NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 15.

BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing their offensive operations along the western flanks of Bakhmut; they are likely making advances, though we cannot confirm the extent of any such progress at present. Russian sources claim their forces have reached the south-western outskirts of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, located around seven miles (12km) to the north-west of Bakhmut. Similarly, claims of advances west of Khromove are growing, indicating Russian forces are likely progressing towards the outskirts of Bohdanivka, located around four miles (6km) west of Bakhmut. Several Russian sources also claimed on 14 December that their forces have partially surrounded Klishchiivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut, though this is likely to be highly premature. While Russian forces have claimed recent advances to the north of the settlement, we cannot confirm this at present.
DONETSK: On 15 December, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, reported that Russian forces carried out 80 assaults a day in the Donetsk sector over the past three days. On 14 December alone, Russia reportedly launched 76 ground attacks and 631 artillery strikes. Tarnavskyi stated that Russian assault groups are comprised of 20 combatants and operate with the support of armoured vehicles. Russian assaults also include intense airstrikes and artillery strikes.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage posted on 14 December indicated that Russian forces progressed south of the railway to the north-west of Stepove, a settlement located around five miles (8km) north-west of Avdiivka. Additional geolocated footage from 14 December shows that Russian forces marginally advanced along the eastern outskirts of Novomykhailivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Donetsk city.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Earlier on 15 December, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to enter Synkivka, located about five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. They stated that up to nine armoured vehicles took part in recent assaults. Geolocated footage posted on 14 December indicated that a Russian mechanised infantry attack did take place in northern Synkivka. According to the milblogger, Russian forces are currently seeking to reach the eastern outskirts of Ivanivka, located around 12 miles (20km) to the south-east of Kupiansk.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 14 December that units of the Russian Southern Military District have advanced in an area that is 1.5 miles (2.5km) wide and 0.6 miles (1km) deep located to the south and west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). They also claimed that the units have advanced around 700m near Verbove, located around six miles (10km) to the east. However, we cannot confirm this at present.
STRIKES: Earlier on 15 December, Ukrainian air defences intercepted 14 of 15 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The projectiles were intercepted over Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv and Poltava oblasts. Explosions were also reported in Kharkiv oblast.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SANCTIONS: On 14 December, EU member states agreed to issue a 12th sanctions package against Russia. The measures will take effect on 1 January 2024. They include a direct import ban on Russian diamonds and a phased ban on Russian diamond imports via third countries from March 2024. G7 countries have imposed a similar ban. These measures will elevate compliance scrutiny over companies which claim to adhere to the G7 price cap on Russian oil.
SANCTIONS: Following the latest sanctions, the EU will require more transparency around costs (especially those related to insurance) from Western companies involved in the shipment of Russian oil; it will also impose a notification system that requires authorisation to sell or export tankers. Recent reports indicate that Russia has been able to circumvent the price cap almost fully by building a fleet of ageing oil tankers, as well as by decreasing its reliance on Western insurance companies. The latest package also imposes measures to prevent Moscow from obtaining Western dual-use equipment. As such, the sanctions illustrate the EU’s commitment to enforcing sanctions and curtailing Russia’s commodity export revenues.
AID: On 14 December, US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer announced that the US Senate will delay the scheduled holiday recess so as to reconvene next week to vote on proposed Ukraine and Israel military aid. The Senate was originally set to break for the holidays on 14 December. The announcement reflects the Biden administration’s determination to try to push through a vote on the USD 106 billion Ukraine-Israel spending package as soon as possible. It also possibly indicates that progress is being made on negotiations with hardline Republicans, who have opposed the spending package in favour of greater border security. While a vote next week in the Democrat-controlled Senate will possibly pass, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives would also need to approve the bill before it becomes law. However, unlike the Senate, the House began its holiday recess on 15 December, meaning approval is only likely to be granted in early 2024.
SPILLOVER: On 14 December, Romania’s defence ministry confirmed that remnants of a downed Russian drone were discovered on Romanian territory. This is the latest in a number of such incidents to take place this year amid Russia’s continual drone campaign against Ukraine’s Danube River ports, which are located just across the river from Romanian territory. The investigation confirmed that the drone landed in an unoccupied area around 2.5 miles (4km) north of Grindu (Tulcea county), some 12 miles (20km) from the Ukrainian port of Reni – a regular target of Russian drone strikes. The incident likely took place overnight on 13-14 December when Russian forces launched dozens of drones against Odesa oblast. In response to recent airspace violations, Romania has installed new anti-drone systems and other defensive measures. These latest incidents are highly unlikely to trigger any major escalation with Russia given that they highly likely represent collateral damage following Ukrainian interception efforts as opposed to a deliberate attack against Romania.
BORDERS: On the evening of 14 December, Finland closed two border crossings with Russia after opening them earlier on the same day. Finnish Interior Minister Mari Rantanen stated that Helsinki opened the border in the hope that illegal immigration flows from Russia would have decreased. However, Finnish border guards reported that 96 asylum seekers, mainly from India, Somalia and Syria, crossed the border on 14 December. Since November, Moscow has been orchestrating a migrant crisis along the border with Finland in retaliation to Helsinki’s growing defence ties with the US. Given the heightened tensions between Russia and the West, we assess that Moscow will continue to encourage irregular migrants to cross the border; the Finnish authorities will in turn likely keep the border crossings closed in the coming weeks.

FORECAST

EU: On 14 December, European Council President Charles Michel confirmed that the EU’s 27 member states had agreed to open accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine. The agreement marks a major symbolic and procedural step in Ukraine’s EU ambitions, as well as an important morale boost for Ukrainians at a time of growing concern over the West’s long-term commitment to military and financial assistance. However, even though the move will likely expediate and encourage further reforms to align with EU standards, actual membership for Ukraine remains a remote long-term prospect.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains opposed to Ukrainian accession talks, though he abstained from the vote by leaving the room in order for the motion to pass unanimously. This seemingly never-before-used procedure appears to have allowed the motion to pass legally. Following the vote, Orbán reiterated that he thinks ‘EU membership for Ukraine is a bad decision’. As we previously reported, the unlocking of EUR 10 billion (USD 11 billion) in EU funding likely played a significant part in Orbán’s decision not to veto the agreement; Hungarian opposition likely remains entrenched in other areas.

In a separate vote, Hungary vetoed the allocation of EUR 50bn (USD 54.8bn) worth of macro-economic financing to Ukraine, marking a further blow to Ukraine’s prospect of timely Western funding. Talks on the proposed funding package are set to restart early next year, though it remains unclear if Hungary’s position will change by the next European Council summit in early January. EU foreign policy decisions require unanimity from the bloc’s 27 member states; this provides Budapest with an effective veto on the EU’s Ukraine policy.

*Georgia-Moldova-Ukraine: Progress on EU bid will encourage reform efforts. On 14 December, the EU Council agreed to open accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant Georgia candidate status. The EU’s decision comes after intense wrangling with Hungarian President Viktor Orbán, who opposes opening negotiations with Kyiv. However, the EU decided to release around EUR 10 billion (USD 11 billion) worth of Hungary’s frozen funds, which prompted Orbán to abstain from voting, allowing the EU to make a favourable decision. Nevertheless, earlier on 15 December, Budapest blocked the allocation of around EUR 50 billion (USD 54.8 billion) worth of EU funding for Ukraine, which will likely sustain uncertainty over Ukraine’s macro-financial stability. The EU’s decision reflects the bloc’s ongoing support for Ukraine and Moldova, two countries grappling with Russian destabilisation efforts and aggression. In the case of Georgia, the decision likely aims to dissuade the country from aligning with Russia and will likely ease anti-government unrest risks. While the EU’s decision will encourage the three countries to continue with reforms, EU accession remains a long-term prospect.

*Exploitation of software vulnerabilities by Russian actor points to sustained risks for firms. On 13 December, government agencies from Poland, the UK and the US released a joint advisory regarding the Russian state-sponsored threat actor ‘APT29’, which has exploited an existing software vulnerability to target global organisations. The software vulnerability (CVE-2023-42793) originates in the software management and automation software from TeamCity and grants a threat actor access to source codes and signing certificates. These can then be abused as part of a supply chain attack targeting customers of TeamCity. APT29 has exploited this vulnerability to breach the network of an unnamed US biomedical manufacturing organisation as well as a US-based tertiary education firm, likely as part of an espionage-focused operation. Despite a patch being released for this vulnerability in September, many firms remain vulnerable to exploitation via their software supply chains if they employ inadequate patching policies. Russian cyber threat actors frequently exploit existing and zero-day vulnerabilities in espionage cyber operations; the exploitation risks facing Western firms therefore remain high.

Dec 14.

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 13 December that the Ukrainian military’s transition to primarily defensive operations was a result of poor winter weather conditions and was not a response to a ‘crisis’. Ukraine’s summer and autumn counter-offensive has effectively failed to achieve any significant operational objectives in Zaporizhzhia oblast, and Russia is now attacking on multiple fronts in a bid to reclaim the initiative across eastern Ukraine. As such, Zelensky stated that the most important objective for the Ukrainian military over the winter is to hold its current position and to destroy Russian forces. For further analysis on Ukraine’s next steps in choosing a military strategy for 2024, including a ‘hold and build’ strategy, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 12 December 2023.
BAKHMUT: Recent geolocated footage from 12 December confirms that Russian forces have made some advances along the Bakhmut axis in recent days. Russian forces have advanced north of Sakko and Vantsetti, located around ten miles (16km) north of Bakhmut, as well as north of Klishchiivka, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut. Russian sources continue to claim more advances in these and other directions, including around and to the north of Khromove, just west of Bakhmut. We cannot confirm these reports at present.
DONTESK: On 13 December, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, reported that Russia is concentrating forces in the Marinka sector for coming ground assaults. However, Tarnavskyi stated that Russian claims that these forces have nearly completed the capture of the town are false and part of Moscow’s disinformation campaigning. However, geolocated footage indicates that they control most of the town. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 13 December shows that Russian forces marginally advanced to the south-east of Stepove, located around 1.8 miles (3km) north-west of Avdiivka. On 14 December, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops captured new positions in the industrial zone to the south-east of Avdiivka and Stepove. However, such claims remain visually unconfirmed. Russian sources typically exaggerate the extent of their forces’ advances.
KHERSON: The UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 14 December that Russia’s newly formed 104th Guards Airborne Division of the VDV has highly likely suffered ‘exceptionally heavy losses’ and failed to achieve its objectives in Kherson oblast. The unit was recently deployed in November in a likely bid to dislodge Ukrainian forces operating on the left bank of the Dnieper River near Krynky, located around 22 miles (36km) to the north-east of Kherson city. However, DI reports that the unit has been poorly supported by airpower and artillery and that it is highly likely manned by inexperienced personnel – underscoring our assessment that nominally ‘elite’ new VDV and Guards designations bear little resemblance to the quality of the forces or the experience of their personnel. It is highly likely that Russia’s Dnepr grouping of forces currently defending the left bank of the river is struggling with poor co-ordination, morale and experience levels.
KHERSON: Earlier this week, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Dnepr commander, Mikahil Teplinsky, who is also the commanding officer of the VDV, has ordered the creation of ‘shock battalions’ designed to break through enemy defences to raise the morale of other units. It is possible that new VDV units, such as the 104th, were designed to act as ‘shock battalions’. However, generating highly motivated and experienced forces will remain perennially difficult for the Russians given that they have lost most of their most dedicated and experienced soldiers since the start of the war.
SOUTHERN: Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on 13 December that Russian forces have made marginal advances near Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia) in recent days. Russian forces have been counter-attacking across the southern Zaporizhzhia line in recent weeks; small advances have pushed Ukrainian forces back near Robotyne and north of Verbove, located around six miles (10km) to the east. Ukrainian milblogger Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on 13 December that Russian forces have advanced around 800m towards Robotyne. However, they are reportedly not close to retaking the settlement. The full extent of recent Russian advances along the southern front remains unconfirmed, though advances remain slow and incremental.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 12 December shows that Russian forces made marginal progress to the south-east of Spirne, located around 16 miles (25km) south of Kreminna (Luhansk oblast). On 13 November, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ivanivka and Zahoruykivka, located around 12 miles (20km) to the south-east and ten miles (16km) to the east of Kupiansk, respectively. Overall, the frontline in the Oskil-Kreminna sector has remained broadly stable, with Russian forces having made only limited progress lately.
STRIKES: Overnight on 13-14 December, Russian forces launched 42 drones in three waves from Balaklva and Chuada in Crimea and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Krasnodar Krai. Russia also launched S-300 ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s air defences reportedly intercepted 41 drones. The projectiles targeted Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. The Defence Forces of Southern Ukraine reported that a S-300-launched ballistic missile hit Kherson, killing one person. The latest strike illustrates Moscow’s efforts to launch attacks from different locations in order to overwhelm Ukrainian defences, though interception rates remain high.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: US Republican senators reported to Bloomberg on 13 December that President Joe Biden has offered to amend immigration rules in a bid to reach an agreement on military aid to Ukraine and Israel. Currently, the senators are reportedly weighing proposals which would expand executive powers to deport migrants once a certain number of undocumented individuals have crossed the border. Biden previously indicated that he is willing to compromise on the issue, given the Republican focus on immigration as a pre-requisite before any further aid to Ukraine is agreed. However, some hardline Republicans have reportedly stated that the proposals do not go far enough. The proposed compromise will moderately increase the likelihood of a deal. However, given that Congress is set to enter its holiday recess on 14 December, the prospects of an approved budget before 2024 remain limited.
AID: Meanwhile, on 14-15 December, the EU is hosting a high-profile summit of member states to discuss the bloc’s aid to Ukraine. Prior to the summit, the EU released EUR 10.2 billion (USD 11.1 billion) of funding to Hungary on 13 December in a clear attempt to try to prevent Hungary vetoing the bloc’s Ukraine strategy after Budapest threatened to do so. Many EU politicians have criticised the European Commission (EC)’s decision to unfreeze the funds given that Hungary has not fulfilled requirements regarding rule of law reforms, arguing that the episode effectively amounts to blackmail. While over EUR 50 billion (USD 54.5 billion) of macroeconomic assistance and the opening of Ukraine’s accession talks are set to be debated, Hungary has reiterated its opposition to Ukraine’s assession talks. It therefore remains unclear whether the apparent attempt to placate Budapest will enable the EU’s Ukraine package to proceed. One unnamed European official assessed the likelihood of an agreement to be small (around 20-30%).
AID: During a press conference in Oslo (Norway) on 13 December, President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will have to continue fighting Russia alone if Western support ends, as there is no alternative to victory. Given the ongoing budgetary disagreements in Washington DC, the outcome of the EU summit is all the more important. Both issues are key indicators of whether Ukraine can expect further military and financial support in 2024, or whether growing opposition and divisions will signify a high-water mark for assistance, with aid beginning to decline from next year.
CYBER: On 13 December, Oleksandr Komarov, the head of the Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar, stated that Russian hackers breached Kyivstar’s cyber security via a compromised account belonging to one of the company’s employees. On 12 December, Kyivstar was targeted by a massive cyber attack orchestrated by the Russian hacker group Solntsepek, which has known ties to Russia’s military intelligence (GRU). Komarov stated that Kyivstar services are being gradually restored, though the extent of the damage likely remains significant because technicians were forced to disconnect Kyistar physically from the network. This is the latest indication of Russia’s cyber capabilities and its ability to gain access to closed systems, which will continue to have a profound impact on private and public sector telecommunications in the immediate aftermath of an attack.

FORECAST

PUTIN: n 14 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin is holding the first live ‘direct line’ telethon on national television since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The traditional end-of-year telethon involves Russian citizens and journalists asking the president questions ranging from local economic issues to geostrategic and military matters. While the last telethon in 2022 was cancelled, this year’s event will go ahead as part of Putin’s electoral campaign ahead of the presidential election on 17 March 2024.

While the telethon is ongoing at the time of writing, several key points from Putin’s address relate to the war in Ukraine:

Putin crucially underscored that the war will end only when ‘we achieve our objectives’, but that these objectives ‘do not change’, namely ‘denazification, demilitarisation and Ukraine’s neutral status’. In short, the Kremlin has not officially changed its war aims in Ukraine since the launch of its invasion. This reinforces our own assessment that the Kremlin is not considering peace negotiations in the short-to-medium term and has not abandoned its hopes of achieving greater territorial conquests in Ukraine. Recent comments made by prominent Russian officials, including foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, have reignited discussions about a partitioned Ukraine. Zakharova further emphasised that Ukraine must leave ‘Russian land’ before a peace agreement can be reached – a notably vague demand which keeps the option open for further Russian landgrabs and annexations in the coming years. In relation to this, Putin stated during today’s telethon that Odesa is a ‘Russian city’ and that ‘everyone knows this’. While Russia currently does not have the military capability to take the city, it is clear that Moscow still views it as Russian territory.
Putin began the telethon with a speech about the importance of strengthening Russia’s sovereignty, a common theme, wherein he argued that without ‘sovereignty’, Russia will cease to exist. He also emphasised the need to strengthen Russia’s military, economic and technological sovereignty.
Putin stated that around 617,000 service personnel are currently operating in the Ukrainian combat zone along the 1,250-mile (2,000km) frontline.
When asked about military recruitment, Putin stated that there is no need for a second wave of partial mobilisation. Russia has successfully recruited hundreds of thousands of personnel through conscription and crypto-mobilisation methods (including by recruiting volunteers and coercing migrants and criminals). Putin claimed that around 486,000 have been recruited as contract soldiers. There is widespread opposition to a second formal round of mobilisation; given that the presidential election is approaching, it is highly unlikely that there will be any change to the Russian recruitment strategy before April 2024. While Ukrainian intelligence assesses that a second round of mobilisation is likely after the election, it remains our assessment that crypto-mobilisation methods are (and will be) the preferred form of recruitment for the Kremlin; we assess that a second round remains less likely.

*Russia: Visa restrictions for EU citizens reflect intensification of retaliatory measures against Western countries. On 13 December, Russia’s State Duma approved, in its third reading, a bill toughening entry requirements for citizens from EU countries, as well as Denmark, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The bill suspends international agreements on easing visa requirements for citizens of these countries and raises visa fee revenue by 2.8 times. The authors of the bill explained that such measures were taken in response to the entry restrictions imposed by the EU and other aforementioned countries for Russian citizens following the invasion of Ukraine. The latest measure illustrates Moscow’s increasing willingness to retaliate against Western restrictions. For instance, Russian officials have warned that Russia will take retaliatory measures against the EU if it appropriates frozen Russian assets. Recently, the Duma adopted a law reinforcing the president’s de-facto nationalisation powers regarding foreign-owned assets. Russia will likely intensify retaliatory measures against EU countries amid heightened tensions with the West.

Dec 13.

OFFENSIVES: A de-classified US intelligence report shared with Congress on 12 December allegedly assesses that Russia’s current offensives are aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine, rather than completing any major operational objectives. The report also allegedly assesses that Russian attritional attacks around Avdiivka, for example, are part of a strategy of maintaining the current military ‘deadlock’ over the winter – which Russian strategists believe will drain Western support and provide Russian forces with the advantage. Given ongoing debates in numerous Western capitals, including Washington DC, over Kyiv’s allies’ ability and/or desire to sustain military aid to Ukraine over the long term, this strategy will possibly bear fruit in the coming year ahead of the US presidential election. However, such an attritional strategy is almost certainly exacting a high casualty cost for Russian forces.
OFFENSIVES: The US assessment also reportedly estimates that Russian forces have lost 87% of their total pre-invasion combat personnel strength and around two thirds of their tanks since the start of the invasion. According to US intelligence, Russian forces have lost around 315,000 of 360,000 personnel, around 2,200 of 3,500 tanks and around 4,400 of 13,600 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) that were available before the full-scale invasion. While US intelligence assesses that Russian ground forces have lost over a quarter of their military stockpiles, Russia has been making significant efforts to offset personnel losses with crypto-mobilisation and to compensate for equipment losses by ramping up its military-industrial output.
OFFENSIVES: Despite these efforts, the overall quality, experience and capability of Russia’s replacements are significantly inferior compared to those of the original invasion force. For example, a large proportion of Russia’s most elite airborne (VDV) forces were killed in the first few months of the war. It will take years to rebuild this elite capability. However, Russia’s seemingly attritional strategy does not necessarily require large numbers of elite forces to achieve its medium-to-long term aims; it simply has to out-endure Ukraine and the West. Moscow is almost certainly willing to sustain extremely high casualties to achieve its objectives.
BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Geolocated footage posted on 12 December indicates that Russian forces advanced south-west of Avdiivka. On 13 December, a prominent Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are trying to reach Sieverne and Tonenke, two settlements located between three and four miles (5-6km) west of Avdiivka. They further noted that Russian forces are carrying out intense artillery and airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Pervomaiske, situated about six miles (10km) south-west of Avdiivka, in preparation for ground assaults against the settlement. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky revealed footage on 12 December of Ukrainian forces raising a flag on a waste heap near Horlivka, located about 13 miles (22km) south of Bakhmut.
DONTESK: Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, claimed on 13 December that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 tanks and 12 armoured vehicles in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions over the past 24 hours. Russia’s offensive effort in Avdiivka has come at a high cost in materiel and personnel. Notably, US National Security Council spokesperson Andrienne Watson reportedly revealed to Congress on 12 December that Russian forces have taken over 13,000 casualties and lost around 220 combat vehicles around Avdiivka since launching their offensive in October. Intense material losses in this sector will likely limit the extent of Russia’s advances, forcing the Russian command to resort to highly attritional dismounted infantry assaults.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: On 12 December, Russia’s occupation chief in Zaporizhzhia oblast, Yevgeny Balitsky, claimed that Russian forces had advanced significantly to the north-east of Novopokrovka, located around eight miles (13km) north-east of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia). While there is currently no evidence to confirm this, other Russian sources have reported in recent days that their forces are making slow progress at various points along the southern axis, including south of Robotyne.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 13 December, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian offensive operations are focusing on Synkivka, located about five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. Nevertheless, they noted that Russian forces are unlikely to take the entirety of the village due to Ukraine’s sustained defensive efforts. Notably, Ukrainian Kharkiv oblast governor Oleh Synyehubov stated that capturing Synkivka would facilitate Russia’s efforts to encircle Kupiansk (though this remains a remote prospect at present).
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that Russia launched ten Shahed-136/131 drones and ten ballistic missiles earlier on 13 December. The type(s) of ballistic missile remains unknown. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted all the projectiles. The drones targeted Odesa oblast, while the missiles targeted the capital Kyiv. However, falling debris damaged residential buildings, a hospital and a water supply network in the capital, where 53 people were injured as a result of the attack. President Zelensky pledged that Ukraine will take retaliatory measures against Russia following the latest strikes.
STRIKES: On 12 December, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that Russia has been dispersing drone launch capabilities across several locations; this will almost certainly complicate Ukraine’s air defence efforts. As such, these measures will likely force Ukraine to adjust to new drone attack corridors. The dispersal of drone launch locations, particularly in occupied Crimea, almost certainly forms part of Russia’s efforts to protect its strike capabilities from Ukrainian attacks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BORDERS: On 12 December, Polish media reported that traffic had resumed via the Dorohusk-Yahodyn Poland-Ukraine border crossing. Traffic had been blocked since 11 December due to a broken-down truck, which has since been removed. On 11 December, Polish truck drivers lifted the blockade at the Dorohusk-Yahodyn crossing point. However, Ukrainian media reports from 12 December indicated that Polish truckers will possibly resume the blockade at the crossing point; three other crossing points have been blocked since November. Polish truckers have been protesting against the liberalisation of transit rules for Ukrainian truck drivers. Uncertainty over transit via the Poland-Ukraine border will continue to drive supply chain pressures (though transporting Ukrainian trucks by rail will allow Kyiv to reduce such pressures).
NORTH KOREA: South Korea’s spy agency, the National Intelligence Service, disclosed on 12 December that it has observed signs that North Korea is seeking to deploy workers to Russia. No further information was provided on the matter. On 12 December, North Korea’s minister of external economic relations, Yun Jong Ho, and the governor of Russia’s Primorsky Krai, Oleg Kozhemyako, held negotiations in Pyongyang (North Korea).
NORTH KOREA: According to North Korean state media, Russian and North Korean officials discussed further developing regional economic co-operation. While the veracity of South Korea’s claims cannot be confirmed, cheap North Korean labour would moderately aid Russia in easing its current domestic labour shortages. Pyongyang is likely to receive support from Russia in return, including via the development of its nuclear weapons and rocket programmes. This would highly likely result in further Western sanctions against North Korea and Russia. For further analysis on alleged Russian plans to bring North Korean labourers to Russian-occupied Ukraine, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 18 September 2023.
AID: Hungary is reportedly prepared to lift its veto on an EU aid package to Ukraine if the bloc agrees to unblock its frozen funds. However, Balazs Orbán, the chief political adviser of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, stated in an interview published on 12 December that Budapest remains against a full four-year aid plan. He disclosed that Budapest would prefer that the EU offers financing to Kyiv for a single year with no amendments to the budget. The aide also insisted that Ukraine’s membership in the EU remains a ‘red line’ for Budapest. Orbán stated that the EU should instead offer Kyiv a strategic partnership, as Hungary considers that Ukraine has not met the criteria to open accession talks.
AID: On 13 December, Hungary announced further judicial reforms which are seen as necessary for Budapest to access financing worth up to EUR10bn (USD10.8bn). However, the aide stated that Budapest wants the EU to hand over all the frozen funds, worth around EUR30bn (USD32.4bn). The block will possibly oppose this stipulation unless Budapest meets other demands. As such, Budapest will likely continue to pose an obstacle for further aid for Ukraine and its EU membership aspirations in the coming months.
SANCTIONS: On 12 December, the US state and treasury departments jointly sanctioned 250 individuals and entities suspected of assisting Russia to evade sanctions. Designated entities include sanctions-evading networks operating from China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and the UAE. One network reportedly allowed the transfer of Chinese-manufactured weapons and technologies to Russia, thus circumventing Beijing’s export controls on defence equipment. Other networks are suspected of transferring dual-use equipment to Russia, such as micro-electronics. The latest sanctions illustrate Washington DC’s commitment to undermine Moscow’s ability to procure equipment to use in its war against Ukraine.

FORECAST

US: On 12 December, US President Joe Biden vowed that his country would continue to supply Ukraine with critical weapons and equipment for as long as possible during a press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. However, Biden underscored that without supplemental funding, Washington DC will quickly approach the end of its ability to help Kyiv to respond to its urgent operational demands on the battlefield.

Biden’s statement followed Zelensky’s briefing to US senators on 12 December on the current military and economic situation in Ukraine, as well as the importance of US support. The appeal was likely a bid to incentivise lawmakers to approve additional assistance for Kyiv in the near future. Zelensky stated that he observed positive signals during his talks in Washington DC, but also noted that words and concrete results are different. After a meeting with Zelensky, House Speaker Mike Johnson stated that the Biden administration seems to be asking for significant additional funding for Ukraine with no ‘appropriate oversight’ and no clear strategy to win the war.

The House and Senate are currently expected to enter the Christmas recess on 14 and 15 December, respectively; the two chambers are due to reconvene during the second week of January. US Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell stated that it would be ‘practically impossible’ for Congress to pass the supplemental funding package which includes aid for Ukraine before Christmas, even if a deal is struck in the coming days. At present, a deal is unlikely to be reached before the end of 2023, increasing the likelihood that further aid for Ukraine will be delayed.

Zelensky also underscored that Ukraine objects to ceding territory to Russia for the sake of peace. Polling from Gallup published on 2 November found that 43% of US citizens favour the US helping to end the war quickly, even if this involves Ukraine ceding territory to Russia. Meanwhile, just over half (54%) of US citizens believe that the US government should support Kyiv in reclaiming its occupied territory, even if this prolongs the conflict. In August 2022, this view was shared by 66% of respondents. If this view steadily wanes in the coming months and if a Ukraine-sceptic Republican candidate with a similar stance is elected following the 2024 presidential election, Kyiv’s position will possibly be weakened in any future discussions with Moscow to end the war.

*Russia-Ukraine: Cyber attacks against critical infrastructure elevate security, operational risks . On 12 December, international media reported that the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR) attacked Russia’s Federal Tax Service (FNS). The attack affected the entire network of servers for the tax service with malware that destroyed the functions of the tax system in Russia, including the database and its backup copies. While attempts were made to restore the system, the network remains paralysed and it is suspected that it will continue to be down for at least a month. Ukraine’s largest telecommunications operator, Kyivstar, suffered a cyber attack on 12 December that resulted in an internet outage for millions of users. The emergency air-raid alert system in Kyiv oblast was also impacted, affecting more than 75 settlements therein. There is no timeline for how long restoration will take, increasing the likelihood of significant civilian casualties should Russian kinetic strikes occur while the alert service is offline. While the attack has not been attributed to any actor yet, the attack was likely conducted by Russian-affiliated actors, possibly as a response to the attack on the Russian tax service.

Dec 12.

BAKHMUT: Russian sources continued to claim on 11 December that their forces are making various advances around Bakhmut, though these remain unconfirmed. Russian milbloggers reported that in recent days Russian forces have taken a Ukrainian-held stronghold north of Khromove along the O0506 highway just west of Bakhmut. Similarly, other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have now advanced to within 100m of the outskirts of Bohdanivka, located around four miles (6km) west of Bakhmut. However, this cannot be confirmed.
DONTESK: Earlier on 12 December, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, reported that over the past two days Russian forces have intensified attacks in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions. Ukrainian forces repelled 42 and 49 attacks around Avdiivka on 11 and 12 December, respectively, according to Tarnavskyi. Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian assaults are supported by armoured vehicles and increasing numbers of airstrikes, but that they also come at a high casualty cost. Meanwhile, a prominent Russian milblogger stated earlier on 12 December that Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka sector have entered a new phase. He claimed that one of the tasks of the Russian forces will be to break through Ukrainian lines in Avdiivka’s northern Khimik district, which would significantly undermine Ukrainian defences. However, he also noted that Ukraine has concentrated a significant amount of forces and artillery units in the sector. Despite a high attrition rate, the latest offensive underscores Moscow’s ability to maintain an intense tempo of attacks in the sector.
DONETSK: On 11 December, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence outlet, Fronteintelligence Insight, noted that Ukraine’s logistical situation in Avdiivka had deteriorated. Russia’s increasing use of first-person view (FPV) drones with night vision cameras has resulted in more drone attacks targeting supply routes. While there is no indication that Russian forces are close to encircling Avdiivka in the coming days, growing difficulties in supplying the city will exacerbate logistical challenges for Ukrainian forces defending Avdiivka.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: Overnight on 11-12 December, Russia launched 15 Shahed 136-131 drones. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted nine drones over Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. The local authorities reported that some of the strikes damaged administrative buildings in Odesa.
STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its air defences intercepted a Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missile early on 12 December over Belgorod oblast. The local authorities reported that a projectile was shot down near Bessonovka, a settlement located around 19 miles (30km) south of Belgorod city.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

RECONSTRUCTION: On 12 December, the EU will likely propose a windfall tax on the profits from frozen Russian Central Bank assets. The tax revenue will possibly reach EUR15bn (USD16.2bn) and will be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction. The proposal adopts a gradual approach, first identifying the frozen funds to be taxed and then outlining the measures the financial entities holding Russian assets will be required to implement. The EU will likely recommend protecting entities holding Russian assets against retaliatory measures from Moscow and exempting entities holding small amounts of such assets. The bloc’s member states will need to back the plan unanimously and to implement further steps before Kyiv can receive any funds.
RECONSTRUCTION: Russian officials have repeatedly warned that Moscow will seize EU assets should the bloc tax frozen Russian assets. On 29 October, the chairman of Russia’s State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, warned that Moscow would seize the assets of ‘unfriendly’ EU states if the bloc taxes frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine. Implementing the EU proposal will likely prompt Moscow to confiscate assets owned by European companies in Russia as part of a tit-for-tat response.
ECONOMY: On 11 December, the IMF approved a USD 900 m disbursement for Ukraine which will be channelled for budget support. The tranche falls under the Extended Fund Facility, a four-year funding agreement that will allow Kyiv to access USD 15.6 bn in financial assistance in regular instalments. The IMF stated that the Ukrainian economy continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience, but noted that the outlook remains subject to exceptionally high war-related uncertainty.
ECONOMY: The IMF revised Ukraine’s growth forecast for 2023 to 4.5%, while 3-4% growth in 2024 is likely as the war continues. Ultimately, the latest tranche will likely moderately alleviate short-to-medium term budgetary pressure. However, Ukraine will remain significantly reliant on external financial support in the long term, though the risk of ‘donor fatigue’ will likely remain credible, driving budgetary risks.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Earlier on 12 December, Ukraine’s biggest mobile network operator, Kyivstar, revealed that it was subject to a powerful cyber attack which has disrupted mobile and internet services across the country. Kyivstar stated that the personal data of users has not been compromised, adding that it is working with Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and special state services to document the circumstances and consequences of the attack. The operator did not identify who was responsible, though Ukrainian state agencies and companies have often accused Russia of orchestrating cyber attacks against them.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov stated that Kyivstar will possibly restore operations in four to five hours. Sumy City Military Administration reported that its air warning notification system is down temporarily due to the attack, though the air alert system in the capital Kyiv is unaffected. Telecommunications will likely remain disrupted in the coming hours. Clients of banks which use this mobile operator, notably PrivatBank, will possibly also face disruption at various ATMs and self-service terminals.
PROVOCATIONS: On 11 December, the head of Russia’s nuclear, biological and chemical protection troops, Igor Kirillov, claimed that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) is preparing to use ‘poisonous substances’ in an area where Russia’s armed forces are operating. Kirillov alleged, without providing evidence, that a Ukrainian company specialising in the import of chemical reagents and precursors purchased a small batch of triethanolamine and a nitrogen-containing sodium compound produced by a US-based company in October-November. There is no evidence to support these claims.
PROVOCATIONS: Kirillov claimed that the SBU is prepared to use the substances in order to accuse Russia of using chemical weapons to initiate a new ‘anti-Russia’ campaign within the UN and across international media. Although these claims cannot be verified, they are most likely false and reflective of a general trend whereby Russia ramps up such rhetoric during periods of particularly heightened tensions with the West and Ukraine. As such, the accusations do not necessarily indicate an increased chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat in Ukraine (though we cannot rule this out).

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: In an article published on 12 December, The New York Times cites unnamed US and Ukrainian sources who claim that many US officers and officials are advising Ukraine to focus on consolidating its position and to build up its forces in 2024. These reports come as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visits Washington DC to discuss military aid during talks focusing on a new strategy for the war in 2024 following the effective failure of this summer’s counter-offensive.

Various senior US officials and officers are advising Kyiv to pursue a ‘hold and build’ strategy. This would involve Ukraine focusing on holding the territory it currently controls and building new forces through the expansion of its native military-industrial production in a bid to improve its military self-sufficiency. The aim of building up Ukraine’s resilience and self-sufficiency through 2024 would be to encourage Russia to enter into negotiations in late 2024 or 2025, by which point Ukraine hopes that it will present a credible force which prevents an outright Russian victory.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reiterated the US’ long-term commitment earlier on 12 December by confirming that Washington DC will help Kyiv to build forces capable of repelling Russian aggression ‘in the coming years’. However, if US aid stalls or ends alogether, the war would likely take a very different turn. In this scenario, Ukrainian defensive capabilities would possibly not be sufficient to contain further Russian offensives. Nevertheless, a new poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology published on 12 November found that 58% of Ukrainians are in favour of continuing the war against Russia, even without the help of the West. Neither side is currently seriously entertaining peace negotiations; almost all indicators point to the war continuing well into 2024, if not beyond, irrespective of domestic budgetary disagreements in Washington DC.

Dec 11.

BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 9-10 December indicates that Russian forces have indeed advanced north-west of Bakhmut in recent days, amid an intensification of operations across the eastern fronts. Russian forces have seemingly made some notable advances south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, located two miles (3km) north-west of Bakhmut, and are approaching the outskirts of the nearby village of Bohdanivka. Some Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have advanced around 580m in this direction. Russian forces are also attacking to the south-west, near Khromove and Klischiivka, located six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut.
BAKHMUT: Russian sources also claimed on 10 December that their forces captured 10 unspecified positions and had advanced up to 2.2 miles (3.5km) towards Vesele, a village 12 miles (19km) north-east of Bakhmut. There is currently no visual evidence to confirm this advance, but if it is accurate it would represent a notable advance, and would reflect the broader initiative Russian forces are currently gaining on the Bakhmut frontline.
DONETSK: On 11 December, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that the most intense fighting along the frontlines has occurred in the Avdiivka sector over the last week. According to Ukrainian-released data, 40% of all recent combat engagements have likely occurred around Avdiivka. Russian assaults remain highly attritional as they are conducted by dismounted infantry units, which are often manned by convicts. On 10 December, Vitaliy Barabash, the head of the Ukrainian Avdiivka military administration, explained that Russian troops are intensifying assaults and strikes in the Avdiivka sector despite the deterioration of weather conditions.
DONTESK: Geolocated footage from 9 December indicates that Russian forces progressed east of Stepove, 1.8 miles (3km) north-west of Avdiivka. However, the UK DI stressed on 11 December that Ukrainian troops have been conducting successful counter-attacks, denying Russian troops full control of Stepove. On 11 December, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued progressing in the outskirts of Marinka and north of Marinka’s water reservoir. However, such claims remain visually unverified.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Russian sources have claimed that their forces made some marginal advances along the Zaporizhzhia frontline over the last 72 hours, though the extent of these advances remains unconfirmed and likely limited. Russian forces have been counter-attacking at various points south of Robotyne and north of Verbove, six miles (10km) east of Robotyne, but despite Russian claims of advances in both directions, there is little evidence to support this at present. Both sides have nevertheless reported on 9-10 December that poor weather and ice are undermining both Russian and Ukrainian offensive operations in the south, and are particularly limiting armoured vehicle movement.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 11 December, the Ukrainian Commander of Ground Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said that Russian forces are trying to capture Synkivka, located five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. Capturing Synkivaka would facilitate efforts in the blockade and encirclement of Kupiansk, according to Syrskyi. However, he noted that due to the high casualty rate of its assaults, Russia has begun to transfer additional units to the Synkivka sector. On 10 December, a Russian milblogger said that Russian troops have not managed to break through Ukrainian defences in the Synkivka sector due to the density of minefields. On 11 December, a prominent Russian milblogger noted that the tempo of Russian operations had decreased due to the poor weather.
STRIKES: Overnight on 10-11 December, Russian forces launched 18 Shahed 136/131 drones, most of them targeting Mykolaiv oblast. Concurrently, Russia launched eight ballistic missiles targeting Kyiv oblast, though the type of missiles launched has yet to be confirmed. Ukraine’s Air Force claimed that air defences intercepted all the projectiles. Ukraine’s General Staff reported that air defences intercepted a Kh-29 missile and a Shahed-136/131 drone on 9 December.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, following Russia’s strike launched overnight on 10-11 December, media outlets noted that air alarms in Kyiv were activated only after the ballistic missiles were destroyed. On 11 December, Yury Ihnat, spokesperson of Ukraine’s Air Force, explained that the missiles used in the latest attack were launched from Iskander-M or S-400 ground-based installations, which make them more difficult to detect than air-launched missiles. Ihnat explained that Ukrainian forces must monitor the whereabouts of ground-based missile launchers to mitigate ballistic missile threats. However, the recent air raid underscores that sirens may not give residents sufficient time to find shelter before an attack reaches the city.
STRIKES: On 10 December, the UK DI assessed that Russia’s large-scale missile strike launched on 7 December possibly signals the start of a more concerted winter strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. However, the UK DI noted that given Ukraine’s high interception rate, damage caused by the strike was likely minimal. The destruction of the majority of projectiles launched by Russia overnight on 10-11 December reflects the high interception rate of Ukraine’s air defences, particularly in the capital, where all the ballistic missiles were destroyed.
STRIKES: Russia will most likely continue to vary its striking tactics to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences in a bid to maximise damage to critical and energy infrastructure. A Russian milblogger reported on 8 December that the attack featured a number of decoy Kh-55 cruise missiles, which resemble the more modern Kh-101 variants, in a bid to confuse and overwhelm Ukrainian air defences. If this was the aim, the tactic failed, as the precision weapons that the decoys could have aimed to protect were also successfully intercepted. Future Russian strikes in the coming weeks are likely to increasingly include missiles, though the density of defences around the capital will mitigate the threat to Kyiv specifically, while leaving other cities more vulnerable.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: Earlier on 11 December, the UK announced that it will lead a new naval coalition with Norway, which involves delivering ships and vehicles to strengthen Ukraine’s maritime capabilities. Later on 11 December, UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps is expected to announce Ukraine’s procurement of two Sandown-class mine counter-measures vessels (MCMVs) for Ukraine’s navy, alongside his Norwegian counterpart Bjørn Arild Gram. The UK government stated that strengthening Ukraine’s maritime capabilities, especially countering threats posed by Russian sea mines, will aid in restoring Ukraine’s maritime exports. The coalition likely intends to offer Ukraine long-term support for increasing security in the Black Sea, but the timeline and logistics for delivery of these maritime capabilities remains unclear.
ELECTIONS: Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on 8 December that he will run for a fifth term in the March 2024 presidential election. Putin disclosed his candidacy at an awards ceremony for Russian military personnel who had fought in Ukraine. The Kremlin has highly likely sought to portray the announcement as spontaneous and at the behest of Russian military personnel, who reportedly asked Putin to stand for another term. Jailed opposition figure Alexei Navalny has urged Russians to vote on 17 March 2024 for any other candidate than Putin. Navalny also called for each of his supporters to convince at least ten other voters to cast ballots for an alternate candidate. However, such tactics are highly unlikely to disrupt Putin from securing another term. Putin will almost certainly be re-elected given the crackdown against authentic domestic opposition and the Kremlin’s desire to maximise government stability amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.
BORDERS: On 10 December, the secretary of Hungary’s hauliers’ association (MKFE) announced that truckers will begin a demonstration today at 1000hrs local time (11 December) at the Záhony-Chop border crossing with Ukraine. Hungarian media reported that the demonstration, which plans to partially block the road (main road 4) leading to the border, is scheduled to last until 0000hrs local time on 31 December. Two trucks will be permitted to cross per hour in each direction. However, there will reportedly be limited exemptions, such as for trucks transporting livestock and produce.
BORDERS: Slovakia’s union of hauliers (UNAS) will restart the partial blockade of the Vyšné Nemecké-Uzhhorod crossing from 1500hrs (local time) on 11 December until further notice. UNAS said entry to Slovakia will be blocked for truck traffic, though personal traffic will reportedly not be restricted. As such, the protests on the Hungarian and Slovak side of the Ukrainian border will further sustain supply chain disruption in the coming days, which will likely increase pressure on other crossings in countries bordering Ukraine.

FORECAST

US: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to arrive in the US today (11 December) for an official visit. US President Joe Biden invited Zelensky for a meeting at the White House on 12 December to underscore the US’ ‘unshakeable commitment’ to supporting Ukraine as the provision of further aid continues to be stalled by funding disputes (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 7 December 2023).

The two presidents intend to discuss further defence co-operation between Ukraine and the US, particularly joint projects on the production of weapons and air defence systems. Meanwhile, White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the leaders will discuss Ukraine’s urgent needs and the ‘vital importance’ of the US’ continued support.

Media reports from 10 December suggest that Zelensky will make an in-person address to US senators in Washington DC early on 12 December. The address will likely seek to push senators to approve further assistance for Kyiv, though it will unlikely influence hardline Ukraine-sceptic Republicans. Democrat Senator Chris Murphy on 10 December condemned Republicans’ tying of border security and immigration issues to the further provision of aid for Ukraine.

In a recent poll, Pew Research Center reported on 8 December that about half of Republicans (48%) think the US is providing too much assistance to Ukraine, compared to 16% of Democrats. Overall, 31% of US citizens believe Washington DC provides too much aid for Kyiv. The steady decline in domestic support for the continued provision of US assistance for Ukraine will likely continue to threaten the flow of further aid in the near term, as well as in the longer term, especially around the November 2024 US presidential election. (Source: Sibylline)

15 Dec 23. Crude ground robots emerge on the battlefields of Ukraine, experts say. As armed aerial drones and artillery threaten troop movements on the front lines in Ukraine, experts are beginning to see crude ground robots whizz over the battlefield to resupply soldiers.

The systems observed so far in shaky footage distributed on social media appear to be designed for logistics, obviating the need for soldiers to venture from their foxholes. A Kremlin-affiliated Telegram channel recently published a clip purporting to show a Russian unmanned ground vehicle, or UGV, delivering supplies to front-line troops while avoiding strikes by Ukrainian mini-drones and transporting a wounded soldier, though the evacuation is never clearly shown.

“Because of so many drones operating in the air, both surveillance and first-person-view ones, moving around has become very difficult for both sides,” Sam Bendett, research analyst at the U.S.-based Center for Naval Analyses think tank, told Defense News. “So regular tasks like logistics, supply and evacuation are in danger of getting discovered and attacked by drones.”

In response, Ukrainian and Russian forces are fielding “simple, DIY platforms” for such tasks, Bendett added.

Federico Borsari, a fellow at the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis think tank, said it appears Russia’s 87th Rifle Regiment recorded the video. That regiment currently operates in the industrial area south of Avdiivka, Ukraine.

“This UGV appears as a simple, almost artisanal system rather than an industrially produced one. The Telegram channel also shows pictures of suspensions, rubber tracks and engine components bought off the shelf and delivered directly to units in Ukraine,” he added.

Both experts agree that based on the looks of the platform, it may have been assembled by soldiers or volunteers on the front lines. Bendett noted that other similar DIY projects, both tracked and wheeled, are currently undergoing tests by Russian troops as logistics platforms.

While it’s unclear whether the makeshift robots could transport a wounded soldier, the analysts said that the one seen in the video could in theory do the job.

“The vehicle’s basic design seems to be approximately 1.5 meters in length and 1.20 meters in width, with two extensible plates on the front and rear of the middle section to carry a single soldier,” Borsari said.

Russia’s recent experiments with ground robots could signal a trend, he added. “The vast array of UGV prototypes that Russian companies are working on is a clear signal that Moscow considers this segment as an important one for its future military capabilities.”

(Source: Defense News)

15 Dec 23. Ukraine signs ‘dozens’ of joint production deals with Western defence firms. Ukraine has agreed dozens of contracts for joint production or technology exchanges with Western partners, Kyiv said on Friday, as it strives to reduce its dependence on military supplies from the West and to boost domestic output. The effort to ramp up production at home has become critically important as the future of large-scale military aid from the United States and European Union appears more uncertain and Western stockpiles have become more depleted.

“We have dozens of new contracts between companies on joint production or technology exchange,” Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov said in a Facebook post.

He pointed to an international defence industry forum hosted by Kyiv in September with more than 250 Western weapons producers, followed by a joint Ukraine-U.S. defence conference in Washington in December.

“We signed a memorandum with the United States on joint production and technical data sharing,” Umerov said.

This week, Kyiv hosted another conference with the largest British defence manufacturers including Babcock International Group (BAB.L) and BAE Systems (BAES.L) participating, state-owned arms maker Ukroboronprom said on Telegram messenger.

“I called on British defence companies to use Ukrainian factors — the possibility of testing weaponry in combat and getting quick feedback from the military — for transparent and effective cooperation with Ukrainian manufacturers,” Umerov said.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said Ukraine does not want to rely solely on military aid from allies and aims to become a donor of security for its neighbours in the future.

Ukraine is seeking more agreements similar to its venture with German arms producer Rheinmetall AG (RHMG.DE) to service and repair Western weapons, and an agreement with two American firms to jointly manufacture vital 155 mm artillery shells.

Domestic defence output has tripled in 2023, according to the strategic industries ministry, and is expected to increase six times more in 2024.

(Source: Google/Reuters)

15 Dec 23. Coalition on Ukraine Air Defense Holds Initial Meeting. First Meeting on Strengthening Ukrainian Air Defense. What might Ukraine’s future air defense look like? And how can it be made compatible with that of NATO? These questions were the focus of an international conference in Berlin. The participants were not only concerned with “today” – but also with the long-term perspective beyond 2030.

At the last meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein format, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Germany and France would jointly lead a coalition to strengthen Ukraine’s ground-based air defense. The first meeting of this Capability Coalition Integrated Air and Missile Defense (CC IAMD) took place on December 12th and 13th, 2023.

Goal setting and work structure

The coalition is intended to coordinate the efforts of individual states to build air defense for Ukraine according to NATO standards.

The opening conference in the Julius Leber barracks in Berlin was led by Lieutenant General Lutz Kohlhaus, the deputy inspector of the German Air Force. In addition to France and Germany, representatives from 20 other nations, including Ukraine, as well as from NATO and the EU took part.

As leading nations in the coalition, Germany and France form the interface to other capability coalitions and control the work of the individual working groups. Regular meetings ensure that all participating nations are informed about current needs, that progress is being made and new impulses are being given.

First meeting – first successes

The first measures were already initiated at the launch event in Berlin. First, the 70 participants recorded the current situation in Ukraine and the status quo of the Ukrainian air defense forces. They identified needs and future requirements in the subject areas of “training”, “systems” and “command structure”, defined responsibilities and coordinated the work in the working groups.

Germany took over the leadership of the “Training” group, France of the “Command Structure” group and the USA of the “Systems” group.

The first steps were designed together within the working groups. Finally, a target image of the future Ukrainian air defense was developed and a roadmap with key milestones was created.

(Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ German Ministry of Defense; issued Dec. 14, 2023)

15 Dec 23. Germany Procures Artillery Ammunition. Germany can supply Ukraine with additional 155 millimeter ammunition for its defense against Russian aggression. The Budget Committee of the German Bundestag has approved the framework agreement on the production of artillery shells. A French arms company is producing 68,000 explosive projectiles for the Ukrainian armed forces for 278 million euros. The project is financed through the upgrade title in Section 60. Selected partner states receive military equipment assistance and material through the Federal Government’s upgrade initiative.

The 155mm caliber ammunition is fired by the PzH2000 self-propelled howitzer, for example. Germany delivered 14 of these self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine, which have proven themselves in combat. In addition, Ukrainian crews are trained in Germany.

The framework agreement with the manufacturer offers the option of having up to 350,000 rounds of ammunition produced and delivered. Other countries can also take part in the project, as it is part of the EU ammunition initiative to accelerate the delivery, procurement and production of ammunition for Ukraine. It is also about increasing European ammunition production in the long term so that EU member states can replenish their ammunition stocks.

In coordination with the European arms industry, we are continuing to look for ways to increase ammunition production. Germany had agreed to open its national framework agreements with industry to partner states.

(Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com)(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ German Ministry of Defense; issued Dec. 14, 2023)

15 Dec 23. Danish Government Allocates Additional $1.3bn Aid for Ukraine. The Government Allocates DKK 1.75bn for Industrial Pool Together with DKK 7bn Donation Package. The government has today consulted the Foreign Policy Council on another series of significant donations to Ukraine. The 14th donation package has a value of over DKK 7bn for the coming years and, in addition, DKK 1.75 billion for purchases directly from industry to Ukraine. (The total amount of DKK 8.75bn is worth about $1.3bn–Ed.)

The industrial pool is to target purchases from the defense industry to meet Ukrainian military support needs.

“It is crucial that purchases in the defense industry take place on the basis of Ukraine’s specific need for military support. I am happy that so many Danish companies support Ukraine’s defense struggle. I talk regularly with representatives from the Danish defense industry about how we can better utilize the knowledge and capacity of the business world in relation to the military donations to Ukraine. We can do that to an even greater extent with the industrial pool”, says Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen.

The industrial pool is financed within the framework of the Ukraine Fund with DKK 1bn in 2024, DKK 500m in 2025 and DKK 250m in 2026, with the possibility of additional financing.

“Denmark is ready to support Ukraine as long as there is a need for it. Therefore, today we are announcing the largest donation package to date, with a focus on meeting Ukraine’s urgent needs for winter and in the longer term. At the same time, we must think strategically, and here the industry’s commitment is crucial to ensure continuous support. That is why I am happy that we are allocating funds in the Ukraine Fund to buy from the defense industry with a view to donating to Ukraine,” says Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

“Ukraine’s fight for freedom is our fight for freedom. Since Putin’s troops disgustingly invaded the Ukrainian border, we have supported the Ukrainian people with everything from humanitarian to military support. Danish companies have played a decisive role here. They will come to that again. For Danish companies are world class when it comes to meeting the needs Ukrainians demand. With the industrial pool, we are strengthening the development and innovation of the Danish defense industry and supporting the all-important Ukrainian defense,” says Minister of Business Morten Bødskov.

Donation package XIV

Donation package XIV, like previous donation packages, involves a number of different agreements with allies on both purchases and donations from the defense industry as well as joint donations. Elements in the donation package also come from Danish companies.

The donations cover i.a. air defense, artillery ammunition, tanks, drones and anti-drone equipment, maritime capabilities and additional contributions to the British-led fund, the International Fund of Ukraine (IFU) as well as the international IT coalition.

Donation package XIV is financed within the framework of the Ukraine Foundation with approx. DKK 7bn in the period 2023-2026.

“Denmark has been a faithful supporter of Ukraine since the beginning of the war. With donation package XIV, we fulfill a number of Ukraine’s urgent military needs, but also deliver capacities that have an effect in the longer term,” says Troels Lund Poulsen. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Danish Ministry of Defence; issued Dec 14, 2023)

15 Dec 23. (Extract) The EU has failed to agree a critical €50bn financial aid package to Ukraine after Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán vetoed the proposal, throwing into doubt Europe’s ongoing support to Kyiv. The collapse of talks on the funding, seen as crucial for Ukraine’s financial stability into 2024, follows repeated failures by the US Congress to agree a $60bn aid package proposed by the White House. That has raised fears of weakening western resolve to sustain the country as it continues to battle against Russia. EU leaders, who were locked in negotiations over the package until the early hours of Friday, will return to Brussels in early 2024 for talks on the financing, with possible options to provide cash to Kyiv without Orban’s input. The failed efforts were announced hours after the leaders agreed to open accession talks with Ukraine — a milestone on Kyiv’s path to join the EU once the war with Russia is over and an endorsement by Brussels of the country’s western trajectory. The European Commission, the EU’s executive body, had tied the Ukraine funding package — intended to support Kyiv’s budget for 2024-27 — to €21bn of broader top-up funding for the bloc’s shared budget, including money for migration and defence. Leaders of 26 countries endorsed the top-up, but Orbán refused to agree, forcing them to reconvene in January, said European Council President Charles Michel, who chaired the summit. “Summary of the nightshift: veto for the extra money to Ukraine,” Orbán posted on social media platform X. His veto came despite Brussels unlocking €10.2bn of EU funding to Hungary that was previously blocked on rule of law grounds. Orbán, who is the only EU leader to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin this year, is the Kremlin’s closest partner in Europe and has consistently spoken out against western sanctions aimed at punishing Moscow for the war. An alternative proposal to raise cash for Ukraine through an agreement among the EU’s 26 other countries is being considered as a fallback option. “We have various tools in our hands to make sure we deliver on our political priorities,” Michel said. But such an instrument would last only a year, officials said. It would also be more expensive and take longer to set up. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said the 26 member states could proceed without Hungary, but it was “much more complicated”. He added that he was “cautiously optimistic we can get a breakthrough also with Hungary early next year”. (Source: FT.com)

13 Dec 23. Ukraine locates fifth Russian UAV launch site in Balaklava.

The new launch site in Balaklava demonstrates Russia’s strategy of long-range strikes and playing for time.

In a daily update on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 13 December 2023, the UK Ministry of Defence (UK MoD) referred to intelligence from the Ukrainian Air Force reporting that Russian forces launched at least 15 Shahed-131/136 one-way-attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) and two Kh-59 missiles, from the Balaklava district of Crimea on 12 December.

“Balaklava is now the fifth confirmed OWA-UAV launch site being used in Russian operations against Ukraine alongside the sites at Cape Chauda, Yeysk, Primorsko and Kursk,” the UK MoD affirmed.

Ukrainian air defences are said to have destroyed nine UAVs and both missiles.

Ukrainian military officials said that the missiles targeted Zaporizhia Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, while Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian UAV strike damaged an administrative building in Odesa City.

“Russia is likely dispersing its OWA-UAV launch capabilities across several locations as both a force protection measure and to complicate Ukrainian air defence efforts,” UK defence intelligence surmised. “Russia will likely use additional launch sites in response to Ukrainian attacks, forcing Ukraine to adapt to new transit corridors of these systems.”

Balaklava launch site shows Russia changing strategy

It has become clear that Russia is now targetting Ukrainian infrastructure as a way of eroding national morale as both sides enter a period of winter attrition. The new launch site in Balaklava demonstrates Russia’s strategy of long-range strikes and playing for time.

This method adds to the dissatisfaction that comes with a stagnant Ukrainian counter-offensive. While the UK MoD praised Ukraine’s small gains on 11 December, wherein it denied the enemy full control of the village of Stepove, the US Department of Defense recently described the front as moving “back and forth.”

Russia’s adoption of a long-range strike strategy may account for its loss of personnel since the invasion began in February 2022. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted that US intelligence assessed that the war in Ukraine has devastated the pre-war Russian military, although Russia has partially offset these losses and continues to prepare for a long war in Ukraine.

Iranian-made OWA-UAVs

Russia’s Shahed-136s are precision-attack loitering munition systems developed by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), which is a subsidiary of Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO), a state-owned aerospace company controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.

The suicide drone has been in service with the Iranian military since 2021. Russia also imported Shahed-136 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to use in the war against Ukraine. The drones have been rebranded as Geran-2 or Geranium-2 by Russia.

The drone measures 3.5 metres (m) long and 2.5m wide and weighs 200 kilogrammes (kg). It is designed with a delta-wing shape, with stabilising rudders at the tips. The fuselage of the aircraft is centralised and blended into the wings. It can carry up to 40kg of warheads at its nose section and can be mounted and launched from a military or commercial truck.

In August 2023, the ISW also revealed that Iran intends to establish Shahed production sites in Russia and Belarus to make the system more readily available to invading Russian forces against Ukraine.

14 Dec 23. Norway to double NASAMS donation to Ukraine. Norway will donate NASAMS air defences to Ukraine worth $31.7m, amounting to the same number of systems previously donated.

With Ukraine in urgent need of air defences to counter Russian bombardment by missile and one-way drones, Norway is donating additional NASAMS from its own defence stocks to defend lives and infrastructure in Ukraine, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence announced on 13 December 2023.

The decision to supply NASAMS from Norways own reserves reflects the urgency of the donation. Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy reportedly told analysts on 11 December that Ukraine only has a ‘handful’ of air-defence missiles to protect Kyiv, according to Politico. With the congressional deadlock over US military budgets and the Presidential drawdown, support for Ukraine from its single greatest benefactor is in a state of uncertainty.

While the number and make-up of systems to be donated by Norway has not been defined by its Ministry of Defence, it is known that the value of the systems being drawn from Norway’s own reserves amounts to Nkr335m ($31.7m).

In June, Lithuania donated two NASAMS air defence systems to Ukraine with an estimated cost of $10.7m, suggesting that a donation by Norway of purely of launchers valued at $31.7m could be up to six units, minus any budget allocated to fire direction centres or SENTINEL radars necessary to a NASAMS battery.

Norway will also order more NASAMS from defence supplies, and from this separate channel Norway will donate 8 more launch systems and 4 more fire direction centres, which it states will amount to the same number of NASAMS that Norway has previously donated to Ukraine, doubling the presence already in place.

Up to this date, Norway has supplied 4 NASAMS to Ukraine, with 2 fire control centres and 2 launchers donated in July, and 2 complete NASAMS fire units donated in conjunction with the USA in Autumn 2022.

The NASAMS system is a mobile air-defence platform designed to safeguard assets including air bases, ports, military personnel, and civilian populations. This technology has been implemented in 13 other countries, including the United States, Norway and Ukraine. With Nato’s increased defence posture in Eastern Europe, NASAMS systems have been deployed to Estonia from Spain’s inventory, and Lithuania have deployed their own as part of air defence for the Baltic-Nordic area.

The NASAMS system is comprised of several components, including the AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel radar, Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace’s Fire Distribution Centre, launcher, and a variety of munitions that include the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile Extended Range, and AIM-9X. (Source: army-technology.com)

14 Dec 23. Vladimir Putin has said his invasion of Ukraine will end only when Russia’s “goals are achieved”, indicating he intends to keep fighting unless Kyiv capitulates. Speaking at a marathon press conference and phone-in on Thursday, Russia’s president said he was still focused on the “denazification” and “demilitarisation” of Ukraine. The stage-managed event was the first time Putin had taken questions at length since ordering the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. “There will be peace when our goals are achieved,” said Putin. His vaguely worded demands, which also include a pledge by Ukraine to abandon its bid for Nato membership, essentially amount to its wholesale surrender and acceptance of long-term Russian dominance. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has refused to negotiate a ceasefire and accept the loss of a fifth of his country’s territory, which is currently under Russian control. But Ukrainian optimism after inflicting a series of humiliating battlefield setbacks on Russia last year has faded recently as western resolve has started to falter. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, left, and US President Joe Biden at a news conference on Tuesday © Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images Zelenskyy this week travelled to Washington but failed to secure additional military support from US Congress, where the Republican majority is holding up a $60bn bill put forward by the White House. In addition, EU leaders gathering in Brussels on Thursday were set to hold difficult negotiations to overcome Hungary’s opposition to a €50bn funding package for Ukraine for the next four years and to approve the start of EU accession talks with Kyiv. “Ukraine produces almost nothing today, everything is coming from the west, but the free stuff is going to run out some day, and it seems it already is,” said Putin. He claimed that Ukraine was running out of troops after taking heavy casualties in its counteroffensive, which failed to secure any significant territorial gains this year, and expressed confidence that Russia’s army was turning the tide. “The enemy announced a big counteroffensive. None of it worked anywhere,” said Putin. “I don’t even know why they do this. They are just sending their men out to be destroyed.” Kremlin spin-doctors and state media used the telethon to present Putin as an all-powerful, benevolent leader capable of solving ordinary Russians’ personal problems while crowing of victories on the battlefield and his prowess as a global statesman. But in a sign of how the war was impacting Russian society and economy, some questions revealed citizens’ concerns about high inflation, frontline soldiers’ frustrations and complaints about crumbling social services. An oncologist in south-east Ukraine said they needed more doctors in annexed regions. Messages including “Why does a box of eggs cost 550 roubles in Dagestan?” and “Why is your ‘reality’ at odds with our lived reality?” flashed on a giant screen behind Putin. Putin at times struggled to come up with an answer. “Of course you’re right that things don’t always work. The frontline is almost 2,000km long,” said Putin. “Of course not everything is delivered everywhere on time.” He reassured Russians that there was no need to draft more men after last year’s mobilisation led to mass panic and prompted hundreds of thousands of people to flee the country. Recommended War in Ukraine Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia in maps: latest updates The president ranted at length about what he claimed were the true roots of the Ukraine crisis, apportioning blame to the US, Lenin, and the Russo-Turkish wars in the 19th century. Still, he insisted Russia’s war was nothing compared with the “catastrophe” of Israel’s bombing campaign on Gaza. “Everyone here and across the whole world can see. Look at the special military operation and what is happening in Gaza. And notice the difference. Nothing like that is happening in Ukraine,” said Putin. (Source: FT.com)

13 Dec 23. We will fight with or without the West, says Zelensky. Volodymyr Zelensky has vowed Ukraine will fight on against Russia with or without Western support.

“In the first days of the full-scale war, on 24, February, we were really alone,” the Ukrainian president told a press conference as he visited Oslo, Norway.

“But we didn’t run away, we began to fight, so when you say if it is possible without help… It is possible like it was.”

Western support for Ukraine has wavered in the aftermath of its underwhelming summer counter-offensive.

The US Congress is refusing to approve $48bn ($61bn) in new military aid and Hungary has said it will veto accession talks and a £43bn ($54bn) aid package proposed by the European Union.

“Of course, you can’t win without help, but you can’t lose, because this is the only thing you have – your country,” Mr Zelensky added. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

13 Dec 23. Sweden to Donate Its Largest Non-Military Support Package to Ukraine. The Government is due to adopt a new winter package for Ukraine, to support the Ukrainian people ahead of the winter and alleviate suffering in the country. The package is worth a total of SEK 1.4bn and is the largest single non-military Swedish package to Ukraine.

“Ukraine is enduring another winter under Russian aggression. Like last year, Russia is stepping up its attacks on civilian infrastructure, not least on energy and heat supply. Such attacks have devastating consequences for an already hard-hit population and worsen the humanitarian situation in the country. This support will help heat Ukraine and strengthen its resilience this winter,” says Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade Johan Forssell.

This support will help bolster Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure during the winter, its energy system, emergency shelters and health and medical care system.

“Access to energy is crucial to Ukraine’s security and resilience, and to rebuilding the country and kick-starting Ukraine’s business sector as quickly as possible once Russia’s war of invasion is over. Sweden will support Ukraine for as long as it takes,” says Minister for Energy, Business and Industry Ebba Busch.

The 2023 winter package to Ukraine encompasses SEK 1.4bn from the development assistance budget and will be channelled via the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), UNESCO and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.

“We stand side by side with Ukraine, and the importance of continuing to provide military, humanitarian and economic support cannot be overstated. We’re also convinced that it will strengthen Sweden’s security and our trade relations in the long term,” says Aron Emilsson, foreign policy spokesperson for the Sweden Democrats.

“We must respond to the cold winter with our solidarity. This is about both their freedom and ours. Ukraine must win the war, and Russia must lose it,” says Joar Forssell, foreign policy spokesperson for the Liberal Party.

About this support

Support to Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure via the World Bank

SEK 900m will be allocated via the World Bank’s Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund, which supports Ukraine’s key infrastructure in sectors such as energy, housing, health care and transport. Procuring equipment to shore up heating and transfer capacity in the Ukrainian electricity grid is crucial to the Ukrainian population making it through the winter. The largest project in the energy sector, RePower Ukraine, focuses on these very issues.

Energy and environmental support via the EBRD

SEK 300m will be allocated via the EBRD’s Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P). The Partnership was established in 2009 under Sweden’s then Presidency of the Council of the EU, and Sweden has been the largest donor for almost 15 years. It supports municipal infrastructure initiatives in Ukraine to boost energy efficiency and environmental protection.

Support for grain exports via the World Food Programme

The winter support package also includes support via the UN World Food Programme (WFP), with SEK 100m going to Ukrainian grain exports via the WFP’s Grain from Ukraine initiative. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Swedish Government)

12 Dec 23. Biden Administration Announces New Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s fifty-third tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This package includes additional air defense capabilities, artillery ammunition, anti-tank weapons, and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing war of aggression.

This package utilizes assistance previously authorized for Ukraine during prior fiscal years under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) that remained after the PDA revaluation process.

The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $200m, include:

AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
Air defense system components;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
More than 4 m rounds of small arms ammunition;
Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing;
Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure;
Spare parts, generators, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

In close cooperation with its Allies and partners, the United States continues to support Ukraine’s most pressing battlefield requirements, including capabilities needed to protect Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure from Russia’s unrelenting aerial attacks. U.S. leadership remains essential to sustaining the coalition efforts of some 50 allies and partners currently supporting Ukraine. This support has enabled Ukrainian forces to defend their sovereignty and independence. It is critical that Congress takes action soon and passes the President’s national security supplemental request to ensure that Ukraine can consolidate and extend its battlefield gains.

Security assistance for Ukraine remains a smart investment in our national security. It deters potential aggression elsewhere in the world, while strengthening our defense industrial base and creating highly skilled jobs for the American people. (Source: U.S. DoD)

12 Dec 23. Drones, jammers in Ukraine signal new era of warfare, Del Toro says.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, now nearing the end of its second year, has ushered in a “new era of war” in which drones and electronic warfare are having outsize impacts, the secretary of the U.S. Navy said.

Both Russian and Ukrainian militaries are employing unmanned aerial systems to scout, target and attack while simultaneously using jammers and spoofers to defend the skies above or the trenches they’ve dug. The cat-and-mouse game is deadly, with each side trying to outthink and outbuild the other.

“The world around us is changing at a rapid pace, with an air of uncertainty as to what the future holds,” Carlos Del Toro said Dec. 12 at the Association of Old Crows conference in Maryland. “For the U.S. and our NATO allies, the conflict in Ukraine reinforces the emphasis that we place on developing and maintaining a ready, interoperable combat power that is capable of fighting in contested environments, including the electromagnetic spectrum.”

The U.S. Department of Defense is pouring bns of dollars into the development of drones, EW and a mix of the two.

The Navy this year tested Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Off-Board Electronic Warfare pod, meant to be mounted aboard helicopters to detect and deceive anti-ship missiles, and separately linked what one commander described as “unmanned and unmanned” at the Integrated Battle Problem exercise in the waters off California.

“We recognize that spectrum operations, in particular electronic warfare, with any potential or actual adversary, is a constant series of moves and countermoves to develop strategic, operational and tactical advantages in the battlespace,” Del Toro said. The Navy’s established EW efforts include the Growler aircraft, made by Boeing, and the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program, or SEWIP, featuring contractors General Dynamics, Lockheed and Northrop Grumman.

Washington has committed both drones and EW equipment to Kyiv. While the Defense Department often discloses the makes and models of the former as they are shipped over seas, it does not publicly discuss the latter.

Del Toro and other national-security officials met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy this week. Continued U.S. aid for the besieged country could soon dry up amid congressional disagreements.

“He beseeched us, the entire United States government, to please help Congress pass the supplemental that is being debated on Capitol Hill, hopefully over the next week or so,” Del Toro said said of Zelenskyy. “I cannot begin to tell you how incredibly important that is. We cannot simply afford to leave our allies and partners on the battlefield of Ukraine without the support that they so deserve.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/C4ISR & Networks)

12 Dec 23. Ukraine equipped with VAMPIRE C-UAS. The US Navy has delivered a new counter-UAS platform as Russian forces target Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure. Ukraine’s Armed Forces finally delivered counter-uncrewed aerial system (C-UAS) platforms known as the Vehicle Agnostic Modular Palletised ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) Rocket Equipment, also referred to by its abbreviation: ‘VAMPIRE’.

Initially sent as part of a US Department of Defense (DoD) military aid package in January 2023, the western donor sent the final $40m rocket-launching platform to the war-torn country, according to an 11 December press release issued by the original equipment manufacturer L3Harris.

A week earlier, on 6 December, the US Navy stated that “We delivered the first four systems in only six months by leveraging an innovative contracting strategy and working diligently to keep pace with the system’s rapid development.”

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VAMPIRE is a compact, palletised rocket-launching platform that consists of a sensor ball and four-shot Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) launchers designed to mount to any truck with a flatbed. The US Navy and Army have traditionally used APKWS against air-to-ground targets.

Importance of VAMPIRE as Russia strikes infrastructure

With VAMPIRE, the laser-guided rocket can defend against uncrewed aerial threats – an effective and cost-effective method of warfare that Russia relies upon.

As the Ukrainian Army enters a period of winter attrition, invading Russian forces have begun targetting the nation’s civilian infrastructure to erode morale, adding to Ukraine’s stagnant counter-offensive, which the DoD Press Secretary, Major General Pat Ryder, described as moving “back and forth.”

On 9 December, Ukrainian General Staff reported that their air defences downed a Kh-29 missile and Shahed-136 UASs and that Russian forces struck Velykyi Burluk, in the Kharkiv region with two S-300 missiles the following day.

Likewise, on 10 December, the UK Ministry of Defence assessed that Russian forces likely conducted their first missile strike series of the anticipated winter campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of 7 December.

“Early customer reports say VAMPIRE is already having a positive effect in Ukraine thanks to the U.S. Navy’s ability to respond with ‘unprecedented speed and agility,’” said Jason Lambert, president of ISR at L3Harris. “As adversary tactics evolve, our customers rely on us to anticipate, design and rapidly deliver reliable mission capabilities. We’ll continue partnering with the [DoD] to field critical capabilities that will help save lives.”

VAMPIRE’s mission management system integrates an advanced infrared/electro-optical targetting sensor system, Wescam MX-10 RSTA, with its weapons station, allowing an operator to engage targets quickly and accurately. (Source: army-technology.com)

13 Dec 23. UK lose 65% of ORCs and retain Viking vehicles after Ukraine donation. In a flurry of support for Ukraine’s maritime defence, the UK extends its commitment to Ukraine, gifting 20 Viking amphibious vehicles and 23 offshore raiding craft (ORC). In a speech lauding the Ukrainian Navy at Admiralty House in London on 12 December 2023, the UK Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, extended British support for the service with an additional donation of 20 Viking BvS10 amphibious, all-terrain vehicles and 23 offshore raiding craft (ORC).

This continued support comes just off the heels of the establishment of the Anglo-Norwegian-led Maritime Capability Coalition, formed on 11 December, to strengthen Ukraine’s Navy and make it more interoperable with other Nato fleets.

Alongside this, Shapps also gifted two British Sandown-class mine-hunting vessels from Britain’s five-strong fleet, which were originally acquired between 1998 and 2001.

Balancing British inventory, a 65% loss of ORCs

Britain’s transfer of 20 Viking BvS10 vehicles to Ukraine comes after the UK Royal Navy replenished its inventory of amphibious support vehicles under the Collaborative All-Terrain Vehicles programme (CATV). This joint procurement plan saw Sweden, Germany and the UK jointly acquire 436 BvS10 units from the original equipment manufacturer, BAE Systems in December 2022. The three buyers are due to receive 236, 140 and 60 vehicles respectively, according to the Royal Navy.

The uprated Vikings – which will be in service until 2058 – can operate in harsh climes such as the Arctic or desert where the Royal Marines regularly operate as the UK’s experts in warfare in the most extreme environments.

The Viking vehicle consists of two linked tracked units, which are articulated vertically and horizontally for steering and for manoeuvring over rough terrain. All four tracks drive continuously, providing maximum tractive effort in all conditions.

Furthermore, Britain’s Royal Marine Commandos also operate a total of 35 ORCs – 27 troop-carrying and eight fire-support boats. In contrast to offsetting the Viking vehicles, the Navy will have a deficit of ORCs by 12 boats, or 65% of its ORC fleet.

The Royal Marines use ORCs for troop insertion and extraction on the front line, patrols as well as fire cover in combat. These boats are fast and versatile craft capable of transporting 12 Royal Marines Commandos at a time. The craft are launched by a trailer under-slung from a helicopter and secured to the deck of a ship or aircraft hold. (Source: naval-technology.com)

11 Dec 23. (Extract) Brussels will propose on Tuesday to ringfence profits generated from Russia’s frozen assets in the EU, aiming to eventually skim off up to €15bn for Ukraine’s benefit. The European Commission plan had been delayed since the summer after several EU member states and the European Central Bank raised legal and financial concerns. But the faltering US and EU efforts to agree additional financial support for Ukraine has given fresh impetus to the proposals to tap profits from Moscow’s immobilised cash, said people familiar with the discussion. “It’s important to look at how we can use Russian immobilised assets and proceeds from those immobilised assets to support Ukraine,” commission vice-president Valdis Dombrovskis told the Financial Times. Noting the G7 had agreed to freeze the assets until Moscow had paid damages to Ukraine, Dombrovskis argued it was time to look at ways to best use the proceeds generated in the interim. To win over sceptics, the commission will initially require central securities depositories holding Russian central bank assets to place the profits generated from them in separate accounts, according to people briefed on the proposal. Securities depositories generate profits by reinvesting cash from matured securities such as government bonds, as payments to Moscow are banned due to the sanctions. EU member states would need to unanimously back the plan, as well as further implementing steps, before the money could be disbursed to Kyiv. Hungary has separately blocked further EU funding for Ukraine ahead of a leaders’ summit on Thursday. In the second stage of the plan, the profits would be moved to the EU’s common budget to help support Ukraine, the people said. Only proceeds from Russia’s central bank assets would be targeted under the proposal. The commission estimates this would generate up to €3bn a year, or €15bn between 2023 and 2027, though officials warned that the amount would depend on interest rates through the period. The measures would principally affect Euroclear, a Belgium-based depository that holds about €191bn in Russian sovereign assets, the largest share immobilised in the west. Euroclear is already separating profits voluntarily, and earned €3bn in income on all Russian assets in the first nine months of this year alone. Not all those profits were generated from Russian central bank assets. Euroclear declined to comment on the upcoming proposals, which could still change before being put forward by the commission. (Source: FT.com)

11 Dec 23. U.S. Support for Ukraine ‘Unshakable,’ Says Austin. America’s commitment to supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression is unshakable, said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III.

Austin delivered introductory remarks prior to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address at the National Defense University today in Washington.

“Ukraine’s fight for freedom is one of the great causes of our time. And the United States is proud to stand with you. And, make no mistake about it, Ukraine matters profoundly to America’s security and to the trajectory of global security in the 21st century,” Austin said.

That’s why the United States has committed more than $44 bn in security assistance to Ukraine’s brave defenders and has rallied a historic coalition of some 50 allies and partners, who have contributed more than $37 bn in security assistance to Ukraine, he added.

“The capabilities from our coalition are making a crucial difference on the battlefield. Ukraine has taken back more than half of the territory grabbed by Russia since February 2022,” the secretary said.

The Russian military had been badly weakened. Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to demoralize the Ukrainian people. Instead, he demoralized the Russian military, Austin said.

America and the coalition are determined to help Ukraine fight to defend its territory and its citizens and to extend its battlefield gains, he said.

“If we do not stand up to the Kremlin’s aggression today, if we do not deter other would-be aggressors, we will only invite more aggression, more bloodshed and more chaos,” Austin said.

Zelenskyy said that Russia’s fight against Ukraine is really a fight against a free and united Europe.

Putin is looking for allies who are susceptible to his ideology, even in America, the president said. “His weapon against you right now is propaganda and disinformation.”

Zelenskyy said that Putin’s aim isn’t just the takeover and destruction of Ukraine. He will wage a global war on freedom.

“Ukrainians haven’t given up and won’t give up. We know what to do. And you can count on Ukraine. And we hope just as much to be able to count on you,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

12 Dec 23. (Extract) EU diplomats are discussing technical proposals to raise emergency funding for Ukraine outside of the bloc’s shared budget, as Hungary vowed it would not yield to pressure to drop its veto on a support package critical for Kyiv. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has said he would block Brussels’ bid to provide a critical €50bn financial aid lifeline to Ukraine and approve formal talks on the country joining the EU at a summit of its leaders on Thursday. His stance comes in spite of efforts by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and other EU capitals to persuade him. Failure by the EU to agree the proposed funding package would severely affect Ukraine’s financial stability, Ukrainian and European officials have warned. It would also mark the most egregious reversal in Brussels’ support since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, amid uncertainty over a similar-sized funding package in the US. EU officials are working on possible solutions to overturn Hungary’s block on the package, which require unanimity, including the release of bloc funds earmarked for Budapest but currently frozen on rule of law concerns. With time running out before the summit begins, diplomats have also begun private talks on the feasibility and technical details of potential financial package between the other 26 members, people briefed on the discussions told the Financial Times. This would provide Kyiv with emergency funding for at least a year. The talks, involving officials from the European Commission and large member states that would saddle most of the cost, are being kept confidential to avoid undermining the primary objective of overturning Budapest’s veto, given Orbán has said he has no objection to other EU countries providing aid. An off-budget instrument would take more time and cost more money in interest and other costs, the people said. One added: “Nobody wants to do this if we don’t have to . . . But it would be reckless not to have a plan B.” Orbán’s EU minister, János Bóka, told the FT that Hungary was insistent that any aid for Ukraine could not come from the EU’s joint budget, and that a decision on membership talks must wait until the European parliament elections in June. “Hungary will not change its mind,” Bóka said. “We can talk about the period after the December summit with member states [but] I do not see any factor that would change our decision, which is rooted in principle.” Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, said on Monday that Ukraine had received no assurances that the €50bn would be provided in one form or another, and that any alternative would challenge the country’s stability. “In the case of no decision on the €50bn, there could be an interim solution,” she told reporters, but it would leave Ukraine on “the edge of survival with zero [financial] predictability for the whole year”. An inability to agree the support package and to open membership talks would be seen by Kyiv as “a failure of the whole EU”, she added. The commission is set to give in-principle approval to unfreeze more than €10bn in EU budget funds it has withheld for rule of law and graft concerns with Orbán’s government. Multiple EU officials said reforms Budapest has enacted meant it deserved the cash, but that approval would be helpful in the wider effort to persuade Orbán to change his course on Ukraine. But any formal or informal link between the two issues would “amount to political blackmail not from Hungary, but against Hungary, which we reject”, Bóka added. Stefanishyna said Orban had implied in an impromptu conversation with Zelenskyy over the weekend that unlocking Hungary’s EU cash was one aspect of his positioning regarding Kyiv. Bóka said in response: “Hungary is playing with an open hand.” (Source: FT.com)

11 Dec 23. Kremlin Establishes Supply Channels for Chinese Drones Bypassing Beijing authorities. The Kremlin discredits China by continuing to import components, military equipment, and dual-purpose goods for its international sanctions. This contradicts the official position of Beijing, which tries to maintain formal neutrality in this war.

It is most likely that Moscow uses military intelligence channels to ensure the purchase of scarce goods and components.

According to our data, the Chinese-based company Shandong Buyun Aviation Technology Co., Ltd plans to deliver 1,000 drones to Russia.

The Hong Kong-based trading company SGGI Limited (3/F, Workingston Tower, 78 Bonham Strand, Sheung Wan, HK), which is most likely connected to Russian intelligence, will handle the order for the manufacture of drones and logistical issues regarding their delivery from the PRC to Russia.

The disassembled drones will be delivered first to Kazakhstan (via the city of Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous District, PRC), each in a separate case, and then shipped to Russia. Thus, the delivery scheme indicates that the government of Kazakhstan does not prevent, and likely supports Moscow in creating schemes to tackle sanctions preventing arms supplies to Russia. Accordingly, Astana deliberately violates the sanctions regime and export control rules, likely due to the Russians having infiltrated the decision-making system at the highest level.

Contacts with the manufacturer were established back in February 2023, when it was reported that an agreement had been reached to supply 100 drones set to be delivered in April through indirect supply schemes organized by Russia’s defense intelligence. Most likely, the agreements relate to the ZT-180 drone model, which is capable of carrying a 35-50 kg payload. The drone seems to be “a close clone” of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 widely used by Russia in Ukraine. Russia would likely use the ZT-180 much in the same way as it has deployed the Iranian Shahed-131 and -136 “suicide” drones in Ukraine.

Drones developed by Bingo had been used in military exercises and described their technical strength as “first class.” Chinese-made drones would likely receive “battlefield testing” in Ukraine to see whether or not they are actually able to compete with the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 on military and civilian targets in Ukraine. A similar range for the ZT-180 would mean the Chinese-made drones could quite comfortably hit key targets within Ukraine, including Kyiv.

The similarity of the parameters of Iranian and Chinese drones may indicate that Moscow provides Iranian technology to China to develop similar drones at a favorable price, since Beijing, unlike Tehran, does not have issues with tech components. Thus, the renewal of negotiations with China may indicate Moscow’s frustration over Iran’s production capacity.

We have no confirmation that the delivery involved participation of the Chinese authorities. Most likely, the Russians went directly to the manufacturer and offered a deal through a Hong Kong intermediary firm in the interests of Kazakhstan. Even early this year there were indicators that Bingo could have plans to help establish a production site for the drones in Russia, where up to 100 units could be manufactured per month. However, the plans could be affected by negotiations between Beijing and Washington.

Shandong Buyun Aviation Technology Co., Ltd (Room 813, Building 1B Yaogu, Gangxing road /Shandong/ Rilot Free Trade Zone, Jinan, China), founded in 2015, specializes in the manufacture of drones of various modifications and the training of drone operators. The company has its own projects and patented products. It cooperates with the Nanjing University of Astronautics and Aeronautics. In November 2018, Bingo said it had signed a strategic cooperation agreement with an online platform established by Poly Technology Defense Investment, a unit of state-owned China Poly Group which aims to support military trade and research into military equipment.

According to our estimates, the restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on the export of UAVs since September 1 have significantly complicated their supply to Russia and led to a shortage of some components, as well as UAVs weighing over 4 kg. China’s ban on the export of drones that can be used for military purposes also led to the suspension of supplies of products that are not directly subject to restrictions, for example, 30-40kg drones used in agriculture that are not produced in Russia in large quantities.

Russia traditionally tries to circumvent restrictions through third countries, as well as by exploiting the existing gaps in the imposed bans. It cannot be ruled out that some representatives of the Chinese government are aware of the ultimate destination for drone supplies but chose not to interfere. Thus, the deal with Shandong Buyun Aviation Technology Co., Ltd may have been a corrupt bid by Russian intelligence seeking to procure military drones to bypass the Chinese government’s ban. This would allow Moscow to reduce its dependence on Beijing, and intelligence officials to gain profit. (Source: UAS VISION/Robert Lansing Institute)

11 Dec 23. Bulgarian MPs Override Presidential Veto, Approve AFV and Missile Donation to Ukraine. Parliament Overrides Presidential Veto on Sending Armoured Vehicles to Ukraine. Parliament Friday overrode a presidential veto on sending armoured vehicles to Ukraine as aid. The legislature reconfirmed, in a 162-55 vote with no abstentions, the ratification of an agreement between the Defence Ministries of Bulgaria and Ukraine for the provision of aid. The agreement was signed in Sofia on August 8 and in Kyiv on November 13. [Bulgarian] President Rumen Radev vetoed it on December 4. The veto was overridden on 64 votes from GERB-UDF, 59 from Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria and 34 from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. Vazrazhdane (35 MPs) voted in favour of the veto as did 20 of BSP for Bulgaria and five of There Is Such a People. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Bulgarian New Agency, BTA)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

Protek Selected By Dutch Armed Forces

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS

MANAGEMENT ON THE MOVE