NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 20.

*Russia: Proposal to strip citizenship highly likely aimed at coercing migrants to fight in Ukraine. The head of Russia’s investigative committee, Alexander Bastrykin, said on 19 October that migrants who acquired Russian citizenship should be deprived of it if they refuse to fight in Ukraine. On 28 August, a draft law was submitted to the lower house of Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, to strip acquired citizenship for evading military registration or mobilisation. The head of Russia’s human rights council, Valery Fadeev, criticised the proposal. According to Russia’s internal affairs ministry, over 691,000 people received Russian citizenship by the end of 2022. The latest threats are highly likely aimed at ramping up pressure on migrants (particularly from Central Asia) to fight and bolster manpower in a bid to avoid further rounds of national mobilisation, which would likely receive domestic backlash ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

*Moldova: Opposition will continue to leverage socio-economic problems to destabilise government. Early on 20 October, Moldova’s pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) majority voted against the motion of no confidence submitted by the opposition Communist and Socialist bloc. The opposition submitted the motion on 5 October, accusing the government of impoverishing the population and failing to tackle the rising cost of living. The opposition bloc said that given the government officials, including Prime Minister Dorin Recean, failed to address the subject of the motion during the parliamentary hearing, it will appeal to the Constitutional Court to authorise a second vote of no confidence. Although a second vote is also highly likely to fail, it reflects the opposition’s strategy to leverage socio-economic difficulties to undermine the government, especially ahead of the November local elections. In the longer term, failure to mitigate socio-economic health and energy security risks in the upcoming autumn-winter months will offer opportunities for the opposition to organise moderate-sized protests.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian sources continue to report that their forces are making slow but steady progress south of Bakhmut; they are reportedly pushing through Russian defensive positions along the railway line east of Klishchiivka (Donetsk oblast). However, there is still currently no visual confirmation of Ukrainian advances beyond the railway line, while Russian reports continue to be contradictory, with some denying any such advances in recent days.
DONETSK: On 20 October, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces resumed offensive operations near Avdiivka, with the aim of encircling the city. However, Russian forces continued to suffer heavy losses; the General Staff reported over the last 24 hours that 900 soldiers were killed or injured, while 50 tanks and over 100 armoured vehicles were damaged or destroyed. While this figure cannot be confirmed, and casualty estimates have often been exaggerated on both sides, Russian attritional rates are currently clearly very high. Furthermore, on 19 October, Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed five fixed-wing aircraft, including at least one Su-25 fighter jet, over the past ten days. Ukraine’s efforts to degrade Russian aviation capabilities will likely undermine the close air support provided to Russia’s offensive operations in the sector, particularly after last week’s attacks against rotary aircraft in Berdiansk (Zaporizhzhia oblast) and Luhansk (Luhansk oblast).
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 19 October shows that Russian forces made marginal advances north of Spartak, located 2.5 miles (4km) south of Avdiivka. On 20 October, a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces managed to occupy important unspecified positions north of Avdiivka. He nevertheless stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counter-attacks, dislodging Russian forces near Berdychi, located around eight miles (13km) north-west of Avdiivka.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 19 October indicates that Russian forces progressed north of Ivanivka, located around 12 miles (20km) east of Kupiansk. On 19 October, a Russian millblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makiivka, located around 12 miles (20km) south-west of Svatove, though such claims remain unverified.
SOUTHERN: On 19 October, a Ukrainian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces had advanced approximately 0.9-1 miles (1.5-1.6km) into Russian defensive positions west of Verbove, around 12 miles (20km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia). The source claimed that Russian VDV Airborne units immediately attempted to counter-attack, but failed to displace the Ukrainians. Other Russian sources reported earlier on 20 October that Ukrainian forces have renewed attempts to break through Russian defences around Verbove, though we cannot confirm these advances. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian General Staff also reported on 19 October that Ukrainian forces had advanced 400m at an unspecified section of the frontline in Zaporizhzhia.
STRIKES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that late on 19 October, air defences intercepted two Ukrainian drones over Belgorod oblast (Russia).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

MIGRATION: The head of Russia’s investigative committee, Alexander Bastrykin, stated on 19 October that migrants who acquired Russian citizenship should be deprived of said citizenship if they refuse to fight in Ukraine. On 28 August, a draft law was submitted to the lower house of Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, to strip acquired citizenship for evading military registration or mobilisation. The head of Russia’s human rights council, Valery Fadeev, criticised the proposal. Fadeev noted that the deprivation of citizenship is a ‘very serious measure’ which the Russian authorities should not consider lightly.
MIGRATION: According to Russia’s internal affairs ministry, over 691,000 people received Russian citizenship by the end of 2022. This includes more than 173,000 citizens from Tajikistan, 45,000 from Armenia and 42,000 from Kazakhstan. The latest threats are highly likely aimed at ramping up pressure on migrants (particularly from Central Asia) to fight in Ukraine and to bolster manpower in a bid to avoid further rounds of national mobilisation, which would likely prompt domestic backlash ahead of the 2024 Russian presidential election.
SABOTAGE: NATO announced on 19 October that it is increasing patrols in the Baltic Sea region following recent damage to undersea infrastructure. Additional surveillance and reconnaissance assets will be deployed, including maritime patrol aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft and drones. A fleet of four NATO minehunters is also being dispatched to the area. On 17 October, Sweden (which aspires to join NATO) confirmed than an undersea telecommunications cable linking the country to Estonia was partially damaged around the same time that the Balticconnector gas pipeline and another cable were damaged earlier this month (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 18 October 2023).
SABOTAGE: While Russian involvement has not yet been confirmed in either incident, Russia has both the will and capability to conduct undersea sabotage operations – including in the Baltic Sea. The additional patrols in the Baltic Sea are almost certainly aimed at preventing and monitoring for potential Russian sabotage in the region, particularly ahead of the coming winter due to the adverse impact on energy security. However, given the distances involved and the nature of submarine operations, undersea infrastructure will remain vulnerable despite the increased patrols.
BLACK SEA: On 19 October, Russia’s MoD reported that two Russian Su-27 fighter jets intercepted three UK Royal Air Force (RAF) assets over the Black Sea. The MoD stated that the Russian fighter jets scrambled to prevent the ‘air targets’, identified as an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft and two Typhoon fighter jets, from violating the ‘Russian state border’. However, the RAF aircraft allegedly turned back as the Russian fighter jets approached, and no border violation occurred. The RAF has not commented on the reported incident at the time of writing.
BLACK SEA: No further specifics were provided on where the alleged interaction occurred or how close the planes came to each other, though future such incidents remain highly likely. Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed on 18 October that he had instructed Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to permanently patrol the neutral airspace zone over the Black Sea using MiG-31 jets equipped with Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 18 October 2023). The growing re-militarisation of sections of the Black Sea, including its airspace, will continue to increase the risk of miscalculation with NATO aircraft in the coming months, particularly UK assets. However, even during such incidents the risk of an escalation towards a full-scale Russia-NATO military confrontation remains low.

FORECAST

AID: In a rare national address from The White House on 19 October, US President Joe Biden stated that the US is at an ‘inflection point’ in history, and that it must double down on its support for two key democracies which are under attack: Israel and Ukraine. He also announced that he was going to send Congress an ‘urgent’ funding request for aid to Israel and Ukraine on 20 October. Biden said he is asking Congress to ensure Washington DC can continue to send Kyiv the weapons it needs to defend itself without interruption.

The US president did not specify the sum of the request, though Reuters reported that around USD 60 billion will be allocated for Ukraine and USD 14 billion for Israel. Meanwhile, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters that it will also include around USD 10 billion for humanitarian aid, USD 14 billion for border security and USD 7 billion for the Indo-Pacific region. Half of the sum Biden is requesting for Ukraine will reportedly be allocated towards replacing and modernising US weapons stocks.

While the combined package is almost certainly aimed at improving the likelihood of Ukraine receiving further military assistance, it will be sent to what is an effectively frozen Congress. The House also remains without a Speaker, making it impossible to propose and pass legislation. It is therefore unclear if and when such assistance would be dispatched if it is approved by Congress, which is likely to be opposed by some Republicans (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 19 October 2023).

Separately, Axios reported on 19 October that the Pentagon intends to send Israel tens of thousands of 155mm artillery shells (which had been earmarked for Ukraine) from US emergency stocks. The outlet, which cited three Israeli officials, claimed that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the Israeli MoD told the US that they urgently need artillery shells to prepare for a ground operation into Gaza and a potential escalation of the war by Hizballah along the Israel-Lebanon border.

Axios also noted that the ammunition destined for Ukraine comes from a US weapons stockpile kept in Israel as part of an agreement between the countries. Axios also claimed that US officials have suggested that rerouting the shells from Ukraine to Israel would have no immediate impact on Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting Russian forces. However, should the US prioritise supporting Israel militarily in the coming weeks and months over Ukraine, Washington DC’s resources for Kyiv will possibly become stretched, despite reassurances from US officials stating otherwise.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba implied on 19 October that the US will supply Kyiv with more long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and will do so on an ongoing basis. Ukrainian forces reportedly used the projectiles to conduct the 17 October strike against airfields in Berdiansk and Luhansk. The provision of further ATACMS will bolster Kyiv’s ability to strike Russian logistics in the coming months. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 18 October 2023.

Oct 19.

BAKHMUT: Several Russian sources reported on 18 October that Ukrainian forces crossed the railway line near Klishchiivka, located around four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut. However, others have denied these reports. While the true picture remains unclear at this stage, Ukrainian forces have in recent weeks advanced to the railway line, which currently marks the frontline running south of Bakhmut. Limited crossings are therefore possible amid Ukrainian efforts to push further east as they attempt to interdict key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Russian forces in Bakhmut.
DONETSK: On 18 October, Vitaliy Barabash, the head of the Ukrainian Avdiivka military administration, stated that Russian forces are likely regrouping near Avdiivka and that new assaults are likely in the coming days. On the same day, the Tavriisk Group of Forces spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces are regrouping and that they aim to encircle the city. On 18 October, several Russian sources criticised the poor sanitary conditions in Russian units and bases, while on 17 October, a Russian source noted that Russian counter-battery fire is performing poorly and constitutes the main problem impeding Russia’s offensive. Such statements challenge previous claims by Russian mibloggers that Russian forces have learned from previous errors and that they have made necessary tactical adjustments, including better use of counter-battery artillery fire. While Russian forces will likely relaunch offensive operations in this sector in the coming days, they are unlikely to take Avdiivka in the short term.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
KHERSON: Ukrainian marine units are likely still operating on the left (southern) bank of the Dnieper River to the south-east of Kherson, though it remains unclear how long they can maintain operations without sizeable reinforcements. Russian sources reported on 19 October that Ukrainian forces are attempting to consolidate and expand their presence on the left bank, but that heavy artillery fire and counter-attacks are containing them at present, and even pushing them back towards the coastline.
STRIKES: Overnight on 18-19 October, Russian forces launched five Iskander-M ballistic missiles, one Kh-59 cruise missile, one unspecified cruise missile and nine Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down the Kh-59 missile and three drones. The Russian strikes targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Local reports indicate that a drone strike damaged infrastructure in Sumy.
STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that air defences in Crimea intercepted two S-200 missiles on the evening of 18 October. However, a Telegram channel reported that a missile struck a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) weapons storage facility near the settlement of Sakharnaya Golovka, directly east of Sevastopol. Mikhail Razvozhayev, the Russian-appointed governor of annexed Crimea, confirmed that an explosion took place in the area.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: US President Joe Biden’s administration is reportedly considering a USD 60 billion aid package for Ukraine in addition to USD 10 billion for Israel in a supplemental spending request. Reuters reported on 18 October, citing a source familiar with the matter, that the request will possibly be sent to Congress as soon as 20 October. Similarly, the New York Times (NYT) reported on 18 October that the package totals around USD 100 billion, and that it will also be used to bolster security along the US-Mexico border and to provide aid for Taiwan.
AID: According to the NYT, the funding request will likely cover a full year; this will also likely avert spending debates until after the 2024 US presidential election. While the entwined assistance is almost certainly aimed at increasing the likelihood of Ukraine receiving further military aid, several Republican lawmakers oppose the combined package, particularly as most of the funding is reportedly intended for Kyiv. As such, there remains a realistic possibility that an effort to combine Ukrainian and Israeli assistance in a ‘one and done’ package will fail to pass the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 10 October 2023.
NORTH KOREA: Russia’s foreign ministry announced earlier on 19 October that its top diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, met with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un. Russian state media reported that the meeting lasted just over an hour, though no further details were provided on what they discussed. At a meeting with his North Korean counterpart, Choe Son Hui, Lavrov stated that Moscow-Pyongyang relations have reached a ‘qualitatively new strategic level’; this follows talks between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September in Russia.
NORTH KOREA: Choe revealed the two states were building an ‘unbreakable comradely relationship’ under the leadership of Kim and Putin. In mid-September, Putin accepted Kim’s invitation to visit North Korea. However, no date has been set. As such, Lavrov’s official visit to North Korea was highly likely aimed at setting the groundwork for the Russian leader to visit Pyongyang in the coming months. The two states will highly likely continue developing their political and defence ties in the medium-to-long term; this will possibly involve Pyongyang providing Moscow with military aid to use in Ukraine. This will further elevate the risk of Western sanctions targeting both states.

FORECAST

ARMENIA: On 18 October, an unnamed senior Russian official claimed that the West is trying to turn Armenia into ‘Ukraine 3.0’ and compared Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This comes amid heightened tensions between Moscow and Yerevan in recent weeks.

The official stated that Moldova is ‘Ukraine 2.0’. This highly likely indicates that such statements reflect Moscow’s perception that the West is now attempting to promote anti-Russian sentiment within Yerevan’s leadership. Similar rhetoric from Russian officials or ‘experts’ in the coming weeks and months will almost certainly follow as part of a likely attempt to dissuade Yerevan from pursuing perceived anti-Russian policies and strengthening diplomatic and security ties with the West.

The Russian official characterised Pashinyan’s address to the European parliament earlier this week as ‘irresponsible and provocative, especially concerning […] Russian-Armenian relations’. In his speech on 16 October, Pashinyan criticised Moscow, claiming that alliances with Russia failed to guarantee security. Russia, which still regards itself as the principal security guarantor in the South Caucasus, will continue to condemn such comments; it has ramped up rhetoric in recent weeks after the Third Nagorno-Karabakh War accelerated Pashinyan’s turn to the West.

On 13 October, Armenia formally ratified the Rome Statute, meaning Yerevan is now required to enforce the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) arrest warrant against President Putin should he ever enter the country. Growing antagonism with Moscow will increase the risk of a Russian destabilisation campaign against Armenia, akin to that staged against Moldova. It will also increase the growing threat of a Russia-backed coup attempt, particularly if Pashinyan grants major concessions to Azerbaijan to prevent another war.

Oct 18.

KHERSON: Russian sources reported that Ukrainian marines launched a sizeable raid across the Dnieper River, seizing a bridgehead east of Kherson
STRIKES: The US confirmed the transfer of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine for the first time; they will likely force Russian commanders either to fortify or disperse rear area bases
CHINA: President Putin’s visit to China underscores Moscow’s growing economic reliance on Beijing amid its isolation from the West
FORECAST: Sweden confirmed that a separate undersea telecoms cable was damaged around the same time as the Balticconnector, significantly increasing the likelihood of Russian culpability
BAKHMUT: Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to attack and counter-attack at the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut, though the overall shape of the battlefield has not changed significantly. Geolocated footage from 16 October indicates that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances north-west of Zalznyanske, around seven miles (11km) north-west of Bakhmut. Meanwhile, Russian forces are reportedly counter-attacking to the south around Kurdyumivka, around eight miles (13km) south-west of Bakhmut, though they have not made any confirmed advances. Several Ukrainian sources have reported that Russian forces are building up reserves in the area, and that they are possibly preparing for further counter-attacks in the coming days.
DONETSK: On 17 October, Ukrainian military officials claimed that the intensity of the Russian offensive in the Avdivvka sector has decreased. Major Maksym Morozov, who is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Freedom Legion, stated that Russian troops have been unable to gain a foothold in the new positions which they recently captured and are withdrawing. However, Morozov noted that the decrease in tempo possibly means that Russian forces are regrouping and waiting for reserves and additional equipment supplies. He concluded that given the significant losses, there is a realistic possibility that Russian forces will pause their assaults against Avdiivka or conduct small-scale ground attacks in anticipation of further offensive action. On 16 and 17 October, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance near Avdiivka. However, such claims remain unverified.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 17 October indicates that Russian forces progressed nearly one mile (1.5km) west of Yahidne in the Ivanivka direction, around 12 miles (20km) south-east of Kupiansk. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reported on 17 October that Russian forces are prioritising operations towards Ivanivka and Synkivka, located around 12 miles (20km) east and five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk, respectively. According to Yevlash, Russian forces are consolidating advantageous positions in these sectors and are trying to advance as much as possible in the Kupiansk area before the cold weather slows down battlefield progress. Nevertheless, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) assessed on 18 October that Russian forces are highly unlikely to achieve a major operational breakthrough on this axis.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on 18 October that its forces had achieved ‘partial success’ south of Robotyne, located around seven miles (12km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). No further details were provided, though any partial success is highly likely to be very limited given the extremely slow progress Ukrainian forces have made over the last month.
KHERSON: A Russian news aggregator reported on 17 October that Ukrainian forces launched an assault across the Dnieper River (Kherson oblast) and took territory on the left bank of the river. Ukraine’s 35th and 36th Marine Brigades reportedly established a beachhead by capturing the town of Poima, before then advancing towards nearby Pishchanivka, located roughly nine miles (14km) east of Kherson city. This cannot be confirmed. As of earlier on 18 October, Russian sources report that their forces are counter-attacking and heavily shelling Ukrainian positions, as well as launching Iskandr ballistic missiles at Ukrainian troop concentrations in the area. However, Ukrainian forces still reportedly maintain a bridgehead around the two towns. The size of the Ukrainian attack remains unclear. It is also challenging to assess whether Kyiv will commit additional reinforcements in an attempt to keep the bridgehead open. If they do so, such an operation will likely aim at drawing off Russian forces from other critical frontlines in the east.
STRIKES: On 17 October, Western media outlets confirmed that the US secretly provided Ukraine with army tactical missile system (ATACMS) missiles with a range of 103 miles (165km). According to Politico, Washington DC approved the provision on 21 September. Ukrainian forces reportedly used such projectiles to conduct the 17 October strike against airfields in Berdiansk (Zaporizhzhia) and Luhansk (Luhansk oblast). Late on 17 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the missiles had ‘proven themselves’, though he did not confirm whether they were used in the 17 October strike. Nevertheless, Russian sources posted images of ATACMS cluster submunitions found in Berdiansk following the latest strike. Russian military personnel near the base also claimed the strike was one of the most devastating attacks against their army aviation capabilities of the whole war.
STRIKES: Kyiv’s ATACMS strike will likely force Russia to disperse its aviation assets and ammunition depots, which will likely undermine its ability to support defensive operations rapidly across southern Ukraine. Subsequently, Russian forces will likely need either to fortify or disperse their ammunition depots, which will possibly further disrupt the supply of ammunition to the frontline. However, Kyiv likely has a limited stock of ATACMS missiles; unconfirmed reporting indicates that only 20 have been transferred so far. It also remains unclear whether Ukraine will have access to a steady supply of such missiles to retain a credible long-term threat to Russian rear positions and logistics.
STRIKES: The immediate Russian response to the ATACMS strike was possibly evident in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s confirmation on 18 October that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) will step up MiG-31 patrols across the Black Sea. These aircraft are armed with Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles. Tensions over the Black Sea are already high; increased MiG-31 patrols will possibly increase the risk of a miscalculation with NATO aircraft, particularly the UK’s air assets.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 18 October that its air defences shot down 28 Ukrainian drones targeting Belgorod and Kursk oblasts (both Russia). While Kyiv did not claim responsibility for the strike, the attack clearly illustrates Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities. The unusually large number of Ukrainian drones mirrors Russia’s large-scale drone attacks. At the same time, local Ukrainian authorities reported that a Russian missile struck a residential building in Zaporizhzhia earlier on 18 October. Details of the missile type have not been provided at the time of writing.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NEGOTIATIONS: Ukraine and its international partners reportedly agreed to hold the latest round of security advisor negotiations in Malta at the end of October. The negotiations will focus on President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Peace Formula (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November 2022). Earlier summits took place in Copenhagen (Denmark) and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) in June and August, respectively. Notably, China took part in the Jeddah talks. No major progress towards an international consensus on how the war should end was reached at either meeting. It remains unlikely that the Malta talks will expediate the end of the war; all indicators suggest the fighting will likely continue well into 2024.
AID: On 17 October, the US confirmed that all 31 M1 Abrams main battle tanks that had been pledged to Ukraine have been handed over. Despite the return of Ukrainian tank crews who had trained on the assets in the US, the deployment of the Abrams tanks to the battlefield will likely still take some time; the exact timeframe remains unclear.
CHINA: Earlier on 18 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit in Beijing (China), where he praised his ‘dear friend’ Xi Jinping and promoted economic co-operation. Putin’s visit is only his second known foreign trip outside of the Former Soviet Union since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin emphasised opportunities for China and other powers to participate in the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). He also praised the BRI for improving trade links. The summit underscores Moscow’s growing reliance on Beijing as an economic partner. For further analysis, see Sibylline Special Report – China-India-Russia – 10 October 2023.

FORECAST

SABOTAGE: On 17 October, Sweden confirmed that an undersea telecommunications cable linking the country and Estonia in the Baltic Sea was partially damaged around the same time that the Balticconnector and a separate cable were damaged on 8 October (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 11 October 2023). The damage to the Swedish-Estonian cable was reportedly sustained outside Sweden’s exclusive economic zone. Swedish officials publicly stated that the cause of the damage remains unclear. We previously assessed that the initial damage on 8 October was possibly the result of Russian sabotage.

The latest development only increases the likelihood that this was Russian sabotage. On 17 October, Finland’s Central Crime Police reported that it acquired information about two vessels that were operating over the Balticconnector site at the time of the damage, which the Estonian newspaper Postimees reported included the Russian oil tanker SVG Flot, as well as a Hong-Kong flagged vessel. While Helsinki has yet to confirm this development, wider OSINT investigations have confirmed that various Russian vessels, including the Sibiryakov (a ‘research’ vessel), were in the area.

Moscow has both the intent and capability to conduct complex undersea sabotage operations. It is likely doing so as a part of a strategic deterrence campaign amid heightened tensions with the West over the war in Ukraine. Given such a campaign offers plausible deniability, and reduces escalation risks, there is a realistic possibility of further Russian undersea sabotage operations in the coming months.

As we have previously assessed, key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) in the coming months will include the accession of Sweden into NATO, the establishment of an Estonian ‘contiguous zone’ in the Gulf of Finland (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 25 January 2023) and the ongoing investigation into the sabotage of Nord Stream. If the last TWI concludes that Ukraine was behind the sabotage, this will provide Russia with cover to conduct its own sabotage operations which it can (will) then blame on Ukraine.

*Ukraine: Exploitation of communication platform elevates security risks facing critical infrastructure. On 16 October, the security firm Trellix reported on a state-sponsored threat actor conducting a campaign using the communication platform Discord to deploy malware against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The campaign distributes a OneNote file pretending to be from dobro.ua, a Ukrainian non-profit organisation. The file contains references to Ukrainian soldiers and donations to bait users into clicking the malicious link. The attackers intend to target entities related to Ukrainian critical infrastructure and to exfiltrate information about these systems. Consequently, future campaigns against the same entities are highly likely to employ more sophisticated malware. The use of Discord for malicious activity typically involves the theft of low-level information; state-sponsored groups are rarely observed using it in operations due to their inability to control the command-and-control (C2) server fully. The fact that this new tactic was observed being employed by a state-sponsored group highlights these groups’ adaptability and capacity to exploit popular applications in order to establish long-term footholds in networks, elevating security risks facing critical infrastructure entities.

*Baltics: Damage to third piece of undersea infrastructure increases likelihood of Russian culpability. On 17 October, Sweden confirmed that a Baltic Sea telecommunications cable linking the country and Estonia was partially damaged around the same time as the Balticconnector and a separate cable were damaged on 8 October (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 11 October 2023). The damage to the Swedish-Estonian cable was reportedly sustained outside Sweden’s exclusive economic zone. Swedish officials publicly stated that the cause of the damage remains unclear. We previously assessed that the initial damage on 8 October was possibly the result of Russian sabotage. The latest development only increases the likelihood that this was Russian sabotage. Moscow has both the intent and capability to conduct complex undersea sabotage operations. It is likely doing so as a part of a strategic deterrence campaign amid heightened tensions with the West over the war in Ukraine. Given such a campaign offers plausible deniability, and reduces escalation risks, there is a realistic possibility of further Russian undersea sabotage operations in the coming months.

*Armenia: Bid to deepen ties with EU, shift away from Russia will sustain government stability risks. On 16 October, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed the EU Parliament in Strasbourg (France). Pashinyan stated that Armenia is ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integration by the end of 2023. At the same time, he reiterated that security alliances with Russia have failed to guarantee the country’s interests. Pashinyan further implied that following the mass migration of Karabakh Armenians to Armenia, ‘security allies’ made calls to overthrow the government. Pashinyan compared such efforts to a ‘plot’ that tried to undermine the government’s stability following Armenia’s military clashes with Azerbaijan in September 2022. He subsequently advocated to deepen the Armenia-EU relationship. Pashinyan’s speech underscores Yerevan’s persistent efforts to shift away from Russia to seek Western guarantees for its security in the region. However, the diplomatic move will increase the risk of Moscow leveraging growing anti-government sentiment to destabilise Pashinyan’s government in the coming months.

Oct 17.

BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
DONETSK: On 16 October, Ukrainian sources reported that Russia has committed at least two Central Military District (CMD) brigades to support the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps in the Avdiivka sector. Some newly transferred units which had previously operated along the Oskil-Kreminna front were subsequently replaced by the recently formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA). The reported deployment of these new units highlights Moscow’s commitment to sustain offensive operations in the sector, despite the high rate of losses it has already incurred. The UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) assessed earlier on 17 October that the offensive in Avdiivka is likely Russia’s most significant offensive operation since at least January.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage shows Russian forces made marginal advances past the E50 road, around two miles (3km) south of Avdiivka. Earlier on 17 October, a prominent Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces are consolidating freshly occupied positions and intensifying air and artillery strikes to disrupt Ukraine’s personnel and ammunition supply transfers. The intensification of strikes likely aims to compensate for the recent slowdown of Russian progress.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
SOUTHERN: Russian sources reported on 16 October that Ukrainian forces launched an attack west of Verbove using heavy artillery support and armoured vehicles, including Leopard tanks and Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Poor weather reportedly led to the Ukrainians calling off the attack, while Russian sources claim the attacks were broadly repulsed. However, they did acknowledge various marginal Ukrainian gains, pointing out that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 200-300m of Russian positions west of Verbove (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
STRIKES: A highly significant Ukrainian attack struck a key Russian army aviation airbase in Berdiansk (Zaporizhzhia) on 16 October; it likely caused extensive damage. Ukrainian sources confirmed by NASA FIRMS satellite data and Russian commentators reported that an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) likely struck the airbase; Kyiv claimed another similar attack against an airbase in occupied Luhansk oblast. Ukrainian special forces reported the attack destroyed nine helicopters, an anti-air launcher and ammunition depots. However, the full extent of the damage remains unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian air force has emphasised that undermining Russian helicopter capabilities (including Ka-52s and Mi-24s) close to the frontline remains its priority. Russian military personnel near the base claim it was one of the most devastating attacks against their army aviation capabilities of the war; it is therefore likely to have a profound impact on Russia’s ability to bring forward close air support (CAS) to the battlefield.
STRIKES: The head of the Russian occupation authority in Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, reported that Russian air defences intercepted eight Ukrainian drones over Crimea earlier on 17 October. The governor of Belgorod oblast (Russia), Vyacheslav Gladkov, reported that three drones were shot down near Belgorod city. Over the past few days, reports point to an uptick in Ukrainian drone strikes against bordering Russian regions.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that Russia launched six Shahed-136/131 drones and one Kh-59 cruise missile earlier on 17 October. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted all the projectiles. In addition, the Ukrainian authorities reported that Russia launched missile strikes against Izium district (Kharkiv oblast) late on 16 October.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BLACK SEA: A Liberian-flagged oil tanker, the Ali Najafov, struck a mine on 15 October off the coast of Romania in the Black Sea. Sources familiar with the matter reported that the vessel sustained minor damage and that the crew was unharmed. The Ali Najafov was transporting 5,600 tonnes of diesel fuel when the explosion occurred, according to media reports. It was reportedly sailing near the Sulina channel at the time. A Turkish-flagged cargo ship also hit a mine north of Sulina (Romania) earlier this month (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 6 October 2023). The latest incident underscores that floating mines will continue to pose a credible threat to maritime shipping. Mines hitting oil tankers will possibly also lead to ecological damage in the north-western Black Sea in the form of oil spills, which would possibly adversely impact agricultural businesses and tourism.
ESPIONAGE: Ukrainian Secretary of National Security, Oleksiy Danilov, claimed on 16 October that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) is actively attempting to form a new agent network in Ukraine. Danilov alleged that this is a long-term political project aimed at influencing the remnants of pro-Moscow Ukrainians with the intent to cause internal destabilisation. The official stated that the sharp intensification of various ‘experts’ and ‘intelligence actors’ promoting the Kremlin’s agenda in the Russian language are evidence of this new network.
ESPIONAGE: This new campaign reportedly involves pro-Russia networks promoting commentary regarding the ‘failure’ of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, hints at the need to revise the goals of the war and the necessity to negotiate with Russia. A poll by Ukraine’s Razumkov Centre published in May found that 64% of respondents opposed direct negotiations with Russia to achieve peace, while fewer than a quarter (23.1%) were in favour. While Danilov’s claims cannot be confirmed, Russia is likely attempting to create internal divisions within Ukrainian society and will likely continue to do so. However, such attempts are unlikely to be successful given polling confirms that the invasion has irrevocably turned the vast majority of the population against the Kremlin, and that Ukrainians are overwhelmingly committed to continuing the war and ejecting Russian forces from Ukraine.

FORECAST

AID: Euractiv reported on 16 October that talks to bolster the EU’s funding mechanism to sustain military aid to Ukraine, the European Peace Facility (EPF), are likely to be delayed. The talks are unlikely to conclude before the bloc’s leaders review Brussels’ entire budget in December. EU leaders are likely to discuss the bloc’s future finances following the European Commission’s (EC) proposed review of the bloc’s budget, as well as a new fund for the Strategic Technology European Platform (STEP) and a top-up of the EPF.

An anonymous EU official told the outlet that the bloc’s leaders will discuss a ‘whole package’ of support for Ukraine. This reportedly includes the EU budget mid-term review, the Ukraine EUR 50 bn macro-financial assistance package, the EUR 20 bn EPF-top up and the new STEP platform. Member states consider the EPF as vital as it allows them to donate their defence equipment to Kyiv and to be reimbursed in return. However, Euractiv claimed that EU diplomats consider that a decision on the EUR 20 bn top-up will possibly be ‘laborious’. Certain member states like Hungary and Slovakia will possibly attempt to delay such discussions, further slowing the provision of assistance to Ukraine in the coming months.

On 16 October, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico’s populist left-wing Smer-SD party agreed to form a governing coalition with the centre-left Hlas (Voice) party and nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS). Pro-West President Zuzana Čaputová will now need to approve the coalition. Fico’s Smer-SD party will take charge of the defence and foreign affairs ministries. As such, Bratislava will likely alter its foreign policy in relation to Ukraine. Fico has previously said his government would provide humanitarian aid and meet its financial obligations vis-à-vis Kyiv, but would not send ‘another bullet’ to Ukraine.

Earlier in October, a Slovak government spokesperson said the country’s outgoing caretaker government had halted further military aid to Ukraine amid coalition talks to form the new government. As Smer-SD will oversee Slovakia’s defence and foreign affairs policies, the prospect of the country providing military assistance to Ukraine in the long term remains unlikely. Bratislava will possibly also oppose further EU sanctions against Russia; this would likely deepen internal fractions within the bloc and undermine EU policy timelines, increasing the risk of more (and lengthier) delays.

Oct 16.

BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 15 October indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced marginally south of Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are making slow progress north of Klishchiivka, located around four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut, towards the railway line that runs south of the town. Further north, Russian forces continue to launch counter-attacks, with geolocated footage from 14 October indicating marginal Russian advances east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, around seven miles (12km) to the north-west of Bakhmut.
DONETSK: On 15 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russian forces are conducting ‘active defence’ operations in Avdiivka, seemingly downplaying the significance of the ongoing offensive. This differs from the more optimistic commentary recently made by Russian sources and likely aims to moderate expectations of Russian achievements in the Avdiivka sector. Over the past 48 hours, Russian milbloggers have acknowledged the difficulties faced by Russian forces, noting that the pace of Russian operations has slowed down, and that they remain highly attritional.
DONETSK: On 13 October, US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby claimed that Ukraine anticipated Russia’s offensive push near Avdiivka, and that it ‘did not come as a surprise’. However, it is clear that some Ukrainian units were not prepared for the initial attack, which involved some minor Russian advances around the flanks of the city. Nevertheless, Russian forces have taken largely unsustainable losses during the first phase of the attack, with Kirby stressing that they are launching highly attritional human wave-style attacks.
DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 13 and 14 October shows that Russian forces advanced south of Avdiivka and achieved limited progress just over a mile (2km) north of Avdiivka. Despite a slowdown of the tempo of Russian operations, Russia’s goal remains to achieve a decisive breakthrough in this sector. A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka, though they are unlikely to encircle the city for the time being. Nevertheless, the reduction of the tempo of operations possibly reflects Russian attempts to recover from tactical mistakes, as well as to reconstitute and prepare for intensified operations in the coming days.
DONETSK: Meanwhile, On 15 October, Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces launched successful counter-offensive operations in the Avdiivka sector and recaptured unspecified positions near Pervomaiske and Siverne. These settlements are located seven miles (11km) south-west and four miles (6km) west of Avdiivka, respectively. At the same time, geolocated footage from 14 October shows that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Marinka.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 14 October, Ukrainian Commander of Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces have intensified operations in the Kupiansk and Lyman direction. Syrskyi explained that after previously experiencing significant losses in the sector, Russian forces reconstituted forces for two months. Russian troops then reportedly resumed offensive operations in the Makiivka sector before launching assaults in the Kupiansk sector. Geolocated footage from 13 October shows that Russian forces made limited gains east of Makiivka. Over the past 48 hours, Russian milbloggers continued to claim that their forces made advances in the Kupiansk sector. However, such claims remain unconfirmed.
SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to launch counter-attacks on the southern axis, which are at once constraining Ukrainian advances and also providing Ukrainian forces with opportunities to exploit. Geolocated footage from 13 October indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kopani, located around eight miles (13km) south of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Footage from 14-15 October similarly shows Russian forces recapturing Ukrainian positions west of Verbove. Further Russian reporting on 14 October claimed that Ukrainian forces have been pushed further back in this direction, though we cannot confirm this assertion. Nevertheless, despite these marginal advances, a prominent Ukrainian milblogger stated on 15 October that Ukrainian forces are taking advantage of these counter-attacks; they claimed that Ukrainian forces have succeeded in advancing both west of Robotyne and east of Verbove in the aftermath of the Russian counter-attacks.
SOUTHERN: The Russian strategy of ‘elastic defence’ has largely contained Ukrainian advances in the south and prevented an operational breakthrough, though at a seemingly very high cost. Such counter-attacks will create vulnerabilities which Ukrainian forces can exploit. However, the fact that Russian forces are currently on the offensive around Avdiivka indicates that Moscow believes it has ample forces (including an unusually high number of armoured vehicles) in the south to contain Ukrainian attacks while simultaneously launching fresh offensives on a separate axis.
STRIKES: Overnight on 15-16 October, Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, five Kh-59 cruise missiles and 12 Shahed-136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted two Kh-59 missiles and 11 drones. Reports indicate that the strikes targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad and Poltava oblasts. Serhiy Lysak, the governor of Dnipropetrovsk, reported that the strikes damaged residential buildings and energy infrastructure in Dnipro and Nikopol (both Dnipropetrovsk). Falling debris also damaged residential buildings in Poltava oblast. Meanwhile, Kursk mayor Igor Kutsak reported that air defences intercepted 18 drones targeting the city overnight on 14-15 October. Falling drone debris reportedly damaged residential buildings.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

TRANSPORT: Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) announced on 15 October that it has launched a new train line between Lviv and Warsaw (Poland). It stated that residents of Bryukhovychi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kalush, Kolomyia, Lviv, Stryi and Zhovka (Ukraine) will now be able to travel to Warsaw or Lublin (Poland) with one transfer at Rava-Ruska due to differences in track gauges. Rava-Ruska is a Ukrainian town situated around six miles (10km) from the Polish border. The company stated that both trains can carry about 200 passengers per journey, though Polish media revealed it can carry almost 500 passengers in each direction. A Polish outlet also stated that it will run on a daily basis, with the journey from Lviv to Warsaw taking approximately nine hours; this will improve transport options for those entering Ukraine given all air travel remains suspended.
AID: North Korea has allegedly supplied around 1,000 containers of equipment and munitions to Russia, according to the US. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on 13 October that Washington DC assesses that Pyongyang is seeking Russian military assistance, including the provision of fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), ballistic missile production equipment and/or other advanced technologies in exchange for munitions. However, Russia is possibly reticent to provide fighter aircraft and missiles at present given the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, though the transfer of less-needed capabilities or technological know-how remains a realistic possibility. The White House released images that it claims demonstrate how the containers were loaded onto a Russian-flagged ship before being transported via train to south-western Russia. The containers were allegedly shipped between 7 September and 1 October from North Korea’s Najin to Dunay (Russia). Putin and Kim met last month in Russia.
POLAND: Preliminary results from Poland’s 15 October general election indicate that the centre-right opposition led by former prime minister Donald Tusk’s Civil Platform (PO) secured enough votes to form a majority coalition government. While the official result is unlikely to be announced until at least 17 October, and the nationalist ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party will likely be given the first chance to form a government due to President Andrzej Duda being a PiS ally, the initial results indicate that a Tusk-led Civic Coalition (KO) government is the most likely outcome. Tusk was critical of the current government’s decision to suspend future military aid to Ukraine, and stated during the election campaign that a Ukrainian victory is in Poland’s interests and therefore military aid to Kyiv ‘should not be questioned’. Although both PiS and PO are strong supporters of a Ukrainian victory, a Tusk-led government would be more likely to re-start military aid to Ukraine, though its spending programme would possibly place limitations on such ambitions.
POLAND: The most significant outcome of a Tusk-led government for Ukraine would be greater EU unity. Warsaw and Brussels have been locked in longstanding disputes over PiS’s judicial reforms and concerns over democratic backsliding, placing significant strain on general EU political unity. PiS has also been deeply critical of the German government. By contrast, Tusk is a former president of the European Council (EC) and has pledged to re-align with the EU. Polish-EU relations would therefore almost certainly improve under Tusk which would help improve EU decision-making on matters relating to Ukraine. Moscow ultimately benefits from cracks within the Western bloc and a key assumption in its war strategy is that Western resolve to support Kyiv will fade over time. As such, a potential Tusk-led government represents a small blow to the Kremlin, and will help offset the impact of a more ‘Russia friendly’ government recently elected in Slovakia.

FORECAST

CHINA: Russian President Vladimir Putin will attend the third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit in Beijing (China) on 17-18 October. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated earlier on 16 October that Putin will discuss with Chinese President Xi Jinpnig both countries’ ties when they meet.

In an interview with China Media Corporation ahead of the summit, Putin stated that Sino-Russian economic relations are diversifying each year. Putin added that he is ‘almost certain’ their trade turnover will reach up to USD 200 bn this year. Xi and Putin previously set this sum as a target to reach by 2024. The two leaders are likely to emphasise the importance of their trade ties at the forum; they will possibly sign various memoranda to further consolidate their trade partnership.

Putin also noted that the two sides enjoy ‘very diverse’ and significant energy co-operation. Russia exports around two m barrels of oil per day to China; this accounts for over a third of its overall total crude oil exports. China is also the second-largest buyer of Russian oil after India, underscoring the importance of Beijing in enabling Moscow to sell its oil to offset the impact of Western sanctions following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For further analysis on Chinese-Indian-Russian relations, please see Sibylline Special Report – 10 October 2023.

Putin insisted that Russia’s burgeoning relations with China did not develop as a result of current ‘world affairs’. Rather, he stated that they took shape over two decades ‘carefully and calmly’ in a clear effort to underplay the role of the Russo-Ukrainian war and Moscow’s growing economic reliance on eastern markets, namely China, amid Western economic sanctions. Putin likely wants to portray their relationship as balanced and mutually beneficial, though an imbalance in favour of Beijing is likely to dominate their ties in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)

20 Oct 23. Russians appoint new Aerospace Forces commander to replace Surovikin. Viktor Afzalov has been appointed as the commander of Russia’s aerospace forces, replacing Sergei Surovikin, Russian propaganda news agencies have reported. Afzalov was already acting commander when Surovikin commanded the Joint Grouping of Troops and Forces in Ukraine. Afzalov received the rank of colonel general last December. (Source: Google/https://news.yahoo.com/Russian state-owned news agencies RBC; RIA Novost)

19 Oct 23. Austin Says Croatia’s Support for Ukraine Is Commendable. The United States appreciates Croatia’s steadfast commitment to help Ukraine, said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III.

Austin hosted an enhanced honor cordon and meeting, today, welcoming Croatian Defense Minister Mario Banozic to the Pentagon.

Croatia’s commitment to Ukraine consists of numerous military equipment donations, including all of its Mi-8 helicopters, as well as humanitarian assistance, Austin said.

“All of that is making a real difference in Ukraine’s fight for freedom. I look forward to your perspectives on the challenges posed by Russia’s cruel invasion of its peaceful neighbor Ukraine,” he said.

Croatia has become a reliable defense partner and a valued NATO ally, he said.

Croatia has forward-deployed its forces to NATO battle groups in Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, the secretary said.

The nation has made impressive progress over the last 30 years, since the end of the Croation War of Independence, fought from 1991 to 1995. Since then, Croatia has become a fully integrated member of NATO and the European Union, Austin said.

“That kind of progress doesn’t just happen. It takes hard work and sound policy. And it takes a willingness to set aside differences and to look to the future,” he said.

“One of the bedrocks of a democracy is the strength of its institutions,” Austin said. Croatia’s ministry of defense and armed forces have both played pivotal roles in the nation’s transition to a peaceful and stable democracy, he said.

Austin said he looks forward to discussing Croatia’s defense modernization and its continued investments in its armed forces, as well as its ongoing state partnership with Minnesota’s National Guard.

Banozic said the United States is a strategically important ally to Croatia.

Croatia, he said, stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States to defend global security and deter aggression. “We are committed to this fight.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

20 Oct 23. Ukraine to receive ATACMS ‘regularly.’ Asked whether regular shipments and larger numbers of missiles were expected, Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba said they were.

“And this is a direct result of the agreement between President Zelensky and President Biden, reached in Washington during a personal meeting in late September.”

Earlier this week, the White House said it had supplied Kyiv with ATACMS and Ukraine said its forces had used such missiles in action.

It is not clear how many missiles have already been delivered. According to the New York Times, citing two Western officials, the US has sent about 20 of them so far. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

19 Oct 23. Russia deploys jets with hypersonic missiles to patrol Black Sea. Recent setbacks for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet sees Putin switch to an air-based approach with “visual control” of the Mediterranean.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he has sent military jets armed with hypersonic missiles to patrol the airspace over the heavily contested Black Sea following talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping yesterday (18 October).

“This is not a threat, but we will exercise visual control – control with weapons – over what is happening in the Mediterranean Sea,” Putin told reporters.

The move represents an escalation in Russia and Ukraine’s Battle of the Black Sea, as exemplified by tweets identified by GlobalData’s social media analytics. It has also intensified Moscow-Washington relations, given the increased proximity of the Russian Air Force and US Air Force transiting to and from Israel as the Middle Eastern conflict ramps up.

Putin emphasised that the MiG-31 aircraft, equipped with Kinzhal missiles, “have a range of more than 1,000km at a speed of Mach 9”. With 1,375km separating Israel from the Black Sea, the likelihood of US and Russian military aircraft occupying the same airspace has risen.

Already in the Gulf region is the USS Mesa Verde, an amphibious transport dock, the Bataan, an amphibious assault ship, and the USS Carter Hall, a dock landing ship, TIME reported.

These vessels carry E-2 Hawkeye surveillance planes and F-18 fighter jets, both of which are intended to deter other Middle Eastern parties from engaging in the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Russia’s strategic switch from navy to air force

Putin’s decision to opt for an air-based approach in the Black Sea is partly driven by Russia’s recent naval troubles in the region.

Despite Ukraine lacking a naval fleet, having scuttled its flagship (the Hetman Sahaidachny) in March 2022 to avoid capture by Russia, Kyiv has inflicted considerable damage on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in recent weeks.

On 22 September, Ukraine landed a missile strike on the Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters in Sevastopol, part of annexed Crimea.

Kyiv’s strategy of asymmetrical warfare, including the use of naval drones, has caused Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to withdraw from Sevastopol and relocate to Novorossiysk port – 381km away on the Black Sea’s eastern coastline. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

19 Oct 23. Russia loses aircraft, helicopter, 11 tanks and air defence system. The General Staff of the Armed Forces has reported that Russia’s losses in the war against Ukraine over the past day have increased by 630 servicemen, 1 fixed-wing aircraft, 1 helicopter, 1 air defence system, 11 tanks, 17 armoured combat vehicles, and 39 artillery systems.

Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook

Details: The total combat losses of Russian troops between 24 February 2022 and 19 October 2023 are estimated to be as follows [figures in parentheses represent the latest losses – ed.]:

290,680 (+630) military personnel
4,992 (+11) tanks
9,437 (+17) armoured combat vehicles
6,983 (+39) artillery systems
818 (+4) multiple-launch rocket systems
548 (+1) air defence systems
320 (+1) fixed-wing aircraft
324 (+1) helicopters
5,318 (+17) tactical UAVs
1,534 (+0) cruise missiles
20 (+0) ships and boats
1 (+0) submarines
9,337 (+34) vehicles and tankers
985 (+3) special vehicles and other equipment

The information is being updated.

The General Staff in its morning report on 19 October said, “Over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian Air Force conducted 15 strikes on areas where Russian military personnel, weapons and equipment were concentrated, and three strikes on Russian anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition, the defenders destroyed a Russian Su-25 ground attack jet and five reconnaissance UAVs.”

In addition, Ukraine’s Rocket Forces and Artillery struck two command posts, a Tor anti-aircraft missile system, a Zoopark-1M radar station and 11 artillery pieces belonging to the Russians. (Source: News Now/https://www.pravda.com.ua/)

18 Oct 23. Putin says US wading deeper into Ukraine war, calls missile supplies a ‘mistake.’ Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday that the United States was wading deeper into the Ukraine conflict and making a mistake by providing Kyiv with long-range ATACMS missiles.

He told a news conference during a visit to China that he had briefed President Xi Jinping “in some detail” about Ukraine. He said “external factors” and “common threats” served only to strengthen Russia-Chinese cooperation.

The Kremlin chief said Washington’s decision to supply the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), whose use Kyiv confirmed on Tuesday, “just prolongs the agony” for Ukraine.

“Firstly, this of course causes harm and creates an additional threat. Secondly, we will of course be able to repel these attacks. War is war,” Putin said.

“But most importantly, it fundamentally lacks the capacity to change the situation on the line of contact at all … This is another mistake by the United States.”

Ukraine had repeatedly asked Washington for ATACMS to help it attack and disrupt supply lines, air bases and rail networks in Russian-occupied territory. “A mistake of a larger scale, as yet invisible but still of great importance, is that the United States is becoming more and more personally drawn into this conflict. And let no one say that they have nothing to do with this. We believe they do,” Putin said.

He noted that the United States had sent two aircraft carrier groups to the Mediterranean in response to the explosion of violence between Israel and the Palestinians, and said he had ordered Russian planes with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles to patrol over the Black Sea.

Putin said it was good that the West was starting to talk about the need to solve the Ukraine crisis by peaceful means, though he did not cite examples.

Russia has long said it is willing to negotiate, but only if Kyiv accepts “new realities”, meaning Moscow’s occupation of more than a sixth of Ukraine.

Kyiv insists on a full withdrawal of Russian forces, including from the Crimean peninsula, which Moscow annexed in 2014. (Source: Reuters)

19 Oct 23. Counter-offensive proceeding as planned, Ukraine says.

Ukraine’s counter-offensive is proceeding as planned, the general leading Kyiv’s offensive in the south has said. General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi said Ukrainian forces were continuing with their planned advance towards the Sea of Azov. Troops from the southern group of forces “are continuing their offensive. They have had partial success to the south of Robotyne,” Gen Tarnavskyi wrote on Telegram.

Robotyne is one of a group of villages in the south that Ukraine wants to secure as part of the advance – aimed at severing a land bridge linking Russian positions in the south and east.

It comes after a former Ukrainian presidential adviser described Kyiv’s stalled counter-offensive as a “disaster.”

Ukrainian forces cross Dnipro river in major tactical advance

Analysts say ‘high-risk, high-reward’ amphibious operation may soon begin after bridgehead secured in Russian-held terrain

Ukrainian forces have crossed the Dnipro river and established a position on the opposite bank as they push into Russian-occupied territory in southern Ukraine, according to Russian sources.

Pro-Kremlin military bloggers said Kyiv’s troops had created a bridgehead, captured the town of Poima, and were pushing north towards the nearby town of Pishchanivka.

The two towns are south of a destroyed railway bridge and upriver from the Antonivka road crossing, meaning the Ukrainians have to make dangerous, amphibious crossings.

It was claimed that Ukraine, after massing units on the opposite bank, had managed to gain a foothold on the Russian-held side after a sustained campaign of artillery and drone attacks.

‘The situation has stabilised’

Unverified battlefield footage appeared to show Ukrainian forces being targeted by Russian artillery near a railway bridge on the left bank of the Dnipro, south from Ukrainian-held Prydniprovs’ke.

From the footage, it is not clear whether Ukraine has been able to establish a permanent presence in the area.

Another video appeared to show Ukrainian forces moving away from the initial area of fighting and back towards safer ground near Antonivka bridge.

Rybar, an authoritative Russian military blogger, said: “The situation has stabilised thanks to massive shelling of both the forward and rear lines of the Ukrainian navy.

“However, it is still a long way to completely surprise the enemy since there are reserves, and no one has cancelled plans for an offensive in the Kherson region.”

Until recently, fighting had almost completely ground to a halt in the Kherson region after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam flooded much of the potential battlefields. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

18 Oct 23. Ukraine develops jam-resistant radio. A handheld radio developed by Ukraine-based Himera Tech and operational with the Ukrainian armed forces has proven highly resistant to Russia’s electronic warfare (EW) systems, Janes has learnt. Known as Himera G1, the handheld ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio has been designed to fill a capability gap at the squad-level for an affordable tactical communications system that is resistant to jamming and has a low probability of detection, Misha Rudominski, co-founder of Himera Tech told Janes on 13 October.

Development of the radio was primarily driven by the need to overcome shortcomings with the Motorola radios widely deployed by the Ukrainian armed forces, which are not suited for military purposes, Rudominski added. (Source: Janes)

17 Oct 23. Ukraine fires US-provided long-range missiles on Russian forces -reports. Ukraine launched U.S.-provided long-range ATACMS missiles against Russian forces on Tuesday, according to media reports that citing unidentified sources familiar with the matter.

The United States secretly provided Kiev with the missiles, although it was not immediately clear when Washington sent them, CNN reported, citing two unidentified U.S. officials.

The ATACMS, or Army Tactical Missile Systems, were fired on Tuesday, their first use in the roughly 20-month-long conflict, according to the Wall Street Journal. Politico also reported on the acquisition and deployment of the missiles, which it said were sent in recent weeks.

The U.S. State Department said it could not confirm the reports and referred questions on military operations to the Ukraine government.

Representatives for Kiev could not be immediately reached for comment.

Kyiv has repeatedly asked the Biden administration for ATACMS to help attack and disrupt supply lines, air bases and rail networks in Russian-occupied territory.

President Joe Biden had told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Washington would provide Kyiv with ATACMS long-range missiles, NBC News reported last month, although the White House and Pentagon would not comment. (Source: Reuters)

17 Oct 23. All 31 Abrams Tanks in Ukraine, US Military Confirms to VOA. All 31 U.S.-made M1A1 Abrams tanks promised to Kyiv by the Biden administration have arrived in Ukraine, according to the U.S. military.

Col. Martin O’Donnell, a spokesman for U.S. Army Europe and Africa, told VOA that all of the Ukrainians who trained on the tanks with U.S. forces in Germany have also returned to Ukraine, along with ammunition and spare tank parts.

“We have lived up to our end of the bargain. From this point forward, it is up to them [Ukraine] to determine when and where they will deliver this capability,” O’Donnell said.

Military officials say it could take time before the Abrams are sent to the battlefield, as Ukrainian troops make sure they have needed support elements in place and determine when and where to use the tanks for greatest effect against Russian forces.

“I think Ukraine will be deliberate in when and where they use it,” O’Donnell said. “The Abrams tank is one hell of an armored vehicle, but it’s not a silver bullet. Ultimately, it’s Ukraine’s determination to break through that matters most.”

The first of the 31 American-made Abrams tanks were delivered to Ukraine late last month, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The delivery came faster than initial estimates and in time for potential use in the final weeks of Kyiv’s counteroffensive against Russian forces before winter sets in.

“Abrams are already in Ukraine and are preparing to reinforce our brigades,” Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram on September 25.

The Abrams will add to other Western tanks already in Ukraine’s arsenal as it fights to reclaim Russian-held territory in Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions.

The U.S. pledge to donate Abrams tanks earlier this year came alongside a pledge from European nations to deliver German-made Leopard 2 tanks, which Berlin had been unwilling to approve without a similar commitment from the United States.

The United Kingdom was the first country to agree to send Western tanks to Ukraine, pledging its Challenger 2 tanks in January of this year, which arrived in the spring.

British Major Nick Bridges told VOA shortly after the U.K announcement that Challenger 2 tanks can “take multiple hits and stay in the fight,” even as they are considered slower than the Abrams and Leopard 2 tanks.

“The battles in the Ukraine will be slow, and what you need is a heavy tank like a Challenger [2 tank] that can take a hit, and more so than a T-72 [Russian-made tank], which will probably be destroyed after one round,” he told VOA.

Russian forces hit a Challenger 2 tank in Ukraine for what appeared to be the first time last month. Video released at the time showed a badly-damaged tank ablaze, with a Western defense source confirming to news outlets that the tank was indeed a Challenger 2 tank and that all of the crew had survived the attack.

Ukraine has asked for hundreds of Western tanks for its offensive. They have received dozens to date.

Ukraine has intensified a campaign of missile and drone strikes to hit targets deep behind Russian lines, which has placed parts of the occupied Crimean Peninsula under repeated attack.

But with winter approaching, Ukrainian forces have yet to achieve a decisive breakthrough, a concern among Kyiv’s backers that has raised questions about the future of international support.

The Abrams tanks’ arrival in Ukraine comes as the United States provided up to $200m in additional military aid for Ukraine in a package last week. The Pentagon said the package included weapons for air defense such as the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, artillery munitions for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), TOW anti-tank missiles, and 155mm and 105mm rounds.

The package marked the 48th time that the U.S. has used the presidential drawdown authority to provide Ukraine’s miliary with equipment from U.S. stockpiles, and it was the first since Congress excluded new aid for Ukraine in a stopgap spending bill passed last month to prevent a government shutdown.

The U.S. has provided about $44bn in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022.

The Pentagon still has about $5bn of congressionally approved funding for Ukrainian military aid.

Soon after the stopgap spending bill passed, the House ousted House Speaker Kevin McCarthy from his position as speaker. The House has yet to vote for a new speaker, and new aid for Ukraine could hinge on who is selected. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/Voice of America News)

17 Oct 23. Strike on Russian air force ‘one of most serious’ since war began. Ukraine said it struck Russian helicopters in missile attacks on key airports controlled by Moscow’s forces. Kyiv hit Russian airfields, equipment and personnel, destroying nine helicopters, near the cities of Luhansk and Berdyansk, the military said on Tuesday.

“The Armed Forces of Ukraine made well-aimed strikes on enemy airfields and helicopters near the temporarily occupied Luhansk and Berdyansk,” officials said.

The attack was “one of the most serious strikes in all of the duration of SMO (Special Military Operation)”, according to the Russian military blogger “Fighterbomber,” who has links to the air force.

Rob Lee, the military analyst, said earlier this year that Russia had “transferred 20 helicopters to the Berdyansk airport”.

But Russian officials denied the strikes on Berdiansk were successful.

“According to preliminary information, our air defence system successfully intercepted enemy rockets,” Rogov said on the Telegram. “Information about victims and possible damage is being clarified.”

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

16 Oct 23. The Netherlands Donates Extra Patriot Missiles to Ukraine. The Netherlands will supply additional Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine. The government recognizes the country’s need to defend critical infrastructure. Minister Kajsa Ollongren, also on behalf of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, reported this to the House of Representatives today.

Last Wednesday, President Zelensky warned about Russian tactics to cut energy supplies. He did this during the meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) in Brussels, which brought together an international coalition of countries to coordinate military support to Ukraine. Minister Ollongren then announced that the Netherlands was working hard to provide additional air defense.

The Dutch decision follows Germany’s announcement of a new support package for Ukraine. This includes an additional Patriot launch system including missiles, and 2 additional IRIS-T anti-aircraft systems. The Netherlands itself previously supplied launch installations of Patriot systems and missiles to Ukraine. There will now be an extra delivery on top of that.

“Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, with continued attacks on both military and civilian targets, including critical energy infrastructure. With winter approaching, its defense is crucial. Additional support is also important to organize air defense throughout the country,” said Minister Ollongren.

Effects on the armed forces

The delivery of the additional missiles has a significant impact on the readiness and deployment of Defense. Given the need to support Ukraine, this risk is accepted. The material to be supplied comes from our own stock. Defense is taking measures to replenish these stocks as quickly as possible.

Earlier this week it was reported that the Netherlands had made a new donation to Ukraine. This package included drones, demining equipment and ammunition.

The total value of all equipment supplied is now more than €2.1bn.

(Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Netherlands Ministry of Defence; issued Oct 13, 2023)

16 Oct 23. Russia aims to break through Ukraine defences in northeast – Ukrainian general. Russia is aiming to break through Ukrainian defences in the Kupiansk-Lyman sector of the front line in northeastern Ukraine after a sharp increase in fighting there, the commander of Ukraine’s ground forces said on Monday.

Video footage released by the ground forces showed General Oleksandr Syrskyi meeting troops at an undisclosed location in woodland, and quoted him as saying fighting in the northeastern Kupiansk-Lyman sector had “significantly escalated”.

“The enemy is preparing, seriously preparing for offensive actions, bringing in staff,” Syrskyi said in the footage posted on the Telegram messaging app. “The main goal is to break through our troops’ defences and recapture our territory.”

Ukrainian forces recaptured the city of Kupiansk and nearby areas nearly a year ago, ending months of Russian occupation following Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, but Russian forces have gone on the attack in the region again.

The Ukrainian military reported in its daily update that fighting was raging along the eastern front, particularly around Kupiansk, and near Avdiivka and Mariinka in the Donetsk region.

Russia went on the offensive around Avdiivka last week and fighting there has been intense. A strategically important town with a large coking plant, Avdiivka is located in the northern outskirts of the Donetsk region, much of which has been occupied by Russia.

Ukrainian officials have repeatedly said Ukrainian troops are holding their positions in the east.

Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in the east and south at the start of June but in over four months it has reported only minor gains.

(Source: Reuters)

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