NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 6.

• BAKHMUT: Nothing significant to report
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Russian sources continued to report successful counter-attacks along the Vremevsky salient on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border on 5-6 October. Russian forces reportedly recaptured some lost positions east of Urozhaine, six miles (10km) south of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast), but this cannot be confirmed. Meanwhile, Russian and Ukrainian sources have reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to advance towards Pryyutne, 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka, but Russian forces claim such attacks have failed. Further west, Ukrainian forces continue efforts to expand the Orihkiv breach, and advance west and south of Robotyne and east towards Verbove. Russian sources claimed on 5 October that Ukrainian forces have been pushed back in various places, including around Verbove, but we cannot confirm this.
• KHERSON: Russian sources are reporting an increase in Ukrainian activity along the southern Kherson axis, which they assess as preparation for future river crossings. According to Russian sources, Ukraine’s 30th Marine Corps is being prepared to deploy to the frontlines, with increased use of drones along the Dnieper River. Ukrainian forces have in recent weeks been continuing reconnaissance operations across the Dnieper River delta, and further attacks remain a realistic possibility amid efforts to draw Russian forces away from the southern Zaporizhzhia front. A Russian source claimed on 5 October that elements of the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army and the previously destroyed 810th Naval Infantry Brigade have recently deployed to the Kherson axis. While we cannot confirm this, it would likely reflect enduring Russian concerns around the vulnerability of the Kherson front to such Ukrainian attacks in the coming weeks.
• STRIKES: On 5 October, a Russian launched a missile against the village of Hroza in Kharkiv Oblast, killing 51 civilians. The strike hit a café where residents were participating in a wake ceremony. Ukrainian Minister of Interior Ihor Klymenko stated the projectile was likely an Iskander ballistic missile. While the attack is undoubtedly one of the deadliest of the war, the strike does not necessarily indicate that Moscow is looking to step up attacks on civilians. Russia will likely continue primarily targeting infrastructure and military targets.
• STRIKES: Killing civilians en masse has no military advantage for Russian forces, as it uses valuable missile stocks and can in fact serve to boost Ukrainian morale on the frontline. As such, the missile strike against Hroza was most likely the result of an intelligence failure in identifying military targets. Its proximity to the Kupiansk frontline means Russian forces most likely thought it was being used as a barracks for soldiers, though this cannot be confirmed. The attack nonetheless underscores the high risk of civilian casualties arising from such mistakes and collateral damage. This is particularly the case in areas closer to the frontline where Russian intelligence can (erroneously) perceive or suspect civilian buildings being repurposed for military use.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 5-6 October, Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted 25 of the 33 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The drones targeted Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa and Zhytomyr oblasts. In Odesa oblast, drones targeted port infrastructure in the Danube Izmail port and reportedly damaged grain facilities, as part of the ongoing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s export capacity. Meanwhile, Russian Belgorod authorities reported that Russian air defences shot down six Ukrainian drones early on 6 October. On the same day, Mikhail Razvozhayev, the Russian governor of annexed Crimea, claimed that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) repelled two Ukrainian sea drones targeting Sevastopol.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: Politico reported on 5 October that US President Joe Biden’s administration is considering using a State Department grant programme to provide Ukraine additional military aid. Unspecified US officials with knowledge of the matter said the White House is exploring alternative options after lawmakers removed funding to avert a government shutdown. The two officials stated that one possibility is using foreign military financing, a programme run by the State Department that provides grants or loans to assist partner countries in obtaining weapons and defence equipment. However, a US official noted that Congress would still need to authorise additional funding for Ukraine if this option was taken to purchase further military aid, meaning that it could realistically be rejected. Another reported possibility could be asking Congress to redirect funding from elsewhere in the Pentagon’s budget to aid Ukraine, though this would require approval from lawmakers.
• AID: A two-day Reuters/Ipsos poll, which closed on 4 October, indicates that support is declining among Americans for arming Ukraine. While 41% of respondents believed that Washington should provide weapons to Ukraine, 35% disagreed and the rest remained uncertain. A similar poll in May indicated that 46% of Americans were in favour of sending arms, 29% opposed and the remainder were unsure. Should the American electorate’s support for supplying Ukraine arms continue to decline ahead of the 2024 US presidential election, this is likely to be a determining factor in the vote and, in turn, the US’ sustained military and financial assistance for Kyiv in the long term. A reduction or halt in US aid for Ukraine could considerably impede Ukraine’s war efforts from 2024-2025. Ultimately, Moscow’s strategy likely remains heavily contingent upon Western ‘war fatigue’ (perceived or actual), and Russian propaganda outlets and bot farms are set to capitalise on this narrative of declining support to boost its prospects of outlasting the Ukrainians in this attritional war.
• AID: On 5 October, several European leaders pledged to provide Ukraine with air defence systems after meeting with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky at the EU summit in Granada (Spain). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Germany would provide Ukraine with another US-made Patriot air defence system. However, he did not give a specific timeframe for the delivery of the system. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez promised the provision of another six MIM-23 Hawk air defence systems. On 6 October, Sweden announced that it would send a new military aid package worth around USD 200 m to Ukraine, which consists mainly of artillery ammunition, spare parts, as well as infantry equipment. However, Stockholm also said it has asked its armed forces to assess whether Sweden can deliver Gripen fighter jets to Kyiv. While Swedish Defence Minister Pal Jonson stated that the report for potentially sending the planes is due on 6 November, he noted that Sweden would need to become a NATO member before it could potentially send any spare jets. Therefore, the provision of the planes could realistically be delayed for several months.
• GRAIN: A Turkish-flagged cargo ship hit a mine in the Black Sea on 5 October, though it sustained only minor damage. According to a British maritime security company, the vessel struck the mine north of Sulina in Romania, near the entrance to the Sulina Canal. No casualties were reported and the vessel resumed sailing around three hours later. An unspecified Ukrainian government source confirmed a ship had hit a mine, but said it was probably one from the Second World War, or landing mines that were left in the Black Sea last year. The UK stated on 4 October that Russia will possibly lay sea mines in the approach to Ukrainian ports to target civilian shipping in the Black Sea (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 5 October 2023). While the mine’s origin ultimately remains unclear, loose sea mines will continue to pose credible threats to the safety of maritime shipping, particularly in the north-western Black Sea, over the long term.

FORECAST

NUCLEAR: Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on 5 October while speaking at the 20th Valdai Discussion Club that his country had successfully tested a new generation of nuclear-powered cruise missile. The Burevestnik is a ground-launched, low-flying cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead (and is also nuclear-powered). The International Institute for Strategic Studies, which cited a Russian military journal in 2021, said the Burevestnik would have a notional range of up to 12,400 miles (20,000km) and a significantly lower notional altitude than a conventionally powered cruise missile. This would make it harder for air-defence radar to detect.

Putin also stated that Russia had almost completed its work on its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. However, the Russian president did not provide further details on this work, nor when testing of the Burevestnik took place. It is widely understood that the Burevestnik has been tested at least 13 times in recent years, almost all of which resulted in failure. Putin nevertheless insisted that there is no need for Russia to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons. The remarks align with our assessment that Moscow often resorts to nuclear rhetoric during periods of particularly heightened tensions with the West and military setbacks in Ukraine, though Russia remains highly unlikely to use a nuclear weapon.

However, the Russian leader hinted that Russia could withdraw from the nuclear test ban treaty. Putin added that the US has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), noting that it was ‘theoretically possible’ for Moscow to de-ratify the agreement. On 6 October, the speaker of Russia’s State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, said Russian legislators will consider revoking the treaty at the ‘next meeting’. According to Russian state media, this is scheduled for 9 October. Although the Kremlin has denied that it intends to carry out nuclear tests if it moves ahead with de-ratifying the CTBT, its potential revocation will highly likely raise suspicion between Washington DC and Moscow. It could realistically lead to increased covert testing on both sides, as we have previously assessed.

Separately, Putin also insisted that Russia’s war in Ukraine is not a conflict over territory, but rather about ‘principles’ underlying the new international order. Putin’s efforts to frame the war in Ukraine as the result of a Western-dominated world order are highly likely part of Moscow’s wider efforts to create a new multipolar world that is not dominated by Western interests. Ultimately, Putin’s speech echoes previous Kremlin rhetoric on the war, supporting our assessment that there has been no shift in Kremlin policy. Moscow remains determined to continue fighting for the foreseeable future.

Oct 5.

• BAKHMUT: A Russian source affiliated with the Kremlin claimed on 4 October that Ukrainian forces now occupy positions located less than 40m from the key railway line east of Klishchiivka, located four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut. Russian forces are reportedly counter-attacking and utilising army aviation helicopters in an attempt to slow the Ukrainian advance. However, armoured Ukrainian attacks are likely still making slow progress towards the railway line and the T-0513 highway beyond it. If Ukrainian forces can successfully break through Russian lines and reach the highway, they will be able to begin pressuring Bakhmut town itself from the south and to bring forward more artillery. However, progress remains very slow as various VDV airborne units continue to spearhead counter-attacks.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 5 October, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Ilya Yevlash reported that the eastern Oskil-Kreminna axis is currently ‘more difficult’ than Bakhmut. Yevlash reported that Russian forces have stepped up their rate of Su-35 multi-role aircraft sorties, together with Su-25 fighter bomber and Ka-52 attack helicopter attacks. On 3 October, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian airstrikes have destroyed at least five bridges across the Oskil River in recent weeks, likely aimed at disrupting Ukrainian reinforcements. However, such claims have yet to be visually confirmed. Russian forces are reportedly now focusing the majority of their offensive efforts on Makiivka, located around 19 miles (30km) north-west of Kreminna, where Ukrainian forces are currently facing mounting pressure. On 5 October, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have managed to capture positions on the outskirts of Makiivka. We cannot confirm these claims at present.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 4 October indicates that Ukrainian forces have made marginal progress east of Novoprokopivka, located around 2.5 miles (4km) south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Ukrainian officials have claimed ‘partial success’ in this direction in recent days, with heavy fighting taking place along the T-0408 road. Further east along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border, Russian forces are seemingly stepping up their tempo of counter-attacks, though we cannot confirm whether they have made advances. Russian sources reported on 4 October that unspecified Spetsnaz units have repelled Ukrainian forces near Pryyutne, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Zaporizhzhia). Other Russian sources also claim that separate Russian units are advancing along the Vremevsky salient, though we cannot confirm this.
• STRIKES: Ukraine’s air force reported that its air defences intercepted 24 of the 29 Shahed-136/13 drones launched by Russia earlier on 5 October. The 24 drones were destroyed over Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts. The local authorities reported that the remaining drones damaged infrastructure facilities in Kirovohrad. Meanwhile, the governor of Russia’s Kursk oblast, Roman Starovoyt, reported on 5 October that drones hit infrastructure facilities in Glushkovsky, Korenevsky and Sudzha districts (all Kursk), causing power outages. On same day, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its air defences intercepted a Ukrainian drone targeting Belgorod oblast. These latest developments illustrate both sides’ willingness to retaliate in tit-for-tat attacks against infrastructure. These dynamics are likely to continue ahead of Moscow’s likely winter strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: Turkey is reportedly preparing to host the third international gathering aimed at building support for a peace summit later this year. Bloomberg reported on 4 October that the meeting is tentatively scheduled to take place in Istanbul later in October. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ten-point peace plan is likely to be on the agenda, which calls for Russia to withdraw all troops from Ukrainian territory and the restoration of Ukraine’s state borders, among other demands. Russia is reportedly not invited, which is likely to enable the Ukrainian side to present its conditions for peace to countries which have taken a ‘neutral’ position on the war without objections from Moscow. While both Ukraine and Russia are unwilling to engage in negotiations at present, further events promoting Kyiv’s proposals are likely to continue throughout the war to rally ‘neutral’ states behind Ukraine’s conditions for peace. For analysis on Zelensky’s peace plan, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November 2022.
• AID: President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 4 October that while his country’s forces are steadily advancing, arms and ammunition shortages, namely for air defence systems, are causing difficulties. Although ammunition shortages are an ongoing concern, Admiral Rob Bauer, the chair of NATO’s military committee, warned on 3 October that Western ammunition stocks for Ukraine are running considerably low. Without Western production increasing significantly in the near term, ammunition shortages could possibly significantly hinder Ukraine’s war efforts.
• AID: On 4 October, Slovak media reported that President Zuzana Čaputová has opposed sending additional military assistance to Kyiv following the electoral victory of Robert Fico and his Smer-SD (Smer) party. The report stated that Slovakia’s defence ministry had considered providing a new aid package during the tenure of Prime Minister Ľudovít Ódor. However, the president declined, stating that the parliamentary elections must be respected. Fico previously vowed that Bratislava would not send a ‘single round’ to Ukraine. The report underscores that the Smer party’s stance has already hindered the provision of aid to Kyiv, which likely signals that Slovakia will reduce aid even further in the coming months.
• GRAIN: On 4 October, Bloomberg reported that Germany intends to supply Ukraine with additional air defence equipment to assist with protecting grain shipments from future Russian strikes. Unspecified sources familiar with the matter reported that Berlin will send one IRIS-T air defence system and more than a dozen Gepard anti-aircraft guns; they will allegedly protect grain cargoes heading to Romania along Ukraine’s southern coast. This will possibly increase confidence among shipowners and crews to resume, or even increase, maritime traffic flows heading to Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube River ports. The equipment will reportedly arrive in Ukraine by the end of the year; further IRIS-T units will arrive after they have been built. However, Bloomberg’s sources did not specify which routes the defences would protect. While Russia is highly likely to continue attacking Ukraine’s grain infrastructure and ports, additional air defence capabilities will likely increase Ukrainian interception rates during future Russian attacks (though they are unlikely to prevent drones penetrating air defences entirely).
• GRAIN: Separately, UK intelligence reports issued on 4 October reveal that Russia will possibly lay sea mines along the approaches to Ukrainian ports in order to target civilian shipping in the Black Sea. London assesses that Moscow wants to target civilian shipping using Ukraine’s ‘humanitarian corridor’ to deter the export of Ukrainian grain, thereby further pressuring Ukraine’s economy. The reports also note that Russia almost certainly wants to avoid being blamed for sinking civilian ships; they assess that Russia will likely place blame on Ukraine for any such attacks. We previously assessed that Russia likely lacks the capability or will to sink civilian ships, particularly as NATO announced in July that it was stepping up surveillance and reconnaissance in the region alongside its allies. Ultimately, the laying of sea mines would pose long-term risks for civilian ships in the Black Sea; it would also undermine revenue from maritime traffic for littoral states such as Bulgaria and Romania. Dislodged sea mines would possibly also pose risks for seaside resorts in these countries in the medium-to-long term.

FORECAST 

MARITIME: The leader of the pro-Russia Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia confirmed on 4 October that Russia has signed a deal to build a permanent naval base on its Black Sea coast. The new base will allegedly be constructed in Ochamchira region; the Kremlin has not yet confirmed any such news. The development is highly likely part of a radical shift in the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)’s presence in the region given the growing vulnerability of its surface fleet to Ukrainian long-range drone and missile attacks. Satellite imagery from 1-3 October also indicates that large numbers of BSF vessels have been transferred from their headquarters at the naval base in Sevastopol (Crimea) to Novorossiysk (Krasnodar Krai), some 210 miles (340km) to the east, where they are much less vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks.

While some Russian commentators claim the transfer of vessels is routine, it remains highly likely that growing Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets have forced the fleet to relocate in order to protect their increasingly vulnerable hulls. The decision is highly likely due to successful Ukrainian strikes against Sevastopol’s BSF headquarters and naval drydocks last month (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 13 September and 22 September 2023). On 4 October, Ukrainian Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that Russian ships no longer ‘dare’ sail beyond Cape Tarkhankut, the western-most point of the Crimean peninsula. However, in the absence of surface vessel patrols, the BSF’s naval aviation has taken on an increasingly pivotal role in fleet operations, with Humenyuk reporting an uptick in Russian airstrikes using guided aerial bombs against Snake Island.

Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to step up maritime operations across the north-western Black Sea; its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy is clearly bearing fruit as the Russian surface fleet retreats ever eastwards. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported on 4 October that special forces landed on occupied Crimea, where they inflicted damage on defending Russian forces before reportedly retreating. The Russian MoD claims that its forces repelled a Ukrainian raid (which reportedly involved high-speed boats and jet skis) with assets of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). Together with drone and missile strikes, Ukrainian special forces raids against Crimea are increasing in frequency, indicating that Ukraine is gaining momentum in the Black Sea theatre.

Oct 4.

• BAKHMUT: The Ukrainian General Staff claimed earlier on 4 October that their forces continue to advance around Bakhmut, reporting partial success near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, located around four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut. Russian sources have also reported on Ukrainian attacks along this axis, principally aimed at reaching the railway line that runs south from Bakhmut. However, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has claimed that these attacks have been repulsed, and we cannot confirm at present whether Ukrainian forces are making progress towards the railway line amid almost continual Russian counter-attacks.
• DONETSK: On 4 October, a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have managed to capture positions in an important contested ‘grey zone’ near Nevleske, directly west of Donetsk City. Meanwhile, the milblogger reported that Russian attacks remain unsuccessful in the Avdiivka and Marinka sectors.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 3 October shows that Russian forces made limited progress south-west of Kreminna. However, wider operations remain on trend amid an overall slowdown of the pace of Russian operations in the sector reported by Ukrainian military officials over the past week.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces continue counter-offensive operations south of Robotyne and west of Verbove (Zaporizhzhia oblast), but progress remains slow. There have been few indications of Ukrainian or Russian advances along the southern axis over the last 24 hours, though the commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk Group of Forces Oleksandr Tarnavsky did state on 3 October that his forces had advanced in the area, without specifying further. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol Ivan Federov stated on 3 October that Russian forces are continuing to improve fortifications along the southern axis. A complex trench network including two-tiered underground dugouts has been established near Novoprokopivka, 2.5 miles (4km) south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
• STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that its air defences destroyed 31 Ukrainian drones early on 4 October over Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions. Governor of Belgorod Oblast Vyacheslav Gladkov reported that falling debris damaged civilian infrastructure in Belgorod’s Grayvoronsky district. Kyiv typically does not claim responsibility for strikes against Russian de jure territory. However, amid the increasing tempo of strikes against Russia, the latest strike underscores Kyiv’s ability to carry out large-scale drone attacks akin to Russia’s drone attacks, thus underscoring Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• GRAIN: On 2 October, Bloomberg reported that ten ships have completed journeys to Ukraine’s major Black Sea ports without interference from Russia in recent weeks. Two ships reportedly reached Odesa on 1 October, meaning that vessels have now travelled to all three of Ukraine’s deep-sea ports (Chornomorsk, Odesa and Pivdennyi/Yuzhnyi) using Ukraine’s temporary maritime export corridor. While their successful journeys underscore the viability of using such routes, ships are still required to stay close to the Bulgarian and Romanian coastlines while heading to Ukraine. The risk of Russian interference in the Black Sea will remain credible in the coming months, however, despite numerous ships having completed incident-free voyages. GPS jamming remains a key issue for such vessels in the area. On 3 October, Ukraine’s First Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food, Taras Vysotskyi, disclosed that Ukraine exported 50,000 tonnes of agricultural products from its Black Sea ports in September. Although the minister stated that Ukraine hopes to increase the volume of agricultural products leaving its Black Sea ports in the coming weeks, it is unlikely that exports will reach the same level as under the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI).
• GRAIN: Meanwhile, on 3 October, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis announced that a corridor for the transit of Ukrainian grain to Baltic ports has been agreed. Landsbergis said that it will relieve pressure at Ukraine’s borders and increase supplies to Africa and other regions of the world. The grain will be exported from the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda by sea, where inspections for pests and plant diseases will take place from today (4 October). While the development will modestly expand Ukraine’s grain export capacity, it could also help in easing tensions between EU member states, such as Poland, over Ukrainian grain.
• SANCTIONS: On 4 October, Vsquare, an independent online media outlet, published an investigation unveiling how Estonia has become a hub for financial crime linked to cryptocurrencies. In 2021, 55% of the global cryptocurrency providers registered in Estonia. At the same time, Estonia’s efforts to attract these companies have created attractive opportunities for financial crime, including fraud, money laundering, sanctions evasion and illicit financing of sanctioned entities. Notably, the Russian far-right Rusich group linked to the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) was able to obtain foreign donations in cryptocurrencies worth hundreds of thousands of euros via the Garantex Europe OÜ, a cryptocurrency provider under US sanctions and linked to cybercriminal elements. While Tallinn withdrew the company’s cryptocurrency licence on 24 February 2022, it has remained active during the war, according to the investigation. The report further claims that Estonian-based cryptocurrency exchange companies have allowed Russians to convert rubles to other currencies, thus creating opportunities for sanctions circumvention. Given their deregulated and decentralised nature, digital exchanges are difficult to track and will continue to provide opportunities for sanction evasion and illicit funding for Russian-sanctioned entities.

FORECAST

EU: On 3 October, Politico reported that the EU is preparing to open negotiations with Ukraine on its future accession into the bloc. The outlet, which cited three diplomats familiar with the matter, said EU leaders are preparing to approve the beginning of formal talks before the end of the year. Roberta Metsola, the president of the European Parliament, insisted in late September that formal negotiations on the accession of Moldova and Ukraine into the EU should begin by the end of the year.

According to an unnamed EU official, the European Commission (EC) is due to issue a ‘progress report’ assessing Ukraine and other countries seeking to join the bloc in November. Another anonymous EU diplomat stated that once the progress report has been adopted, the EC will issue a statement that will make it ‘very hard’ for member states to disagree on opening negotiations for Ukraine. This is likely aimed at persuading more Ukraine-sceptic member states, such as Hungary and potentially Slovakia following the victory of Robert Fico in the country’s snap elections (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 2 October 2023). In late September, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said ‘very long and difficult questions’ needed to be addressed before the EU can begin membership talks with Ukraine.

European Council President Charles Michel said in an interview with Der Spiegel on 3 October that Ukraine may become an EU member by 2030. Michel did not give an assessment of how far Ukraine currently meets EU membership standards, however. An unnamed EU official meanwhile told Politico that Ukraine’s progress towards fulfilling the seven conditions required to start talks was encouraging, but noted that reforms concerning minorities appeared more problematic in the short term. Issues surrounding minority rights have been a point of contention for Hungary. Budapest could therefore realistically push back against unlocking accession talks if it considers that Kyiv has not made adequate progress in this regard (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 13 September 2023).

On 3 October, Bloomberg reported that Hungary proposed splitting a EUR 50bn (USD 52.4bn) EU package for Ukraine. People familiar with the matter stated that Budapest told member states last week that EUR 25 bn would be a sufficient sum for Ukraine at present, while the other half could be provided after the bloc evaluates the contribution halfway through the 2024-2027 disbursement period. Ultimately, internal divisions within the EU could realistically continue to impede the level of assistance that Brussels is able to provide Ukraine in the medium to long term, and the prospect of Ukrainian accession (as well as wider englargement) by 2030 remains a highly contentious prospect within the bloc.

Oct. 3.

• OFFENSIVES: Russian sources have claimed that the deputy commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Mikhail Teplinsky, has been ‘quietly’ removed from his command; this has reportedly taken place alongside other command changes in recent days. While it remains unclear whether Teplinsky has been removed, he is the highest-ranking critic of Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), despite being the deputy to Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Alexander Khodakovsky, a prominent Russian volunteer commander who is currently fighting near the Vremevsky salient (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia oblasts), claimed on 2 October that Teplinsky had recently ‘saved’ a VDV Airborne unit which had received orders to the undertake ‘decisive action’ south of Bakhmut, despite morale and personnel losses rendering them effectively combat ineffective. It remains unclear if Teplinsky’s intervention played a part in his reported dismissal. Nevertheless, the claims mirror broader institutionalised cultural issues within the Russian command chain which actively discourage officers from reporting inconvenient realities to their superiors.
• BAKHMUT: Russian commanders are highly likely continuing to order counter-attacks around Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast) and elsewhere under false or misleading reports that their forces are in better fighting condition than reality dictates. Russian sources linked to a ‘Storm Z’ assault unit also speculated in recent days that the MoD has removed the commander of Russian forces south of Bakhmut due to their poor performance. While we cannot confirm these reports, sources claim Lieutenant General Andrei Sychevoy was removed from his command after ordering unprepared and unsupported counter-attacks near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, located around four miles (6km) south of Bakhmut.
• DONETSK: On 2 October, Russian sources claimed that their forces captured Ukrainian positions four miles (6km) west, as well as nine miles (14km) and five miles (8km) north-west of Avdiivka (Donetsk). However, these claims remain unverified. Earlier on 3 October, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces failed to recapture lost positions in the Avdiivka sector. On 3 October, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces stepped up the intensity of their operations in this sector. However, they did not report on any Russian progress therein over the past 24 hours.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 2 October, Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) elements stationed near Kreminna (Luhansk oblast) are not engaged in high-intensity operations. As such, the 25th CAA deployment is unlikely to alter the balance of forces along the Oskil-Kreminna line. However, even if a new Russian offensive is launched in the coming weeks, it is unlikely to result in major advances.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 2 October indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken trench lines west of Robotyne previously retaken by Russian forces; this underlines the dynamic nature of the Orikhiv battlefield at present. It remains unclear precisely when these trench lines were retaken. Elsewhere, Ukrainian forces are continuing to attack across the axis, though there is little indication of other major progress in recent days.
• SOUTHERN: Further east along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border, geolocated footage from 2 October indicates that Ukrainian forces have made marginal progress north-west of Novomaiorske, around eight miles (12km) south-east of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). Russian sources also reported on 3 October that a Ukrainian attack against Staromaiorske, located around six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk), failed and that Russian forces managed to push Ukrainian forces back; this remains unconfirmed.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 2-3 October, Russia launched 31 Shahed-136/131 drones and one Iskander-K ballistic missile at Ukraine. Ukraine’s air force reported that air defences in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts intercepted 29 drones and the Iskander-K ballistic missile. The strike was reportedly launched from Crimea. Serhiy Lysak, the governor of Dnipropetrovsk, reported that drone debris damaged a factory in Pavlohrad, as well as residential buildings elsewhere in the oblast. Meanwhile, the governor of Bryansk oblast (Russia), Alexander Bogomaz, reported that air defences shot down a drone over Trubchevsk district (Bryansk) earlier on 3 October.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: According to a letter seen by the Associated Press (AP), the Pentagon has urged the US Congress to replenish funding for Ukraine. On 2 October, the outlet stated that Pentagon Comptroller Michael McCord told House and Senate leaders that there remains around USD 1.6 bn of the USD 25.9 bn provided by Congress to replenish US military stocks sent to Kyiv. Meanwhile, AP claimed that McCord said Washington DC has ‘completely run out’ of long-term funding for Kyiv through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which provides money for future arms deliveries. McCord stated that without immediate additional funding, the US will have to delay or reduce air defence weapons, ammunition, drones and other ‘critical and urgent’ equipment. On 2 October, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller also disclosed that the US has already exhausted much of the existing security assistance funding for Ukraine. However, he noted that Washington DC has the ability to continue to support Ukraine in the immediate term. Given that Washington DC has been one of Kyiv’s largest suppliers of military assistance, a decrease or halt in aid in the coming weeks and months would likely significantly impact Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting Russian forces; it would possibly also undermine morale along the frontlines.
• AID: On 2 October, the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) announced that the first round of Leopard 2 tanks has been redelivered to Ukraine after undergoing repairs in Poland. It stated that repair work on other tanks is in progress (without specifying numbers or when they would be redeployed for use in Ukraine). In July, Germany and Poland agreed to set up a repair centre for Leopard 2 tanks that sustain damage on the Ukrainian battlefield. According to a Forbes report in late August, Ukrainian forces lost five of 71 Leopard 2 tanks in the 13 weeks since the beginning of their counter-offensive. The losses reportedly occurred along the southern axis.
• NUCLEAR: On 2 October, the New York Times (NYT) reported there is evidence that Russia is preparing to test a nuclear-powered cruise missile in its Arctic region. The outlet claimed that the recent activity is consistent with that observed before tests of the 9M730 Burevestnik (a nuclear-armed cruise missile) in 2017 and 2018. Since 31 August, Russia has warned its aviation assets to avoid airspace near the launching area. However, it remains unclear whether the tests have already been conducted or are yet to occur. According to an arms control NGO called Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Russia conducted 13 unsuccessful Burevestnik tests between 2017 and 2019. NTI explained that the missile is a ‘second strike strategic range weapon’. According to a report in September, satellite imagery taken by Planet Labs indicates that China, Russia and the US are all increasing activity at nuclear test sites; it states that heightened activity at Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago in the Arctic Ocean, possibly indicates that Russia is preparing to resume underground nuclear tests or that it is already covertly conducting low-yield explosions. We previously assessed that Moscow’s suspension of the New START Treaty will likely result in Russia increasing nuclear testing. The expansion of its nuclear arsenal will remain a long-term goal for Moscow, with nuclear testing being a key element of the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric and posturing during periods of heightened tensions.
• WAGNER GROUP: A Russian source affiliated with the Kremlin reported on 2 October that the Wagner Council of Commanders and Wagner Group commander Anton Yelizarov signed an agreement with the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia). Under the reported deal, Wagner Group personnel must sign contracts to join Rosgvardia before 1 January 2024. According to the source, the deal will prevent Wagner Group units being ‘torn apart’ and allow Wagner Group personnel to retain their call signs and symbols. If accurate, the deal would allow Wagner Group remnants which have not already signed contracts with the MoD to retain their identity, though it remains unclear when and where they will be deployed in Ukraine. Pavel Prigozhin, the son of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the deceased former head of the Wagner Group, has reportedly taken over as overall leader of the remnants of the private military company (PMC). It remains unclear whether he will retain control over the group’s operations abroad; the extent of his influence over any new Wagner Rosgvardia units is also not known.

FORECAST

CORRUPTION: On 2 October, Politico reported that it had obtained a confidential US strategy document which indicates that officials in US President Joe Biden’s administration are significantly more concerned about corruption in Ukraine than what is publicly admitted. According to the report, the ‘sensitive but unclassified’ version of Washington DC’s long-term plan outlines several steps which the US is taking to help Kyiv tackle the issue and to reform several Ukrainian sectors.

The report claims that graft will possibly prompt Western allies to withdraw support for Ukraine. While a senior Biden administration official stated in February that there is no evidence that Kyiv is misusing US financial assistance, concerns over corruption will likely remain high among US lawmakers unless Kyiv takes significant measures to root out corrupt practices within government sectors. While the recent overhaul of the Ukrainian defence ministry over corruption concerns illustrates ongoing efforts to do so, Republican lawmakers and right-wing figures (both in the US and Europe) will likely leverage concerns over graft in an attempt to limit assistance for Ukraine; this would possibly hinder long-term support for Kyiv.

According to an unnamed US official familiar with the matter, the Biden administration is discussing with Ukrainian leaders the possibility of conditioning future economic aid on reforms that tackle corruption and make Ukraine more attractive for private investment. The official noted that such conditions are not being considered for the provision of military aid, meaning they are unlikely to impact US military assistance for Kyiv. However, without major corruption reform successes, any such decision would possibly hinder Ukraine’s economic recovery after the war ends and discourage private entities to resume operations and/or expand amid Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Oct 2.

• BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces have continued counter-offensive operations to the north and south of Bakhmut, with geolocated footage indicating marginal advances east of Andriivka, six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast). However, Russian counter-attacks continue. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Ilya Yevlash stated on 1 October that Russian forces have concentrated more than 10,000 personnel within Bakhmut city itself. Some Russian sources have also claimed that Russian sources are currently regrouping near Klishchiivka to recapture the settlement, though this is unlikely to be successful if such a counter-attack is launched.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 1 October, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Ilya Yevlash reported that the freshly formed Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) operating on this axis includes 17,000 personnel. It is reportedly deployed south and west of Kreminna likely to replace degraded military formations in these sectors. Meanwhile, on 30 September, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made unspecified progress near Kyslivka located around 18 miles (30km) north-west of Svatove, though such claims have yet to be corroborated.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to launch counter-attacks in the south, which are seemingly successfully limiting Ukrainian advances around Robotyne and Verbove (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Geolocated footage from 30 September showed Ukrainian forces firing on Russian forces occupying a trench west of Robotyne, which Ukrainian forces had previously occupied earlier in September. Similarly, geolocated footage from 30 September also indicated marginal Russian advances north-west of Verbove, six miles (10km) east of Robotyne. This axis remains highly dynamic as Russia’s flexible defensive strategy in tandem with the fixed defences continues to constrain Ukrainian advances. We had previously reported that Russian forces had been given orders to counter-attack near Robotyne, and these trench lines are likely the result of that effort. It remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to continue counter-attacking successfully, but Ukrainian forces did still make some marginal gains north-west of Robotyne in recent days, further indicating that this frontline remains highly dynamic at present.
• STRIKES: Early on 2 October, Ukraine’s Air Force reported that air defences intercepted four of the seven Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that air defences intercepted 16 of the 30 Shahed-136/131 drones launched by Russia on the night from 30 September to 1 October. Local authorities reported that drones damaged infrastructure facilities in Cherkasy and Donetsk Oblast. On 1 October, Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson, Yuriy Ihnat, acknowledged that air defences could not intercept the total number of drones, in particular, due to Russia launching the projectiles from three different points. Ihnat stated that Shahed drones are high-precision projectiles with large power reserves, thereby allowing Russian forces to attack targets far from the launching points. According to the military official, Russia is looking into making the drones more resistant to electronic warfare, which will likely further challenge Ukrainian air defences. On 2 October, Ihnat stated that Ukraine will be able to maintain an 80% drone interception rate but, that Ukraine’s ability to expand air defences depends on the assistance of its Western partners.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 September, Russia launched 40 Shahed-136/131 drones, targeting Odesa, Mykolaiv and Vinnytsia Oblast. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that its air defences intercepted 30 drones. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that the strike damaged an infrastructure facility in Vinnytsia. At the same time, Russian sources claimed that the attack struck a Ukrainian military arsenal located around 14 miles (22km) north of Vinnytsia, in Kalynivka. Russian sources also claimed that the strike hit port infrastructure in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. On 30 September, Romania’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that army radars possibly detected a breach of the country’s airspace during the overnight Russian drone strike. Moscow’s commitment to strike Ukrainian export infrastructure, particularly in the Odesa oblast bordering Romania, increases the risks of miscalculation or debris crossing international borders. For further analysis, see SPILLOVER below.
• STRIKE: On 1 October, the Russian MoD reported that air defences intercepted two Ukrainian Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missiles over Crimea. The head of the Russian occupation authority in Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, said that debris reportedly fell on the outskirts of Dzhankoi, damaging warehouses. Dzhankoi is a transport hub located in the north-east of Crimea. Ukrainska Pravda reported that on 1 October, Ukrainian drones hit a helicopter base in Sochi (Krasnodar krai) and an aircraft factory in Smolensk. The Ukrainian media later confirmed that Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) was responsible for the attack. Given Ukraine’s efforts to increasingly target aircraft, the latest strike illustrates Kyiv’s increasing capacity to degrade Russia’s aviation capabilities. It also reveals the vulnerability of strategic sites such as the Smolensk aircraft factory to Ukrainian attacks. Furthermore, these strikes illustrate the GUR’s ability to gather intelligence on the location of these high-priority targets.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: A senior Ukrainian official stated on 30 September that there are no changes in the US’ support for Kyiv despite a stopgap funding bill to prevent a US government shutdown lacking any aid provisions for Ukraine. The chief of staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Andriy Yermak, said Ukrainian leadership regularly meets with representatives of both the Democratic and Republican parties. While the US government managed to avoid a federal shutdown, the Kremlin is highly likely to perceive the lack of funding for Kyiv as indicative of the US weakening its support for Ukraine. However, US President Joe Biden said Republicans had pledged to provide aid for Ukraine through a separate bill, which could therefore mitigate the immediate impact of Ukraine not receiving the aid if it is passed.
• SLOVAKIA: On 30 September, Robert Fico’s populist party Smer-SD (Smer) won Slovakia’s snap elections with 23% of the vote, beating the Progressive Party (PS). Smer is likely to hold coalition talks with Hlas-SD (Hlas), which split from Smer in 2020, as well as the far-right SNS party. The leader of Smer has repeatedly advocated EU-sceptic and pro-Russia narratives.  A coalition with Hlas would likely soften the EU-sceptic and pro-Russia stance of a government spearheaded by Smer. However, it also remains likely that such a government would adopt a far less Ukraine-friendly position than previous administrations; it would possibly seek to resist EU sanctions and further support for Kyiv, such as military aid (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 21 September 2023).
• SLOVAKIA: Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said on 2 October that it is too early to assess how Fico’s victory will impact Kyiv, adding that the Ukrainian government will wait until a coalition is formed. Fico stated after winning the vote that he will do ‘everything’ to prompt peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv, which Ukraine is highly unlikely to be in favour of given its determination to reclaim all of its territory occupied by Russia. Any such Smer-led government would likely dampen the investment climate and elevate risks for businesses operating in or with Slovakia, compounding the fallout of alleged corruption within previous Smer administrations.
• SPILLOVER: Romania’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated on 30 September that Romanian army radars detected a possible breach of the country’s airspace around Galați during an overnight Russian drone attack against Ukraine. The MoD stated that the authorities were looking for fragments indicating that a possible intrusion took place. The ministry said that during a Russian attack on Ukraine’s Danube River ports on the evening of 29 September, an air alert was issued for residents of Romania’s Galați and Tulcea counties. On 27 September, the Army Chief of Staff of Romania, General Daniel Petrescu, accused Russia of actively and consistently jamming the GPS communications of ships in Romanian territorial waters. This will likely elevate the risk of collisions for merchant vessels therein, which could realistically make some crew reluctant to operate in these waters. Ultimately, the risk of conflict spillover into Romania, as well as other littoral Black Sea states within NATO, is likely to remain elevated throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, though such incidents are highly unlikely to trigger a military confrontation between NATO and Russia.

FORECAST

AID: On 29 September, Kyiv hosted the First International Forum of Defence Industries (DFNC1), which was attended by 252 defence companies from over 30 countries. According to Ukraine’s government portal, the Ukrainian side signed 20 agreements and memorandums on the manufacturing of drones, the repair and production of armoured vehicles, as well as ammunition. On 28 September, Germany’s Federal Cartel Office approved the establishment of a joint venture between Rheinmetall, a German defence manufacturer, and the Ukrainian Defence Industry – a state-owned defence group. Ten agreements were also signed between French and Ukrainian defence manufacturers.

Greater co-operation between European defence firms and Ukraine would strengthen Kyiv’s ability to produce weapons domestically and alleviate constraints on European governments, especially if the war protracts into an open-ended attritional conflict. However, such efforts would be unlikely to seriously alter the situation on the battlefield this year, improving prospects for the arming of operations in the medium-long term. Furthermore, European defence firms establishing a presence in Ukraine will likely be highly vulnerable to Russian strikes.

On 30 September, the chair of the Defence Committee of Germany’s Bundestag, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, urged Berlin to transfer Kyiv long-range Taurus missiles so Ukraine can attack targets inside Russian territory. According to Strack-Zimmermann, the weapons would enable Ukraine to significantly disrupt Russian logistics and claimed that international law permits Kyiv to attack military facilities on de jure Russian territory.

The Deputy Head of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, stated on 1 October that Moscow will consider German missile manufacturing plants as a legitimate target for attacks if Berlin transfers long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. Medvedev’s comments are almost certainly designed to dissuade Berlin from providing such aid and are highly unlikely reflective of legitimate intentions within the Kremlin. On 27 September, the Wall Street Journal reported that Germany is delaying sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine due to concerns that their provision would require German technicians to operate on the ground. Some German officials are reportedly concerned that this could bring Berlin closer to direct military confrontation with Russia, noting that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz believes transferring military training personnel to Ukrainian frontlines would require a parliamentary vote. Nevertheless, more hawkish German politicians will continue to push Scholz to deliver the equipment in the near term, though Berlin will likely seek assurances from Kyiv that any missiles provided will not be used to strike de jure Russian territory. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Oct 23. Ukraine expects ‘record’ number of drone attacks this winter – air force. Ukraine’s air force expects a record number of Russian drone attacks on its soil this winter, its spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat said on Sunday, as Kyiv girds for a second winter of mass bombardment of its energy facilities.

Ihnat said that data for September showed the use by Russia of Iranian-designed Shahed kamikaze drones would smash last year’s figure.

“This autumn and winter … is already a record in terms of the number of Shahed drones. Over 500 (were used) in September,” Ihnat said in an interview on national television.

He contrasted this number with Russia’s air strike campaign on Ukraine last winter, when he said about 1,000 Shahed drones were used in six months.

Attacks on energy facilites last winter damaged a significant chunk of Ukraine’s power system and forced most cities to ration electricity and hot water.

Despite Ukraine bolstering its air defences, officials have warned of the risk of a repeat this winter, with the power grid still far from rebuilt after the last campaign of bombardment. (Source: Reuters)

 

05 Oct 23. Ukraine’s Invisibility Cloak Protects Against Russian Thermal Imagers. Ukraine, on the basis of the Brave1 coordinational platform, has developed super protection against Russian thermal imagers and drones with thermal imaging cameras.

Source: Mykhailo Fedorov, Deputy Prime Minister for Innovation, Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine

Quote: “The cloak blocks the radiation of heat and makes the fighters invisible to the enemy. For example, to snipers or Special Operations Forces groups that perform combat tasks,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

The invention is compact and light; it weighs up to 2.5 kg. It has high protection against rain and wet snow.

Apart from that, the cloak does not burn and protects against high temperatures. The samples have already successfully been tested in the field.

“The invisibility cloak is just one of the developments that will help save the lives of our soldiers at the front. We need even more,” Fedorov stressed. (Source: UAS VISION/y!news)

 

06 Oct 23. Sweden pledges more military aid to Ukraine, considers fighter jets. Sweden will send Ukraine a new military support package worth 2.2bn crowns ($199m) – consisting mainly of artillery ammunition – and is looking into sending fighter jets, Defence Minister Pal Jonson said.

Jonson told a news conference the armed forces were due to report by Nov. 6 on the potential for sending Jas Gripen jets to Ukraine after the government asked them to assess the issue.

But he reiterated that Sweden would for domestic security reasons need to become member of NATO before it would be able to potentially spare any fighter jets.

Sweden hopes to join the NATO defence alliance soon although its accession has been held up by member states Turkey and Hungary.

The new military aid package will be Sweden’s 14th to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion, taking the total value of the Nordic country’s such aid to just over 22bn crowns.

“We need to design our support so that it’s long term and sustainable,” Jonson said. “It is now important that more countries step up to support Ukraine.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Thursday warned European leaders at an informal meeting in Granada, Spain that Russia could attack other countries within five years if Europe were to waver in its support.

He also said he remained confident of continued U.S. and European financial aid, however. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Reuters)

 

05 Oct 23. Italian official warns of war fatigue, limited resources for Ukraine. The Italian government is running out of military equipment to send to Ukraine, just as domestic public opinion loses interest in supporting Kyiv, Italy’s defense minister said Wednesday.

Claiming Italy does not have “unlimited resources”, Guido Crosetto said Italy has “done almost all that it could do,” when it comes to sending weapons to Ukraine. ”There is not much more room,” for freeing up military supplies.

Crosetto’s claim follows growing doubts over the supply of U.S. arms to Ukraine due to Republican party opposition, just as Ukraine struggles to maintain the momentum of its counteroffensive against Russian forces.

Italy has firmly backed the defense of Ukraine since Russia invaded the country in February 2022, and has dispatched seven packages of military kit, with Italian foreign minister Antonio Tajani discussing an eighth package during a visit to Kyiv this month.

In a tweet Wednesday, Ukrainian defense minister Rustem Umerov said he had discussed with Crosetto Ukraine’s “urgent” need for long-range rockets and electronic warfare systems. In January, Italy said it was ready to supply Ukraine with its Samp-T air defense system — a truck-based tactical anti-missile system designed to tackle cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles.

Italy has not revealed what other kit has been sent, although Stinger surface-to-air missiles, mortars and Milan or Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons as well as Multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Pzh2000 howitzers and vehicles were reportedly planned for consignment.

Tajani has said the first five packages of military aid were worth €1bn (U.S. $1.05bn). Now that Rome must replace Samp/T batteries and other equipment sent to Ukraine, it is also planning the purchase of 133 new Leopard 2 A8 combat version tanks from German firm Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, as well as spending nearly €900 m to upgrade its ageing Ariete tanks.

Both initiatives have been spurred by a new focus on land warfare and a need to keep up with NATO requirements since the invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, Italy must keep up the pace on spending on the new GCAP fighter it is developing with partners Japan and the United Kingdom.

Last month, reports that Japan and the UK would dominate design and manufacturing on the project drew a testy response from Rome, which said it would remain an equal partner.

An annual, multi-year spending document covering 2023-2025, which was due out before the summer and which gives a breakdown on which programs get what cash, has yet to be issued.

”This is evidence that spending priorities are still adjusting, in part due to the Ukraine war,” said one Italian analyst who declined to be named because he was not authorized to speak on the record.

A further problem facing defense officials is Italy’s struggling economy, which is putting pressure on the government to trim spending as it prepares its 2024 budget.

Defense minister Crosetto also warned about creeping war fatigue in Italy and throughout the West.

”Public opinion has veered away from the war with the passing of time because it has coincided with the increase of inflation and an industrial and production crisis which has worsened living conditions in Western democratic countries,” he said. ”Yesterday, we had a conference call with our allies in which I raised this problem: inflation, prices, energy, migration — they are all consequences of the conflict. They have an impact on citizens, which generates a resistance, or risks creating fatigue in public opinion.”

“If we want to defend Ukraine robustly, we also need to pay attention to these consequences,” he added. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

 

04 Oct 23. US sending seized Iranian munitions to Ukraine. More than one million Iranian rounds of munitions that were seized by the U.S. military late last year have been sent to Ukraine to assist the effort repel Russia’s invasion, Central Command said.

The seizure occurred as Iran was sending weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen. In July, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to forfeit thousands of rifles, hundreds of machine guns and rocket launchers and around 700,000 rounds of ammunition that the U.S. intercepted from Iran on the same path. The motion allowed the U.S. to take control of the munitions now being sent to Ukraine, which had previously been stored in U.S. facilities around the Middle East.

The 1.1m 7.62 mm rounds being sent to the Ukrainian military were seized by “Central Command naval forces from the transiting stateless dhow MARWAN” in December, it said. According to a Department of Defense fact sheet, the U.S. has sent Ukraine “more than 300,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades” to date.

The transfer, which the U.S. had sought for months, comes as the Biden administration faces increasing friction on its efforts to support Ukraine.

Over the weekend, Congress passed a six-week continuing resolution without further aid to the country that the White House had sought. The Democratic-controlled Senate initially planned to include some $6 bn in such aid in its version of the CR. The bill never reached a vote, lest a shutdown arrive before a deal could be reached with the majority-Republican House.

Without more aid appropriated — and it will be that much harder to pass more without a speaker of the House — the Pentagon has limited options to support Ukraine. Department of Defense spokespeople say the U.S. has $5.4 bn left to draw down its stocks for Ukraine. But only $1.6 bn is left to replenish such stocks, meaning there’s an almost $4 bn gap in what the Pentagon can send to Ukraine and what it can resupply.

“We have enough funding authorities to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs for just a little bit longer but we need Congress to act,” said Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh at a briefing. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)

 

05 Oct 23. Russian vessels are leaving Sevastopol. According to the satellite images from October 4, six amphibious assault ships, Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov frigates, and three Project 636 Varshavyanka class submarines were deployed to Novorossiysk.

The Project 22160 Vasyl Bykov patrol ship and two Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ships were also relocated. However, four amphibious ships and one submarine remain in Sevastopol. Some of them are presumably undergoing repairs. Part of the Black Sea Fleet remains in remote ports in eastern Crimea, away from Ukrainian weapons. In particular, another amphibious assault ship, minesweepers, and missile boats are stationed in Feodosia.

A new “regrouping”

The most likely reason for the deployment of so many Black Sea Fleet ships to the less protected port of Novorossiysk is the constant threat of Ukrainian missile strikes and drone attacks in the west of the occupied peninsula.

For example, over the past month, Ukrainian forces in Crimea destroyed the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, the Minsk landing ship, and the Rostov-on-Don submarine.

According to the Russian Navy Command, the “regrouping” to remote ports in the Black Sea should protect the fleet from this threat.

For Ukraine, this decision means a decrease in the presence of the Russian fleet in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.

Besides, almost all Kalibr cruise missile carriers have been redeployed to Novorossiysk. Thus, launching missiles from remote waters will significantly increase the flight time, which will increase the time for allied reconnaissance aircraft to detect them and for Ukrainian air defense systems to respond.

This is not the first defeat of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Due to the operation of the Neptune anti-ship missile system and the deployment of the American Harpoon anti-ship missile system, the Russians lost their flagship and were forced to leave the western maritime zone. The Russian Navy also failed to paralyze the work of Ukrainian ships. At the same time, the threat of a potential amphibious assault on Odesa is becoming more and more illusive. (Source: News Now/https://mil.in.ua/en/news/)

 

05 Oct 23. Spain, asked to send Patriots to Ukraine, cleared to buy missile system by US. Spain has been cleared to buy 3 batteries of Patriot air defence missile systems by the US State Department for $2.8bn.

Spain, which has been a generous donor of military equipment to Ukraine as it defends itself from the invasion by Russia, has been cleared to buy additional Patriot missile defence systems from the US, it was announced 4 October by the US State Department.

The possible Foreign Military Sale, worth $2.8bn, will supply Spain with all of the components necessary for three new batteries, including 51 Patriot PAC 3 missiles, 24 launch stations, four radar sets, eight antenna groups, and four electrical power plants and energy power units.

Patriot Coalition

The green-light follows requests from Netherlands and Ukraine to transfer its existing Patriot systems to Ukraine in June this year, reports El Pais, as part of what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the “Patriot Coalition”, a reference to the “F-16 Coalition” that was successful in bringing the fighter jets to the conflict.

While Spain’s pattern of donations suggest a willingness to participate in the defence of Ukraine, of the three Patriot batteries that Spain has currently, two are invested in national defence, and the third is part of a Nato mission to defend Turkey that is not scheduled to conclude until the end of 2023. Spain’s Defence Minister Margarita Robles said on 6 June that transferring Patriots from Turkey to Ukraine is “not part of the government’s plan at this time.”

The programme for the purchase of new Patriot 3+ launchers and their corresponding batch of PAC-3MSE missiles, as well as the modernisation of existing ones, is one of thirteen programmes included by Spain’s Ministry of Defence in the General State Budget of 2023 with an estimated value of €1.4bn ($1.47bn)

Air-defence missile capability

The Patriot missile long-range air defence system is an all-altitude, all-weather air defence system to counter tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. The missile has a range of 70km and a maximum altitude greater than 24km. The minimum flight time is less than nine seconds while the maximum is three and a half minutes.

The new PAC-3 missile has increased effectiveness against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles through the use of advanced hit-to-kill technology. The missile guidance system enables target destruction through the kinetic energy released by hitting the target head-on. 16 PAC-3 missiles can be loaded on a launcher, compared to four PAC-2 missiles. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

05 Oct 23. Continued Support to Ukraine, Replenishing Military Stocks: Priorities for Department. Although the U.S. has the funding to continue to support Ukraine’s war efforts in the short term, Pentagon officials underscored today that more funds will be needed to continue to assist Ukraine in the long term.

The Defense Department has remaining approval to send about $5.4bn worth of military equipment to Ukraine through presidential drawdown authority, and also has about $1.6bn on hand now to replenish its own stocks after sending those weapons and munitions.

Continuing to support Ukraine and continuing to replace its own stocks remain top priorities for the Defense Department. Meeting those goals will require assistance from Congress, said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a briefing today at the Pentagon.

“We have enough funding authorities to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs for just a little bit longer, but we need Congress to act to ensure there is no disruption in our support, especially as the department seeks to replenish our stocks,” Singh said. “We have seen bipartisan support for Ukraine in Congress and we urge members of Congress to keep their commitment to the people of Ukraine and secure the passage of support needed to help Ukraine at this critical moment,” she said.

This past weekend Congress passed a continuing resolution — in lieu of a full fiscal year 2024 funding bill — which will keep the federal government open until mid-November. That stop-gap funding effort, however, includes no additional funds to assist in Ukraine’s war effort.

Singh said Pentagon officials continue to communicate with lawmakers on the Hill, to discuss ways to secure more funding for Ukraine.

The U.S. has committed about $43.9bn in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022. That funding has come in two ways. Under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, for example, the U.S. contracts for new military hardware from defense contractors and then sends that equipment to Ukraine once it is ready. The U.S. has also sent a substantial amount of equipment to Ukraine through presidential drawdown authority. Under PDA, equipment that is already in U.S. military inventory is pulled from the inventory and sent overseas.

Right now, Singh said, there is no more USAI funding available to contract for newly-manufactured military hardware. But there does remain authorization to pull as much as $5.4bn worth of hardware from U.S. military inventory through PDA and send that to Ukraine.

Once that equipment is gone, the DOD hopes to replace it with new gear, and the department has about $1.6 bn on hand to accomplish that. Singh said that the department is requesting more funding to help replenish stocks depleted due to PDA, but she also reiterated that the department has been careful in drawing down military hardware for Ukraine so that it does not put its own readiness at risk.

“We’ve been very public here from the podium here saying that we’re not going to drop below certain levels,” she said. “But we do know that replenishing our stocks is a priority for this department, as we continue to send and flow aid to Ukraine.”

The DOD has so far sent 47 security assistance packages to Ukraine, and Singh said the department will continue to exercise it’s authority to send support to Ukraine in the form of PDA.

“We’re still putting together packages,” Singh said. “You’re going see … our regular cadence continues, which is usually weekly or every other week, give or take.” (Source: Defense-Aerospace.com/US DoD)

 

05 Oct 23. Dozens killed in ‘brutal’ missile strike on Kharkiv grocery shop.  A six-year-old boy was reportedly among the dozens of people killed in a missile strike on a grocery shop in Kharkiv.

At least 49 people are thought to have died in the attack on Hroza, a village in the Kupyan district, which took place just after 1pm.

Volodymyr Zelensky, attending a summit with European leaders in Granada, condemned the “brutal attack” and renewed his calls for allies to provide air defences.

Kharkiv governor Oleh Synyehubov said: “Rescuers continue to work on the spot. As of now, the bodies of 48 dead people, including a six-year-old boy, have been recovered from the rubble.

“Six people, including one child, were injured. Doctors provide them with the necessary assistance. Rescue operations are ongoing at the site.”

In a later update on the Telegram messaging app, Mr Synyehubov said the death toll had risen to 49.

Mr Zelensky wrote on social media: “Russian terror must be stopped. All those who help Russia circumvent sanctions are criminals.

“Now we are talking with European leaders, in particular, about strengthening our air defence… about giving our country protection from terror.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

05 Oct 23. Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia has signed a deal with Moscow to establish a permanent naval base on the region’s Black Sea coast, its leader said, as Russia shifts its vessels in the area following Ukrainian missile attacks. Aslan Bzhania, Abkhazia’s leader, told the Russian newspaper Izvestiya on Thursday that the region had signed an agreement with Moscow “and in the future there will be a permanent base for the Russian navy fleet in the Ochamchira district”. The Kremlin declined to confirm the claim, which came a day after Bzhania met Russian president Vladimir Putin, and follows the transfer of several Russian vessels away from occupied Crimea in Ukraine, according to satellite images. The Washington DC-based Institute for the Study of War, citing satellite imagery, said on Tuesday that the Russia military “recently transferred several Black Sea Fleet vessels from the port in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea to the port in Novorossiysk . . . likely in an effort to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in occupied Crimea”. Russia’s Black Sea fleet has come under repeated fire in recent weeks from Ukrainian forces, including with UK and French-supplied long-range missiles and with aerial and sea drones.

Russian ships at the port of Novorossiysk. Vessels are being moved away from Sevastopol in Crimea to avoid Ukrainian attacks, according to Institute for the Study of War © 2023 Maxar Technologies Russia, which recognised the independence of Abkhazia after a brief war with Georgia in 2008, has been in discussions with the breakaway region about setting up a naval base in its coastal city of Ochamchira since 2009. It opened a coastguard station there in 2017, according to local media. Andriy Yusov, an officer in Ukraine’s military intelligence services, told the Financial Times that Russia’s navy has partially retreated from Sevastopol, but declined to reveal details. “There is a process under way . . . they are taking measures to partially transfer the fleet and infrastructure, but not completely,” Yusov said. “A portion of their military vessels remain there and near Crimea, but they started this process after a series of strikes.” The Ukrainian long-range strikes are an attempt to prevent Russia from further using Crimea, which it occupied in 2014, as a southern staging ground for its full-scale invasion and naval blockade of Ukrainian ports, which Kyiv uses for grain exports. Recent Ukrainian strikes have hit the Black Sea fleet’s headquarters in Sevastopol, and destroyed an amphibious navy vessel and submarine based there. Those strikes were preceded by Ukrainian attacks on Russian air defence systems and air bases on the peninsula. Yusov said the strikes on “military infrastructure on the peninsula will continue to increase because Crimea is actively used by the enemy as a logistical hub to project its forces and means on other occupied territories”.

Russian naval vessels patrolling the Black Sea have also been targeted by Ukrainian sea drones, keeping them away from a shipping corridor Ukraine unilaterally launched this summer, which hugs the coast of its Odesa region and southern neighbours Romania and Bulgaria, both members of the Nato military alliance. The attempt by Kyiv to reboot maritime exports of grain and metal products follows Russia’s withdrawal in July from a UN-backed grain agreement allowing safe passage of cargo carrying food from Ukraine to global markets. Oleksander Kubrakov, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, said this week that 10 commercial vessels have so far used the corridor and more are heading to Ukrainian ports to pick up cargo. (Source: FT.com)

 

05 Oct 23. Vladimir Putin’s cabinet is turning to increasingly irregular revenue-raising measures to fund a rapid rise in defence spending, which has tripled since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian government has said it aims to spend a staggering Rbs10.8tn ($108bn) on defence next year, three times the amount allocated in 2021, the last year before the invasion, and 70 per cent more than was planned for this year. To cobble together that sum, the cabinet is relying to a greater extent on irregular revenues stemming from one-off taxes and levies, including “voluntary donations” western businesses have to pay when leaving Russia. The defence budget “will allow us to completely support the tasks of the special military operation”, finance minister Anton Siluanov said on Tuesday, using the Kremlin’s euphemism for the war in Ukraine. The military spending increase, he said, was “essential to achieve our main goal: making sure we win”.

Russia’s record Rbs36.6tn budget for next year will take defence spending to 6 per cent of gross domestic product, exceeding social welfare for the first time, and require the Kremlin to tap considerably more sources of revenue than previously. “Putin has two priorities: war and power,” said Konstantin Sonin, an economist and professor at the University of Chicago. “That’s why the budget process now works in such a way that policymakers first make sure the junta gets what it needs for the war and then address the rest of the budget . . . And to do all that, they constantly look for new sources to scrape money together.” As part of the funding plans for 2024, irregular budget revenues will leap to Rbs2.52tn, the highest level ever. By contrast, this year, such revenues amounted to just Rbs745bn. The bulk of next year’s one-off revenues are Rbs800bn worth of social contributions that Russian companies were supposed to pay in 2022, but were postponed until 2024. Another Rbs2bn is expected to come from new export duties tied to exchange rates, the western companies’ “voluntary donations” when leaving Russia, tax increases and subsidy cuts for energy producers, and a rise in utility tariffs. Those measures come after Russia raised Rbs300bn this year from a windfall tax on “excessive profits” made by commodities companies, particularly the metals sector, more tax increases in the energy sector, and Rbs114bn from western companies. That “voluntary donation” will increase next year from 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the value of the sale of their Russian business. Another source of revenue will come from excise taxes for alcohol and tobacco, which will triple in 2024. Some of the new income will bypass the budget entirely, meaning that overall irregular state revenues could be even higher. Still, analysts are sceptical that the Kremlin will secure all the extra revenue it says it needs.

“There is a possibility that Russia will not receive about Rbs1tn of the expected revenues because the budget is based on an overly optimistic economic forecast,” said Sofya Donets, a former central bank official and chief economist at Renaissance Capital. In that case, the Russian government was likely to slap more one-off levies as it has done in the past, she added. Spending cuts in areas other than defence were a “last resort”, Donets said, adding that Moscow could also tap excess revenues from energy sales, which currently have to be saved rather than spent. Russia’s war spending goes beyond what is earmarked for defence in the budget breakdown. Half of the national security and law enforcement budget was also war-related, as it included payments to Russian security forces as well as a modernisation programme for the defence industry, said Pavel Luzin, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Recommended Edward Luce The return of American isolationism Adding to Russia’s financing challenges are the bns of roubles needed to “rebuild” and annex the territories in south-eastern Ukraine which it has occupied since the beginning of the war. The search for new funds has raised alarm bells among Russia’s oligarchs, who are already feeling the squeeze from western sanctions and government attempts to shore up the rouble. “Our priorities are having a sovereign economy and improving our citizens’ welfare but only within central Moscow and on TV,” oligarch Oleg Deripaska wrote last week. He said a new floating export tax would wipe out most of the profits of companies in Siberia. “They must want to drive everyone completely nuts by the new year.” (Source: FT.com)

 

04 Oct 23. Kyiv expects first results on US-joint air defence production by year-end – minister. Ukraine expects the first “results” of joint air defence systems production with the United States by the end of the year, a government minister said in an interview published on Wednesday,

Oleksandr Kamyshin, minister of strategic industries, told the media outlet nv.ua that the two countries had already started working on joint production following a visit by a Ukrainian delegation to Washington last month.

“During our visit to the United States, we received not just another assurance of continued financial and military support, but also a willingness to work on the joint production of air defence systems,” Kamyshin was quoted as saying. “We have already started working on this.”

Kamyshin said the first results of joint production would be seen by the end of 2023, without specifying if that meant the first jointly built system would be ready by then. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Oct 23. F-16s are no magic bullets in Ukraine, but their armaments will matter. Now that Ukraine is in line to receive F-16s, opinions surrounding their effectiveness span from being counterproductive to war-winning for Ukraine. While most discussions have focused on the fighters’ air-to-air performance and the platform itself, the broader effect of their deployment with the right munitions will be decreased Russian ground strikes.

Neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have air superiority over the battlefield. Surface-to-air missiles, or SAM, and anti-air artillery provide the majority of air control for both sides. And yet, Ukraine is too vast for SAMs to cover, as most require line-of-sight, limiting maximum ranges at lower altitudes. The mobility and line-of-sight of fighters makes them well suited to defend areas with sparse SAM coverage. Fighters can also avoid adversary SAMs by flying low while also being able to engage aircraft doing the same.

The aircraft’s first role will likely be supporting air defense by intercepting cruise missiles. Given Russia’s low monthly capacity for missile strikes on Ukraine, only a few F-16s are necessary to intercept cruise missiles that enter Ukrainian airspace — providing needed relief to Ukraine’s overtaxed SAMs. Some commentators have highlighted the F-16′s ability to deploy cruise missiles and other munitions for strikes and interdiction such as the Storm Shadow missiles. However, those weapons are scarce, and F-16s provide only limited additional capacity unless Ukraine receives a large influx of air-to-ground munitions.

As Ukraine gains proficiency with F-16s, the next mission will be suppressing Russian SAMs, a mission that is more involved than stand-off strikes. F-16s are well suited to operate the AGM-88s that Ukraine has been supplied to suppress forward Russian SAMs. These destroyed Russian SAMs are expensive and unlikely to be replaced quickly. Attritting these systems is critical for Ukraine to gain local air superiority improving the survivability of its drones and ground forces in the process.

The two missions described are possible with the initial pledged F-16s. Of the approximately 60 F-16s promised, only around a dozen are expected by early next year. As more arrive, higher impact missions become possible.

Russia’s limited capacity of stand-off munitions has not hindered its ground attack aircraft and helicopters from striking Ukraine. Initially, Russia resorted to flying below line-of-sight of Ukrainian SAMs while employing “dumb” bombs. Russia has since adapted to use precision, stand-off glide bombs. Russia has also employed its multi-role aircraft in air-to-ground roles as it faces little resistance in the air. F-16s can target the latter and force the former to air-to-air roles. Whether Russia diverts aircraft to air defense, takes higher risks, or performs fewer strikes, the result is fewer effective Russian air-to-ground strikes.

There will also be downstream effects on Russian operations. Russia has, for example, expended large quantities of its long-range SAMs for ground attacks. Given the high overlap of SAM, ballistic missile and air-launched missile components, increasing production of SAMs for replenishment will likely come at the expense of other missile production, which means even fewer Russian ground strikes against Ukraine.

F-16s alone are not enough. They require training, support crews, communications, early warning, upgraded avionics and munitions. This infrastructure takes years to develop and is not likely to be fully fielded in the conflict timeframe. To date, little public discourse exists on exactly what the pledged F-16s will have in terms of capabilities and supporting infrastructure.

Beyond a high probability that Ukraine will receive more AGM-88s and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), no other public disclosures of F-16 munitions have been announced. NATO’s most capable long-range, air-to-air missiles (AAMs) are the U.S. AIM-120D and the U.K. Meteor. These are necessary to overcome Russia’s long range AAMs, yet neither has been pledged. Even if Russia has been inefficiently using its R-37′s by firing from long range and leaving the fight, Russia likely retains large quantities of R-77 missiles. It remains uncertain how many of the AIM-120 variants previously provided for air defense are still available. An F-16 with any AAM is still an improvement over Ukraine’s current MIG-29s.

If Ukraine’s F-16s are expected to strike ground targets, they will require the right munitions. F-16 munitions designed for fighting Cold War-era ground formations are the upgraded variants the CBU and Rockeye series. Soon these will need decommissioning and will lack host aircraft. Stand-off glide bombs like the GBU-39 are already being offered as ground-launched variants and the air-launched variant could provide needed survivability for the F-16 to strike ground targets.

Will F-16s win the war for Ukraine? No. Only ground victories and unacceptable Russian losses will force Putin to negotiate. The most important support to Ukraine is still artillery, medical equipment, infantry weapons, ground vehicles, and drones. However, a long-term commitment to supporting a well-equipped, sizable F-16 force will improve the likelihood of Ukrainian success even if an F-16 never shoots a Russian fighter. (Source: Defense News)

 

04 Oct 23. Russia Uses Chinese Plywood in Kamikaze Drones over Ukraine. Russian volunteers now use Chinese plywood to assemble drones and transport them to Russian soldiers to attack Ukrainian cities. The plywood-framed drones can reduce the cost of drone manufacturing by 10-15% and have the potential, if approved by the Russian government, to scale up the production to meet repaid deployment.

Russian volunteers have now produced the Chinese plywood prototypes, “hobby-grade & made in China.”

The advantage of the design is “its ease in making different size frames for different applications,” according to a Russian source.

“For example, 5-inch frames are suitable for training, 6-inch for reconnaissance, 7-inch for kamikaze and 9-inch for bomber.”

A computer-controlled router is used to cut the drone frames out of 9mm thick plywood, with a laser cutter cutting parts out of thinner plywood.

“Keep in mind that to turn 500 frames into drones would require about US $200,000 worth of components,” the source said.“In a poor and corrupt country like Russia, it’s unclear how this would work out.”

Wood Central understands that many of the frames produced by volunteers were shipped to the Ukrainian war front but have disappeared.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the country’s relationship with China took on even greater significance.

More than 83% of Russia’s timber export goes through Chinese supply chains, with China now Russia’s distribution point to global forest markets.

China is the world’s largest plywood manufacturer and, in 2020, supplied more than 71% of the world’s plywood market.

A significant portion of plywood produced comes from Russia’s Siberia and Far East forests, which are exported to China and presumably reimported to Russia via train or sea. This could include the proposed Arctic Transhipment, which could see superpowers collaborating on Northern sea routes for oil, gas and timber.

Increasingly, drones have become an integral part of the war. Russian and Ukrainian forces regularly employ them to target personnel and vehicles – with most drones being off-the-shelf models customised to carry grenades. (Source: UAS VISION/Wood Central)

 

04 Oct 23. Russia says it downed 31 Ukraine-launched drones over Russian territory. Russia downed 31 Ukraine-launched drones overnight over the regions of Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk bordering Ukraine, the defence ministry said on Wednesday.

There was no information about potential casualties or damage.

Separately, Ukrainian forces fired cluster munitions at several villages in Russia’s southern region of Bryansk, Governor Alexander Bogomaz said on the Telegram messaging app.

There were no casualties in the attacks, although several homes were damaged, he added.

Reuters was not able to verify the reports. There was no immediate comment from the government in Kyiv.

Ukraine has received cluster munitions from the United States and pledged to use them only to dislodge concentrations of enemy soldiers.

Russian officials in Bryansk and other regions bordering Ukraine have repeatedly accused Ukraine’s armed forces of indiscriminate shelling.

Cluster munitions are prohibited by more than 100 countries. They typically release large numbers of smaller bomblets that can kill indiscriminately over a wide area. Those that fail to explode can pose a danger for decades. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Oct 23. Continued Support to Ukraine, Replenishing Military Stocks: Priorities for Department. Although the U.S. has the funding to continue to support Ukraine’s war efforts in the short term, Pentagon officials underscored today that more funds will be needed to continue to assist Ukraine in the long term.

The Defense Department has remaining approval to send about $5.4bn worth of military equipment to Ukraine through presidential drawdown authority, and also has about $1.6bn on hand now to replenish its own stocks after sending those weapons and munitions.

Continuing to support Ukraine and continuing to replace its own stocks remain top priorities for the Defense Department. Meeting those goals will require assistance from Congress, said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a briefing today at the Pentagon.

“We have enough funding authorities to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs for just a little bit longer, but we need Congress to act to ensure there is no disruption in our support, especially as the department seeks to replenish our stocks,” Singh said. “We have seen bipartisan support for Ukraine in Congress and we urge members of Congress to keep their commitment to the people of Ukraine and secure the passage of support needed to help Ukraine at this critical moment,” she said.

This past weekend Congress passed a continuing resolution — in lieu of a full fiscal year 2024 funding bill — which will keep the federal government open until mid-November. That stop-gap funding effort, however, includes no additional funds to assist in Ukraine’s war effort.

Singh said Pentagon officials continue to communicate with lawmakers on the Hill, to discuss ways to secure more funding for Ukraine.

The U.S. has committed about $43.9bn in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022. That funding has come in two ways. Under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, for example, the U.S. contracts for new military hardware from defense contractors and then sends that equipment to Ukraine once it is ready. The U.S. has also sent a substantial amount of equipment to Ukraine through presidential drawdown authority. Under PDA, equipment that is already in U.S. military inventory is pulled from the inventory and sent overseas.

Right now, Singh said, there is no more USAI funding available to contract for newly-manufactured military hardware. But there does remain authorization to pull as much as $5.4 bn worth of hardware from U.S. military inventory through PDA and send that to Ukraine.

Once that equipment is gone, the DOD hopes to replace it with new gear, and the department has about $1.6 bn on hand to accomplish that. Singh said that the department is requesting more funding to help replenish stocks depleted due to PDA, but she also reiterated that the department has been careful in drawing down military hardware for Ukraine so that it does not put its own readiness at risk.

“We’ve been very public here from the podium here saying that we’re not going to drop below certain levels,” she said. “But we do know that replenishing our stocks is a priority for this department, as we continue to send and flow aid to Ukraine.”

The DOD has so far sent 47 security assistance packages to Ukraine, and Singh said the department will continue to exercise it’s authority to send support to Ukraine in the form of PDA.

“We’re still putting together packages,” Singh said. “You’re going see … our regular cadence continue, which is usually weekly or every other week, give or take.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

03 Oct 23. With Wide-Ranging New Sanctions, OFAC Targets Russian Military-Linked Elites and Industrial Base. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed nearly 100 sanctions on Russian elites and Russia’s industrial base, financial institutions, and technology suppliers as the United States continues to leverage sanctions and economic restrictions to undermine Russia’s capacity to wage its war against Ukraine. The U.S. Department of State has also designated more than 70 persons. These sanctions focus on persons benefiting from, supporting, and sustaining Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia continues to rely on third-country entities to keep importing much-needed dual-use goods to enable its unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has repeatedly raised the issue of the shipment or transshipment of dual-use goods to Russia with the Government of Türkiye and the Turkish private sector. OFAC has therefore also targeted two entities based in Türkiye. Margiana Insaat Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Margiana) has allegedly made hundreds of shipments to Russia-based entities Limited Liability Company SMT-iLogic (SMT-iLogic) and Saturn EK OOO (Saturn EK), which were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 on May 19, 2023 and July 20, 2023, respectively. SMT-iLogic is known to be involved in the supply chain for producing Russian military UAVs used in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Margiana’s shipments to SMT-iLogic and Saturn EK have included High Priority Items of the kind recovered in multiple Russian weapons systems used against Ukraine, including the Kalibr cruise missile, the Kh-101 cruise missile, and the Orlan-10 UAV. Margiana was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, SMT-iLogic and Saturn EK, persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024. Demirci Bilisim Ticaret Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Demirci), founded in March 2022, has sent sensors and measuring tools to Russia. Demirci was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy. As a result of these sanctions, all property and interests in property of the designated individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Click here for further identifying information on the designated individuals and entities. In connection with the imposition of these sanctions, OFAC has issued Russia-related General License 55A, “Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2” and Russia-related General License 72, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on September 14, 2023.” (Source: glstrade.com)

 

02 Oct 23. The First Renovated Tanks for Ukraine Leave the BUMAR-ŁABĘDY Service Hub. Just a few days after the launch of the service hub for Leopard family tanks used during the war in Ukraine in BUMAR ŁABĘDY, the first damaged vehicles arrived in Gliwice.

The company dealt with the equipment in a comprehensive manner, starting with the verification of damage and assessment of the actual condition of the vehicles. The tanks were efficiently restored to full combat readiness, undergoing repairs and final tests at the company’s training ground.

On Friday, September 29, the first renovated Leopard 2A4 tanks were handed over to the Ukrainian side. Due to the seriousness of the situation, the work was completed in a record time – less than two months. These vehicles will soon be sent to the front. More cars are undergoing repair and renovation processes.

Zakłady Mechaniczne “BUMAR-ŁABĘDY” is an enterprise of strategic importance for the country’s defense. Over 70 years of experience in the production, servicing and renovation of tracked vehicles prove that the plant is an undisputed specialist in this field. BUMAR-ŁABĘDY has appropriate production infrastructure and experienced staff. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Bumar-Labedy)

 

03 Oct 23. Denmark Contributes DKK 100m for the Joint Purchase of Ammunition for Ukraine. Denmark contributes DKK 100m (approx. $14m –Ed) for a joint European procurement of artillery ammunition for Ukraine under the European Defense Agency. The ammunition is expected to be delivered during 2024.

Ukraine urgently needs special artillery ammunition in the fight against Russia. The government has therefore decided to contribute DKK 100 m for a joint European purchase of 155mm artillery ammunition.

“The Ukrainians are still in a situation where they are acutely short of artillery ammunition. We must do something about that, and with this contribution, Denmark – in cooperation with a number of other EU countries – is taking responsibility for supplying Ukraine with 155 mm ammunition for their artillery. Denmark will contribute to more joint purchases of ammunition and remains prepared to support Ukraine in the long run”, says Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen.

The procurement is carried out under the auspices of the European Defense Agency (EDA), which Denmark was admitted to on 23 March 2023. The project on joint procurement of ammunition forms the overall framework and mandate for the member states to carry out joint procurement of ammunition. The project runs over 8 years, and EDA is the contract holder and coordinates the purchases.

During the project, specific joint purchases can be carried out, to which the Member States take an individual position from time to time as to whether they wish to contribute.

“It is absolutely crucial that the aid to Ukraine is based on broad cooperation between allied countries – including through joint procurement. With the abolition of the EU defense reservation last year, Denmark has been given the opportunity to participate fully in European defense cooperation, including in EDA. It contributes both to helping Ukraine but also to strengthening Danish and European security in the long term,” says Troels Lund Poulsen.

EDA expects the ammunition to be delivered in 2024. Denmark’s contribution of DKK 100 m kroner for the joint purchase of artillery ammunition for Ukraine was allocated in Donation Package XI and is financed under the Ukraine Fund. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Danish Ministry of Defence)

 

03 Oct 23. EU Proposes Over $5bn in Aid for Ukraine in 2024. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on Monday said the bloc remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine, announcing a proposed spending package of up to $5.25bn for Kyiv in 2024.

Borrell made the comments during a press briefing alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in Kyiv where EU foreign ministers convened their first ever off-site meeting in a display of support for Ukraine.

Though Monday’s meeting in Kyiv was touted by Borrell as a historic first, it comes at an awkward time for the pro-Ukraine Western alliance. A pro-Russian candidate won an election in Slovakia, an EU and NATO member, and the U.S. Congress omitted funding for Ukraine from its temporary spending bill. The Ukrainian military counter-offensive has been slower than Western leaders had hoped before autumn mud clogs the treads of their donated tanks.

“Our victory explicitly depends on our cooperation — the more powerful and principled steps we take together, the sooner this war will end,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the EU Foreign ministers during the meeting.

Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine continues to protect its people and its economy from continuous Russian attacks, that its counteroffensive aimed at liberating its occupied territories is progressing steadily and reminded the EU leadership that Ukraine needs more money, more weapons and more military training to achieve its goals. He also asked them to intensify sanctions against Russia.

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called for efforts to prepare Ukraine for the coming winter, including through air defense and guaranteed energy supplies, after Russia bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure last year.

“Last winter, we saw the brutal way in which the Russian president is waging this war,” said Baerbock. “We must prevent this together with everything we have, as far as possible.”

French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said holding the meeting in Ukraine’s capital was a show of “resolute and lasting support for Ukraine. It is also a message to Russia that it should not count on our weariness. We will be there for a long time to come,” Colonna told reporters.

Dutch Foreign Minister Hanke Bruins Slot said Russia must be held accountable for its aggression in Ukraine and that it is important to pressure Russia with sanctions. “We have to do whatever it takes, as long as it takes, for the freedom of the people of Ukraine,” she said.

Russian shelling

Meanwhile, at least two people were killed and 10 were injured, including children, by Russian shelling of Ukraine’s southern region of Kherson. Regional governor Oleksandr Prokudin said on the Telegram messaging app that Russian forces pounded residential areas, shops, medical facilities and other infrastructure overnight.

In the eastern city of Kharkiv, which is located near the Russian border, officials announced plans to build a school entirely underground in response to frequent Russian bomb and missile attacks.

Students have used online courses and met in Kharkiv’s metro stations to avoid the dangers.

Mayor Ihor Terekhov said on Telegram that the new underground school “will enable thousands of Kharkiv children to continue their safe face-to-face education even during missile threats.” (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Voice of America News)

 

03 Oct 23. French Companies Sign 16 Agreements with Ukraine. Support for Ukraine: 16 Industry Agreements for Direct and Sustained Aid. On Thursday September 28, the Minister of the Armed Forces went to Kyiv accompanied by defense manufacturers and parliamentarians. The objective, which was to move from a logic of sales of military equipment to a logic of acquisition from French companies, seems to have been achieved. Our details on these industrial agreements.

Six additional Caesar cannons

The KNDS company, formed by the merger of the companies Nexter and Krauss Maffei Wegmann, has announced that it will supply six additional Caesar cannons to Ukraine. They will be added to the eighteen cannons already delivered by the French army and the twelve others acquired directly by Ukraine from KNDS. The company also signed an agreement to ensure the operational maintenance of these guns and of the AMX-10 RC light tanks present on Ukrainian territory.

The Arquus company is committed to supporting the Véhicules de l’Avant Blindés (VAB) transferred by France, in particular through the local production of parts. It is also studying the establishment of a partnership to produce VABs directly in Ukraine.

In order to deploy mobile solutions for manufacturing spare parts in the theater of operations, the Vistory company has entered into an agreement for additive manufacturing solutions (3D printing).

Additional drones

In the field of drones, the Delair Tech company has announced that it will provide additional equipment to the 150 drones selected by Ukraine and financed by France already being delivered. The company also undertakes to ensure the maintenance of the equipment already delivered.

Manufacturers Thales and Turgis & Gaillard have also each reached an agreement to co-develop drones, with the objective of manufacturing them locally.

Finally, in terms of cooperation, the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) and the Group of French Land and Airland Defense and Security Industries have, for their part, signed two contracts to promote cooperation in arms between France and Ukraine. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com)(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ French Armed Forces Ministry;)

 

03 Oct 23. Australian Slinger C-UAS System Heading for Ukraine. Australian-made 30mm weapon systems are being sent to Ukraine as part of a US security assistance package announced earlier this year. ‘Slinger’ light-weight 30mm cannon systems, made by Canberra-based Electro Optic Systems Defence Systems, have been ordered for use on “30mm gun trucks” announced by the US Department of Defense earlier this year on 4 April.

Each “Slinger” contains a radar, 30mm stabilised cannon with proximity-fuse, hi-explosive or armour-piercing ammunition designed for tracking and drone engagement at a range of more than 800 metres.

The Ukraine version will be used in coordination with Northrop Grumman’s M-ACE (acquisition, cueing and effector) system.

EOS Defence Systems executive vice-president Matthew Jones, responsible for defence systems in Australia, the US and Singapore, said the weapon system could be mounted on a heavy 4×4 for operation or for unmanned ground vehicle configuration.

“The Slingers have been contracted by Northrop Grumman, we received a purchase order for three systems, and there’ll be more to follow after the first three. The Slinger configured systems use a M230LF light-weight 30mm cannon … with single-shot engagement beyond 800 metres,” he said.

“We’ve been in trials with Northrop Grumman on this particular capability for actually a couple of years, and this will be their first export sale of the Slinger capability.

“The configuration that we’re delivering under this contract is a manned vehicle, a four-by-four US truck mounted configuration with the operator operating the system from within the cab, and the system mounted on the back in the tray.”

Slinger uses sophisticated technology to achieve a blunt result. In Canberra, EOS test engineer Charlotte Capper used a joystick to follow a drone on the system’s targeting screen

“I’m just making sure it’s staying on track, it’s staying armed, and when we get the signal we can fire and take down the drone,” she said.

“It’s very quick and easy to learn. You don’t have to know much about the technology. It’s easy to see what each thing does and how it does it.”

Last month, Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia Vasyl Myroshnychenko saw first-hand during testing how Slinger can bring down drones for a fraction of the cost of missiles.

“Sometimes those missiles cost ms. And you hit the drones, which cost $20,000, right? And it’s all about the cost,”

Mr Myroshnychenko said.

“But you never know where that drone is aiming at and what exactly that drone is going to destroy.”

Slinger’s price tag is less than $1.55m per system. It aims to take down drones at a cost of between $155 and $1,550 per engagement.

“Ukrainian cities are being attacked by drones and missiles on a daily basis. And we have been seeing these drones now for a year and a half,” the Ukrainian ambassador said.

“The Slinger system provides a unique way to target moving targets, especially when we can intercept their drones.”

Slingers Being Shipped to Ukraine

In Queanbeyan and the ACT, EOS assembles the cameras, lasers, and gimbals that make its tracking systems work. Eighty-five per cent of the component parts are sourced from Australian suppliers.

The company’s defence products are a direct link to its origins in the space business.  EOS monitors objects as small as a 10-cent piece orbiting up to 36,000 kilometres above the Earth.

That technology translates directly into targeting fast-moving small objects – like drones.

“What we’re really doing here is we’re using the tracking, we’re using the stabilisation algorithms we’ve used to develop for deep space tracking,”

said Matt Jones, Executive Vice President, Defence Systems, Electro Optic Systems, or EOS.

Ten Slingers now being made in the ACT are expected to be delivered to Ukraine by the end of the year as part of a US military aid package.

A spokesperson for the Department of Defence said the Australian government was committed to delivering on its current contribution to Ukraine. But there are no current plans to add Slingers to the $710m in Australian military assistance to Ukraine.

Mr Ryan believes Ukraine needs as many counter-drone systems as it can get to defend against the new reality of war.

“This has literally been a Cambrian explosion in the use of drones in warfare,” he said.

“One of the most intense periods of innovation and adaptation in the systems that we have ever seen, and we’re probably not at the end yet.

We’re probably closer to the beginning than the end.”  (Source: UAS VISION/abc News; Defence Connect)

 

03 Oct 23. Russia to hold ‘nuclear war’ evacuation drills. Chosen by us to get you up to speed at a glance. Russia will today hold nationwide drills simulating the evacuation of civilians during a nuclear war, according to reports.

The exercises on Tuesday will test rescue workers’ readiness to remove large numbers of people from hypothetical “radiation zones”, leaked documents published by Russian media outlet Baza show.

It is unclear how many civilians, if any, will be involved.

Russia holds civil defence drills annually, but this is thought to be the first time the exercises will be held simultaneously across the country.

They come after the head of Russia’s leading nuclear energy research centre reportedly urged the Kremlin last week to stage an atomic weapons test in the Arctic Ocean as a show of force.

Both the United States and Russia – by far the world’s largest nuclear powers – have said that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought, but the conflict in Ukraine has raised fears of a direct confrontation between Moscow and the West. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

03 Oct 23. Slovakia promises to cut aid to Ukraine after pro-Moscow candidate wins election. Only a minority of voters in the central European country believe Russia is at fault for Ukraine war. Slovakia is poised to cut military aid to Ukraine after its pro-Moscow former premier Robert Fico won the country’s parliamentary elections on Saturday, threatening western unity over the war.

The 59 year-old’s SMER-SSD party secured nearly 23 per cent of the vote, earning the president’s nod to start talks to replace a technocratic government that has been backing Kyiv against Russia’s invasion.

“We are not changing that we are prepared to help Ukraine in a humanitarian way,” Mr Fico said at a news conference on Sunday. “We are prepared to help with the reconstruction of the state but you know our opinion on arming Ukraine. We have clear ideas, we have clear plans. If the mandate comes, I know exactly what to do.”

Mr Fico’s campaign call of “not a single round” for Ukraine had appealed to voters in the nation of 5.5m, playing on anti-western and pro-Russian sentiment.

Slovakia, an EU and Nato member state, has until now been steadfast in its support for Kyiv, supplying surface-to-air missiles and helicopters, and even donating its entire fleet of retired MiG-29 fighter jets.

But Mr Fico said Slovakia has bigger problems than the war, including energy prices and living costs. He said his party would do everything possible to start peace talks in a bid to end the conflict.

Coalition partners

Sloviakia’s liberal Progresivne Slovensko (Progressive Slovakia, PS) party came second in Saturday’s vote with almost 18 per cent of votes and wants to stay the course on backing Kyiv.

So Mr Fico may look to the moderate leftist HLAS (Voice) party, which came third with nearly 15 per cent of votes, as a partner along with the nationalist, pro-Russian Slovak National Party. He said coalition talks could take two weeks.

Those three parties would have a parliamentary majority of 79 seats if they joined forces in a coalition government.

In the capital, Bratislava, voters were divided on the country’s future following Mr Fico’s win. Martin Cisár, 24, warned “democracy is over” for Slovakia.

Petra, a student who had voted for Progressive Slovakia, voiced similar concerns. “What now?” she said. “Everyone in my neighbourhood voted for Progressive Slovakia, where are the people who voted for Smer?”

But others welcomed Mr Fico’s victory.

“I’m glad we won’t be trying any experiments. We don’t have time or space for that. I have to pay for my family life and that’s why I need security,” said Boris, 34.

When asked whether his election win also signalled victory for Vladimir Putin, Mr Fico said on Sunday that his opinion on Ukraine did not mean he backed Moscow.

“Respect that we have a different opinion on some things,” he said.

Mr Fico also pledged to tackle illegal migration and said re-starting border controls with Hungary would be a top priority. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

02 Oct 23. Kyiv official urges more cost effective weapons for countering Russia drones. A senior Ukrainian official called on Monday for a reassessment of Western anti-aircraft systems being supplied to Ukraine, saying simpler and cheaper weapons could be more cost-efficient in countering Russia’s Iranian-made Shahed drones.

The Shahed drones are deployed in Russian attacks virtually every day. Ukraine has become skilled at downing them though some still hit industrial and residential sites despite Moscow’s assurances that it does not target civilians.

Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, said the issue was not just one of securing more anti-aircraft systems “but primarily solving a mathematical problem lying in the economics of war”.

While Western systems, like NASAMS and Iris-T, were used to down missiles, he said, using them to intercept Shaheds may not be cost-effective, Podolyak wrote in English on the X platform, formerly Twitter.

“Thus, it leads to depletion of allied stockpiles and long-term weakening,” Podolyak wrote.

“The solution is obvious: in addition to mobile large-caliber machine guns, there are plenty of simpler and cheaper anti-aircraft systems available today that have proven themselves to be effective against Shaheds. These include Gepard and Vampire.”

The Gepard is an anti-aircraft-gun tank made in Germany. The U.S.-made Vampire counter-drone system consists of a laser-guided missile launcher than can be installed on a truck bed.

Such scaling-down, Podolyak wrote, “will minimise the effect of Russian ‘raids’ and ensure long-term stability of Ukrainian skies and our neighbouring NATO countries”.

Ukraine has relied heavily on arms supplies from Western countries in facing the 19-month-old Russian invasion and in launching a counteroffensive in June aimed at recovering the roughly 18% of its territory held by Moscow’s troops.

Zelenskiy and other officials have stressed in recent weeks the importance of developing Ukraine’s own arms industry and in jointly developing weapons with Western companies. (Source: Reuters)

 

02 Oct 23. US Congress debates Ukraine aid as Pentagon warns money running low. A last-ditch weekend spending agreement avoided a U.S. government shutdown but left pro-Ukraine officials in Washington scrambling on Monday to determine the best path forward for securing approval for bns more assistance for Kyiv.

Leaders in the Senate, which is narrowly controlled by President Joe Biden’s fellow Democrats, promised to take up legislation in the coming weeks to ensure continued U.S. security and economic support for Ukraine.

But in the Republican-led House of Representatives, Speaker Kevin McCarthy said he wanted more information from the Biden administration, and a Republican pushing for his removal as speaker accused McCarthy of cutting “a secret deal” with Biden to allow the House to vote on a bill.

Washington has sent the Kyiv government $113bn in security, economic and humanitarian aid since Russia invaded in February 2022. President Joe Biden asked Congress in July to approve another $24bn related to Ukraine, which Ukraine supporters – Republicans as well as Democrats – had hoped could become law as part of a spending bill.

A U.S. official said that, as of Monday, the Defense Department had $1.6 bn left to replace weapons sent to Ukraine, no funds left under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and $5.4bn worth of Presidential Drawdown Authority.

Congress passed a stopgap funding bill late on Saturday after McCarthy backed down from a demand by his party’s hardliners for steep cuts in domestic aid programs. But he, and some other Republicans in both the House and Senate, refused to include more aid for Ukraine in the measure.

REPUBLICAN ANTI-UKRAINE DRUMBEAT CONTINUES

Opponents of Ukraine aid, many of whom are close allies of former Republican President Donald Trump as he seeks re-election to the White House next year, kept up their drumbeat against assistance for Kyiv on Monday.

Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, who said he would try this week to remove McCarthy as speaker, accused McCarthy on Monday of reaching a “secret deal” with Biden for Ukraine aide, amid reports that McCarthy had agreed to allow a House vote on assistance for Kyiv after the spending bill passed.

McCarthy later denied it. He called on the administration to arrange a briefing for House members about the path it sees to reach an end to the conflict.

“Our members have a lot of questions, especially on the accountability provisions of what we want to see with the money that gets sent,” he told reporters.

White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre urged Congress to move quickly. “They don’t have to wait 45 days to get this done,” she told a daily press briefing, where she also expressed confidence the assistance would continue.

“If (Russian President Vladimir) Putin thinks he can outlast us, he’s wrong. We’ll have another package of aid soon to signal our support for the brave people of Ukraine,” Jean-Pierre said.

Department of Defense Comptroller Michael McCord sent a letter to McCarthy saying the Pentagon has already had to slow down resupplies for some troops.

“Today, DoD has exhausted nearly all available security assistance funding for Ukraine,” McCord wrote in the letter, dated Sept. 29 and expressing concern that the stopgap spending bill did not include security assistance for Ukraine.

And in an effort to show the impact on U.S. congressional districts, McCord’s letter called out how U.S. funds increase jobs and production in Tucson, Arizona, where RTX Corp (RTX.N) has facilities and Lockheed Martin’s (LMT.N) Camden, Arkansas, facilities where GMLRS missiles and Patriot interceptors are made.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said Kyiv was in talks with Republicans and Democrats in Congress, and that the drama around the stopgap bill was an “incident” rather than something systemic.

(Source: Reuters)

 

02 Oct 23. Denmark contributes $14m to EU ammunition order for Ukraine. Denmark will contribute 100m Danish crowns ($14.1m) to a joint European order for ammunition under an EU scheme to aid Ukraine, the Danish ministry of defence said on Monday.

Seven EU countries have ordered ammunition to get 155mm artillery rounds to Ukraine and replenish depleted Western stocks, the European Defence Agency (EDA) said on Friday.

“With the abolition of the EU defense reservation last year, Denmark has the opportunity to participate fully in European defence cooperation, including in EDA,” minister of defence, Troels Lund Poulsen, said in a statement. The ammunition is expected to be delivered during 2024, the Danish ministry of defence said. ($1 = 7.0860 Danish crowns)(Source: Reuters)

 

02 Oct 23. ‘Everything for the front’: Russia allots a third of 2024 spending to defence.

Summary

• Defence to make up 29.4% of 2024 budget spending
• ‘Everything needed for victory’ is in budget – minister
• Defence rise means effective freeze for education and health

Defence spending will account for almost one third of Russia’s total budget expenditure in 2024, the government’s draft plans show, as Moscow diverts ever more resources towards prosecuting its war in Ukraine.

Russia also plans to ramp up state borrowing to help fund what it calls a “special military operation” in Ukraine in the coming years and is counting on a recovery in oil and gas revenues to pre-invasion levels to do so.

Spending under the “national defence” section of Russia’s budget will total 10.78trn roubles ($109bn) next year, or 29.4% of total planned expenditure of 36.66trn roubles, according to the finance ministry’s budget documents that outline the government’s fiscal plans for 2024-2026.

In 2021, the year before Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine, defence spending totalled 3.57trn roubles, 14.4% of total spending. In 2022, the share of defence spending rose to 17.7%, data on Russia’s electronic budget page showed earlier this year.

Spending figures for 2022 were subsequently removed from the online budget portal. The most up-to-date data for 2023 was published as part of the finance ministry’s 2024-26 budget plans.

The finance ministry has allocated 6.41trn roubles to defence in 2023, or 21.2% of total budget expenditure of 30.27trn roubles, but Finance Minister Anton Siluanov last week said total spending would be above plan at around 33.5 trillion roubles.

That may mean that defence spending will also be significantly higher than first envisaged.

Moscow doubled its target for defence spending in 2023 to 9.7trn roubles, Reuters reported exclusively in August, citing a government document.

“The budget’s structure shows that the main emphasis is on ensuring our victory – the army, defence capability, armed forces, fighters – everything needed for the front, everything needed for victory is in the budget,” Siluanov said last week.

“This is a big strain for the budget, not a small one, but it is our absolute priority.”

EDUCATION, HEALTHCARE FREEZE

As defence spending in 2024 triples from pre-invasion levels, the share of spending on “national security”, which covers funding for law enforcement agencies, is also rising, set to reach 9.2% in 2024, the documents showed.

To compensate for those increases, Moscow will effectively freeze spending on education and healthcare. The share of spending on “national economy”, encompassing roads, infrastructure and construction, will decrease to 10.6% in 2024, the lowest share since 2011.

“Social policy”, traditionally the leading spending area on state salaries, pensions and benefits, will account for less spending than defence at 7.73trn roubles in 2024, and with its lowest share of spending since 2011 of 21.4%.

Spending on those areas will nominally rise, but below inflation, meaning real-term cuts.

Chief Economist, Russia and CIS, at Renaissance Capital Sofya Donets said that taking defence and national security spending to almost 40% of all Russia’s expenditure pending may have a strong short-term impact, but will contribute little to growth in the long-term due to their minimal impact on tax revenues.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov last week said increasing defence spending was “absolutely necessary” for the budget because Russia is living “in a state of hybrid war”.

Russia argues that the West is fighting a hybrid war against it to sow discord and ultimately carve up its vast natural resources, allegations that Western leaders deny, saying Moscow’s decision to invade Ukraine was unprovoked.

Ukraine vows to eject every last Russian soldier from its territory, and casts the invasion as an imperial-style land grab by Russia. ($1 = 98.8830 roubles) (Source: Reuters)

 

02 Oct 23. Analysis: War’s Loss on Russian and Ukrainian Military Equipment and Combat Vehicles since February 2022. Before the onset of the war in February 2022, the military capabilities of Russia and Ukraine were notably different, with Russia having a significant advantage in both equipment and personnel.

Russia’s long-standing history as a major military power was evident in its vast arsenal and manpower. The country boasted over 15,857 armored fighting vehicles, in contrast to Ukraine’s 3,309. In aviation, Russia’s dominance was clear with 1,391 aircraft, over ten times Ukraine’s 128, and 821 helicopters compared to Ukraine’s 55. The naval disparity was also pronounced; Russia operated 49 submarines, while Ukraine had none.

Furthermore, Russia had one of the largest tank fleets in the world, with around 13,000 tanks, more than five times the number Ukraine had, which stood at about 2,500. While Russia had approximately 27,000 armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine had around 8,500. In terms of artillery, Russia possessed around 10,000 pieces, almost four times as many as Ukraine’s 2,850. Russia’s missile capabilities were vast, including a range of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and advanced air-defense systems like the S-400. In contrast, Ukraine had its range of missiles, but they were not as advanced or numerous as Russia’s. The Russian Air Force operated around 4,000 aircraft, which was significantly more than Ukraine’s 240. Lastly, the Russian Navy, with approximately 360 ships, including submarines and a sole aircraft carrier, dwarfed the Ukrainian Navy, which had a few dozen ships, primarily patrol boats and corvettes.

In terms of manpower, Russia’s armed forces were substantially larger with 900,000 active personnel and an additional 2 m in reserve. In comparison, Ukraine had 196,000 active personnel with 900,000 reservists. Specifically, Russia’s land forces numbered 280,000 troops, more than double Ukraine’s 125,600. The Russian air force was also considerably larger, with 165,000 personnel, dwarfing Ukraine’s air force strength of 35,000.

Financially, the defense budgets of the two nations further underscored the disparity. In 2021, Ukraine allocated $4.7bn to defense, a mere fraction of Russia’s substantial defense expenditure of $45.8bn. Despite these numerical imbalances, the determination and combat will of Ukrainian troops have been highlighted as significant strengths. Analysts have noted the resilience of the Ukrainian forces, with their fighter jets still operational and taking off amidst the conflict, as particularly impressive.

In terms of military strategy, Russia has deployed various systems against Ukraine. Among the most effective is the Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopter, which played a pivotal role in operations around Zaporizhzhia Oblast. These helicopters have been responsible for destroying several infantry fighting vehicles and tanks. However, their effectiveness has been curtailed by Ukraine’s robust air defense systems. Russia has also strategically placed dense minefields, resulting in Ukraine becoming one of the most heavily mined countries globally. Additionally, Russia has employed “kamikaze” drones, such as the Lancet drone, to target Ukrainian military assets.

Financially, the war has taken a toll on Russia. They have spent more than £134bn on the conflict, with equipment losses amounting to £27 bn. This massive expenditure encompasses various aspects, including military operations costing £41bn, servicemen salaries at £28 bn, compensation for the families of the deceased at £21 bn, and assistance to wounded soldiers costing £16bn. The financial strain has been further exacerbated by the depreciation of the ruble, impacting the overall costs associated with Russian soldiers.

From 24 February 2022 to 29 September 2023, the estimated combat losses of the Russian troops are substantial. They have lost approximately 277,660 military personnel, 2,329 tanks, 4,118 armored vehicles including APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers) and IFVs (Infantry Fighting Vehicles), 1,099 artillery systems including howitzers and rocket launchers, 166 air defense systems, 72 fixed-wing aircraft, 105 helicopters, around 300 UAVs, 16 naval ships and submarines, one submarine, and 930 tactical vehicles and other equipment. These figures are continuously being confirmed and updated. The primary source of this information is the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as they reported on their official Facebook page and were covered by Ukrainska Pravda.

However, as the conflict progressed, the Ukrainian armed forces experienced significant losses. They lost 652 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), 1,421 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), and Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) vehicles. This count includes not only vehicles from the military inventory of the Ukrainian army but also combat vehicles and tanks donated by European allies and the United States. Additionally, Ukraine lost 424 artillery systems, which encompassed self-propelled howitzers, towed guns, and cannons. Their air defense capabilities were hit with the loss of 128 missile systems. The Ukrainian Air Force suffered with the loss of 72 aircraft and 35 helicopters. Furthermore, 193 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) were lost, and their naval capabilities were impacted by the loss of 27 ships. (Source: Paulo Dominonni via LinkedIn/ ARMY RECOGNITION)

 

04 Oct 23. Russia’s Shahed-136 Drones Now Feature Tungsten Shrapnel. Russia is stepping up its attacks with Shahed-136 drones and is using a new generation of those weapons featuring warheads packed with tungsten balls, Ukrainian officials say.

Overnight Thursday, Russia attacked with 44 Shaheds drones, all but 10 of which were destroyed in the air, the Ukrainian Air Force claimed on its Telegram channel. That’s the largest number of those drones used in a single attack this month, Reuters reported.

“It may be a record,” Mykolaiv Oblast Gov. Vitalli Kim said Thursday on his Telegram channel.

“Russians are using Shahed drones more intensively,” Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuri Ignat said during a recent national television broadcast. “Unfortunately, Russia now has the opportunity to manufacture its own. This is a new challenge against which we will respond. It is likely they will start attacking energy infrastructure again.”

In recent days, Russia has used the Shaheds to conduct raids across Ukraine, but especially against port facilities on the Black Sea and Danube River, killing several civilians and damaging port and grain facilities as well as a landmark hotel.

Thursday’s attacks were far less effective than previous ones, Oleh Kiper, head of the Odesa regional military administration said on his Telegram channel.

“No hits and destruction,” he said. “There are no casualties. Only a few small [areas] of ignition of dry grass were recorded as a result of falling fragments”

of the drones, which were downed by air defenses, he said.

In addition to using an increased number of these drones, Russia is using new models, Ukrainian officials say. That’s based on findings from the recovery of recently downed Shaheds.

The latest generation of these drones were found to have new warheads, engines, batteries, servomotors and bodies, Capt. Andriy Rudyk, a representative of Ukraine’s Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment, said Thursday at a press briefing.

The new warheads contain tungsten balls for fragmented shrapnel, which is an upgrade over the Shahed-136’s original blast fragmentation warhead configuration. Tungsten balls are also a design feature of US – manufactured Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) munitions fired by the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) provided to Ukraine.

Driven by the force of the explosives, fragments, like ball bearings, widen the destructive area of the warheads and tungsten’s high density penetrates better into whatever they hit, and do so with more force.

Rudyk did not say what, if any, impact adding the tungsten balls to the Shahed warheads is having and none of the previously quoted Ukrainian officials even mentioned the new generation of drones.

Much of the rest of the changes do not alter the general characteristics of the drones, but appear to have been engineered to reduce the manufacturing cost to increase production volume, Rudyk said.

The newer Shaheds have MicroPilot UAV Flight Control Systems MD550 gas-fueled engines instead of the Mado MD550 gas-fueled engines, said Rudyk.

The Mado MD550 gasoline-fueled engine used by older versions of the Shahed-136 drones. (Ukrainian Military Media Center photo)

Rudyk did not address the source of the components. However, the MicroPilot engines are made in China while the Mado engines are made in Iran, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.

Aside from the different engines, the latest Shaheds now use the Russian-made Kometa digital antennas for satellite navigation receivers in the navigation system designed to reduce the ability of enemy jamming. It’s the same system Russia uses in its UMPK glide bombs. (Source: UAS VISION)

 

02 Oct 23. Baykar to Invest $100m in Three Ukrainian Projects. During the First International Defense Industries Forum in Kiev, Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of Baykar, announced that the Turkish company, known for the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles, is investing $100m in three Ukrainian projects.

One of these endeavours includes the development of a drone production facility, with an anticipated completion period of eighteen months, as reported by a Ukrinform correspondent.

“We have three main investments in Ukraine. One of them is a factory. Then we have a service center and also we have a headquarters office in here. […] This investment, which is around $100m, has already started. The construction has already started. It will take about one-and-a-half years to finish it. We are targeting a minimum of 300 people to work here. And we have ongoing cooperation,”

Bayraktar said, adding that this facility will prioritize self-sufficiency, environmental considerations, and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Ukraine possesses distinctive engine production technologies, while Turkey specializes in drones where these engines can be integrated.

“We also have some challenges. The supply chain, sourcing, and development of the human capital because of the effects of the war, and regulatory environment especially the regulations that will support these investments.

We also have some challenges. The supply chain, sourcing and development of the human capital because of the effects of the war, and regulatory environment especially the regulations that will support these investments,”

Bayraktar said.

He mentioned that the ongoing conflict has evolved into a battle dominated by unmanned aerial vehicles, and Ukraine possesses certain advantages in this regard, partly attributed to its utilization of diverse aircraft types, despite the inherent challenges.

In such circumstances, receiving input from the military regarding technology deployment is of paramount importance. This is why the Bayraktar drones deployed in Ukraine have been outfitted with a range of distinctive systems.

The CEO of Baykar also conveyed his support for Ukraine.

“We are not here to maximize our revenues or profits. We are here to maximize our support for you. We respect your fight for your freedom and independence, to keep your sovereignty,” Bayraktar said.

He indicated that all contributions from Baykar, Ukraine, and Poland have been allocated, primarily for the procurement of radar systems, which have already successfully detected thousands of targets and yielded significant outcomes on the battlefield.

“The total value of these donations is up to $106m,”

Bayraktar said, adding that Baykar had undertaken several humanitarian efforts, such as delivering humanitarian aid shipments and arranging a camp for Ukrainian children. (Source: UAS VISION/Almayadeen; Ukrinform)

 

28 Sep 23. Lessons learned in Ukraine: are they the right ones?

The C-UAS community – in common with almost every other sector of the broad defence and security worlds – focuses a great deal of attention on what is happening in Ukraine as the 21-month-old conflict with Russia continues to unfold. Almost every commercial or marketing presentation trumpets “this is what we learned – and this is what we’re doing about it”. Sometimes it takes an alternative perspective to stimulate a rethink and a re-evaluation of conventional wisdom. And that is just what happens on reading an account, recently published on social media, of a venture capitalist’s visit to the conflict area.

We will not attempt to summarise the article – that would be both grossly unfair and would rob the author of the benefit of readers perusing what he actually said, as opposed to what somebody else says he said: read the article linked below – you will be glad you did. It is, however, worth reflecting on some of the conclusions that the author highlights in his social media post, for they provide an alternative point of view and provoke constructive thought – which is never a bad thing! Admittedly, these conclusions derive from looking at the whole spectrum of the conflict – but they translate with terrifying ease to having significant potential impact on the development, acquisition and deployment of C-UAS solutions.

The first observation, as the author puts it, is that “the adversary has a plan for countering legacy concepts and capabilities,” which, he concludes, demands observing nations “design for adaptation”. Although Russian equipment (and doctrine and experience, in particular) have failed to live up to expectations – which will have a detrimental effect on the nation’s credibility and the long-term health of its defence export prospects – there is considerable evidence that some aspects of the potential countermeasures they may face were considered prior to the invasion, and supposedly adequate measures put in place. The fundamental problem with the apparent failure to defeat those countermeasures is an issue of training, doctrine and mission readiness (or lack thereof) rather than one of technology. Nevertheless, designing for adaptation is good advice, for the current mentality of the Russian military system does not react particularly effectively – or swiftly – to the unexpected.

The second conclusion unearths one of the abiding truths of modern conflict. “The contested electromagnetic spectrum shapes the employment of all other capabilities,” to which the suggested counter is “Invest in the ecosystem”. That is a graceful encapsulation of what so many developers are doing – and, to a certain extent, those are being echoed by the operators. The investment made in the last several generations of AI, autonomy, data fusion, sensor fusion and simple-to-use interfaces have the potential to transform modern warfare. Evidence from Ukraine – and elsewhere – currently suggests some of those effects are beginning to manifest, but resting on laurels is not an option. The imperative to invest in technological capability remains, if not paramount, then at least of supreme importance.

Yet the very next conclusion offered by the author appears to counter the argument above. “Combat forces on the modern battlefield have a preference for affordable mass over exquisite capability [therefore] Accelerate autonomy”. While we might argue with the potential universal applicability of the first part of that statement, there can be no doubt that some military cultures espouse exactly that concept. Russian use of EW drones in enormous numbers and their use of overwhelming artillery power are good examples of the concept at work. There is also the issue of the ‘affordable’ part of the statement – a word that in many other cultures becomes the rock on which other, wider-scale solutions often founder. Autonomy – safe, error-free, reliable and repeatable autonomous capability – will undoubtedly provide a competitive advantage in almost every conflict scenario currently being played out or foreseen. But there is still a phenomenal amount of work to be completed (and funded) before we get from where we are to where we aspire to be.

Finally, a truism that merits repetition, despite the fact the casual reader may ask “Isn’t that obvious?” Indeed it is – but it is also all too rarely highlighted as a current imperative. “Innovating under fire is hard, scaling innovation while under fire is harder”. If we, the external observers, should take to heart any lesson the Ukrainian armed forces and wider population are learning at such enormous human cost, this is it. Don’t spend too long observing, analysing, interpreting and discussing: start to build effective responses now or, as the author puts it, “Team and iterate now”.

It is almost always worth while considering perspectives from a different point of view, which is why Unmanned Airspace will continue to seek out and report on them when the subject matter and ‘alternative’ nature of the argument justify calling it to the attention of our global audience.

For more information: Startup Army: How the War in Ukraine is Rewriting the Future of Defense Tech (hs-sites.com) (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

25 Sep 23. Russia deploys tank-mounted Volnorez jammers in Ukraine. First seen in public at the Russian Army Expo 2023, the Volnorez (Breakwater) C-UAS jammer has now been seen mounted on T-80BVM main battle tanks in Ukraine, according to social media reports circulating in mid-September.

Volnorez spans the frequency range from 900-2,000MHz and is able to disrupt drone signals from ranges in excess of one kilometre, providing the jammer-equipped vehicle (and its immediate neighbours) with enhanced levels of protection in an increasingly intense conflict. The jammers – which are magnetically attached to the host vehicle, thus increasing operational agility-are omnidirectional, thereby providing 360° coverage. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

29 Sep 23. An urgent matter of drones: What NATO should learn from UAS operations in Ukraine. A recent report published by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, DC, focuses attention on what the UAS and C-UAS communities can and should learn from careful observation and analysis of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. A link to the extensive report – which makes for absorbing and thought-provoking reading – is provided below, but we think it valuable and interesting to consider the conclusions the authors reach.

1. NATO must swiftly and carefully assess both UAS and counter-UAS capability requirements, using lessons learned from recent conflicts, taking recent technological developments and threat evolution into account;
2. Both capability and policy/doctrine development need to be guided by the imperative for multi-domain operations and by the requirements for scale and interoperability;
3. There is an imperative need to enhance and refine enabling capabilities, including AI, data architecture, communications and cyber/space functionalities;
4. Leveraging the significant innovation efforts already underway among NATO member states and partners should be accompanied by improvement of the operational experimentation and procurement processes;
5. At the NATO level, doctrine, operational concepts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) must be reassessed and appropriately modified to reflect new and expanded UAS roles and the increasing importance of counter-UAS;
6. Development of the appropriate human resources requires a specific focus in order to assure UAS and C-UAS capability integration into NATO and member states forces.

The issue of watching and learning from current conflicts is a supremely important one. Unmanned Airspace is currently engaged in its own analysis of what the C-UAS community can take away from events in Ukraine for reflection and analysis: the results will be made available in a special report to be published in December. For further details, please send you contact details and inquiry to Tim Mahon, Publisher – C-UAS.

For more information: An Urgent Matter of Drones: Lessons for NATO from Ukraine – CEPA (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

01 Oct 23. Russia could target any British soldiers training troops in Ukraine, Medvedev says. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Sunday any British soldiers training Ukrainian troops in Ukraine would be legitimate targets for Russian forces, as would German factories producing Taurus missiles should they supply Kyiv.

Medvedev, who is deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and has become an increasingly hawkish and anti-Western figure in Russian politics, said such activities by the West were bringing World War Three closer.

In a post on Telegram, Medvedev first directed his ire towards recently appointed British Defence Minister Grant Shapps, who said in a newspaper interview that London wants to deploy military instructors to Ukraine, in addition to training Ukrainian armed forces in Britain or other Western countries as at present.

“(This will) turn their instructors into a legal target for our armed forces … understanding perfectly well that they will be ruthlessly destroyed. And not as mercenaries, but namely as British NATO specialists,” Medvedev wrote on Telegram.

British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak rowed back from Shapps’ comments on Sunday, saying there were no immediate plans to deploy military instructors to Ukraine.

“What the defence secretary was saying was that it might well be possible one day in the future for us to do some of that training in Ukraine,” Sunak told reporters at the start of the governing Conservative Party’s annual conference in Manchester.

“But that’s something for the long term, not the here and now. There are no British soldiers that will be sent to fight in the current conflict.”

Medvedev also vilified those in Germany who want Berlin to supply Ukraine with Taurus cruise missiles that could strike Russian territory and try to limit Moscow’s supply to its army.

“They say this is in accordance with international law. Well, in that case, strikes on German factories where these missiles are made would also be in full compliance with international law,” Medvedev said.

“These morons are actively pushing us towards World War Three,” he added, repeating similar warnings he has made before. In July he said actions by the “completely crazy” West meant World War Three “is getting closer.” (Source: Reuters)

 

01 Oct 23. Joe Biden pleads with Congress not to end US support for Ukraine. Federal funding for Kyiv will end in mid-November unless further spending packages are agreed.

Joe Biden pleaded with Congress to urgently approve more funds for the Ukrainian army after a spending package cobbled together to avert a US government shutdown dramatically cut off support.

The US president, speaking in the White House Roosevelt Room on Sunday, said Ukrainians would “die needlessly” if funding was allowed to run dry from mid-November.

“We have time, not much time and there’s an overwhelming sense of urgency,” he said in an impassioned plea.

“Look at me,” Mr Biden went on, as he stared straight into the camera. “We’re going to get it done.”

The US has so far provided more than $113bn (£93bn) to support Ukraine in the face of Russia’s invasion.

Mr Biden had asked Congress to supply another $24bn for the next phase of the conflict, but the deal reached late on Saturday to avoid a shutdown of the federal government scrapped even a much-reduced agreement of $6bn.

Split among Republicans

The deal was the brainchild of Kevin McCarthy, the Republican House speaker, who cut aid to Ukraine in order to win over the Republican Right, which is increasingly wary of funding the war.

A shutdown looked all but inevitable last week and would have left the government’s 4m employees unpaid, while shuttering services from national parks to financial regulators.

US federal funding for Kyiv will end in 44 days from Monday unless further spending packages are agreed. The Pentagon still has the authority to draw down about $5.6bn from its existing stockpile of arms.

On Sunday, Mr Biden’s plea was bolstered by the EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, who urged Congress to reconsider the decision to drop financial support for Ukraine.

“I have hope that this will not be a definitive decision and Ukraine will continue having the support of the US,“ he added.

Republican presidential candidate Nikki Haley rounded on Congress for ditching aid to Ukraine.

Financial support for Ukraine would prevent war, she said on Fox News Sunday.

“It’s going to make sure Ukraine has what they need. And it’s going to make sure that if they win, this is not another win for Russia or China, but it’s preventing war so that it doesn’t go into Poland and other NATO countries.”

New package for Ukraine

Lindsay Graham, a Republican senator, said he expected work would soon start on a $60bn package to help Kyiv “through the next fighting season”.  Though Republican support for Ukraine is waning, a majority of its congress members back further aid deliveries.

In a surprise move on Saturday, Mr McCarthy sidestepped Republican conservatives by turning to the Democrat minority to secure a stopgap spending bill.

The measure passed with the support of 209 Democrats, who joined 129 Republican centrists in agreeing to fund the government for another 45 days.

To win Democrat support, Mr McCarthy ditched conservative demands for deep spending cuts and immigration restrictions.

Republican rebels, led by Florida ultraconservative Matt Gaetz reacted furiously to the co-operation with Democrats, vowing to unseat Mr McCarthy from his post as speaker.

‘Bring it on’

This has left Mr McCarthy, whose election as speaker triggered a lengthy battle within the Republican ranks, relying on Democrats not joining forces with Mr Gaetz and his supporters to remain in post. He was confident of surviving on Sunday night, saying “bring it on”.

Meanwhile, Republicans demanded the expulsion of a Left-wing Democrat who triggered a fire alarm by using an emergency exit, delaying the crucial vote to prevent a shutdown.

Jamaal Bowman is now facing a formal investigation by the House Administration Committee over the incident – which he said was accidental.

Only 20 members of Congress have been expelled in the history of the US, the last being Democrat James Traficant in 2002, following his conviction on 10 criminal counts. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

29 Sep 23. US DoD: Ukrainian pilots must learn English before moving onto F-16s in October. The US has left a very short period for English language training before Ukrainian pilots begin to learn how to operate F-16 fighter jets.

In a US Department of Defense (DoD) press briefing conducted on 28 September 2023, the Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh confirmed that “English language training has started for several pilots,” before personnel begin to learn how to operate the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

While a week earlier on 21 September, the DoD Press Secretary Air Force General Pat Ryder noted that “we do expect Ukrainian pilots and maintainers to arrive in the United States soon to conduct the initial English language training, and then the pilot training to start in the weeks after that.”

So the DoD anticipates its Ukrainian pilots to begin flying complex, western fighter jets sometime in October. However, the pilots must learn a lot in a very short period of time.

Singh added that the “English language training will vary, depending on proficiency and skill,” which will only complicate the process even more as the pilots learn how to operate this complex platform at different levels of understanding.

“So again, [I] don’t have an exact timeline of when folks will then move from [language] training to start pilot training, but yes, English language training has begun,” Singh stated.

Ukraine’s F-16 pilot training programme.

The topic of training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16s has been a major discussion in the backdrop of the counteroffensive currently being waged by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the south and east of the country.

Many observers of the Ukraine conflict consider the western fighter jet to be an essential asset to maintaining Ukrainian airspace from the indiscriminate Russian strikes that have attacked civilian and military personnel alike.

However, in June 2023, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United States agreed to join forces to provide training to Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft, with the aim of enabling them to undertake combat missions at the earliest opportunity.

In addition, Denmark announced in late August that it would provide Ukraine with 19 of its legacy F-16 fighters to aid Kyiv as part of a multinational aircraft and training programme to deliver combat air to the Ukrainian Air Force.

Overcoming the language barrier with limited time

The Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon is one of the world’s most prolific fighter aircraft.

The F-16 Block 70/72 – a fourth-generation platform enhanced with fifth-generation capabilities – is the latest production configuration; it has been ordered by five countries so far. The upgrade increases new configuration’s structural life by 50% when compared to previous F-16 production standard.

Advanced equipment fitted on the current build of the F-16 includes Honeywell colour flat-panel liquid crystal multifunction displays, digital terrain system, modular mission computer, colour video camera to record the pilot’s view of the head-up display, a colour triple-deck video recorder and an enhanced programmable display generator.

The aircraft has nine hardpoints for weapons payloads: one at each wing tip, three under each wing, and one centre line under the fuselage.

Compared with Ukraine’s legacy fleet of MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets, with 13 additional units that Slovakia provided in April this year, the Russian-manufactured jets lack the fourth-generation performance of the F-16, which is said to be in use until the 2060s. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

30 Sep 23. Ukraine lures Western weapons makers to transform defence industry. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Saturday he wants to turn Ukraine’s defence industry into a “large military hub” by partnering with Western weapons manufacturers to increase arms supplies for Kyiv’s counteroffensive against Russia.

He was speaking at a forum his government convened with international producers to discuss how to jointly develop industrial capacity to build and repair weapons in Ukraine despite constant Russian bombardment.

“Ukraine is in such a phase of the defence marathon when it is very important, critical to go forward without retreating. Results from the frontline are needed daily,” Zelenskiy told executives representing more than 250 Western weapons producers.

“We are interested in localizing production of equipment needed for our defence and each of those advanced defence systems which are used by our soldiers, giving Ukraine the best results at the front today,” he told the forum in Kyiv.

Zelenskiy said that air defence and de-mining were his immediate priorities. Ukraine also aims to boost domestic production of missiles, drones and artillery ammunition.

Kyiv began its counteroffensive in early June to try to recapture territories seized by Russia, which still controls about 18% of the Ukrainian territory. Kyiv reported advances in several directions and liberated over a dozen villages, but so far has not managed to retake any major cities.

Ukraine critically depends on Western financial and military support and has had tens of bns of dollars of such help since the start of Russia’s invasion in February 2022. But the war created a constantly growing demand for arms and ammunition.

Executives from weapons producers from over 30 countries attended the forum. Some said they were depleting their stocks quickly and had struggled to find supplies to be able to ramp up production to meet Ukrainian demand.

Ukrainian officials see the development of domestic defence production as a boost to the economy, which has shrunk by about a third last year due to the war.

Several leading Western producers like Germany’s weapon production giant Rheinmetall and Britain-based BAE Systems have already announced plans to team up with Ukrainian producers.

The Foreign Ministry said Ukrainian producers signed about 20 agreements with foreign partners for joint production, exchange of technology or supply of components to make drones, armoured vehicles and ammunition. It did not identify the companies.

The Ukrainian government plans to create special economic conditions to draw Western investment into the domestic defence sector including a fund to support new technology development.

“It will be a mutually beneficial partnership. I think it is a good time and place to create a large military hub,” Zelenskiy said during a separate meeting with U.S., British, Czech, German, French, Swedish and Turkish weapons producers. (Source: Google/Reuters)

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