NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 29.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to advance south of Bakhmut, towards the key railway line and the T-0513 road east of Klishchiivka. Both Ukrainian and Russian sources have reported heavy fighting in the area over the last 24-48 hours, but we cannot confirm whether Ukrainian forces have succeeded in advancing. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Ilya Yevlash stated on 28 September that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems disrupted 258 Russian drone attacks over the previous day alone. While we cannot confirm the number, it likely reflects the intensity of and reliance on drone operations on both sides. It also highlights the effectiveness of Ukrainian EW capabilities on this axis, which some Russian sources have acknowledged as being superior to Russia’s own capabilities in recent weeks.
BORDERS: Russian sources claimed on 28 September that Ukrainian units attempted to penetrate border defences and enter Belgorod oblast near Terebreno 47 miles (76km) north-west of Belgorod, but the attacks were reportedly repulsed. Russian sources have also commented on increased Ukrainian military activity in Kharkiv oblast, which they assess could indicate preparation for further cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts, though we cannot confirm this.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 28 September, Senior Ukrainian National Guard officer Mykola Urshalovych stated that Russian forces have prioritised defensive operations along the Oskil-Kreminna line over the past week. On the same day, the Ukrainian General staff reported that Russia did not conduct any offensive operations. Although Russian sources recently made unverified reports of Russian attacks, the Ukrainian claims likely indicate a reduction in the pace of Russian offensive operations in the Oskil-Kreminna sector. At the same time, Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces, Ilya Yevlash, reported on 28 September that Russian Su-35 planes and Ka-52 helicopters are increasingly active in the Kupiansk and Lyman directions, with Ukrainian Kherson authorities having reported that the number of airstrikes has also increased in Kherson oblast. It remains unclear why the rate of air sorties has increased so notably on these fronts, while Russian offensive operations have decreased, but it could be an attempt to provide Russian forces with a rest after months of continual orders to advance.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian mayor of occupied Melitipol Ivan Federov stated that Russian forces are deploying increasing numbers of service personnel and equipment to Zaporizhzhia oblast. It remains unclear how many reserves Russian forces possess, and whether an increase in deployments to this critical sector reflects efforts to strengthen Russia’s second and third lines of defences near the Ukrainians’ Orikhiv breakthrough. However, Federov assessed that Russian forces are likely planning to deploy ‘civilian guards’, likely a reference to security forces and Rosgvardia (National Guard) units, to protect strategic sites across the region.
SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, Russian sources reported on 28-29 September that Russian forces have stepped up counter-attacks to the east, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border region. Russian forces claim to have advanced near Pryyutne, 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Zaporizhzhia oblast), and the Ukrainian General Staff have reported that they repulsed a number of Russian attacks in the area. However, there is no visual or other confirmation of Russia’s claims. Along the key Orikhiv front, Ukrainian forces are likely continuing to broaden the breach south of Robotyne and west of Verbove, but there has been little indication over the last 24 hours that they have made much progress.
STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that earlier on 29 September, air defences intercepted 11 Ukrainian drones, ten over Kursk oblast and one over Kaluga oblast. Kursk Governor Roman Starovoyt reported that one of the drones dropped two explosive devices in a settlement in Belovsky District (Kursk oblast). The attack caused a fire at a power transformer, leaving five settlements without power. Ukrainska Pravda posted a video reportedly shared by the country’s Security Service (SBU) showing the drone attack targeting power infrastructure. On 26 September, Starovoyt also reported that a drone attack caused a power outage in seven settlements in the Kursk region. As such, the strikes underscore the increasing vulnerability of the Russian energy infrastructure, particularly in bordering regions. Such strikes also illustrate Kyiv’s goal to mirror Russian strikes against power infrastructure. The mayor of Mykolaiv confirmed earlier on 29 September that a Russian missile struck an ‘infrastructure facility’ on the outskirts of the city earlier today.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: The US House of Representatives approved a USD 300 million tranche of military aid to Ukraine after House Republicans had earlier removed it from the proposed bill. House Republicans approved the fund after separating it out from the wider Pentagon spending bill, which allowed it to pass 311-117, though the Pentagon bill was much closer, passing by 218-210. The procedural negotiations will ensure the funds reach Ukraine, but the looming government shut down will continue to threaten timelines and the overall amount of US funding for Ukraine in the coming months (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – US – 28 September 2023).
ECONOMY: On 28 September, Russia announced that it will raise defence expenditure by nearly 70% for 2024 to fight the ‘hybrid war’ waged by the West in Ukraine. The Russian Finance Ministry has confirmed that defence spending is set to rise over 68% year-on-year, to an estimated USD 111.15 billion. The announcement was made on the same day NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. On 27 September, Moscow accused Ukraine’s Western allies of helping Kyiv conduct the recent strike on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. While the budget has been long prepared, rhetoric accompanying the announcement is likely part of Moscow’s aims to demonstrate its readiness to endure a long-term conflict and justify the ballooning expenditure by casting the entirety of NATO as Russia’s enemy. However, increasing defence spending amid a slowdown of exports will likely continue to drive Russian ruble volatility and increase inflation. A 70% increase in Russia’s defence budget will therefore inevitably further strain Russia’s economy, but Moscow will likely find the money by reducing social spending. This will further depress living standards but is unlikely to trigger major unrest in the short term.
CONSCRIPTION: On 29 September, the Russian MoD held a conference outlining the rules for the autumn conscription cycle, which will begin on 1 October. There are no major changes to the conscription cycle officially, beyond adding the newly annexed regions in Ukraine to the conscription cycle. Moscow has stated that the General Staff has no plans to add additional mobilisation measures, as there are allegedly enough contract personnel and volunteers to conduct operations in Ukraine. Nevertheless, crypto-mobilisation efforts are highly likely to continue throughout the autumn and winter, as Moscow’s need for personnel only increases amid Ukraine’s counter-offensive. The MoD reiterated that conscripts will not be sent to participate in the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, or deploy to ‘new regions’, referring to the annexed Ukrainian territories. Notably, the MoD also stated that conscripts will ‘staff research and production units […] in the interests of national defence’, likely referring to the practice of conscripts working in arms factories to support the war effort.

FORECAST

WAGNER GROUP: The Kremlin confirmed on 29 September that Russian president Vladimir Putin has met with Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and former Wagner Group commander Andrei Troshev. Putin reportedly spoke to Troshev about the formation of volunteer units to fight in Ukraine, underscoring the efforts of both the Kremlin and the MoD to attract Wagner fighters to MoD-controlled ‘volunteer’ units and private military companies (PMCs). Troshev was a founding member of Wagner Group, and Putin had previously suggested he take command of the PMC after the failed rebellion in June, indicating he is likely perceived as more loyal to the Kremlin than Wagner officers who remained loyal to Yevgeny Prigozhin.

The future of the Wagner Group still remains unclear, and while elements of the PMC are now deploying in eastern Ukraine, including around Bakhmut, there are many thousands of Wagner personnel that are unaccounted for. Negotiations are reportedly underway between Wagner and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), but there are indications that those negotiations have now stalled.

Georgia: Rampant corruption likely to curtail bid for EU membership, sustain anti-government unrest. On 27 September, Transparency International (TI) released a report highlighting widespread corruption involving government officials and their relatives in Georgia. TI concluded that the nature of corruption in Georgia meets the definition of ‘kleptocracy’, in which political elites capture national wealth and simultaneously crack down on critical voices. TI further explained that the bodies in charge of combating corruption, namely the Prosecutor’s Office and the State Security Service, systematically fail to properly investigate and prosecute cases of alleged high-level corruption, particularly if members of the ruling Georgian Dream party are involved. TI reiterated recommendations made by the EU that an independent body should conduct anti-corruption investigations. However, the Georgian government is unlikely to implement such a measure. Pervasive high-level corruption will undermine the country’s investment environment. Moreover, the European Commission is likely to provide an unfavourable recommendation in October when Georgia’s candidate status for EU membership will be reviewed. Perceptions of entrenched corruption will sustain anti-government sentiment and drive unrest risks within the population.

Ukraine: EU extends protection for Ukrainian refugees, driving tensions in Poland, Czech Republic. On 28 September, the European Council extended the temporary protection of Ukrainian refugees through 4 March 2025. The protection mechanism, activated in March 2022, applies to four million Ukrainian refugees who are currently residing in the EU. The goal is to provide comprehensive protection to displaced persons who are unable to return to their countries. As such, Ukrainian refugees can reside in the EU and benefit from various rights, including access to the labour market, housing, medical assistance, social welfare assistance and education. The EU’s decision will reduce the uncertainty over the humanitarian situation for Ukrainian refugees as the war protracts. However, the presence of Ukrainian refugees will strain the resources of countries that have welcomed large numbers of arrivals, such as Poland and the Czech Republic. This will, in turn, drive regional tensions, particularly as Poland implements nativist policies and has threatened to suspend aid to Ukrainian refugees. (Source: Sibylline)

Sep 28.

BAKHMUT: A spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces, Ilya Yevlash, reported on 27 September that Ukrainian forces have enjoyed unspecified success along the Bakhmut axis. Specifically, he reported that successful operations took place near Klishchiivka, Odradivka and Shumy, located four miles (6km), six miles (10km) and 15 miles (24km) south of Bakhmut, respectively. Notably, Russian sources have reported over the last 24 hours that Ukrainian forces are pushing hard east of Klishchiivka, where they are trying to advance towards the railway line and T-0513 highway. Russian claims that they have repelled all these attacks cannot be confirmed.
BAKHMUT: Yevlash also reported that around 500 former Wagner Group personnel fighting as part of Ministry of Defence (MoD)-controlled units are currently in the Bakhmut area. Yevlash stated that their numbers are unlikely to change the situation on the battlefield around Bakhmut significantly; we assess that this claim is likely to be accurate. It remains likely that ongoing disagreements among Wagner Group remnants are undermining efforts to retain the private military company (PMC)’s independence; a Russian source claimed on 26 September that the appointment of a new Wagner Group commander triggered an exodus of personnel, who subsequently joined MoD-controlled units. However, this cannot be confirmed.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 27 September, Russian sources claimed that Russian air strikes destroyed a bridge across the Oskil River; they claim the attack disrupted Ukrainian supplies. While such claims remain unconfirmed, they nevertheless indicate that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to disrupt Ukrainian supply routes and ground lines of communication (GLOC) in Kharkiv oblast.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 27 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have entered a trench line west of Verbove, though progress towards the town itself remains slow. Meanwhile, the Russian MoD claimed on 27 September that Ukrainian forces have not broken through Russian defences in western Zaporizhzhia oblast. However, there is growing evidence that Ukrainian forces are now successfully operating beyond the fixed line of trenches and anti-tank dragon’s teeth west of Verbove, though the rate of their advances remains unclear.
STRIKES: During the early hours of 28 September, Russian forces reportedly launched 44 Shahed 136/131 drones. Ukraine’s air force alleged that its air defences intercepted 34 drones. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that air defences were activated in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, as well as across central regions. On the evening of 27 September, Russia reportedly launched drone and missile strikes against Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kirovohrad and Mykolaiv oblasts. During these strikes, the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russia launched five Shahed 136/131 drones, three of which were destroyed by air defences. The local authorities reported that a missile struck infrastructure facilities in the outskirts of Mykolaiv.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

MUNITIONS: The US State Department reported on 27 September that Russian and North Korean officials are continuing negotiations over an arms deal, and that they could result in a deal soon. While neither side is likely to announce the details of any potential arms deal, the provision of large quantities of North Korean-produced artillery ammunition would likely help Russian forces to continue operations throughout the winter, while advanced Russian ballistic and satellite technology would augment Pyongyang’s own ambitions.
MUNITIONS: Meanwhile, Iran and Russia are continuing their own negotiations over potential arms deals. During Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Tehran (Iran) on 19 September, both sides discussed the impending expiration of UNSCR 2231 missile restrictions on Iran from 18 October. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported on 27 September that this would likely provide Tehran with new opportunities to export missiles to its partners, chiefly Russia, without international supervision. Moscow has likely long sought to acquire large numbers of Iranian cruise, ballistic and anti-tank missiles; it is likely that Iranian exports to Russia will increase sharply after 18 October. Depending on the deal struck and the volumes of projectiles transferred, cruise and ballistic missiles would likely be used to augment Russia’s winter strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
AID: On 27 September, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has blocked the transfer of Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine despite the ruling coalition having approved their provision. The WSJ explained that the chancellor fears that providing the German-made equipment would require Germany sending military technicians to help service the weapon, which Scholz is concerned would possibly lead to confrontation with Russia. In August, German government officials expressed their reluctance to provide such weapons out of fear that Kyiv would use them to strike de jure Russian territory. Despite mounting domestic pressure, it remains unclear when and if Scholz will U-turn on the Taurus missile issue; he has agreed to send various other military equipment to Ukraine, despite his initial opposition.
AID: On 27 September, Switzerland’s National Council, the country’s lower parliament, voted against a proposal to authorise the re-export of Swiss-made defence equipment to Ukraine. In June, the National Council voted against a similar amendment to the country’s strict neutrality law, which prohibits the re-export of Swiss-made defence equipment to countries engaged in a conflict. The Swiss lower house’s consistent refusal to authorise re-exports of weapons will restrict the ability of third-parties, including Germany, to export Swiss-produced weaponry to Ukraine.
AID: On 27 September, the Bulgarian parliament agreed to transfer unserviceable S-300 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to Ukraine. Bulgaria’s MoD stated that the missiles were no longer being used by Bulgarian forces and that Ukraine has the ability to repair the defective projectiles, which still form the backbone of Ukraine’s air defence network. Russia warned Sofia that the provision of the missiles would violate a defence military co-operation agreement between both countries in place since 2002. Bulgaria remains a key supplier of Soviet-era equipment. However, ultranationalist groups staged protests in Sofia (Bulgaria) on 21 September against the government’s pro-West policies. The government also expelled three church clerics following accusations of espionage by the security services. Bulgaria’s continuing efforts to aid Ukraine militarily will possibly reinforce pro-Russia sentiment and moderately raise the risk of Russian-backed unrest and sabotage attacks against defence sector sites; such sites have already been attacked in 2023.

FORECAST

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: On 27 September, Samvel Shahramanyan, the president of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh in Nagorno-Karabakh, signed a decree that will dissolve all state institutions of the unrecognised republic on 1 January 2024. The decree marks the end of the ethnic-Armenian controlled breakaway region in Azerbaijan. The decision will have profound implications for Russian influence and involvement in the South Caucasus, particularly as Russian peacekeepers have facilitated the evacuation of tens of thousands of people to Armenia. The billionaire former head of Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto government Ruben Vardanyan was arrested by Azerbaijani forces on 27 September; he was subsequently charged with supporting terrorism. Vardanyan remains one of the most influential pro-Russian actors in the region; his arrest will likely influence domestic politics within Armenia, where mounting anti-government sentiment is increasing the risk of major unrest; this will possibly trigger a repeat of the Velvet Revolution which swept the current prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, to power in 2018.

However, growing anti-Pashinyan sentiment will possibly be leveraged by Moscow and pro-Russian forces in Armenia. While Pashinyan has criticised Moscow and seemingly wants to move Yerevan away from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in favour of relations with the US and France, there remains residual pro-Russia sentiment among many hardline Karabakh Armenians – tens of thousands of whom are now being evacuated to Armenia. Pashinyan has faced widespread opposition from within the military in recent years. Arrests and demotions of prominent military leaders took place after the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces called for Pashinyan to resign in 2021, leading to fears at the time of a possible coup.

With Moscow ramping up its anti-Pashinyan rhetoric in recent weeks, the risk of Russia supporting an attempted coup against Yerevan is increasing. If Baku pushes Yerevan for further concessions, including the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, the stability of Pashinyan’s government will be severely tested. The government will almost certainly face pressure stemming from refugee flows; it therefore remains a realistic possibility that pro-Russia actors will seek to exploit the situation and destabilise Pashinyan with the aim of replacing him with someone (possibly a Karabakh Armenian) who is less pro-West and friendlier towards Moscow.

Sep 27.

OFFENSIVES: Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu stated on 26 September that the Russian army is continuing to increase its combat power and that the ‘sequential implementation of measures […] until 2025 will enable [the army] to achieve its intended goals’. Shoigu’s statement was (perhaps deliberately) vague, but it implies that Moscow is preparing longer term plans to improve Russia’s depleted combat potential, with a time horizon well beyond 2024. While Shoigu did not say so directly, this reinforces our assessment that Moscow is ready to fight a protracted, attritional war well beyond 2024 if necessary and underscores that an end to the war is unlikely in the short to medium term.
BAKHMUT: Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces Ilya Yevlash reported on 26 September that Ukrainian forces are continuing to advance south of Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces are likely making marginal advances in this direction, though there is limited indication that they have made a significant breakthrough, despite reports of the ever-diminishing capability of Russian forces defending the T-0513 key ground line of communication (GLOC) running south from Bakhmut. Russian forces are continuing to launch counter-attacks across the Bakhmut axis, which while costly in terms of attrition for the Russians, are likely slowing Ukrainian advances nonetheless.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 27 September, UK Defence Intelligence (DI) assessed that the ‘piecemeal’ deployment of elements of the newly formed Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) is indicative that a new Russian offensive is highly unlikely in the coming weeks. The UK DI reported that since mid-September, elements of the 25th CAA have been engaged in operations in the sector. Notably, the 67th Motor Rifle Division and 164th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, which are units of the 25th CAA, are reportedly fighting west of Severodonetsk and Kreminna, along the border between Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. However, the UK DI stressed that Russia has struggled to maintain an army-size grouping which could be used in a major new offensive thrust. As such, the ‘piecemeal’ deployment of the 25th CAA likely aims to reinforce the overstretched forces along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline, and enable continual tactical counter-attacks along the frontline, rather than a major mechanised manoeuvre offensive that would threaten Ukrainian cities in eastern Ukraine.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 27 September, the head of the Russian Kharkiv occupation administration, Vitaly Ganchev, claimed that Russian forces are successfully preventing Ukrainian forces from restoring supply routes across the Oskil River. Ganchev also asserted that Russian forces have consolidated their positions in the Kharkiv region. On 26 September, Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that Russian troops have expanded their foothold near Synkivka and Petropavlivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east and four miles (7km) east of Kupiansk, respectively. However, such claims remain unverified and are most likely aimed at exaggerating limited progress made along the Oskil-Kreminna line.
SOUTHERN: On 27 September, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Tavriia Grouping of Forces fighting in Zaporizhzhia oblast announced ‘good news’ in the southern direction, without specifying where any advances had taken place. It remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces are continuing to advance west of Verbove, as Russian sources claimed that attacks launched on 26 September were repulsed. Additionally, some Russian sources have claimed earlier on 27 September that Russian reports of a large-scale Ukrainian attack around Robotyne-Verbove on 26 September were inaccurate, and that the frontline as of the morning of 27 September remains relatively quiet and restricted to exchanges of artillery fire.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources reported on 26 September that Ukrainian forces had reached the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka, 2.5 miles (4km) south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast), but we cannot confirm this. However, as anticipated, various Russian units have been counter-attacking around Novoprokopivka. Notably, elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army’s 42nd Guards Motorised Rifle Division have taken part in these counter-attacks, which is likely a highly degraded unit, though other degraded VDV Airborne units are also counter-attacking in this area. Notably, reports have emerged in recent days that inter-ethnic tensions are growing within the 42nd in the area, with mobilised service personnel from North Ossetia-Alania allegedly being beaten by ethnic Russian military police officers for racial reasons. Given the disproportionate percentage of non-ethnic Slav soldiers that have been mobilised, such incidents will continue to undermine morale and unit cohesion during a crucial period for the Russian defence.
SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, a senior advisor to the exiled Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol stated on 27 September that Russia has begun construction of direct railway links to the major occupied Ukrainian cities of Donetsk, Mariupol and Volnovakha (all in Donetsk oblast). The new rail routes are highly likely aimed at reducing Russian forces’ dependence on rail connections via occupied Crimea, namely the vulnerable Kerch Strait bridge. The new routes, when and if completed, would allow Russia to supply its forces in southern Ukraine directly via the major Russian cities and logistics hubs of Roston-on-Don and Taganrog. Ukrainian forces are highly likely going to attempt to undermine these construction efforts, particularly efforts to build a rail bridge across the Kalmius River, but given the strategic importance of railheads to the Russian military, they will likely be an air defence priority.
STRIKES: Moscow oblast authorities reported that overnight on 26-27 September emergency services extinguished a fire in Shchyolkovo, located 25 miles (40km) north-east of Moscow. Residents reportedly heard explosions, while several Russian Telegram channels claimed that the fire occurred at the Chkalovsky air base or a military training centre near Shchyolkovo. As of writing, information remains insufficient to confirm the causes of the fire. However, it fits a wider pattern of suspected Ukrainian operations. On 20 September, Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) claimed that unknown saboteurs blew up two aircraft and a helicopter on 18 September at the Chkalovsky military airbase in Moscow oblast. As such, the fire likely resulted from a Kyiv-backed attack, though this has yet to be corroborated.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

MOBILISATION: On 26 September, Ukraine’s Ministry of Health clarified that women with medical training will be allowed to travel abroad, after earlier comments by an official indicated that they will need special permission to do so. All women with medical training, including doctors, nurses, pharmacists and midwives, will have to register themselves at enlistment centres from 1 October, whereafter they will be liable for mobilisation. However, until they are mobilised, the Ministry of Health has clarified that they can travel freely. Nevertheless, as Kyiv struggles for personnel, travel restrictions and ever broader mobilisation efforts are likely to proliferate as the attritional war continues.
ENERGY: On 26 September, Volodymyr Kudrytskiy, head of Ukraine’s state energy operator Ukrenergo, assured that air defences and fortifications of Ukrenergo’s substations have been reinforced. The goal is to increase the resiliency of the country’s electrical grid against Russian attacks and, as such, mitigate the risk of power blackouts. However, Kudrytskiy also stressed power outages could nevertheless still occur depending on the intensity of Russia’s winter strike campaign. He also noted that electricity imports are likely still needed for Ukraine to get through the winter. We continue to assess that Russia will most likely intensify strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the coming cold season, which will almost certainly raise the risk of power disruption in Ukraine.

FORECAST

SANCTIONS: On 27 September, the Guardian published an article claiming that a leaked Ukrainian document indicated that a wide range of Western components are still being used in Iranian-designed Shahed-136/131 drones. Components produced by companies headquartered in numerous Western countries, including the US, Canada, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Japan, have been found in recent drones used to attack Ukraine. The document did not indicate any wrongdoing on the part of the companies that produce the components, given that most of the components are readily available commercially.

The report also indicated that Russia and Iran have succeeded in diversifying the production of UAVs through factories in Syria as well as inside Russia itself. Iran and Russia are also reportedly developing a new engine for the system, which will likely ensure greater speed and range for the UAVs. In a separate development, the Ukrainian Navy reported on 26 September that between 30-50 components within Russian missiles are produced outside of Russia, such as the Kh-101 cruise missile. These latest reports underscore how Russia is consistently able to circumvent sanctions and acquire dual use components.

The Ukrainian document, entitled ‘Barrage deaths: report on Shahed-136/131 UAVs’, outlined Ukrainian appeals to Western partners for long-range capabilities to attack these Shahed production sites, not only in Russia but also in Syria and Iran. It remains highly unlikely that Ukraine’s Western partners would provide Kyiv with such capabilities and condone attacks outside the immediate Ukrainian battlefield; particularly not in Iran. Nevertheless, as Russia has likely established its own domestic production of Shaheds, namely in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan, Ukraine is likely to attempt to hit these locations to disrupt Russian UAV operations, but will likely have to rely on domestically produced drones launched from inside Russia itself.

Sep 26.

BAKHMUT: On 25 September, Ilya Yevlash, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces, stated that his country’s troops have retaken an additional 1.2 miles (2km) of ground in the Bakhmut direction; he did not specify the exact location of this reclaimed territory. Meanwhile, Russian sources continue to report that fighting is ongoing to the north of Bakhmut, specifically around the town of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (which Russian forces claimed last week to have retaken). Ukrainian forces reportedly counter-attacked in this direction, though Russian forces allege these operations were unsuccessful. We cannot confirm if the town is now under Russian control.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 26 September, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces managed to capture new positions near Kyslivka, located around 18 miles (30km) north-west of Svatove. The settlement is located near the N-26 highway, an important logistics route. However, these claims remain unverified. The milblogger also claimed that fighting is taking place in the Serebrianske forest area near Dibrova, located around four miles (7km) south-west of Kreminna.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 25 September that Ukrainian forces managed to reach the northern outskirts of Verbove (Zaporizhzhia oblast), but that Russian forces successfully counter-attacked. While we cannot confirm these Ukrainian forces’ current situation, Russian sources claim that their forces pushed the Ukrainians back to their original positions. Aside from this, there have been few major developments along the southern axis in the last 24 hours and no confirmed Ukrainian advances.
STRIKES: On the night of 25-26 September, Russia launched 38 Shahed-136/131 drones against Ukraine. While Ukrainian air defences reportedly intercepted 26 drones, the remainder allegedly struck Danube riverine port infrastructure in Izmail district (Odesa oblast). In addition to yesterday’s strike against Odesa’s Black Sea port, the latest attack underscores Moscow’s commitment to degrading Kyiv’s ability to export grain via the Black Sea and Danube.
STRIKES: On 26 September, an unspecified source from Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported to the media that Ukrainian forces launched a High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) missile strike against a Russian command post in Kherson oblast. The strike allegedly killed eight Russian officers and wounded seven others. The strike was launched during a daily meeting of Russian officers from the 24th Motorised Rifle Regiment, part of the 70th Motorised Rifle Division. The high-precision attack, which has yet to be confirmed, comes after Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike on 22 September against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) headquarters in Sevastopol (Crimea) during a meeting of senior BSF officers. That strike allegedly killed the fleet’s commander, Admiral Viktor Sokolov. These high-precision attacks likely reflect a shift in Ukraine’s strategy, namely a pivot towards disrupting Russia’s command and control centres.
STRIKES: On 26 September, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) stated that Ukrainian attacks against Russia’s BSF have likely reduced the BSF’s ability to enforce the blockade of Ukrainian ports. They have also likely diminished its ability both to protect assets docked in port and to conduct routine maintenance. However, according to DI, the BSF is almost certainly still capable of performing its main role, namely launching Kalibr cruise missile strikes and conducting local security patrols.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CURFEW: Ukraine’s National Resistance Centre reported on 25 September that the Russian occupation authorities in Donetsk oblast have placed the region under a tightened curfew. The centre claimed that the oblast’s leader, Denis Pushilin, has allegedly ordered the military to censor phone calls and written correspondence across the region in an effort to clamp down on dissent and increase mobilisation. Pushilin also signed a decree on 18 September outlawing large gatherings; this likely reflects the Russian occupation authorities’ ambition to be prepared to crack down on the local population quickly in the event of public unrest.
AID: On 25 September, a spokesperson for the US State Department announced that in the event of a US government shutdown on 1 October, military aid deliveries to Ukraine would possibly be impacted. Military aid to Ukraine has already featured strongly in the ongoing budgetary debate in the US Congress; while the Biden administration remains committed to transferring financial and military aid to Kyiv in the short-to-medium term, a shutdown would likely delay or dilute said provisions. Nevertheless, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on 25 September that the first US-supplied Abrams main battle tanks have now arrived in Ukraine. Washington DC confirmed it intends to send a total of 31 Abrams tanks; the first batch likely amounts to around ten.
SANCTIONS: On 25 September, the US issued a new wave of trade restrictions against 16 companies (11 Chinese and five Russian). The entities are suspected of supplying drone components to a St Peterburg-based defence technology firm (Special Technology Centre) which is involved in manufacturing Orlan drones. The sanctions underscore the US’ commitment to curtailing sanctions-dodging networks which help Russia to procure weapons it can then employ in the war.

FORECAST

SPILLOVER: Russia’s latest strike campaign has underscored the ongoing (albeit limited) spillover risks facing Ukraine’s neighbours. Russian drones targeted Odesa oblast overnight on 25-26 September, striking sites near the Danube riverine port of Izmail. The attack resulted in the temporary closure of the Orlivka-Isakcha crossing point between Ukraine and Romania. Given Russia’s persistent targeting of Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube ports since the collapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), the Romanian border has faced an increased risk of collateral damage due to both Russian drones and Ukrainian air defence missiles.

In a related development, the Polish authorities confirmed earlier on 26 September that the missile which killed two individuals in Przewodow (Lublin voivodeship, Poland) in November 2022 was Ukrainian, not Russian. According to the investigation, a Ukrainian S-300 5-W-55 air defence missile crossed into Polish airspace. Ukraine claimed at the time that it was a Russian missile. We assessed that the projectile was possibly a Ukrainian S-300 missile.

The Moldovan government confirmed on 25 September that remnants of an S-300 missile crossed into Russian-occupied Transnistria, the latest incursion into de jure Moldovan air space. While Chişinău cannot confirm the origin of the projectile (and has blamed Russia), it was likely a Ukrainian air defence missile. We assess that further such incidents are likely in the coming weeks and months. As Russian forces continue to strike targets on or near Ukraine’s borders, the risk of stray Ukrainian air defence missiles (as well as Russian drones) crossing into neighbouring territories (including NATO countries) remains high. However, these incidents are highly unlikely to trigger a military escalation with NATO.

Sep 25.

BAKHMUT: Head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, stated on 22 September that Ukraine’s objective around Bakhmut is to pin Russian forces in the area to prevent their redeployment to other critical fronts, namely the southern axis. However, this came after President Volodymyr Zelensky’s confirmation that Ukraine intends to retake the town during his visit to Washington DC last week, which notably contrasted US strategic thinking that broadly believes Kyiv should be focusing solely on the southern breakthrough. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces are likely consolidating control of recently liberated settlements south of the town. A spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces stated on 24 September that Ukrainian forces are currently working to cut off the T-05013 highway, which is a key Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) running south of Bakhmut. Nevertheless, the situation to the north of Bakhmut remains more dynamic, with senior Russian occupation official Vladimir Rogov claiming on 25 September that Russian forces had retaken the town of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, eight miles (13km) north-west of Bakhmut. However, this cannot be confirmed.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 24 September, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack in Bilohorivka, located around six miles (10km) south of Kreminna. Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces spokesperson Illia Yevlash noted that although the attack was unsuccessful, it was the first time Russian forces attacked in this sector for a ‘long time’. Yevlash further stated that the Russian command continues to transfer reserves to the Kupiansk and Lyman direction. A Russian online news outlet and Russian milbloggers claimed on 23 and 24 September that Russian forces are advancing near Synkivka and Petropavlivka, located around five miles (8km) north-east and four miles (7km) east of Kupiansk, respectively. However, such claims remain unverified.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 24 September indicates that Ukrainian armoured vehicles are continuing to advance towards Verbove (Zaporizhzhia oblast), and have now reached the western-most outskirts of the town. Russian sources have similarly reported that Ukrainian forces entered Verbove on 22 September, with a VDV airborne-affiliated source claiming that as of 24 September Ukrainian forces currently occupy half the town. Some Russian sources have expressly accused the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) of hiding the true scale of Ukraine’s breakthrough in Verbove, but the currently available open-source intelligence (OSINT) cannot verify the extent of Ukraine’s advances. Nevertheless, on 25 September, commander of Ukraine’s Tavriisk Group of Forces Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces had broken through Russian defences in Verbove, and mounting evidence indicates Ukraine likely controls more of the town than Russian officials are acknowledging.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces are also stepping up attacks to the north of Verbove. NASA FIRMS thermal heat signatures show a notable uptick in heat anomalies between 22-24 September, indicating Ukrainian efforts to push towards Novofedorivka, four miles (6km) north-east of Verbove. While we cannot confirm the extent of Ukrainian advances in this direction, some Russian sources have aired growing concerns in recent days that VDV Airborne units operating in this direction are at growing risk of encirclement, given Ukrainian advances.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces are continuing to widen the breach to the west as well, with geolocated footage published on 23 September indicating advances south of Robotyne. Ukrainian forces are moving steadily southwards and are likely operating at the outskirts of Novoprokopivka, 2.5 miles (4km) south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The village sits to the north of the main line of Russia’s fixed anti-tank defences, which Ukrainian forces have now breached further to the east. In recent days, Russian sources have seemingly corroborated our assessment on 22 September that Russian forces, namely various VDV units, have been ordered to counter-attack and encircle Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv salient. However, Russian sources also indicate that such operations have so far failed to make much progress, likely in part due to the degraded and undermanned nature of many of the Russian units currently operating in the area. Nevertheless, despite the alleged order, Ukrainian forces retain the initiative across the Orikhiv axis and momentum is slowly building amid the push on Verbove.
STRIKES: On 25 September, Russia reportedly launched a missile and drone strike against the Black Sea port of Odesa. The attack included 12 Kalibr cruise missiles, two anti-ship Onyx missiles and 19 Shahed 136/131 drones. Ukrainian air defences reportedly shot down all of the drones and 11 missiles. However, the remaining projectiles damaged grain storage facilities and a hotel in Odesa’s Black Sea port, while drones and missile debris also damaged residential buildings and warehouses in the suburbs of Odesa. On the night of 22-23 September, Ukraine’s Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 15 drones, of which Ukraine’s air defences intercepted 14. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russia launched five unspecified missiles against Kremenchuk (Poltava Oblast). Local authorities said the strike hit civilian infrastructure, while Russian sources claimed that the missiles targeted an airfield in retaliation for the strike against the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) headquarters on the same day.
STRIKES: On 23 September, head of Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov claimed that the 22 September strike against the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) headquarters in Sevastopol injured several high-ranking Russian commanders. Budanov also stated that the strike killed nine Russian military personnel. On the same day, Ukraine’s Special Operations claimed that the attack was intentionally launched during a meeting of senior BSF military officials, with the commander of Russian forces defending Zaporizhzhia oblast, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, also reportedly injured during the strike. The attack clearly illustrates Kyiv’s increasing capacity to gather intelligence on the whereabouts of senior Russian military officials in Crimea, and underscores growing Russian operational security and air defence failings. The high-precision attack comes amid an intensification of broader strikes against the Russian-annexed peninsula and de jure Russian territory more broadly. Notably on 24 September, the governor of Russia’s Kursk oblast, Roman Starovoyt, said that a Ukrainian drone attacked an administrative building in the central district of Kursk. On the evening of 24 September, a power outage occurred at St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Airport (LED) and Shushary district. According to Telegram channels, residents reported having heard an explosion an hour before the power outage, though it remains unclear if a Ukrainian attack was behind the incident.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

WAGNER GROUP: The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating potential links between senior members of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) and the Wagner Group rebellion in June. A Russian telegram channel with connections to various Kremlin factions reported on 22-23 September that an investigation is now ongoing over potential Rosgvardia involvement in storing Wagner Group supplies during the rebellion. Separately, last week rumours emerged that elements of Wagner Group are seeking to return to the Ukrainian battlefield under the aegis of Rosgvardia, though this cannot be confirmed. Former Ukrainian governor of Luhansk oblast Serhiy Haidai claimed on 23 September that Wagner personnel are currently operating in the oblast, but he reportedly does not know their number or under what organisation they are operating. Wagner Group sources have indicated that 500 Wagner personnel who had refused to take part in the June 2023 rebellion are operating in Ukraine. This could realistically refer to personnel who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), or else joined an MoD-affiliated private military company (PMC). Other Ukrainian officials nevertheless strongly denied reports on 22 September that Wagner Group personnel had deployed to Ukraine, and the state of any ongoing negotiations to integrate Wagner personnel into the Russian war effort remains unclear.
GRAIN: On 24 September, Polish President Andrzej Duda reassured Kyiv that Poland will continue to allow the transit of Ukrainian grain so that it can reach global markets. Duda’s statements come amid a growing rift between Kyiv and Warsaw after Poland decided to unilaterally ban imports of Ukrainian grain in a bid to protect domestic producers. Tensions worsened after Poland announced that it would halt the supply of military aid to Ukraine on 20 September, though Warsaw has subsequently clarified that existing weapons commitments will be honoured and that the halt will only apply to new military equipment purchased for Poland’s own armed forces. This clarification and Duda’s promise to facilitate grain exports will most likely alleviate pressure on Ukraine’s grain exports and moderately lower tensions with Kyiv.
NEGOTIATIONS: On 23 September Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated at the UN General Assembly that Russia is ready for negotiations on Ukraine, but also stated that no proposals for a ceasefire will currently be considered. This ultimately underlines that Moscow’s position has not changed, and reinforces our assessment that even a temporary ceasefire, let alone a substantial effort to end the war, remains highly unlikely in the next three months. In a separate development, the i Newspaper reported on 22 September that UK officials have been holding secret diplomatic talks with Kremlin officials throughout the war. The topic of the reported secret talks involved discussion of security matters impacting the UK, including grain shortages and nuclear safety, but has not involved any secret discussions on ending the war. We have previously assessed that back-channel negotiations are highly likely taking place between Russia and various Western governments. Given that the UK is amongst the most vulnerable nations to escalation in the Black Sea, deconfliction channels such as these are an important avenue to avoid unwanted escalation.

FORECAST

AID: Republican Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy, stated on 23 September that he would now support keeping a USD 300 m military aid package for Ukraine amid an ongoing budget impasse. McCarthy had previously indicated his support for removing it in order to win over Republican hardliners and break the budgetary gridlock. While the U-turn indicates that the proposed funding for Ukraine is more likely to pass, disagreements and delays in approving the US budget could yet have notable repercussions on Ukraine’s own budgetary plans for 2024. The 2024 budget submitted to the Ukrainian Rada on 15 September, including a budget deficit expected to reach one-fifth of the country’s GDP in 2024 (under the most optimistic growth forecast) has further underscored Kyiv’s reliance on US aid and that provided by other key backers. As such, as long-term funding for Ukraine becomes an ever more divisive issue in the US Congress, policy shifts ahead of the 2024 presidential election could jeopardise Ukrainian military planning for next year.

On 23 September, leading Republican presidential candidate Ron DeSantis stated that he does not believe Ukrainian NATO membership is ‘in our interests’. He also stated that the US should not provide Kyiv with a ‘blank cheque’ without trying to ensure the fighting ends. Such comments reflect a growing sentiment in the Republican party, which will seriously jeopardise Kyiv’s current determination to continue fighting Russian forces indefinitely until they are defeated and eventually join NATO. Ultimately, Ukrainian NATO membership is still a long-term prospect which is impossible under current conditions, but such statements reflect growing concern in Kyiv that US support for Ukraine is no longer a given, particularly if the fighting continues into 2024, which remains highly likely.

Nevertheless, US aid continues to flow for the time being, with the Biden administration underscoring its long-term commitment to supporting Kyiv. On 22 September, NBC cited four unnamed US officials confirming that the US will provide Ukraine with a ‘small number of long-range missiles’, understood to be army tactical missile systems (ATACMS). While not yet confirmed, it remains most likely that the US will provide a cluster bomb warhead variant of ATACMS missiles, rather than ones with a single warhead. While this will limit the range of the missiles, they would nevertheless provide Ukraine with a range of up to 190 miles (305km), which would allow Kyiv to strike Russian rear positions across occupied Ukraine. This would in turn likely require Russian air defence systems, including S-300s, to withdraw further from the frontline. However, the overall number of such missiles Washington DC will provide Ukraine remains unclear, and a ‘small number’ is unlikely to seriously alter the situation on the battlefield. (Source: Sibylline)

28 Sep 23. Putin has lost control of the war, says head of UK Armed Forces. Admiral Sir Tony Radakin pledges continued support to President Zelensky during meeting also attended by Grant Shapps Admiral Sir Tony Radakin visited Kyiv with Grant Shapps, the Defence Secretary, to reaffirm the UK’s commitment to the war-torn nation. Sir Tony said they had discussed new military aid with President Volodymyr Zelensky during the visit on Wednesday.

“The recent strikes on the Black Sea Fleet are another example of how Ukraine retains the initiative. Putin has lost control of the war he started, and Russia is diminished as a consequence,” he said.

Last week, a British-designed Storm Shadow missile blew a hole through the roof of Russia’s naval headquarters in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. The audacious attack on Russia’s Black Sea fleet nerve centre was described by Ukraine’s Air Force spokesman as a “blow to Putin’s dictatorship”. Ukraine has repeatedly asked for more Western arms, including longer-range weapons, to regain occupied territory as the front lines have stayed largely frozen. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

29 Sep 23. Putin tasks former Wagner commander with overseeing volunteer fighters. Vladimir Putin has tasked a former commander of the Wagner group with overseeing volunteer fighter units in Ukraine, according to a Kremlin statement on Friday.

“At the last meeting we talked about you overseeing the formation of volunteer units that can carry out various tasks, first and foremost of course in the zone of the special military operation,” Putin was quoted as saying to Andrei Troshev, using Moscow’s name for its offensive in Ukraine.

“You yourself have been fighting in such a unit for more than a year,” Putin said. “You know what it is, how it is done, you know about the issues that need to be resolved in advance so that the combat work goes in the best and most successful way.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the RIA news agency that Troshev now worked at the defence ministry.

The meeting underscored the Kremlin’s attempt to show that the state had now gained control over the mercenary group after a failed June mutiny by Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was killed in a plane crash in August.

The Kremlin said that Putin had met with Troshev, who is known by his nom de guerre “Sedoi” – or “grey hair”, and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who sat closest to Putin, on Thursday night.

The meeting came just days after a Ukrainian military spokesman said several hundred members of Russia’s Wagner private mercenary group had returned to eastern Ukraine. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

28 Sep 23. British Defence Secretary Grant Shapps and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have discussed how to strengthen Ukraine’s air defences ahead of possible Russian strikes on critical energy infrastructure this winter during a meeting in Kyiv. They also discussed the use of long-range weapons, according to Mr Zelenskyy’s office.

Britain has been one of Ukraine’s closest allies throughout the full-scale invasion launched by Russia in February 2022.

Earlier this year, it supplied Kyiv with Storm Shadow cruise missiles that have allowed Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes on Russian targets in territory occupied by Moscow.

“On behalf of the whole nation, I thank you for everything you are doing for us. We are grateful for your help – military, financial, humanitarian. We greatly appreciate that we can rely on you,” a statement released by Mr Zelenskyy’s office read.

Mr Zelenskyy also raised defence sector co-operation between Kyiv and London, which, he said, had enabled Ukraine to significantly expand its capabilities on the battlefield with long-range weapons.

The statement said Mr Shapps and Mr Zelenskyy discussed ways to improve Ukrainian air defences in anticipation of winter.

Mr Zelenskyy said in his daily video address late on Wednesday that “our warriors need more means of destroying Russian missiles, Shaheds and other combat drones, as well as Russian aircraft.”

The visit was not announced in advance, and it is unclear exactly when Mr Shapps met Mr Zelenskyy.

Mr Shapps has visited Ukraine before during the war, but in his previous capacity as Energy Secretary.

He replaced Ben Wallace as Defence Secretary last month, vowing to keep up Britain’s support for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, an infrastructure facility on the outskirts of the Black Sea port city of Mykolayiv was hit by a Russian missile late on Wednesday, regional governor Vitaliy Kim said on Telegram.

Ukrainian air defence shot down 33 out of 44 Shahed drones launched by Russia overnight, the Ukrainian air force said in a post on the Telegram messenger app. (Source: News Now/https://www.thenationalnews.com/)

28 Sep 23. Cheap Drones Have Yielded ‘Huge Results’ for Ukraine, US General In Top NATO Role Says (excerpt). The war in Ukraine is showing how small investments in cheap drones can have an outsized effect on the battlefield, the top U.S. military commander in Europe said Wednesday. Ukrainian forces have added a new dimension to their fighting with “first person” and “one-way attack” drones that have delivered “huge results on the battlefield,” U.S. European Command’s Gen. Christopher Cavoli said from his headquarters in Belgium, where he serves in his role as NATO supreme allied commander.

“One of the biggest results (a simple drone) is it gives people a feeling of insecurity on the other side,” Cavoli said. “It’s not just that you got hit with the drone, it’s that you kind of didn’t hear it coming. And every time you hear a buzzing sound in the air, it fills you with dread.”

The result is “a paralytic effect” on the adversary, he said.

Cavoli’s comments came during a discussion at a security forum hosted by the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Numerous allied teams have been assembled to learn from Russia’s full-scale invasion, which was launched in February 2022.

The U.S. training of Ukrainian forces at various bases in Europe also works in reverse, with American personnel learning firsthand from the combatants themselves, Cavoli said.

Electronic warfare is an area where Cavoli said allies are gaining new insights, but he declined to go into detail for security reasons.

“There are disruptive technologies out there, and we’re studying those closely, and we hope to adopt some of them ourselves,” he said.

The grinding trench warfare not seen in Europe for many decades has left both Russia and Ukraine looking to friendly nations to supply them with weapons such as artillery shells and ammunition. (end of excerpt)

(Click here for the full story, on the Stars and Stripes website: Cheap drones have yielded ‘huge results’ for Ukraine, US general in top NATO role says Stars and Stripes. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/Stars and Stripes)

28 Sep 23. German Federal Cartel Office gives go-ahead to joint venture between Rheinmetall and Ukrainian Defence Industry Launched in May 2023, strategic cooperation between Rheinmetall and Ukraine’s state-owned Ukrainian Defence Industry group (UDI), the former Ukroboronprom, has taken another step forward. On 28 September Germany’s Federal Cartel Office, Bundeskartellamt, cleared the way for establishing a joint venture between Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH and UDI in Kyiv. Authorization from other relevant agencies has already been applied for and is expected to come shortly.

“The joint venture is to be based in Kyiv and engage in service and maintenance as well as the assembly, production and development of military vehicles,” the German Federal Cartel Office said in its press release of 28 September 2023. “It will initially operate exclusively in Ukraine. There will be no competitive overlaps in Germany, nor are there any indications of competition concerns. The Bundeskartellamt cleared the transaction within one month.” Cooperation between Rheinmetall and the Ukrainian defence industry is designed to strengthen Ukraine’s defence sector and ultimately the country’s national security by gradually building joint capabilities in defence technology in Ukraine. Under the agreement, Ukraine will benefit from comprehensive technology transfers; from the creation of defence technology capabilities at home; from additional local value added; and from the prompt delivery of military equipment from Germany. As a first step, cooperation will focus on the maintenance and repair of vehicles transferred to Ukraine under the German government’s multilateral “Ringtausch” equipment exchange programme as well as those directly supplied to Ukraine by Germany. In later phases, based on a comprehensive transfer of technology, the cooperation partners intend to jointly produce selected Rheinmetall products in Ukraine. Looking ahead, cooperation between Rheinmetall and UDI could also involve the joint development of military systems by teams of Ukrainian and German specialists, including for subsequent export by Ukraine. About Rheinmetall: Headquartered in Düsseldorf, Germany, Rheinmetall AG is an integrated technology enterprise. It consists of five divisions: Vehicle Systems; Weapon and Ammunition; Electronic Solutions; Sensors and Actuators; and Materials and Trade. With some 28,000 employees working at 132 locations worldwide, the Group generated sales in 2022 of €6.4bn.

As well as being one of the world’s foremost defence contractors, Rheinmetall is a powerful force for technological and industrial innovation in its civilian markets. A strong orientation to sustainability is an integral part of Rheinmetall strategy. About Ukrainian Defence Industry group: A state-owned enterprise, Ukrainian Defence Industry group has 67,000 employees active among other things in the production and maintenance of armoured vehicles, missiles and artillery, as well as radar and aircraft production. Since the very first days of war with Russia UDI has been working around the clock to meet the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces.

27 Sep 23. With 10 Leopard 2 tanks, Sweden has given Ukraine “all that we can.” After delivering the main battle tanks, a statement from Sweden’s Armed Forces has chilling overtones regarding Ukrainian assistance. ‘“We have given them all that we can in terms of great materiel and good knowledge. We wish them all the luck in the world and that they succeed in freeing their country”,…’ began a release published by the Swedish Armed Forces on 21 September, quoting Mats Ludvig, Operations Commander of the Swedish Army Staff.

The release followed the delivery from Sweden to Ukraine of 10 Leopard 2 tanks (known as Stridsvagn 122 in Sweden), which amounted to nearly a tenth of Sweden’s previous stock of the platform.

The chilling statement appears to signal the end of support for Ukraine by Sweden, a move that mirrors Poland’s decision on the same day to stop transferring weapons to the war-torn country.

Later in the release from the Swedish Armed Forces, Army Chief Jonny Lindfors avowed the prudence of the donation of Leopard 2 main battle tanks, but added that Sweden needs “to procure new tanks as soon as possible, to increase the amount even more. Otherwise, the army will not be able to achieve the expansion objectives of Defence Resolution 2020.”

In a newly outlined appropriation plan, Sweden intends to reach a series of spending targets ahead of schedule, with a possible 71% increase in military-specific appropriations for the development procurement, replenishment and phasing out of defence material in the next year.

The need to prepare national defences is also consistent with Poland. In a television interview with Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, where he stated that Poland “no longer transferring any weapons to Ukraine because we are now arming ourselves with the most modern weapons.”

A Polish government spokesman went on to clarify that Poland will only make donations of weapons that it has already agreed to deliver, according to PBS.

Sweden first announced it would donate ten of the prized armoured Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine came on the anniversary of the full-scale invasion, 24 February 2023. The Swedish Armed Forces trained Ukrainian personnel in Sweden during an intense two week period during the summer.

Beyond this, Sweden has donated surface-to-air missile subsystems and parts, 8 155mm Archer self-propelled artillery systems, more than 50 CV9040 infantry fighting vehicles, mine clearance equipment, anti-ship missiles, man-portable air defence systems and small arms and anti-tank weaponry, with some of these donations still waiting to be delivered. (Source: army-technology.com)

27 Sep 23. National Armaments Directors Meet in Support of Ukraine. National Armaments Directors from more than 40 countries, the European Union, and NATO gathered Wednesday in Brussels, Belgium under the auspices of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to further ongoing efforts aimed at collaboratively solving industrial base and sustainment challenges in support of Ukraine. Led by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante, the session was the sixth meeting to date.

Last week’s forum came on the heels of the 15th meeting of the full UDCG hosted by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin a day earlier in Ramstein, Germany.

“Ukraine’s progress is a testament to the fighting spirit of its people,” Austin said to ministers of defense and senior military officials. “But Ukraine’s recent gains also hinge on the crucial capabilities provided by members of this Contact Group.”

In total, the United States and Ukraine’s global partners have committed more than $76bn in direct security assistance to Ukraine’s defense, including an additional $325m military aid package announced by President Joe Biden Thursday.

“The opportunity to hold an out-of-cycle session immediately after the full ministerial UDCG reinforces the value and importance of the NAD forum, both now and looking toward the future,” LaPlante said. “Whether we’re finding ways to increase global 155mm artillery production or tracking down repair parts for the myriad of international platforms and systems donated to the Ukrainians, this is an operational body that is working the hard challenges every day and delivering tangible results.”

Security Assistance in Action

Throughout the last year, NADs established four working groups to closely coordinate international efforts in key capability areas: ground-based, long-range fires; integrated air defense systems, air-to-ground capabilities; and sustainment support.

Chief among items discussed at Wednesday’s NAD meeting was building sustainment capacity in Ukraine, including forward repair activity, access to spare parts, and other sustainment enablers such as translating manuals, transferring technical data packages and leveraging advanced manufacturing.

“The longer this conflict goes on, sustainment becomes exponentially more important to the Ukrainian’s continued success,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment Christopher Lowman said, noting the sheer variety of equipment that has been donated to Ukraine in terms of quantity, type, and country of origin. “Our sustainment working group has grown to 26 countries—more than half of all UDCG members—which is a testament to both the breadth of efforts actively being worked and the degree of collaboration that’s been enabled by establishing the UDCG NAD forum.”

For example, since the United States and Ukraine last convened the group virtually in June, large-scale, commercial-grade 3D printers and associated consumables have been delivered, along with training for Ukrainian operators and maintainers. Multiple contracts were also awarded to procure spare parts for and repair Soviet-era equipment.

LaPlante echoed Austin’s challenge to Contact Group members to increase donations of critical munitions as well.

As Ukrainian forces continue expending high volumes of artillery shells, the U.S. and allies and partners have continued to increase production of 155mm ammunition. The U.S. has roughly doubled its monthly production and expects output to reach 80,000-100,000 rounds per month by late 2025 timeframe. However, both Austin and LaPlante emphasized the urgency of finding solutions to meet near-term demands while domestic and global production ramps come to fruition over the next two years.

Proliferating use of unmanned systems has also heightened threats to Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure, and the integrated air defense systems working group likewise stressed urgency in increasing the interoperability and interchangeability of international systems. A number of capabilities delivered to date have demonstrated the power of successful multinational integration, and LaPlante encouraged continued creativity in bringing together delivery platforms, effectors, and supporting command and control.

Future Forces and Beyond

While focus remains on ensuring Ukraine’s immediate needs continue being met, the UDCG at both the ministerial and NAD levels are simultaneously addressing longer term requirements.

“Our commitment to Ukraine isn’t just for the duration of one campaign,” Austin said in Ramstein. “It’s a commitment to long-term security in Europe and beyond. And it’s a commitment to our shared values of freedom and sovereignty.”

Over the coming weeks and months, focus will continue to be placed on long-term strategies for sustaining donated platforms, exploring opportunities for greater collaborative production, and identifying both mitigations to supply chain bottlenecks to expand global capacity—including domestically within Ukraine.

“What the NAD forum has been able to accomplish in a year is nothing short of remarkable, and it’s a real testament to Secretary Austin’s leadership,” LaPlante added. “All of my counterparts in attendance remain committed to supporting Ukraine for the long haul, and even once the fighting stops, I think we’ll see the forum live on well into the future. It is just that valuable.”

The next UDCG NAD meeting is expected to occur in October 2023. (Source: U.S. DoD)

28 Sep 23. Ukraine says it destroyed 34 of 44 drones launched by Russia. Ukraine’s Air Force said on Thursday its air defence systems shot down 34 of 44 Shahed drones that Russia launched overnight, while a regional official said no casualties were caused by the attack.

“Fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft missile units and mobile fire groups were engaged to repel the attack,” the military said on the Telegram messaging app.

Odesa regional governor Oleh Kiper said his region was the main target, but the attack left no casualties.

“Our air defence forces did an excellent job,” Kiper said on Telegram.

“No hits or destruction. There were no casualties. There were only a few small fires on dry grass as a result of the falling wreckage of the downed Shahed.”

Ukraine’s southern seaport region of Odesa has suffered Russian drone and missile attacks since July, when Russia left a UN-brokered grain export deal that allowed Kyiv to ship its grain abroad. (Source: Reuters)

25 Sep 23. Ukraine has broken through Russia’s lines in the Zaporizhzhia region and expects to make further breakthroughs, the general leading Kyiv’s offensive in the south has said.

“On the left flank [near the village of Verbove] we have a breakthrough and we continue to advance further,” General Oleksandr Tarnavskiy told CNN.

He acknowledged the advance had so far been slower than Ukraine hoped.

“Not as fast as it was expected, not like in the movies about the Second World War,” he said. “The main thing is not to lose this initiative.”

The major breakthrough is expected to come if Kyiv’s forces manage to retake Tokmak, 12 miles beyond the current frontline, the general said. The liberation of the city would allow Ukrainian forces to push further towards occupied Melitopol and annexed Crimea.

“I believe yes [there will be a big breakthrough],” Gen Tarnavsky said. “I think it will happen after Tokmak. At the moment [the Russians] are relying on the depth of their defensive line there.”

His comments about advances in the south are the latest in a series of claims from Kyiv in recent weeks that they are progressing in the Zaporizhzhia region and have penetrated Russia’s strongest defences.

The “crossroads, tree lines and minefields between the tree lines,” represent the biggest challenges, he said in the interview.

There is “a combination of small, harmful enemy defence groups that currently are planted very precisely and competently,” he said. “But the actions of our fighters force them to slowly pull back when they face our assault squads.”

For Gen Tarnavsky, reaching Tokmak is the minimum to claim success in the counter-offensive.

“Tokmak is the minimum goal,” he said. “The overall objective is to get to our state borders.”

While many fear that the onset of winter could further slow the offensive, Gen Tarnavsky said he believes the weather is unlikely to hold them back now.

“The weather can be a serious obstacle during advance, but considering how we move forward, mostly without vehicles, I don’t think [the weather] will heavily influence the counter-offensive,” he said.

Russian officials have given a very different picture of the battle in Zaporizhzhia.

The interview was published a day after Kyiv struck Russia’s Black Sea Fleet headquarters in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, claiming to have killed “senior” commanders.

Gen Tarnavsky said the counter-offensive’s success depends not only on what happens on the front, but also on “destroying command centres” that create “a mess on the battlefield”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

25 Sep 23. Odesa port damaged by Russian missile strikes. Russian drones and missiles fired on Odesa destroyed grain stores at the Black Sea port, according to Ukrainian authorities.

Southern defence forces said Moscow had directed 19 Shahed drones, two Onyx supersonic missiles and 12 Kalibr missiles at the city.

The port infrastructure sustained “significant damage” while an unspecified number of granaries and a “landmark” hotel were destroyed, according to Ukrainian authorities. Warehouses caught fire as a result of “falling debris”, they said.

Oleh Kiper, the region’s governor, said a woman had been sent to hospital after suffering a shrapnel injury. “Crimes of Russian terrorists are recorded by law enforcement agencies,” he added.

Moscow has intensified attacks on Ukraine’s ports, including Odesa and Mykolaiv, since pulling out of a UN-brokered deal to export grain along the Black Sea in July.

The latest strikes followed reports on Sunday that a second cargo ship carrying Ukrainian grain had reached Turkey via Nato-controlled waters since Russia’s de-facto blockade took effect. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

22 Sep 23. NATO Flies Phoenix UAV Along Finnish-Russian Border for First Time. NATO has flown its Northrop Grumman RQ-4D Phoenix high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) along the Finnish-Russian border for the first time.

NATO Air Command confirmed the mission, which had been visible via online flight tracker servicers that showed the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40-derived UAV flying from its home base at Sigonella on the Italian island of Sicily, and routing along a third of the length of the Finnish-Russian border up to about 460 km north of Helsinki, before returning along the same track.

“This mission was the first time a NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force (NAGSF) RQ-4D drone flew over Finland,” NATO Air Command said. “This mission came as NATO air forces continue to step up their reconnaissance missions on the alliance’s eastern borders in the wake of Russia’s full-fledged war against Ukraine.”

Callsigned MAGMA10, the 13 September mission was the first flown by the Phoenix in the High North of NATO, and came six months after Finland opened its airspace to allow intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft of “key international partners”.

The announcement by the Finnish government in March coincided with a surveillance flight flown by a US Air Force (USAF) L-3 RC-135W Rivet Joint signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft that was seen on flight tracker services routing the length of the Finnish-Russian border. (Source: UAS VISION/Janes)

22 Sep 23. Ukraine to Produce Necessary Weapons Together with America: President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (excerpt). It was a very important visit to Washington, with very significant results. I met with President Biden and his team. There is a new defense package: air defense, artillery, shells, engineering equipment.

There is also a long-term agreement – we will work together for Ukraine to produce the necessary weapons together with the United States.

This is a new level of our unity! Co-production in the defense industry with the United States is a historic thing. A new industrial base, new jobs for both our nations. In particular, Ukraine will be able to produce air defense systems.

We are preparing to create a new defense ecosystem together with the United States to produce weapons to further reinforce freedom and the protection of life together.

This will yield global positive results. Thank you, Mr. President Biden!

I thank the Congress – both parties, both houses. Today, I started my day in the American capital with the Congress – with very frank, detailed conversations. I felt trust – trust that is always the basis of unity. There were clear, straightforward questions from members of the House of Representatives and senators. There were straightforward answers. It is a priority for Ukraine to have the necessary transparency in our relations with America.

There were meetings today at the Pentagon as well – important conversations about defense support. Important agreements were reached.

Government officials have been quite busy. In particular, today the Ministry for Strategic Industries, Minister Kamyshin, signed cooperation agreements with three key associations. More than 2,000 defense companies are American companies. We are engaging them to work in Ukraine. We have a memorandum on energy cooperation. Today we discussed fundamental things about Ukraine’s recovery after the hostilities. (end of excerpt)

(Click here for the full text of the speech, on the Ukrainian MoD website: https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2023/09/22/) (Source: defense-aerospace.com/ Ukraine Ministry of Defence)

25 Sep 23. British Army trains Ukrainian soldiers in mine disposal skills. The Royal Engineers are delivering world-leading training to Ukraine’s combat engineers in Poland, with 1,500 mine detectors having been provided to Ukraine by the UK.

Royal Engineers sappers have delivered crucial explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training to Ukrainian soldiers to disable mines, munitions and other explosive devices that are being used in Ukraine and are currently one of the biggest threats to the safety of civilians in the country.

Mines present one of the biggest obstacles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as they seek to re-take illegally occupied land. It is critical to the success of the ongoing counter-offensive that Ukraine has the resources to deal with mines; this thorough and tailored training package teaches soldiers munition recognition, disposal methods and search procedures to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines, booby traps and trip wires.

Training includes how to conduct a threat brief, plan mine-disposal operations, and practical lessons on how to clear not only vast swathes of land, but also trench systems, bunkers and civilian buildings. Final assessments involve search teams covering a complex area with a designated commander.

Soldiers use metal detectors and personnel mine extraction kits and are taught how to adapt the equipment they have available on the front line. They have also been trained on equipment donated by the UK, including VALLON detectors.”

Defence Secretary Grant Shapps said: “Our support for Ukraine is unwavering and I want to be clear that we will continue to support Ukraine to ensure they win this war and reclaim their sovereignty. Putin’s illegal invasion has left Ukraine’s fields and towns covered in deadly landmines and unexploded munitions, which presents an immediate danger to its citizens now, and for years to come.

The Royal Engineers are using their world-leading experience to train Ukraine’s bomb disposal experts, who can pass on these lifesaving skills to their own recruits and ensure a safer future for all Ukrainians.

Much of the training takes place within an area designed to simulate conditions similar to those on the frontline, where the Armed Forces of Ukraine are encountering minefields, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices.

The training package, which was developed following a request from Ukraine, is delivered in Poland by 35 Engineer Regiment EOD&S and is tailored based on feedback provided by Ukrainian sappers, some of whom have served on the frontline since as far back as 2014.

The UK is also supporting a Canadian-led programme in Poland, teaching basic combat engineering skills to the AFU and both courses have collectively trained approximately 1,000 soldiers with ambitions to train more.

Considerable equipment and training to Ukraine has been provided by the UK to improve their ability to clear mines. This has included over 1,500 sets of both vehicle-mounted and ‘on-the person’ mine clearing and explosive ordnance disposal equipment, including necessary training.

More mine-clearance capabilities are expected to be announced in the next round of funding from the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine, which has raised £770m from partners to supply military equipment to Ukraine.

Captain Chris Wilson, 35 Engineer Regiment EOD&S, who is commanding the EOD training, said: “We are teaching Ukrainian sappers skills we developed during various deployments, as well as evolving our own techniques based on feedback from Ukraine’s frontline, in order to deliver vital training which will save Ukrainian lives.”

More than 23,500 recruits from the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already received training in the UK since the start of 2022, learning essential frontline skills including trench and urban warfare, leadership, and medical training.

At the start of 2023, the UK committed to train a further 20,000 Ukrainian recruits – approximately double the amount trained last year – under one of the largest training programmes of its kind in the world.

Beyond teaching combat skills to recruits, the UK has provided a broad package of other skills including medical training to provide pastoral care, spiritual support and moral guidance.

Including both the Op Interflex and the programme for marines, the UK’s training for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is supported by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

The UK remains fully committed to supporting Ukraine, with a further £2.3bn already earmarked for further military support through 2023, with additional munitions and equipment to be delivered in the coming months. Further UK government assistance continues in the form of humanitarian support and economic aid. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

22 Sep 23. 12 Leopard 2 Tanks Donated By Sweden Now Operational in Ukraine. Swedish Main Battle Tank “Stridsvagn 122” Now In Ukraine.

It has been named the best tank in the world – by experts and by those that use it alike. Now, ten Swedish tanks (stridsvagn 122) are on the battlefield in Ukraine, manned by Ukrainian crews, trained in Sweden.

“We have given them all that we can in terms of great materiel and good knowledge. We wish them all the luck in the world and that they succeed in freeing their country”, says Mats Ludvig, Operations Commander, Army Staff.

There are more than 3 600 such tanks. The TV channel Discovery named it the best tank in the world. There is no doubt that the German tank Leopard 2 – in Sweden designated stridsvagn 122 – is among the best in the world. For more than 30 years, it has constituted the backbone of Swedish mechanised brigades. Now, the Ukrainian army has some ten tanks to use in their fight to free their country. The tanks are manned by soldiers that were trained in Sweden, by the Swedish army.

On 24 February 2023, on the anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the political decision was made, which meant that Sweden were to donate some ten tanks to Ukraine. The Swedish Armed Forces army units, led by the Army staff, had already prepared for this decision – as well as to train Ukrainian personnel on how to use the Swedish tanks.

“This training was to take place in parallel with the greatest defence exercise in 30 years. At the same time, we also had a cohort of conscript soldiers doing basic training in the army. It took careful planning to organise this, and our staff that were assigned as instructors made great sacrifices to achieve these ambitious objectives. But, together we managed to organise it all and I’m very impressed with our personnel and the level of training they provided”, says Mats Ludvig.

Equally impressed is instructor and tank officer Erik, who during a couple of intense summer weeks was training the Ukrainian tank crews.

“This is something that I will always remember, because this training, it couldn’t be more real or more important. It had to be good and it had to be carried out in a very short period of time. You have to bring your A-game and use all the educational tools that you have in order to optimise the training, regardless of whether the people you train used to be miners or gunners.

Now, the tanks have been in Ukraine for a while. Erik and his colleagues follow their progress and success on social media, as far as possible.

“Of course we hope that they will excel, and that the conditions on the ground are as good as possible and that the system is used as intended, in combination with Swedish combat vehicles, in order to achieve optimal effect.

Sweden used to have a total of 120 armoured tanks; a tenth of which have been donated to Ukraine.

“It was absolutely the right decision to donate the tanks, in my opinion. However, it obviously has had an effect on the capability of the army. So we need to procure new tanks as soon as possible, to increase the amount even more. Otherwise, the army will not be able to achieve the expansion objectives of Defence Resolution 2020”, says Army Chief Jonny Lindfors. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: defense-aerospace.com/ Swedish Armed Forces)

22 Sep 23. US will send Ukraine ATACMS long-range missiles, Biden tells Zelenskiy: NBC. U.S. President Joe Biden has informed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that Washington will provide Kyiv with ATACMS long-range missiles, NBC News reported on Friday, citing three U.S. officials and a congressional official.

Kyiv has repeatedly asked the Biden administration for Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to help attack and disrupt supply lines, air bases and rail networks in Russian occupied territory.

But the White House did not disclose any decision on ATACMS when Zelenskiy visited Washington on Thursday for talks with Biden, even as it announced a new $325m military aid package for Kyiv.

The White House and Pentagon declined to comment on the NBC report. The Pentagon also declined to say whether any promise of ATACMS were given to Zelenskiy during his meetings on Thursday at the Pentagon, saying: “In regards to ATACMS we have nothing to announce.”

In Ottawa, Zelenskiy did not answer directly when asked about the NBC report, but noted that United States was the biggest single supplier of weaponry to Ukraine.

“We are discussing all the different types of weapons – long range weapons and artillery, artillery shells with the caliber of 155 mm, then air defense systems,” Zelenskiy, speaking through an interpreter, told a press conference during an official visit to Canada. (Source: Reuters)

25 Sep 23. Rheinmetall: A Powerful Partner at Ukraine’s Side. Major deliveries of military material and extensive logistical support make Rheinmetall one of Ukraine’s most important backers in its fight to defend itself against Russian aggression. Thanks to its massive production capacity, the Düsseldorf-based tech enterprise is able not only to furnish vital products like ammunition. It can also draw on its extensive technology portfolio to aid Ukraine’s struggle for national survival.

In addition to short-term shipments of military hardware, in the long run Ukraine will need help in re-establishing its own defence industry and reorienting its production to western standards. In May 2023 Rheinmetall therefore announced a strategic cooperation agreement with Ukraine’s state-owned Ukroboronprom. As a first step, repair and maintenance of combat vehicles is planned, to be followed by production in Ukraine of armoured vehicles like the Fuchs/Fox armoured transport vehicle, the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle and Panther main battle tank. The objective is to turn Ukraine into an efficient partner, to rebuild its once powerful defence sector, and to assure its strategic autonomy.

WHAT RHEINMETALL IS DOING TO SUPPORT UKRAINE

Ammunition

Rheinmetall is now the sole defence contractor capable of supplying the Ukrainian military with large amounts of new medium- and large-calibre ammunition, including 20mm for the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, 40mm ammunition, as well as 105mm for the Leopard 1 and 120mm tank ammunition for the Leopard 2. The first lot of 35mm ammunition for the Gepard antiaircraft tank was already delivered in early September. Out of the total of 300,000 rounds earmarked for Ukraine, tens of thousands will be produced and ready for shipment by the end of the year. Moreover, Rheinmetall is a vital strategic source of 155mm artillery ammunition for Ukraine, having already supplied the embattled country with tens of thousands of rounds, with more on the way.

Combat vehicles

— Marder IFV

Rheinmetall is also providing Ukraine with substantial support in the combat vehicle domain, either through multilateral Ringtausch exchange programmes with partner nations like Greece, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, or via direct transfers. Acting on behalf of the German government, Rheinmetall shipped the first of twenty Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine back in March 2023. A second lot of twenty Marder IFVs, ordered in June 2023, also shipped recently. In addition to the forty IFVs already delivered, in September 2023 the German government awarded the Düsseldorf-based technology group another major contract, bringing to eighty the total number of Marder IFVs ordered for Ukraine. Delivery of the overhauled Marder 1A3 IFVs, drawn from surplus Bundeswehr stocks, will take place soon. Work on the vehicles is already proceeding apace at several Rheinmetall locations. Additional vehicles are available for follow-up call-offs.

— Leopard 1 and 2 MBTs

The potential for supplying Ukraine with Leopard 1 tanks is also substantial: Rheinmetall is capable of furnishing scores of these tried-and-tested vehicles. The Leopard 2 is advancing as well. In addition to Ringtausch programmes with Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Rheinmetall is supplying Ukraine with these tanks, financed in this case by the Dutch and Danish governments. In addition, a contract has been awarded for maintaining these combat vehicles, another example of Rheinmetall’s wide-ranging support of the Ukrainian war effort.

–Air defence

The success of the 35mm Gepard anti-aircraft tank in Ukraine underscores the effectiveness of cannon-based air defence, especially against cruise missiles and drones. Upholding this tradition is Rheinmetall’s state-of-the-art Skynex, which is also a cannon-based system. It is designed for very close-range air defence operations, where guided missiles are ineffective. Using programmable 35mm Ahead airburst ammunition, developed by Rheinmetall precisely for this purpose, is significantly less costly than comparable guided missile-based systems. Moreover, it is impossible to influence or deflect 35mm rounds with electronic countermeasures.

The Skynex systems are mounted on new Rheinmetall HX 8×8 swap body trucks, hundreds of which have already been introduced by the Bundeswehr. Once Ukrainian troops have been trained to use them, the Skynex systems will be shipped without delay.

In the second half of 2023, Ukraine will take delivery of two cutting edge Skynex air defence systems, including airburst munitions. The Skynex systems will be mounted on new Rheinmetall HX 8×8 military trucks.

— Trucks: Rheinmetall HX miitary logistic vehicle

Made by Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles, HX trucks are among the most widely used military logistic vehicles worldwide, with a global reputation for durability, offroad mobility, user-friendliness and modularity that sets them apart from industry rivals.

At present nearly 100 Rheinmetall-made trucks are operating in Ukraine, which recently took delivery of 26 more brand new ones straight from the factory.

Service and logistical support

Wherever military equipment is in action, service and maintenance support is indispensable. To keep Western-made systems operational and assure adequate logistical support, Rheinmetall is establishing a maintenance and logistics centre at Satu Mare in Romania, a fellow NATO member nation. In future, the hub will also be available to service armoured vehicles and logistic trucks belonging to NATO armed forces in the region. Furthermore, additional maintenance hubs run in cooperation with partners are now available in Ukraine and Lithuania.

— Rheinmetall’s mobile field hospital

In cooperation with the German government, Group subsidiary Rheinmetall Mobile Systeme GmbH supplied the Ukrainian military with a turnkey field hospital in August 2023. It includes 32 patient beds, eight of them for intensive care, as well as top-of-the-line medical and intensive care equipment. It was only at the end of 2022 that Rheinmetall received the order. Equating to a German county hospital, this combined tent- and container-based system is a complete, entirely autarkic medical corps facility, fully compliant with NATO Role 2 standards.

In August 2023 ten Ukrainian troops completed a 14-day training in Germany where they learned to assemble, disassemble and operate the mobile field hospital. They returned to their respective areas of operation as soon as they completed the course.

At the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024, Rheinmetall Mobile Systeme GmbH will transfer two more high-mobility aid stations to Ukraine.

— Reconnaissance systems

Augmenting this extensive support package is the SurveilSPIRE mobile reconnaissance system, which is equipped with day-and-night-capable cameras and autopiloted mini drones. Five SurveilSPIRE airspace surveillance systems were supplied in 2022, with another five ordered in 2023. Rheinmetall is cooperating here with an Estonian partner company.

These capabilities will be augmented following delivery to Ukraine of recently ordered LUNA NG reconnaissance drones. The Ukrainian armed forces will be deploying these systems within a matter of weeks.

The equipment delivered to date underscores Rheinmetall’s role as a key source of military support for the Ukrainian armed forces, making the company a mainstay of European defence architecture and a guarantor of freedom and democracy. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Rheinmetall)

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