide imminent military support, much like other US arrangements in the Baltic.
The Swedish Government has agreed to US military presence in its territory under the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA). It is believed to be “a natural extension of Sweden’s Nato membership and the changing conditions for Sweden’s security policy,” explained Sweden’s Ministry of Defence.
According to the DCA, the cooperation is based on Sweden’s consent and is conducted with full respect for Swedish sovereignty, Swedish legislation and international obligations.
DCA does not violate Sweden’s policy that, as in other Nordic countries, there is no reason to deploy nuclear weapons or permanent bases on Swedish territory in peacetime.
Entering into this agreement does not alter this position, which was previously expressed within the framework of Sweden’s Nato application. Sweden’s application to join Nato had broad support in the its governing body, the Riksdag, without reservations. “This position remains unchanged,” the government affirmed.
Presence is deterrence
“With the DCA, Sweden can receive early, swift and effective military support from the United States in a deteriorating security situation, which is carefully regulated and based on Swedish consent,” said the Minister for Defence Pål Jonson.
“Therefore, the agreement acts as a deterrent and is stabilising. It reduces the risk of war breaking out and makes Sweden safer.”
The Baltic model
This follows similar military presence in Lithuania, where there has been an uninterrupted, rotational presence since 2019.
Current US battalions serving in Pabradė, in the east of the country, around 360 miles from the border with Belarus, a key Russian ally, are the Hounds Battalion, 67th Armour Regiment and the Battle Kings Battalion. The Baltic nation also hosts German forces in a similar capacity.
On 21 February 2024, the former Lithuanian Defence Minister, Arvydas Anušauskas, pledged to build permanent infrastructure to support these rotational units of US troops. The country has already made efforts to accommodate German forces in Nato’s Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group as well as the 4,000 troops it agreed to send on a bilateral basis. (Source: army-technology.com)
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