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28 Feb 24. Admiral Tony Radakin asked to stay on as head of British Armed Forces. Adml Sir Tony Radakin has been asked to stay in post for another year to continue his contributions to the Ukrainian war effort.
Sir Tony, 58, has been asked by the Prime Minister to stay on as the Chief of the Defence Staff until the Autumn next year.
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022, Sir Tony has travelled to Kyiv multiple times to show his support and meet with members of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, including meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president.
In August last year he met his counterpart, Gen Valery Zaluzhny, the former head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, which Sir Tony said marked a number of “regular meetings” the two had had since the invasion.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
28 Feb 24. Italy getting further away from NATO 2% defence spending target, minister says. Italy’s military budget is set to shrink again this year, taking the country further away from a NATO target of spending at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence by 2028, Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said on Wednesday.
Defence spending has fallen steadily from 1.59% of GDP in 2020 to 1.46% in 2023, and “will probably fall” again this year, Crosetto said in a question time session at the lower house of parliament.
“This is not news that makes me happy,” he added.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s European members are under pressure to boost their defence capabilities, and have come under renewed fire from U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump for not paying enough into the military alliance.
At a summit in 2014, NATO leaders agreed to move towards spending at least 2% of GDP on defence within a decade, but Italy’s previous government, led by Mario Draghi, postponed the objective by four years.
In November, Crosetto told parliament that even meeting the less ambitious 2028 target was “difficult”. Italy faces tight budget constraints, being the second most indebted country in the euro zone after Greece.
Crosetto on Wednesday reiterated a pledge to continue supporting Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression, after Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni last week signed a 10-year defence pact with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Kyiv. (Source: Reuters)
28 Feb 24. Will the EU’s defence aims lead to a shattering of US tech dependency? The US defence sector has penetrated virtually every aspect of European military procurement, as the European Commission seeks to pull up the technological drawbridge.
As the European Union’s (EU) senior leadership calls for increased collaboration among member states’ defence procurement, there is a growing risk of trading capability for commonality in the drive towards Single Market exclusivity.
In a speech at the European Parliament Plenary on 28 February, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, said member states should increase collaboration in defence spending as the EU looks to become a more independent actor on the global stage.
Referencing the need to “rebuild, replenish, and modernise” military capabilities among member states’ armed forces, von der Leyen said that Europe should “strive to win the next generation of battle winning operational capabilities” through a “turbocharging” of the defence industrial capacity over the next five years.
“Europe must spend more, spend better, spend European,” von der Leyen rallied.
To this end, the EU would put forward its proposals “in the next weeks” with the European Industrial Defence Strategy, along with the European Defence Investment Programme, which will prioritise joint defence procurement.
“Just as we did it very successfully with the [Covid-19] vaccines or for example with natural gas, this will help us reduce fragmentation and increase interoperability. But to do this we must collectively send a strong signal to industry,” von der Leyen said.
“We will increase support for industrial ramp-up, as we are now doing with ammunition through [Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)]. We will identify European defence projects of common interest… and we will focus on innovation to ensure Europe has that edge in the new technologies, which we see being deployed across the world in different conflicts.”
The possible acceptance that EU member states could struggle to compete with the industrial capacity of the United States, and its clear technological advantage, is perhaps indicated in von der Leyen’s call for public and private lenders to support the continent’s defence industry and, in particular, its small and medium enterprises.
“Small and medium enterprises are the backbone of our industry. They are the driver of innovation and a critical factor in the Single Market,” von der Leyen said.
In addition, von der Leyen stated that in the “next weeks” the European Commission would announce funding under the ASAP programme intended to double European ammunition production to cover two m shells a year by the end of 2025.
The positioning of von der Leyen as President of the European Commission as a supporter of defence industry runs counter to her six-year span as German defence minister from 2013-2019, presiding over a series of controversies regarding German military readiness, which included the use of painted broomsticks in place of machine guns during Nato exercises.
Von der Leyen has also called for the creation of a Defence Commissioner within the European Commission, effectively acting as the EU’s defence minister.
US designed fighters own Europe’s skies
It is yet to be seen whether the defence industry in the EU’s member states will be able to agree on the exact structure needed for collaboration. While programmes such as the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter and Airbus A400M transporter have achieved some success, infighting continues to hamper multinational developments as national industrial workshares hamper cooperation.
Among EU member states, France, and perhaps Sweden, are outliers in leaning almost exclusively on national defence industries to provide for their armed forces, although key strategic capabilities, such as the French Navy’s E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, are sourced from the United States.
Germany, the other industrial power of the EU, has agreed deals to acquire US CH-47F helicopters and F-35A stealth fighters, in what were seen as significant blows to the European aerospace sector. Indeed, the US-origin F-35 aircraft has become the defacto 5th generation fighter across the EU, having won in Italy, German, Poland, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.
Incorporating the US F-16 and F/A-18 fighters into European inventories, nearly 50% (13 of 27) of EU member states use US designed or manufactured fixed-wing air combat fleets, either in part or whole of their entire inventory.
Of those that do not sourced US origin fighters, a number of EU members, including the Republic of Ireland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, and others, do not actually maintain a fixed-wing air combat capability.
The proliferation of transport aircraft such as the C-130 series, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, or the Black Hawk tactical rotary-wing platform, and US penetration into Europe’s aerospace procurement goes even further.
Much of Europe’s airborne missile, either air-to-air or air-to-surface, is acquired from the US as well, such as the AIM series of missiles. In the land and naval domain, kinetic effectors such as the Harpoon anti-ship missile, the SM family of missiles, or the RAM missile-based close in weapons system, are sourced from the United States.
Former EU member state the UK is also a significant provider of technology and platforms into EU armed forces through programmes such as Poland’s Miecznik programme, which has seen UK defence prime Babcock win a contract to provide the design for three new frigates for the Polish Navy, plus build support.
Poland has also committed much of its immense increase in defence spending to companies outside of Europe altogether, acquiring main battle tanks and 155mm artillery howitzers from South Korea.
Non-EU state the UK is also the lead industrial partner in the GCAP programme, which will develop a 5+ generation fighter in collaboration with EU member state Italy, and Asia-Pacific powerhouse Japan. In contrast, the EU trio of France, Germany, and Spain are struggling to get their own 5+ generation FCAS programme off the ground.
Meanwhile, the US is at least half a technological generation ahead of the EU in the air domain and is pushing ahead with Next Generation Air Dominance platform, which is expected to offer at least 6th generation capabilities, and likely beyond.
Across Europe, the United States provides a significant quality of its sensor requirements, such as radars across the land, sea, and air domains.
The CAVS effort is indicative of the kind of capabilities that European countries develop in cooperative programmes. Credit: Patria
Current EU collaborative programme are of a more modest endeavour, such as the 6×6 CAVS platform on land, or the European Patrol Corvette at sea. Germany and France are also working to develop a new main battle tank (MBT) to replace their Leopard 2 and Leclerc MBTs, although this has achieved little progress since its launch in 2017.
Absent US leadership, the EU has to act if Ukraine is to survive
Nevertheless, lessons being learned in Ukraine and the inability of the US, which is stymied in political infighting in an election year that has seen its support of Kyiv in its fight against Russia come grinding to a halt, indicate that despite the challenges greater EU integration is likely required.
Tristan Sauer, defence and aerospace analyst at GlobalData, stated that the focus on joint-procurement initiatives and commonality was “essential” for the EU to achieve industrial scalability.
“The European defence market has had to diversify its capability offerings to satisfy radically different requirements from nation to nation, undermining sustainability and thus resulting in the current lack of scale and depth of materiel,” Sauer explained.
“By focusing on commonality, European governments may finally be incentivised to invest in the industrial base to provide sufficient scalability & sustainability over the long-term. The high attrition rates of the Ukraine conflict have illustrated there’s no alternative to mass in a high intensity conflict.” (Source: army-technology.com)
27 Feb 24. UK to take new approach in tackling overseas and domestic security threats. The Government will take a new integrated approach that combines how it tackles overseas and domestic security threats, Cabinet Office Minister Baroness Neville-Rolfe said in a speech at the Royal United Services Institute today [26 February].
This shift will be underpinned by the transition of the UK Government’s Conflict, Stability & Security Fund (CSSF) into a new Integrated Security Fund (ISF) in April.
The CSSF was a cross-government fund that tackled security challenges overseas that threatened UK national security. Its successor the ISF will continue its important work helping to deliver the government’s national security objectives.
The transformation of the CSSF into the ISF is a natural evolution that recognises that many global challenges – cyber security, terrorism and people smuggling – also threaten us here in the UK.
The new ISF will build on the success of the CSSF to combine our overseas and domestic security response to tackle transnational challenges threatening the UK and its partners. This integrated approach will help to address key challenges such as causes of instability and conflict, serious and organised crime, smuggling, illicit finance, cyber-attacks and illegal migration.
Minister Neville-Rolfe told delegates at RUSI on Monday:
“The security challenges we face do not respect borders, they can happen anywhere and come from any place, at any time.
“For example, Serious Organised Crime Groups operate in multiple countries inside and outside the UK.
“We need to be able to work across borders and that is what the ISF is designed to do.”
She highlighted serious and organised crime groups operating both in the UK and overseas as an example of a priority national security challenge that the ISF has set its sights on.
In her speech at RUSI, the Minister will also set out six focus areas for the ISF’s work:
- Combating state threats to the UK and its interests from state-level actors, such as Russia.
- Combating non-state threats to the UK and its interests from terrorist groups, violent extremists, and criminal gangs.
- Defending against malicious cyber activity
- Improving understanding of the maritime domain and combating maritime threats to the UK, its allies and partners.
- Deploying effective economic deterrents to counter hostile acts.
- Addressing the causes of instability in conflict and helping those worst affected by it, including women and girls.
The Minister also outlined the work that the new ISF will do to counter disinformation, including the threat of AI and emerging technology. She will stress the importance of this in a year with more than 70 elections scheduled to take place globally:
“Work to guard against disinformation has never been more important than in 2024; a year that sees elections in over 70 countries with a combined population of half of the world’s total.”
Support for Ukraine remains a key priority for the Government and the Fund as they defend their country against Russia’s illegal and unprovoked attack. Last year Ukraine was the biggest single-state recipient of Official Development Assistance. It received £41 m from the ISF’s predecessor, the CSSF.
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak first announced the creation of the ISF as part of the March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
26 Feb 24. Sweden clears final hurdle in bid to join NATO after Hungary approves accession. Hungary’s parliament overwhelmingly approved Sweden’s bid to join NATO on Monday, clearing the way for the Nordic nation’s accession to the alliance after nearly two years of intense negotiations and dealing a geopolitical blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Getting approval from the Hungarian parliament was the final hurdle for Stockholm joining NATO. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson visited Budapest on Friday to discuss defense and security cooperation with his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orban. The two sides appeared to reconcile, agreeing on a deal that would see Hungary acquire four new Swedish-made Gripen fighter jets.
Of the 194 members of parliament who voted, just six rejected Sweden’s accession.
“Today is a historic day,” Kristersson said on X shortly after the vote. “Sweden stands ready to shoulder its responsibility for Euro-Atlantic security.”
Sweden will formally join the alliance after it submits its instrument of accession with the United States government, which is the depository of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed Sweden’s will become a member of the block now that all allies have approved its bid to join.
“Sweden’s membership will make us all stronger and safer,” he said.
With Sweden’s accession, NATO will count 32 countries among its members, an ironic twist given that Russia launched its war against Ukraine in part due to the alliance’s growth in Eastern Europe along Russia’s border.
Last year, Finland became the 31st NATO member, adding some 1,300 kilometers (830 miles) to the alliance’s frontier with Russia.
As NATO states, Finland and Sweden will enjoy the protection granted under Article 5 of the treaty that established the alliance – which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack against all.
Sweden and Finland announced their intention to join the alliance in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, abandoning the decades-long policy of non-alignment that defined both states’ foreign relations during the Cold War.
NATO has an open-door policy, meaning that any country can be invited to join if it expresses an interest and is able and willing to uphold the principles of the bloc’s founding treaty.
However, under the accession rules, any member state can veto a new country from joining. While most NATO members quickly approved Finland and Sweden’s applications, Hungary and Turkey held out for some time.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Finland and Sweden of being too lenient toward Kurdish terrorist organizations, while Orban claimed they were spreading “outright lies” about his country’s failure to adhere to European Union standards on the rule of law – fundamental values enshrined in EU treaties.
Such concerns prompted the EU to freeze bns of dollars’ worth of funds meant for Hungary until such concerns were addressed. Orban and his government have repeatedly denied that they have breached EU rules.
Hungary and Turkey later both softened their stance on Finland’s membership and approved its application last March. The Turkish parliament approved Sweden’s entry last month, after Stockholm tightened its anti-terror legislation and pledged closer cooperation with Turkey on security concerns.
Shortly after the Turkish vote, Orban told NATO chief Stoltenberg that his government would also support Swedish membership. The Hungarian leader said during his state of the nation speech on February 17 that the country would be able to ratify Sweden’s accession at the start of the spring session of parliament on Monday.
“Hungary has a vested interest in Europe’s security,” government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs said after the vote on Monday. “In Sweden we have a strong and reliable ally who will benefit the future of NATO for the better.”
NATO allies had been concerned that, while Orban was publicly supportive of Sweden’s bid, the country had spent months stalling. Budapest’s foot-dragging elicited concerns that Orban, the EU leader closest to Putin, was acting in a manner that benefited the Kremlin.
In recent weeks, however, Europe has had some success in getting Hungary to fall in line with the bloc’s foreign policy goals. Budapest earlier this month dropped its objections to an EU funding deal for Ukraine worth $50 bn, which Orban had vetoed in December on procedural grounds. Orban’s critics had accused him of blocking the deal in response to the EU’s decision to withhold the funds meant for Hungary. Hungary denied there was any connection between the two.
Sweden’s accession to NATO comes at a crucial time in the war in Ukraine, with Russia finding renewed success on the battlefield and cracks appearing to emerge in Western support for Kyiv after two years of fighting. Focus has also shifted away from Europe since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel sparked war in the Middle East.
The rise in populist sentiment in Europe and the United States ahead of elections in June and November respectively also threatens to stymie Ukraine’s efforts to continue its fight against Russia.
Politicians in Western democracies are struggling to convince an increasingly skeptical electorate that supporting Ukraine and stopping the march of authoritarianism abroad is a good use of bns of dollars’ worth of taxes when voters face other issues closer to home, such as coping with rising inflation. (Source: CNN)
23 Feb 24. Europeans are building a war economy. Can they master it?
When Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron quickly proclaimed Europe needed an “économie de guerre” — a war economy — to underwrite its security.
Since then, governments here have rushed to assess how rapidly they can purchase weapons. Most were sobered by the lack of production capacity in an arms industry focused on the promise of expensive, advanced technology rather than mass output.
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, there’s a movement afoot to remake the European defense-industrial complex into a muscular deterrent in its own right. The effort is playing out in national capitals as well as at the European Union. Officials in Brussels are expected to unveil a defense industry strategy soon that will test the bloc’s ability to unleash and simultaneously tame a market that went from obscure to omnipresent in two short years.
“Russia’s invasion has been a wake-up call for Europe,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said last month. “We have to rethink our own defense and defense-industrial base.”
The ability to produce more weapons faster has become the singular yardstick for progress. In Germany, politicians have begun debating ways to front money to arms makers for the production of critical equipment, coupled with long-term purchase guarantees. And companies are building new production facilities and introducing new work shifts to keep up with making weapons needed both by Ukraine and national forces.
But amid the frenzy, there has been little discussion about anchoring the business of defense among a set of political rules that reflect an expectation production will only take place on terms acceptable to governments.
In an interview with Defense News during a recent visit to Washington, Lt. Gen. Michael Claesson, the chief of the Swedish defense staff, described a new model for the interplay between governments and the arms industry as “public-private partnership 2.0.″
“I don’t believe in increasing necessarily government ownership” he said. “What I’m asking for is government engagement.”
Private companies can still deliver the best results, he added, “but there needs to be interaction in a different way than before.”
In Germany, politicians have long seen the defense market as one like any other, said Torben Schütz, an analyst at the Berlin-based German Council of Foreign Relations. “That is no longer up to date,” he added, arguing vendor incentives alone “probably won’t get you anywhere” in finding the equilibrium between government control and laissez-faire economics.
Growing prices
Key weapons, needed by European nations and Ukraine alike, have seen major price increases. Citing NATO officials, The Wall Street Journal reported last month the price of a 155mm artillery shell has risen from $2,100 apiece to $8,400 since the war began in February 2022.
In Germany, there is an entire cohort of weapon systems whose cost projections are expected to rise because of contract provisions with vendors that allow prices to remain flexible in line with market conditions. The increases are now showing up on the books because stipulations in the German government’s €100 bn (U.S. $108 bn) military plus-up fund prescribed that all programs financed through it must fully account for any expected cost escalation.
Affected programs include the Eurodrone, for which officials last month reported a 35% jump, or €1.3bn, since last summer, according to the Defence Ministry’s most recent report on the status of major weapon systems, dated January. The document downplays the increase as academic, noting the terms of the contract had remained the same while future cost hikes during the performance period through 2035 were now baked in.
The types of contractually agreed price adjustments taking effect in the Eurodrone program are “generally” unlimited in both directions — less expensive or pricier over time, a ministry spokesman told Defense News in an email. But it’s possible to restrict the degree of volatility in negotiations with contractors, the spokesman added.
In addition, the cost for a new short-range air defense system to counter drones for the German military has increased from €240m at the program’s inception in 2018 to almost €1.3bn now, as first reported by Der Spiegel in December.
According to the defense spokesman, higher demand for counter-drone capabilities on the global arms market has led to manufacturers increasing their prices.
“Demand goes up, supply remains relatively constant,” Schütz said. “We all have enough economics knowledge to know what happens as a result.”
But there are more factors wrapped up in cost increases than simply higher demand. As the war in Ukraine rages, companies have complained about the growing price of everything from labor to raw materials, raising the key question: Are vendors charging more now because they must, or because they can?
Government reach
The question of how to arrange the relationship between the European defense market and governments buying from it has taken on an almost existential dimension. That is because defense analysts believe Russia could one day attack the continent if it succeeds in Ukraine.
Daniel Fiott, the head of a defense and statecraft program at the Brussels School of Governance, said governments generally agree there’s a need for them to interfere in the defense market, but it’s a tricky concept to apply at the EU level.
“Defense markets across the world experience state intervention, and for good reasons,” Fiott told Defense News. “Without control, governments would experience job and skills losses, and even lose manufacturing capacity to rivals.”
“In this sense, price volatility for equipment could pose a national security risk if it means governments become priced out of a market to which they urgently need access,” he said..
While the United States has the Defense Production Act, which allows the government to prioritize the production of goods needed for national security, there is no such tool available to the European Union.
There is also limited understanding in Brussels about the intricacies of the European defense market as a whole, its supply chains and its pricing mechanics. The lack of knowledge became more apparent in past years as EU officials, for example, tried to identify vital suppliers needing protection from potentially nefarious investors outside the bloc.
Still, officials believe they can translate lessons learned from collective COVID-19 vaccine or natural gas purchases into the defense market to refill national armories. For now, equipment levels remain low until manufacturers can catch up following their donations to Ukraine. But there are exceptions, thanks to early government action, according to Minna Ålander, an analyst on Nordic defense matters at the Helsinki-based Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
“The Finnish Defense Forces (FDF) received extra funding for procurement and immediately issued new contracts in the spring of 2022, not long after Russia’s full-scale invasion and before other countries woke up to the issue,” she wrote in an article for the Center for European Policy Analysis earlier this month. “As a result, the country’s stockpiles have been filling to such an extent that more warehouse capacity is needed.”
Meanwhile, in Germany, the lack of experience in using defense-industrial policy as a deliberate planning tool of governing — often decried by industry executives — is now coming back to haunt Berlin, and officials are now forced to wise up in a hurry, according to analysts here.
German officials never had to think about industrial mobilization because the assumption was the Cold War front-line nation would immediately lose its manufacturing base in a major war anyway, according to Schütz.
“The discussion about the particulars of a war economy are off to a slow start here,” he said. “Hopefully not too late.”
The upcoming EU defense industry strategy won’t solve all of the dilemmas facing the bloc’s defense market, according to Fiott. At the same time, he added, it’s the first of its kind and could provide European industry with greater certainty about demand over the coming years.
“Alongside the strategy should also be the European Defence Investment Programme, which seeks to invest in defense technologies and systems beyond the prototyping phase, where the EU’s European Defence Fund currently ends, to production and commercialization,” Fiott said. “Clearly, then, if the strategy and the EDIP emerge in public together, and if the EDIP comes with a hefty investment tag — some have called for €100 bn over a seven-year period — then the demand signals sought after in the strategy may become a reality.” (Source: Defense News)
22 Feb 24. UK Minister stresses “total focus” on achieving GCAP by 2035.
The Minister for Defence Procurement discouraged the possibility of additional GCAP partners, a move that would put the delivery timeline at risk. In a Parliament Defence Committee hearing discussing Britain’s future aviation capabilities on 21 February, 2024, the UK Minister for Defence Procurement, James Cartlidge, stressed that it is “militarily crucial” to deliver the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) by 2035.
GCAP is a trilateral alliance in which Italy, Japan and the UK will jointly develop a sixth generation combat aircraft. This arrangement was codified in a legal framework set up in December 2023.
With the goal of bringing the future fighter into service by 2035, the alliance intends for the platform to replace their ageing combat aircraft approaching the end of their life-cycle. These include the 20-year-old Eurofighter Typhoons, the even older AMX A-11 Ghibli, as well as the Mitsubishi F-2.
In the current security climate militaries around the world are prioritising the delivery of platforms more than ever before in order to be able to field platforms and systems as soon as possible.
Cartlidge reiterated this reality, arguing that “2035 is a really crucial target date to get [GCAP] into service… [we] would not want any variation to occur in structure or approach which puts that at risk, let’s be absolutely clear.”
GCAP partners versus customers
One important implication of this statement is that the Minister discouraged other countries from joining the GCAP programme as a potential partner.
Having already formalised a legally binding treaty, more partners would risk delays as the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) would need to reassert respective, national requirements for the aircraft.
“I think the crucial point,” Cartlidge noted, “is that this is a trilateral partnership, whatever we did with another country in terms of them partnering would require the support of all three countries. But, equally, from the beginning we’ve all been very clear that exportability is very important to this programme.”
Ensuring military readiness is key and Cartlidge is rightly wary of any restructuring that may hold back any progress.
This is a pivotal lesson learned from previous combat air programmes, such as Eurofighter, F-16 and F-35, where there was a persistent problem with agility and decision-making to deliver the aircraft as originally intended.
There is a real need for GCAP, “it is not a luxury,” he said. “If we want to remain competitive militarily, we will have to be developing this capability and the Japanese have their threat, they also have their fighter which is the F-2 coming out of service, we all have those challenges, with the Typhoon etc., so there is a total focus on this.”
(Source: airforce-technology.com)
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