NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

08 Sep. 23

BAKHMUT: The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on 8 September that their forces had advanced south of Bakhmut, and geolocated footage indicates marginal advances around Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of the town. Heavy fighting continues across the Bakhmut axis, but Ukrainian forces are prioritising advances in the small village where progress has nevertheless been extremely slow and attritional over the last month.
DONETSK: A Russian milblogger reported on 8 September that Russian forces have expanded their control in Marinka, west of Donetsk city. The source claimed that Russian forces also occupied an unspecified fortified area to its north, adding that battles for this fortified area took place in 2014. The milblogger specified that this fortified area is east of Krasnohorivka. Another prominent source made similar unverified claims on 7 September, describing this fortified area that Ukrainian forces had allegedly held for more than nine years as ‘legendary’. However, another prominent milblogger noted on 8 September that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in Marinka and on the southern approaches to Avdiivka. It is likely that certain milbloggers are exaggerating claims of seizing this territory for their information objectives.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: The governor of Kharkiv oblast Oleh Synyehubov stated on 7 September that Russian forces continue to form assault units in the Kupiansk sector and are determined to storm this direction. However, Synyehubov claimed Russian troops are not advancing in this direction. Elsewhere on the axis, a Russian milblogger claimed on 8 September that Russian forces managed to advance near Novoyehorivka, located around ten miles (16km) south-west of Svatove (Luhansk oblast). The source reported that Russian forces knocked out Ukrainian forces from an unspecified key height near this village but did not establish control over it. This claim, however, cannot be verified and indicates that Ukrainian forces could realistically re-establish themselves there in the coming days or weeks.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 7 September confirms that Ukrainian forces are continuing to make advances on the southern axis, particularly around the Robotyne spearhead where their troops are penetrating the first layer of Russian fixed defences. Ukrainian forces are making tactically significant advances toward Verbove, a settlement six miles (10km) east of Robotyne, and are likely pushing towards the north-west outskirts with light infantry, though they have not yet decisively broken through to the town. Ukrainian officials and military officers continue to report that Russian defences and minefields are less dense past the first layer of fixed defences. However, the current rate of Ukraine’s advance is slow enough that Russian forces will likely have time to begin preparing additional defences and lay additional minefields, and satellite imagery has clearly shown that Russian forces have been augmenting and expanding fixed defensive lines across the southern front during the course of the counter-offensive. Additionally, Ukraine’s National Guard stated on 7 September that Russia is redeploying additional troops to the southern axis, though they did not provide details.
SOUTHERN: Trent Maul, the director of analysis of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated on 6 September in an interview with the Economist that there is a ‘realistic possibility’ (40-50%) that Ukrainian forces will succeed in breaking through the remaining Russian defensive lines in the south by the end of 2023. Another unnamed US official cited by the Economist predicted that Kyiv has around six to seven weeks before the counter-offensive will culminate. During this time, Ukrainian advances will in part depend on the weather and the onset of the October rainy season (Bezdorizhzhia, also known as Rasputitsa in Russian), though it remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces can sustain the current tempo of counter-offensive operations, or indeed Russia sustain its current attrition rates in its active defence.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force shot down 16 out of 20 Shahed-136/131 attack drones on 8 September in the fifth attack this week against Odesa oblast. Two drones were intercepted over Mykolaiv oblast, while the remaining were destroyed over Odesa oblast. Odesa oblast governor Oleh Kiper said drone debris damaged an unspecified non-residential building. On the morning of 8 September, Ukrainian officials also reported that a Russian missile hit a police building in the city of Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Officials reported that the attack damaged 14 administrative buildings, a religious facility and more than a dozen apartment buildings, as well as four private houses. The type of missile was not specified. Meanwhile, Russian forces fired several missiles, with preliminary information stating these were ballistic, at civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia city. An unspecified Russian missile also attacked Sumy (Sumy oblast), north-eastern Ukraine, damaging residential buildings.
STRIKES: A Ukrainian commander stated in an article published by Reuters on 7 September that Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against renewed Russian attacks against critical infrastructure this upcoming autumn-winter period will be more effective. Serhiy Naiev, commander of the Joint Forces of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, said Ukraine has received and is currently operating more air defence systems than last winter. The article notes that Kyiv has bolstered its air defences, including by utilising the German-made Gepard system, which is highly effective against Shahed 136/131 drones. While each Gepard system has a radius of just over seven miles (12km), Naiev said US-made M2 Browning machine guns can help increase coverage. Ultimately, such air defence equipment, together with strategic-level assets like Patriot batteries, will likely reduce the lethality of certain Russian strikes against critical infrastructure, such as energy facilities. However, Ukraine will not be able to prevent all potential strikes against infrastructure, with drones in particular the most cost-effective and sustainable Russian means of attacking for the foreseeable future.
STRIKES: Authorities in Russia’s Volgograd oblast reported on 7 September an attempted drone attack against the region. It is the first known incident in Volgograd since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to Baza, a Russian Telegram channel with links to Russia’s law enforcement agencies, the drone attempted to attack a military unit in the Gorodishchensky district. Elsewhere, the authorities in Bryansk oblast reported a Ukrainian drone attack against an industrial facility in Bryansk city on the evening of 7 September . The drone was intercepted, but its debris hit an administrative building, causing a fire. A local Telegram channel reported that the drone targeted a microelectronics plant. Meanwhile, on 8 September, a Ukrainian drone was shot down in the north of Russian-occupied Crimea. A loud explosion was reported in Armyansk. According to a local Telegram channel, debris damaged a residential house near the railway station in Armyansk, noting that there is a military unit of Russian border guards located nearby, which was likely the intended target.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CORRUPTION: On 7 August, Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and five associates were charged with embezzlement by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). The investigation alleges that Kolomoisky embezzled USD 250 million between January and March 2015 by transferring funds from his formerly owned PrivatBank bank to his offshore company. Kolomoisky’s case illustrates Kyiv’s efforts to curtail oligarchs’ influence in Ukraine. This high-profile case comes after recent graft cases have shaken the Ministry of Defence (MoD). As such, Kolomoisky’s trial is likely part of Kyiv’s efforts to offset the backlash from the recent corruption scandals involving the MoD, to remove any near-term obstacles to financial and military aid and to improve Ukraine’s long-term EU integration prospects.
GRAIN: The UK-based Lloyds of London reported on 7 September that it is holding talks with the UN to provide insurance for ships transporting Ukrainian grain along the Black Sea grain corridor. Lloyds CEO John Neal stated that the market has the ability and will to provide cover for grain shipments if the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) is renewed. Neal explained that the insurance would be ‘structured differently than before’ and added that Lloyds could possibly provide support to Ukrainian insurers. The announcement comes amid Turkey’s efforts to persuade Russia to renew the BSGI. At the same time, on 7 August, the head of the Beazley insurance company, Adrian Cox, reported that his company has reportedly provided cover for ships taking the humanitarian corridor established by Ukraine. Kyiv also submitted a proposal to Turkey on 7 September to resume the GSGI without Russia, but it remains unclear if Ankara will want to pursue such an option. On 21 August, Ukraine reported that it was finalising a deal with global insurers to cover grain ships. Nevertheless, Russia is unlikely to agree to the BSGI’s renewal in the short term, which means that insurers are unlikely to provide cover in the absence of security guarantees provided by the parties of the grain deal.
MOBILISATION: On 7 August, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that all women with medical training must register at military enlistment offices from 1 October. Once registered, women with medical education or training, including nurses, midwives, doctors and pharmacists, will be required to stay on Ukrainian territory as they might be called up for military service. It remains highly likely that women with medical skills called up for military service will be employed for medical tasks away from the frontline. Nevertheless, the MoD’s announcement likely reflects a shortage of medical personnel in the military, amid wider personnel shortages given the high casualty rates during the ongoing counter-offensive.

FORECAST

STARLINK: On 7 September, CNN reported that Elon Musk ordered Starlink satellite communications provided by SpaceX to be cut off near the coast of Crimea in order to disrupt a Ukrainian sneak attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. CNN obtained the information from Musk’s forthcoming biography written by Walter Isaacson. Isaacson claims that Musk feared a Russian nuclear response to an attack on Crimea, and so decided to cut satellite communications. This resulted in a Ukrainian maritime drone ladened with explosives losing connectivity and washing ashore ‘harmlessly’. Musk claimed that satellites were not active in those regions, and he decided not to activate them.

Since the full-scale invasion, Space X’s Starlink satellite internet system has dramatically improved Ukraine’s internet resilience amid Russia’s consistent strikes against power and internet infrastructure. However, it subsequently became a vital component in Ukraine’s military command and control infrastructure and key to battlefield co-ordination. In October 2022, Musk stated that due to elevated upkeep costs, Starlink might be unable to provide any more internet service to Ukraine and requested funding from the US Department of Defense. While Starlink continued to provide internet services to Ukraine, Musk’s recent alleged call with Russian President Vladimir Putin also raised concerns over his commitment to supporting Ukraine indefinitely, leading to Ukrainian authorities expressing concerns in July over the country’s high reliance on Starlink internet systems. In July, the New York Times also reported that in 2022 Space X cut off Ukraine’s access to 1,300 Starlink terminals due to failure to pay the monthly fee.

Uncertainty over SpaceX’s willingness and ability to provide Internet indefinitely will remain a key challenge not only for Ukraine’s internet resilience but also for its military operations. The fact that a private individual seemingly impacted a highly strategic Ukrainian military operation presents a new challenge to the independence of Ukrainian operations and reinforces Kyiv’s continued reliance upon foreign (state and private) aid to sustain its war effort.

07 Sep. 23

BAKHMUT: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 7 September that their forces continue to advance south of Bakhmut, with marginal advances likely taking place in Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of the town. Russian sources have in recent days reported that Ukrainian forces now control roughly half the settlement, but progress remains slow as Russian forces continue to commit significant effort to counter-attack.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated on 6 September that Russian forces are rotating and continuing to train reserves in the Lyman and Kupiansk directions. According to Yevlash, Russia does not have problems with the quantity of manpower available, but noted that newly mobilised Russian troops have difficulties with equipment and communication. The spokesperson claimed that Russian forces are forming combat-ready units out of broken detachments for further offensive operations. Separately, a Russian milblogger claimed on 6 September there are no breakthroughs for Russian troops to the outskirts of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), stating instead that Ukrainian forces are slowly pushing through and continue to transfer reserves to this sector. A Russian milblogger reported on 7 September that Ukrainian troops managed to regain an unspecified number of previously lost positions in the Serebrianske forest area near Shypylivka (Luhansk oblast), though this cannot be confirmed.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces are likely continuing to make slow, marginal advances along the Robotyne spearhead in Zaporizhzhia oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on 7 September that their forces have achieved unspecified success south of Robotyne and west of Verbove, six miles (10km) to the east, though there is little visual confirmation of the extent of these likely advances over the last 24 hours. Notably, however, the Russian acting governor of Zaporizhzhia oblast Evgeny Balitsky effectively acknowledged for the first time on 6 September that Russian forces are no longer in Robotyne. He stated that Russian forces have withdrawn from the contested ‘grey zone’ in order to secure tactically more advantageous positions outside of the settlement. Numerous Russian sources, including Balitsky, have up until now maintained that they retain a presence in the south of the town. Balitsky’s latest acknowledgement seemingly confirms that Ukrainian forces have consolidated their control over the settlement, and are increasing pressure to the south and west. Some Russian sources nevertheless maintained earlier on 7 September that Russian forces still control the south of the town. Balitsky also claimed on 7 September that Ukrainian forces conducted a rotation of units near Robotyne and Verbove, though this cannot be confirmed.
STRIKES: Ukraine reported on 7 September that it destroyed 25 out of the 33 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones in an overnight attack, which largely targeted Odesa oblast. Odesa oblast governor Oleh Kiper stated it is the fourth bombardment against the region’s Izmail district in the last five days (see FORECAST below). Civilian and port infrastructure were damaged, including a grain elevator and an administrative building. Attacks against port and grain infrastructure are highly likely to continue in the coming weeks, likely with the aim of impeding Ukraine’s grain exports through the Danube River. Russian drones also targeted northern Sumy oblast, though it is not clear what was being targeted. On 6 September, Ukrainian officials reported that at least 16 people were killed in a Russian missile strike on a market in the city of Kostyantynivka in Donetsk oblast.
STRIKES: Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 7 September that two Ukrainian drones were shot down over Rostov oblast and one over Ramenskoye district of Moscow oblast. The governor of Rostov oblast said one of the drones fell in the western part of Rostov-on-Don, while the second in the city centre. An explosion reportedly took place near the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District. Meanwhile, in Moscow oblast, a Russian Telegram channel reported that the drone crashed near Zhukovsky International Airport (ZIA). Partial restrictions were imposed on flights at Domodedovo (DME), Vnukovo (VKO) and Zhukovsky airports on the morning of 7 September. Meanwhile, three drones were shot down over Bryansk oblast, with the wreckage of one of the drones lightly damaging the Bryansk-Orlovskiy railway station and the station square.
STRIKES: Russian media reported on 7 September that the former commander of Moscow city’s air defence force has been charged with bribery in relation to the alleged expropriation of land owned by the Russian MoD. General Konstantin Ogienko is accused of receiving a bribe of USD 5,000 (RUB 500,000), together with another officer – Dmitry Belyatsky – though this sum was the first part of a kickback worth USD 300,000 (RUB 30 m). According to Kommersant, Ogienko commanded the Russian Aerospace Forces’ 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army from 2021 until ‘recently’. The case against him was reportedly initiated in July this year. It is likely that the case was initiated in part after Russian failures to intercept Ukrainian drone attacks against the capital.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

GRAIN: On 6 September, Russia and Turkey reportedly reached an agreement in principle to supply one m metric tons worth of Russian grain to Africa at a discounted price, with the financial support of Qatar. On 7 August, Russian state news outlet Tass reported that unnamed official Turkish sources confirmed that Turkish companies have agreed to process Russian grain. The agreement comes after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with his Russian counterpart President Vladimir Putin on 4 September to discuss the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). While Erdoğan was hopeful of the renewal of the BSGI soon, Ankara’s agreement – if implemented – will likely lower incentives for Russia to rejoin the grain deal in the short term and would align with Russian efforts to circumvent Ukrainian ports to supply the Global South with Russian grain. By facilitating Russian supplies to Africa, Moscow likely hopes that the agreement would mitigate diplomatic backlash from pulling out from the grain deal. While Ankara’s agreement has not yet been confirmed, Russia is unlikely to agree to renew the BSGI in the short term.
SANCTIONS: Amid possible Qatari and Turkish involvement in a new grain agreement, on 4 September, EU, UK and US officials started an official visit to the UAE to persuade authorities to further comply with Western sanctions against Russia. Western officials will likely pressure UAE authorities to curtail sanctions circumvention networks from continuing to supply Russia with banned goods. Notably, data collected by the Ukraine-based Kyiv School of Economics indicate that the UAE exported USD 149 m worth of electronic components in the first five months of 2023, while in 2022, over the same period, it exported just USD 1 m worth. The rise in exports of electronic components indicates that the country has become a key node in Russia’s parallel import strategy which is sustaining military production. While UAE officials have told the Wall Street Journal that the UAE will step up the monitoring of dual-use exports, sanctions evasion networks will continue to operate from the country and supply the lucrative Russian market.
AID: On 6 September, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced a new assistance package to Ukraine worth more than USD 1 bn. The announcement was made during Blinken’s visit to Kyiv. The aid package reportedly includes USD 665.5 bn worth of military and civilian security assistance. On the same day, the US Department of Defence announced the aid package would include depleted uranium rounds and US-made Abrams tanks. Russian officials have strongly criticised the move, aligning with earlier condemnation of the UK’s decision in March to provide similar depleted uranium ammunition, which led Moscow to make various nuclear threats. However, despite Russian claims, we continue to assess that the provision of conventional depleted uranium shells does not constitute a trigger for nuclear escalation. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 22 March 2023.

FORECAST

NATO: On 6 September, Romania’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) acknowledged that remnants of a suspected Russian Shahed drone did land inside Romanian territory on 4 September, reversing Bucharest’s earlier denials. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations have confirmed that the suspected drone in question fell roughly 100m inside Romanian territory across the Danube opposite the Ukrainian border at Izmail. Russian drones, namely Iranian-produced Shahed 136/131 drones, have been attacking the Danube river port consistently since the collapse of the BSGI, clearly in a bid to undermine Ukraine’s grain export capability. Romanian president Klaus Iohannis stated that if it is confirmed that the debris is from a Russian drone, which remains likely, it would be ‘completely unacceptable and will be a serious violation of Romania’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.

However, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on 7 September that the alliance sees no indication that the drone remnants were a result of a deliberate Russian attack against Romania, though an investigation remains ongoing. Both Bucharest, NATO and Washington D.C. have sought to downplay the incident and it remains highly unlikely that Romania will trigger Article 5 discussions given the drone was highly unlikely to have been a deliberate Russian attack on NATO soil. Nevertheless, the fact that Russian forces have once again attacked Izmail overnight on 6 September likely illustrates Moscow’s efforts to continue testing NATO indirectly.

Any subsequent warnings from NATO states are unlikely to deter Russian forces from continuing to strike Ukrainian targets near international borders, given Moscow’s desire to illustrate it can attack Ukraine with impunity. As such, the risk of accidental or deliberately ambiguous crossings into NATO (especially Romanian and Polish) territory is set to continue, though given robust deconfliction processes and both NATO and Moscow’s desire to avoid open escalation, this is highly unlikely to result in an open confrontation.

06 Sep. 23

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces are continuing to make marginal advances along Bakhmut’s southern flanks. Geolocated footage from 5 September confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced modestly south of Andriivka, six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut. Ukrainian officials also claimed on 5 September that their forces have advanced around Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut, with some Russian sources also acknowledging marginal Ukrainian gains in the village over the last 24-48 hours.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: The commander of Ukraine’s land forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated on 6 September that Russian forces are preparing to take ‘revenge’ and gain the operational initiative along sections of the eastern frontline. Syrskyi said the Russian military has not abandoned its plans to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. According to the commander, Russia is completing the training of assault units to be deployed in the direction of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Meanwhile, the general reported that Russian forces continue to replace troops with reinforcements from the recently formed 25th Combined Arms Army in the Lyman sector (Donetsk oblast). While these claims cannot be verified, they likely indicate that Russian forces are prioritising freeing up more experienced units to laterally redeploy to the crucial southern Zaporizhzhia front. Separately, a Russian news aggregator reported on 6 September that the Russian army is advancing in the Kupiansk direction, claiming that Russian soldiers are expanding their foothold near the Zherebets River, though this cannot be confirmed.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces are continuing to make slow but steady progress around the Robotyne spearhead. Geolocated footage from 5 September confirms the Ukrainian force’s penetration of the first main line of fixed Russian defences north-west of the village of Verbove, six miles (10km) east of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Ukrainian forces appear to be advancing west to east along the line of fixed defences, which include anti-tank ‘dragons teeth’ emplacements and trenches. Geolocated footage has also confirmed that Ukrainian forces are consolidating their control over Robotyne, and have advanced both to the north-west and south of the settlement, though Russian sources continue to claim (without evidence at present) that Russian forces are successfully counter-attacking inside the town.
SOUTHERN: UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps confirmed on 6 September that a British-supplied Challenger 2 main battle tank has been destroyed by Russian artillery near Robotyne. It is the first confirmed sighting, and first confirmed destruction, of a British-supplied tank, though an estimated five Leopard 2 tanks have also been destroyed during the counter-offensive. Armour losses are inevitable for both sides during such a large-scale counter-offensive operation, but it remains unclear to what extent Ukrainian losses will continue to mount as they penetrate the first major line of fixed defences and confront dedicated anti-tank defences.
SOUTHERN: Further east, Ukrainian counter-offensive operations along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border remain intense, particularly along the Vremevsky salient, where Ukrainian forces are likely making marginal gains. Local Russian commander Alexander Khodakovsky reported on 5 September that Ukrainian forces managed to take a number of unspecified Russian positions near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske, located around eight miles (12km) south-east of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Other Russian sources have denied that Ukraine has broken through the defences. Meanwhile, a Russian milblogger published an audio clip on 5 September allegedly of a member of the Russian 247th VDV Regiment claiming that his unit lost as many as 49 killed in action in a single day of fighting. He also claimed that Russian commanders are not overseeing the collection of the dead, forcing his unit to retrieve bodies near Staromaiorske, six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast).
STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force reported on 6 September that 15 out of the 25 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 drones were shot down during an overnight attack. It also said all eight missiles used to strike Ukraine, including seven Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles and one Iskandr-M ballistic missile, were intercepted. The governor of Odesa oblast Oleh Kiper said Russian forces attacked the region’s Izmail district with attack drones. Port and agricultural infrastructure were damaged, including grain elevators, administrative buildings and agricultural enterprises. Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces said 15 of the Shahed-136/131 drones were destroyed over Odesa oblast. Kyiv City Military Administration reported that the Ukrainian capital was targeted with missiles, but said all were shot down. Later on 6 September, the governor of Zaporizhzhia oblast stated that Russian forces launched a missile attack on Zaporizhzhia city, which damaged a civilian infrastructure site. The blast wave reportedly shattered windows in several high-rise buildings and educational institutions. Meanwhile, the Russian authorities in Bryansk oblast reported on 6 September that a Ukrainian drone was shot down over Navlinsky district.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

MOBILISATION: On 5 September, Fedir Venislavsky, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s parliamentary representative, stated that draft-eligible individuals who fled the country would likely be extradited to Ukraine. Venislavsky explained that given the law does not authorise mass extradition procedures, extradition procedures would take place on an individual basis. Notably, on 4 September, a Polish media outlet reported that according to the Polish Border Guard, since the beginning of the war, 2.87 m Ukrainian adults have entered Poland, among which 80,000 Ukrainian men are eligible for military service. According to the media outlet, Polish courts are likely to organise the extradition of such individuals, having already expelled individuals involved in smuggling illegal migrants to Europe. However, the procedure remains cumbersome as Polish courts need Ukrainian authorities to issue an international warrant for each individual. Furthermore, difficulties in locating the whereabouts of these individuals will likely complicate extradition procedures.
MOBILISATION: Nevertheless, the acknowledgement that extraditions of draftable-aged men will now occur is highly notable and will increase pressures on Ukrainian staff members living abroad. The proposal to extradite draft-eligible individuals illustrates Kyiv’s efforts to curtail draft dodging networks and the growing need for military personnel to sustain the attritional war effort. Anecdotal reports of pressure on even 60-year-old men not to leave the country in case of mobilisation illustrate the extent to which the government is likely attempting to retain possible recruits, though this cannot be confirmed.
DEFECTIONS: On 5 September, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (GUR) reported that Maksim Kuzminov, a Russian helicopter pilot who defected to Ukraine with his Mi-8 transporter helicopter on 23 August, will be offered a USD 500,000 reward. On the same day, Ukraine released footage of an interview with Kuzminov inviting further Russian service personnel to defect. In April 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law by which the state can offer rewards up to USD 1 m for Russian military defectors; the reward varies depending on the military equipment the defector has transferred. Kuzminov’s defection illustrates Kyiv’s efforts to encourage further defections of Russian military personnel to exploit low morale among Russian soldiers. Notably, Reuters published on 5 September extracts of Ukrainian intercepts of 17 phone calls from July allegedly showing Russian soldiers complaining about equipment deficiencies and heavy losses, which likely illustrates the poor morale of Russian service personnel at the front. The intercepts were shared by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), illustrating Ukraine’s communication effort to advertise low morale within the Russian military to trigger more defections. However, Russian security services will most likely take counter-measures to dissuade service personnel from defecting, particularly by increasing military surveillance, toughening the punishments for defections and implicitly or explicitly threatening revenge on perceived ‘traitors’.

FORECAST

ARMENIA: On 5 September, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)’s Armenia service reported that Yerevan is providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine for the first time since the full-scale invasion. While Yerevan has not confirmed this, such a transfer of aid would present a notable shift in Armenia’s stance on the war and its partnership with its principal military ally Russia.

Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military alliance, but Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has increasingly questioned Armenia’s relations with Moscow. This culminated on 4 September with Pashinyan openly stating that Armenia’s dependence on Russia for security was a ‘strategic mistake’, echoing wider sentiments that Russia had failed to support Armenia in its confrontation with Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Tensions are rising in the region, even as Russian peacekeepers patrol the area. However, it is clear that Armenians are losing faith in the ability (or indeed willingness) of Russian peacekeepers to prevent an escalation with Azerbaijan, and Russia’s ability to support Armenia militarily given its overcommitment to Ukraine.

Armenia’s potential humanitarian aid to Ukraine is brought into sharper relief by the confirmation on 6 September that Yerevan will hold joint military exercises with the US next week – the first such joint exercises in history. The exercises will reportedly take place in Yerevan as part of ‘stabilisation operations’ vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh. They strongly indicate Armenia’s apparent geopolitical pivot away from Russia and represent a significant diplomatic and military blow to the coherence of the CSTO and Russia’s traditionally dominant role in South Caucasus security. While Russia will still remain an important player in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future, operating a military base in Armenia’s Gyumri and overseeing peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, this is the latest illustration of how the war in Ukraine is actively undermining Russia’s influence and foreign policy objectives in other flashpoint regions, which Ukraine and its Western partners are highly likely to exploit.

Russia-Turkey: Black Sea grain deal renewal is unlikely in short term. On 4 September, after meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Russia, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed hope for the short-term renewal prospects of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Erdogan explained that the UN has made new proposals after Putin stated that Russia is ready to restore the deal if all the restrictions on Russian agricultural exports are lifted. Such demands have previously included connecting a subsidiary of Russia’s agricultural bank to the SWIFT international payment system and facilitating the transit of Russian fertilisers through Ukraine. Previous UN proposals to facilitate Russian agricultural transactions failed to convince Moscow to renew the deal on 17 July. Therefore, Russia will likely attempt to leverage a possible BSGI renewal to coerce Western countries to make larger concessions, but given this remains unlikely, the Erdoğan-Putin talks are also unlikely to result in the BSGI renewal in the short term.

05 Sep.

BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 4 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, located around seven miles (12km) to the north-west of Bakhmut. Heavy fighting continues to rage along various other flanks to the north and south of Bakhmut, though progress remains extremely slow for Ukrainian forces.
DONETSK: On 4 September, several Russian sources claimed that Russian attacks were successful near Novomykhailivka and Krasnohorivka, located around six miles (10km) west and immediately south-west of Donetsk city, respectively. However, Ukraine’s General Staff and a Russian milblogger reported on 4 September that Russian attacks in these sectors were unsuccessful. On 5 September, the Russian milblogger claimed that the line of combat has stayed the same along the Donetsk frontline, indicating that Russian forces have not made any gains over the past 24 hours.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Maliar, disclosed on 4 September that Russian forces are preparing for a renewed offensive in the Kupiansk and Lyman directions. A Russian milblogger claimed on 4 September that Russian troops are slowly advancing in the Kupiansk direction, and that they are roughly capturing one Ukrainian stronghold per day. The source also claimed that Ukrainian resistance along this part of the frontline has increased following the transfer of unspecified reserves. According to the milblogger, Russian forces continue to push near Synkivka and towards Petropavlivka (both Kharkiv oblast), located around four miles (7km) east and five miles (8km) north-east of Kupiansk, respectively.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A prominent Russian milblogger stated on 5 September that fighting has intensified near the village of Novoyehorivka, situated around ten miles (16km) south-west of Svatove (Luhansk oblast). According to the milblogger, Russian troops managed to cut into Ukrainian defences near Novoyehorivka. The source also claimed that Russian assault troops managed to occupy several Ukrainian strongholds near the village of Stelmakhivka (Luhansk), located to the north-west of Svatove. However, it is unclear whether these unverified claims refer to significant gains that will strengthen Russian forces’ ability to advance further in this sector.
SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 4 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have made advances along the southern Zaporizhzhia front and are expanding the spearhead between Robotyne and Verbove. The imagery indicates that Ukrainian light infantry has penetrated the first layer of fixed defences to the north-west of Verbove, located around 12 miles (20km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). There are also clear indications that Ukrainian forces have pushed south of Robotyne, located around six miles (10km) west of Verbove, though Russian sources continued reporting on 4-5 September that the southern sectors of the town remain contested. While Ukrainian forces are making slow but steady progress, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 4 September that Russian forces had ‘improved their tactical situation’ in the area, though it remains unclear whether this refers to additional deployments of reinforcements.
SOUTHERN: While Ukrainian forces are making tactically significant advances, there are indications that they are suffering very high casualties in order to penetrate dense Russian defences. An interview in The Times on 5 September with members of the elite Skala Battalion, a special assault unit of the 47th Mechanised Brigade leading counter-offensive operations near Robotyne, indicates the scale of the casualties suffered by Ukrainian assault units. The Skala Battalion has reportedly been reduced to 25% of its original strength since joining counter-offensive operations near Robotyne in July; its members stated that the life expectancy of fighters in the unit is the ‘shortest on the front’. In addition, medical teams along this front have reportedly sustained a 50% casualty rate around Robotyne, even though they are using US-supplied M-113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to evacuate the wounded. It is clear that Ukrainian forces are making advances, though at significant cost given the attacker-to-defender ratio of casualties and the density of Russian fixed defences. Nevertheless, Ukrainian commanders recently offered a more optimistic assessment of the density of minefields and other Russian defences throughout the second- and third-layer defences. A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report on 4 September indicated that Russian forces are likely suffering from a shortage of mines; this possibly means that subsequent layers of Russian defences will be easier to penetrate.
SOUTHERN: Further east, Ukrainian forces are also continuing counter-offensive operations along the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk oblast border and the Vremevsky salient, though progress remains slower than around Robotyne. Numerous Russian sources, including a Russian volunteer commander who is fighting in the region, reported earlier on 5 September that Ukrainian forces have launched new assaults towards Novodonetske and Novomaiorske, settlements located around eight miles (12km) south-east of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). While a heavy Ukrainian bombardment of the area seemingly preceded the renewed assault, it remains unclear whether this reflects a serious Ukrainian push. Nevertheless, Russian and other sources have recently reported on the deteriorating situation for Russian defenders on this flank, in particular weak Russian counter-battery capabilities; this will possibly provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to make further gains in the coming weeks.
STRIKES: On 5 September, Moscow’s mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, reported that Russian air defences destroyed several drones targeting the capital. Russia’s MoD stated that two drones were destroyed over Kaluga and Tver oblasts, which border Moscow oblast. According to Russian sources, the drone which was downed over Tver was shot down near the village of Zavidovo, close to where Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly has a residence. A third drone was shot down over the Istra district of Moscow. Debris from the drone reportedly damaged a ‘household facility’, though Sobyanin did not provide further details. Flights to and from Moscow’s Sheremetyevo (SVO) and Vnukovo (VKO) airports were temporarily restricted. The drone attacks further reinforce Ukraine’s willingness to strike targets located deeper into Russian de jure territory, including the capital; this will likely cause further disruption to air travel in the coming weeks. The MoD also claimed a Ukrainian drone was destroyed over the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula, though it did not provide further details about the exact location.
STRIKES: Ukraine is reportedly adapting its domestically produced Neptun anti-ship missiles to enhance its long-range strike capabilities. According to a report on 4 September, which cited an anonymous Ukrainian defence official, the modified missile was used in an attack against a Russian air defence system in western Crimea in late August, though this cannot be confirmed. Ukrainian Secretary of National Security Oleksiy Danilov said a ‘new, completely modern’ missile was used in the attack on an S-400 ‘Triumf’ at Cape Tarkhankut (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 August 2023). If an adapted Neptun missile was used in the strike, this would demonstrate Ukraine’s efforts to modernise its own weaponry and longer-range strike capabilities in order to target Russian-controlled or Russian de jure territory.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

GRAIN: On 4 September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was hopeful about the short-term prospects of the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) after meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Sochi (Russia). Erdogan explained that the UN made new proposals after Putin stated that Russia is ready to restore the deal if all the restrictions on Russian agricultural exports are lifted. Such demands have previously included connecting a subsidiary of Russia’s agricultural bank to the SWIFT international payment system and facilitating the transit of Russian fertilisers through Ukraine. Erdogan called on Kyiv to ‘soften its stance’, though it remains unclear what specific concessions Ankara are proposing. Previous UN proposals to facilitate Russian agricultural transactions failed to convince Moscow to renew the deal on 17 July. Russia will therefore likely attempt to leverage a possible BSGI renewal to coerce Western countries into making larger concessions. However, the Erdoğan-Putin talks are unlikely to result in a renewal in the short term.

FORECAST

NORTH KOREA: On 4 September, the New York Times reported that North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un plans to travel to Russia this month to meet President Vladimir Putin. According to the outlet, which cited unnamed US and allied officials, Kim will travel from the capital Pyongyang to Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East. The report implied that both leaders will possibly attend the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, which is scheduled to run from 10 to 13 September. Officials claim that Putin wants Kim to transfer artillery shells and anti-tank missiles to Russia, while Kim wants Russia to provide North Korea with advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines; food remains another likely Russian offering. While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, any such meeting would likely strengthen relations between Moscow and Pyongyang; this would possibly precipitate further military co-operation and weapons deals.

According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, and as quoted by state news agency Yonhap on 3 September, Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu has likely suggested that North Korea could participate in trilateral naval exercises with Russia and China. On 3 September, Alexander Matsegora, the Russian ambassador to North Korea, stated that trilateral naval exercises would be an ‘appropriate’ response to the US-led joint exercises in the region. However, he also said that there are currently no concrete plans to hold any drills. Should any drills occur, they would mark North Korea’s first appearance at such joint exercises. They would likely increase Kim Jong-un’s prestige domestically and reinforce the regime’s internal stability, while food aid from Russia would possibly alleviate dire domestic shortages. From Moscow’s perspective, the inclusion of Pyongyang in the naval exercises would likely reinforce Russia’s efforts to secure additional supplies of defence equipment.

The proposed trilateral exercises would also serve various foreign policy objectives, driving tensions in the region and confirming that a new ‘trilateral’ partnership stands in opposition to growing US-South Korean-Japanese military co-operation. Nevertheless, the drills are unlikely to increase regional security threats significantly given North Korea’s limited naval capabilities, as well as Russia’s and China’s efforts to contain escalatory risks.

04 Sep.

BAKHMUT: Ukraine’s deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar reported on 3 September that Ukrainian forces have retaken 1.2 square miles (3 sq km) around Bakhmut over the last week. She also reported on 1 September that the heaviest fighting is taking place around Andriivka, six miles (10km) south-west of the town, where Ukrainian forces have recently made unspecified advances. Geolocated footage published on 3 September indicates advances into southern Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut. Nevertheless, Russian forces continue to counter-attack at various points which are slowing the rate of Ukrainian advances on this axis.
DONETSK: A Russian milblogger reported on 3 September that Russian forces continue to storm Ukrainian positions daily in the western part of Marinka, west of Donetsk city. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on 4 September that Russian units conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and that Ukraine’s defence forces continue to hold back Russian offensive operations in the area of Marinka. However, geolocated imagery posted on 2 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced in Marinka.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage published on 1 and 2 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced in certain sectors of the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. The imagery shows that Russian troops advanced south of Vilshana, located over eight miles (14km) north-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) and south-east of Novoyehorivka, situated around ten miles (16km) south-west of Svatove (Luhansk oblast). The Ukrainian head of Luhansk oblast, Artem Lysohor, reported on 3 September that Russian forces have renewed offensive operations near Novoyehorivka after a brief pause following significant losses in personnel and equipment. However, Lysohor added that Russian offensive operations on 2 September were unsuccessful in this area.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 3 September, a Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces retain the initiative in the Luhansk direction, but caveated that this remains merely in terms of tactical advances. The source stated there is still no discussion of Russian forces breaking through Ukrainian defences in the direction of operationally important areas around Borova and Kupiansk (both Kharkiv oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated on 1 September that Russian forces had captured several Ukrainian strongholds and strategic heights near Kupiansk, though the extent of recent Russian gains remains unclear and unlikely to be of major operational significance.
SOUTHERN: Various Ukrainian officials have reported unspecified advances along the southern Zaporizhzhia axis, as Ukrainian forces continue efforts to expand their spearhead near Robotyne, six miles (10km) south of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Ukrainian forces have over the past week intensified attacks south-east towards Verbove, six miles (10km) east of Robotyne, and have claimed some progress, but the extent remains unclear. Meanwhile, various Russian sources have reported over the last 48 hours that the southern sectors of Robotyne remain contested, while others reported that Russian forces have now withdrawn from the town. Such contradictory reports make it difficult to confirm, but it remains unlikely that Ukrainian forces are exercising significant control beyond the southern-most outskirts of the town at present. For further analysis on the progress of the counter-offensive in the south, see FORECAST below.
STRIKES: Ukraine reported on 4 September that air defences destroyed 23 out of 32 Russian-launched Shahed-136/131 attack drones used to attack Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts. Six drones were shot down in the former region, but an unspecified ‘infrastructure object’ was hit. Ukrainian air defences downed 17 of the 23 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used to attack Odesa oblast, though the region’s governor noted that warehouses, production facilities, agricultural machinery and industrial equipment in Izmail district were damaged. Similarly, the Russian military attacked Odesa oblast with 25 Shahed-136/131 attack drones overnight on 3 September, with air defences destroying 22 of the UAVs. Ukrainian media reported that Ukraine’s riverine ports Izmail and Reni were the targets of the attack. Russia’s MoD reported it had launched the attack against fuel storage facilities allegedly used to supply Ukraine’s armed forces in the Reni port and claimed it had hit its intended target (see NATO below for further analysis).
STRIKES: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s air force Yuriy Ihnat disclosed on 3 September that Ukraine is strengthening its air defence for potential Russian attacks against critical infrastructure facilities this autumn and winter. Ihnat stated that Western air defence systems complement Ukraine’s Soviet-era models, such as the S-300 and Buk. However, he noted that there is not enough air defence equipment to cover Ukraine’s territory, meaning that protecting cities and strategic facilities is prioritised.
STRIKES: Russian air defences reportedly shot down two Ukrainian drones at around 0100hrs local time on 4 September over the Black Sea near the annexed Crimean peninsula and Kursk oblast. The governor of Russia’s Kursk oblast reported on 3 September that a non-residential building in the city of Kurchatov caught fire following a Ukrainian drone attack. A Ukrainian outlet quoted an unnamed source as stating that the UAV hit a building belonging to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), though this cannot be confirmed. One of Russia’s biggest nuclear plants is located near Kurchatov, but there were no immediate reports to suggest it had been damaged or targeted in the attack. On 2 September, the Russian MoD reported that three Ukrainian drones had been shot down over Belgorod oblast. Further Ukrainian attacks against Russian de jure territory and the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula are highly likely in the coming weeks.
MARITIME: Ukrainian naval forces are seemingly continuing to launch attempted raids on the Crimean coast, though Russian forces claim to be successfully intercepting them. The Russian MoD reported late on 1 September that Ukrainian forces had attempted another ‘terrorist attack’ on the Kerch Strait Bridge using a semi-submersible unmanned boat, which was destroyed in the Black Sea. While we cannot confirm, a semi-submersible maritime drone likely refers to either the small Toloka TK-150 or, more likely, the much larger and more capable Marichka autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), though it remains unclear whether the latter remains a prototype. Elsewhere, the Russian MoD reported on 4 September that naval aviation assets of the Black Sea Fleet had destroyed four ‘US-made military boats’ allegedly carrying Ukrainian paratroopers which were en route to Crimea. While we cannot confirm this, Ukrainian forces have been attempting to launch small-scale reconnaissance and sabotage raids against the Crimean coast in recent weeks, and it remains unclear if claimed Russian interceptions will deter further raid attempts in the coming weeks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CORRUPTION: On 4 September, Ukrainian minister of defence Oleksiy Reznikov submitted his resignation to the Ukrainian parliament. His resignation comes after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 3 September that he would dismiss Reznikov and replace him with the State Property Fund of Ukraine chairman, Rustem Umerov. The decision comes against the backdrop of several corruption scandals involving the MoD during Reznikov’s tenure, though he has not been personally implicated or accused of involvement. In early August, several Ukrainian media outlets reported that the Ukrainian MoD purchased USD 20 m worth of winter jackets from a Turkish firm at a highly inflated price, with the jackets being unfit for cold weather. On 11 August, Zelensky sacked the heads of regional military recruitment offices after an investigation showed that recruitment officials were illegally enriching themselves by helping draft-eligible men leave Ukrainian territory. Reznikov’s dismissal is likely part of Kyiv’s campaign to promote its anti-corruption efforts and reinvigorate trust in the MoD, but institutional corruption will remain a long-term issue that will continue to undermine the war effort for the foreseeable future.
MOBILISATION: On 3 September, Ukraine’s MoD amended the list of medical exemptions for military service. According to the new list, individuals cured of various ailments, such as tuberculosis or viral hepatitis, will be considered fit for military service. Meanwhile, on 3 September, Fedir Venislavsky, Zelensky’s representative in parliament, proposed a bill abolishing the deferral of mobilisation for students over 30 years who are studying a non-consecutive degree or are studying a second degree. Venislavsky explained that the number of students over 25 studying for a university degree has risen from 40 thousand in 2021 to 106 thousand in 2022. The official alleged that enrolling in a university degree is among the various strategies to avoid military service, with 60,000 draftable men having allegedly signed up for university courses to avoid military service. If adopted, the bill would retroactively apply to students who started university in 2022 and 2023. As such, the MoD’s decision and the bill proposal illustrate Ukraine’s efforts to curtail draft dodging loopholes as Ukraine continues to face recruitment challenges amid a highly attritional conflict.
NATO: On 4 September, the spokesperson of Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oleg Nikolenko, claimed that Russian drones fell and exploded inside Romanian territory. Nikolenko posted a photo of the explosion, stating that Russian strikes pose a threat to NATO member countries. Nikolenko’s statements come after Russian drones targeted grain exporting infrastructure in the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail on 4 September. However, Romania’s MoD categorically denied Nikolenko’s claims, stating that the latest Russian strikes did not pose a military threat to Romania. On 2 September, Poland’s MoD also denied Belarus’s accusation that a Polish helicopter violated Belarus’s airspace. Bucharest and Warsaw’s statements reflect NATO’s efforts to tone down escalatory risks with Russia and curb false or alarmist information during periods of heightened tensions. At the same time, Russia’s effort to consistently target Ukraine’s Danube ports will increase the risk of debris hitting Romanian territory, which could realistically drive tensions between Moscow and NATO, though the risk of escalation remains low.
NUCLEAR: On 1 September, the head of Roscosmos Yuri Borisov stated that Russia’s new generation Sarmat nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system had been put on combat duty for the first time. While no further details were provided, the new system is part of Russia’s modernisation and strengthening of its nuclear triad, though notably, a test of the new system on 20 February 2023 failed (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 22 February 2023). As previously reported, conventional military failures or challenges on the battlefield are likely to be met with increased nuclear rhetoric and posturing during periods of heightened tensions. While the expansion of Russia’s nuclear arsenal following the collapse of the New START nuclear arms limitation treaty in February will remain a long-term project, the deployment of the new Sarmat system has not altered our nuclear threat assessment, which maintains that a nuclear escalation remains highly unlikely in the short term.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: Various Ukrainian military officers have reported that Russian defences are less dense past the first fixed layer of defences south of Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia oblast), which Kyiv has claimed Ukrainian forces have successfully penetrated. Tavriisk Group of Forces commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated on 2 September that he expects Ukrainian forces will make faster gains in the south given the next layer of fixed Russian defences are weaker. He claimed that Russian forces devoted 60% of their efforts to building the first layer of defences, which Ukrainian forces have now breached, and only 20% respectively to the two subsequent layers to the south.

Tavriisk spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun furthermore stated on 3 September that Russian minefields are less dense in these subsequent defensive layers, which would allow Ukrainian forces greater room for manoeuvre than previously. Shtupun confirmed that heavy minefields up until now have forced Ukrainian forces to conduct mine-clearly breaching operations along narrow corridors, allowing for a greater concentration of Russian artillery fire to slow the advance. Ultimately, the density of Russian minefields in their subsequent layers of defences remains unclear, and while lower densities would create opportunities for greater advances, much will depend on the overall disposition and strength of Russian forces at various fall-back points.

Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are deploying additional reserves to support defensive operations on this axis, which if accurate would reflect Ukraine’s growing momentum in the south. This likely alludes to unconfirmed Ukrainian intelligence that elements of Russia’s newly raised 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) have been deployed prematurely to Luhansk oblast, in order to free up more experienced units to laterally redeploy to the Zaporizhzhia front. Recruitment posters for the 25th CAA suggested that training would be conducted between 1 September and 1 December 2023, before deploying to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblast. While there is currently no confirmation that the 25th CAA has been deployed, if they have been committed some four months early, the force is highly likely to be severely understrength and/or poorly trained and ultimately reflects the pressure on Russian forces defending the Zaporizhzhia front at present.

Moldova-Russia: Moldova will likely remain vulnerable to Russian energy weaponisation. On 3 September, Moldovan President Maia Sandu disclosed that international auditors disproved that Chișinău owes Russia’s Gazprom around USD 800 m in debt, though this cannot be confirmed. Sandu claims that Russian negotiators have urged Moldovan negotiators to sign an agreement to pay back USD 800 m in return for gas. Sandu stated that Chișinău refused this proposal due to the cost. In May 2023, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean announced that Moldova is no longer dependent on Russian natural gas or electricity, underscoring Chișinău’s efforts to diversify its energy supplies. However, there is a realistic possibility that Russia will seek to weaponise energy this winter to stir tensions between the central government in Chișinău and the pro-Moscow region of Transnistria; the non-payment of alleged debts will increase the likelihood that Gazprom will cut energy supplies this winter. (Source: Sibylline)

08 Sep 23. Elon Musk denies switching off Starlink to halt Ukrainian drone boat attack. Elon Musk has denied switching off Starlink satellite internet and called for an immediate truce between Russia and Ukraine. The 52-year-old South African-born bnaire had been accused of covertly instructing his engineers to deactivate the communications network during a major Ukrainian offensive. They claimed it was part of a plan to thwart the secret attack, adding that Ukrainian submarine drones, armed with explosives, lost connectivity as they advanced towards Russian warships. But Mr Musk denied the accusations on Twitter on Thursday.

“The Starlink regions in question were not activated. SpaceX did not deactivate anything,” he wrote.

“Both sides should agree to a truce. Every day that passes, more Ukrainian and Russian youth die to gain and lose small pieces of land, with borders barely changing. This is not worth their lives.”

Satellite terminals donated by Mr Musk’s SpaceX, as well as the US government and private donors, have become vital to Ukrainian military communications. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

07 Sep 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package to support Ukraine’s battlefield needs and demonstrate unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine. This package provided through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) includes equipment to augment Ukraine’s air defenses, artillery munitions, and other capabilities.

This USAI package highlights the continued U.S. commitment to meeting Ukraine’s pressing requirements by committing critical near-term capabilities, while also building the enduring capacity of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to defend its territory and deter Russian aggression over the mid and long term.

Unlike Presidential Drawdown authority, which DoD has continued to leverage to deliver equipment to Ukraine from DoD stocks at a historic pace, USAI is an authority under which the United States procures capabilities from industry or partners. This announcement represents the beginning of a contracting process to provide additional priority capabilities to Ukraine.

The capabilities in this announcement, which totals up to $600 m, include:

Equipment to sustain and integrate Ukraine’s air defense systems;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
105mm artillery rounds;
Electronic warfare and counter-electronic warfare equipment;
Demolition munitions for obstacle clearing;
Mine clearing equipment; and
Support and equipment for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements. (Source: U.S. DoD)

07 Sep 23. A new report published today by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reveals that external threats and related strategic concerns are driving governments to pursue more ambitious cyber strategies. The impact of cyber operations in Ukraine is most visible in Europe but less so in the Middle East or in developing countries.

Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment finds that:

The impact of cyber operations during the war against Ukraine has been profound as countries are crafting national cyber policies and substantially upgrading their cyber security all over the world;
World leaders in cyber include Germany and the Netherlands;
Estonia and Singapore display exemplary practices in cyber security and resilience;
The UAE and Saudi are strengthening their cyber defences in the face of serious cyber threats from Iran.
Turkiye’s aspirations in cyber remain within the strategic environment, but it does not yet display world-leading strength;
With few external threats, the push for digitalisation of the economy appears to be a higher priority for Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria than developing their core cyber-intelligence capabilities.

Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment is the second volume in a two-part series that uses an original methodology developed by the IISS to assess national cyber power.

A total of 25 countries are studied across both volumes to illuminate the distribution of cyber power in the world today. This second volume assesses the cyber power of: Brazil, Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Turkiye.

Key assessments:

The role of the war in Ukraine – the report highlights the profound impact of cyber operations in the war against Ukraine, the substantial upgrades of cyber security in the Persian Gulf, and the challenges for other countries of navigating US-China tensions as they craft national cyber policies.
The United States remains the world leader in cyber – volume one identified the United States as the only country to merit tier one cyber-power status; none of the ten states reviewed in volume two meet the requirements to qualify for this category.
Germany and the Netherlands are the strongest cyber powers among the ten countries studied – this is a result of their prominence in aspects of the global digital economy, leadership in global cyberspace affairs and strategic positioning as NATO members and the collective cyberspace capabilities of the European Union. Effective partnerships with other cyber-capable states, including the United States, make up for gaps in core cyber-intelligence capabilities and offensive cyber operations.
Size matters when it comes to cyber power – while Singapore and Estonia are both significant actors in cyberspace affairs and have implemented exemplary practices in cyber security and resilience, the report finds that Singapore and Estonia cannot be regarded as world leaders given their modest cyber-intelligence capabilities and lack of indigenous ICT industry and personnel.
UAE and Saudi Arabia have yet to fulfil their potential as cyber powers – despite their use of cyber assets for intelligence, especially in cyber surveillance, neither country currently demonstrates world-class strengths in other categories. Both are strengthening their cyber defences in the face of serious cyber threats from Iran and, given their significant wealth, are well placed to procure foreign cyber services.
Turkiye’s high aspirations held back by domestic governance – with various strategic concerns driving Turkiye’s strategies for cyberspace, including terrorism, the civil war in Syria, disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus or Ukraine, the country may well aspire to be a cyber power. Yet it is not a world leader in any of the seven categories of cyber power, with its main constraints being in domestic governance.
An absence of external threats explains low cyber-power aspirations of Brazil, NIgeria and South Africa – all three show low levels of consistency in the digitalisation of the economy and society, with the inevitable impact on cyber capabilities. The push for digitalisation of the economy nonetheless appears to be a higher priority than core cyber-intelligence capabilities.

The IISS methodology for measuring national cyber power differs from the index-based approaches developed by other organisations. It is broader and qualitative, analysing the cyber ecosystem of each state and how it intersects with international security, economic competition and military affairs. As the national circumstances of each state continue to evolve, the national assessments only represent a snapshot in time.

The states are assess in seven categories: strategy and doctrine; governance, command and control, core cyber-intelligence capability, cyber empowerment and dependence; cyber security and resilience, global leadership in cyberspace affairs; offensive cyber capability.

The report categorises selected countries in three tiers of cyber power. The first tier is for states with world-leading strengths. Those with world-leading strengths only in some categories account for tier two. Finally, tier three countries display strengths or potential strengths in some of the categories, but significant weaknesses in others.

06 Sep 23. US considering long-range fires for Ukraine, State Dept. official says. The Biden administration is “closely considering” providing long-range fires and other capabilities to Ukraine, a State Department official overseeing arms transfers said.

“We do need to continue to take a very close and deliberate look at what it is Ukraine needs,” Laura Cressey, director of regional security and arms transfers at the State Department’s political-military affairs bureau, said Wednesday at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Va.

“There’s been a lot of talk about F-16s, a lot of talk about long-range fires,” she said. “All of those the U.S. government is very closely considering, but it takes a lot in terms of training.”

The U.S. can’t provide “whatever is the hot topic at the moment,” Cressey said. “We need to take a close look at the conditions on the battlefield, the absorptive capacity of the Ukrainians themselves, the training.”

“This is not just the United States that is providing Ukraine the capabilities,” said Cressey. “This is a coalition of over 50 countries and it’s significant. Other countries are not gap filling. They’re providing significant materiel whether you’re looking at air and missile defense, modern fighters, armor, the like.”

Cressey and Mike Miller, the deputy director of the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, expressed hope that Congress will continue appropriating funds to arm Ukraine.

“The support of the U.S. Congress in this effort has been remarkable,” Miller said during a panel discussion, pointing to presidential drawdown authority to provide weapons from U.S. stockpiles, longer-term aid contracted out through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, foreign military financing grants and authorizations for multiyear procurement of munitions.

Congress has passed $61bn worth of military aid for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. The White House in August asked Congress for an additional $13bn in Ukraine military aid via a supplemental spending request. Most senators, including Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., support the request but House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., has ruled out additional Ukraine aid amid growing opposition from the right-flank of his caucus.

An August CNN-SSRS poll found 55% of U.S. voters oppose additional aid for Ukraine. The poll found 71% of Republicans oppose additional Ukraine aid while 62% of Democrats favor more assistance for Kyiv.

Reversing course on F-16s

Pro-Ukraine Republicans in Congress have pressured the Biden administration to send Kyiv long-range capabilities like Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, as requested by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – so far to no avail. President Joe Biden did reverse course on providing F-16s to Ukraine in August, authorizing training for Ukrainian pilots who will fly jets provided by Denmark and the Netherlands.

A provision in the House’s fiscal 2024 defense policy bill would require the Pentagon to build the Lockheed-made ballistic missiles for Kyiv via the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Britain has also provided long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine.

Estonia’s No. 2 defense official, Defense Ministry Permanent Secretary Kusti Salm, called the Ukraine war “an existential question for NATO” noting “we’re fairly confident” that the U.S. and its European allies can help Kyiv win despite a slow-moving counteroffensive.

“Russia has pushed this into a war of attrition,” said Salm at the conference. “Our job is to send the message that we can out-manufacture you.”

“Our defense has been a self-inducing spiral of declining defense budgets, especially in Europe,” he added “Our job is to turn this around.” (Source: Defense News)

07 Sep 23. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s planned meeting with Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok, as revealed by US intelligence, gives us a new insight into Russia’s strategy in Ukraine as well as a warning of wider dangers for the world.

As Kyiv’s offensive wears on into its fourth month, with only limited success and a few Russian counter attacks, it is becoming clear that Moscow’s plan may be to allow Ukraine to exhaust its men, tanks, shells and missiles against the Surovikin Line’s hardest edge. The thinking could be that, once Ukraine’s Western equipped and trained manoeuvre forces have been ground down, Russia will then be able to launch its own major offensive, perhaps as early as January.

After almost two years of fighting that has been compared more to the First World War than the Second, this plan is reminiscent of the Germans’ Kaiserschlacht, the spring offensive which began in March 1918 and drove the allies back, seizing more territory than had been taken by either side in the preceding four years of war. This was achieved by the Germans bleeding the enemy dry while building massive reserves of men and munitions behind the lines, ready to unleash a devastating assault not unlike what the British aimed for, but failed to achieve, during the Battle of the Somme in 1916.

The problem for Putin is that, as he seeks to grind down Ukrainian forces, he is expending vast quantities of ammunition, especially artillery shells and ballistic missiles, and very large numbers of tanks. While Russia has a greater volume of military industrial production than much of the West, and continues to mobilise tens of thousands of men each quarter on a rolling basis, its core supplies remain inadequate for the level of expenditure required for a major new offensive. (Source: (excerpt)Daily Telegraph)

07 Sep 23. Russia redeploys more troops to hold back Ukrainian breakthrough. Russia has begun redeploying more reserve forces to hold back Ukraine’s forces as they try to consolidate a breakthrough in the south.

“By regrouping forces from other areas and using reserves, [the enemy] is reinforcing units engaged in defensive actions in the Berdiansk and Melitopol sectors,” said Colonel Mykola Urshalovych, a Ukrainian military spokesman.

Ukrainian officials have said in the past week that their forces have managed to push past Russia’s first line of defences and are battling to break through further lines of fortifications and minefields.

“The Ukrainians are gradually gaining ground…They have been able to breach the defensive lines of the Russian forces, and they are moving forward,” Nato Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Thursday.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

06 Sep 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This announcement is the Biden Administration’s forty-sixth tranche of equipment to be provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021. This package includes: additional air defense equipment; artillery munitions; anti-tank weapons, including depleted uranium rounds for previously committed Abrams tanks; and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing war of aggression.

The capabilities in this package, valued at up to $175 m, include:

Equipment to support Ukraine’s air defense systems;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
81mm mortars systems and rounds;
120mm depleted uranium tank ammunition for Abrams tanks;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems;
Over 3 m rounds of small arms ammunition;
Tactical air navigation systems;
Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment;
Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing; and
Spare parts, maintenance, and other field equipment.

This security assistance package will utilize assistance previously authorized under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for Ukraine that remained after the PDA revaluation process concluded in June.

051 Sep 23. Switzerland to provide remote-controlled mine-clearing vehicle to Kyiv. Switzerland’s Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports (DDPS) announced in a press release on 29 August that it had received a tracked remote-controlled mine-clearing vehicle the same day from Digger Foundation, a Swiss-based non-profit organisation (NPO), for delivery to Ukraine. Developed and produced by Digger, the vehicle can destroy or detonate mines, cluster munitions, and explosive remnants, according to the DDPS. A Digger representative told Janes on 1 September that the mine-clearing vehicle is a Digger D-250, the NPO’s fourth-generation remote-controlled humanitarian demining machine.

The vehicle, a truck trailer, and three years’ worth of spare parts, valued at CHF1.2m (USD1.36m), will be transported to Ukraine in September by the Van for Life Foundation and handed over to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. (Source: Janes)

05 Sep 23. Russian Su-34 Uses Kinzhal Hypersonic Missile in Special Op — Official. Russia’s Su-34 multipurpose fighter bomber used the Kinzhal hypersonic missile in the course of the special military operation in Ukraine, a defense official told TASS.

“The Su-34 fighter jet used the Kinzhal hypersonic missile in the special military operation. The first crew who successfully accomplished such a task will receive state awards,” the official said.

The Kinzhal is Russia’s latest system with hypersonic aero-ballistic missiles carried by specially equipped MiG-31K fighters-interceptors. The Kinzhal missile features low radar signature and high maneuverability and is designed to strike ground and naval targets.

The Kinzhal missile system has been on experimental combat duty since December 2017. The Russian Army first officially used the missile in combat in the country’s special op on March 18, 2022.

(Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/TASS)

06 Sep 23. Russia covers nuclear bombers with tyres in bid to outfox Ukraine drones. Satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies appears to show dozens of car tyres placed on the wings and fuselages of two Tu-95 strategic bombers at the Engels airbase near Saratov in Russia more than 400 miles from the front line in Ukraine.

Experts have speculated the tyres could be used to protect the aircraft from Ukrainian drones and also reduce their visibility during nighttime raids.

“We believe it’s meant to protect against drones,” a Nato official told CNN. “We don’t know if this will have any effect.”

Francisco Serra-Martins, of One Way Aerospace, which manufactures drones used by Ukraine, said: “It may reduce the thermal signature for exposed strategic aviation assets placed on airfield aprons, but they will still be observable under infrared cameras.”

Ukraine has become increasingly bold with its long-range attacks on military targets inside Russia to curtail Vladimir Putin’s war machine.

Last week, Kyiv’s forces targeted six Russian regions, including Moscow, in its largest drone assault since the start of the invasion.

Ukraine’s military intelligence, in a rare admission, confirmed it was behind the attack on an airfield in Pskov, near Russia’s border with Estonia, that destroyed two Il-76 transporter planes and damaged two more.

Kyiv also claims to have damaged Su-30 fighter jets, one MiG-29 and various equipment based in Russia using drones made of cardboard.

Russia has deployed increasingly creative, and sometimes questionable, efforts to defend strategic targets, such as bridges, from attacks by Ukrainian forces.

It was recently reported that Moscow’s forces had sunk ferries around the Kerch Bridge, linking occupied Crimea and the Russian mainland, to prevent it from being hit by Ukraine’s fleet of sea drones.

Russia has also launched military balloons with radar reflectors to exhaust Ukraine’s air defences over Kyiv. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

05 Sep 23. First Challenger 2 tank destroyed in Ukraine after drone shot down near Putin residence. A video on the Telegram messaging site shows the blackened tank burning by the road.

Russian forces appear to have destroyed a British-supplied Challenger 2 tank for the first time, after a suspected Ukrainian drone was shot down near one of Vladimir Putin‘s residences this morning.

Video posted online shows what appears to be the Challenger 2 nearly destroyed – the first to have been destroyed in the conflict, after the UK donated 14 to Ukraine in March. It is not known when the tank was destroyed.

A Russian-installed official in Ukraine’s southern region of Zaporizhzhia said that a Challenger 2 had been set alight in fighting near the south-eastern village of Robotyne.

Vladimir Rogov said the tank belonged to the Ukrainian army’s 82nd brigade and was meant to have reached Crimea, annexed from Ukraine by Russia in 2014, but had been destroyed on what he claimed was the first line of Russian defence.

He posted a video on the Telegram messaging site showing the blackened tank burning by the road, as thick grey smoke billowed from it.

In March, Ukraine thanked the UK for the “fantastic machines” after London donated 14 of the Challenger 2 main battle tanks.

Justin Crump, military analyst and CEO of Sibylline, confirmed that the wreckage showed a Challenger 2. “The gun, general turret shape and what looks to be oil drums on the back all match this type of tank. As the turret stayed intact, you can clearly see the thermal imagery system over the gun, which is unique to the Challenger 2,” he told Sky News.

A Western defence source confirmed to the BBC the footage showed a Challenger 2 tank and that its crew had survived.

Hamish de Bretton Gordon, a former British tank commander, said it was the first time the tank had been hit by enemy fire.

It has not been confirmed exactly where the tank was destroyed.

The news emerged after the Russian defence ministry said it had brought down three drones targeting Moscow, including one that crashed near one of President Putin’s official residences north of the capital.

Russian officials said air defences had destroyed the drone, which crashed in the village of Zavidovo, where Mr Putin’s “Rus” residence is located about 75 miles north of Moscow.

There was no suggestion that Mr Putin, whose main residence is the Novo-Ogaryovo estate west of Moscow, was in Zavidovo at the time.

The ministry also said drones had been intercepted in the Kaluga region and the Istra district near the capital.

Meanwhile, a defence think-tank has described how the Russian army is learning from Ukraine’s tactics, meaning Ukraine has been losing some of its battlefield advantage.

Russia’s troops were “actively learning” from Ukrainian forces during its counteroffensive – in a “concerning trend” that could significantly improve Russia‘s capabilities, a report added.

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (Rusi) said that the Russia army was adapting its methods, including increasing the density of minefields, dispersing its electronic warfare systems rather than concentrating them on major platforms, and increasing the use of laser-guided shells and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over indiscriminate shelling, as was favoured in the Soviet era, but which has meant Russia is running out of ammunition.

“The trend appears to be towards maximising accuracy and reducing the number of rounds necessary to achieve the desired outcome rather than resorting to saturation fire. This is a concerning trend, as over time it will likely significantly improve Russian artillery,” the Rusi report said. “The growth in the complexity, diversity and density of Russian UAVs is concerning.”

Ukraine has been losing some of its battlefield advantages as a result, the report added. (Source: News Now/https://inews.co.uk/)

05 Sep 23. Ukraine reports frontline success, Russian minister decries Kyiv’s failure. Ukraine’s military on Tuesday reported advances and robust defence along the front lines of its 18-month old war with Russia, with Moscow acknowledging “tension” in the southern sector but dismissing Kyiv’s campaign as unsuccessful. Ukraine launched a counter offensive in June to reclaim territory seized by Russia, but has struggled to break through entrenched Russian lines and has faced growing criticism in Western media of concentrating forces in the wrong places.

With Moscow’s stretched military resources and dissent in the ranks, however, both sides have measured recent successes by taking control of tiny villages or small pockets of land.

Kyiv has retaken several villages in a southward drive towards the Sea of Azov and says it is regaining ground near the eastern city of Bakhmut, seized by Russia in May after months of battles.

“We are pressing our offensive in the Bakhmut sector and our defenders are advancing confidently metre by metre, namely Klishchivka,” Ilya Yevlash, spokesperson for Ukrainian troops in the east told national television.

He was referring to a village located on heights south of Bakhmut, seen as critical to recapturing the city.

Yevlash said Ukrainian troops had withstood an onslaught further north near Lyman, a town they retook last year.

Russian forces had been dealt “a good kick” near the village of Novoyehorivka which halted their advance, he said.

Ukraine’s general staff, in its evening report, said its forces were moving towards Melitopol in the south – aimed at severing the land bridge Russian troops have established between Crimea, annexed by Moscow in 2014, and the occupied east.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed the offensive as a failure, while admitting that things were far from easy in parts of southeastern Zaporizhzhia region that Moscow controls.

“Ukraine’s armed forces have not achieved their goals on any front,” the defence ministry quoted Shoigu as saying.

“The most tense situation is that on the Zaporizhzhia front, The enemy has engaged brigades from its strategic reserve whose personnel have been trained by Western instructors.”

Ukrainian analysts said the drive to capture a succession of villages was paying off, but much would depend on pushing on for the next two months before wintry weather takes hold.

Military analyst Serhiy Zgurets, writing on the website of Espreso TV, said the military had opened new fronts in the south with a strategy he dubbed “stretch, attrition and strike”.

Ukrainian officials have said in the past week that their forces have managed to push past Russia’s first line of defences but now confronted further lines in areas where Moscow has had time to build up fortifications and minefields.

“The enemy is trying to make the most of the ‘dry period’ to fortify themselves, redeploy and manoeuvre,” Natalia Humeniuk, spokesperson for southern forces, told national television.

“They can feel the degree to which we can secure fire control on the logistics routes so important to them.” (Source: Reuters)

05 Sep 23. Made in Germany – first shipment of new Gepard ammunition now on its way to Ukraine. A first shipment of new ammunition for the Gepard antiaircraft tank is now headed for Ukraine. Per agreement, Rheinmetall AG of Düsseldorf has shipped a first lot of 35mm air defence ammunition as part of German support for Ukraine’s defensive struggle. By the end of this year, 40,000 rounds are to be produced and provided.

In Ukraine the shipments from Germany are eagerly awaited: with its 35mm twin guns, the Gepard has emerged as a decisive factor in the embattled nation’s fight to defend itself. The German government has made 46 of these antiaircraft tanks available, with another six to follow. For Ukraine, they play an essential part in the struggle to control its airspace, having proved highly effective in countering the kamikaze drones Russia uses to attack Ukrainian cities. They are almost permanently in action, making ammunition consumption correspondingly high.

Rheinmetall has long produced much of its ammunition for medium-calibre weapons in Switzerland; now, however, new production capacity for supplying the Gepard systems has been created in Germany, where a multim-euro figure has been invested in plant and equipment.

In February 2023 Boris Pistorius, the German defence minister, announced at a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group that capacity for producing ammunition for the Gepard would be created in Germany at Rheinmetall. A contract for the rapid delivery of a total of 300,000 rounds of ammunition for the antiaircraft tank had already been signed several days earlier. Owing to the urgency and high political relevance of the project, the pressure to complete the new facility was immense from day one, requiring a true technological and logistical tour de force.

In the words of Rheinmetall AG executive board chairman Armin Papperger,

“We keep our promises. Just six months after signing the contract, we’ve already started delivery, as agreed. My sincere thanks go to the men and women of Rheinmetall who have done so much to make this project a success, even working on weekends. Our subcontractors and vendors deserve praise as well, having helped us to achieve what at first seemed impossible. The pressure to succeed was huge – but so was our commitment to getting the job done. We want to help the people of Ukraine. Every drone that’s shot down saves lives!”

The German government left no stone unturned in its effort to supply Ukraine with fresh ammunition, including abroad – albeit in vain. In Germany stocks of the ammunition had dropped to zero, as the Gepard systems had been retired from service some fifteen years earlier. Other countries declined to make available existing stocks of ammunition, citing either political considerations or constitutional restrictions.

In the end, it was a tightly woven intermeshing of expertise of Rheinmetall technicians and engineers in Switzerland, Germany and Italy that made creating the new production facility possible.

The problem: earlier tools for producing the original ammunition were simply no longer there. The solution turned out to be a mix of reverse engineering and adaptive development quite unlike anything seen before: existing 35mm ammunition from the main armament of an infantry fighting vehicle was modified for use in the Gepard. Making sure that the Gepard fire control unit could reliably recognize the ammunition was a special challenge.

Despite their excellent performance, the electronics and fire control technology of the aging antiaircraft tank – developed in the 1960s – proved to be a veritable black box. At the same time, the supply chain for the new ammunition had to be expanded in order to minimize as far as possible the Swiss value-added share.

As Armin Papperger puts it, “We have an unbeatable strength at Rheinmetall: namely, the broad-based expertise that comes with being a systems house. Whether in ammunition development, mechanical production and materials knowledge, in the development of air defence weaponry, in comprehensive live fire testing, in the design and construction of production facilities – everywhere our experts worked with tremendous drive and great personal commitment to complete the project. They knew how urgently Ukraine needed the ammunition – and the sooner, the better.”

Following multiple tests at the Group’s proving ground at Unterlüss in Lower Saxony, the verification programme was concluded in May 2023 when the ammunition was successfully fired by a Gepard antiaircraft tank.

Meanwhile, at one of Rheinmetall’s civil sector plants in Neuss, an LAAP line was designed and subsequently built at a Group facility in Lanciano, Italy, before being transferred to Unterlüss. LAP stands for loading, assembly and packing, the process in which the cartridges are loaded with propellant; the various parts of the round are put together; and subsequently packaged. The propellant powder comes from Nitrochemie, by the way, another member of the Group.

A total of 40,000 rounds are to be delivered this year. Ukraine will be receiving 150,000 rounds each of two different types of ammunition. One of these is a subcalibre APDS-T munition containing heavy metal penetrators, and thus especially suitable for engaging hardened targets. Rheinmetall is also supplying Ukraine with conventional HEI-T high-explosive incendiary ammunition designed for bringing down typical air defence targets, e.g., aircraft and guided missiles.

05 Sep 23. Drone attack on Moscow repelled, Russia says. Russia was forced to shut major Moscow airports as it shot down at least three Ukraine-launched drones targeting the capital. The Russian defence ministry said that its air defence systems had destroyed two unmanned aerial vehicles over the Kaluga and Tver regions, which border the Moscow region.

Another was downed closer to the capital, over the Istra district of the Moscow region, the ministry claimed.

Russian news agencies reported that almost 50 flights were cancelled or postponed early Tuesday from the four major airports around the capital – Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo and Zhukovsky.

Drone attacks on Russian targets have become a regular occurrence since early May. Ukraine rarely takes direct responsibility for the strikes.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

31 Aug 23. L3Harris Vampire rocket system ‘operating in Ukraine’ – media reports. The Vampire rocket system developed by L3Harris Technologies being used in Ukraine to combat Russian drones, according to media reports. The US defence department awarded L3Harris a USD40 m contract to deliver 14 Vehicular Agnostic Modular Palletised ISR Rocket Equipment (VAMPIRE) multi-purpose weapons system to strengthen Ukrainian security defence efforts in January 2023.

The equipment is truck-mounted and outfitted with fuses designed to detonate near unmanned aerial vehicles.

A statement by the Pentagon’s Acquisition and Sustainment Office says the weapons are designed to help Ukraine to defeat Russian strikes. “Initial Vampire systems have been delivered and are in operation by Ukrainian Armed Forces,” it said.

Four of the first 14 systems arrived in Ukraine midyear, with the rest to come by year-end.

Unlike the bulk of US military aid to Ukraine, which comes from existing stocks, the Vampire contract taps the defence industry directly under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, according to the South China Morning Post. For more information visit: www.l3harris.com; www.uasvision.com; www.scmp.com (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

31 Aug 23. Targeted drone attack puts sophisticated ‘Russian anti-aircraft missile system out of service.’ According to an article published by Ukraine media company Defense Express, soldiers from Ukraine’s 92nd Mechanized Brigade attack drone company have published a video showing a UAV crashing into a Russian Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile system.

“The Russian equipment was damaged as a result. From the last seconds of the drone’s live feed, we can see the operator was trying to hit the radar which was in its folded state. If put out of order, Tor-M1 becomes unable to operate, and the repairs would be expensive,” says the article. “Judging by the circumstances, the Tor-M1 had just arrived at the new position or was ready to leave it and move somewhere else. Surely, the moment for the attack was not perfect since the radar was hidden in the hull. But in the bigger picture, the case itself is quite illustrative in terms of FPV drone efficiency. First of all, it is a roughly USD500 drone that can effectively put valuable equipment worth ms of dollars out of service in a single accurate strike. Secondly, Tor-M1 is deemed in Russia as the best tool for countering UAV threats.

“The Tor system family was initially designed to cover vanguard land force echelons from attack aircraft and rotorcraft, intercept cruise and anti-radar missiles back in the USSR times when it was designed. The modern reality is the Tor system which is conceptually supposed to be deployed close to the frontline has itself become a target for suicide drones – the most cost-efficient, long-range, and simple-to-use weapon on the tactical level.

“The bottom line is, in a situation that earlier required higher-level interference, such as deployment of artillery units or high-precision missiles, to take down a valuable target, an FPV drone enables soldiers on the ground to deal with the problem by own means. That is a sign of explosive drones becoming a real game-changer,” says Defense Express.

www.defence-ua.com (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

31 Aug 23. Russia successfully tests ‘combat laser designed to destroy unmanned aerial systems.’ According to reports by Russian news agency RIA Novosti and Eurasian Times, Russia has successfully tested a combat laser designed to destroy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at a military training ground. An unnamed source said “the laser gun demonstrated high efficiency in hitting UAVs”. The source further added that the laser destroyed drones of both aircraft and quadcopter types.

“The testing comes when Russia has been ravaged by drone attacks that it attributes to Ukraine,” says Eurasian Times. Drozens of drones are alleged to have attacked Crimea in what is being touted as one of the biggest Ukrainian aerial attacks on Russian-held territory. The Russian Ministry of Defense (RuMoD) claims to have destroyed many drones and supressed those remaining using electronic jamming. For more information visit: www.eurasiantimes.com (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

31 Aug 23. Ukraine to begin mass production of drones by the end of 2023 says defence minister. Yury Shchigol, head of Ukraine’s State Special Communications Service says Ukraine plans to produce and purchase approximately 200,000 combat UAVs during the year, according to Focus UA: The government official said: “40bn hryvnias have been allocated for the development of Ukrainian drones. 25bn hryvnias have already been spent – they have been spent under contracts for the production of 22,000 strike drones”. Ukrainian forces lose on average 40-45 reconnaissance drones per day. These are the simplest Mavic, Matrice, and large professional drones of Ukrainian and foreign production, adds Focus UA. Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov said during a press conference that Ukraine will begin mass production of drones by the end of 2023. For more information visit: www.focus.ua (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

01 Sep 23. Russia-led alliance holds military drills in Belarus. More than 2,000 troops from a Russia-led security alliance opened military exercises Friday in parts of Belarus near the borders of NATO countries.

The exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization include troops from Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Armenia is also a member of the CSTO but did not send any of its forces; in January, Armenia said it would not host CSTO drills this year amid tense relations with Russia.

Belarus’ defense ministry said the exercises, which are to last through Wednesday, are to prepare for joint operations, including responses to a nuclear accident.

The exercises are taking place in three western Belarus regions that border NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau said the purpose of the military exercises was to destabilize the region.

Belarus late Friday claimed that a Polish military helicopter flew at low altitude about 1200 meters (0.75 miles) into Belarusian airspace in the Grodno region, one of the areas where the exercises are taking place. Polish charge d’affaires Wojciech Filimonowicz was summoned for a complaint, Belarus said.

Belarus hosts Russian forces and equipment that have been used in the war in Ukraine, although Belarusian forces have not taken part. Russia also says it has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

Ukraine’s Joint Forces commander Gen. Serhii Naiev said Ukraine has strengthened its border with Belarus for the exercises. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

04 Sep 23. International partners must invest now to prepare Ukraine for winter fighting and 2024 operations, reflecting the high likelihood that “major ground combat operations will continue in 2024”.

That’s the conclusion of a major piece of analysis conducted by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and published on 4 September. The full paper can be viewed here.

The report, authored by Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, examines Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in 2023. It is based on interviews with and observations of Ukrainian military units in 2023.

Noting that Ukraine’s partners must “overcome their habitual sluggishness in doing what they have identified as necessary” to ensure that Ukraine can maintain the initiative into the next fighting season in 2024, Jack and Nick identify the necessary means through which Ukraine’s international partners should be strengthening exist support. This includes:

Creating a sustainable supply for a consolidated artillery park, focussing on maintaining a more limited range of guns at greater scale.
Ensuring that the industrial support is available to make the Ukrainian military sustainable.
Using more algorithmic image analysis via UAVs to map minefields more quickly.
Providing more bespoke staff officer training, based on observation of how Ukrainian brigade staffs operate and the tools they depend on.
Better integrating collective training with the training conducted by the Ukrainian military in country.

Jack and Nick conclude that it is now clear that the conflict will protract. It is therefore important that Ukraine’s international partners “invest now to give Ukraine protracted advantages”, noting that “failure to make timely adjustment to support will come at a heavy price in 2024.”

(Source: RUSI)

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