NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 27.

BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to counter-attack to the north and south of Bakhmut; they have made marginal gains in recent days. Geolocated footage from 26 October indicates that Russian forces have advanced south of Ozaryanivka, located around nine miles (15km) south of Bakhmut, though Russian forces have likely not entered the settlement as of yet. Meanwhile, Russian sources claimed earlier on 27 October that their forces are also advancing towards Vasyukivka, located around eight miles (13km) north of Bakhmut, though this remains unconfirmed.
DONETSK: Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations near Avdiivka on 26 October but made no confirmed advances, as heavy losses likely continue to complicate the offensive. Tavriisk Group of Forces spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported on 26 October that Russian forces have lost around 5,000 troops (killed and/or injured) and over 400 armoured vehicles in the offensive to capture Avdiivka since 10 October. Although we cannot confirm these figures, it is clear that the offensive has been extremely costly for Russia. On 27 October, US presidential spokesperson John Kirby reported that US intelligence indicates that the Russian military is executing Russian soldiers who refuse to obey orders on the front; this would align with previous reports of isolated mutinies along the frontline. Meanwhile, Russian milbloggers reported on 26 October that Ukrainian losses and the ongoing Russian offensive have forced Ukraine to transfer more personnel and equipment to the city. While one noted that this would provide Russian forces with the opportunity to counter-attack elsewhere along the frontline, another warned that Ukraine could launch its own counter-attack from Avdiivka.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 26 October indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances south-west of Lyman Pershi, located around seven miles (11km) north-west of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Volodymyr Fityo reported that the number of Russian forces grouped in the direction of Kupiansk and Lyman (Donetsk oblast) remains around 100,000 after additional reserves were committed to degraded units in this sector. Russian units will continue to conduct offensive operations towards Kupiansk. While they will likely make further marginal gains, we continue to assess that the primary objective of Russian operations is to divert Ukrainian resources from the southern axis; a substantial breakthrough remains unlikely along the Oskil-Kreminna line.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources reported on 26 October that the tempo of Ukrainian offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia oblast has slowed due to poor weather conditions, with neither side firing much in the way of artillery due to poor visibility. While there is little indication of Ukrainian advances over the last 24 hours, Russian sources claim that their forces are making progress in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia border region along the Vremevsky salient. Russian sources also claim that minor progress was made north of Pryyutne, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk).
KHERSON: Ukrainian forces have succeeded in modestly expanding their presence on the left bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson oblast. Geolocated footage from 25 October indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced north of Pidstepne, around ten miles (16km) east of Kherson city. Russian sources also reported earlier on 27 October that Ukrainian forces had gained a foothold in the Dacha area, and are advancing on both Pidstepne and Poima, located around six miles (10km) south-east of the Antonovisky Bridge.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that Russian forces launched six Shahed-136/131 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile at Ukrainian targets overnight on 26-27 October. The six drones were fired towards Ukraine’s southern oblasts, five of which were intercepted over Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts. It is unclear where the sixth drone landed. The Iskander missile was reportedly fired from Russia’s Voronezh oblast and struck a fire department building in the once Russian-occupied town of Izium (Kharkiv). At least eight people were injured and 13 pieces of equipment were damaged as a result of the strike.
STRIKES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian air defences intercepted two unspecified Ukrainian drones over Kursk oblast (Russia) on 26 October. No details were provided on whether the drone debris caused any damage. The tempo of cross-border drone attacks by both Russia and Ukraine has decreased in recent weeks. It is possible that Ukraine will increase the frequency of cross-border drone strikes in retaliation for Russia’s widely anticipated winter strike campaign.
STRIKES: According to the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI), Russia’s Long Range Aviation (LRA) fleet has not conducted air-launched cruise missile strikes into Ukraine for over 30 days. DI assesses that this gap – one of the longest since the full-scale invasion began – is almost certainly because Russia needs to replenish its stockpile of Kh-101 and other cruise missiles. In line with our own forecast, DI assesses that Russia is likely to use newly produced cruise missiles to strike Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure this winter.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: On 26 October, the newly elected US House Speaker, Mike Johnson, stated that financial assistance to Israel and Ukraine should be considered separately. Johnson disclosed that he met with US President Joe Biden earlier on 26 October and told White House staff that the consensus among House Republicans is that the two issues need to be split. He reiterated his stance that House Republicans want to understand the objective of further funding for Kyiv, claiming the White House has not provided any such clarification.
AID: Johnson insisted that Congress is not going to ‘abandon’ Ukraine, temporarily reducing concerns that funding for Kyiv will be halted in the near term. Nevertheless, his remarks on splitting the funding request indicate that there is a moderate to likely possibility that the USD 106 billion in supplemental funding requested by Biden for border enforcement, the Indo-Pacific region, Israel and Ukraine will be delayed. If the funding request is considered separately, it would possibly be rejected given opposition among some House Republicans for further military aid to Ukraine. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 20 October 2023.
AID: The newly elected Slovakian Prime Minister Rober Fico confirmed on 26 October that Slovakia would no longer supply weapons to Ukraine but would continue to send humanitarian aid. Although Slovakia has not been a key weapons supplier for Ukraine, the previous administration did transfer pieces of Soviet-era military equipment, including the S-300 air defence system and old MiG-29 fighter jets. Although these are inferior to the modern Western-made military equipment which Ukraine has requested, Ukrainian forces are used to operating these systems and do not need to undergo months of training to deploy them on the battlefield. The loss of Slovakia as an arms supplier therefore represents a small blow for Kyiv. This will likely be offset if Donald Tusk resumes Polish military aid to Kyiv after forming the next Polish government, which is highly likely.
CORRUPTION: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on 26 October for the lifelong financial monitoring of politically exposed persons (PEPs). The measure intends to dissuade politicians from using their positions to enrich themselves; it expands scrutiny over their finances past their time in office. Ukrainian lawmaker Yaroslav Zhelezniak stated that the legislation should be considered a crucial step towards Ukraine’s EU membership bid. However, a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published on 26 October indicated that the majority of Ukrainians (71%) consider the government’s reform efforts to be insufficient. Notably, 90% of respondents believe anti-corruption reforms should be one of Kyiv’s top-three priorities, with 58% arguing it should be the most important task. Ultimately, tackling corruption in the coming months will remain vital for Ukraine’s progress to join the EU, as well as for bolstering confidence among the population and international business leaders in its reform efforts.
SPILLOVER: Romanian President Klaus Iohannis disclosed on 26 October that his country has installed an anti-drone system in the Danube delta near its border with Ukraine. Iohannis stated that the radars are capable of detecting targets at a much lower altitude than before. The previous radars only detected targets higher than 600m. The anti-drone system will possibly enable Romania to prevent Russian-launched drones that target Ukraine’s Danube River ports and grain infrastructure from landing on Romanian territory more effectively. However, the risk of limited conflict spillover into this part of Romania will remain elevated in the coming months.
BLACK SEA: Following reports on 26 October, Ukrainian officials clarified that Ukraine has not closed its maritime corridor for civilian cargo traffic in the Black Sea. The initial reports indicated that a de facto suspension of the corridor had been in place since at least the evening of 25 October following reports of Russian aircraft dropping mines in the area. Despite these claims, ships continue to transit the route, according to the Ukrainian government.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: China will reportedly miss a summit in Malta on 28-29 October which intends to build support for Ukraine’s conditions for peace. Bloomberg reported on 26 October that officials from more than 55 states will be at the meeting of national security advisers, including those representing G7 countries, India, Qatar, South Africa and Turkey. Insiders familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine intends to host a summit later this year and that rallying China is crucial to those efforts as Beijing is assessed to wield a degree of influence over Russian President Vladimir Putin. No explanation was given as to why Beijing will allegedly not attend, though Ukrainian officials have previously overstated the importance of China’s participation in similar events (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 7 August 2023).

Beijing is unlikely to condemn Moscow for its full-scale invasion for the foreseeable future; the two neighbours will almost certainly continue building bilateral relations in the face of Western sanctions. It remains in China’s interests to uphold its self-proclaimed neutrality, though this does not necessarily mean that Beijing will avoid attending similar fora in the coming months or attempt to broker peace on its own. Although Putin recently visited Beijing for the third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum, it is unlikely that this alone prompted China to reconsider attending the summit in Malta.

Oct 26.

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: Heavy rainfall slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka on 25 October. However, it is likely that Russian forces entrenched themselves on the strategically important slag heap known as Terrikon. While some Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces were defending previously captured positions at Terrikon, others claimed that the tactical site had been entirely captured. Notably, at least one Ukrainian source also stated that Terrikon was under Russian control. Another Ukrainian source reported on 25 October that Russian forces have made advances toward Stepove, located 1.8 miles (3km) north-west of Avdiivka. However, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian attacks were repelled in this vicinity. Regardless, it is increasingly clear that marginal Russian advances near Avdiivka are extremely costly. It therefore remains unclear how long highly attritional offensive operations can be sustained, particularly if unconfirmed reports that some Russian forces have mutinied near Avdiivka in recent weeks amid a lack of artillery, ammunition and basic sustenance are accurate.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Russian sources over the last 24 hours have reported that their forces have stepped up counter-attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region. While it remains unclear if they have made any progress, various sources claimed on 25 October that Russian forces are steadily pushing through Ukrainian defences along the Vremevsky salient, and have advanced around 200m near Pryyutne, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Further west, Ukrainian sources claimed on 25 October that Russian forces have withdrawn from the north-western outskirts of Novoprokopivka, located about two miles (4km) south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast), though this has not been confirmed.
STRIKES: Yuriy Ignat, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s air force, indicated earlier on 26 October that poor weather conditions were likely why Russia launched no drone and/or missile strikes against Ukrainian targets overnight on 25-26 October. However, Ignat also noted that drones guided by GPS navigation can nevertheless be operated in bad weather conditions and that the lull in attacks was possibly intentional. Russia is almost certainly stockpiling drones and missiles ahead of a strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure this winter.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SANCTIONS: The Insider, a Russian outlet, reported on 25 October that contractors for Russian defence companies producing Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles have so far avoided European sanctions. This has reportedly enabled the contractors to import the necessary equipment directly from EU nations. The investigation noted that a defence enterprise linked to Rostec (a Russian state corporation) received thermal and cooling chambers manufactured by a Moscow-based company which imported equipment from Poland during the war. It also noted that some deliveries have come from Germany, including gun drills and integrated chips, among other tools. While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, it underscores that Russian defence firms are still able to circumvent sanctions loopholes. The EU’s and Ukraine’s other Western allies are highly likely to continue efforts in the coming months to close such procurement loopholes.
NUCLEAR: The Kremlin disclosed on 25 October that Russia successfully tested its ability to deliver a massive retaliatory nuclear strike via land, sea and air. Russia stated that it launched a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile from a test site at a target in the country’s Far East, while a nuclear-powered submarine fired a ballistic missile from the Barents Sea; Tu-95MS long-range bombers reportedly also test fired air-launched cruise missiles. The exercise coincided with the approval by the upper house of Russia’s parliament of the de-ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). While Russia periodically carries out such drills to test its nuclear triad, which drives tensions with the West, they are not indicative of a major nuclear escalation in the near future.
MOBILISATION: On 25 October, a member of Ukraine’s committee on national security, defence and intelligence postulated the mobilisation of personnel into the country’s military-industrial enterprises. Serhiy Rakhmanin noted that many enterprises lack qualified specialists and proposed that if an individual with a coveted skillset is located in one region, they could theoretically be deployed to fill a corresponding vacancy in another. Rakhmanin added that he is considering submitting a legislative initiative regarding the matter, while also expressing doubts that it would be successful. While Rakhmanin’s proposal is not reflective of current government policy, similar initiatives will possibly be proposed in the coming months to address personnel shortages in high-demand fields to offset growing labour shortages in critical industries.
BLACK SEA: Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on 25 October that Russian tactical aviation aircraft discharged four ‘explosive devices’, likely ‘bottom mines’, in the north-western Black Sea region. While this cannot be confirmed, Kyiv maintains that the devices were dropped over the newly created maritime shipping corridor leading from Odesa, which resulted in Ukraine suspending the use of the corridor earlier on 26 October until further notice. With Russia’s Black Sea Fleet surface assets becoming increasingly constrained, it appears likely that Russian aircraft have begun mining the Black Sea given that minelayer vessels can no longer reach these areas. This will sustain the threat posed by mines to maritime traffic across the north-western Black Sea region.

FORECAST

AID: The EU is reportedly falling behind on its plans to supply Ukraine with 1m artillery shells by March 2024. According to a Bloomberg report on 25 October, the bloc’s pledge to provide Kyiv with the ammunition over a 12-month period has so far delivered about 30% of this target; based on the number of contracts signed to date, the bloc risks missing its goal.

The outlet claimed that several EU member states have privately asked to extend the deadline, though this cannot be confirmed. Ukraine’s allies allegedly hoped that their combined support would match Russia in volume, but that Kyiv would have an advantage due to the superior standard of Western-provided weaponry and shells. The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, revealed earlier this month that both sides’ ammunition requirements currently surpass the volume which their respective allies can replenish.

Ukraine’s strategic industries minister, Oleksandr Kamyshin, disclosed on 25 October that while the country has significantly bolstered its defence production capacities, it is unable to produce enough shells to meet the current demand. This therefore renders the reliable and consistent supply of Western ammunition increasingly important as Kyiv will remain reliant on such supplies for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Bloomberg claimed that Russian plants will possibly be able to manufacture 2 m rounds next year, indicating that Russian artillery production is continuing to grow.

While EU production levels are not where they need to be, US reserve stocks of various systems, in particular 155mm artillery ammunition, are also running low. CSIS data indicates that under early 2023 production levels, it would take five years of surge production to rebuild the stockpiles of the ammunition already provided to Ukraine. When combined with Israel’s growing need for ammunition, the US will also face growing concerns over its own production capacity. As Russia’s attritional war in Ukraine continues to protract, the delayed and/or insufficient provision of artillery shells risks significantly hindering Ukraine’s ability to fight in the medium-to-long term.

Meanwhile, on 25 October, Republican Congressman Mike Johnson was elected as the Speaker of the US House of Representatives. Johnson stated that he supports further aid to Ukraine, though with ‘conditions’. The congressman insisted that House Republicans want accountability and clear objectives from the White House on assisting Kyiv, but noted that ‘productive’ discussions on the matter will take place.

According to the pro-Ukraine ‘Republicans for Ukraine’ congressional record, Johnson has a ‘very poor’ voting history on issues related to Ukraine. The only pro-Ukraine legislation which Johnson voted for was the Lend-Lease Act of 2022, which allowed the lending/leasing of US defence materiel to Ukraine. Therefore, it is not clear whether Johnson’s election will ease concerns for Kyiv and its allies over the US’ long-term provision of military aid; this provision is all the more important to Ukraine’s long-term prospects given flagging European arms production capacity.

*Latvia: Sabotage of critical land infrastructure remains unlikely despite threats to schools, Baltic Sea incidents. On 25 October, Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa stated that Latvia’s critical infrastructure on land is significantly more secure than critical infrastructure at sea. She stated that due to the very nature of the sea, it is impossible to monitor and protect the various parts of a sea cable network. Her comments follow recent damage to the Balticconnetor gas pipeline and two separate undersea telecom cables in the north-east Baltic Sea region, which was likely the result of sabotage. Additionally, there was a sharp spike in hoax bomb alerts at schools in the Baltic region (and elsewhere in Europe) in early October. Riga is set to release a report on improving the protection of all critical infrastructure in Latvian territory in the coming weeks. Despite these developments, and the fact Latvia has a large Russian minority population – elements of which Moscow is likely to leverage for various illicit activities – critical infrastructure on land is unlikely to be the target of sabotage.

Oct 25.

Executive summary

In our most likely short-term scenario over the next three months, Ukraine’s counter-offensive does not achieve a strategic breakthrough which establishes conditions for a timely end to the war.
In our most likely medium-to-long-term scenario over the next 12 months, the war evolves into a broadly stable attritional conflict that protracts well into 2024.
The ongoing Israel-Hamas war is likely to reinforce already increasing divisions within the US Congress on maintaining military aid to Ukraine in the long term.
Russia is the most likely culprit behind the damage inflicted on the Balticconnector gas pipeline and two separate telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea in October, reinforcing the highly credible threat posed by further Russian sabotage operations to European critical infrastructure.
The onset of the heating season in November will increase the risk of large-scale Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian critical energy infrastructure, elevating risks facing businesses this winter.
BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully crossed the railway line east of Andriivka, located around four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut. It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces have been able to consolidate and capitalise on this advance, though Russian sources reported earlier on 25 October that the situation south of Bakhmut had ‘stabilised’. Meanwhile, Russian sources reported that their forces are actively counter-attacking north of Bakhmut, claiming that they advanced near the village of Berkhivka reservoir, located around three miles (5km) north-west of Bakhmut. Other sources claimed on 24 October to have pushed back Ukrainian forces up to 0.9 miles (1.5km), though this remains unconfirmed.
DONETSK: Russian forces likely made further tactical advances in offensive operations in Avdiivka on 24 October. Most notably, Russian forces advanced towards the slag heap known as ‘Terrikon’ next to the Avdiivka Coke Plant – a key area of high ground in the city. The extent of the advance remains unclear. One prominent Russian milblogger reported that the advances represented a ‘serious tactical success’ and that the slag heap was occupied by Russian forces. However, geolocated footage only confirms that Russian forces were operating in an area to the north-west of the heap; another Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces had only gained a ‘foothold’. If Russian forces are able to seize the heap, this would mark an important tactical success. However, Ukrainian forces have repeatedly repelled Russian advances in Avdiivka, including around the slag heap; they will likely commit significant resources to maintain control of the city.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 24 October confirms that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances west of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). However, progress remains very slow. Russian sources have meanwhile reported that Ukrainian forces have stepped up the intensity of their attacks towards Kopani and Novoprokopivka, located around four miles (7km) west and two miles (4km) south of Robotyne, respectively. However, they claim that Ukrainian forces have not advanced in these directions.
STRIKES: The Ukrainian air force reported earlier on 25 October that it intercepted all 11 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russian forces overnight on 24-25 October. The drones were reportedly intercepted over Cherkasy, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Poltava and Zhytomyr oblasts. This marks the third consecutive day that Ukrainian air defences have reportedly achieved a 100% interception rate against a small-scale wave of drone strikes (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 October 2023). Notably, the energy ministry reported that debris from a Russian drone in Khmelnytskyi oblast landed ‘near’ the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), causing damage to power transition lines and leading to localised power cuts.
STRIKES: A spokesperson for Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Andriy Yusov, claimed on 24 October that Russia is currently stockpiling missiles but will be unable to replenish stockpiles to early-2022 levels. Yusov also reaffirmed that Kyiv anticipates a renewed Russian strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Earlier on 25 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Kyiv is carrying out preparations in anticipation of Russian strikes against energy infrastructure, but also stated that Ukraine would ‘respond’. While Zelensky provided no details regarding this response, he noted that Russia has been forced to move Black Sea naval and wider aviation assets deeper into Russian territory as a result of Ukrainian strikes; he also underlined that an uptick in Ukrainian strikes against strategic Russian assets is a realistic possibility in retaliation for Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

EU: On 24 October, Reuters reported that the European Commission (EC) is likely to present an assessment of Ukraine’s progress on its ambitions to join the EU on 8 November. According to Reuters, which cited three unnamed officials, a decision is then expected during a summit of EU leaders on 14-15 December on whether to start formal membership negotiations with Kyiv. Reuters reported that Ukraine is likely to receive a positive recommendation as well as additional conditions relating to minority rights and corruption, though this cannot be confirmed. The former would likely be aimed at appeasing Hungary, as issues surrounding minority rights have been a long-standing point of contention for Budapest (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 4 October 2023).
EU: Ukraine’s justice minister, Denys Maliuska, claimed in an interview on 23 October that the country’s authorities are no longer cautious of prosecuting Ukrainian oligarchs. Maliuska noted that oligarchs have become ‘quite accessible’ for the Ukrainian authorities, adding that it is now easier to access documents, witnesses and case files. The official also revealed that a 2021 law intended to limit oligarchs’ influence in national politics sent a clear message to the country’s tycoons.
EU: Maliuska’s comments were highly likely intended to underscore Kyiv’s commitment to de-oligarchisation and combatting corruption, which will remain key challenges to address for EU membership. In June, the EC stated that Ukraine had fully met two of the seven conditions to unlock EU accession negotiations, though various levels of progress were observed vis-à-vis other requirements. However, even if a decision to launch formal negotiations to join the bloc is made in the coming weeks, Ukraine is highly unlikely to become an EU member for the foreseeable future.
MINORITIES: Ukraine has reportedly formed a battalion of soldiers comprised entirely of Russian citizens who oppose Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on 24 October that dozens of Russians and ethnic minorities from Russia, such as Buryats and Yakuts, who travelled via third countries to join the Ukrainian army make up part of the Sibir (Siberia) battalion. The outlet, which cited officials at their training camp, reported that the soldiers are part of the regular Ukrainian army and will likely be deployed to the frontline very soon. Bloomberg claimed that Russian citizens in the battalion underwent thorough security checks to verify that they truly support Ukraine; this measure is likely aimed at mitigating the risk of espionage-related infiltration operations.
MINORITIES: As the battalion reportedly comprises 60 members at the time of writing, its purpose is more likely to be politically driven (for now) than to bolster Ukrainian manpower significantly. Russia has mobilised its ethnic minorities to fight in Ukraine at a disproportionate rate. Should ongoing crypto-mobilisation efforts continue to target ethnic minorities in the coming months (which is highly likely), this would possibly incentivise more Russian ethnic minorities to join the Sibir battalion. However, given its size, the battalion is unlikely to represent a significant challenge to Russia’s government stability and internal dynamics in the short term. However, it will reinforce ethnic tensions and anti-Moscow sentiment in certain regions.

FORECAST

SABOTAGE: Finnish investigators stated on 24 October that they recovered an anchor from the site where the Balticconnector pipeline was damaged on 8 October. The Finnish police revealed that broad drag marks were observed on the seabed leading up to where the link was broken and that the anchor was found immediately next to the site of the damage. One of the anchor’s spikes reportedly broke off; a narrower trail leading for dozens of miles was also visible.

The chief of Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Robin Lardot, stated that it needs to be determined whether the pipeline’s damage was intentional or inflicted through negligence or poor sailing, concluding that it was too early to makes assessments at this point. The NBI stated on 24 October that it had established that the Chinese Newnew Polar Bear container ship, which is at the centre of the investigation, was missing one of its front anchors. However, this is not definitive evidence that the vessel was responsible for damaging the Balticconnector pipeline either accidentally or deliberately.

Nevertheless, a broken anchor will possibly provide the vessel with plausible deniability if it is determined that the Newnew Polar Bear was wholly or partially responsible for the Balticconnector’s damage. On 11 October, the head of Estonia’s vessel traffic management department, Are Piel, explained that the dropping of anchors around pipeline infrastructure is rare and prohibited. Piel noted that while vessels can drop anchor half a mile (0.8 km) away from underwater infrastructure to avoid causing damage, anchor dragging is nevertheless a very rare occurrence. It remains unlikely that the crew of the Newnew Polar Bear would be unaware of such commonplace rules. However, it remains to be seen what conclusions the investigation will draw, and whether further evidence emerges that points to deliberate sabotage, or at least wilful malpractice.

The Finnish findings also do not fully account for the simultaneous damage to two separate telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea region, meaning deliberate sabotage remains likely. Sweden has confirmed that an undersea cable connecting the country to Estonia was partially broken around the same time that the Balticconnector and a separate cable sustained damage (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 18 October 2023). As investigations have concluded that various Russian ships, including the Sibiryakov ‘research’ vessel, were in the vicinity at the time, the likelihood of Russian involvement in the damage remains moderate to high.

*Ukraine: Kyiv highly unlikely to join EU in near term despite possible launch of accession talks. On 24 October, international media reported that the European Commission (EC) is expected to present an assessment of Ukraine’s progress in its efforts to join the EU, on 8 November. According to reports, which cited three unnamed officials, a decision is then likely during a summit of EU leaders on 14-15 December on whether to start formal membership negotiations with Kyiv. Ukraine is expected to receive a positive recommendation, possibly including additional conditions relating to minority rights and combatting corruption, though this has not been confirmed. In June, the EC said Ukraine had fully met two of the seven conditions to unlock EU accession negotiations, though various levels of progress were observed in other requirements. However, even if a decision to launch formal negotiations to join the bloc is made in the coming weeks, Ukraine is highly unlikely to become a member of the EU for the foreseeable future.

Oct 24.

BAKHMUT: Following earlier reports of Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut, geolocated footage has confirmed that Ukrainian forces have crossed the railway north of Klishchiivka, located around four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut. Wider indications, including Russian sources reporting on the situation on this axis, have indicated that despite conducting numerous counter-attacks, Russian forces have been unable to push the Ukrainians back from the key railway line.
DONETSK: Russian forces have made marginal advances in ongoing offensive operations near Avdiivka over the last 48 hours. Geolocated footage posted on 23 October indicates that Russian forces have advanced south-west of Krasnohorivka, located around three miles (5km) north-east of Avdiivka. One Russian milblogger claimed on 23 October that Russian forces continue to advance along the railway in Krasnohorivka and have advanced up to 1.2 miles (2km) in this area over the last few days. A Ukrainian source acknowledged that Russian forces have gained a ‘foothold’ at the crossroads west of Krasnohorivka, but denied that they have broken through to the railway line. The same Ukrainian source also reported that Russian forces have pushed back Ukrainian units at Sieverne, though only by about 200m, highlighting the difficulty involved in making progress in the heavily defended city.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 22 October indicates that Russian forces have likely made very limited advances south-east of Ivanivka in the direction of Kupiansk over the last 48 hours. One prominent Russian milblogger reported on 24 October that constant assaults by Russian troops have forced Ukrainian units to withdraw from numerous unspecified ‘strongholds’. The source also claimed that as a result of Russian pressure, Ukraine has been forced to shore up its defence of Kupiansk, a key transport hub. It is almost certainly the aim of Russia’s military leadership to divert Ukrainian resources away from the southern axis. A Ukrainian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces had intensified attacks towards Kupiansk, but claimed that they have made no substantial progress. The Ukrainian General Staff similarly reported earlier on 24 October that Ukrainian forces rebuffed attacks near Ivanivka.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 24 October that its forces had achieved ‘partial success’ south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). However, Russian sources also claim to have advanced further east. Russian Zaporizhzhia oblast occupation leader Vladimir Rogov claimed on 23 October that Russian forces launched a series of counter-attacks near Verbove, located around six miles (10km) east of Robotyne. He claimed that they retook numerous lost strongholds and positions. However, this cannot be confirmed.
SOUTHERN: Further east, Russian forces have been counter-attacking in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region, where they have made some advances. Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have steadily advanced north of Pryyutne, around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Various Russian sources claimed this week that their forces advanced over 1.8 miles (3km), but visual confirmation only indicates advances of around 0.6 miles (1km).
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported earlier on 24 October that its air defences intercepted all six Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russian forces overnight on 23-24 October. This marked the second day in a row that Ukraine reported a 100% interception rate, though the small-scale nature of both strike efforts means the interceptions are not necessarily indicative of a major improvement in air defences. The drones were reportedly launched from Crimea and were intercepted over Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv and Vinnytsia oblasts.
STRIKES: Russian forces have launched over 300 cruise missiles and nearly 400 Shahed drones in the direction of the capital Kyiv over the past 12 months. According to the head of Kyiv City Military Academy, Serhii Popko, the scale of Russia’s strike campaign underlines the need for increased air defences. The comments come ahead of an anticipated Russian strike campaign against Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure; they were likely timed to bolster Ukraine’s case for additional air defences from its Western allies.
MUNITIONS: On 23 October, Ukrainian analyst Colonel Petro Chernyk estimated that Russian forces are currently expending between 10,000 and 15,000 artillery shells each day. While this rate is notably lower than the peak weight of fire in the summer of 2022, when between 45,000 and 80,000 shells were fired each day, the current rate is much more sustainable and will likely enable Russian forces to continue offensive and defensive operations for the foreseeable future. On 20 October, the head of Estonia’s military intelligence, Colonel Ants Kiviselg, reported that Russian forces currently have around 4 m artillery shells remaining in their stockpiles; he estimated that these are enough for an additional year of ‘low intensity’ warfare. He also estimated that recent imports of North Korean container shipments, likely comprising some 300,000-500,000 pieces of artillery ammunition, would be enough to sustain up to a month of fighting at the current daily rate of fire. Ultimately, as Russia ramps up its domestic artillery production, its forces will likely be able to sustain combat operations. Ukrainian forces will remain much more reliant on Western ammunition donations to sustain their own rate of fire in 2024.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: On 23 October, EU foreign ministers once again failed to agree on EUR 500 m (USD 530 m) in military aid for Ukraine, reportedly because of Hungary. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s Europe stated on 23 October that Budapest wants legal assurances that Hungary’s OTP bank will be permanently removed from Ukraine’s ‘international sponsors of war’ list. While the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, confirmed that the negotiations did not result in an agreement to allocate the funding, he did not specify a reason. Hungary will likely continue to drive internal divisions within the EU in the coming months, particularly in relation to new sanctions against Russia or military aid for Ukraine.
PMCs: A private military company (PMC) operating under the control of Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has reportedly started recruiting women to serve as snipers and drone pilots in Ukraine. On 23 October, iStories reported that it had discovered an employment advertisement for a six-month contract posted by the Redut PMC’s Borz Battalion offering a starting monthly salary of RUB 222,000 (USD 2,355). In addition, compensation sums for battlefield injuries reportedly range from around RUB 1 to 3m (around USD 10,000 to 21,000); compensation sums for death stand at around RUB 5 m (USD 53,000). Recruits without firearm skills are reportedly being offered the chance to attend a month-long training course in Russian-occupied Donetsk.
PMCs: Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed in March that around 1,100 women were participating in Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, iStories noted that they typically take on what are perceived by some to be conventionally ‘feminine’ roles, such as cooks or medics. The aforementioned report underscores Russia’s efforts to expand its personnel sources by targeting women – including those with limited experience – and offering lucrative remuneration. The Russian and Soviet militaries have long histories of deploying limited numbers of female personnel to frontline combat positions, notably during the First and Second World Wars. Amid high attrition rates in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s clear desire to avoid formal mobilisation, the recruitment of female volunteers by PMCs is likely to continue into 2024.

FORECAST

ASSASSINATIONS: The Washington Post reported on 23 October that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and military intelligence (GUR) have allegedly conducted dozens of assassinations in Russian-occupied territories and deep inside Russia since 2022. The outlet, which cited unspecified Ukrainian and Western officials, revealed that these include the assassination of a former submarine commander in the southern Russian city of Krasnodar (Krasnodar krai) in July and the prominent milblogger Vladlen Tatarsky in a cafe in St Petersburg (Leningrad oblast). According to the Washington Post, the SBU also conducted the car bombing that killed Daria Dugina (the daughter of the Russian ultranationalist Alexander Dugin) in August 2022 near Moscow (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 22 August 2022).

While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, Ukraine almost certainly has the capability and will to kill high-profile Russian targets in Russia. The Washington Post reported that the SBU nearly killed Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. He was reportedly visiting the frontlines when Ukrainian forces attempted to strike his suspected location after obtaining information about high-value Russian targets. No further specifics were given as to when or where the alleged attempt took place.

The outlet also claimed that unspecified officials revealed that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has spent ‘tens of ms’ of USD to transform Ukraine’s Soviet-style intelligence services since 2015. The agency has also allegedly provided Kyiv with advanced surveillance systems, trained recruits in Ukraine and the US, built new headquarters for departments in Ukraine’s GUR and shared a significant volume of intelligence. However, the Washington Post claimed that Ukrainian-orchestrated assassinations have complicated Kyiv’s relationship with the CIA due to Russian allegations about US complicity in such operations. Although the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, continued high-profile assassinations (successful or attempted) will highly likely raise tensions between Russia, Ukraine and the US, especially in light of Washington DC’s clear attempts to mollify Ukraine’s special operations inside Russia. Future operations will also play into Russian narratives that the West, particularly the US and UK, are attempting to destabilise Russia by using Ukraine. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 25 May 2023.

Oct 23.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian counter-offensive operations near Bakhmut continue, but only marginal progress has been made in recent weeks. Ukrainian sources claimed on 22 October that their forces have stepped up operations along the key railway line that runs south from Bakhmut, and reportedly crossed the line north of Zelonopillya, located around seven miles (12km) south of Bakhmut. However, as in recent weeks, it remains unclear whether such attacks have successfully pushed the Russians back, given that Moscow’s forces are continuing counter-attacks in the area, which continue to constrain Ukrainian advances.
DONETSK: Russian forces likely intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka over the past 72 hours, despite high attrition rates and very limited success. Geolocated footage posted on 21 October indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances south-east of Pervomaiske, located around 6.9 miles (11km) south-west of Avdiivka, as the push to close the cauldron around the heavily fortified city continues. Tavriisk Group of Forces spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Russian forces more than doubled artillery strikes on 21 October compared to the previous day. However, Ukrainian sources also reported that Russian attacks along the Avdiivka sector were repelled.
DONETSK: On 22 October, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that Russian attacks near Avdiivka have caused a 90% increase in Russian casualties, as registered by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD). While these numbers are possibly inflated, it is clear that Russian forces have sustained very heavy equipment and personnel losses in the latest push to encircle Avdiivka. On 22 October, Shtupun also reported that high attrition rates have forced Russia to transfer military personnel from Russian territory to Avdiivka, which has increased the number of Russian personnel unfamiliar with the specific terrain and tactical picture along the front. A Ukrainian military observer similarly reported on 22 October that Russia committed additional formations to the front in recent days.
DONETSK: Meanwhile, DI reported that Russia has likely suffered between 150,000 and 190,000 permanent casualties during the course of the war (meaning those both killed and permanently wounded). The total casualty rate is likely between 240,000 and 290,000, not including Wagner Group casualties. The current costly Avdiivka offensive clearly indicates that Moscow is prepared to sustain very high casualty rates for the foreseeable future.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian sources claimed on 22 October that their forces had successfully pushed Russian forces out from the western outskirts of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). However, any further advances remain unconfirmed. Russian VDV Airborne forces operating in the area reportedly withdrew several hundred metres over the weekend, though this is unconfirmed. Reports of modest Ukrainian advances of around 200m west of Verbove, located around six miles (10km) to the east, also remain unconfirmed at present.
KHERSON: Ukrainian forces highly likely maintain a presence on the left bank of the Dnieper River after launching cross-river raids last week. Russian sources and the BBC Russian Service reported over the weekend of 21-22 October that Ukrainian forces are operating in the town of Krynky, located around 23 miles (37km) north-east of Kherson city (Kherson oblast), indicating Ukrainian forces have expanded their presence on the left bank. However, the full extent of this Ukrainian presence remains unclear; some Russian sources claimed on 22 October that Ukrainian forces have advanced 1.2 miles (2km) south of Krynky, while others denied this. Fighting is also reportedly taking place further west near the village of Pishchanivka, located around nine miles (14km) east of Kherson. Russian sources maintained earlier on 23 October that Ukrainian forces still control parts of Krynky, but have been pushed back towards the riverbank near Pishchanivka.
STRIKES: On 21 October, Ukrainian Southern Operational Command (SOC) spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces launched an unprecedented combination of strikes on 20-21 October. According to the SOC, Russia launched unknown air-to-surface missiles at Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts, as well as Kh-59 missiles at Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. Iskandr-K ballistic missiles and Shahed drones were also launched at Kryvyi Rih, while 30 modified KAB guided missiles were launched against frontline areas in Kherson. This combination of munitions was almost certainly geared towards identifying gaps and testing Ukraine’s air defences ahead of the winter months.
STRIKES: On 23 October, the Ukrainian energy company DTEK reported that Russian forces struck a thermal power plant in an unspecified location on 22 October. The strike reportedly caused ‘significant damage’ to equipment on site and repair works began immediately afterwards. Russia will highly likely conduct a systematic strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure over the winter months – as it did in the winter of 2022-23 – and is currently almost certainly probing Ukraine’s air defences. However, Kyiv has sought to bolster the resiliency of its energy system in anticipation of the upcoming strike campaign, with the 22 October attack likely part of a preliminary reconnaissance operation. On 22 October, the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that British Army Royal Engineer specialists have delivered training to improve Ukraine’s ability to plan the defence of its energy infrastructure and bolster security around national critical infrastructure assets.
STRIKES: Russia launched a more limited set of strikes on 22 October, including eight S-300 missiles, a Kh-59 missile, three Shahed-131/136 drones and two unspecified drones. While the three Shahed drones and the Kh-59 were intercepted, at least two S-300 missiles struck Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast) and Kostyantynivka (Donetsk oblast). In Kharkiv, a likely S-300 missile launched from Belgorod oblast hit a postal depot in Nova Poshta, killing at least six people and injuring 14 others.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine’s air force reported that it intercepted all 13 Shahed-136/131 drones, an unspecified drone and a Kh-50 missile launched by Russian forces overnight on 22-23 October. The strikes were reportedly aimed at unspecified areas of central, eastern and southern Ukraine. The interception rates underline the effectiveness of Western air defence systems, albeit against a relatively small strike effort in this instance. These systems remain most heavily concentrated against the capital Kyiv.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

SABOTAGE: Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced on 20 October that it is focusing on a Chinese container ship in its probe into the damage caused to the Balticconnector. According to the Finnish police, the Hong Kong-registered Newnew Polar Bear’s movements coincide with details regarding the time and place of the pipeline damage on 8 October. Meanwhile, Estonian investigators stated that they are still looking at two ships – the Newnew Polar Bear and Russia’s Sevmorput, which was also in the area at the time. Russia’s state nuclear-powered icebreaker company Atomflot operates the Sevmorput.
SABOTAGE: Rosatom, Atomflot’s parent organisation, has denied any involvement of the vessel in the Balticconnector sabotage. While Russian involvement has not been definitively determined, Moscow has both the capability and intent to conduct complex undersea sabotage operations. While Chinese involvement remains highly uncertain, the proximity of the Chinese vessel to the site and the current investigation will possibly elevate tensions between Beijing and the West. Some European capitals will regard the investigation as further evidence of the need for a comprehensive EU China strategy with a focus on de-risking, even if the investigation concludes there was no Chinese involvement.
AID: The German media outlet Bild reported on 22 October that the German government has not yet allocated enough funds to deliver sufficient military aid to Ukraine in 2024. The article cited a confidential memo from the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The 2024 budget will be approved in mid-November, though the MoD is allegedly concerned that the current draft budget allocates only around EUR 120 m (USD 127.2 m) for fresh military support to Kyiv. According to Bild, the German finance ministry has earmarked around EUR 4 bn (USD 4.2 bn) for military support to Ukraine next year, though the MoD has estimated that around EUR 3.1 bn (USD 3.3 bn) will be spent on projects that have already been announced.
AID: Bild reported that the German MoD needs billions more in funding to meet Ukraine’s defence needs. More than EUR 5bn (USD 5.3bn) is reportedly missing from the budget. This includes around EUR 2.34bn (USD 2.48bn) for repairs, spare parts and logistics, EUR 935m (USD 990m) for protective equipment, EUR 880m (USD 932m) for air defences and EUR 675m (USD 717m) for armoured combat vehicles, among other capabilities. While negotiations are reportedly ongoing ahead of the November deadline, the report underscores how growing budgetary pressures will possibly undermine Western military aid to Ukraine. A reduction of assistance, either through policy disputes or budgeting constraints, would possibly significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to sustain its war effort in the long term.
MOBILISATION: Russian riot police (OMON) reportedly raided a mosque in the town of Kotelniki (Moscow oblast) and took the worshippers to a military enlistment office. Independent Russian news outlet Meduza reported on 22 October that they were then forced to sign contracts with the Russian MoD or face criminal charges. According to Meduza’s source, the police forced the men exiting the mosque onto a bus under the pretext of checking their documents before sending them to a military enlistment office in neighbouring Lyubertsy (Moscow). Both towns are known for having a high concentration of migrants, largely from Central Asia. The incident underscores Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilisation efforts, as well as the disproportionate targeting of migrants and ethnic minorities within Russia. For further analysis, please see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 20 October 2023.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: Ukrainian Secretary of National Security Oleksiy Danilov stated in an interview published on 21 October that ceasefire negotiations with Russia will not take place as long as Moscow refuses to leave occupied territory. Danilov also emphasised that this includes Crimea, reiterating that Kyiv remains set on recapturing all Russian-annexed regions.

Danilov stated that he is convinced that the situation on the battlefield will ‘fundamentally change’ once F-16 fighter jets arrive, despite that fact that this remains a long-term prospect. Furthermore, he did not provide a timeframe for when Ukrainian forces plan to regain this territory, adding that it is hard to predict. The commander of US Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa, General James Hecker, stated on 18 August that while the fighter jets would bolster Ukraine’s air capabilities, they will not be a ‘silver bullet’. Additionally, Hecker noted that it may be several years before Ukrainian pilots build significant ‘proficiency’ on F-16s.

The national security secretary also stated that Ukraine has informally agreed not to use Western-supplied weapons in attacks against de jure Russian territory. This is likely aimed at easing concerns among certain countries, such as Germany, about sending long-range strike capabilities to Ukraine in the coming months, such as Taurus cruise missiles. However, he noted that Ukrainian forces could possibly use domestically produced arms to target facilities around Moscow. Ukraine has demonstrated its growing capability and will to target key Russian infrastructure in recent months, with Danilov’s comments implying that future attacks against Moscow are highly likely.

Meanwhile, the Russian authorities are almost certainly anticipating such attacks against Moscow and making preparations accordingly. On 20 October, Russian media reported that the Moscow city authorities want to more than double their security budget for next year to RUB 106 bn (USD 1.1 bn). Additional budget allocations will reportedly aim at ensuring the safety of the capital’s residents, as well as protecting the city’s facilities against ‘terrorism’. The increased security budget is highly likely aimed at minimising the impact of drone attacks ahead of the 2024 presidential elections. While incumbent Russian President Vladimir Putin will almost certainly be re-elected, the Moscow authorities highly likely want to bolster security to avert criticism that the Russian government cannot protect the city against Ukrainian attacks and other threats. (Source: Sibylline)

26 Oct 23. U.S. ambassador says Ukraine pilots training on F16s. The U.S. ambassador to Ukraine said on Thursday that Ukrainian pilots were undergoing training in the United States on F-16 fighter aircraft, a key element on Kyiv’s wish list to secure the weaponry it needs in its war against Russia.

The U.S. approved sending F-16s fighter jets to Ukraine from the Netherlands and Denmark in August once pilot training is completed.

“Ukrainian pilots are now training with the Arizona Air National Guard on F-16s,” Ambassador Bridget Brink said on X, formerly Twitter.

“This is an essential part of building Ukraine’s air defense. The United States is proud to work w/ European partners to support Ukraine against Russia’s brutal aggression.”

Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in the 20-month-old war last June and has retaken a number of villages in the eastern and southern theatres, but at a much slower pace than a rapid advance through occupied northeastern Ukraine a year ago.

The country is still subject to missile and drone attacks striking infrastructure, including its power generating network, as well as other targets.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has pledged to build an “F-16 coalition” and the Netherlands and Denmark have been among those taking the lead in offering to provide the fighters. Ukraine’s air force is made up mostly of Soviet-era aircraft.

(Source: Reuters)

27 Oct 23. Russia ‘executing disobedient soldiers’, says White House. The Russian military is executing soldiers who do not follow orders, the White House has said.

John Kirby, a White House spokesperson, told reporters: “We have information that the Russian military has been actually executing soldiers who refuse to follow orders.

“We also have information that Russian commanders are threatening to execute entire units if they seek to retreat from Ukrainian artillery fire.”

Mr Kirby condemned the alleged threats to execute the soldiers as “barbaric.”

He added: “But I think it’s a symptom of how poorly Russia’s military leaders know they’re doing and how bad they have handled this from a military perspective.”

Representatives from the Kremlin, the Russian defence ministry, and the Russian embassy to the United States did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

It comes after Ukrainian officials said that Russian forces were disregarding heavy losses and pressing on with a drive to capture the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka.

Mr Kirby said Russia’s mobilised forces were undertrained, underequipped, and unprepared for combat. He said the military was using “human wave tactics” by throwing groups of poorly trained soldiers into the fight.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

26 Oct 23. U.S. Military Continues Focus on Supporting Israel, Ukraine. U.S. efforts in the Middle East remain focused on supporting Israel’s defense needs as the nation battles Hamas terrorists in Gaza, deterring other actors who seek to use the Hamas war on Israel as a pretext to expand the conflict and to ensure force protection for U.S. forces serving in the region, Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said today.

Approximately 900 U.S. troops are in the process of deploying to the U.S. Central Command area of operations, Ryder said.

These include forces that had previously been put on prepare-to-deploy status and they are deploying from the continental United States.

Deployed and deploying units include a terminal high-altitude area defense battery from Fort Bliss, Texas; Patriot batteries from Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Patriot and Avenger batteries from Fort Liberty, North Carolina and associated air defense headquarters elements from Fort Bliss and Fort Cavazos, Texas.

“I won’t talk specific deployment locations for these forces, I can confirm that they are not going to Israel,” Ryder said. The units and personnel are intended to support regional deterrence efforts and further bolster U.S. force protection capabilities.

Ryder said that between October 17 and 26, U.S. and coalition forces have been attacked at least 12 separate times in Iraq and four separate times in Syria, by a mix of one-way attack drones and rockets. The general would not provide specific groups that have claimed responsibility for these attacks. All he would say is “we know that these groups are affiliated with Iran.”

Ryder said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III continued his near-daily calls to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. He received updates on Israeli operations and Israeli military needs. “During the discussion, Secretary Austin reiterated the importance of ensuring humanitarian aid can be delivered into Gaza and repeated our calls for Israel to ensure the protection of civilians,” the general said.

Ryder confirmed that the United States is sending two U.S. Iron Dome systems to Israel to help further bolster air defense capabilities and protect citizens from rocket attacks.

Israel is not the only hotspot in the world, and Ryder said the United States is sending a $150m package of military aid to support Ukraine’s urgent security needs. “This marks the 49th provision of equipment from DOD inventories to Ukraine since August 2021,” he said. “This crucial security assistance includes air defense capabilities, artillery, ammunition, anti-tank weapons and other important aid to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing aggression and continue its fight for independence and freedom.”

The general reiterated U.S. leaders’ pledges to Ukraine that the United States will stand with Ukraine “and we will continue to have their backs.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

26 Oct 23. DOD Announces Up to $150m in Aid for Ukraine. The Defense Department announced today an additional security assistance package valued at up to $150m to help Ukraine counter Russia’s unprovoked invasion.

The package includes additional air defense equipment, artillery rounds and antitank weapons, among other equipment, to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs.

The latest round of assistance marks the 49th drawdown of equipment from DOD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. It reflects the United States’ continued commitment to supporting Ukraine and ensuring its defenders are armed with critical capabilities.

Last week President Joe Biden underscored the need for U.S. leadership against Russia’s ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine and following the deadly attack against Israel by Hamas terrorists.

Biden pledged the U.S. will not waiver in support of its allies.

“American leadership is what holds the world together,” Biden said in an Oval Office address last Thursday. “American alliances are what keep us, America, safe. American values are what make us a partner that other nations want to work with.”

“To put all that at risk if we walk away from Ukraine, if we turn our backs on Israel, it’s just not worth it,” he said.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. has rallied a coalition of nations in support of Ukraine and committed more than $43.9 billion in assistance to help the country defend itself.

Biden has formally asked Congress to approve a supplemental funding request that ensures the U.S. will continue to support its allies.

The request, submitted last week, includes funds for additional weapons and equipment to help Ukraine succeed on the battlefield and shore up its economy and critical infrastructure as it defends against Russian aggression.

The request also includes funds to strengthen Israel’s air defenses and replenish DOD’s weaponry inventory, which the department has drawn from to help arm Israel quickly since the attacks.

Additionally, the president is requesting funds to provide humanitarian assistance for those impacted by both wars.

The request also includes funds to strengthen U.S. security in the Indo-Pacific and along the U.S. southern border.

“It’s a smart investment that’s going to pay dividends for American security for generations, help us keep American troops out of harm’s way, help us build a world that is safer, more peaceful and more prosperous for our children and grandchildren,” Biden said.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

26 Oct 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s forty-ninth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This package includes additional air defense capabilities, artillery ammunition, anti-tank weapons, and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing war of aggression and fight for its independence and freedom.

This package utilizes assistance previously authorized for Ukraine during prior fiscal years under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) that remained after the PDA revaluation process concluded in June.

This security assistance package is another visible signal of the United States’ continued commitment to supporting the Ukrainian people in the face of Russian aggression. The United States remains committed to working with Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs, and the Biden Administration calls on Congress to meet its commitment to the people of Ukraine by passing additional funding to ensure Ukraine continues to have what it needs to defend itself against Russia’s brutal war of choice. Security assistance for Ukraine is a smart investment in our national security. It helps to prevent a larger conflict in the region and deter potential aggression elsewhere, while strengthening our defense industrial base and creating highly skilled jobs for the American people.

The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $150m, include:

Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
AIM-9M missiles for air defense;
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin anti-armor systems;
More than 2 million rounds of small arms ammunition;
Night vision devices;
Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing;
Cold weather gear; and
Spare parts, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment.

25 Oct 23. Australia deploys E-7A Wedgetail to Germany in ongoing support for Ukraine. Australia reaffirms its commitment to Ukraine with the deployment of an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft and an additional $20m in military assistance.

Australia continues to stand by Ukraine in its time of need, sending an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to Germany to support the lifeline of humanitarian aid and military assistance to Ukraine.

This deployment, along with an investment in equipment, underscores Australia’s support for Ukraine.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese expressed Australia’s commitment to Ukraine, stating, “I’m proud to confirm the E-7A Wedgetail has arrived in Germany to commence its important mission. Australia is honoured to provide this aircraft to help protect the vital lifeline of humanitarian aid and military assistance entering Ukraine.”

This deployment aligns with Australia’s promise ahead of Prime Minister Albanese’s visit to the NATO Summit in Vilnius.

According to GlobalData’s “Australia Defense Market 2023-2028” report, Australia’s Air Force possesses six of the AEW&C E-7A Aircraft, following the procurement of the Wedgetail from Boeing between the years of 2012 and 2015.

The E-7A Wedgetail has landed at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where it will embark on a six-month deployment as part of Operation Kudu. Accompanying the aircraft are up to 100 Australian Defence Force personnel.

The E-7A Wedgetail will not participate in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, nor will it operate within the airspace of Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine. Australian personnel and assets will not enter Ukrainian territory during this deployment, as it is primarily focused on providing support from a neighbouring nation.

In addition to the deployment of the E-7A Wedgetail, the Australian Government is allocating an additional $20m (A$31.6m) for military assistance to Ukraine, with the aid of the local defence industry.

This support package includes a range of Australian-developed equipment from companies such as DroneShield, Micro-X, Minelab, and SPEE3D. The items to be provided are de-mining equipment, portable X-ray machines, a 3D metal printer, and counter-drone systems, all of which will enhance Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy highlighted the solutions offered by the local defence industry, noting, “3D metal printers can be used to print spare parts while de-mining and portable x-ray equipment can provide life-saving assistance for Ukrainian personnel on the battlefield.”

This additional support brings Australia’s overall assistance to Ukraine to approximately $910m. This aid includes providing Bushmaster-protected mobility vehicles, heavy artillery, ammunition, and contributions to the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund.

Australia’s commitment demonstrates the solidarity of nations in safeguarding Ukraine’s access to humanitarian and military resources during these challenging times.

In 2014, Boeing Defense Australia secured a $901m contract extension from the Australian Defence Materiel Organisation to continue supporting the Royal Australian Air Force’s E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft fleet. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

26 Oct 23. Russia Uses Italmas ‘Flying Lawnmower’ Drones in Ukraine.

Russia has been combining the use of Shahed drones with cheaper and lighter domestically-produced Italmas UAVs in its attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Russian media suggested on 23 October that Russian forces had used new long-range Italmas drones and their variants for the first time in Ukraine during a drone attack on Kyiv Oblast.

Russian sources noted that Italmas drones are lighter than Shaheds and less easily detected and shot down. Russian military bloggers (milbloggers) pointed out that Italmas UAVs are cheaper than Shaheds, meaning they are cheaper to produce and deploy but carry less payload.

Russian sources say Russian troops are going to use Italmas drones in tandem with Shaheds.

ISW previously reported that Russia was likely trying to expand and diversify its drone, missile, and guided bomb arsenal to target Ukraine’s critical infrastructure ahead of the autumn/winter season. And the use of Italmas drones is likely part of the effort to diversify its munitions.

Russian media reports indicate that the Italmas are lighter than the Gerans (as the Russians call Shaheds – ed.), run on gas and make a completely different sound, like that of a lawnmower, rendering them harder to identify and shoot down. The code name of the UAV in production is Product 54. (Source: UAS VISION/y!news)

26 Oct 23. Russian generals ‘sacrificing own men’ in eastern assault on Avdiivka. Russian generals are throwing their troops forward in their assault on the eastern town of Avdiivka despite suffering heavy losses, Ukraine has claimed.

“The enemy is trying to move forward and then we beat them back,” said Oleksandr Shtupun, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s southern groups of forces.

He estimated Russian losses in the last six days as 2,500 dead and wounded in the area.

”This is quite significant even for Russia, bearing in mind that they do not look after their own men,” he added.

Over the past two weeks, Russia has concentrated on Avdiivka in Donetsk, a town known in peacetime for its big coking plant and now seen as a bulwark of Ukrainian resistance. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

24 Oct 23. Doodle Labs and UKRSPECSYSTEMS Provide Secure Data Links for Ukraine Defense Forces. Doodle Labs, a provider of advanced wireless communication solutions, has announced its strategic partnership with UKRSPECSYSTEMS, a manufacturer of cutting-edge unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This collaboration aims to address the critical challenges faced by drone manufacturers supplying UAS to the Ukraine defense forces and elevate the operational capabilities of the Mini Shark UAV.

Ukraine defense forces have encountered significant hurdles when deploying UAVs, ranging from the persistent threat of Russian jamming techniques to challenging terrain and unpredictable conditions.

Recognizing the need for robust and resilient communication systems in UAV operations, UKRSPECSYSTEMS has integrated Doodle Labs’ battle-tested ‘Helix Mesh Rider Radio into the MINI SHARK UAV. This powerful on-board datalink solution is specifically designed to overcome the challenges faced by the Ukraine defense forces.

The Helix Mesh Rider Radio by Doodle Labs employs state-of-the-art patented multi-band wireless technology, enabling secure and reliable communication in the face of jamming attempts. Its advanced mesh networking capabilities ensure seamless connectivity, even in demanding and unpredictable environments. By leveraging the Helix Mesh Rider Radio’s cutting-edge features, the MINI SHARK UAV gains enhanced situational awareness, extended operational range, and unparalleled resilience against hostile interferences.

Operators in the field in Ukraine report being able to successfully transmit HD video up to 80 km and avoid active Russian jamming attempts by making use of multi-band Mesh Rider Radio’s six available frequency bands.

“We are thrilled to partner with UKRSPECSYSTEMS in revolutionizing the UAV industry by equipping the MINI SHARK UAV with our Helix Mesh Rider Radio,” said Ashish Parikh, VP Business Development for Doodle Labs. “By combining our expertise in wireless communication with UKRSPECSYSTEMS’ exceptional UAV capabilities, we can provide the Ukraine defense forces with a superior solution that addresses the unique challenges they face.”

The MINI SHARK UAV, developed by UKRSPECSYSTEMS, has gained global recognition for its exceptional performance, versatility and reliability. With the integration of Doodle Labs’ Helix Mesh Rider Radio, it sets a new standard in the field of unmanned aerial systems, empowering Ukraine defense forces to overcome obstacles and achieve mission success in even the most hostile environments.

“We are delighted to integrate Doodle Labs’ Helix Mesh Rider Radio into our Mini Shark UAV,” UKRSPECSYSTEMS said in a statement. “The partnership with Doodle Labs allows us to offer a cutting-edge solution to our valued customers, ensuring they have access to advanced technology that surpasses the challenges faced in UAS operations.” (Source: UAS VISION)

24 Oct 23. Support for Ukraine: Rheinmetall AG and Ukrainian Defence Industry JSC establish joint venture in Kyiv. The tech enterprise Rheinmetall and Ukraine’s state-owned Ukrainian Defense Industry JSC (UDI, the former Ukroboronprom) have set up a joint venture company in Kyiv. Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine’s Prime Minister, made the announcement on the occasion of the German-Ukrainian Business Forum in Berlin, which was also attended by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Rheinmetall Ukrainian Defense Industry LLC has already been operating since 18 October 2023. It is jointly owned by Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH, with a 51% stake, and UDI, which holds the remaining 49%.

Strategic cooperation in the defence realm between the two organizations began back in May 2023. On 28 September 2023 Germany’s Federal Cartel Office gave the new joint venture the green light, followed by approval from the relevant agencies in Poland and Ukraine in early October. A few days later Rheinmetall Ukrainian Defense Industry was officially registered and commenced operations.

The joint venture will be active in the fields of service and maintenance as well as assembly, production and development of military vehicles, and will initially operate solely on Ukrainian sovereign territory. “In Germany there are no competition overlaps and no indications of competition-related concerns”, stated the Federal Cartel Office in a press release dated 28 September 2023.

First announced in May 2023, cooperation between Rheinmetall and the Ukrainian defence sector is intended to strengthen Ukraine’s domestic defence industry and, ultimately, its national security. The plan calls for creating joint defence industry capabilities in Ukraine.

Ukraine stands to benefit from this cooperation in multiple ways, including the creation and expansion of defence technology capacities in-country, additional local added value as well as the swift delivery of military equipment from Germany.

Service and maintenance of military vehicles supplied to Ukraine either directly or via the German government’s “Ringtausch” multilateral equipment exchange projects form the first step in cooperation between Rheinmetall and UDI. The cooperation will soon extend to the joint production in Ukraine of selected Rheinmetall products.

About Rheinmetall: Headquartered in Düsseldorf, Rheinmetall AG is a technology enterprise with some 28,000 employees at 132 locations worldwide. In 2022 the Group had sales of €6.4 bn. One of the world’s foremost defence contractors, Rheinmetall is also a driver of forward-looking technological and industrial innovation in the civil sector. A strong orientation to sustainability is an integral component of Rheinmetall corporate strategy.

About Ukrainian Defense Industry JSC (the former Ukroboronprom): A state-owned enterprise, Ukrainian Defense Industry JSC has 67,000 employees engaged, among other things, in the production and maintenance of armoured vehicles, missiles, artillery, radar and aircraft. Since the first days of the Russian invasion, the company has been tirelessly supporting the nation’s war effort.

24 Oct 23. Russia Using Simple Aeromodelling Club Wooden Drones.

During the shelling of Ukraine on Sunday, October 22, Russian troops launched two drones of an unknown type. Various sources evidence that these devices derive their propulsion systems purchased from the Chinese online marketplace, AliExpress.

This was stated by the spokesman of the Air Force Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Yuriy Ignat, writes RBC-Ukraine with reference to the broadcast of the “My-Ukraine” TV channel.

“There are wreckage, there are remnants, you can see what the enemy is making them from. In fact, the engines were bought there from AliExpress, and this is how the enemy will use them. This is not the first time when this “plane” is sculpted from simple materials, as they say, “from sticks” and launch it towards our country,” he said.

Despite this, according to the speaker, drones of this type are a dangerous target

“This UAV is of an attack type, it carries several kilograms of explosives, so it poses a danger. These two UAVs were launched from the northern direction,”

Ignat added.

During an interview at the United News telethon, Spokesperson of the Air Force of Ukraine Yurii Ihnat noted that such drones are assembled of

“whatever is available at hand: a simple engine that can be bought online, and an airframe can be assembled at any aeromodelling club.”

A closer look at one of those that got downed by Ukrainians in May 2023 allows to see the details they can be made of: a fuselage of plywood, a bottle instead a fuel tank, and more interestingly, a corner reflector that makes the drone times more conspicuous to radars. Experts suggested that the Russian idea is to send these drones in as decoys and force Ukrainian soldiers to spend valuable missiles on them instead of real targets.

While in the air, it is impossible to find out whether such a drone carries any explosives or not, so it needs to be destroyed regardless, and hence succeeds in exhausting Ukrainian air defense.

“It is a target we have to react to and eliminate. That is exactly what we did today,” Ihnat stressed.

Worth noting, during the last russian missile shelling campaign throughout the fall and winter of 2022–2023, when the Shahed-136 munitions first appeared in russia, they were regarded as means for exhausting and distracting Ukrainian air defense in the same way.

However, at this point cruise missiles have been almost phased out, and Shaheds have practically become the main weapon of russian remote attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Now they deploy these “drones of unknown type” to avert the attention of Ukrainian air defenses from the barrage of Shaheds.

At the same time, Ukraine also uses similar solutions and even looks into the option of producing drones even cheaper than the russian wooden UAVs. Such as the PPDS (Precision Payload Delivery System) aerial drones manufactured by the Australian SYPAQ company which are literally made of cardboard. (Source: UAS VISION/Defense Express; RBC)

23 Oct 23. Launch of the Collective Defense AI Fusion Center (CDAIC) in Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy implemented the decision of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) of October 17 regarding the protection and ensuring the safety of the functioning of critical infrastructure and energy facilities in the conditions of hostilities. This is stated in decree No. 695 of October 17, 2023.

In line with this decision, the Ukrainian National Center for Cybersecurity Coordination and IP3 International, a leading energy security developer, are launching a Collective Defense AI Fusion Center (CDAIC) in the Ukraine that enables Ukraine and its allies to defend together in cybersecurity.

Ukraine and its energy infrastructure have been the target of sustained cyber-attacks from Russia and its axis of aggressors for more than a decade with an exponential escalation since the invasion of the Ukraine in 2022.

The CDAIC project is part of an ongoing investment in the reconstruction of the Ukraine through the Ukraine Energy Security Fund focused on energy security and infrastructure.

The CDAIC will work closely with the IT Coalition under the Ramstein Framework.

The CDAIC offers a platform and secure space for cybersecurity companies of allies to do product innovation in partnership with the Ukrainian National Cybersecurity Center and the private sector.

The CDAIC will include a cyber range to enable cybersecurity companies from Ukraine’s allies to train its personnel under real conditions of cyber war in country.

The CDAIC offers access to scarce cybersecurity talent by making experienced Ukrainian cybersecurity specialists on contract work available for the cybersecurity companies of allies.

The CDAIC offers a secure collaboration platform to share threat Intelligence in real time on threats of mutual concerns to Ukraine and its allies. The objective is to build a networked defense that is AI-based for the future defense of Ukraine and her allies. The network will give Ukrainian allies early warning of the type of attacks and malware that Ukraine is suffering from Russia and the axis of aggressors’ incessant cyber-attacks. The vital threat Intelligence sharing is Ukraine’s support and defense of her allies.

IronNet, Inc. (“IronNet”), the leading collective defense platform, is deploying its IronRadarSM early warning system as part of the CDAIC program and its IronDome® for collective defense that enables the sharing of threat Intelligence at machine speed.

The Chairman of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov said, “The provision of proper cyber protection, primarily of our critical infrastructure facilities as well as of our security and defense forces, is an urgent task for Ukraine today. Ukraine is making the maximum efforts to build an efficient platform to defend against Russia with partners in the cyber domain. The Ukrainian Government is building the widest possible alliance of partners with IP3 and IronNet to create a modern and innovative cyber security architecture. This alliance will allow Ukraine to strengthen the capabilities of the state significantly in the cyber domain as well as increase the resilience and efficient rapid response time to cyber incidents.”

Linda Zecher, CEO of IronNet said, “We are pleased to be deploying IronRadar and IronDome as part of the CDAIC program. Leveraging the network effects of peer threat correlation is a powerful way to combat the nation-state level cyberattacks that Ukraine faces. IronNet’s collective defense technology forming part of Ukraine’s security infrastructure is a vital step forward as we continue to drive shared situational awareness for cyber security operations centers worldwide.”

Rear Admiral Hewitt, CEO of IP3 International said, “We are delighted to partner with the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council and the National Cyber Security Coordination Center to bring the Collective Defense AI Fusion Center to fruition. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure needs urgent defending; we are highly committed to reinforcing Ukraine’s defenses through this partnership, ensuring the nation’s security remains steadfast.”

About The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine

The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine is the coordinating body in matters pertaining to national security and defense under the President of Ukraine. The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine shall coordinate and supervise the activities of organs of executive authority in the sphere of national security and defense. The President of Ukraine is the Chairman of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine.

About The National Coordination Center for Cybersecurity (NCCC) for Ukraine

The goal of the NCCC is to attract the technological and engineering potential of direct producers to cooperate with the NCCC, to use the existing installation base in Ukraine for critical infrastructure and to deepen cooperation with cybersecurity actors and private companies.

About IronNet, Inc.

Founded in 2014 by GEN (Ret.) Keith Alexander, IronNet, Inc. (OTCMKTS: IRNTQ) is a global cybersecurity leader that is transforming how organizations secure their networks by delivering the first-ever collective defense platform operating at scale. Employing a number of former NSA cybersecurity operators with offensive and defensive cyber experience, IronNet integrates deep tradecraft knowledge into its industry-leading products to solve the most challenging cyber problems facing the world today.

About IP3

IP3 is the lead U.S. integrator for the development and operations of peaceful and secure civil nuclear power in the global marketplace. IP3’s vision is to create thriving, peaceful environments in critical world markets through the development of sustainable energy and security infrastructure via public/private initiatives and industry-led partnerships. (Source: BUSINESS WIRE)

24 Oct 23. Russia destroys three Ukrainian drone boats off Crimea. Russian naval forces destroyed three uncrewed Ukraine-launched boats in the northern part of the Black Sea off the Crimean Peninsula, Russia’s defence ministry said on Tuesday.

”Anti-sabotage missiles and bombs hit the area where the unmanned boats were detected,” the ministry said on Telegram.

It added that an anti-mining and an “anti-sabotage” operation was being carried out off Sevastopol port, which is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. It was not immediately clear whether the incident caused any casualties or damage. There was no immediate comment from Ukraine.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

23 Oct 23. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he spoke with President Joe Biden about future U.S. support for his nation, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited a military headquarters near the Ukrainian border as the warring countries prepare for the winter and next year’s combat operations.

Almost 20 months of war have sapped both sides’ military resources. The fighting is likely to settle into positional and attritional warfare during the approaching wintry weather, analysts say, with little change along the more than 1,000-kilometer (600-mile) front line.

Zelenskyy said late Thursday he spoke to Biden by phone about “a significant support package” for Ukraine. Western help has been crucial for Ukraine’s war effort. The U.S. president is expected to ask Congress on Friday for bns of dollars in military assistance for both Ukraine and Israel, the same day he was to huddle with European Union leaders in the Oval Office and mull how they can help Kyiv.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said the latest U.S. pledges to back Ukraine would bear no fruit in the war.

“Mr. Biden hasn’t mentioned that all those efforts to deter Russia have proven inefficient,” Peskov said. “They will remain inefficient in the future.”

Zelenskyy also spoke Friday with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who “reasserted (Germany’s) sustained and steadfast solidarity with Ukraine,” according to the German government.

Putin visited late Thursday the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District, which is located less than 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Ukraine’s southeastern border. He was briefed on the war by the chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, the Kremlin said.

With the scale of the Western aid that Kyiv can expect going forward uncertain, and after a 5-month-long Ukrainian counteroffensive that drained Russia’s reserves but apparently only dented its front-line defenses, both countries are scrambling to replenish their stockpiles for 2024.

Ukraine has been expending ammunition at a rate of more than 200,000 rounds per month, according to Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London.

“Sufficient ammunition to sustain this rate of fire is not going to be forthcoming as NATO stockpiles deplete, and production rates for ammunition remain too low to meet this level of demand,” Watling wrote in an assessment published late Thursday.

Meanwhile, Russian production “has turned a corner,” he said. Moscow’s domestic ammunition production is growing quickly, at more than 100 long-range missiles a month compared with 40 a month a year ago, for example, according to Watling.

Also, Russia is reported to be receiving supplies from Iran, North Korea and other countries.

Though the counteroffensive has not made dramatic progress against Russia’s formidable defenses, it has suppressed gains by the Kremlin’s forces.

If Ukraine can keep up the pressure, it would further stretch Russia’s already strained manpower resources, according to the Institute for the Study of War.

The think tank based in Washington said in its latest assessment that “Russian forces largely lack high-quality reserves and are struggling to generate, train and soundly deploy reserves to effectively plug holes in the front line and pursue offensive operations.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)

22 Oct 23. Royal Engineers lead training effort to help Ukraine defend its critical national infrastructure.

Ukrainian civilian engineers have received training in the UK to learn techniques to protect critical infrastructure from Russian drone and missile attacks.

British Army Royal Engineer specialists have delivered a new programme of training to help Ukraine strengthen its ability to protect its critical national infrastructure (CNI) from Russian attacks and save civilian lives this winter.

Damage and destruction of CNI by Russian missile and drone attacks represents one of the greatest threats to the lives and safety of Ukrainian civilians following Putin’s illegal invasion.

The training will improve Ukraine’s ability to plan the defence of its CNI from such attacks, with trainees instructed how to identify the most vulnerable elements of CNI, potential blast ranges and impacts of different weapons and explosives, and where best to locate physical and aerial barriers to help protect these sites from Russian attacks.

Defence Secretary Grant Shapps said: “It is essential that Ukraine receives the support it urgently needs throughout the winter, as its civilian population faces mortal danger on a daily basis from Putin’s forces and their indiscriminate campaign of bombardment against its critical infrastructure. The Ukrainian people have demonstrated unwavering resilience in the face of this illegal invasion and this tailored package of training will help save lives during the bitterly cold winter months, where access to reliable energy is of vital importance.”

The two-week training package was developed and delivered following a request from Ukraine to further improve the protection of its energy sector and has already progressed in complexity from earlier courses focused on basic protection measures, such as use of sand bags and entrenchment.

Defence Secretary Grant Shapps recently announced a new package of support for Ukraine, procured through the International Fund for Ukraine, to provide £100m in capability to provide maintenance and manoeuvre support – including heavy duty plant vehicles to help shore up Ukraine’s defensive infrastructure. The UK also hosted the Ukraine Recovery Conference this year, where new support was announced including a £45m funding boost for Ukraine’s energy recovery.

Bringing together Ukrainian professionals from across the energy, water, transport, and academic sectors for the CNI protection training meant they could share knowledge and past experiences which ultimately will increase the resilience of the CNI network.

Major Michael Suddaby, from 63 Works Group Royal Engineers, said:

There is no doubt this training will be implemented in Ukraine in the coming weeks and have a real-life impact on the quality of life of its civilians and the ability for Ukraine to resist Russian attacks throughout the winter.

The Ukrainian participants were extremely motivated and will be able to apply the specialist force protection measures and the infrastructure assessment methods delivered on this course to support their country.

The Royal Engineers have drawn on specialist reservists, who work within the UK CNI sector and have employed their professional experience and technical knowledge to deliver elements of the training at a UK gasworks, military airstrip, and a port facility.

This is built upon experience from deployments including to Bangladesh to assess flood damage and Nepal to assess earthquake damage. The course drew on several real-life scenarios to provide Ukrainian participants with opportunities to practice plan development and implementation of practical solutions to provide their CNI facilities with the most efficient protection. (Source: https://www.gov.uk)

26 Oct 23. Slovakia and Hungary threatened to scupper EU unity on providing military support to Ukraine, as the bloc’s leaders gathered in Brussels for a summit where the conflict in the Middle East was taking centre stage. The EU’s financial and military support has been critical in Kyiv’s 20-month-long defence against Russian aggression, but Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán and his newly elected Slovak counterpart Robert Fico have spoken out against continued military aid, which requires unanimity. Fico said on Thursday ahead of the EU summit that his government would not vote in favour of any new measures to help Ukraine or sanctions against Russia without a full assessment of how they could affect Slovakia. “This is a very worrisome development and changes the dynamic,” said a senior EU official involved in projects to supply weapons to Ukraine. “It could be a real problem.” EU military support to Ukraine is delivered bilaterally but can be refunded by a Brussels-managed fund financed by member states, which requires unanimous support to top it up. The last increase to that fund took place in January, and subsequent attempts to top it up have been blocked by Hungary’s veto. Budapest now has an ally in the newly elected government in Bratislava. Orbán last week became the first EU leader to meet Vladimir Putin since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against the Russian president. The Hungarian leader defended his meeting with Putin and said he was “proud” of his country’s engagement with Russia. Arriving at the EU summit, Orbán said Hungary had a “clear and transparent policy” of engagement with Russia and Putin. “We would like to keep open all the communication lines to the Russians, otherwise there will be no chance of peace,” he said. Baltic leaders expressed concern at the prospect of EU support for Ukraine fraying. Lithuania’s president Gitanas Nausėda described Orbán’s interaction with Putin as “regrettable”. “It is really more than strange to see that we start to flirt with a regime that is committing very cruel atrocities on the territory of Ukraine,” he told journalists, adding that it was sending a “very wrong message” not only to Ukraine but to other EU partners. Estonia’s prime minister Kaja Kallas said a lack of effort from some member states in jointly producing ammunition for Ukraine risked giving “a signal that we are not taking defence seriously enough”. “I’m very worried that some are giving out signals that we can’t do this and we are not even aspiring to do this,” she said, referring to meeting Ukraine’s defence needs. With tensions and conflicts rising, Kallas said, “we don’t have time to think about this, but we have to do steps in order to fulfil our promises to Ukraine, but also to be more ready ourselves to really strengthen our own defence”. Aside from the conflict between Israel and Hamas and its possible ramifications for Europe, and the war in Ukraine, the EU’s 27 leaders will also discuss migration and a proposed increase to the bloc’s shared budget. (Source: FT.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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