NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 01.

BAKHMUT: Russian sources continued to report on 30 November-1 December that their forces are consolidating recent gains near Bakhmut, though there remains no visual confirmation. Russian forces are reportedly expanding their control over areas south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, located two miles (3km) north-west of Bakhmut, and have also advanced along the O0506 highway between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar, though this also remains unconfirmed. Further south, a Ukrainian milblogger reported on 30 November that in recent days Russian forces have taken multiple Ukrainian positions near Klishchiivka, located four miles (7km) south-east of Bakhmut. Nevertheless, other Russian sources reported earlier on 1 December that fighting around the village is now primarily positional, with neither side able to break through at present.
DONETSK: On 30 November, Ukrainian Suspline Media reported that the frozen ground in the Avdiivka sector has softened into mud, complicating the advance of both sides. According to Ukrainian military sources quoted by the media outlet, Russian forces continue to maintain the intensity of offensive operations despite failing to achieve progress.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 1 December, Ukrainian Kharkiv oblast governor Oleh Synyehubov said Russian forces are continuing to experience heavy losses in equipment and personnel in the Kupiansk sector. According to Synyehubov, this has led Russian troops to conduct rotations to carry out new assaults in the Kupisansk region. Nevertheless, on 29-30 November, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops made gains on the outskirts of Synkivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk. Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces dislodged Ukrainian forces near Lyman Pershyi, around 7 miles (11km) north-east of Kupiansk and breached Ukrainian defences along the Tymkivka-Ivanivka-Kyslivka line, between 12 and 14 miles (20-23km) south-east Kupiansk. However, such claims remain unconfirmed, with Russian milbloggers typically exaggerating the extent of Russian progress.
STRIKES: Early on 1 December, Russian forces launched 25 Shahed-136/131 drones and two Kh-59 cruise missiles. Ukraine’s air defences intercepted 18 drones and one missile. The strike targeted eastern and southern regions, with air defences active in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia. Reports indicated that a Russian missile and falling drone debris damaged agricultural storage buildings and equipment in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet destroyed a Ukrainian sea drone early on 1 December.
STRIKES: Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Havryliu claimed that Ukraine plans to increase the production of defence equipment in 2024. Havryliu said air defence production will include anti-air missiles with a range of 62 miles (100km), such as Koral guided missiles. Meanwhile, on 6 November, Herman Smetanin, the head of the state-owned Ukrainian Defence Industry manufacturing company, said that Ukraine has launched the mass production of kamikaze drones with a range reaching up to 621 miles (1000km). Kyiv reportedly plans to invest seven times more in its defence industry in 2024 than in 2023. Over the past month, Ukrainian forces have been increasingly launching strikes against Russian-annexed Crimea and Russian territory. As such, increased domestic production of drones and missiles will allow the country to sustain the tempo of its attacks, as well as reinforce air defences throughout 2024. At the same time, increasing defence spending will increase budgetary pressures, with Ukraine already heavily relying on international aid to maintain macro-financial stability.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

PROTESTS: Ukraine’s trade representative and deputy economy minister, Taras Kachka, said on 30 November that Polish hauliers’ ongoing partial blockade of border crossings will reduce Ukraine’s overall imports by about a fifth in November. According to Kachka, this could realistically result in Kyiv losing 1% GDP growth if the protests continue. Unpublished government data indicates that Ukraine imported USD 3.8 billion worth of goods and products in the first 26 days of November, down from USD 5.2 billion across the whole of October. The Federation of Employers of Ukraine, an industry lobby group, has estimated that direct losses to the economy amount to around USD 437 million. However, this figure could likely rise as the protests are likely to continue in the coming weeks, which could realistically increase prices for certain goods, including food products.
AID: International media reported on 30 November, citing the Pentagon and insiders familiar with the matter, that the US’s first delivery of Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) weapons has been delayed until early 2024. GLSDB weapons are adapted to strike at a range of just under 100 miles (160km) and can be used by the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which will enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. An unspecified Pentagon spokesperson said the US expects that this capability will be provided in early 2024 after testing. Russia claimed to have shot down a US-supplied GLSDB for the first time in March, though an unnamed US official and a person familiar with the matter said Washington DC has not supplied any of the smart bombs to Kyiv.
RECONSTRUCTION: On 28 November, US Senators introduced a bill that would allow the Department of Justice (DOJ) to seize high-value assets belonging to sanctioned Russian oligarchs more quickly to be used towards financing Ukraine’s reconstruction. Separately, the EU is reportedly progressing with its own proposal to tax profits from frozen Russian Central Bank assets to assist in Ukraine’s reconstruction. The European Commission reportedly intends to present its proposal on 12 December. However, such initiatives will likely render the EU and US more vulnerable to retaliatory assets appropriations by Russia in the coming weeks.
POLLS: Independent Russian polling organisation Chronicles found that a minority of Russians are pro-war in a recent telephone survey. The pollster, which conducted the survey between 17-22 October, noted that the number of consistent supporters for the conflict is at a historic low of 12% – down from 22% in February. These are Russians who support the war, would not support a decision from Russian President Vladimir Putin to withdraw troops and start peace talks without achieving the objectives of the war, and that the government should prioritise military spending.
POLLS: Chronicles disclosed that, for the first time, more Russians would support Putin’s decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine without Russia having met its war aims than not (40% versus 33%). The number of respondents who would not support Moscow pulling out its forces and continuing the war is steadily decreasing. Less than half (47%) of Russians surveyed shared this view in February, with this figure dropping to 39% in July. Although Russian opinion polling should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism, Chronicles’ findings indicate that support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is steadily slipping. However, such sentiment is highly unlikely to push the Kremlin to end the war ahead of the presidential election in March 2024.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with the Associated Press (AP) published on 30 November that the war with Russia is in a new phase with the onset of winter. Winter in Eastern Europe, often characterised by heavy snow, ice and low temperatures can indeed present obstacles for large-scale military operations, though Zelensky said Ukraine would continue fighting regardless.

Zelensky also provided his assessment of the summer counter-offensive, which failed to result in significant breakthroughs for Ukraine. He admitted that Ukraine is losing personnel and that Kyiv did not receive all the weapons that it wanted from its Western partners. The Ukrainian President did not provide specific numbers of troop losses. However, he noted that Ukraine wanted faster results from its counter-offensive and acknowledged that Ukraine did not achieve its desired objectives in this regard. Zelensky said limits in the size of Ukraine’s military force and Western equipment also prevented a quick advance.

However, he noted that Ukraine managed to make incremental territorial gains against a better-armed and fortified enemy. Zelensky disclosed that Ukraine is focused on bolstering domestic arms production, adding that a sizeable part of the budget is allocated for this purpose. The President said Ukraine is looking to Western allies, including the US, to offer loans and contracts to assist with this – including licenses to build US weapons in-country. Although Kyiv will highly likely remain reliant on Western military aid for the foreseeable future, efforts to bolster the country’s military self-sufficiency will nevertheless continue, likely to reduce such dependency in the long term.

Separately, on 30 November, Zelensky assessed that it will be easier to re-integrate the residents of Russian-occupied Crimea than those in Donbas. Zelensky stated that the most fervent separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic’s (DNR and LNR) continue to stand their ground. According to Zelensky, if residents in the Donbas do not want to re-integrate into Ukraine, it will be challenging for Kyiv. While these comments do not represent a change in the Ukrainian leadership’s stated objectives to reclaim all of its Russian-occupied territory, it is a notable acknowledgement of the extremely difficult task of reintegrating occupied territories even if Ukraine was able to militarily or politically regain them. Ultimately, Zelensky’s recent interviews are among his most candid to date, and recognise the extremely difficult military tasks ahead in 2024 and Ukraine’s reliance upon Western partners to continue to war effort.

Russia: Airport management transfer underscores ongoing seizure risks for foreign-owned assets. On 30 November, a presidential decree ordered the transfer of the managing rights of St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport (LED) from foreign stakeholders to a new Russian entity. The foreign stakeholders include German airport operator Fraport AG as well as the Qatari and Abu Dhabi wealth funds. Existing investors will keep their stakes but will not be able to vote; they will be able to restore their voting rights under certain conditions. In 2022, Fraport AG supported Western sanctions against Russia, with recent reports indicating it sought to divest from Pulkovo Airport. The decree is likely part of Moscow’s deterrence strategy, by which it issues economic restrictions against foreign stakeholders associated with ‘unfriendly states’ and offers opportunities to entities associated with states that have adopted a neutral stance on its war in Ukraine, such as the Qatari Wealth Fund. The decree underscores the ongoing risks of assets seizures of Russian assets owned by Western entities

Nov 30.

BAKHMUT: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 29 November that their forces had captured Khromove, at the western outskirts of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast). This remains unconfirmed. Other Russian sources also reported this, alongside advances by VDV airborne near the Berkhivka Reservoir to the north, but there is not yet any visual confirmation of either of these advances. Khromove has remained on the frontline for many months, but Russian forces have been consistently counter-attacking to the west of Bakhmut in recent weeks. Ukrainian sources also reported on 29 November that the situation to the south-west of Bakhmut remains particularly challenging due to increased numbers of Russian units operating in the region.
DONETSK: On 29 November, the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk group of forces, Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, said that Russian activity in the Avdiivka sector has increased since 28 November. Tarnavskyi noted that Russian forces are using armoured vehicles. Meanwhile, on 29 November, Russian sources claimed that Russian forces progressed between 0.186 and 0.310 miles (300—500 meters) towards Novokalynove and near Stepove, located (10km) and (7km) north-west of Avdiivka, respectively. However, such claims remain visually unconfirmed.
KHERSON: The Russian command and control (C2) situation on the left bank of the Dnieper River (Kherson oblast) remains poor, which is undermining Russian defensive operations despite the deployment of additional reinforcements. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on 29 November that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade operating in the region are refusing to attack Ukrainian positions due to limited artillery support and poor communications that result in the provision of limited intelligence and awareness of Russian minefield locations. This communication failure reportedly resulted in over 50 casualties for the brigade.
KHERSON: UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported earlier on 30 November that Russian airborne VDV forces have likely begun deploying the newly formed 104th Guards Airborne Division to Kherson oblast. The arrival of additional VDV units is likely part of an effort to create a force capable of repelling Ukrainian forces from the left bank, which they have failed to do over the last month. As waterways begin to freeze this winter, Russian forces will likely face increased Ukrainian sorties across the Dnieper, and so pressure is likely increasing on the Dnepr group of forces to repel Ukrainian forces before stable bridgeheads are consolidated. However, despite the newly deployed unit’s nominal airborne and Guards status, it is highly likely to be poorly trained and under-equipped.
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 November, Russia launched 20 Shahed-136/131 drones and eight S-300 missiles. Ukrainian air defences reportedly destroyed 14 drones. Reports indicate damage was caused to residential buildings in Myrnohrad (Donetsk oblast). Odesa oblast regional authorities reported that five drones were destroyed over the region and that an unused building was hit. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that air defences in Belgorod intercepted a Ukrainian drone early on 30 November.
STRIKES: On 30 November, the Ukrainian state grid operator Ukrenergo said that over 442 settlements were left without electricity, partly due to Russian attacks. Additionally, 191 settlements in Ukraine are facing energy issues due to the bad weather conditions. Kyiv has implemented contingency preparations to mitigate energy blackouts and reinforced air defences with Western-provided air defence systems. Nevertheless, the country’s energy grid will remain vulnerable to Russian attacks, with bad weather conditions likely compounding energy security risks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

DEMOGRAPHICS: On 29 November, Ukraine’s National Resistance Centre claimed that Russia has relocated over 100,000 Central Asian migrants to Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine. It reported that most of the migrants work in construction, though Russia intends to mobilise them in exchange for Russian citizenship. While the report cannot be verified, international media reported in March that Russian firms had hired hundreds of Central Asian migrants to work in Russian-occupied Ukraine, often with relatively lucrative salaries. Moscow will likely continue to coerce and facilitate Central Asian migrants to work and fight in Russian-held regions of Ukraine to bolster its labour force and manpower therein in the medium-to-long term.
DEMOGRAPHICS: Central Asian governments themselves continue to discourage such practices, with a Kazakh court on 28 November sentencing a Kazakh national to over six years in prison for ‘mercenarianism’. He reportedly served in a Wagner Group unit in Bakhmut. This is the second Central Asian citizen to be sentenced for fighting in the Russian military, but despite such efforts to deter migrants, Russian state coercion against Central Asian migrants already in Russia is ramping up.
SECURITY: On 29 November, French foreign ministry spokesperson Anne-Claire Legendre said that France aims to conclude a bilateral security guarantee agreement with Ukraine by the beginning of 2024. Legendre explained that the security guarantee framework would include long-term humanitarian aid, support for reconstruction and military assistance. Reports indicate that Ukraine and Germany have begun bilateral negotiations on security guarantees on 17 November. Such bilateral accords are part of the G7 countries’ pledge to bolster Kyiv’s long-term security following the July NATO summit in Vilnius (Lithuania).
BORDERS: Poland’s infrastructure minister, Alvin Gajadhur, met on 29 November with representatives of the road transport industry who are participating in the ongoing blockade of the Polish-Ukrainian border. A representative of the transport industry, Waldemar Jaszczur, said that Polish hauliers do not intend to stop their protest. However, Jaszczur said hauliers will not extend the blockade to two other border crossing points (Malhowice-Nyzhankovychi and Zosin-Ustyluh) despite preparations to do so. He also said hauliers are willing to consider softening the protest if Warsaw strengthens effective controls on trucks entering Poland. Jaszczur did not provide further details as to what this could involve, however.
BORDERS: Meanwhile, Slovakia’s union of hauliers (UNAS) said on 29 November that truckers have decided to block the Vyšné Nemecké-Uzhhorod crossing from 1500hrs (local time) on 1 December until further notice. UNAS said the blockade will not undermine the transportation of humanitarian and military aid, livestock, fuel and refrigerated or fresh goods. However, commercial goods carried in trucks will be moved at a rate of four trucks per hour. The blockade on the Slovak-Ukrainian border will highly likely sustain supply chain disruption in the coming days and weeks.

FORECAST

SABOTAGE: Media reports emerged earlier on 30 November that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) carried out a bombing on the Baikal-Amur mainline in Russia’s far eastern republic of Buryatia overnight. Ukrainian media outlets, which cited sources in law enforcement agencies, claimed that this is a major railway line linking Russia to China. The outlets claimed that four explosive devices detonated as a freight train was moving through the Severomuysky Tunnel. Russia’s East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office confirmed a fire had taken place on this section of the railway, but did not mention Ukrainian involvement.

The SBU is yet to officially comment on the operation; its involvement is therefore unconfirmed. However, if confirmed, it underscores the SBU’s efforts to target vital infrastructure deep within Russia, including those that connect Russia to its close partner China. Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate (GUR) stated on 30 November that disruption on Russian railways is becoming more frequent. It said two facilities burned down on important sections of Russia’s railway over the past two days in Moscow oblast, and that train traffic on these sections was paralysed as a result of joint efforts with the ‘resistance movement’.

*Russia: Theft of military data highlights increased vulnerability to state-backed hacker groups. On 29 November, international media reported that a Ukrainian hacking group collaborated with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to target the Russian Labour Ministry. The hacker group (‘BLACKJACK’) gained access to the ministry’s server and downloaded 100 terabytes of data in this operation. This included statistics on the performance of Russian military operations in Ukraine and the personal information of Russian soldiers. The hackers also claimed to have obtained information on collaborators in leadership positions in Russian-occupied regions in Ukraine. This incident highlights the evolution of hybrid warfare tactics, with countries’ military and security services enlisting third parties (like hacktivists and hackers) for cyber operations, operating outside conventional rules of engagement. The use of hackers and hacktivists suggests that more countries are outsourcing specific skillsets to bolster their capabilities

*Finland-Russia: Irregular migration will continue in coming weeks despite border closures. On 28 November, Helsinki announced that it would close all its border crossings with Russia in response to an uptick in irregular migration, which is highly likely orchestrated by Moscow. The last remaining border crossing, Raja-Jooseppi, will be closed between 30 November and 13 December. As cargo rail traffic remains open, trade between the two countries will continue, though this has been severely dampened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo said the decision was made after ‘new information’ bolstered the government’s view that the migrants are being directed by Moscow. Nearly 1,000 migrants have attempted to enter Finland via its eastern border so far in November, compared to around 30 in an ordinary month. The tactic is highly likely Moscow’s retaliation for Finland’s expected defence deal with the US and accession to NATO. While the border crossings’ closure may serve as a deterrent, Russia will nevertheless likely continue to send migrants to the Finnish border over the coming weeks.

Nov 29.

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Geolocated footage posted on 28 November shows that Russian forces made limited progress in the industrial zone south-east of Avdiivka. On 29 November, a Russian milblogger stated that Russian troops progressed in this area over the past 24 hours. A prominent Russian milblogger said on the same day that Russian forces are consolidating their positions in the recently controlled areas of the industrial zone and are conducting demining operations in the sector. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 29 November that Ukrainian forces repelled 27 attacks in the Donetsk area over the past 24 hours, with heavy fighting ongoing near Avdiivka.
KHERSON: Russian sources reported on 28 November that Ukrainian forces are ‘firmly entrenched’ on the left bank of the Dnieper River, but are currently unable to expand their foothold. Ukrainian forces on 28 November continued to attack into the forested area south of Krynky, located 22 miles (36km) north-east of Kherson city, but Russian forces are reportedly containing these attacks. Other Russian sources have reported that in recent days additional Russian reinforcements have deployed to the region to support efforts to push the Ukrainian presence back. However, some Russian milbloggers continued to report extensive command and control issues, with the 1822nd Battalion, for example, allegedly not even knowing who their commanding officer was for a prolonged period.
KHERSON: Russian milbloggers also claim that certain mobilised units are being ordered to retake various islands in the Dnieper delta, despite extremely high casualty rates, as ‘punishment’. The recently installed commander of Russia’s Dnepr Grouping of Forces, Mikhail Teplinsky, is likely attempting to overcome legacy command and control issues, but these highly credible reports reflect entrenched issues within the Russian military that will continue to undermine morale and combat effectiveness.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 28 November that their forces counter-attacked and regained some limited positions near the Vremevsky salient on the border of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. While we cannot confirm this, Russian forces reportedly retook unspecified heights north of Staromaiorske, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). Meanwhile, further west, Ukrainian sources reported on 28 November that their forces had made progress west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast) in recent days, but we cannot confirm the extent of any Ukrainian advances at present.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 27 and 28 November indicates that Russian forces progressed north of Synkivka and west of Pershotravneve, located 5.6 miles (9km) and 12.4 miles (20km) north-east of Kupiansk, respectively. On 29 November, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces managed to gain a foothold in Synkivka, though he noted that Ukraine has transferred additional forces to defend the village. He also said that positional fighting is taking place between Ivanivka and Kyslivka, both located around 12 miles (20km) east of Kupiansk.
STRIKES: Overnight on 28-29 November, Russia launched 21 Shahed-136/131 drones and three Kh-59 cruise missiles. Ukraine’s air defences intercepted all the drones and two missiles. The drones targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In Khmelnytskyi oblast, local authorities reported that a building belonging to an agricultural enterprise was damaged. Information on the impact location of the missile, which was not intercepted, has not yet been provided. Meanwhile, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported that air defences shot down a Ukrainian drone approaching the capital earlier on 29 November.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SABOTAGE: On 28 November, Russian state-media reported that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented a series of ‘terrorist attacks’ in Tatarstan. A member of the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), a resident of the region’s capital (Kazan), had reportedly prepared them. The suspect allegedly admitted during interrogation that he planned to set fire to a military vehicle park at a tank school training ground. In May, the pro-Ukraine Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and LSR conducted a raid from Ukrainian territory into Belgorod oblast (Russia, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 23 May 2023). While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, it underscores that the LSR is seemingly able to prepare and co-ordinate attacks far removed from the border with Ukraine.
BORDERS: Slovakia’s hauliers’ union (UNAS) threatened on 27 November to block the Vyšné Nemecké-Uzhhorod crossing from 1 December – the only crossing on the shared border open to heavy trucks. No information was provided on how long the blockade would last if the move went ahead. UNAS’ chief Stanislav Skala said the organisation would wait until 30 November for a reaction from the transport ministry before deciding to block the crossing. Skala said a meeting of European transport ministers will take place in Brussels (Belgium) on 4 December. However, he said the prospect of a breakthrough is unlikely, which will sustain supply chain disruption in the coming weeks.
BORDERS: On 28 November, Helsinki announced that it will close all its border crossings with Russia in response to an uptick in irregular migration, which is highly likely orchestrated by Moscow. The last remaining border crossing, Raja-Jooseppi, will be closed between 30 November and 13 December. As cargo rail traffic remains open, trade between the two countries will continue, though this has been severely dampened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo said the decision was made after ‘new information’ bolstered the government’s view that the migrants are being directed by Moscow.
BORDERS: Nearly 1,000 migrants have attempted to enter Finland via its eastern border so far in November, compared to around 30 in an ordinary month. The tactic is highly likely Moscow’s retaliation for Finland’s expected defence deal with the US and accession to NATO. While the border closure may serve as a deterrent, Russia will nevertheless likely continue to send migrants to the Finnish border over the coming weeks.
ENERGY: The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) said on 28 November that a project to synchronise the Ukrainian state grid operator Ukrenergo to its counterparts in continental Europe has been completed. Ukrenergo’s CEO, Volodymyr Kudrytskiy, said this development will aid in significantly increasing the flexibility and reliability of the company’s grid operation and create conditions for expanding co-operation. It will also likely bolster Ukrainian and Moldovan energy security and resiliency, particularly as Russia will highly likely target Ukrainian energy infrastructure across the 2023-2024 winter months.
NEGOTIATIONS: On 28 November, an unspecified senior US State Department official assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not agree to a ceasefire before he knows the results of the 2024 US presidential elections. This opinion is reportedly widely shared among US government officials and also aligns with our own assessment that peace negotiations are highly unlikely for the foreseeable future – with the US elections a key pivot point for the war. Moscow highly likely hopes that Western resolve and support for Kyiv will wane in the coming months, particularly if a Ukraine-sceptic Republican candidate wins in the US. This attritional strategy likely aims to weaken Ukraine’s position before discussions to end the war eventually take place to extract the maximum possible concessions.

FORECAST

RUSSIA: On 29 November, Russian-state media reported that the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) is proposing to introduce a ‘loyalty agreement’ for foreign citizens entering the country. The measure allegedly aims to protect Russia’s national interests, though it is highly likely aimed at increasing the state’s control over the activities of foreign nationals once in Russia.

Foreign citizens would be prohibited from interfering with the activities of the Russian authorities, discrediting the country’s foreign and domestic policies, as well as Russian authorities and officials. Foreigners would also be restricted from diminishing or encouraging the rejection of ‘constitutionally significant moral values’, such as what Moscow considers to be ‘traditional family values’. It is unclear how the agreement would be enforced or what potential penalties would be for non-compliance. A Russian media outlet reported that it is assumed that foreigners will confirm that they understand the consequences of violating the rules by signing a document. It alleged that foreigners may realistically be required to pay the costs for possible deportation for non-compliance with the agreement, though this cannot be confirmed.

No specific date was provided on when the legislation would be sent to the lower house of Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, for consideration. However, if approved, it would highly likely further undermine the business environment in Russia, including deterring migrant workers and tourists. Last December, Russian media reported that organised tourism to Russia fell by more than 90% in 2022.

On 28 November, Russian-state media reported that the MVD has proposed to introduce a ‘controlled stay’ regime for illegal migrants. The measures would include a ban on the migrants’ ability to register legal entities and, as individual entrepreneurs, purchase and sell vehicles, drive a car and obtain a driver’s licence, open a bank account, among other restrictions. The proposal highly likely forms part of the Russian government’s efforts to coerce migrants into military service by restricting their economic and social rights.

Separately, on 28 November, media reports emerged indicating that the Russian government has issued a decree allowing the confiscation of passports of Russian citizens under a travel ban. The decree was issued on 22 November and will be effective from 11 December. Individuals subject to a travel ban will have five days to hand over their passports after the law comes into effect.

The Russian authorities can impose foreign travel bans on conscripts, individuals with access to classified information, convicts, suspects and defendants in criminal cases, malicious debtors and bankrupted individuals. Conscripts will reportedly be able to get back their passport upon completion of their military service. The decree will further complicate exit strategies for draft-eligible individuals and will deter draft-eligible Russians living abroad from returning to Russia. It will further limit labour flexibility.

*Russia: Passport confiscations will hinder exit strategies for individuals evading conscription. Media reports emerged on 28 November indicating that the Russian government has issued a decree allowing the confiscation of passports of Russian citizens under a travel ban. The decree was issued on 22 November and will be effective from 11 December. Individuals under a travel ban will have five days to hand over their passports after the law comes into effect. The decree expands on an existing law, which permits Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to impose a travel ban on individuals with access to classified information, convicts, suspects and defendants in criminal cases, malicious debtors, bankrupted individuals and conscripts. Conscripts will reportedly be able to get back their passport upon completion of their military service. The bill reflects Moscow’s wider efforts to curtail draft evasion and increasing repression of Russian citizens. The decree will further complicate exit strategies for draft-eligible individuals and will deter draft-eligible Russians living abroad from returning to Russia.

*Russia: Proposal to increase control over foreigners will further undermine business environment. On 29 November, Russian state media reported that the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry is proposing to introduce a ‘loyalty agreement’ for foreign citizens entering the country. Foreign citizens would be prohibited from interfering with the activities of the Russian authorities, or discrediting the country’s foreign and domestic policies, as well as the Russian authorities and officials. Foreigners would also be restricted from diminishing or encouraging the rejection of ‘constitutionally significant moral values’, such as what Moscow considers to be ‘traditional family values’. No specific date was provided on when the legislation would be sent to the lower house of Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, for consideration. It is unclear how the agreement would be enforced or what potential penalties would be for non-compliance. The agreement almost certainly seeks to increase state control over the activities of foreign nationals once in the country. If approved, it would highly likely further undermine the business environment in Russia, including deterring migrant workers and tourists.

Nov 28.

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: On 27 November, Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun said that Russian forces’ assaults consist of ten to 20 combatants in the Avdiivka sector. Previously, Russian assault groups included up to ten fighters, according to the Ukrainian official. Shtupun stated that Russian forces have been launching attacks from six directions, with heavy fighting ongoing near the Avdiivka Coke Plant in north-eastern Avdiivka. He also said that Russian forces have limited their use of first-person view (FPV) drones due to deteriorating weather conditions but continue to carry out airstrikes. On 27 November, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops captured the entire industrial zone south-east of Avdiivka and have reached Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts. However, such claims have not yet been visually corroborated. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed earlier on 28 November that Russian troops advanced near a petrol station located around one mile (1.5km) east of the Avdiivka Coke Plant. According to the milblogger, Ukraine has deployed troops to the Avdiivka sector from other fronts. Nevertheless, these statements remain unverified.
DONETSK: On 28 November, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that since the beginning of October, Russian forces have moved the frontline up to 1.2 miles (2km) in the Avdiivka sector. According to the UK DI, this advance represents the largest gains since Spring 2023, though such advances have been obtained with significant equipment and personnel losses. The UK DI assessed that although Russian forces are getting closer to the Avdiivka Coke Plant, Ukrainian forces still hold defensive positions in this part of the Avdiivka sector. More broadly, Ukrainian troops still retain control of the corridor of territory around 4.3 miles (7km) wide, through which Avdiivka continues to be supplied.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to attack and counter-attack across the southern frontline in Zaporizhzhia oblast, with indications of marginal gains for both sides in recent days. Russian forces have reportedly retaken some minor positions during counter-attacks near Verbove, located six miles (10km) east of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast), over the last 48 hours. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 26 November indicates Ukrainian forces have taken some limited ground south of Robotyne. Overall, however, the pace of advances remains very slow for both sides, with poor weather conditions limiting offensive opportunities.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
STRIKES: Early on 28 November, Ukraine’s air defences intercepted one Shahed-136/131 drone and one Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone launched by Russia. Falling drone debris reportedly damaged residential buildings in Khmelnytskyi oblast. On the same day, a Russian Iskandr ballistic missile struck the building of an enterprise in Zaporizhzhia, killing one person, according to local authorities. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that an unidentified missile hit the city of Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) overnight on 27-28 November; details on the extent of the damage caused by the missile have yet to be provided.
STRIKES: On 27 November, Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson, Yuriy Ihnat, said that Russia will increasingly rely on drone attacks for its coming winter strike campaign. Ihnat said that drone attacks will be more frequent than missile strikes, which is likely due to Russia’s inability to replenish missile stocks to winter 2022-2023 levels. The unprecedented drone attack launched overnight on 24-25 November likely reflects Moscow’s growing domestic drone production capabilities, as well as ongoing military-industrial co-operation with Iran.
STRIKES: On 27 November, Russian media outlets reported that the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) ordered a batch of ten kamikaze sea drones from the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant (KMZ). According to KMZ head Mikhail Danilenko, Russia will receive the drones by the end of 2023. Ukraine has been increasingly using maritime drones for its attacks against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF). The reported order follows Zelensky’s announcement earlier this week that Ukraine will receive unspecified surface warships from its Western partners to protect its waters. As such, Russia is likely ramping up efforts to mirror Ukrainian sea drone attacks, which will likely increase security threats in the Black Sea, in particular for civilian commercial vessels transiting to and from Ukrainian Black Sea ports.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

ESPIONAGE: According to Ukrainska Pravda, the wife of the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Marianna Budanova is suspected to have been poisoned. While this cannot be confirmed, Ukrainian outlets have reported that ‘sources’ within Ukrainian intelligence and recent tests have confirmed she was poisoned, likely by ‘heavy metals’ via her food. She has undergone her first phase of treatment and is alive. Her husband, Kyrylo Budanov, has previously reported that he had survived more than a dozen attempts on his own life. Budanov has also disclosed previously that he lives with his wife in his office, and so it remains unclear whether Marianna and/or her husband were the intended targets. Russian intelligence services, particularly military intelligence (GRU), have frequently conducted poisonings abroad. While we cannot confirm this latest incident, it remains highly credible given established Russian modus operandi and Budanov’s central role in Kyiv’s war effort.
AID: US House Speaker Mike Johnson stated on 27 November that he is confident that Congress will be able to secure additional funding for both Israel and Ukraine. Johnson has previously insisted that funding for Israel and Ukraine be separated and that other key priorities, including funding southern border policies, need to be addressed first. Meanwhile, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s office confirmed that they have dispatched a delegation to meet senior Republican party leadership in the US as part of this effort to release further funding. Johnson’s recent comments indicate a slight change in tone that could provide the Biden administration with an opportunity to push through a vote on Ukraine military aid worth over USD 100 bn in the next couple of weeks. Otherwise, any new funding will likely be delayed until late January 2024.
INTERNET: On 28 November the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation unveiled a new interactive map of the capital, Kyiv, that allows users to identify internet providers and locations that will stay online even in the event of blackouts. The new map (here) will allow users to check their providers’ readiness for power outages and apply to use the internet in the event of a blackout. Aimed at improving resiliency throughout the winter, the new map is planned to scale to include other major Ukrainian cities in the future, and will improve business resiliency in the event of prolonged blackouts when (and if) Russia begins its intensive strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the winter.
BORDERS: On 27 November, Polish truck drivers and farmers confirmed they will continue a partial blockade of the Medyka-Shehyni border checkpoint. This is the fourth border crossing to be blocked since 6 November. Protests are ongoing at the Yahodyn-Dorohusk, Rava-Ruska-Hrebenne and Krakivets-Korczowa crossings. A survey of retail businesses conducted by Interfax-Ukraine found that the blockade risks increasing the price of various imported goods such as alcohol, confectionery and food. In Poland, ongoing efforts by the current ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party to form a new, viable government mean solving the issue is not a priority. Nonetheless, Poland’s Infrastructure Minister has appealed to Ukraine to exempt EU vehicles without cargo from the electronic queue system at two border crossings. The blockades are likely to persist in the coming days and will possibly continue in the near term.

FORECAST

CONSCRIPTION: The Guardian provided further details on 27 November of the Ukrainian government’s planned changes to conscription, which are due to be announced in full later this week. According to cited Ukrainian officials, the military will leverage two major commercial recruitment companies to undertake targeted conscription to provide much-needed personnel for the war effort. While the precise role these companies will play in the conscription process remains unclear, contracts with two major companies have reportedly been signed. The new policy aims at countering ongoing draft dodging and inefficiencies within the existing conscription system. Specifically, the new campaign will aim to dissuade skilled patriotic Ukrainians from dodging the draft by reassuring them that they will be assigned roles according to their skills, rather than used as frontline infantry.

Amid high casualty rates during this year’s counter-offensive and ongoing draft dodging schemes, Ukraine is struggling to match the number of personnel fielded by Russia as this attritional war continues. As such, stricter rules are set to be introduced throughout 2024, alongside this week’s expected announcement.

Kyiv is also considering other conscription reforms which will begin to close loopholes that have allowed military-aged men to evade recruiters up until now. Senior Ukrainian officials have previously proposed amendments to existing laws that would abolish the deferral of mobilisation for students who are studying a second degree and tightening exemptions for individuals who care for a disabled family member. There are also proposals to begin expanding mobilisation to offset shortages in critical industries. While this is unlikely to be introduced in the short term, such policies will become increasingly likely in 2024 as labour shortages have ever more serious impacts on Ukraine’s military-industrial capacity.

*Ukraine-Poland: Partial blockade of fourth border crossing will exacerbate supply chain disruption. On 27 November, Polish truck drivers and farmers confirmed they will continue a partial blockade of the Medyka-Shehyni border checkpoint. This is the fourth border crossing to be blocked since 6 November. Protests are ongoing at the Yahodyn-Dorohusk, Rava-Ruska-Hrebenne and Krakivets-Korczowa crossings. The border blockade is causing notable supply chain disruption, despite exemptions for humanitarian and military aid deliveries. A survey of retail businesses conducted by Interfax-Ukraine found that the blockade risks increasing the price of various imported goods such as alcohol, confectionery and food. In Poland, ongoing efforts by the current ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party to gain support in the Sejm (Parliament) for a new government mean solving the issue is not a priority. Nonetheless, Poland’s Infrastructure Minister has appealed to Ukraine to exempt EU vehicles without cargo from the electronic queue system at two border crossings. The blockades are likely to persist in the coming days and will possibly continue in the near term. Supply chain risks are sustained.

Nov 27.

BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces last week made some modest but confirmed gains north of Klishchiivka, a key village located four miles (7km) south-east of Bakhmut. Russian sources have also claimed in recent days that their forces have advanced at other points of the Bakhmut line, but this remains unconfirmed. Heavy fighting remains ongoing along the railway line that runs south of Bakhmut via Klishchiivka, and despite recent Russian advances, Russian sources reported on 26 November that Ukrainian forces still control ‘key heights’ around the village.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 26 November indicates that Russian forces made marginal progress north-west of Kranohorivka, around four miles (7km) north-west of Avdiivka. Additional geolocated footage posted on 26 November shows that Russian troops are using armoured vehicles in their assaults in the industrial area on Avdiivka’s south-eastern outskirts. On 27 November, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Russian forces have stepped up the pace of attacks in the Avdiivka sector, where Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled 30 assaults over the past 24 hours.
KHERSON: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to launch offensive and counter-offensive operations across the southern Zaporizhzhia oblast frontline, with both sides making marginal advances at various points. Geolocated footage from 24 November confirmed that Russian airborne VDV units have retaken some positions north of Verbove, located around six miles (10km) east of Robotyne. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have taken additional trench lines west of Robotyne. However, over the weekend of 25-26 November, there was no confirmation of any further advances by either side amid poor weather conditions.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 26 November, the spokesperson for Ukrainian Ground Forces, Volodymyr Fityo, said that Russian forces maintain their objective to take control of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Fityo said that in attempts to advance towards Kupiansk, Russian forces aim to reach the borders of Synkivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk, where they have reportedly intensified the use of loitering munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones. The official also explained that Russian forces are probing Ukrainian defences in the sector to find the weak points to break into. Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 26 November indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced south-west of Pershotravneve, 15 miles (24km) east of Kupiansk.
STRIKES: Overnight on 24-25 November, Russia launched 75 Shahed-136/131 drones against Ukraine, the largest drone strike since the beginning of the invasion, according to Kyiv. 66 drones targeted the capital, Kyiv; the remaining projectiles targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Russia also launched a Kh-59 cruise missile, which was reportedly intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that the strike was launched on Ukraine’s remembrance day of the 1932-33 Holodomor famine – underscoring the importance of symbolic anniversaries to Russian war planning. Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy said that many drones targeted Kyiv’s power infrastructure. Ukraine’s air defences reportedly destroyed 74 drones. The unprecedented scale of the attacks likely underscores Moscow’s plan to overwhelm Ukraine’s defences. Overnight on 25-26 November, Russia subsequently launched nine Shahed-136/131 drones, of which Ukrainian air defences intercepted eight.
STRIKES: Following Russia’s massive drone attack, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat said that the Russian-launched Shahed drones were coloured in black and had a material that absorbs radar signals. Such new modifications are part of Russia’s ongoing efforts to make drones more difficult to detect by radars, alongside wider experimentation with new tactics and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s drone interception rate in the latest attacks remained very high, underscoring the improved air defences, particularly around the capital.
STRIKES: On 26 November, Ukraine reportedly launched 35 drones against five Russian regions, including Bryansk, Kaluga, Moscow, Smolensk and Tula oblasts. We had previously assessed that Ukraine was highly likely to launch its own drone attacks in response to any large-scale Russian attack this winter. An unnamed Ukrainian military intelligence source quoted by Ukrainska Pravda said the Ukrainian strikes targeted military facilities and defence production infrastructure. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) said that air defences in Moscow intercepted 24 Ukrainian drones. Nevertheless, Moscow’s Vnukovo (VKO) and Domodedovo (DME) airports temporarily suspended arrivals and departures in the aftermath of the attacks. On 27 November, Russia’s MoD also reported that two drones were shot down over Rostov and Smolensk oblasts.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

ENERGY: On 26-27 November, a severe storm hit the Black Sea region and Ukraine, with heavy rain, strong winds and snowfall causing flooding, power outages and widespread travel disruption. Occupied Crimea has been particularly badly affected, with an estimated 500,000 people without electricity on the peninsula. Meanwhile, flooding and snowfall resulted in the closure of major roads in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, while trucks were temporarily prohibited from entering the capital, Kyiv, due to heavy snowfall. Meanwhile, an apparent Russian ‘attack’ some 60 miles (100km) north of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on 26 November resulted in the plant losing connection via its sole off-site power line. The plant is now relying on a back-up power line to maintain safety procedures, and it remains unclear when the main line will be restored. While this underscores enduring nuclear safety concerns at the plant, it remains highly unlikely that the ongoing power outages will cause a major nuclear incident at the plant.
INFIGHTING: Speculative reports continue to emerge that tensions are growing between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi. On 26 November, Mariana Bezuhla, a member of Zelensky’s ruling Servant of the People party, called for Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal, though the party itself does not endorse her words. She also claims that Zaluzhnyi has not provided a plan for Ukraine’s armed forces for next year, though this cannot be confirmed. Zelensky confirmed on 24 November that he had ordered Zaluzhnyi, together with defence minister Rustam Umyerov, to develop a comprehensive plan for the mobilisation of the military by this week.
INFIGHTING: Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council Oleksiy Danilov claimed earlier on 27 November that Russian intelligence has activated a network of spies inside Ukraine with the express aim of ‘driving a wedge between the political and military leadership of Ukraine’. It currently remains unclear to what extent civil-military relations are strained in Ukraine. However, the effective failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive to achieve major strategic territorial gains this year has highly likely strained relations given the need to formulate a new strategy for the war in 2024 amid the increasingly uncertain long-term level of support Ukraine can rely upon from its Western partners.

FORECAST NEGOTIATIONS: The German newspaper Bild reported on 24 November that Berlin and Washington DC are co-ordinating on a plan to put Ukraine in the strongest strategic position to enter into negotiations with Russia to end the war. The paper claimed that German federal officials stated that Ukraine cannot continue the war without the continued support of its two principal military aid providers – the US and Germany – and that negotiations to end the war will need to take place at some point.

Such comments cannot be confirmed. The US has also reiterated in recent days that it will continue to support Ukraine’s military to win the war, and maintains that it is for Kyiv to decide when and/or if it enters into negotiations. Nevertheless, if Western support for Ukraine begins to dry up, as remains a realistic possibility following the 2024 US presidential election, pressure will likely increase on President Zelensky to enter into negotiations.

Even if Zelensky does seek to enter into negotiations (as currently remains highly unlikely), it also remains unlikely that Russia would seriously want to agree to end the war at that point. If Western aid begins to decline, such a state of affairs would increase the likelihood of Russian forces gaining an upper hand on the battlefield. All wars ultimately end in some form of negotiated settlement but despite speculation such as in the Bild report that Western pressure on Ukraine will increase, current military and political conditions mean neither side is seriously likely to begin talks over the next three to six months. For further analysis on peace negotiations, please see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly: Scenarios and Forecasts – 23 November 2023.

*US: Upcoming vote on Ukraine aid increases pressure on Senate, poses policy stagnation risks. On 26 November, US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer announced plans to hold a vote on President Joe Biden’s request for billionns of dollars in assistance to Ukraine and Israel as soon as next week (beginning 4 December). The announcement puts pressure on lawmakers to negotiate a deal quickly. Negotiations for this aid have been previously stalled by Senate Republicans that want to couple enhanced border security provisions with any new supplemental military aid bill. Senate Republicans have suggested that border security inclusions would enable the defence aid bill to pass in the House, where the Republican majority is reluctant to fund Ukraine. The hastened timeline underscores increased partisanship in Congress, heightening policy stagnation risks in the short-to-medium term. However, given the increased threats these conflicts pose to US interests abroad, it is likely that a bipartisan compromise will be reached within the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

01 Dec 23. Germany seeks to reduce amount it gives to €20bn EU fund for Ukraine, leaked document reveals.

Paper sparks fears that Olaf Scholz, the chancellor, could scupper future EU attempts to support Kyiv’s fight against the Russian invasion

Germany is seeking to reduce the amount it gives to a €20billion European Union fund for weapons for Ukraine, a document leaked to The Daily Telegraph on Friday revealed.

In a confidential “non-paper”, Berlin argues that the European Peace Facility (EPF) should take into account the billions in military aid it has donated to Kyiv bilaterally.

The EPF has provided €4.5 billion worth of weapons to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion last February and drilled 34,000 Ukrainian troops as part of an EU training mission.

The German document, a non-binding positional paper, has sparked fears among European capitals that chancellor Olaf Scholz could scupper future attempts by the EU to support Ukraine’s fight against the Russian invasion.

In a separate paper seen by The Daily Telegraph, France argues that the EPF should halt the supply of weapons from member states’ stockpiles and instead concentrate on “common procurement” of military aid from European arms manufacturers.

The French have previously been accused of slowing down EU efforts to deliver one million artillery shells to Ukraine by demanding that only companies based in the bloc benefit from the scheme.

Until now, Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian prime minister, had been the sole opponent to the creation of a €20billion war chest for weapons supplies to Kyiv.

Direct deliveries of military equipment

In its paper, Berlin says: “Military support for Ukraine can be provided either through financial contributions to the Ukraine envelope in the EPF or as direct deliveries of military equipment to Ukraine.”

The document adds that “in kind contributions” should be “fully credited against a member state’s agreed contributions to the Ukraine envelope”.

The wording has raised concerns that Germany could insist on writing off bilateral contributions to Kyiv from the EPF.

Berlin is the EU’s largest economy and contributes a quarter of funds to the EPF.

Last month, it announced it would double its military aid to Ukraine in 2024, signing off on an €8 billion package.

But Germany has often complained the bloc’s member states are abusing the EPF scheme to send old weapons to Ukraine and use reimbursements to modernise their militaries.

It has rejected a European Commission request for €100 billion to top up the EU’s common budget, which is funded by member states.

Half of the cash would be set aside for supporting Ukraine over the next four years, while the other €50 billion would be used to repay common debt, as well as for migration spending and increased salaries for EU officials.

Limit on public spending

Mr Scholz has told EU counterparts that he is fully committed to funding for Ukraine but a recent ruling by Germany’s powerful constitutional court has made additional spending commitments hard to meet.

The court in Karlsruhe ruled that his government had breached a constitutional “debt brake”, which places a limit on public spending.

EU leaders will discuss the overhaul of the EPF when they meet in Brussels later this month for their final European Council summit of the year.

Josep Borrell, the EU’s top diplomat, created the €20billion pot to purchase weapons for Ukraine over the next four years as part of a longer-term strategy to support the war-torn country.

But several European capitals are attempting to place significant restrictions on the fund ahead of the talks.

Hungary, seen as Russia’s closest ally in Europe, has suggested “voluntary contributions” to the EPF, to distance itself from the project. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

01 Dec 23. Rheinmetall to produce first armored vehicles in Ukraine in 2024 -report. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall AG (RHMG.DE) wants to build its first armored vehicles in Ukraine next year, Chief Executive Armin Papperger was cited as saying by German magazine WirtschaftsWoche.

Papperger said he expected a deal with Ukraine on the construction of Fuchs armored transport vehicles – named after the German word for fox – and Lynx infantry fighting vehicles by early next year.

“After the contract is signed, we want to have finished the first (Fuchs) within six-seven months, and the first Lynx within 12-13 months,” he was quoted as saying.

Ukraine had announced in October a joint defence venture with Rheinmetall AG to help with the local production of some key equipment as well as to service and repair Western weapons sent to Kyiv against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Ukraine relies heavily on financial and military support from the West, which has poured in tens of billions of dollars of weapons since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. Germany is a key ally.

Ukrainian officials hope cooperation with Western arms producers can help revive a domestic arms industry plagued by inefficiency and lack of transparency for years before Russia’s invasion.

Kyiv also wants to try to reduce its reliance on Western aid, create an additional boost for the economy and speed up ammunition supplies to the front to support its counteroffensive against a bigger Russian army. (Source: Reuters)

01 Dec 23. Russian Students Asked to Donate Vapes for Parts to Make Drones. College students in Russia are being asked to turn in their vaping pens so their components can be used to make more combat drones, Russian independent publication Novaya Gazeta Europe has reported.

The University of Samara in southwestern Russia is organizing the initiative to help the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

A so-called “Falcon” patriotic military club put collection boxes around the campus and distributed flyers that said,

“1 e-cigarette = 1 drone attack on the enemy!”

According to the volunteer group, the microcircuits and batteries in the pens can be repurposed to operate ammunition release systems on kamikaze drones.

The military-patriotic club “Falcon” – the organizer of the action – was created on the basis of the military department of Samara University in 2008. It follows from the order that the goal of the club is the patriotic education of students. After the club was transformed into a military-patriotic association, it included five more clubs of a similar orientation, including “Volunteers in Uniform.”

In addition to lessons in courage and patriotic education, the club collects humanitarian aid for the Russian army. This time, volunteers managed to collect 214 electronic cigarettes, 5 batteries, 4 heating systems for sticks and 1 power bank with wireless charging function.

The collection drive started after some of its members were approached by “people involved in the special military operation” against Ukraine.

Apart from vaping pens, the group previously collected broken mobile phones, camping stoves, and clothing for Russian soldiers on the frontline.

Not the First Time

The collection of e-cigarettes to aid the development of loitering munitions has been done before in Ukraine.

Earlier this year, students at the Chernivtsi Polytechnic College in southwestern Ukraine set up a similar scheme to make drop mechanisms for drones.

They were also reportedly approached by Chernivtsi college graduates who are now deployed on the frontline against Russia.

In addition to drop mechanisms, the e-cigarette components were used to make power banks for Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield.

More than 30 vape batteries are needed to create one powerbank that can last about 10 days, according to a report by the Kyiv Post.

Effects of Sanctions?

Russia’s move to collect vapes to make combat drones can be seen as a clear effect of the international sanctions imposed on the European nation.

A US defense official previously said that the sanctions were already biting into Russia’s arms industry, making it hard for the invading country to resupply its troops.

Among the sanctions imposed, the embargo on electronic components is reportedly one of the most difficult for Moscow since it has launched so many precision-guided missiles since the invasion began in February 2022.

(Source: UAS VISION/Novaya Gazeta Europe; Defense Post)

01 Dec 23. Counteroffensive ‘didn’t achieve desired results,’ Zelensky admits. Ukraine’s counteroffensive did not achieve its “desired results,” Volodymr Zelensky has said, as he admitted they wanted “faster results”.

The Ukrainian president told the Associated Press: “We wanted faster results. From that perspective, unfortunately, we did not achieve the desired results. And this is a fact.”

Ukraine did not get all the weapons it needed from allies, he said, and limits in the size of [our] military force precluded a quick advance, he said.

“There is not enough power to achieve the desired results faster. But this does not mean that we should give up, that we have to surrender,” Mr Zelensky said. “We are confident in our actions. We fight for what is ours.”

He added that he was “satisfied” and said Ukraine was “not backing down”.

Elsewhere in the interview, he admitted that “only the blind” cannot see the consequences of international attention shifting because of the tragedy in the Middle East, adding that Ukraine had to “fight for attention”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

30 Nov 23. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy calls for fortifications in key frontline areas. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called for faster construction of fortifications in key sectors under pressure from Russian forces, particularly in eastern Ukraine, the focal point of Moscow’s advances 21 months into its invasion.

Zelenskiy issued his appeal after touring Ukrainian positions in the northeast, one of several areas where Russian forces have been trying to make recent headway – and recapture areas taken back by Ukrainian troops a year ago. He said one of the meetings he held with commanders dealt with fortifications.

“In all major sectors where reinforcement is needed, there should be a boost and an acceleration in the construction of structures,” Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address.

“This of course means the greatest attention to the Avdiivka, Maryinka and other sectors in Donetsk region. In Kharkiv region, this means the Kupiansk sector and the Kupiansk-Lyman line.”

Russia has made slow progress in trying to secure all of the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, but has boosted attacks in several areas. These include Kupiansk near Kharkiv, retaken by Ukraine in a drive through the northeast a year ago.

Russian occupying forces have built solid fortifications and minefields of their own in areas they have held since pouring over the border in February 2022.

Those defences have been a key factor in holding back a Ukrainian counteroffensive under way since June. Ukrainian troops have made only incremental gains in the east and south.

Russian forces have focused attention since mid-October on the devastated town of Avdiivka, known for its vast coking plant and its position as a gateway to the Russian-held regional centre of Donetsk, 20 km (12 miles) to the east.

Military spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun said Ukrainian forces had rebuffed Russian attacks on the coking plant.

“The plant is under our control. The enemy is suffering significant losses there,” Shtupun told Espreso TV, noting Russian artillery and air attacks inside and around the town.

“The Russians are actively pressing ground attacks, sometimes using armoured vehicles.”

Reuters could not verify accounts of fighting from either side.

Avdiivka was briefly seized by Russian-financed separatists who took control of larges stretches of eastern Ukraine in 2014. It has held out since thanks to a considerable extent to fortifications put in place by its Ukrainian defenders.

RUSSIAN DRIVE AROUND BAKHMUT

Russian forces have also been pressing near contested villages surrounding the equally shattered town of Bakhmut, captured by Russian forces in May after months of fighting.

Russia’s Defence Ministry on Wednesday announced the capture of Khromove, one such village, but unofficial Ukrainian accounts dispute that claim.

The office of Ukraine’s general prosecutor said a Russian attack on the city of Toretsk, south of Bakhmut, had killed one person. Three others were pulled alive from underneath the rubble of a house.

Initial investigation showed Russian forces had dropped two bombs, in the second assault on the town throughout the day.

Ukrainian military analyst Serhiy Hrabskyi said the Russians sought to capitalise on their capture of Bakhmut to advance on at least three cities to the west.

“It is crucial for the enemy to develop things in tactical terms with an eye to possibly advancing on Kostyantynivka, as well as Sloviansk and Kramatorsk,” Hrabskyi told Radio NV. (Source: Reuters)

30 Nov 23. Ukraine’s new long-range rocket delivery from US pushed to next year. Ukraine will need to wait until next year before it receives its first big shipment of rocket-propelled bombs the U.S. has adapted to strike at a nearly 100-mile (160km) range, according to the Pentagon and people familiar with the timing.

When the U.S. was first approached by Boeing (BA.N) to buy and ship the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) to Ukraine last fall, the most optimistic timeline for shipping was around spring of this year, according to a document seen by Reuters at that time. It was reported by Politico in February that delivery wouldn’t take place until later in 2023.

Ukraine needs GLSDB to augment the limited number of 100-mile range ATACMS rockets the U.S. has sent. It will allow Ukraine’s military to hit targets at twice the distance reachable by the rockets it now fires from the U.S.-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and force Russia to move its supplies even farther from the front lines.

People familiar with current timing say delivery to the U.S. by Boeing, the prime contractor for the GLSDB, will take place in late December – followed by several months of testing before onward shipment to Ukraine.

A Pentagon spokesman said “we anticipate providing this key capability in the early 2024 timeframe after successful verification,” another term for testing.

Because the contract to begin production of GLSDB was signed in March, according to a Pentagon statement to Reuters, delivery was forced towards year-end. Production required government furnished materials, so contract signing constrained its start.

The decision to send the long-range rocket, something the U.S. government hasn’t purchased for itself, followed a proposal last summer from Boeing Co (BA.N) to U.S. commanders in Europe managing weapons for Ukraine.

Boeing did not respond to a request for comment.

Although Russia said in March it had shot down a GLSDB, the U.S. has not supplied any of the smart bombs to Ukraine, a U.S. official and a person familiar with the matter said. Reuters could not determine if another country supplied Kyiv with the weapon.

GLSDB is made jointly by Sweden’s SAAB AB (SAABb.ST) and Boeing Co (BA.N). It is GPS-guided, can defeat some electronic jamming, is usable in all weather conditions, and can be used against armored vehicles, according to SAAB’s website. (Source: Reuters)

30 Nov 23. Lithuania to Share Experience in Procurement Transparency and Anti-Corruption with Ukraine. On November 29 Minister of National Defence Arvydas Anušauskas had a meeting with Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine Yuryj Dzhygyr who is on a visit in Lithuania. The officials focused particularly on transparency of procurement and anti-corruption measures which is one of the key issues on the agenda of the present Minister of Defence Rustem Umerov.

“We value and support Ukraine’s effort in implementing the defence reform regardless of the war. Lithuania will be sharing expertise with Ukraine on transparent procurement procedure development and supervision. We will transfer to Ukraine our best practices, the scratch we began with, the legislation, methods of ensuring transparency of procurements and corruption prevention,” said A. Anušauskas.

Minister assured the guest of high prioritization of MoD assistance to Ukraine and briefed him on the updated concept of the demining coalition for Ukraine assembled by Lithuania. The concept encompasses assistance in military and humanitarian min clearance efforts. There are 22 nations that have expressed interest in joining the coalition so far.

Wednesday Y. Dzhygyr met with Vice Minister of National Defence Greta Monika Tučkute. They discussed Lithuanian-Ukrainian cooperation options in defence industry research and development. Lithuania aims to benefit from Ukraine’s experience in innovation.

Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine is in Lithuania on November 29 through 30 to attend high-level Conference “EU Vision and Level of Ambition in the Eastern Partnership Policy Security and Defence Agenda”. The conference has been hosted by the Ministry of National Defence for a decade to facilitate engagement of the Eastern Partners in the EU Common Security and Defence Agenda. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Lithuania Ministry of Defence;)

30 Nov 23. Russian Troops Call Ukrainian Vampire Bomber Drone the ‘Baba Yaga,’ After a Mythical Evil Creature. Ukraine says its Vampire bomber drones are becoming such a nightmare for Russia that they’ve earned a menacing nickname among its troops.

The fast, hard-to-detect drone has apparently earned a reputation during its nighttime raids, with Russian forces calling it “Baba Yaga,” an evil witch from Slavic folklore. Ukraine says the capabilities of the bomber drone allow them to fly close to Russian tanks and armor at night before hitting them with major explosives.

On Tuesday, the defense ministry of Ukraine shared a video of the Vampire drone from United24, a Ukrainian government-run crowdfunding and digital-media site, calling the unmanned aerial vehicle “the Russian’s nightmare.”

The short video focuses on a specific drone unit, Unit Code 9.2, outside Bakhmut, explaining that the operators use DJI Mavic drones — small UAVs that Ukraine has been using in combat, sometimes crudely attaching explosives to them — during the day.

But at night, it’s time for the Vampires to fly,” the video says.

These UAVs can fly fast — usually about 23 meters a second — and carry hefty explosive payloads to enemy targets.

“With a capacity of carrying up to 15kg and a flight distance of up to 10km, this drone has become a true nightmare for the Russians,” the video narration says.

Part of the appeal of the Vampire, Ukraine says, is its thermal imaging, which allows operators to identify and target enemies at nighttime. Some other UAVs also have thermal-imaging capabilities, but the ability to fly during both day and night with a heavy explosive payload makes the Vampire a valuable asset.

The Vampire drones, which are domestically produced, have been used to drop various types of munitions on Russian enemies, most often targeting tanks. They also wrecked a Russian warehouse near Bakhmut back in August and have proven effective at avoiding Russian jamming, which has become so prevalent on the front lines.

Back in August, Mykhailo Fedorov, the vice prime minister of Ukraine for innovation, education, science, and technology, posted a video showing off a room full of Vampire drones. He said 270 of the UAVs would be headed to the front lines “to back up our Ukrainian soldiers during the counteroffensive.”

Fedorov had previously shared footage in June of what he said was a Vampire drone delivering humanitarian aid to people on the Russian-occupied southern bank of the Dnipro River. (Source: UAS VISION/Business Insider)

30 Nov 23. Facing failure, Estonia pushes EU ammunition target for Ukraine. The European Union’s sluggish progress in drastically increasing ammunition supplies to Ukraine has Baltic nation Estonia nervous about some member nations’ internal politics getting in the way, according to a senior Estonian defense official.

“On our part, we are constantly pushing different nations to not give up because the timeline of deliveries is next March, so we still have a couple of months ahead of us to either fully reach it or at least get as close to it as possible,” Tuuli Duneton, undersecretary for defense policy said, told Defense News in an interview.

“I wouldn’t say I am entirely pessimistic about the EU target, but a lot remains to be done,” she added.

Estonia was a key initiator last spring of an EU plan to jointly deliver 1m rounds of ammunition to Ukraine by March 2024.

Duneton’s comments came after Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called on Kyiv’s backers to ensure that the country has enough 155mm artillery shells to repel invading Russian forces, with companies synced to execute substantial production increases.

For now, the number of shells delivered is 300,000, according to Kuleba.

“We need to create a Euro-Atlantic common area of defense industries,” he said ahead of a meeting with his NATO counterparts in Brussels this week.

In Tallinn’s view, the diagnosis of what went wrong so far in producing the envisioned amount is more complicated than EU leaders’ initial reaction of pointing the finger at industry.

“Altogether, European nations have not in previous years placed significant orders for 155mm ammunition, and all of a sudden there is a need to put peak orders on the market right away,” Duneton said. “Simultaneously, many bigger states, the same who are struggling to fulfill NATO’s 2%, are scrambling to achieve that target while facing their own domestic issues.”

A contributing factor is the secrecy with which some governments treat Ukraine support and related domestic production increases, which makes to difficult to compare notes among member nations.

“One of the big things we struggle with in Europe, is there is little visibility on what have been the bigger orders from different nations’ to their defense industry and what they are doing. A majority of nations do not share the information,” she said.

The overall vagueness could also be due to political hedging, Duneton added, without wanting to name specific countries. “A possibility could be that they haven’t put any orders into the pipelines, in which case we must ask: Are they really willing to finance those orders? Industry cannot extend its production infinitely if they do not see orders coming in.”

The outcome of Ukraine’s defense is considered existential for Estonia, as officials there believe a victorious Moscow could target the Baltics next, Duneton said.

“It is possible that this threat perception is not as widely shared by all, as of course it always depends on where one is geographically located, but from our perspective, we need to pull all the stops to make Ukraine win,” she said. (Source: Defense News)

30 Nov 23. Ukraine Security Assistance Strengthens Nation’s Defense Industrial Base. Since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine last year, the United States has remained committed to providing the Ukrainian armed forces with the equipment and security assistance needed to fight off Russian invaders and secure their nation’s sovereignty.

In the U.S., support for Ukraine has mobilized the defense industrial base in ways that haven’t been seen in decades. Industry partners across the DIB have stepped up to meet that mobilization by manufacturing the equipment and providing the capabilities needed to support U.S. commitments.

Since the Feb. 24, 2022, Russian invasion, the U.S. has committed approximately $44bn in security assistance to Ukraine. Assistance has been provided through either presidential drawdown authority, where equipment is pulled from the military’s inventory and sent overseas, or through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, where the government contracts directly with industry to send new equipment to Ukraine once it’s ready.

When capability is pulled from existing U.S. inventory, it must be replaced to ensure U.S. military units maintain their own readiness. As of mid-November, the department has obligated nearly $17bn toward purchasing replacements for the equipment that was sent to Ukraine from U.S. stocks.

At the same time defense contractors are busy building new equipment to replace what has been sent overseas, they’re also manufacturing new capabilities to fulfill the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative orders. DOD has obligated more than $10bn in funds though that initiative.

Coast-to-coast, the Defense Department’s more than $27bn in obligations for PDA replenishment and USAI orders are directly impacting prime vendors and critical suppliers in 37 states.

“Across the board, the response of our U.S. industrial base to meet Ukraine’s defense needs has been truly historic,” said William LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. “It’s been a nationwide effort that spans the full spectrum of our supply chains in nearly every capability area. While there’s no question we still have significant work ahead of us to fully rebuild a modern defense industrial ecosystem, we should not lose sight of what we’ve been able to achieve together with our partners in industry over the past 21 months.”

At the same time the department is purchasing equipment from the defense industrial base, it’s also helping the DIB expand its capacity to produce the most important defense capabilities.

The department has committed some $3.3 bn in funding across 18 states to help defense contractors both expand and modernize existing production lines and add new lines entirely. Contractors are making, among other things, the 155 mm artillery round, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Stinger and Javelin missiles.

This week, the department released details related to how the defense industrial base in more than 37 states is contributing to the U.S. security commitment to Ukraine. That information, and other data related to U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, can be found in an infographic on the Acquisition & Sustainment website. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/US DoD)

29 Nov 23. UK affirms support to Ukraine at OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting. UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron tells foreign ministers, in Skopje before the OSCE Ministerial Council, that the UK continues to support Ukraine and the OSCE, The Foreign Secretary said, at a meeting of foreign ministers in Skopje before the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ministerial Council, that the UK would stand with Ukraine for as long as it took and continue to give moral, diplomatic, economic and military support. He added that Russia was responsible for the conflict and their actions were indefensible. They had trampled on all of the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act which guided relations between states. The Foreign Secretary concluded his remarks by saying that Britain was clear in its support for the OSCE. He called on all those foreign ministers present to support the organisation and secure its future, welcoming Malta’s assumption of Chair in Office for 2024. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

29 Nov 23. A Ukrainian sniper using a Horizon’s Lord rifle has been credited with making the world’s longest sniper kill – with the secret to its long-range success lying in the type of ammunition that was used.

The Ukrainian-made Volodar Obriyu (Horizon’s Lord) is an anti-materiel rifle (AMR) which is capable of making long-range shots and can be particularly effective when coupled with the right ammunition.

According to Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) sources, the sniper killed a Russian soldier 3,800 metres away – 2.36 miles – and a video has been circulating showing the incident.

It is not possible to verify the distance based on the video alone, but sources inside the SBU are claiming it as a new world record.

Jonathan Ferguson, the Keeper of Firearms and Artillery at the Royal Armouries Museum in Leeds, explained how he thought the shot had been accomplished.

He said: “There’s no technical innovation in the rifle itself, it’s the ammunition choice and selection of accurate components and high standards of manufacture.”

The Horizon’s Lord can be configured to accept several different calibres, swapping components such as the bolt and barrel where necessary.

The Ukrainian sniper is thought to have configured their rifle to use cartridges in 12.7×114 calibre, which couples a larger case containing more propellant with a smaller round.

The bullet flies at supersonic speeds and is ballistically efficient, making it less sensitive to wind drift and bullet drop.

Mr Ferguson said: “What you need for long-range shooting is case capacity, so a lot of powder, but also ideally a flat-shooting high-velocity projectile, so ideally the projectile will be smaller.

“You get the high velocity generated by a large amount of propellent in a big old case, but you get the lower air resistance and more velocity out of the small bullets as well.

“With a 14.5mm cartridge case with a .50 calibre bullet [12.7mm], you get the best of all worlds.”

He added: “I’d certainly be concerned about something like this in the enemy’s hands.

“Then again, these guys are facing POV drones coming out of nowhere, artillery shells, guided mortars, all sorts of threats on the battlefield that are more prevalent and just as much of a threat if not more so than this thing.

“This is another tool in the Ukrainian armed forces’ toolbox. It’s not I would say any sort of game-changer though.”

A Canadian special forces sniper serving in Iraq was previously credited with taking the longest confirmed kill shot in history, hitting an Islamic State militant from 3,450 metres away – 2.14 miles.

He used a McMillan TAC-50 rifle in .50 BMG. (Source: forces.net)

29 Nov 23. Visible Progress at Russia’s Shahed Drone Production Site.

Nearly three months after the Institute and The Washington Post publicly revealed detailed information on the plans of JSC Alabuga 1 (“Alabuga”) to produce thousands of deadly Shahed-136 kamikaze drones on Russian soil, satellite imagery indicates that plans are progressing at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone.

Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga, and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. The information in internal documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, reveals not only detailed timelines for Alabuga’s production of weaponized drones and the establishment of mass production with Iranian assistance, but also multiple pressure points and vulnerabilities.

Now, not later, is the time for the U.S. government to take the lead, work with partner governments and industry, and use leverage against those less inclined to cooperate, to hinder Alabuga from succeeding in providing the Russian military with thousands of Shahed-136 drones. With winter fast approaching, and Alabuga’s Shahed output increasing, Russia can be expected to accelerate its Shahed-136 attacks against Ukraine’s vital energy infrastructure, causing brutal living conditions for the civilian population.

A key, overdue first step is for the United States and its allies to sanction JSC Alabuga and its associated companies.

The Main Production Site at Alabuga

A September 15, 2023, satellite image shows the two main fabrication buildings in the Alabuga SEZ in Yelabuga, Russia, where Shahed-136, aka Geran-2, production takes place (see Figure 1). The buildings were identified by the White House as involved in Shahed drone production early this year, and the internal Alabuga documents confirm the location and reveal JSC Alabuga as the main responsible party for the production and supply of drones to the Russian military. Alabuga numbered the buildings in order of construction, 8.1 and 8.2, where 8.1 is east of 8.2. The internal Alabuga documents contain a floor plan for each of the two buildings that precisely match the size and configuration of the buildings.

The floor plan for building 8.2 focuses on Shahed production and is more detailed, while the floor plan for building 8.1 is less detailed. This can be explained by additional documents containing information on additional drone types to be produced in building 8.1. The satellite image dated to mid-September shows construction that directly correlates with the planned layout of building 8.2, indicating that Alabuga is making progress in executing its production plans, which includes not only adopting Iranian production processes but improving and streamlining them, and ultimately advancing the drone’s capabilities.

The image also shows that Alabuga is completing new security perimeters, including a large wall with checkpoints at what was a historically civilian commercial site. Further, on the latest imagery, the employee parking lot in the northwest corner of the facility was full with about 350 vehicles visible just outside the perimeter wall, and more than a dozen higher-ranking personnel vehicles present inside the wall along the eastern side of Building 8.1.

Changes at the Site Since April 2023

Since the White House released an image of the buildings taken in April 2023, new construction includes an addition to building 8.2 that directly matches the layout of a series of five motor test cells (see Figure 3). The addition measures about 20 meters by 55 meters, consistent with five motor test cells about 9.5 meters long. The cells are set up in two pairs and one single one, apparently with matching equivalent ventilation units.

Changes at the Site Since July 2023

Notable is a newly built corridor that connects the two buildings 8.1 and 8.2. Most interestingly, the corridor does not connect the two buildings in the middle, but rather it leads from the southern third of building 8.2 to the southern third of building 8.1, and then up along the west side of building 8.1 to the top third of that building. Based on the floor plans of the buildings, at least the top fifth of the floor space in building 8.1 is dedicated to Shahed production.

Alabuga is also installing physical security perimeters around buildings 8.1 and 8.2, where an outer security wall is being erected in addition to a previously built inner security fence. This is one of few sites within the Alabuga SEZ with such visible security measures, consistent with the fact that the drone production contract for the Russian military represented a major shift in Alabuga’s business strategy, aimed at attracting international producers of a variety of civilian goods before the war.

Timeline of Shahed production at Alabuga

Ongoing construction around 8.1 and 8.2 is consistent with the main timeline revealed in internal documents, namely that Alabuga was to begin with onsite assembly of drones provided by Iran in the first months of 2023 while transitioning to onsite airframe production. In the second half of 2023, Alabuga was to establish production lines for internal components onsite. According to these internal plans, beginning in 2024, Alabuga is expected to be able to make additional major components, including internal components, such as navigation, anti-jamming and anti-spoofing modules, engine, and propeller, onsite. At this point, monthly production of drones would increase to up to 226 drones per month, for a total of 6000 drones produced by September 2025.

JSC SEZ PPT Alabuga is a joint stock company where shareholders are 100 percent state-owned, with 66 percent Russian state and 34 percent Republic of Tatarstan. It controls the management company of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone and operates the Limited Liability company Alabuga Development, which builds the infrastructure but also engages in procurements for the site, including the drone projects. There are also related companies that engage in foreign procurements. The SEZ comprises 40 square kilometers in the Yelabuzhsky District of the Republic of Tatarstan, ten kilometers from Yelabuga. (Source: UAS VISION/Institute for Science and International Security)

29 Nov 23. Russia attacks Ukraine with 21 drones, three missiles – Ukraine air force. Russia launched 21 drones and three cruise missiles at Ukraine overnight, but all the drones and two of the missiles were destroyed before reaching their targets, Ukraine’s air force said on Wednesday. The third missile was not destroyed but did not reach its target, the air force said without going into further detail.

The Iranian-made Shahed drones were headed towards the western region of Khmelnytskyi, the air force said. The target was not identified, but the region is home to a large air base.

The air force said the missiles were shot down over the southern region of Mykolaiv, while the drones were downed in seven provinces all over Ukraine. Reuters could not independently verify the Ukrainian report. There were no immediate reports of damage from falling debris.

Earlier on Wednesday, Russia’s defence ministry said a frigate from its Black Sea Fleet launched an attack with four cruise missiles on Ukraine’s military infrastructure, but it was not clear when the attack took place.

The Russian defence ministry occasionally releases information after a delay. Ukraine’s navy said Russia’s three cruise missiles were launched from the Kherson region bordering the Black Sea, parts of which have been under Russian control since early in the war that Moscow started 21 months ago. (Source: Reuters)

29 Nov 23. Russia says frigate hits Ukraine’s military infrastructure with cruise missiles. A frigate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet launched an attack with four cruise missiles on Ukraine’s military infrastructure, Russia’s defence ministry said early on Wednesday.

“The crew of a frigate of the Black Sea Fleet received a task of launching a strike with Kalibr cruise missiles in the shortest possible time against enemy military infrastructure,” the ministry said on its Telegram messaging app.

The ministry said that “the designated targets” were hit. Reuters could not independently verify the claim. There was no immediate comment early on Wednesday from Ukraine about infrastructure being hit overnight.

Reuters could not immediately establish when the attack took place. A video of the reported attack published by the ministry on the Telegram showed a ship launching missiles during what it seemed like sunrise or dawn hours, but there was also a footage of daylight.

Ukraine’s navy said late on Tuesday that the Russian navy had kept two submarines with a total equipment of up to eight Kalibr missiles on combat duty in the Black Sea as of Tuesday evening.

“The missile threat level is high,” Ukraine’s navy said on its Telegram messaging app.

The Black Sea has become a crucial theatre in the 21-month-long war. Ukraine’s increased air and sea drone attacks on Russian military targets there have damaged ship and naval repair yards in the port of Sevastopol, and struck other targets.

Moscow uses its fleet in the Black Sea to launch long-range strikes on Ukraine. But for President Vladimir Putin, the waters – which connect to the Mediterranean Sea – are also an important springboard for projecting power into the Middle East, Europe and the West.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said Kyiv’s ability to strike warships and diminish Russian surveillance in the Black Sea have undermined Russia’s war efforts and helped Ukraine to secure a shipping route to export its grain. (Source: Reuters)

28 Nov 23. US funding for Ukraine arms has poured into Pennsylvania, Arizona and Texas. The Biden administration has been circulating on Capitol Hill the first breakdown of which U.S. states have benefited from the bns of dollars spent on arming Ukraine, in a move to gather more support from Republicans who have voted against aid for Kyiv.

While three of the eight Republican members of Congress from Pennsylvania have been voting against funding to help stop Russia’s invasion, the data shows the Keystone State has received $2.364 bn – the most of any state – in spending and investments to build arms and ammunition, according to documents seen by Reuters.

In Texas, 18 of the 25 Republican U.S. representatives have voted against Ukraine aid. At the same time, Texas has received $1.45 bn to produce 155 millimeter shells and other weapons. In Arizona, three of six Republican representatives voted against aid while $2.196 bn poured into the state.

During his latest request for $106 bn in new funds for Ukraine, Israel, the Indo-Pacific region and border enforcement, U.S. President Joe Biden on Oct. 20 emphasized that arms for Ukraine equals jobs for Americans.

He noted some of the money would go to U.S. companies to replace equipment sent abroad and mentioned Patriot missile systems that are made by RTX’s (RTX.N) Raytheon in Arizona, and “artillery shells manufactured in 12 states across the country,” naming Pennsylvania, Ohio and Texas.

Pennsylvania and Arizona are pivotal swing states that will be critical to Biden next year.

In recent days the administration has circulated maps among lawmakers on Capitol Hill showcasing the state-by-state breakdown for the $27 bn worth of investments, and spending on “munitions and tactical vehicle procurements.”

A vocal bloc of Republicans has opposed sending aid to Ukraine, saying taxpayer money should be spent at home, but a majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress still support aid to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government.

Companies in four states on the Biden administration’s map – Arizona, Pennsylvania, Arkansas and Wisconsin – are home to manufacturing facilities that are collectively receiving contracts totaling more than $1bn for their products that aid Ukraine. Another $18bn in contracts is spread around manufacturing facilities located in more than two dozen other states.

The conservative Defending Democracy Together group’s “Republicans for Ukraine” campaign has been tracking Republican rhetoric and voting patterns on Ukraine aid legislation. A report card by the group gave “poor” or “very poor” grades to 18 of 25 Republican representatives from Texas for their lack of support for Ukraine. It gave “poor” or “very poor” grades to two of Wisconsin’s six Republican representatives, to one of Arkansas’ four Republican representatives and to three of Pennsylvania’s eight Republican representatives.

Still, further aid for Ukraine has a hard road ahead. In his first major legislative act as Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson introduced a bill addressing Biden’s request for aid to Israel, separating it from Ukraine and other needs.

Johnson told a news conference before the November Congressional recess, “Ukraine will come in short order. It will come next.”

Yet Johnson voted against Ukraine aid repeatedly before he became speaker last month. House Democrats have overwhelmingly voted in favor of the 2022 and 2023 Ukraine-related supplemental spending bills. (Source: Reuters)

28 Nov 23. The Capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Industry Tripled Compared to Last Year. On November 24, Ukroboronprom took part in a meeting initiated by the Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. It was attended by representatives of 30 companies producing weapons and military equipment – both state and private. It was about providing the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapons and military equipment in 2024, as well as procurement plans of the MoU for the next year.

The main focus is to provide the Defense Forces with what is produced in Ukraine, and therefore to contract manufacturers and create appropriate conditions for investment in defense production.

“We have a significant increase in the capabilities of the domestic defense industry. This year – three times compared to last year. Next year, it will increase six times by 2023. Already this year, the defense industry has become one of the biggest drivers of the recovery of Ukraine’s economy. We produce everything we can domestically. This is a clear task from the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi and our joint position with the Minister of Defense Rustem Umyerov,” said Oleksandr Kamyshin, Minister of Strategic Industry.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Rustem Umyerov, called on business to cooperate and promised support to manufacturers.

“Our goal is to localize as many productions as possible in Ukraine. This is a matter of our national security. I call on Ukrainian companies to work together according to clear rules. Our task as the Government is to guarantee simple and clear procedures for cooperation with defense enterprises,” said the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Rustem Umyerov.

(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/)

28 Nov 23. UK to galvanise support for Ukraine as Foreign Secretary attends NATO.

During a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Brussels today (28 November), Foreign Secretary David Cameron will galvanise support for Ukraine among NATO Allies.

Foreign Secretary David Cameron will underline the UK’s unwavering support for Ukraine in his first meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers
He will attend the NATO-Ukraine Council in Brussels tomorrow (Wednesday, November 29)

During a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Brussels today (28 November), Foreign Secretary David Cameron will galvanise support for Ukraine among NATO Allies.

At a gathering of the NATO-Ukraine Council tomorrow (29 November), due to be attended by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba, the Foreign Secretary will update his counterparts on his recent visit to Kyiv, his first trip in his new role, and underline that the UK remains firmly behind Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, urging Allies not to waver in their support.

The Foreign Secretary will also set out the need for Sweden’s urgent accession to the Alliance, stating that the agreement would mark a critical step forward in strengthening peace and stability in Europe.

The Foreign Secretary, David Cameron, said: “NATO keeps over one bn people safe and secure. And nearly 75 years on, the Alliance is stronger than ever. Putin first believed that NATO would be divided and that Ukraine would crumble. Now he believes he can wait out his war in Ukraine. He was wrong then and he is wrong now. Together, the UK and our NATO allies will never turn a blind eye to Russian aggression. The UK will continue to be a steadfast supporter of Ukraine and a champion for European peace and stability.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/ Ukroboronprom)

28 Nov 23. Russian tank units in Ukraine take delivery of new counter-drone EW systems. Russian tank units – which have been taking a notable beating at the hands of Ukrainian forces in recent weeks – have started receiving a new EW system, dubbed Volnorez, which aims to protect the vehicles from drone attacks. The Volnorez (‘Breakwater’) was first seen in public last year, as reported earlier this year by Unmanned Airspace.

The claim, supported by photographs, has surfaced on Russian social media recently. Russian sources claim that the system, operating between 900-2,000MHz, establishes a 360° protective shield around the parent vehicle and disrupts drone signals at ranges to 600 metres. An apparent option for remote control adds a layer of flexibility to the operator’s capacity to counter drone threats.

For more information: «Может эффективно подавлять беспилотники»: в западной прессе оценили установку на российские танки постановщика помех «Волнорез» (topwar.ru) (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

24 Nov 23. Germany to supply Ukraine with IRIS-T systems in $1.4bn package. Germany will provide Ukraine with an additional four IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defense systems as part of a military aid package worth more than €1.3bn ($1.4bn), the German Defence Ministry said in a statement Thursday. The systems will be supplied from 2025.

The package also includes drones and drone-defense systems, demining vehicles, satellite communications, electronic warfare equipment, directional anti-tank mines and artillery shells, aimed at addressing acute needs of the Ukrainian armed forces, according to the ministry.

Germany has become the biggest supplier of military aid to Ukraine behind the U.S., after initial reluctance to provide arms. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius earlier this month confirmed plans to boost the country’s military support for Ukraine, in response to media reports the government is seeking to double the aid to €8bn in 2024.

IRIS-T systems and a second Patriot tracking radar handed over in October will reach Ukraine this year, once Ukrainian personnel have completed their training, the ministry said.

Pistorius announced the support on Nov. 22 in a video conference with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the 17th meeting in the so-called Ramstein format, and said Germany will stand with Ukraine “now and for the long term,” according to the ministry.

In addition to short-term aid, the contact group discussed the long-term capability development of the Ukrainian armed forces. Germany and France will lead a “capability coalition,” bringing together more than 20 countries to establish the Capability Coalition Ground Based Air Defense, the ministry said.

Germany will also support other future capability coalitions, and further steps would be discussed at the next meeting on this topic, expected to take place in Berlin in December.

The German government stands ready make a “significant contribution” to modernizing and upgrading the Ukrainian armed forces, according to the statement.

“The Ukrainian armed forces must be made so strong that they can defeat Russian aggression today and deter any attempt at a further attack tomorrow,’’ the ministry said.

Pistorius pointed out during the support meeting that Germany has made an “enormous contribution” since the start of the war, with Ukraine “massively strengthened” in the area of air defense through the delivery of Patriot and IRIS-T systems, as well as almost 50 Gepard anti-aircraft guns.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in September urged allies to “dig deep” and provide more air defense systems for Ukraine, to help the country fend of barrages of Russian missiles. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

27 Nov 23. Turkey’s exports to Russia of goods vital for Moscow’s war machine have soared this year, heightening concerns among the US and its allies that the country is acting as a conduit for sensitive items from their own manufacturers. The growing trade, and the corresponding rise in imports to Turkey of 45 civilian materials used by Russia’s military, has undermined US and European attempts to curb Moscow’s ability to equip its armed forces, fuelling tensions between Ankara and its Nato partners. In a sign of how it has become a priority in Washington to rein in this trade, Brian Nelson, US Treasury under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, will visit Istanbul and Ankara this week, where he is set to discuss “efforts to prevent, disrupt, and investigate trade and financial activity that benefit the Russian effort in its war against Ukraine”. It will be Nelson’s second trip to Turkey this year and comes amid indications that some dual-use parts — identified by the US and its allies as being of particular value to the war — are being transported directly to Russia even when they have been labelled as going to another country. Efforts to cut off this ghost trade to Russia have been complicated as the items have both commercial and military applications. In the first nine months of 2023, Turkey reported $158mn of exports of 45 goods the US lists as “high-priority” to Russia and five former Soviet countries suspected of acting as intermediaries for Moscow. That was three times the level recorded over the same period in 2022, when the war in Ukraine began. The average figure for 2015-21 was $28mn, according to a Financial Times analysis of data from customs database Trade Data Monitor. The 45 categories of goods, which include items such as microchips, communications equipment and parts such as telescopic sights, are subject to US, EU, Japanese and UK export controls aimed at preventing them from entering Russia. But these can be circumvented by companies using middlemen structures to disguise their ultimate destinations. Turkey’s imports of high-priority goods from G7 countries are up more than 60 per cent so far this year compared with the same periods between 2015 and 2021 to nearly $500mn. (Source: FT.com)

27 Nov 23. Ukraine Downs 74 of 75 Shahed Drones Over Kyiv in One Night.

Ukraine said on Saturday that it had downed 74 out of 75 Russian attack drones overnight, in what Kyiv said was the biggest drone attack since the start of the invasion.

“The air force destroyed 71 Shahed 131/136 attack UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). The vast majority of them were destroyed in the Kyiv region,”

the air force said on social media.

Air raid sirens kicked off in Kyiv just before 2:00 a.m. Around two hours later, a Kyiv Post reporter in the Solomianskyi district heard what appeared to be the sounds of anti-aircraft fire and then an explosion nearby.

Drone debris fell in several districts of the city, injuring at least two people, including an 11-year-old child., Mayor Vitali Klitschko said in a post on Telegram.

“At this time, there are two victims in the Solomyansky district. Both received medical aid on the spot”,

Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko wrote on Telegram.

An apartment building in the district had been damaged by falling debris and emergency services were working to extract two women from the rubble, he added.

Several fires were reported in the same district, including one at a kindergarten, according to Klitschko.

Debris from drones shot down by Ukrainian anti-aircraft defence also fell on Pechersky district.

In total, approximately 75 Iranian UAVs were launched by Russia from two different directions – Primorsko-Akhtarsk and the Kursk Region. All of them were primarily targeted at the city of Kyiv.

To counter the air assault, Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile forces, tactical aviation, mobile fire groups, and electronic warfare units were deployed. Additionally, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, an X-59 guided aviation missile was intercepted and destroyed.

The drone attack came as Ukraine marked Holodomor Remembrance Day, commemorating the 1930s starvation of ms in Ukraine under Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.

President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed his views on social media, stating,

“More than 70 Shahed on the night of the Holodomor Remembrance Day… The Russian leadership is proud of the fact that it can kill.”

Holodomor, translated as “death by starvation” in Ukrainian, was a deliberate consequence of the Soviet Union’s agricultural policies.

“They tried to subdue us, to kill us, to exterminate us. They failed,” Zelensky added.

Zelensky said Russia’s current attacks on Ukraine were possible because of what he called uncondemned crimes of the past.

“In the last century, famine came from Moscow. Now, we hear words of denial from there. And every one of these words of denial actually sounds like a confession,” Zelensky said. (Source: UAS VISION/Kyiv Post)

27 Nov 23. Russian tank factory hit by mystery explosion. A mystery explosion rocked a Russian tank factory which produces engines and artillery for the war in Ukraine. Online footage showed a fireball engulfing the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant in Chelyabinsk, a city near the border with Kazakhstan. The factory is under sanctions from the Ukraine and the US as “an enterprise specialising in the production of diesel engines for military equipment”. Ukraine has not commented but if responsible, it would be its furthest attack behind enemy lines of the war so far. But Russian officials have insisted the huge blaze was caused by a short circuit. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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