NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 4,

OFFENSIVES: On 3 August, the secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, Oleksiy Danilov, stated that there are no deadlines or schedules for the ongoing counter-offensive. This is the latest intervention by a senior Ukrainian official to manage expectations as Ukraine’s counter-offensive is likely to remain a slow, drawn-out attritional operation before opportunities to create a breakthrough are realised. Danilov also emphasised that Russian forces have made extensive defensive preparations, including minefields. He stated that, on average, there can be three, four or even five mines per square metre in such minefields. Such a density of mines is inevitably slowing Ukrainian advances, with relentless Russian artillery and flexible defences posing a notable obstacle to a Ukrainian breakthrough over the last two months.
BAKHMUT: Numerous Ukrainian officials and military officers have reiterated that the situation around Bakhmut remains ‘extremely difficult’, with Russian forces committing significant reserves to the defence and counter-attacks across a wide frontage. On 3 August, Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing by ‘hundreds of metres’ a day around Bakhmut, but noted that they are not conducting frontal assaults in a bid to conserve manpower and minimise casualties. Nevertheless, heavy fighting continues, with Russian sources reporting on 3 and 4 August that Ukrainian forces are continuing attempts to breakthrough around Klishchiivka and even on the outskirts of Bakhmut itself – though this remains unconfirmed.
DONETSK: On 4 August, a prominent Russian milblogger reported that Ukraine counter-attacked to the north-east of Avdiivka and managed to regain a number of previously lost positions. However, there are currently no further specifics or evidence indicating where or how extensive these advances have been. The source also stated Russian forces conducted further unsuccessful assault operations in the (largely Russian-controlled) town of Marinka. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on 4 August that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north and south-east of Avdiivka, as well as south-east of Pervomaiske, situated around seven miles (11km) south-west of Avdiivka.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: The commander of Ukraine’s Land Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported on 3 August that Ukrainian troops continue to disrupt Russian troops’ attempts to break through their defences in the Kupiansk and Lyman sectors. A Russian milblogger reported on 4 August that Russian forces have managed to advance near Bilohorivka (Luhansk oblast) and reach the eastern outskirts of the village. The source also claimed Russian troops had also managed to occupy a number of new positions in Novoselivske, located around nine miles (14km) north-west of Svatove behind the N26 highway, connecting Kupiansk to Svatove. Geolocated imagery published on 2 August indicates that Russian forces advanced up to the highway in southern Novoselivske, demonstrating that Russian troops have had marginal gains in this direction. Additional claims that Russian forces have secured a bridgehead across the Zherebets River in this direction remain unconfirmed at present.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Elsewhere on this axis, fierce fighting continues around the Serbrianske forest area, near Kreminna (Luhansk oblast). A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced and occupied several Ukrainian strongholds in the region after repelling a number of counter-attacks. The milblogger noted the day prior that the configuration of the front remains unclear due to the inaccessibility of the area, but cited ‘confirmed reports’ that Russian forces were able to advance, dislodging Ukrainian formations from several positions in the Serbrianske forest area. However, we cannot confirm this. Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 3 August shows that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Dibrova, north of the Serbrianske forest area and south-west of Kreminna. Fighting around the Serbrianske forest area will likely remain dynamic and intense in the coming weeks, limiting opportunities to confirm conflicting claims.
SOUTHERN: Senior Ukrainian National Guard officer Mykola Urshalovych stated on 3 August that Ukrainian forces advanced 650m into Russian defensive positions across an unspecified 0.9 mile (1.5km) stretch of the frontline, likely near the Vremevsky salient (Donetsk oblast). The Ukrainian General Staff’s latest summaries of the southern battlefield on 3-4 August continue to vaguely report on the continuation of counter-offensive operations, but without specific claims of major advances. Kyiv still places emphasis on counter-battery operations in their regular updates, indicating that the attritional strategy designed to inflict maximum casualties on Russian forces to eventually set conditions for a breakthrough is ongoing. Given the slow pace of advances, it remains unclear when the Ukrainians will next attempt a large-scale mechanised attack on the southern axis.
STRIKES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 3 August that Russia has launched at least 1,961 Shahed-136/131 to attack Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. While Zelensky stated a significant number of the UAVs have been shot down, he noted not all of them have been, adding that Ukraine is working to secure more air defence systems. UK Defence Intelligence reported on 4 August that Russia is highly likely utilising Iranian-produced one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA UAVs) in an attempt to coerce international shipping into stopping trading via Ukraine’s Danube River ports. Ukrainian officials will likely attempt to bolster air defence capabilities to protect these ports in the coming weeks, which have been targeted following Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in July.
STRIKES: Meanwhile, the Russian MoD reported on 4 August that 13 drones had been downed over the annexed peninsula of Crimea. The ministry claimed there were no casualties or damage during the aerial bombardment. However, Russian sources reported explosions in Feodosia and that a kamikaze drone had hit an oil depot in the town. For further analysis, see FORECAST below.
Ukraine-US: Security talks will likely shape nature of long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. On 3 August, the US State Department confirmed that Ukrainian and US officials initiated talks on bilateral security arrangements. The talks come after the G7 countries pledged in July to provide Kyiv with long-term security guarantees through bilateral security arrangements. The negotiations took place before a Saudi Arabia-hosted peace summit, which will be held between 5 and 6 August. The summit will discuss Ukraine’s Peace Formula, a 10-point peace plan proposed by Kyiv in November 2022. It will reportedly cover ten themes, including food and energy security, the release of prisoners and deported people and the prospects of a war crimes tribunal. However, Kyiv is unlikely to gather significant support for its peace plan, especially amongst countries of the Global South that remain reluctant to condemn Russia’s invasion. Ultimately, Washington’s security guarantees will likely set a model for other G7 countries to provide Kyiv with bilateral security arrangements, thus bolstering Ukraine’s long-term security prospects.
Belarus-Lithuania: Possible partial border closure would elevate trade friction, mitigate travel mobility risks. Earlier today, 4 August, Lithuanian Interior Minister Arnoldas Abramavičius stated that a decision on whether to close two border checkpoints with Belarus would be made ‘in the near future’. The statement comes amid ongoing concerns among the Baltic states and Poland over the presence of a small contingency of Wagner personnel in Belarus’s Grodno oblast, which borders the Suwalki Gap, connecting Poland and Lithuania. Abramavičius indicated that the possible closure of two border checkpoints – there are currently six operational – would be a precautionary measure. He stressed that a full border closure with Belarus would require co-ordination with Latvia and Poland given that a unilateral ban by one country would increase traffic and disruption at the checkpoints of the others. A partial border would increase cross-border trade friction, but mitigate travel and work mobility risks (compared to a complete border closure) as personnel could continue to cross between Belarus and Lithuania.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

ROMANIA: On 3 August, Romania’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it had initiated an investigation into reports of a Russian drone crashing on Romanian territory. On 3 August, local authorities of the Ceatalchioi commune near the Ukrainian border reported that residents saw Russian drones falling into a nearby forest. The allegations were made following Russia’s recent strike against the Odesa oblast on 2 August. However, Romania’s Air Force concluded that no evidence has corroborated these allegations. The Romanian MoD, nonetheless, stated on 3 August that it had stepped up the monitoring of Romania’s airspace in co-operation with NATO. While there is no evidence confirming the crash of Russian drones on Romanian territory, there is a realistic probability that such accidental violations of Romania and neighbouring Moldova’s airspace will occur, given Russia’s efforts to target Ukrainian Danube port infrastructure.
ROMANIA: Notably, the UK Defence intelligence reported on 4 August that Russian drone attacks have struck targets as close as 0.123 miles (200m) from the Romanian border, indicating that Russia’s risk appetite for conducting strikes near NATO territory has increased. On 14 February, Moldova and Romania closed their airspace due to reports of unidentified aerial objects over Moldova’s northern airspace. As such, accidental (or plausibly deniable) violations of Romania’s airspace will increase the risk of temporary closures of airspace, elevating the risk of short-term travel disruption.
RECRUITMENT: On 3 August, former Russian President Dimitry Medvedev claimed that between January and August 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) recruited more than 231,000 volunteers. On 24 March, Bloomberg reported that Russian authorities were seeking to recruit 400,000 contract soldiers to offset the casualties and maintain critical mass without having to conduct formal mobilisation. According to an investigation published by the independent Russian media outlet Meduza on 10 July, 47,000 Russian personnel have died in the war. The Russian recruitment campaign is likely targeting ethnic minorities from Central Asia and underdeveloped Russian regions to offset casualties. For instance, on 3 August, Reuters reported that online recruitment advertisements have increased in Kazakhstan. Such campaigns offer one-off payments of up to USD 5,300 upon signing a contract, and a monthly salary of at least USD 2,000. Given the high attritional rate of the conflict, and the Kremlin’s reluctance to recruit in affluent regions or institute another round of formal mobilisation, ethnic minorities will continue to be systematically targeted by Russian MoD recruitment efforts and sustain disproportionate casualty rates.
ECONOMY: On 3 August, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine’s defence budget would reach USD 48 billion in 2023, which rose by 50% compared to 2022 spending. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine has received USD 28 billion worth of foreign aid so far in 2023 and 31 billion in 2022. According to the quarterly economic report of Ukraine’s National Bank, inflation is expected to decrease, with the economy likely to continue on its path to recovery. However, given that the war is likely to protract beyond 2023, the growing defence expenditure will continue to strain Ukraine’s finances, thus increasing the country’s reliance on foreign aid. As such, foreign aid will represent the most important variable for maintaining Ukraine’s macro-economic stability for the duration of the war.
ECONOMY: In comparison, Russia’s defence budget is expected to double in 2023, reaching more than USD 100 billion, which accounts for one-third of the total federal budget. Likewise, the growing defence budget will remain a flashpoint for Russia’s financial stability, though export revenues from extractive industries will continue to help offset the destabilising effects of increased military spending. On 3 August, Russian independent online investigation media Mediazona reported a significant increase in secret presidential decrees in July. A similar rise was observed in March 2022, one month after the beginning of the war. As such, the recent rise of decrees is likely in part related to decisions related to the war, including military spending projects.
For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2023, please see Sibylline Special Report: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023.

FORECAST

MARITIME: Overnight on 3 August, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy conducted a special joint operation against the key Russian naval base and oil export terminal Novorossiysk. The attack involved two unmanned surface vehicle (USV) maritime drones, which reportedly carried 450kg warheads. While the Russian MoD was quick to claim the attack had been repulsed, various pieces of evidence (including video footage from the drone itself published by the SBU) confirm that one of the USVs successfully attacked the Ropucha I-class large landing ship, the Olenegorsky Gornyak. Video footage following the attack clearly shows the vessel listing heavily to port, indicating it took a significant hit during the attack but was not sunk.

The port is also one of the most important oil terminals in the world, with 1.8 million barrels of Russian and Kazakh oil exported through the terminal every day. This roughly equates to 2% of global supply, and the primary oil export of land-locked Kazakhstan. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which oversees oil exports through Novorossiysk, confirmed that shipping in and out of the port was temporarily suspended following the attack. Further attacks are likely to steadily undermine oil exports.

The attack is a highly significant demonstration of Ukraine’s growing offensive maritime drone capabilities, which serves multiple tactical and strategic Ukrainian objectives:

Besides Sevastopol, Novorossiysk is the most important Russian naval base in the Black Sea. Its importance has grown since Ukraine’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities forced the Black Sea Fleet to relocate many of its vessels further east.
Increasing pressure on the eastern port and the Black Sea Fleet’s surface vessels more generally serves the key strategic purpose of undermining Russia’s ability to enforce a blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports. In particular, USVs are successfully constraining Russian surface vessels’ ability to intercept civilian vessels and board them – a key component of Russia’s deterrence campaign to limit or stop entirely Ukrainian grain exports.
Steadily increasing attacks against Novorossiysk is also highly likely in part revenge for Russia’s targeting of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. It remains likely that Ukrainian special operations will extend to Novorossiysk’s onshore infrastructure in a bid to undermine Russia’s ability to export oil, as Russian strikes undermine Ukraine’s ability to export grain. Oil exports remain a key revenue source for the Kremlin. In this regard, the timing of a simultaneous overnight drone attack, this time using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the Crimean town of Feodosia is notable (see STRIKES above). The town hosts a large oil depot and the Ukrainian decision to target the town could indicate a wider campaign to begin undermining Russian oil exports in the Black Sea.
Finally, attacking large landing ships like the Olenegorsky Gornyak is likely a high priority for the Ukrainians to support Kyiv’s wider efforts to cut off occupied-Crimea and undermine Russian logistics across southern Ukraine. Recent successful attacks on the Kerch Strait Bridge and the Chonhar Bridge have severely undermined land connections to the peninsula, and therefore Russia’s ability to keep it supplied. Naval amphibious landing vessels have been used to dock and rapidly load and unload civilian and military cargo across the Kerch Strait in the absence of a stable bridge connection. Steadily eroding Russia’s amphibious lift capabilities will ultimately undermine Russia’s long-term ability to control Crimea.

Aug.3

*Windows of Opportunity. Sources suggest that there are two Windows of Opportunity for Ukraine. One to consolidate gains by September before the change in the weather to grind away at Russian positions and the other to ensure continued support by the US and NATO to ensure a peace deal by November 2024, for which negotiations could go on for years. The source suggests that Russia will not make a consolidated counter counter offensive unless it is sure that ground will be taken swiftly and not to weaken its overall position. More drone attacks on Moscow could waeken long-term Russian resolve.

BAKHMUT: On 3 August, some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have suspended the assault against Klishchiivka and are shifting the vector of attack further south, focusing on the villages of Andriivka and Kurdyumivka, six miles (10km) south of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage from 2 August indicates that Ukrainian forces are advancing towards the railway line near Kirdyumivka, and Russian sources acknowledged on 3 August that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the suburbs. Russian forces, meanwhile, have continued to launch counter-attacks in an attempt to retake lost positions around the flanks of Bakhmut, which the Ukrainian General Staff claimed on 2 August have remained unsuccessful.
DONETSK: A Russian milblogger reported on 3 August that Russian forces have made limited advances while attacking Ukrainian defensive lines on the Donetsk front. The source claimed attacks on the south-western approaches to Avdiivka were successful, causing Ukrainian troops to leave a number of unspecified positions; though this is unconfirmed. Contradictory and unconfirmed claims render it more challenging to assess the accuracy of this report. Overall, the Donetsk front has remained one of the most static of the entire war, with only incremental advances achievable by either side in months. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s General Staff reported on 2 August that Ukrainian forces continue to hold back Russian offensive operations around the city of Marinka situated south-west of Donetsk city.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian milbloggers claimed on 2 August that Russian forces continue successful offensive operations towards the Oskil River and Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) in the Svatove direction. The source claimed Russian troops maintain a pace of up to 0.6 miles (1km) a day. According to the milblogger, pressure has also intensified north-east of Kupiansk, west of Synkivka and near Masyutivka (both Kharkiv oblast). The milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces have not yet been able to stabilise the front, but we cannot yet confirm the extent of Russian advances on this axis.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, further south, geolocated footage from 2 August indicates that Russian forces made limited advances south of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast around 31 July. For several months Russian attacks against Bilohorivka, located around six miles (10km) south of Kreminna, have failed to make any meaningful progress, so this indicates a notable, if still limited, advance. A Russian news aggregator reported on 2 August that Russian forces have the initiative in the Svatove-Kreminna direction, claiming Russian troops are successfully attacking Ukrainian positions in Torske, situated nine miles (15km) west of Kreminna, and the nearby Serbrianske forest area. On 2 August, Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated almost half of the battles in the Lyman-Kupiansk direction took place in the Serbrianske forest in Luhansk oblast. According to Cherevaty, 11 battles took place in this area in one day, underscoring the intensity of fighting at present. As Ukraine’s General Staff did not report successfully repelling Russian attacks on the Kupiansk and Lyman directions on 3 August, this omission could realistically imply a tacit acknowledgement that Russian forces have advanced in these areas.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces are unlikely to have made any notable advances over the last 24-48 hours along the southern axis, but heavy fighting continues at various key flashpoints along the line. Ukrainian attacks along the axis likely remain small infantry assaults, rather than larger co-ordinated mechanised efforts. Russian occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on 2 August that Russian forces had repulsed an attack involving 10 soldiers and a mine-clearing vehicle near Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Similarly, a small platoon-sized attack supported by a tank was allegedly repulsed on the same day. Such small-scale attacks likely reflect the current extent of Ukrainian offensive operations during the continuation of this attritional and preparatory phase of the operation. Nevertheless, UK Defence Intelligence reported on 3 August that thick undergrowth along the southern frontline is creating extra cover for Russian defence positions and making identifying and clearing minefields harder for Ukrainian forces, which is contributing to the slow pace of the Ukrainian advance.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force reported on 3 August that 15 Shahed-136/131 attack drones launched by Russia overnight were shot down. It also reported shooting down seven reconnaissance UAVs over the past day. Ukrainian officials stated ‘almost 15’ drones were downed over Kyiv. Meanwhile, Russian authorities reported on 3 August that six drones were shot down overnight in the south-west of Kaluga oblast, which is situated south-west of Moscow and north of Bryansk oblast. The UAVs were likely headed to the Russian capital; further attempted drone attacks against Moscow are likely in the coming weeks. A drone was also downed over Belgorod city. Speaking on 2 August, the secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, Oleksiy Danilov, stated there is no ‘taboo’ on striking Russian territory with Ukrainian-made weapons, indicating further attacks inside Russia are highly likely in the coming weeks.
COMMAND: On 2 August, the commander of Russian Airborne (VDV) Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky publicly credited defence minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for strengthening the VDV, in an apparent rapprochement with the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Teplinsky is understood to be the de facto deputy theatre commander in Ukraine, and has historically been highly critical of the MoD’s handling of the war effort and had connections to Wagner Group. Teplinsky’s statement likely confirms that he is publicly aligning with the MoD as part of Moscow’s efforts to curtail dissent following the Wagner mutiny. Teplinsky also notably announced that two new VDV regiments would be formed before the end of 2023, though these units will highly likely be staffed by untrained personnel, further diluting the VDV’s traditional elite status before the full-scale invasion. For further analysis on the degrading capabilities of Russian elite and special forces, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 17 April 2023.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

GRAIN: On 2 August, in a call with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Russian President Vladimir Putin said ‘reliable options’ for the supply of Russian grain, including free shipments, are being developed for countries most in need. Such shipments are highly unlikely to compensate for the overall lost export volumes triggered by Moscow’s withdrawal from the deal, under which more than 32 million tonnes of corn, wheat and other grains were exported. Notably, on 2 August, the EU warned developing countries that Russia is offering discounted grain to create new dependencies by exacerbating economic vulnerabilities and global food insecurity. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell reportedly wrote a letter on 31 July imploring those nations to urge Moscow to return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) and stop attacking Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure. Uncertainty over whether Moscow will return to the deal, coupled with the ongoing strikes against Ukraine’s grain infrastructure, will continue to fuel food price volatility in the coming weeks, despite Russian plans to distribute small quantities of grain free of charge to certain Sub-Saharan African states.
WAGNER GROUP: On 2 August, independent Russian online media Istories reported that the Wagner mercenary group continues to recruit fighters in Russia. The report contradicts Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s claims on 31 July that Wagner has halted the recruitment of fighters as it allegedly already has a sufficient reserve of personnel. Furthermore, following the 23-24 June Mutiny, the Wagner group announced on 2 July that it had suspended recruitment, especially as its mercenaries officially do not participate in the war in Ukraine. However, according to the investigation, clandestine recruitment networks continue to operate in Russia, with some recruiters reportedly offering recruits opportunities to fight in Ukraine without signing a contract with the Russian MoD. The investigation follows recent reports indicating that the mercenary group is attempting to recruit fighters in Belarus. As such, while the existence of crypto recruitment networks cannot be independently verified, it nonetheless highlights efforts to reinforce Wagner forces, likely ahead of future African deployments, despite Prigozhin’s claims to the contrary.
For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2023, please see Sibylline Special Report: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: On 2 August, during an address to the heads of Ukraine’s diplomatic missions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared that 12 countries have so far signed the G7’s joint declaration on ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine. On 12 July, on the final day of the Vilnius NATO summit, the G7 countries officially announced plans to guarantee Kyiv’s long-term security (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 13 July 2023). According to the statement, each G7 member state will establish bilateral long-term security arrangements. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will start discussing such bilateral security agreements with the US this week.

Zelensky also stressed that the next six months will be crucial for Ukraine’s diplomacy to gather support for Ukraine’s Peace Formula. Presented in November 2022, the 10-point Peace Formula is increasingly gathering support, according to Zelensky, though there are serious questions around how realistically it can be implemented (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 15 November 2022). He stated that Ukraine aims to involve countries from the Global South – a significant amount of which have so far remained reluctant to condemn Russia’s invasion – in the Peace Formula. However, the Russia-Africa Summit that took place in St Petersburg on 26-27 July underscored Russia’s enduring influence across large parts of the continent. The supply of discounted grain will likely facilitate Russia’s African diplomacy, though there are clearly limits to this given Russia’s withdrawal from the BSGI has severely destabilised global food security.

On 5 and 6 August Saudi Arabia will host a summit to discuss Ukraine’sPeace formula. The event will gather senior officials from 30 countries and, as such, will be crucial for Ukraine to secure the support of developing countries. Russia is not expected to attend. Senior US diplomats will likely attend the summit to assist Ukrainian officials in gathering support from BRICS countries, Brazil and India. However, given the neutral stances of these countries regarding the war and their increasing trade co-operation with Russia, Kyiv and its Western allies are unlikely to obtain strong support for the Peace Formula from these countries. Zelensky, nonetheless, expressed hope that the summit in Jeddah would facilitate the organisation of a peace summit in the autumn. While such diplomatic efforts will remain important for paving the way for eventual negotiations, a diplomatic resolution to the war remains an outside chance over the next three to six months.

Moldova: Ample gas storage, supply diversification will mitigate Russia-related energy security risks. On 2 August, Moldova’s state-owned gas company, Energocom, confirmed that Moldova had enough gas reserves to last until the end of 2023. The company reportedly purchased 300 million cubic meters (mcm) in June and July and aims to store up to 450 mcm by October. Moldova’s annual consumption varies between 1 and 1.3 billion cubic meters (bcm). Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the pro-EU government in Chișinău has attempted to curtail the country’s reliance on Russian gas by increasingly sourcing from alternative suppliers. While Chișinău has been able to reduce Russian gas consumption, it still relies on it for electricity generation. However, in March, the EU announced that Moldova had synchronised its electricity grid with the EU grid, which will likely allow the country to secure alternative electricity providers and further lower the dependence on Russian energy in the longer term. Chișinău’s energy policies will likely mitigate the destabilisation risks resulting from Russia’s weaponisation of energy supplies, but shortages will remain a realistic possibility this winter.

Aug 2.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian offensive operations around Bakhmut have slowed in recent days, but Ukrainian forces continue to make slow and incremental advances along the southern flank as of 2 August. Some Russian sources have in recent days commented on the quiet along the front, claiming that Ukrainian forces have changed tactics and are now conducting smaller scale assaults, though this cannot be confirmed. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 2 August that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to counter-attack in order to regain lost positions around Klishchiivka, four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut.
DONETSK: A spokesperson for Ukraine’s General Staff reported on 2 August that Ukrainian forces dislodged Russian troops from their positions south of Avdiivka, though this cannot be confirmed. According to Pavlo Kovalchuk, Russian forces were forced to withdraw from the area during operations conducted by Ukraine’s defence forces. However, Kovalchuk did not provide specific details relating to the area. Ukraine’s General Staff also reported on 2 August that Ukrainian forces successfully repelled all attacks by Russian troops in the Avdiivka area, adding that defence forces continue to hold back the advance of Russian troops around the city of Marinka, situated south-west of Donetsk city.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar reported on 1 August that Russian forces are currently conducting their largest assaults in the directions of Lyman (Donetsk oblast) and Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Maliar stated Russian troops are also attempting to advance in the Svatove direction, but said Ukrainian forces are repelling Russian attacks. According to Maliar, who described the situation as ‘tense’, these are very intense and fierce battles. A Russian milblogger claimed on 1 August that some units of Ukraine’s forces are close to being 50% manned in the Kupiansk direction, adding that Russian troops are less than 9.3 miles (15km) from Kupiansk. While Russian sources continue to make claims of advances, there is still limited evidence to confirm this at present. It is likely that Russian sources will exaggerate claims of advances and Ukrainian staffing issues in the coming weeks, but Ukrainian forces are likely weaker on this axis than the others to the south.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage published on 1 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have made limited gains south-east of Kuzmyne, situated just over one mile (2km) south-west of Kreminna (Luhansk oblast). Meanwhile, a Russian source reported on 1 August that Russian forces captured another fortified area near Chervonopopivka, located around three miles (5km) north-west of Kreminna. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 2 August that units of the Centre Group of Forces captured seven strongholds of Ukraine’s armed forces during active defence around Chervonopopivka and Karmazynivka. However, this cannot be confirmed.
SOUTHERN: The tempo of Ukrainian counter-offensive operations along the southern front continues to decline, with no confirmed advances over the last 24 hours. Rather than report on any advances, the Ukrainian General Staff reported on 2 August that their forces had resisted Russian counter-attacks along the Vremevsky salient, near Staromaiorske, six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Ukrainian forces are likely conducting limited attacks, primarily infantry assaults, along this sector. Further west, in Zaporizhzhia oblast, Ukrainian forces are also reportedly conducting small-scale assaults near Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast), but without confirmed progress.
STRIKES: Ukraine’s Air Force reported on 2 August that 23 Iranian-made Shahed-136/131 attack drones were shot down overnight. Most of the drones were downed in Kyiv and Odesa oblasts – some hit port infrastructure in the latter region. Ukraine’s military said the attack damaged a grain elevator and caused a fire at industrial and port facilities in Izmail – a key Danube River port. The drone strike also damaged or destroyed grain warehouses, administrative buildings, a container in one of the loading terminals and other buildings. It comes amid Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s grain infrastructure since withdrawing from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in July. Further attacks against Ukraine’s Danube River ports, which have become the main export for Ukrainian agricultural products since Moscow abandoned the deal, are likely in the coming weeks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CONSCRIPTION: On 1 August, Ukraine’s national police reported that it had uncovered a large-scale draft dodging scheme involving local military recruitment centres and medical commissions. The investigation found that in Odesa oblast, staff members of the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi territorial recruitment centre and the military medical commission accepted bribes to issue fake medical certificates declaring individuals unfit for military service. The local officials would also provide schemes to leave Ukrainian territory through an international checkpoint in the Odesa region. Amid the ongoing attritional counter-offensive, Kyiv is struggling to recruit sufficient numbers of soldiers and faces various draft dodging schemes. Such schemes include using documents that allow volunteers and humanitarian-aid workers to leave Ukrainian territory. According to Ukrainian authorities, in 2022, 66,374 men left Ukraine under this scheme; more than 9,000 have not returned. The recent police investigation reflects Kyiv’s efforts to crackdown on draft dodging schemes. Given Kyiv’s growing need for manpower to sustain combat operations, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies will most likely step up efforts to curtail draft dodging networks.
MOBILISATION: On 2 August, UK Defence Intelligence (DI) reported that Russia has likely started forming new all-arms military formations, including the new 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA). The creation of combined armies that are designed to operate as self-sufficient forces is rare given Russia’s limited reserves of manpower and equipment shortages. With the exception of the creation of the 3rd Army Corps in summer 2022, Moscow has primarily deployed mobilised reservists to reinforce established formations. Any new formations such as the 25th CAA will likely be deployed as reserve forces in Ukraine, despite more ambitious plans to expand the size of the military to increase its capability vis-à-vis NATO (see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 22 December 2022). However, the UK DI stated that Moscow’s reluctance to conduct a wave of mandatory mobilisation out of fear of public backlash will ultimately limit its ability to mobilise new personnel to support these new formations.
BLACK SEA: On 1 August, the Russian MoD accused Ukraine of attempting to attack Black Sea Fleet ships allegedly escorting civilian vessels heading to the Bosphorus strait. However, on 2 August, the spokesman of the Ukrainian Navy, Dmytro Pletenchuk, stated that Ukraine was not involved in the sea drone attack. In the absence of evidence either way, the Russian MoD’s statement is likely part of Moscow’s efforts to frame Ukrainian activity as being responsible for an escalation of naval activity in the Black Sea region. We cannot confirm whether civilian vessels were involved in the alleged attack, but such a narrative would align with Moscow’s efforts to present Kyiv as threatening civilian operations in the Black Sea.
For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2023, please see Sibylline Special Report: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023.

FORECAST

BELARUS: On 1 August, the Polish defence ministry announced that two Belarusian military helicopters violated Polish airspace during a training exercise near the village of Białowieża, located 41 miles (66km) south-east of Białystok. While Minsk has denied this, Warsaw confirmed earlier on 2 August that it will move additional troops to its border with Belarus in response. The incident comes amid an increase in bilateral tensions since Wagner Group forces began deploying to Belarus in July. As of 2 August, Wagner forces continue to arrive in Belarus, and newly published satellite imagery from Planet Labs confirms that fortifications are now being constructed at the main Wagner camp in Tsel, central Belarus.

It remains highly unlikely that either Belarusian or Wagner forces would stage an open military confrontation along EU and NATO member states’ borders. On 1 August, Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka seemingly backtracked on his earlier claims that Wagner forces had wanted to go on an ‘excursion’ to Warsaw, claiming that he had been ‘joking’. We assessed at the time that those claims were primarily rhetorical and didn’t represent a credible military threat. The White House similarly released a statement on 1 August aligning with our assessment, that the US is not aware of any specific threats the Wagner Group poses to either Poland or other NATO allies in the region.

The presence of Wagner forces forms part of an ongoing effort by Minsk to improve Belarusian military capabilities, but only moderately in the short term and will provide limited offensive capability. Lukashenka stated on 1 August that he wants to use the private military company (PMC) as the beginnings of a new ‘contract army’ – a likely attempt to create a more professional force not reliant upon conscripts, as the Belarusian military currently is. In addition, Belarusian Defence Minister Viktor Khrenin has been in Iran this week, where he has sought to increase defence co-operation with Tehran. Of particular significance, a bilateral military agreement was signed on 31 July, which likely included plans to construct a Shahed drone factory in Belarus. While such military co-operation will reduce logistical issues for Russian forces reliant upon Iran drones, the construction of a drone factory in Belarus is unlikely to represent a major threat of such military drones being used against Poland.

While Belarus’ offensive capability will remain limited, Warsaw has warned that Wagner personnel will possibly attempt to facilitate illegal migrant crossings from Belarus into Poland. The Wagner Group deployments and Belarusian rhetoric mean border provocations similar to the 1 August incident remain an increasingly likely prospect in the coming weeks. Such an uptick would increase the likelihood of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland closing their borders with Belarus, which would further disrupt supply chains across the Baltic region.

Belarus-Poland: Further provocations will increase risk of border closures, supply chain disruption. On 1 August, the Polish defence ministry announced that two Belarusian military helicopters violated Polish airspace during a training exercise near the village of Białowieża, located 41 miles (66km) south-east of Białystok. In response, Warsaw confirmed earlier on 2 August that it will move additional troops to its border with Belarus. The incident comes amid an increase in bilateral tensions since Wagner Group forces began deploying to Belarus in July. Warsaw has warned that Wagner personnel will possibly attempt to facilitate illegal migrant crossings from Belarus into Poland. It remains highly unlikely that either Belarusian or Wagner forces would stage an open military confrontation along EU and NATO member states’ borders. However, an uptick in border provocations similar to the 1 August incident is a realistic possibility. Such an uptick would increase the likelihood of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland closing their borders with Belarus; this would further disrupt supply chains in the Baltic region.

Moldova: Embassies will remain exposed to collateral damage risks due to rising tensions, unrest. Earlier on 2 August, a man drove his car into the gate of the Russian embassy in the capital Chișinău. While it remains unclear whether the crash was an accident or deliberate, the incident occurred amid heightened tensions between Moldova and Russia. On 26 July, Chișinău announced that it will reduce the number of Russian diplomats to mitigate Moscow’s destabilisation campaign. On 31 July, Moldovan lawmakers passed a law prohibiting pro-Russian Șor party members from running in elections. Amid Moscow’s destabilisation campaign, the ongoing polarisation of Moldovan society will act as a flashpoint for domestic unrest risks and possible copycat incidents (if the car-ramming event was intentional), especially in the run-up to local elections planned in November when tensions will be higher. As such, embassies, including the EU mission, will remain vulnerable to collateral damage risks stemming from increased tensions.

Aug 1.

BAKHMUT: The situation around Bakhmut has not altered significantly in the last 24 hours, with Ukrainian forces continuing to concentrate offensive operations along the southern flank of the town. However, they have achieved no notable or confirmed advances over the last 24 hours. Nevertheless, Ukrainian deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar reported on 31 July that over the last week, Ukrainian forces have liberated 0.7 square miles (2 square km) around Bakhmut.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russia’s localised offensive along the Oskil-Kreminna axis continues to take advantage of the relative weakness of Ukrainian forces here, given Kyiv’s commitment to the counter-offensives in the south. However, Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on 31 July that Russian forces have had no positive results in advancing in the Lyman-Kupiansk direction. According to Ukraine’s General Staff on 1 August, Ukrainian forces are firmly holding the defence in the Kupiansk direction and successfully repulsed Russian attacks east of Berestove in Kharkiv oblast, located around 12 miles (20km) north-west of Svatove, and near Novoselivske in Luhansk oblast, situated 11 miles (18km) north-west of Svatove. Nevertheless, a Russian milblogger reported on 31 July that Russian forces continue ‘successful’ offensive operations in the direction of Svatove, claiming the average rate of advance per day is 0.6-1.2 miles (1-2km) per day. The source claimed Russian forces have captured several unspecified small villages and stated this direction, combined with pressure on Kupiansk from the north and north-west, remains the most problematic for Ukrainian forces.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: However, Ukrainian troops near Kreminna claimed on 1 August that Russian troops have only advanced about 0.3 miles (500 metres) in the past two months despite constant assaults, though this contradicts other indicators that Russian forces have made limited advances. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and milbloggers continue to report making progress on this axis, but many of these claims are likely exaggerated. Nevertheless, it remains likely that Russian forces have achieved some localised gains on this axis in recent weeks, but we cannot confirm the extent of these gains.
SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar reported on 31 July that Ukrainian forces have retaken 4.8 square miles (12.6 square km) along the southern front over the past week. However, the rate of advance has slowed in recent days. Heavy fighting continues around the village of Staromaiorske, located six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast), with conflicting Russian reporting indicating that Ukrainian forces are most likely in control of the settlement. However, Russian sources reported on 1 August that their forces are currently conducting positional battles in order to dislodge Ukrainian forces from the settlement, with fighting reportedly taking place along the T-0518 highway that sits to the east of Staromaiorske and the Mokri Yaly River. Ukrainian forces are likely attempting to increase pressure on the neighbouring village of Urozhaine, though they have made no confirmed progress in recent days. Nevertheless, the acting head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin, claimed on 1 August that Ukrainian forces are bringing up significant concentrations of forces around Staromaiorske, with further Ukrainian assaults along the Vremevsky salient likely. Further west, Ukrainian officials claimed on 31 July that Ukraine forces had made unspecified gains south of Mala Tokmachka and Robotyne, six miles (9km) and eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast) respectively.
SOUTHERN: On 1 August, the Russian MoD confirmed that Chief of the General Staff and nominal overall theatre commander in Ukraine, Valery Gerasimov, visited Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia oblast. Videos showing the general inspecting a command centre are clearly aimed at illustrating publicly that Gerasimov remains in control of the war effort, despite his low public profile since the Wagner Group mutiny essentially attempted to remove him from his command.
STRIKES: The Russian MoD reported on 1 August that anti-aircraft units repelled a Ukrainian attack on targets in Moscow and Moscow oblast – the second attack on the Russian capital in two days. The ministry said two drones were downed in suburbs west of the city centre, but said another UAV was hit by radio-electronic equipment and subsequently crashed on the territory of a complex of non-residential buildings in Moskva Citi – the business centre in the Russian capital. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated one of the drones flew into the same tower at the Moskva-Citi complex that was targeted previously. Moscow’s International Vnukovo Airport (VKO) was also briefly closed on 1 August following the drone assaults, underscoring that further disruption to operations at airports serving Moscow is likely if such attacks continue.
STRIKES: Commenting on the drone strikes against Moscow which took place on 30 July, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller reiterated that Washington DC does not encourage Ukraine to strike outside its borders. Miller nevertheless stated that how Ukraine operates during the war is ultimately Kyiv’s decision. Further attacks against the Russian capital are likely in the coming weeks as Ukraine demonstrates its capability and will to conduct longer-range assaults, though open US support for such operations will remain minimal given concerns in Washington D.C. over escalation. For further analysis on the US position and risks of escalation resulting from attacks on Moscow, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 25 May 2023.
STRIKES: Overnight on 31 July – 1 August, Russian forces attacked Kharkiv with Iranian-made Shahed drones. The UAVs reportedly hit populated areas of the city, with one damaging a college dormitory, though Russian sources maintain military infrastructure was hit. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated Russian forces attacked the city using five Shahed drones, while the city’s mayor said there were three hits. A Russian source also stated Russian troops struck targets in the city using Geran-2 kamikaze drones.
BORDERS: On 1 August, Ukrainian officials stated that a Russian ‘saboteur’ group had attempted to cross the international border into Chernihiv oblast, in northern Ukraine. Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko claimed that the attack had been repulsed, which was likely a small-scale raid designed to test Ukrainian defences. Given mounting pressure on Russian forces on the southern axis and around Bakhmut, Russian commanders are likely under significant pressure to alleviate this pressure by stepping up attacks on other sectors of the frontline, in a bid to draw off Ukrainian reserves. Such attacks are highly unlikely to present a genuine threat of major Russian advances in northern Ukraine, however, and will likely remain small-scale raids.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CHINA: On 31 July, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced new export controls on certain drones, including high-performance use commercial models and drone components. The restrictions will take effect on 1 September and last no more than two years. The measure expands the existing export controls with additional specifications such as maximum take-off weight and high-grade radio and camera equipment. Furthermore, Chinese drone exporters must submit information about the end customers and the drones’ intended use to obtain a licence. The increasing use of Chinese-made drones by both sides of the Ukraine conflict most likely prompted the restrictions from Beijing, which has been under criticism over allegations of supplying ‘dual-use’ technology to Russia. This is likely an indication that Beijing is actively seeking to reduce the risk of secondary sanctions amid allegations that Chinese equipment is being supplied to Russia. For further analysis on secondary sanctions exposure, see Sibylline Special Report – 6 July 2023.
SANCTIONS: According to an investigation published by independent media outlet Verstka on 31 July, Russia has imported USD 502m worth of Western microchips over the past six months. While goods classified as dual-use items are under a Western embargo, Russia was reportedly able to import them through back-channel routes departing from third countries. According to the investigation, 11 companies importing these items have links with Russia’s military-industrial complex. As such, according to Verstka, Western-made microchips are used in various military equipment, including missiles, drones and anti-missile systems. Russia was reportedly able to import USD 13.8m worth of dual-use items with shippers based in China and Hong Kong alone. The investigation also reported that, in addition to microchips, Russia was able to import Western aircraft components – shortages of which are posing a serious threat to Russia’s aviation sector. Ultimately, the report reinforces our assessment that despite efforts to curtail Moscow’s import of dual-use items, this continues at scale. The success of Moscow’s parallel import strategy relies on a wide network of economic partners that are reluctant to comply with Western sanctions.

FORECAST

BLACK SEA: As of 31 July, a civilian vessel has successfully arrived at Ukraine’s Izmail Danube port reportedly to load grain, in the first confirmed example of a vessel running the de facto Russian blockade. According to OSINT reports, since 30 July, at least six foreign civilian cargo ships have transited the Bosphorus towards Ukrainian ports, despite the Russian indirect blockade. The vessels kept their transit visible by maintaining their automatic identification system (AIS) despite Russian threats to consider any civilian vessel heading to Ukrainian ports as potential military targets. Four NATO aircraft patrolled and monitored the ships’ transit, which likely lowered the risk of the Russian Navy denying the ships’ passage.

The arrival of the vessels in Ukraine’s Danube port likely indicates that Russia is currently unwilling or unable to enforce a genuine blockade of Ukrainian ports. This comes despite an increased presence of surface vessels in the area, including the deployment of the corvette Sergei Kotov, within is currently operating within range of the main sea routes from the Bosphorus strait to Odesa. However, while the Black Sea Fleet is yet to conduct searches or attacks against vessels heading to these ports, they have done so against numerous vessels transiting to their own ports. The next few days will likely prove a key indicator as to whether Moscow intends to escalate and attempt to enforce a blockade by boarding vessels, or whether its act of deterrence will fail and see further commercial vessels operate in and out of Ukrainian ports despite their threats. In the meantime, however, Black Sea ports will remain highly vulnerable to Russian strikes, such as the drone strike on 24 July against a warehouse in the Ukrainian Danube port of Reni.

On 1 August, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that two patrol vessels of the Black Sea Fleet intercepted three Ukrainian sea drones 211 miles (340 km) south-west of Sevastopol. The patrol ships were far beyond Russian territorial waters, but within the claimed Crimea exclusive economic zone (EEZ). As anticipated in previous reporting, Ukraine is highly likely stepping up attacks against Russian naval vessels and naval infrastructure in a bid to undermine Moscow’s de facto blockade. Similarly, on 18 July, the Russian MoD reported that the Black Sea Fleet intercepted a number of attempted maritime drone attacks, indicating Ukraine’s increasing use of, and experimentation with, maritime drones against Russian warships. While there is no confirmation of the recent drone strikes, such incidents are a clear reflection of the re-militarisation of the north-west Black Sea as a result of the collapse of the grain deal. This in turn will sustain security threats for civilian vessels operating in the region.

Moldova: Banning of pro-Russia Șor party from elections will likely trigger moderate domestic unrest. Moldovan lawmakers passed a bill in the second and final reading on 31 July that prohibits the leaders of the pro-Russia Șor party from running in elections for up to five years. The party’s fugitive leader, Ilan Șor, previously announced intentions to create a new political bloc after the party was declared unconstitutional in June (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 26 June 2023). The party led anti-government protests earlier this year; the ban therefore seeks to curb the party’s capabilities to undermine government stability, particularly ahead of the local elections scheduled for this November and presidential elections in 2024. However, there is a realistic possibility the move will trigger low-level domestic unrest in the coming weeks, with potential demonstrations most likely to take place in the capital Chișinău, as well as the Șor strongholds of Bălți and Orhei.

Ukraine-Russia: Risks to commercial ships in Black Sea remain high despite Russian navy’s incomplete blockade. Since 30 July, at least six foreign civilian cargo ships have concluded journeys towards Ukrainian ports, despite Russia’s indirect blockade, with one vessel arriving successfully at Ukraine’s Izmail Danube port reportedly to load grain. The vessels kept their transit visible by maintaining their automatic identification system (AIS) despite Moscow’s threats to consider any civilian vessel heading to Ukrainian ports as potential military targets. The presence of NATO aircraft monitoring the ships’ transits likely lowered the risk of the Russian Navy denying the ships’ passage. The arrival of the vessels likely indicates that Russia is unwilling or unable to enforce a genuine blockade of Ukrainian ports. However, while the Russian Navy is yet to conduct searches or attacks against vessels heading to these ports, Black Sea ports will remain vulnerable to Russian strikes, such as the drone attack on 24 July against a warehouse in the Ukrainian Danube port of Reni.

Jul 31.

BAKHMUT: Ukrainian sources reported that their forces advanced slowly along Bakhmut’s southern flank over the weekend of 28-30 July. Geolocated footage published on 28 July indicated that Ukrainian forces have made limited progress towards the outskirts of Kurdyumivka, around six miles (10km) south of Bakhmut. However, heavy fighting also continues along the western outskirts of Klishchiivka, located four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut, where Ukrainian forces have slowly been gaining ground in recent weeks. Some Russian sources claim that successful Russian counter-attacks pushed Ukrainian forces out of the village itself. While we cannot confirm this claim, the western sectors of the village likely remain heavily contested.
BAKHMUT: On 28 July, the commander of Ukraine’s land forces, Oleksandr Syrsky, stated that counter-battery operations are now the priority for Ukrainian forces around Bakhmut. This mirrors the priority of Ukrainian forces along other sectors of the frontline amid the current attritional phase of the counter-offensive. However, Syrsky reported that Russian forces have concentrated a significant amount of artillery around Andriivka, Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka to the south of Bakhmut. Nevertheless, Russian forces are clearly rationing artillery on all fronts.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 30 July, Ukraine Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces are trying to gain the initiative along the Svatove-Kreminna line. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that Russian forces advanced 0.186 miles (300m) toward Novoselivske, situated 11 miles (18km) north-west of Svatove. A Russian milblogger claimed on 30 July that over the past week, Russian forces advanced five miles (8km) along the frontline and 4.5 miles (7km) in depth in the sector. However, the milblogger claimed that Russian forces were unable to take Torske, situated about nine miles (15km) west of Kreminna.
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty claimed on 29 July that the increasing concentration of Russian forces along the Oskil-Kreminna line in the Kupiansk direction signals that Moscow is preparing for a ‘major offensive’ in this sector. However, Cherevaty claimed that the Russian command had likely amassed a significant amount of under-trained personnel. As such, Russian forces are unlikely to achieve significant advances in the sector amid Ukraine’s ongoing counter-offensive, despite recent claims by the Russian MoD and milbloggers of their considerable progress along this frontline (including unconfirmed claims of Russian forces securing a bridgehead across the Zherebets River to the west of Svatove).
SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s mechanised counter-offensive effort south of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast) has slowed notably over the last few days. Russian sources claim that poor weather has contributed to a reduction in the tempo of Ukrainian offensive operations, while the Russian MoD continues to make (highly likely inflated) claims about losses of advanced Ukrainian vehicles and equipment. Russian sources are consistently pushing the narrative that the Ukrainian counter-offensive has failed. Nevertheless, while the initial attack seemingly resulted in only modest gains, fresh attempts to penetrate Russia’s fixed defences are likely in the coming days. On 31 July, Russian sources reported increased deployments of Western-equipped Ukrainian units to this section of the front, indicating likely preparations for further ground offensive operations.
SOUTHERN: Despite limited Ukrainian territorial advances, Russian forces are clearly under significant pressure along this frontline; Ukraine’s attritional strategy will possibly provide opportunities for further advances. A prominent Russian volunteer battalion commander, Alexander Khodakovsky, reported last week from the southern axis that Ukrainian forces are currently able to strike deep into Russian defensive positions; they are neutralising increasing numbers of high-ranking officers and therefore undermining Russian command and control. Additionally, Russian sources reported that unspecified Russian units conducted a tactical rotation in western Zaporizhzhia during a lull in Ukrainian ground operations on 29 July. Russian commanders have previously aired the need for exhausted Russian units along this stretch of the frontline to rotate. However, the limited details around the 29 July rotation mean we cannot confirm whether the rotation took place between units already committed to the frontline, or whether fresher units were brought in.
SOUTHERN: Further east along the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Ukrainian forces have made limited advances over the last three days. Geolocated footage indicates Ukrainian forces have taken ground north of Pryyutne, located around 11 miles (18km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). However, Ukrainian forces have enjoyed few other confirmed advances, including along the Vremevsky salient to the east. Russian officials claimed earlier on 31 July that Russian forces successfully counter-attacked against the village of Staromaiorske, located six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka. Various Russian sources are claiming they repelled Ukrainian forces out of the village (which Kyiv retook last week). However, we cannot confirm this assertion.
STRIKES: The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces carried out missile strikes against Ukraine on the evening of 28 July (Ukrainian Statehood Day). It reported that two Iskandr ballistic missiles hit a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) Building in Dnipro city (Dnipropetrovsk). On 31 July, the authorities also reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck the city of Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk). Ukraine will continue to struggle to intercept ballistic missiles due to the limited number of Western air defence systems at its disposal, including the Patriot system (which has proven to be one of the few systems that can successfully intercept ballistic missiles).
STRIKES: On 29 July, Ukraine’s defence ministry announced that its forces successfully struck the Chonhar bridge connecting Crimea to the Ukrainian southern mainland currently annexed by Russia. The bridge is a key supply route for Russian occupation forces in southern Ukraine. However, the Russian occupation authorities claim that the strikes were unsuccessful. According to Kherson oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo, Russian air defences intercepted all 12 British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles launched by Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) also claimed that Ukrainian saboteurs destroyed an ammunition depot in Kozacha Bay near Sevastopol on 28 July. While residents reported explosions, the occupying authorities alleged that they resulted from a military exercise carried out by Russian forces. Notably, very few Russian milbloggers reported on the Chonhar attack. This is a highly unusual omission which possibly shows that the Kremlin is successfully enforcing tighter censorship over war-related reporting.
STRIKES: The Russian MoD reported that three Ukrainian drones targeted the Russian capital Moscow on 30 July (Russia’s Navy Day). While the Russian MoD initially reported that its air defences intercepted all three drones, Russian media reported there were explosions in the Moskva-Citi business district. The drones reportedly damaged buildings housing offices belonging to various government bodies, including the ministries of economic development, industry and trade and digital development. Operations at Vnukovo International Airport (VKO) were also temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, underscoring the growing risks to Russian airspace around the capital.
STRIKES: Several hours following the drone attack against Moscow, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the war is ‘gradually returning’ to Russia, thus implicitly acknowledging that Kyiv was responsible for the drone strikes against the Russian capital. In addition to Zelensky’s statement, the Ukrainian MoD’s claim of responsibility for the strike against the Chonhar bridge contrasts with Kyiv’s habitual refusal to claim responsibility for strikes against Russian territory. Such claims are a key trigger for Russian retaliatory strikes in the coming days. They also indicate Kyiv’s readiness and capability to launch further drone and other attacks against Moscow – attacks which Zelensky described on 30 July as ‘inevitable’.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NUCLEAR: The former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, claimed on 30 July that Russia would need to resort to using nuclear weapons if Ukraine liberates its occupied territories. In January, Medvedev stated Russia’s hypothetical defeat would possibly trigger a nuclear war, adding that nuclear powers have never lost major conflicts on which their fate depends. The former president has made several nuclear threats throughout the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; this demonstrates that such comments are likely mostly rhetorical and only issued during periods of particularly heightened tensions. However, if Ukraine does achieve a highly successful breakthrough along the frontline in the coming weeks (especially along the southern axis) which challenges Russia’s annexation of Crimea, this will increase the risk of a nuclear escalation, as we previously assessed.
NUCLEAR: Meanwhile, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has completed the planned switch of two of its reactors’ shutdown modes. Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi reported on 29 July that Unit 5 has transitioned into ‘cold shutdown’ while Unit 4 has moved to ‘hot shutdown’. The agency stated that its experts visited Unit 5, where all equipment was reportedly in normal condition. A catastrophic nuclear incident at the plant is highly unlikely in the short term; the ZNPP’s six reactors are protected by containments, which will mitigate the release of radiation in the event of any incident. For further analysis on the difference between hot and cold shutdown modes (and the implications) see Sibylline Special Report – Ukraine – 19 July 2023.
BLACK SEA: Ukraine’s border guard service (DPSU) claimed on 28 July that it had picked up threats made by a Russian naval ship to a merchant vessel in the Black Sea. The Russian ship allegedly warned the merchant vessel that transport heading to Ukraine will be considered military cargo carriers. It also stated that the country represented by a vessel’s flag would be considered a party to the conflict in Ukraine. The DPSU named neither the ship nor the port. A senior Ukrainian official, Andriy Yermak, accused Russian warships of threatening civilians in the Black Sea on 28 July, underscoring that such actions violate all norms of international maritime law. If the intercepted threats are verified as authentic, they point to the growing risk of escalation and harassment of civilian vessels in the Black Sea. For further analysis, see Ukraine Daily Update – 20 July 2023.
ENERGY: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on 30 July that Russia is likely to recommence attacks against Ukraine’s energy system this autumn and winter, as we previously assessed. Zelensky underscored the importance of preparing for possible winter attacks both at a regional and national level and called on regional security forces and governments to draw up plans for energy emergencies. According to Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine is currently around 60% prepared for the ‘heating season’. Shmyhal added that over 9,000 miles (14,500km) of overhead power lines have been repaired (as have more than 60% of the country’s damaged thermal power plants) since the beginning of the year. Russia launched waves of missile and drone strikes in the autumn and winter of 2022-23 against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

FORECAST

WAGNER GROUP: Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on 29 July that Wagner Group personnel will possibly pose as migrants in order to cross the border from Belarus into NATO member states such as Poland and Lithuania. Since its abortive mutiny in June, the Wagner Group has steadily been deploying increasing numbers of personnel to a military camp in Tsel (Mogilev oblast) in central Belarus, as well as to western Belarus to train the Belarusian military. Morawiecki also reported that Wagner forces are deploying near Grodno, a city near the Suwalki Gap that connects Poland to Lithuania. However, the group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, stated on 31 July that it has halted its recruitment ‘indefinitely’ given it has sufficiently ‘large personnel reserves’. The Wagner Group is highly likely to be regrouping before deploying to Africa. However, it represents a destabilising force in Belarus in the meantime.

Warsaw anticipates that Wagner personnel will disguise themselves as Belarusian border guards in order to help illegal migrants cross the Polish border in a possible attempt to replicate the migrant crisis Minsk facilitated in 2021-22. Morawiecki confirmed that Belarus has already allegedly ‘pushed’ around 16,000 migrant crossing attempts along the Polish border this year. Senior Polish commissioner Stanisław Żaryn also claimed on 30 July that Belarus is providing migrants with equipment such as bolt cutters and ladders to facilitate attempts to cross the border illegally.

The private military company (PMC)’s deployment has increased the risk of further hybrid destabilisation of the Polish and Lithuanian borders. However, as we previously assessed, the group is highly unlikely to attempt to cross the border in force or to trigger a military confrontation with NATO.

Europe-Eurasia: Increased risk of cyber espionage campaigns against government, diplomatic entities by Russian APTs. On 27 July, a cyber security firm, ‘Recorded Future’, reported that the Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) group, ‘BlueBravo’ (aka ‘APT29’, ‘Nobelium’ and ‘Cozy Bear’) was targeting diplomatic entities in Eastern Europe between March and May 2023. The campaign was initiated via phishing emails that contained a new backdoor (‘GrapicalProton’) to infect end users. BlueBravo allegedly abused legitimate internet services such as Trello, Firebase and DropBox to evade detection, indicating the group’s increased use of legitimate services in operations to obfuscate malicious activity. This campaign underscores the Kremlin’s ongoing cyber espionage efforts to obtain strategic information regarding the Ukraine war as they sustain data exfiltration efforts against government and diplomatic entities in Europe. Russian APTs often target governmental departments in espionage campaigns, with BlueBravo known for its long-term espionage operation against the US Democratic National Committee in 2016. BlueBravo, along with other Russian state-sponsored APTs, will likely continue to target government and diplomatic entities in Europe, particularly those that continue to aid Ukraine, as the war persists. (Source: Sibylline)

06 Aug 23. Ukraine says U.S and German air defence systems ‘highly effective.

Summary
Companies
Zelenskiy says air defences helping Ukraine’s war effort
Russia launches more air strikes
Ukraine calls Jeddah talks productive; Russia says doomed

KYIV, Aug 6 (Reuters) – Ukraine is seeing “significant results” from U.S. and German air defence systems, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Sunday, despite waves of Russian air strikes that Kyiv says targeted civilians and residential buildings.

Russia reported it had shot down a drone heading for Moscow in the third such attack in a week, while officials on both sides said Ukraine had struck two bridges linking Crimea to the mainland.

Both countries have stepped up attacks on each other’s troops, weaponry and infrastructure supporting the war as Ukraine seeks to dislodge Russian forces that have dug in across southern and eastern Ukraine since their invasion last year.

The Moscow-appointed head of Crimea said the Chonhar bridge to the peninsula, which was annexed from Ukraine by Moscow in 2014, had been damaged by a missile strike. Another of the three road links between Crimea and Russian-occupied parts of mainland Ukraine, near the town of Henichesk, was shelled and a civilian driver wounded, a Moscow-appointed official said.

In his nightly video address on Sunday, Zelenskiy said advanced air defence systems, including the U.S.-built Patriot and Germany’s IRIS-T, were proving “highly effective” and had “already yielded significant results.”

Zelenskiy said Ukraine had shot down a significant part of Russia’s attacks over the past week, which included 65 missiles of various kinds and 178 assault drones, including 87 Shaheds.

Ukraine’s military said later that Russia had launched 30 missiles and 48 air strikes.

“Unfortunately, there are casualties and wounded among the civilian population. Residential buildings and other civilian infrastructure suffered destruction,” the military said in a statement.

The attacks followed what Zelenskiy said was a bomb attack late on Saturday on a blood transfusion centre in the town of Kupiansk, around 16 km (10 miles) from the front in the eastern Kharkiv region. He described the strike as a war crime. Reuters could not immediately verify the report.

Russia denies deliberately targeting civilians or military hospitals in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has killed thousands of people, uprooted millions and destroyed cities.

MASSIVE CASUALTIES

In Russia, Moscow’s Vnukovo airport suspended flights on Sunday, citing unspecified reasons outside its control. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said a drone had been shot down south of the capital.

Russia’s defence ministry said earlier it had conducted successful strikes on Ukrainian air bases in the western Rivne and Khmelnytskyi regions and southern Zaporizhzhia region. It said its military launched a group strike using long-range and sea-based precision weapons and all the targets had been neutralized.

The deputy governor of the Khmelnytskyi region, Serhiy Tiurin, said a military airfield in Starokostiantyniv was among the targets. He said most of the missiles were shot down, but explosions had damaged several houses, a cultural institution and the bus station, and a fire had broken out at a grain silo.

Ukraine is two months into a gruelling counteroffensive to try to push out Russian forces occupying almost a fifth of its territory.

Zelenskiy aide Mykhailo Podoliak characterised the weekend Russian missile attacks as a response to Ukraine’s overtures to Global South countries that have been reluctant to take sides in a conflict that has hurt the global economy.

Senior officials from some 40 countries including the United States, China and India held talks about the conflict in Saudi Arabia on Saturday and Sunday, but the meeting ended with no concrete action beyond a commitment to further consultations.

The meeting was part of a diplomatic push by Ukraine to build support beyond its core Western backers. Zelenskiy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, said the discussions had been very productive, but did not give details.

Russia did not attend. Its deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said the meeting reflected the West’s “doomed efforts” to mobilise developing nations behind Zelenskiy.

Additional reporting by Lidia Kelly, Anna Wlodarczak-Semczuk and Vera Eckhert; writing by Philippa Fletcher; editing by Giles Elgood, Doina Chiacu and Leslie Adler (Source: Reuters)

07 Aug 23. Ukrainians repel Russian attacks near Avdiivka under heavy aircraft strikes – General Staff report. Ukrainian defence forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka over the past day under heavy fire from Russian aircraft and artillery.

Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook, information as of 06:00 on 7 August

Details: Over the past 24 hours, the Russians launched 30 missile strikes, 52 airstrikes and 75 attacks using multiple-launch rocket systems on the positions of Ukrainian troops and civilian settlements.

Russian terrorist attacks have resulted in casualties among civilians, both dead and wounded. Residential houses and other civilian infrastructure facilities have been damaged.

A total of over 50 combat clashes took place over the past day.

On the Sivershchyna and Slobozhanshchyna fronts, the Russians launched mortar and artillery attacks on more than 35 settlements, in particular, Buchky, Hremiach and Vesele (Chernihiv Oblast); Seredyna-Buda, Sydorivka, Studenok, Basivka and Velyka Pysarivka (Sumy Oblast); and Huriv Kozachok, Strilecha, Hatyshche, Potykhonove, Odradne and Bolohivka (Kharkiv Oblast).

On the Kupiansk front, the Ukrainian Defence Forces are holding back the Russian advance east of Petropavlivka (Kharkiv Oblast). The Russians carried out airstrikes near Petropavlivka and Podoly (Kharkiv Oblast). Over 10 settlements came under Russian artillery and mortar fire, including Fyholivka, Dvorichna, Kindrashivka, Kucherivka, Kupiansk and Kyslivka (Kharkiv Oblast).

On the Lyman front, the Russian troops carried out airstrikes near Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast and Spirne and Rozdolivka in Donetsk Oblast. They shelled the settlements of Kuzmyne and Bilohorivka (Luhansk Oblast) and Torske, Verkhnokamianske, Spirne, Berestove and Rozdolivka (Donetsk Oblast).

On the Bakhmut front, the Ukrainian Defence Forces are holding back the Russian advance northeast of Dyliivka. The Russians shelled more than 15 settlements, including Vasiukivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka and Pivnichne (Donetsk Oblast).

On the Avdiivka front, Ukrainian defenders successfully repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka while under constant aircraft and artillery fire by the Russians. The Russians shelled Avdiivka and Pervomaiske in Donetsk Oblast.

On the Marinka front, the Ukrainian Defence Forces continue to hold back the offensive by Russian troops near Marinka and Krasnohorivka. The Russians carried out airstrikes near Krasnohorivka. They also shelled Krasnohorivka, Maksymilianivka, Heorhiivka, Pobieda and Novomykhailivka in Donetsk Oblast.

On the Shakhtarsk front, the Russian troops launched an airstrike near Blahodatne. The settlements of Vodiane, Vuhledar, Odradne, Blahodatne and Rivnopil (Donetsk Oblast) came under Russian artillery fire.

On the Zaporizhzhia front, the Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia Oblast). They launched airstrikes near Mala Tokmachka, Robotyne and Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The Russians shelled more than 15 settlements, including Levadne, Chervone, Zaliznychne, Pavlivka, Piatykhatky and Kamianske in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

On the Kherson front, the Russians carried out an airstrike near Olhivka in Kherson Oblast. More than 20 settlements came under Russian artillery fire, including Mykhailivka, Respublikanets, Lvove, Dniprovske, Veletenske and Novodmytrivka in Kherson Oblast.

The Ukrainian Air Force launched 10 airstrikes on clusters of Russian military personnel and 4 airstrikes on Russian anti-aircraft missile systems over the past 24 hours.

Ukrainian Rocket Forces and Artillery struck two command posts, two clusters of Russian military personnel, two artillery pieces at their firing positions and an electronic warfare station.

(Source: News Now/https://www.pravda.com.ua/)

04 Aug 23. Ukraine appears to have sunk Russian Ropucha class landing ship Olenegorski Gornjak. According to information published by the Russian MoD on August 4, 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense has reported that two naval drones attacked a naval base in Novorossiysk overnight.

Two unmanned naval drones were implicated in the incident, which was thwarted by vigilant Russian ships securing the base’s outer perimeters. The drones were spotted and subsequently neutralized, ensuring the safety of the base.

During the attack, local Russian media reported that the landing ship, “Olenegorsky Gornyak”, suffered damage. Russian authorities, however, have yet to officially confirm these reports.

In the wake of the incident, Ukrainian security services acknowledged their involvement. An unidentified insider revealed that both the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Navy orchestrated the operation.

Video evidence supplied to the media depicted a drone laden with 450 kg of explosives attacking a Russian ship. This source suggested that the “Olenegorsky Gornyak” sustained considerable damage, significantly hampering its combat capabilities. This account directly contrasts with Russia’s assertion that they successfully repelled the attack.

While the naval base bore the brunt of the attack, the nearby Caspian Pipeline Consortium, operating in the port of Novorossiysk, reported no impact on their infrastructure.

Consequently, oil shipments to docked tankers continued uninterrupted. Nevertheless, a temporary halt on all vessel movements in the Novorossiysk port was enforced as a precautionary measure.

This recent assault echoes a landmark event from the previous year. On April 14, 2022, the Russian warship Moskva, a flagship of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, tragically sunk during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials credited their forces with the ship’s demise, claiming that two R-360 Neptune anti-ship missiles triggered a fire onboard. The United States Department of Defense later validated this assertion.

The loss of the Moskva represented a significant blow to the Russian navy. It was the largest Russian warship to sink during wartime since the end of World War II and the first Russian flagship to meet such a fate since the Knyaz Suvorov in 1905, amidst the Russo-Japanese War.

In the aftermath of the Moskva incident, Russia announced that it had managed to evacuate 396 crew members, losing one sailor and reporting 27 missing.

However, additional unconfirmed reports suggested a higher casualty count. A Sevastopol court later declared at least 17 of the missing crew members dead. (Source: News Now/https://www.navyrecognition.com/)

04 Aug 23. Slovakia hands over two Zuzana 2 SPHs to Kyiv. Konštrukta-Defence handed over the first two Zuzana 2 self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) paid for by Denmark, Germany, and Norway to Ukraine on 1 August, the Slovak state joint stock company and Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on their websites later the same day. The Slovak MoD expects all 16 Zuzana 2s, worth approximately EUR92 million (USD100.6 million), to be delivered by the end of 2024.

Denmark, Germany, and Norway signed a letter of intent with Slovakia in October 2022 to fund the latter’s production of Zuzana 2 SPHs to donate to Ukraine.

Separately, Ukraine signed a commercial contract with Slovakia in June 2022 for a battery of eight Zuzana 2s, all of which have been delivered, according to the Slovak MoD.

Slovak Prime Minister Ľudovít Ódor said at the Zuzana 2 handover ceremony that Konštrukta-Defence and Ukrainian company KZVV were working on a new howitzer, with Slovakia providing the expertise and Ukraine “its extensive production capacity”. He added that the project would result in a prototype. (Source: Janes)

03 Aug 23. Iran to establish Shahed UAV production sites in Russia and Belarus. Iran intends to establish UAV factories in Russia and Belarus, extending their support for Russian invasion of Ukraine.

An Institute for the Study of War (ISW) update noted that Iran intends to establish Shahed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) production sites in Russia and Belarus to make the system more readily available to invading Russian forces against Ukraine.

According to the ISW, the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for greater defence industry co-operation between Iran and Belarus during a meeting with Belarusian Defence Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin in Tehran on 1 August.

The ISW references reports that claim that the construction of an Iranian UAV factory in Belarus would alleviate the “logistical problems” Russia faces in transporting Iranian drones from Iran to Russia via the Middle East.

Likewise, Iran will benefit with revenue for the Iranian economy. The British Secret Intelligence Service revealed in July that Iran seeks to acquire cash from Russia in return for Iranian drones. The Middle East supplier is currently facing critical economic conditions, with one US dollar equating to more than 500,000 Rials on the 1 August. Similarly, the Iran Statistical Center reported on July 25 that Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 47.5%.

Shahed-136 use in Ukraine

The Shahed UAV is a precision-attack loitering munition system, also referred to as a ‘suicide drone’, that is manufactured by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), a subsidiary of the state-owned Iran Aviation Industries Organisation.

The suicide drone has been in service with the Iranian military since 2021. Russia has been importing Shahed-136 UAVs to use in the war against Ukraine. Russia has rebranded the systems as Geran-2 or Geranium-2.

According to the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), Russian forces have likely launched at least 71 Shahed-series one-way attack UAVs against different targets across Ukraine since the beginning of March 2023.

On 2 August, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, made an address, saying: “[This] morning, we received reports from our warriors from air defence on the downing of ‘Shaheds’. There were 37 ‘Shaheds’ in total during this one night. Some of them were shot down. But only part of them. Fortunately, people were not injured. There were hits in the southern areas – Odessa region, our ports.

“We are doing our best with our partners to increase the supply of air defence systems. It is very important for the world not to get used to this Russian terror. Every hit is a common problem. Not only for Ukraine, but also for all those in the world whose stability Russia is trying to destroy by attacking our ports and infrastructure.”

Long-range weapons and aerial superiority

The Nato allies and partners have donated incremental packages of military assistance to Ukraine including various platforms and equipment, mostly land-based systems, to support the war effort. The United States alone has provided $41.3bn in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia invaded in February last year – they are the largest supplier to the wartorn country.

However, at the Chief of the Air Staff’s Air and Space Power Conference in July, the UK Minister of the Armed Forces, James Heappey, asserted that on Nato’s eastern flank, “mission success on the ground means superiority in the air.”

“The key requirement from an air perspective in this [ground-based] war is if you can provide something that will be able to keep the VKS – the Russian Aerospace Forces’ combat air – at arms length. RUSI analyst, James Bronk, affirmed. “This is a supplementary capability to the main ground-based air defence, then that is worth an enormous amount to buy out the risk of Russian air superiority at some point down the line.”

While Ukrainian F-16 pilots are being taught how to fly the sophisticated fourth-generation fighter jets in Europe, the next best thing the country has received are some long-range, air-to-land-attack Storm Shadow missiles for the UK MoD.

The warhead itself can be configured in blast or penetration function, thus is able to be used against fortifications. Although the range is officially listed by MBDA as being 250km+, it is typical for western defence companies to play down exact capabilities, with the actual maximum range likely to be significantly further.

(Source: army-technology.com)

04 Aug 23. For two months, Ukrainian forces have been on the offensive, trying to break through Russian defence lines to begin the liberation of the occupied territories. The fighting has been difficult and progress has been incremental. But over time, the Ukrainians have been securing the advantage. The question now is whether they can push Russian forces to breaking point. After wasting thousands of troops in a failed spring offensive, the Russian military fell back to around 45km of defensive positions, stretching across the southern front from Zaporizhzhia through Donetsk, to prevent Ukrainian troops advancing towards the strategic, Russian-held city of Melitopol. The so-called Surovikin Line, named after a Russian general, comprises three lines of hardened trenches, each screened by dense minefields, anti-tank ditches, tank traps and wire entanglements. In front of these, Russian fighting positions are bolstered by anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Since the start of the offensive in early June, Moscow has adopted new tactics. Russian forces allow Ukrainians to enter the minefields and then aggressively counterattack, often with tanks and anti-tank guided weapons on the flanks. Once Ukrainian vehicles are knocked out, the Russians deploy mortars and artillery against the infantry. If Kyiv’s forces get across the minefields and into the trenches, the Russians often abandon their fighting positions and detonate prepositioned charges to kill the first wave of attackers. After attempts to breach the minefields using explosives led to heavy Ukrainian casualties, Kyiv has adapted its tactics, infiltrating Russian positions to confuse the defenders and strike from the flanks, before attempting breaches. These methods have reduced Ukrainian losses, but the necessary planning and reconnaissance makes this a slow process, in which the Ukrainians fight for 700m at a time. This gives their opponents the chance to reset. But accelerating the process leads to an unacceptable rate of equipment loss. For the Ukrainians, the key is to manage their equipment, such as vehicles, to exploit a breach once it has been made. As well as assaulting Russian positions, since early June Kyiv has also used precision missiles provided by its partners to destroy counter-battery radar. Without them, Moscow has found itself outranged and unable to locate Ukrainian artillery.

Kyiv’s forces, by contrast, have become adept at locating Russian guns and destroying them with precision shells. This systematic erosion of Russian artillery has been a turning point: for the first time in the war, Ukrainian howitzers can deliver sustained fire on to Russian positions. It also means that Moscow — while still destroying Ukrainian vehicles in the minefields — has less artillery power to kill the infantry that emerge from them. As a result, Ukrainian troops are succeeding in taking Russian positions, even when their vehicles are caught in the open. In response, Moscow has had to be more aggressive with its own armoured vehicles. This has inflicted heavy casualties on Ukrainians, but deploying such vehicles close to the front has left them vulnerable. During the day, dozens of Ukrainian drones surveil the battlespace, filming and identifying targets. At night, these units send repurposed agricultural drones carrying rocket-propelled grenades to hunt for Russian armour. The attrition of critical equipment is important for Kyiv both tactically and operationally. Ukraine has been using Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by the UK to hit command posts, ammunition depots and bridges behind Russian lines. Together, the destruction of artillery, armour, radars and the loss of supplies are leaving Moscow’s infantry with diminishing support. However, Russian units continue to fight hard and Ukraine’s own equipment losses remain high. Kyiv’s forces are struggling with persistent Russian attack helicopters, which sit 8km to 10km from the front at low altitude, safe from air defences, and fire anti-tank missiles at Ukrainian vehicles. The question is which side can sustain the current rate of attrition. On the southern front, Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army has borne the brunt of the fighting. About a quarter of the force is in the fighting positions at any one time and the Russians have had to rotate troops. They have few reserves. Ukraine, meanwhile, has fed additional units from the 10th Corps into the fight, keeping up the pressure. At some point, Russia’s infantry might be spread too thin and, with insufficient artillery and armoured support the defence could crumble. Dry weather will allow Ukraine to continue its push until the beginning of November. This will be a critical point: from then on, progress will depend on which side has made better preparations for winter fighting. The stakes are high for Kyiv. If it breaks through it could liberate significant amounts of territory and force Russia to surge new units into Ukraine before they have finished training. Conversely, if Ukraine fails to breach the Surovikin Line then Russia can keep new units back, train and prepare them, and regain the initiative. Either way, Kyiv will need ongoing international assistance. But by autumn, the trajectory of the conflict will be clear. The writer is senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute think-tank and has worked extensively in Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion. (Source: FT.com)

04 Aug 23. Ukraine attacked the oil export infrastructure that helps fund Moscow’s invasion for the first time on Friday, using a drone strike to damage a Russian naval vessel outside the port of Novorossiysk. Ukraine’s security services, in collaboration with the country’s navy, carried out the sea drone strikes outside the port, according to two Ukrainian sources with knowledge of the operation. Novorossiysk is a major navy base and oil-exporting port located east of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Videos posted on social media, which could not be verified, showed a naval vessel tilted to its side being towed by tug boats back to port. Separate videos released by Ukraine’s armed forces showed footage from a camera mounted on a sea drone as it approached a vessel at night. “As a result of a drone attack in Novorossiysk Bay, the large amphibious ship Olenegorsky Gornyak was damaged,” said Serhiy Bratchuk, a spokesperson for military administration in the Ukrainian port of Odesa, in a social media post. The attack follows a series of Russian strikes on Ukraine’s grain export infrastructure in recent weeks, raising the spectre of escalating reprisals as the countries target each other’s main sources of export income. Moscow moved to reimpose its full naval blockade of Ukrainian ports this summer after it withdrew from a UN-brokered grain export agreement that allowed shipments despite the war. While the US has broadly tolerated Ukrainian strikes on Russian soil, as long as they do not utilise western-supplied weapons, the attack on oil export infrastructure is likely to cause concern in the White House and other western capitals. The US has led the push to keep Russian oil in the market to stop global prices from rising and damaging the world economy, with President Joe Biden’s administration wanting pump prices to remain stable ahead of next year’s presidential election. Novorossiysk is Russia’s main Black Sea oil port, exporting about 600,000 barrels a day. It is also the main export point for oil from Kazakhstan, with the 1.2mn b/d line from the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminating there.

The CPC, in which US oil major Chevron holds a stake, said a “temporary ban” on ship movements had been introduced at the port, but that tankers at berth continued to load. It added there was “no damage” to the pipeline’s infrastructure. Russia has claimed their forces repelled Friday’s attack. “Tonight, the armed forces of Ukraine attempted to attack the Novorossiysk naval base with two unmanned boats,” Russia’s defence ministry said in a statement. “In the course of repulsing the attack, unmanned boats were visually detected and destroyed by fire from the standard weapons of Russian ships guarding the outer ring of the naval base,” the statement added. Andrei Kravchenko, the mayor of Novorossiysk, said that “the crews of the Olenegorsky Gornyak and Suvorovets ships reacted instantaneously and helped avert the consequences of an attack by drone boats”. There were no casualties or destruction as a result of the attacks, Russia’s Interfax news agency reported, citing the governor of the wider region. Oil prices have risen almost 15 per cent in the past month to nearly $85 a barrel, but the market reaction to the attack was relatively muted on Friday, with Brent crude edging up 0.5 per cent to $85.50 a barrel. Ukraine has — without directly claiming credit — conducted sea and aerial strikes on military targets in or near Crimea as well as on Russian soil since President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion last year. Ukraine previously used surface-to-sea missiles to sink the Moskva, the flagship cruiser of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, last year off the Crimean coast. Moscow has also been hit by a series of drone attacks in the past week, including two that struck its central business district. Russia’s defence ministry said on Friday that Ukraine had also conducted aerial drone attacks in Crimea, but there had been no casualties. Ten drones were destroyed by air defences and three more had been “suppressed by electronic warfare”, it added. (Source: FT.com)

04 Aug 23. Russia’s defence minister used a recent visit to Pyongyang to request an increase in North Korean arms supplies, the White House said on Thursday. Sergei Shoigu vowed to strengthen military ties with North Korea on a visit to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean war armistice last week, during which he attended a military parade and a weapons exhibition. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters in Washington that Shoigu had travelled to North Korea to try to convince Pyongyang to sell munitions to Russia. “Our information indicates that Russia is seeking to increase military co-operation with [North Korea], such as through [North Korea’s] sale of artillery munitions . . . to Russia,” said Kirby, noting that any arms deal between the two countries would violate a series of UN Security Council resolutions. “This is yet another example of how desperate Mr Putin has become because his war machine is being affected by the sanctions and the export controls,” Kirby added. “He is going through a vast amount of inventory to try to subjugate Ukraine, and he’s reaching out to countries like North Korea, like Iran, and certainly he’s been trying to reach out to China to get support for his war machine.” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has energetically courted favour with Russian president Vladimir Putin since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, with each offering the other material aid and political backing. Russia has stepped up shipments of grain to North Korea this year amid widespread reports of food shortages after Kim sealed the country’s borders in response to the coronavirus pandemic. In November, the eastern Russian region of Primorsky Krai announced that rail trade between the two countries had commenced for the first time in three years. During his visit, Shoigu relayed a message from Putin thanking Kim for North Korea’s “unwavering support” for Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Kim also gave the Russian defence minister a personal tour of a large exhibition of North Korean weapons in Pyongyang. They included new surveillance and combat drone designs and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Military analysts note that North Korea possesses short-range ballistic missiles that resemble Russia’s Iskander missiles, which the Russian armed forces have used extensively in Ukraine. According to an analysis by Seoul-based media outlet NK News, a Russian military plane made an unannounced visit to Pyongyang on Tuesday and Wednesday, a week after Shoigu was in North Korea. The plane, a Russian Air Force II-62M, is used for high-level military delegations. Analysts noted satellite imagery suggesting that the North Korean weapons exhibition was still going on at the time. In June, the US said North Korea had already completed a delivery of infantry rockets and missiles to Kremlin-linked private military company Wagner Group. The Financial Times reported last week that Ukrainian artillery crews had also been firing rockets made in North Korea against Russian positions. The North Korean arms were used by troops operating Soviet-era Grad multiple-launch rocket systems near the devastated city of Bakhmut. Recommended Taiwan US to provide Taiwan with weapons from its stockpiles for first time On Friday, North Korea strongly criticised a US decision to provide Taiwan with $345mn in weapons. The military aid package, which marks the first time the Pentagon will send arms directly to the country to boost its defences, was described by a North Korean foreign ministry official as a “dangerous political and military provocation”. “It is the sinister intention of the US to turn Taiwan into an unsinkable advanced base against China and the first-line trench for carrying out its strategy for deterring China,” the official added, according to a statement released by North Korea’s state news agency. (Source: FT.com)

03 Aug 23. Dozens of countries will take part in a Saudi-hosted conference beginning on Friday that aims to sway developing countries to support a Ukrainian peace plan and its demands that Russia withdraw troops from its territory. The conference of national security advisers, which will run until Sunday, follows a similar meeting in Copenhagen, as Ukraine increases its efforts to engage key developing countries in isolating Moscow internationally ahead of a planned “peace summit” that Kyiv is pushing to arrange before the end of the year. “The value [of the summits] is actually trying to nudge the Global South countries and ourselves to find some basic agreements around which the global peace summit could then be organised,” said a senior European Commission official who requested anonymity to preview the meeting. “If we can agree on a date for the global peace summit led by the Ukrainians, plus a statement of the basic principles, that would be what I‘d define a success,” the person added. Dozens of countries, many of them developing nations that have been reluctant to condemn Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have been invited to the conference in Jeddah, where national security adviser Jake Sullivan will represent the US. China, which has maintained close links with Russia while warning against further escalation, has been invited but it was unclear whether it would attend, after skipping the Copenhagen meeting. Beijing’s attendance would be a victory for both the Ukrainians and the Saudis, who have maintained close ties with Opec+ partner Russia while hosting Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and sending financial aid to Kyiv. Russia has not been invited to the Jeddah gathering. Saudi Arabia has mediated prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine and has sought to establish itself diplomatically on the global stage. Ihor Zhovkva, Zelenskyy’s deputy head of administration, was optimistic that Ukraine would be able to convince developing countries to sign up to Kyiv’s peace plan, which will demand a Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territories and the setting-up of a tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes. “We’re involving additional countries of the Global South,” Zhovkva wrote in a Facebook post, adding that holding the summit in the Middle East “completely destroys Russia’s narrative about the support of Ukraine exclusively by western countries”. But Ukraine has struggled to court states with longstanding ties to Russia in a conflict that many developing countries view as a struggle between a US-led Nato and Russia.

“The focus is on engagement and outreach,” said a senior official from an EU member state. Officials from the Ukrainian presidency and foreign ministry met developing world experts in Poland last month as they sought ideas of how to improve engagement with Africa, Asia and Latin America. “There have been growing efforts to improve Ukraine’s diplomatic engagement and communications strategy in countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic region,” according to an agenda of the meeting in Warsaw seen by the Financial Times. “Unfortunately, these efforts suffered from a lack of solid co-ordination mechanisms or measurable targets.” The countries targeted in that conference were India, Indonesia, Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil. India, which will attend this weekend’s talks and which relies heavily on Russian oil, has made some gestures of support towards Ukraine but remains mostly neutral. “There’s a question here about turning a very large tanker around, and I’m not sure the captain of the tanker wants to turn that ship around,” said a person familiar with the discussions. Ukraine’s efforts have also faced scepticism in several African countries. “A lot of African countries think this is not their war and [that they] should not be involved,” said a senior Ukrainian diplomat in Africa. One participant in the Warsaw conference said they had advised Kyiv to split international resolutions on Russia’s invasion into two parts, so that developing nations could vote in favour of condemning the invasion without having to sign up to punitive measures against Moscow. “The Ukrainians couldn’t understand why we weren’t against Russia. But we’re not like eastern Europe, we don’t define our existence through opposition to Russia,” the person said.(Source: FT.com)

04 Aug 23. Ukraine strikes Black Sea naval base. Ukraine attacked a Russian naval base in Novorossiysk with two maritime drones last night, the Kremlin has said.

Russia’s defence ministry reported: “The unmanned boats were detected and destroyed by fire from the standard weapons of Russian ships guarding the outer harbour of the naval base.”

The strike did not cause any damage or casualties, according to Veniamin Kondratyev, governor of South Russia’s Krasnodar region.

Social media users heard explosions and gunfire near Novorossiysk this morning. If confirmed it would be the first Ukrainian attack on one of Russia’s main commercial ports.

Reports indicate the Black Sea port, a major hub for Russian exports, was forced to halt all ship movement.

It comes after repeated Russian attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, including Odesa, which targeted grain terminals. Kyiv has not claimed credit for the strike.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

03 Aug 23. Germany to Provide Ukraine with RQ-35 Heidrun Drones. According to information released by the German Chancellor’s Office, Germany will supply a large batch of RQ-35 Heidrun reconnaissance drones to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The RQ-35 Heidrun unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is designed for conducting low-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. It is produced by the Danish drone maker, Sky-Watch company. An unspecified number of these drones were delivered to Ukraine by the government of Denmark in 2022, allowing the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s drone operators to become familiar with the equipment.

Reports from the Ukrainian army indicate that the RQ-35 Heidrun has shown high effectiveness in real combat scenarios. However, based on experiences gathered during operations, engineers from Sky-Watch company have implemented several technical improvements into the UAV.

“Based on our experiences from Ukraine, our skilled engineers have configured the RQ-35 Heidrun to be highly EW resistant and capable of flying in GNSS denied airspace,” the company said on its website.

The German government has not provided any additional details regarding the future deliveries of RQ-35 Heidrun to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

However, the well-recognized and trusted German website, Soldat und Technik, reports that the drones will be delivered to Ukraine by the German defence company, Dynamit Nobel Defence (DND). The website states that DND has established a strategic partnership with the Danish company Sky-Watch.

The cooperation between the two companies aims to integrate the RQ-35 Heidrun drone with DND-developed sensor-to-shooter digital technologies. Furthermore, DND will play the role of a distribution partner for Sky-Watch. (Source: UAS VISION/ Defence Industry Europe)

02 Aug 23. Poland accuses Ukraine of lack of gratitude for support in war. A Polish official has accused Ukraine of a lack of gratitude for support during the war, sparking a bitter diplomatic row between the two neighbours and allies.

The spat erupted earlier this week when Marcin Przydacz, a Polish presidential aide, called on Kyiv to “appreciate the role Poland has played for Ukraine in recent months and years”.

Warsaw is among Ukraine’s staunchest allies as Kyiv fights off Russia’s invasion. But tensions between the pair have grown after Poland opposed Ukrainian grain imports that had been triggering protests from local farmers.

Mr Przydacz’s remarks prompted fury in Ukraine, which on Tuesday described them as “unacceptable” and summoned the Polish ambassador.

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Poland on Wednesday reciprocated by summoning Ukraine’s envoy in Warsaw, Vasyl Zvarych, to the foreign ministry.

It later said his deputy would be hosted instead as Mr Zvarych is currently in Kyiv.

Poland a ‘real shield of Europe’

Mateusz Morawiecki, Poland’s prime minister, had a day earlier lamented Kyiv’s decision to summon his country’s ambassador.

“In the face of the ongoing war and taking into account the enormous support Poland has given Ukraine, such mistakes should not happen,” he said.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, meanwhile sought to defuse the crisis as he lauded Poland for acting as a “real shield of Europe – from sea to sea”.

“We will not let any political affairs spoil the relations between the Ukrainian and the Polish people, and emotions will definitely go down,” said Mr Zelensky, who has developed close ties with his Polish counterpart during the course of the war.

But Pawel Jablonski, Poland’s deputy foreign minister, told the RMF FM radio station on Wednesday that diplomats would air their grievances to Mr Zvarych’s deputy and described relations between the two countries as “not at their best”.

He also defended Warsaw’s decision to seek an EU extension to a ban on imports of Ukrainian grain that is set to expire next month. (Source: Defence Connect)

02 Aug 23. EOS confirms first Slinger exports to Ukraine. Australian-made 30mm weapon systems are being sent to Ukraine as part of a US security assistance package announced earlier this year.

Three “Slinger” light-weight 30mm cannon system, made by Canberra-based Electro Optic Systems Defence Systems, have been ordered for use on “30mm gun trucks” announced by the US Department of Defense earlier this year on 4 April.

Each “Slinger” contains a radar, 30mm stabilised cannon with proximity-fuse, hi-explosive or armour-piercing ammunition designed for tracking and drone engagement at a range of more than 800 metres.

The Ukraine version will be used in coordination with Northrop Grumman’s M-ACE (mobile – acquisition, cueing and effector) system.

EOS Defence Systems executive vice-president Matthew Jones, responsible for defence systems in Australia, the US and Singapore, said the weapon system could be mounted on a heavy 4×4 for operation or for unmanned ground vehicle configuration.

“The Slingers have been contracted by Northrop Grumman, we received a purchase order for three systems, and there’ll be more to follow after the first three. The Slinger configured systems use a M230LF light-weight 30mm cannon … with single-shot engagement beyond 800 metres,” he said.

“We’ve been in trials with Northrop Grumman on this particular capability for actually a couple of years, and this will be their first export sale of the Slinger capability.

“The configuration that we’re delivering under this contract is a manned vehicle, a four-by-four US truck mounted configuration with the operator operating the system from within the cab, and the system mounted on the back in the tray.” (Source: Defence Connect)

03 Aug 23. Ukraine says Russians fail to advance but are well dug in. Russian forces have made no headway along the front lines, but are entrenched in heavily mined areas they control, making it difficult for Ukrainian troops to move east and south, Ukrainian officials said on Wednesday. Russian accounts of the fighting on the frontline said 12 Ukrainian attacks had been repelled in Donetsk region – a focal point of Russian advances for months.

Much of Russian military activity focused on air attacks that damaged grain infrastructure in Ukraine’s Danube port of Izmail. Russia’s Defence Ministry also said its forces had destroyed a Ukrainian naval drone that tried to attack a Russian warship escorting a civilian vessel in the Black Sea.

Ukrainian forces launched a drive in June to retake occupied areas and have been pressing southward toward the Sea of Azov to sever a land bridge between occupied eastern Ukraine and the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula.

Kyiv also says it has retaken areas near Bakhmut, an eastern city seized by Russian forces in May after months of battles.

Deputy Ukrainian Defence Minister Hanna Maliar said Russian forces had “tried quite persistently to halt our advance in the Bakhmut sector. Without success.”

Russian forces, she wrote on the Telegram messaging app, were beefing up reserves and equipment in three areas further north, where heavy fighting has also been reported in recent weeks.

Oleksiy Danilov, the Secretary of Ukraine’s Security Council, said Russian forces had ample time in months of occupation to prepare defences and lay extensive minefields.

“The enemy has prepared very thoroughly for these events,” he told national television. “The number of mines on the territory that our troops have retaken is utterly mad. On average, there are three, four, five mines per square metre.”Danilov restated assertions by President Volodymyr Zeleskiy that the advances, while slower than hoped, could not be rushed as human lives were at stake.

“No one can set deadlines for us, except ourselves… there is no fixed schedule,” he said. “I have never used the term counter-offensive. There are military operations and they are complex difficult and depend on many factors.”

Russia’s Defence Minister, in its account of the fighting,

said Ukrainian forces had made unsuccessful attempts to advance in several sectors in both southern and northern parts of Donetsk region.

It also said Russian forces had launched strikes on towns around Bakhmut, including Kurdyumovka on the city’s southern fringes and Chasiv Yar, the first major town to the west. (Source: Reuters)

02 Aug 23. Russia hands out weapons to civilian defence forces near Ukrainian border. Russian local authorities have begun distributing machine guns and drone defence guns, as well as UAZ off-road vehicles, to territorial self-defence forces in the Belgorod region that borders Ukraine, the state news agency Tass reported. This is the first case of weapons being distributed to the civilian forces since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

“These are necessary measures against the attacks from the Ukrainian territory,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Wednesday. He added that the Kremlin does not fear that the weapons could fall “into the wrong hands”.

“All control mechanisms must be carefully implemented. There is no doubt about that,” Peskov said. (Source: FT.com)

01 Aug 23. Unmanned ground vehicles to see combat in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have announced plans to develop and deploy unmanned ground vehicles in the Ukraine War. The country will prioritise the creation of unmanned logistics platforms for the evacuation of injured troops and delivery of provisions or ammunition to high-risk conflict areas, according to Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Volodymyr Gavrylov.

Development of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) capable of carrying weapon systems would be given secondary priority, Minister Gavrylov said, speaking at a press conference with Ukrainian publisher Industrial Portal.

Such combat-style UGVs could carry automatic grenade launchers, machine guns or anti-tank weapons and be controlled by operators to hit targets from ambushes or from artificial cover.

Development of stationary ground vehicles armed with machine guns or optical stations for defensive purposes will also be considered as a third priority, Minister Gavrylov said. Such systems would be immobile but would be controlled by an operator from a different location.

Late last year, autonomous systems manufacturer Milrem Robotics and German firm Krauss-Maffei Wegmann were contracted by the German Ministry of Defence to deliver 14 THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles to Ukraine.

The country has also reportedly tested domestically produced RSVK-M2 HUNTER unmanned ground vehicles in eastern Ukraine. (Source: Defence Connect)

02 Aug 23. Russia war latest: Russia ‘sets fire’ to grain storage in Odesa. Russia set fire to some grain storage facilities in Odesa, as it launched an attack on the southern coastal region, Ukrainian officials said. Russian drones attacked and damaged port and grain storage facilities.

Odesa governor Oleh Kiper said: “There were no reports of casualties.”

“Unfortunately, there are damages,” President Volodymyr Zelensky said.

“The most significant ones are in the south of the country. Russian terrorists have once again attacked ports, grain, global food security.”

Moscow has ratcheted up its attacks Ukrainian agricultural and port infrastructure after refusing to extend the Black Sea grain deal that had allowed for exports of Ukrainian grain. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

02 Aug 23. Central Europe’s arms makers scramble for workers as Ukraine boosts business. From building apartments for new employees to offering retired workers free canteen meals to share their expertise, Central Europe’s arms manufacturers are scrambling for new ways to cope with the biggest boom since the end of the Cold War.

Facing some of the tightest labour markets in Europe, weapons makers in Poland and the Czech Republic are launching or expanding programs to recruit and train new workers after the Ukraine war drove a spike in demand for their productions.

Central Europe’s arms industry has been churning out guns, shells and other military supplies at the fastest pace since the fall of the Berlin Wall as companies accelerate production to supply Ukraine and feed demand globally as countries boost defense spending.

Take Czech ammunition and artillery shell producer STV Group. It has agreed with the city closest to its biggest plant in Policka, some 200 kilometres (125 miles) southeast of Prague, to build company-financed apartments for new hires, the company’s chairman David Hac told Reuters.

The company has also begun offering retired workers meals at the canteen so they can share knowledge of recently re-started lines producing Soviet-era ammunition for Ukraine, he added.

“This informal exchange of ideas has excellent and immediate effects on the efficiency of production processes, especially when you are restarting production of products that have been out of production for a long time,” Hac said.

The Czech Republic and Poland boast among the lowest unemployment rates in the European Union at 2.7% for June, well below the EU average jobless figure of 5.9% for the same period, according to Eurostat data.

Jiri Hynek, president and executive director of the Defence and Security Industry Association (DSIA) of the Czech Republic, told Reuters a lack of workers could push production out of central Europe. With enough labor and materials, Czech companies could boost production by up to 20 percent, he estimated.

The association, which represents more than 160 companies, said exports accounted for around 90 percent of the industry’s production of weapons and military-related supplies.

Of that, Hynek estimated that supplies of military equipment to Ukraine accounted for 40% of exports.

As demand grows, the need for younger workers with technical skills will only intensify for an industry that depends on innovation to keep growing, Hynek added.

“We have an ageing population, ageing researchers, developers, innovators, and technical and natural sciences (departments) producing an absolute lack of people to use,” Hynek said. “We need growth but we have nowhere to take workers from.”

KEY WEAPONS PIPELINE

Czech explosives maker Explosia – which employs around 600 workers and posted a record 1.2bn crowns ($55m) in revenue last year – told Reuters it is expanding cooperation with local universities and speeding automation to offset a lack of workers at the company, which is known for producing the plastic explosive Semtex.

Polish military technology company WB Group started hiring women last year on a larger scale on assembly lines previously comprising mostly male workers. The company – which employs more than 2,000 staff and generated 602m zloty ($150m) in revenue last year – produces unmanned drones and missile systems.

“With the increase in orders we had to change the production system,” the company’s spokesman told Reuters.

Central Europe represents an important pipeline for Ukraine’s military. Of the 29 states that supplied major weapons in 2022, Poland and the Czech Republic accounted for more than 20 percent of the total Ukrainian arms imports by volume, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The Czech government said that – including weapons supplied from its own stores – the country sent military supplies worth 40bn Czech crowns ($1.84bn) to Ukraine in the first 12 months of the war. That included 89 tanks, 226 armored vehicles, 38 howitzers along with air defense systems, helicopters, ammunition and rockets, it said.

The Czech defense ministry told Reuters, without providing specific details, that the strongest demand from Ukraine was now for large-calibre ammunition for Soviet-era weapons along with western standard artillery, rocket propelled grenades, and tank ammunition.

The government has also started discussions about employing some of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees – most of whom are women and children – living in the country to help companies struggling to find workers, the defense ministry said.

PITCHING PATRIOTISM

Other sectors in Poland – emerging Europe’s biggest economy – and the Czech Republic have struggled in recent years to find workers: a situation that has driven up labor costs and dampened growth.

But the issue is a new one for the arms industry, where the workforce shrank in the wake of the Communist era.

Between the mid-1980s and 2000, employment in Poland’s arms industry fell by 76 percent, according data cited by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

“Of course, you need raw materials and supplies but the lack of skilled workers is now the main problem hampering the expansion of production,” Czech independent defense analyst Lukas Visingr told Reuters.

Poland’s state-owned PGZ – which controls dozens of companies making supplies that include weapons, ammunition, armoured transporters and unmanned air systems – is targeting employees in a wide range of industries using social media ads, the group’s head of human resources, Artur Zaborek, told Reuters.

The company – which employs more than 18,000 people – also plans a campaign next year aimed at convincing Poles employed in Scandinavian shipyards to return home to work on new contracts to build ships for Poland’s navy using ads that highlight the opportunity to boost national defense and work closer to home, Zaborek said.

“The geopolitical situation has led to the largest armaments projects in history for the group, which means demand for skilled workers has increased dramatically,” Zaborek said. ($1 = 21.7920 Czech crowns) ($1 = 4.0241 zlotys) (Source: Reuters)

31 Jul 23. Ukraine signs agreement with Turkish company on drones repair. Ukraine’s defence ministry signed an agreement with Turkish company Baykar Makina to build a service centre for the repair and maintenance of drones in Ukraine, the ministry said on Monday. Ukraine is seeking to boost domestic production of drones to build an “Army of Drones” in its fight against Russian forces who invaded the country in February 2022.

The ministry’s state secretary Kostiantyn Vashchenko was quoted by the ministry website as telling Turkish partners: “The creation of a service centre will be a significant contribution to strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities and will help bring our victory closer.”

Ukrainian producers have sharply increased domestic drone production. More than 10,000 drone operators have been trained with 10,000 more in training, Mykhailo Fedorov, a deputy prime minister in charge of the “Army of Drones” said last week.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have used a wide array of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, for reconnaissance and assault purposes during the war.

Ukrainian media reported earlier this month, citing Ukraine’s minister of strategic industries Oleksandr Kamyshin, that Baykar has started the construction of a plant to manufacture Bayraktar drones in Ukraine. (Source: Reuters)

31 Jul 23. The Biden administration is seeking to increase stretched supplies of crucial munitions for Ukraine to support the counteroffensive against Russian occupying forces. The weapons effort is focused on delivering more 155mm calibre shells used in the howitzers Ukraine is deploying along the front line, officials said, and includes supplies from international allies in the short term and plans to ramp up US production in the next two years. “I personally sit in my office every morning and spend 30 minutes on 155[mm] ammunition,” US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said last month at the Aspen Security Forum. Officials said the Biden administration had been aware for months that Ukraine’s high burn-rate of munitions would begin to stretch supplies and had stepped up efforts to get the shells to the front line as the war entered a crucial phase. European supplies have also become stretched, and the Financial Times reported last week that Ukraine had begun firing rockets made in North Korea. “We are actively working as rapidly as possible to build out the production lines for 155,” Sullivan said. “We do not want to lose a day and there is not a tool, authority or dollar that we’re going to set on the sidelines to not being able to do that.” The US has already struck deals with Bulgaria and South Korea to supply the shells to Ukraine and is in talks with Japan to do the same, officials said. But a US Army effort to increase monthly output of the crucial munitions to 90,000 will take until 2025, highlighting the challenge of ramping up such production quickly, particularly when the US had not previously been focused on it. “Prior to the Ukraine spin-up, most of the army’s focus was on building out new tank munitions,” said Retired Brig. Gen. Guy Walsh, executive vice-president at the National Defense Industrial Association. Recommended Alexander Gabuev Putin is looking for a bigger war, not an off-ramp, in Ukraine The Pentagon has asked to buy only about 790,000 155mm rounds over the past 10 years, mostly for use in training exercises.

That suggests the US has already given Ukraine more than the quantity it procured in 155mm purchases over the past decade, according to a report by the Center for a New American Security think-tank in Washington. Compounding the effort to ramp up production was a US decision to downsize its defence industrial base after the cold war. “We did not anticipate or prepare for a long war and the industrial base was constrained for efficiency,” said Mark Cancian, senior adviser at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies The munitions effort by the US and its allies comes as Ukraine intensifies its weeks-old counteroffensive in the south and east of the country. On Thursday and Friday, Kyiv said it had recaptured Staromaiorske, a village in south-eastern Donetsk region that had been under Russian occupation since early in the full-scale invasion. Artillery warfare has dominated much of the fighting on the front line, with both sides firing thousands of shells each day. The dearth of US supplies of 155mn shells to support the current push was an important driver behind President Joe Biden’s controversial decision last month to authorise shipments of cluster munitions to Ukraine. The decision “helped ensure that Ukraine has the ammunition it needs and that they would not run out”, one US official said. “We’re at the point where they’re supplying Ukraine at the level they can, and they’ve given them as much as they can, while keeping the reserves that they think are important to have in case there were an unforeseen crisis,” said Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the Defence Program at CNAS. Ukrainian leaders have continually called on western allies to increase weapons supply, from air defence systems to fighter jets, as the country comes under pressure from international partners to speed up the counteroffensive. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, said last week that the effort got off to a slower start than hoped because “we had not enough munitions and armaments and not enough brigades properly trained in these weapons”. The US and its international allies have so far trained 66,000 Ukrainian forces, according to Col. Martin O’Donnell, spokesman for US Army Europe and Africa. The US has committed more than $43bn in lethal assistance, including 198 155mm Howitzers as well as more than 2mn rounds for them. “Ukraine is well prepared and well trained to be successful,” US defence secretary Lloyd Austin said last week. But that has not diminished the need for the 155mn shells — the large steel bullets filled with explosives that weigh approximately 100 pounds and are fired from howitzer artillery systems, including American-made M777 and M109 weapons provided to Kyiv. Ukraine is currently firing up to 8,000 rounds of artillery a day, a much larger quantity than the US would fire, according to American officials. “As the front lines stabilise, the importance of artillery increases,” Cancian said. “The surprise has been how important just regular artillery shells are.” The US is now also working to ramp up supply of the shells, with a target of producing up to 90,000 a month by fiscal year 2025, according to the US Army, compared with 24,000 now and 14,000 per month before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, production takes place mainly at four government-owned, contractor-operated sites in Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia and Iowa. A report by CNAS described the effort as “a lean production process with multiple bottlenecks”. The US Army is building more production lines, including retooling a facility in Ontario, Canada, and erecting a new assembly line in Texas. Army officials have said they may also establish new facilities to load, assemble and pack 155mm shells in Arkansas, Iowa and Kansas. “President Biden has said he is committed to supporting Ukraine as long as it takes,” the US National Security Council said. (Source: FT.com)

01 Aug 23. Iran Helping Russia Build Drone Stockpile ‘Orders of Magnitude Larger’ than Before. US intelligence officials have warned that Russia is building a drone-manufacturing facility in country with Iran’s help that could have a significant impact on the war in Ukraine once it is completed. Analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency told a small group of reporters during a briefing on Friday that the drone-manufacturing facility now under construction is expected to provide Russia with a new drone stockpile that is “orders of magnitude larger” than what it has been able to procure from Iran to date.

When the facility is completed, likely by early next year, the new drones could have a significant impact on the conflict, the analysts warned. In April, the US released a satellite image of the planned location of the purported drone manufacturing plant, inside Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone about 600 miles east of Moscow. The analysts said Iran has regularly been ferrying equipment to Russia to help with the facility’s construction.

They added that to date, it is believed that Iran has provided Russia with over 400 Shahed 131, 136 and Mohajer drones – a stockpile that Russia has almost completely depleted, they said.

Russia is primarily using the drones to attack critical Ukrainian infrastructure and stretch Ukraine’s air defenses, a senior DIA official said. Iran has been using the Caspian Sea to move drones, bullets and mortar shells to Russia, often using vessels that are “dark,” or have turned off their tracking data to disguise their movements, CNN has reported.

The US obtained and analyzed several of the drones downed in Ukraine, and officials say there is “undeniable evidence” that the drones are Iranian, despite repeated denials from Tehran that

The DIA analysts showcased debris from drones recovered in Ukraine in 2022 during the briefing on Friday, comparing them side-by-side with Iranian-made drones found in Iraq last year.

One of the drones recovered in Ukraine had only its wings and engine partially intact. But judging by its shape and size, it appeared to be a Shahed-131, the same model as an Iranian-made drone found in Iraq. The analysts removed components from one and easily slid them onto the other, showing that they are virtually “indistinguishable” in their design.

Other drone components found downed in Ukraine were nearly identical to Iranian-made components found in Iraq, the only apparent difference being that the components found in Ukraine featured cyrillic lettering. A phrase written on one component roughly translated to “for grandfather” in Russian, a reference to Russia’s fight against the Nazis in World War II.

The analysts said they were allowing journalists to see the drones in person because they want to give policy makers and the public “undeniable evidence” that Iranian-made drones are being used by Russia in Ukraine.

The US also wants to raise awareness so that western companies begin to better monitor their supply chains for signs that their components are being illegally diverted to help manufacture the drones. The  Biden administration launched an expansive task force last year to investigate how US and western components, including American-made microelectronics, were ending up in the Iranian-made drones being used in Russia.

Tehran, for its part, has flatly denied providing the drones for Russia during the war.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran has not and will not provide any weapon to be used in the war in Ukraine,”

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said in October. In November, Amir-Abdollahian acknowledged that Iran had supplied drones to Russia, but said they had been delivered to Russia months before the war began.

A senior DIA official said on Friday that analysts first saw signs of a growing Russian-Iranian military partnership in April 2022. The White House revealed in July 2022 that Iran was preparing to provide Russia with the drones.

The DIA also showcased an Iranian-made Shahed-101 drone recovered in Iraq, which is smaller and lighter than the Shahed-131 and has not previously been shown to the public, the analysts said. There is a possibility that Iran could begin providing the Shahed-101 to Russia, particularly because they are more compact and easier to ship, they added.

The US had intelligence late last year that Iran was considering providing ballistic missiles to Iran, but that plan appears to have been “put on hold” for now, one of the analysts said.

Iran benefits from providing Russia with military equipment because it can showcase its weapons to international buyers and gets money and support from Russia for its space and missile programs in return, the analysts said. But providing ballistic missiles would represent a “monumental” escalation in Iranian support for Russia’s war, the analysts said, and it is not clear that Tehran is willing to take that risk at this point in the conflict. (Source: UAS VISION)

01 Aug 23. Drones target Moscow, high-rise building hit. The Russian military said its anti-aircraft units had thwarted a Ukrainian “terrorist attack” early on Tuesday and downed drones targeting Moscow, but one drone, sent out of control by its units, struck the same high-rise tower hit earlier in the week. Video obtained by Reuters showed several square meters of the building’s glass facade high above the ground destroyed by the impact.

“On the night of August 1st, an attempted terrorist attack by the Kyiv regime with lethal drones on targets in Moscow and Moscow region was thwarted,” the Defence Ministry said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app.

Two drones, the Ministry said, had been downed in suburbs west of the city centre.

“Yet another (drone) was hit by radio-electronic equipment and, having run out of control, crashed on the territory of the complex of non-residential buildings at Moskva Citi,” the ministry said, referring to a business centre in the capital.

Vnukovo airport, one of three major airports serving the capital briefly shut down, but later resumed full operations.

Emergency services, quoted by Tass news agency, said debris from the falling drone had been located and would be sent for technical expertise.

Earlier, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said one of the drones targeting the capital had flown into the same tower at Moskva Citi that had been struck earlier in the week.

“One flew into the same tower at the Moskva Citi complex hit previously. The facade has been damaged on the 21st floor. Glazing was destroyed over 150 square metres.”

Sobyanin said no injuries were reported.

Moskva Citi was hit by a drone attacks last Sunday — one of several such incidents which have caused limited damage but generated widespread unease.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the day following that incident that Ukrainian attacks on Moscow and other Russian targets were “acts of desperation” and that Russia was taking all measures possible to protect against strikes.

Ukraine rarely comments on incidents that take place on Russian territory in its war against Moscow, now in its 17th month.

But this week, in an oblique reference to drone attacks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the war “is returning to the territory of Russia – to its symbolic centres and military bases”.

(Source: Reuters)

31 Jul 23. Elon Musk ‘refuses to turn on Starlink’ for Crimea drone attack. Elon Musk forced Ukraine to drop a planned naval drone strike in the Black Sea by refusing access to the Starlink satellite network, according to a US report.

The Ukrainian military was not able to remotely pilot a drone laden with explosives into a Russian ship in occupied Crimea following the decision of the SpaceX chief executive.

Mr Musk, the 52-year-old South African-born billionaire, has previously said he does not want Starlink used to conduct long-range offensive strikes.

But General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the leader of Ukraine’s armed forces, was concerned enough about the refusal to raise Musk’s power with his American counterpart, General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to the New York Times.

Kyiv’s top general told him his forces had had their access to Starlink restricted on a number of occasions, the paper reported.

Ukraine has received about 20,000 Starlink terminals since the start of the war

Satellite terminals donated by Mr Musk have become vital to Ukrainian military communications.

Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, told The Telegraph: “The issue is that at critical stages of the war, we desperately need absolute operational and technical independence.

“That is, the dependence of decision-making and its implementation must be 100 per cent. The risks for our military are too great when the course of offensive operations depends on external circumstances or third parties.”

Kenneth Roth, a former executive director of Human Rights Watch, said Kyiv’s military operations were “in effect being second guessed and sometimes rejected by Elon Musk, with his uncertain political loyalties and quirky personality”.

Ulrike Franke, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said “it doesn’t matter how you feel about Musk – no individual should have this power.”

The “constellation” of satellites, operated by Mr Musk’s SpaceX firm, are used to coordinate drone and artillery strikes, stream live video from the battlefield and gather intelligence.

But the technology entrepreneur has long-held reservations over his system being used for offensive capabilities.

He has restricted access to Starlink on multiple occasions throughout the war, according to a report by the New York Times, citing people familiar with the situation.

Decisions to shut down internet access, such as the one taken to block the strikes on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, can be made alone by Mr Musk.

In February, he wrote on Twitter: “We are not allowing Starlink to be used for long-range drone strikes.”

Ukraine has used a fleet of sea drones to strike Russian targets, most recently using two of the crafts to destroy a stretch of the Kerch bridge connecting Crimea to mainland Russia.

It is Mr Musk’s unilateral control over the Starlink system that sparks fear in Ukraine’s government, given his public spats with officials in Kyiv.

On the system’s importance, Mr Podolyak said: “It is vital. At the very least, to balance Russian capabilities and to have effective command of large military groups.

“Starlink is about defence, advancement, and survival,” he added.

Last year, Mr Musk published a “peace plan” for Ukraine, suggesting it should mirror sovereignty referendums organised by Russia in regions it occupied.

The Kremlin welcomed the billionaire’s suggestion as a “positive” step, while Kyiv accused him of presenting proposals aligned to Russian interests.

General Zaluzhnyi told General Milley Ukraine’s military success was dependent on continued access to Starlink in their call in March, which was held over a secure line.

American officials who were also dialed into the call refused to offer Kyiv an assessment of Mr Musk, and his business and political interests.

Mr Musk last year asked the Pentagon to fund his internet service in Ukraine because Starlink could not continue to offer it for free.

The firm estimated the cost at nearly $400m (£310m) for a 12-month period, according to a report by CNN.

Some 1,300 Starlink terminals purchased by a British supplier ceased working after the Ukrainian government couldn’t meet the $2,500 monthly fee for each.

To allay fears, the Pentagon last month brokered a deal to buy up to 500 Starlink terminals that can be used to carry out “key capabilities and certain missions”, two sources told the New York Times.

The Telegraph approached SpaceX for comment. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

31 Jul 23. Two skyscrapers in Moscow’s premier business district have been damaged by drone strikes that sparked a fireball and left charred holes in the side of the buildings, in the latest attack on the Russian capital. Videos taken on Sunday by eyewitnesses showed a drone flying between the high rises of the Moscow City business area before crashing, causing an explosion at the base of one of the towers. Another video taken from inside one of the buildings showed a destroyed office space scattered with debris. The district, which is grouped on the embankment of the Moscow river on the western edge of the city, is home to leading Russian companies, such as VTB Bank and Norilsk Nickel. Sunday’s attack marks at least the fifth time that unmanned aerial vehicles have reached Moscow since May, when two of the aircraft were shot down over the Kremlin. Others have hit buildings in suburban areas, and six days ago drones also crashed into more centrally located buildings, including an office block. “Tonight there was an attack by Ukrainian drones. The facades on two city office towers were slightly damaged,” Moscow mayor Sergei Sobyanin said, adding there had been no casualties. There was no immediate claim of responsibility from Kyiv. Ukraine, which was invaded by Russian forces last year, has tended not to take direct credit for attacks by UAVs and other strikes on Russian territory that have also targeted fuel depots and air bases. Kyiv’s military intelligence service declined to comment on the Moscow City strikes, which bring the war closer to home for Russians and forces their army to keep some air defence resources away from the front lines in order to protect the capital and vulnerable installations. Lieutenant-general Valeriy Kondratiuk, a former head of Ukraine’s GUR military and foreign intelligence services, claimed Sunday’s attack had been launched from within Russia by what he called “tech partisans” using “asymmetric hybrid warfare techniques”. “These patriots are testing their drones not on military training grounds, but in real-time war scenarios on the territory of the enemy,” he said, adding that the newly developed range of drones can cost $20,000 each.

He also claimed that the Moscow City buildings that were hit were “actually offices of Russia’s GRU military intelligence services”. Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a video address on Sunday: “The war is gradually returning to the territory of Russia.” Russia’s defence ministry claimed the drones used in the attack lost control and crashed after they had been suppressed by its electromagnetic defences. It also claimed to have taken down 25 drones over the Crimean peninsula, which was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014. Moscow’s Vnukovo airport, one of its three main airports, was briefly closed to flights as a result of the attack. Tass state news agency reported that the fifth and sixth floors of the IQ-Quarter 50-storey office block in Moscow City were damaged, as was the fourth floor of the Oko-2 tower. President Vladimir Putin was informed of the attack, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was cited by Tass as saying. The Russian president was in Saint Petersburg on Sunday for a parade of the Navy. Speaking a day earlier at the conclusion of his summit with African leaders, Putin claimed Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive had been halted by Russian forces. He also welcomed discussions on a peace proposal for the Ukraine war presented by a group of African leaders and said there were similarities between the proposal and a plan outlined by China. Putin also said Russia would begin deliveries of grain to Africa in the next three to four months. (Source: FT.com)

28 Jul 23. Ukrainian artillery crews have been firing rockets made in North Korea against Russian positions, turning Pyongyang’s munitions against the invasion forces of its ally President Vladimir Putin. The North Korean arms, whose use by Ukraine has not been previously reported, were shown to the Financial Times by troops operating Soviet-era Grad multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) near the devastated city of Bakhmut. The origins of Ukraine’s armoury highlight how Europe’s biggest land conflict since the second world war has become a mixed-up cauldron for generations of the world’s military equipment, ranging from ageing Soviet kit to modern precision weapons. Ruslan, a Ukrainian artillery commander, said the North Korean munitions were not favoured by his troops because of their relatively high dud rate, with many known to misfire or fail to explode. Most were manufactured in the 1980s and 1990s, according to their markings. One Ukrainian Grad unit member warned the FT not to get too close to the rocket launcher when the crew fired the North Korean munitions because “they are very unreliable and do crazy things sometimes”. The Ukrainian soldiers said the rockets had been “seized” from a ship by a “friendly” country before being delivered to Ukraine.

They declined to provide further details. Ukraine’s defence ministry suggested the rockets were taken from Russian forces. “We capture their tanks, we capture their equipment and it is very possible that this is also the result of the Ukrainian army successfully conducting a military operation,” said Yuriy Sak, an adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister. “Russia has been shopping around for different types of munitions in all kinds of tyrannies, including North Korea and Iran,” he added. It is highly unlikely North Korea would provide Ukraine directly with the munitions, as Pyongyang has been supportive of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu flew to Pyongyang this week to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Korean war armistice and “strengthen co-operation” with its military. The White House in March claimed to have evidence that Moscow was negotiating with Pyongyang to exchange weapons for food. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby has also alleged Pyongyang sold rockets and missiles to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner group at the height of the battle of Bakhmut, the longest and bloodiest of the Russian invasion. Prigozhin dismissed the accusation as “gossip and speculation”. Soviet-era Grad multiple-launch rocket systems fire on Russian positions in Donetsk. North Korean munitions have been used in such attacks near Bakhmut in the eastern region © Sofiia Gatilova/Reuters The Grad — its name translates as “hail” — is a self-propelled 122mm MLRS designed by the Soviet Union. Up to 40 rockets can be fired by one system in less than 20 seconds from tubes mounted on its Ural truck chassis. Both sides have employed Grad rocket launchers since Moscow first invaded eastern Ukraine using regular and local proxy forces under the guise of a separatist uprising in 2014. Human Rights Watch has described Grad rockets as being “notoriously indiscriminate”. Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described Grads as “the AK-47 of MLRS”, used by dozens of military forces around the world. Their ubiquity has encouraged many countries to make munitions for the system, including North Korea. Despite reliability issues, the Ukrainians are happy to use them. “We need every rocket we can get,” said Ruslan. (Source: FT.com)

28 Jul 23. Rheinmetall plans tank-repair centre in Ukraine after summer break, CEO says. Germany’s Rheinmetall plans to set up a repair centre in Ukraine for Leopard tanks and other war equipment supplied by Berlin as early as late summer, the industrial group’s chief executive, Armin Papperger, told Spiegel magazine on Friday.

“We are currently already training Ukrainians in Germany for this job,” said Papperger, adding that Rheinmetall wanted to begin operations of the repair centre after the summer break.

Berlin has supplied around 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks to Kyiv.

A repair hub in Ukraine would reduce the distances the tanks have to be transported, though it also brings security concerns: A close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin said earlier this year that Moscow will hit any facility Rheinmetall sets up in Ukraine.

Rheinmetall, which produces the Leopard tanks jointly with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, said in May that it had set up a joint venture with Ukrainian state-owned conglomerate Ukroboronprom to build and repair tanks in Ukraine. The German company announced in April it was setting up a maintenance and logistics hub in Romania, and it founded a similar centre in Lithuania in June 2022 to provide support to NATO vehicles in the Baltic states. (Source: Reuters)

28 Jul 23. Ukraine ‘fires missiles at targets inside Russia’ for first time. The first attack was reported on Friday afternoon when a missile crashed down on the city of Taganrog, situated about 25 miles east of the border with Ukraine. The projectile landed near an art museum and a busy café, creating a large crater and sparking scenes of panic. Local officials reported 20 people were injured.

Footage of the scene, posted online by Russia’s Mash media outlet, showed a first responder treating a young waitress whose face and hands were lacerated with shards of glass. Her white blouse also appeared to be splattered with blood.

Russia’s defence ministry accused Ukraine of carrying out what it said was a “terrorist attack” on the city, which sits on the shores of the Sea of Azov, with an S-200 missile.

“Russia’s air defence has detected and intercepted the missile,” the ministry said, adding that the missile’s debris fell on the city.

Oleksiy Danilov, Ukraine’s secretary for the National Security and Defence Council, blamed Russian air defence systems for the explosion.

Maria Zakharova, Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman, said in a statement that the attack had not appeared to target any military sites.

“We resolutely condemn the new cynical terrorist attacks of the Kyiv regime aimed against civilians and civilian infrastructure,” Ms Zakharova said.

“Russia reserves the right for a tough response,” she added.

Valery Golubev, governor of the wider Rostov-on-Don region, said nine of those injured in the incident had been hospitalised.

The explosion was apparently so powerful that cars parked nearby were buried under bricks ripped off buildings.

A second missile was later shot down over the town of Azov to the east of Taganrog, and its debris reportedly crashed in the countryside, away from residential areas, the Russian military said. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

28 Jul 23. Gepard Anti-Aircraft Tanks, Bandvagn Vehicles in Germany’s New Aid Package to Ukraine. Germany has supplied Ukraine with a new military aid package, according to the website of the German Federal Government. It includes six Gepard anti-aircraft tanks and more than 15,000 shells for them, bringing to 46 the total number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems that combines rapid-fire cannons, radars, and tracking systems to shoot down low-flying enemy aircraft and other aerial threats. In addition, the package included ten Bandvagn 206 all-terrain vehicles, over 2500 smoke shells, 33 RQ-35 HEIDRUN and VECTOR reconnaissance drones, and eight ambulances. Further deliveries from this new aid package, worth $660m, will include the bridge-laying tank Beiber, complete with a bridge, IRIS-T SLM air defense system equipment, and more ammunition. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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