NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 28.

*Belarus-Poland: Border closures in event of Wagner Group provocation would further disrupt supply chains. Poland’s Interior Minister Mariusz Kami?ski cautioned on 27 July that his country, alongside Latvia and Lithuania, could close their borders with Belarus if there are any ‘serious incidents’ involving Wagner Group on their frontiers. Poland previously announced it had closed its border with Belarus to Belarusian and Russian freight vehicles from 1 June until further notice (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 30 May 2023). The presidents of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland expressed concern earlier in July that the arrival of Wagner Group mercenaries in Belarus could prompt Belarusian authorities to provoke a new migration crisis on the EU’s borders, as in 2021-2022. While the mercenary force is unlikely to stage an open military confrontation along EU and NATO members’ frontiers, border provocations remain a more credible risk in the coming weeks. Such incidents could realistically encourage Riga, Vilnius and Warsaw to shut their borders with Belarus, which would likely cause further supply chain disruption.

*Georgia-Russia: Growing Russian commercial interests will represent trigger for anti-Russian protests. On 27 July, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili condemned the transfer of the Abkhazian Sukhumi Airport (SUI) to a Russian investor, reportedly the sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. On 16 June, the parliament of the breakaway pro-Russian region agreed to allow Russian companies to restore and manage Sukhumi Airport under a 49-year term. The Russian investor will benefit from preferential conditions, including the exemption of property tax, profit tax and duty tax on imported construction materials, as well as beneficial electricity tariffs. The development illustrates the increasing risk of Russian appropriation of infrastructure facilities in Abkhazia. Meanwhile, on 27 July, protesters, including media and civil society activists, gathered to oppose the arrival of a Russian cruise ship in the port of Batumi, where Russian commercial interests are reportedly growing, particularly in real estate. As such, Russia’s growing footprint in Georgia’s economy will likely raise activist scrutiny and sustain the potential for low-level, peaceful anti-Russian protests.

OFFENSIVES: Some US officials have tempered expectations of the ongoing mechanised counter-offensive operation in the south, contrary to earlier unofficial US statements. However, Ukrainian forces are likely committing to the ongoing operation south of Orikhiv and are making notable, though unconfirmed, advances. On 27 July, the Washington Post cited an unnamed US official that claimed the current operation may actually be a shaping operation ahead of a later counter-offensive operation, and that the US does not currently consider the Orikhiv attack as part of a ‘main effort’. Ultimately, efforts to manage expectations will continue, and it remains unclear whether the Ukrainians will commit sizeable reserves to the attack. However, this appears likely, as two US officials confirmed to CNN on 27 July that Ukraine has already committed additional reserves to the operation, which likely indicates an attempt to identify potential weaknesses in the Russian line. For further analysis on the counter-offensive in the south, see SOUTHERN below.
BAKHMUT: Ukrainian deputy defence minister Hanna Maliar stated on 27 July that Ukrainian forces are continuing to gradually advance south of Bakhmut, while successfully repelling Russian counter-attacks in the north. The heaviest fighting continues to take place in the outskirts of Klishchiivka and Andriivka, four miles (6km) and six miles (10km) south-west of Bakhmut respectively. Russian sources reported on 28 July that their forces currently retain control over the entirety of Klishchiivka, claiming that Ukrainian forces have been unable to maintain a foothold in the village. The commander of Ukraine’s Land Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported on 28 July that Russian forces are ‘clinging to every centimetre’ around Bakhmut, and are leveraging a significant amount of artillery in the area, which is clearly slowing down the rate of Ukrainian advances.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 28 July, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured several Ukrainian strongholds around Serhiivka, a settlement located seven miles (12km) west of Svatove. According to the Russian MoD, Russian forces penetrated 0.9 miles (1.5km) deep into Ukrainian defences and gained advantageous positions west of Kuzemikiva, situated eight miles (13km) north-west of Svatove. However, on 28 July, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian offensive operations around the settlement of Nadiya, situated near Serhiivka, were unsuccessful over the past 24 hours. Russian sources have in recent days claimed some notable progress south-west of Svatove, but there is currently no visual confirmation of these claims. While Russian offensive operations along this sector have stepped up in recent weeks, such claims are likely part of Moscow’s information campaign to frame limited gains in the sector as significant operational advances, particularly amid Ukraine’s successes in the south.
SOUTHERN: The Ukrainian mechanised counter-offensive slowed after the initial attack on 26 July, but has once again increased in tempo as of 28 July, likely reflecting Ukrainian efforts to regroup and press the attack. The extent of the Ukrainian advances remains unclear, but visually confirmed evidence indicates that they have made significant progress east of the village of Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Geolocated footage from 27 July indicates that a Ukrainian vehicle had reached anti-tank fortifications north-west of Verbove, 12 miles (20km) south-east of Orikhiv. While it remains unclear if this single vehicle was supported, its presence five miles (8km) east of Robotyne indicates Ukrainian forces have likely made some notable advances over the last 24 hours, including advances further south which have yet to be reported upon. Nevertheless, weather conditions along the southern frontline are currently poor, with heavy rainfall over the last 24-48 hours likely undermining large-scale manoeuvre operations in the short term.
SOUTHERN: CNN claimed on 28 July that geolocated footage indicated that Ukrainian forces reached and penetrated Russian ‘dragon’s teeth’ anti-tank fixed defences for the first time. The outlet claims footage of a Ukrainian vehicle approaching such defences was geolocated as far south as positions near the villages of Nove and Kharkove, which sit behind the second and third layers of defences, some seven miles (11km) south of Robotyne. This would represent an exceptional breakthrough past several layers of Russian fixed defences. However, we have seen no further evidence to confirm this specific claim at present. Nevertheless, images of abandoned Ukrainian BMP-1 vehicles in anti-tank ditches indicate that Ukrainian forces are testing Russian fixed defences throughout the area. Specific evidence to confirm where Ukraine has advanced remains limited.
SOUTHERN: Further east along the southern axis, geolocated footage has confirmed that Ukrainian forces are now in control of Staromaiorske, six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Some Russian sources claimed on 28 July that Ukrainian forces have subsequently withdrawn from the settlement in order to prepare for assaults on the neighbouring village of Urozhaine, but current indicators point to Ukraine still retaining control of the village. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 28 July that its forces are consolidating recently acquired territory in the area, and the next phase of operations along the Vremevsky salient will likely focus on attacking Urozhaine across the Mokri Yaly River.
STRIKES: On 28 July, Ukraine will celebrate the Day of Ukrainian Statehood. Although in 2022 Russia did not strike Ukraine on this date, this year’s celebration represents a flashpoint for Russian strikes as the pace of Russian strikes has intensified in the past weeks. Urban centres and port and grain infrastructure are the most at risk. Notably, Ukraine’s Air Force alerted on 28 July at 10:24 that a Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bomber took off from Bryansk oblast to launch missiles.
STRIKES: On 27 July, senior Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak called on Western allies to provide additional Patriot air defence systems amid Russia’s intensifying strike campaign. Podolyak explained that Russia’s strategy aims to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences with drone strikes in order to create opportunities to use ballistic missiles against critical infrastructure. (Since withdrawing from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), Russia has intensified drone strikes against Ukraine, launching one of the largest missile strikes in recent weeks on 26 July). Podolyak noted that modern air defence systems such as the Patriot system are necessary to defend Ukraine against Russia’s use of ballistic missiles and Onyx cruise missiles. According to Podolyak, Ukraine needs at least 10 to 12 patriot systems to defend the totality of its territory but currently has just two – one from the US and another from Germany.
STRIKES: On the night of 27 to 28 July, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that a drone was shot down by Russian air defences. Later on 28 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the destruction of a Ukrainian drone by air defences in Moscow.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AID: US Abrams main battle tanks are likely to arrive on Ukraine’s battlefields in September, according to a Politico report on 27 July, which cites insiders familiar with the matter. A number of Abrams tanks will reportedly be dispatched to Germany in August, where they will undergo final refurbishments before being sent onwards to Ukraine. According to Politico, the US is sending older M1A1 models instead of the more modern A2 version, which would have reportedly taken a year to be delivered. Two insiders stated the initial batch will involve six to eight tanks, but the US is planning to send 31 in total – a Ukrainian battalion’s worth. Pentagon officials have previously said the Abrams would be handed over to Kyiv sometime in autumn. The delivery of Abrams will certainly bolster Ukraine’s ground capabilities but they are unlikely to deployed in the ongoing counter-offensive.
ENERGY: The head of Ukraine’s state energy operator Ukrenergo stated on 27 July that it is preparing for the worst-case scenario next winter. According to Volodymyr Kudrytskiy, this includes repeated missile and drone attacks against energy infrastructure akin to the Russian campaign last winter. However, Kudrytskiy expressed confidence that the country’s main energy network will be able to function without restrictions and noted Ukrenergo is already preparing for energy consumption peaks. The Ukrenergo CEO stated Ukraine needs to build additional transformers, power units and power transmission lines in case existing ones are damaged in an attack, but did not provide details of whether any such steps have already been taken. On 20 July, Ukrenergo stated six months of Russian missile and drone attacks damaged 43% of the main networks. Kudrytskiy’s comments underscore that Ukrenergo is drawing up contingency plans to mitigate the fallout of blackouts across the country given the realistic possibility Russian forces will target Ukraine’s energy network in late 2023 with strikes akin to last autumn and winter.
BLACK SEA: The US and its allies are not currently considering sending convoys to escort vessels carrying Ukrainian grain in the Black Sea. Speaking on 27 July, US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby said deploying warships to the region would only escalate tensions and increase the probability of conflict between Western allies and Russia – though the Montreux Convention which governs the Bosphorus Strait in any case currently prohibits the entry of non-Black Sea nation naval vessels into the sea. Kirby insisted the priorities are ensuring the grain is exported and that the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) is extended. The White House adviser also said the US is going to work with its allies and partners on other ground routes and potentially river routes. However, alternative passages are unlikely to compensate for the volumes of grain previously exported through the Black Sea under the agreement. Kirby’s remarks signify that the US and its allies recognise the risk of escalation has increased since Moscow withdrew from the grain deal and amid Russian moves to remilitarise sections of the Black Sea. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Ukraine Update – 27 July 2023.
For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2023, please see Sibylline Special Report: A Year of War in Ukraine, Scenarios for the Year Ahead – 24 February 2023.

FORECAST

DIPLOMACY: An ex-US official confirmed to the Moscow Times on 27 July that secret diplomatic negotiations between former senior US national security officials and high-ranking members of the Russian government are ongoing. NBC first reported earlier in July the existence of such talks involving prominent Russians believed to be close to the Kremlin and, in at least one case in April this year, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

The insider claimed to have been visiting Moscow at least every three months and that meetings between US and Russian officials have been taking place at least twice a month, often online. This indicates that covert exchanges are occurring relatively frequently. Although the back-channel discussions are highly unlikely to result in the war ending in the coming months, they nevertheless bridge a gap between official government negotiations and unofficial expert dialogues. Such talks, known as track 1.5 diplomacy, have the potential to play a significant role in reducing tensions and setting out respective ‘red lines’ amid an increasingly elevated risk environment in the Black Sea following Russia’s withdrawal from the BSGI.

According to the unnamed former official, it became evident during negotiations that the Russian side was unable to articulate its exact demands and requirements. The insider told the outlet Russians present at the talks are uncertain how to define victory or defeat, with some elites reportedly stating they never wanted Moscow to launch the full-scale invasion in the first place, even saying it had been a ‘complete mistake’. While this cannot be independently verified, the comments suggest Moscow is unlikely to cease its war in Ukraine for the foreseeable future to avoid what it would perceive as humiliation. Moscow will likely remain reticent to enter negotiations in the coming months, as will Kyiv as its counter-offensive is underway and Ukrainian officials are determined to reclaim all territory annexed by Russia.

Jul27.

OFFENSIVES: On 26 July, two unnamed Pentagon officials told the New York Times that the main thrust of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, launched almost two months ago, is now underway along the southern frontline. For further analysis, see the SOUTHERN and FORECAST sections below.
BAKHMUT: Russian sources reported on 27 July that a ‘difficult situation’ is materialising along the southern flanks of Bakhmut, though Russian forces are reportedly still defending sections of Klishchiivka, the key objective for Ukrainian forces on this axis. Heavy fighting is continuing on the outskirts of the settlement, which sits four miles (6km) south-west of Bakhmut, where Russian forces claim that Ukraine is committing additional reserves to press the attack.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Nadiya, situated seven miles (12km) west of Svatove. The milblogger claimed that the action of Ukrainian heavy units and intense shelling forced the Russians to abandon the position. Nadiya is situated near Serhiivka, a settlement that was allegedly taken by Russian forces on 25 July, according to the Russian Ministry of Defence. These statements come after some Russian sources reported on 26 July that Russian troops had control of Nadiya, though no indications corroborate such claims. Geolocated footage from 25 July indicates that Russian forces made advances in the south of Dibrova, located around six miles (9km) south-west of Kreminna, where the Serbrianske forest is situated. According to the milblogger Ukrainian forces are attempting to advance in the Serbrianske forest south of Kreminna.
SOUTHERN: The main thrust of Ukraine’s building mechanised counter-offensive is seemingly targeting the area east of Robotyne, eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Geolocated footage from 26 July as well as Russian reports indicate that Ukrainian forces have managed to penetrate the first line of Russian defences. Geolocated footage shows two abandoned US Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IVFs) and a T-72 tank in this direction, but there are clear indications that Leopard 2 main battle tanks have also been committed to this attack. Nevertheless, reports indicate that Russian forces successfully pushed the initial Ukrainian assault back on 26 July, utilising conventional flexible defensive tactics which the defending 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has been deploying relatively competently in recent weeks. It currently remains unclear if Ukrainian forces have pressed the attack given some Russian sources reported this morning (27 July) that Ukrainian forces are prioritising concentrating reserves for a renewed assault, reporting little additional activity. For further analysis on the new phase of this counter-offensive, see FORECAST below.
SOUTHERN: Further east, other supplementary Ukrainian counter-offensive operations have continued to make ground over the last 24-48 hours, including along the Vremevsky salient. Prominent Russian volunteer battalion commander, Alexander Khodakovsky, who is fighting on the southern axis, reported on 27 July that Ukrainian forces have taken Staromaiorske, six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast), after days of intense fighting. This has not yet been confirmed, but Khodakovsky emphasised that the village had been entirely destroyed, and Ukrainian forces will likely find it challenging to defend the newly taken position if Russian forces launch a concerted counter-attack.
STRIKES: On 26 July, Russia launched a large-scale missile strike comprising 40 missiles, including three Kalibr cruise missiles and four Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, air defences intercepted 36 missiles, including the Kalibr missiles. The strikes reportedly targeted Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts. Russia subsequently launched another strike on 27 July, involving two Kalibr missiles and eight Iranian-made Shahed 136/131 drones. All drones were reportedly shot down over Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. However, the Kalibr missiles damaged port infrastructure facilities in the port of Odesa. While Russian drone strikes have intensified since Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain initiative (BSGI), the 26 July Russian missile strikes constitute the largest single effort in recent weeks. The increasing intensity of strikes is part of Moscow’s strategy to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defences.
STRIKES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on his Telegram channel that Ukraine had received additional air defence systems, which will soon be deployed to ‘where it is needed the most’. Zelensky’s declarations follow his pledge to reinforce air defences after Russia stepped up the intensity of its strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure following its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). As such, the new air defences are likely to be deployed in Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, such as Odesa, which has been a priority target for Russian strikes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BLACK SEA: NATO announced on 26 July that the military bloc and its allies are increasing surveillance and reconnaissance in the Black Sea region, including with maritime patrol aircraft and drones. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Russia’s actions pose substantial risks to the stability of the Black Sea region, which he stated is of strategic importance to the alliance. The military bloc also stated that Russia’s threats against civilian ships and attacks against Ukrainian ports have created new risks for miscalculation and escalation. While NATO’s announcement seeks to provide extra protection for its allies in the Black Sea region, particularly littoral states Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, the area will remain hotly contested in the coming months. Russian forces struck Ukrainian military facilities on Snake Island on 26 July, which furthermore illustrates Russia’s determination to project power and illustrate offensive capability in the north-western Black Sea. Nevertheless, the risk of wider escalation has increased. A Russian fighter jet collided with an unmanned US reconnaissance drone over the Black Sea in March. The risk of accidental confrontation between NATO and Russian aircraft will likely increase further as the Russian Black Sea Fleet steps up deployments in the area in likely preparation to board increasing numbers of civilian vessels.
BLACK SEA: On 26 July, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) claimed responsibility for last year’s attack against the Kerch Strait Bridge linking occupied Crimea to Russia. The head of the SBU, Vasyl Maliuk, described the 8 October 2022 attack as one of the department’s accomplishments. Ukraine’s deputy defence minister Maliar included the October 2022 attack on the bridge in a list of Kyiv’s military successes earlier in July. Such open claims of responsibility indicate more attacks against Crimea and the bridge are likely in the coming months, including potentially around Russia’s Navy Day on 30 July, which will increase the scope for Russian retaliatory strikes and escalation.
MOBILISATION: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a proposal to the parliament on 26 July to extend martial law and general mobilisation for a further 90 days. Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, previously voted to prolong martial law and mobilisation in early May until 18 August. The parliament is highly likely to vote in favour of the extension given Kyiv’s growing need for personnel to sustain not only current counter-offensive operations but offset losses to ensure sufficient reinforcements throughout 2023-2024.
WAGNER GROUP: The Wagner Group is reportedly looking to recruit fighters in Belarus under the condition that they are ready to participate in hostilities on the territories of NATO members Lithuania and Poland. According to a statement posted by Ukraine’s National Resistance Centre on 26 July, the private military company (PMC) is attempting to sign up new recruits while training the Belarusian military. While this cannot be independently verified, our assessment remains that the PMC (or indeed Russia and Belarus) lacks the capability or intent to launch an attack against NATO states Lithuania or Poland. A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel reported on 26 July that a Wagner Group convoy was moving to its second field camp located in an unspecified location in Western Belarus, adding it is likely there will be several such camps. Wagner Group’s presence in western Belarus is likely aimed at driving tensions with neighbouring NATO member states, rather than intended to launch an attack against Lithuania or Poland. For further analysis see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 July 2023.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has claimed that three Ukrainian battalions (effectively one brigade) have been committed to the counter-offensive thrust so far, though we cannot confirm this. It currently appears that alongside 9th Corps units which have been grinding along the southern axis for almost two months, including the 47th Mechanised Brigade, new elements of the Ukrainian 10th Corps are being committed to this renewed effort. The 10th Corps is made up of numerous Western-equipped brigades which have not yet been committed to battle, including Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 armoured units.

Initial Russian reports indicated around 80 armoured vehicles had taken part in the emerging mechanised attack south of Orikhiv, though limited geolocated footage and verifiable reports indicate that this number is likely too high. Nevertheless, even if the Russian upper estimate is accurate, Ukraine still retains several further non-committed Western-equipped brigades in reserve which would likely be committed to reinforce success and support a breakthrough if it materialises in the coming weeks. Ultimately, however, the relative strength of Russian fixed and flexible defences on this axis means a lightning breakthrough remains unlikely in the short term, with extensive minefields and layered defences south of the current line of contact set to slow any Ukrainian advance. In addition, UK Defence Intelligence reported on 27 July that Russian forces have likely reinforced army aviation assets in the south, principally upgraded Ka-52 attack helicopters, which will continue to pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces in the absence of Ukrainian air superiority.

Up until now, Russian minefields and other defences have led to Ukrainian forces conducting largely dismounted operations, i.e. small-scale infantry assaults without significant mechanised support. This was largely due to the attendant risks of their vehicles being constrained by minefields and subsequently destroyed by artillery. Such dismounted operations have set the slow pace of Ukraine’s counter-offensive up until now, and have severely limited opportunities for a breakthrough. The ongoing mechanised offensive operation will likely seek to create such breakthrough opportunities by committing sizeable numbers of armoured and mechanised units, but with a higher risk of casualties and the loss of heavy equipment.

While the success of this next phase of the Ukrainian counter-offensive remains unclear, the operational objective is highly likely to be to penetrate Russian defences to advance towards the key fortified town of Tokmak, roughly 14 miles (23km) south of the current frontline.

Jul 26.

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar claimed on 25 July that Ukrainian forces are sustaining eight times fewer casualties than Russian forces along the Bakhmut axis, and 5.3 times fewer casualties along the southern frontline. While we cannot confirm these statistics, Kyiv’s strategy is likely centred on creating an advantageous attrition gradient whereby Ukrainian forces inflict maximum casualties on the enemy while minimising their own. It is likely that Ukrainian forces have pursued this strategy (which has arguably borne fruit in recent weeks) in order to prepare for renewed counter-offensive efforts, likely in the south.
BAKHMUT: The Ukrainian governor of Donetsk oblast, Pavlo Kyrylenko, claimed on 25 July that Ukrainian forces entered the village of Andriivka, located six miles (10km) south of Bakhmut. This comes amid modest but tactically significant advances. While Kyrylenko acknowledged that fighting was still taking place inside the settlement, other sources have claimed that Ukrainian forces have not yet taken control of the village. Nevertheless, Ukraine Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on 25 July that the capture of Andriivka would possibly allow Ukrainian forces to proceed with plans to encircle Russian forces around Bakhmut. Heavy fighting is also ongoing around the key village of Klishchiivka, located roughly two miles (3km) north of Andriivka. Cherevaty also confirmed on 25 July that Ukrainian forces are using US-supplied cluster munitions near Bakhmut. These weapons will prove particularly significant for Ukrainian forces given the emphasis both sides are placing on infantry operations; they will likely assist Ukrainian efforts to advance through trench networks and to displace infantry positions.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 25 July, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces liberated the settlement of Serhiivka, located seven miles (12km) west of Svatove. It also claimed they advanced 0.9 miles (1.5km) in depth and up to 2.5 miles (4km) along the Oskil-Kreminna line. The Russian MoD also claimed that its forces made progress in the Serbrianske forest, situated seven miles (12km) south of Kreminna. However, on 25 and 26 July, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian operations have been unsuccessful south of Dibrova, located around six miles (9km) south-west of Kreminna, where the Serbrianske sector is situated. Given the conflicting reports, it remains unclear if Russian forces have taken these settlements.
SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed earlier on 26 July that Ukrainian forces have launched a major counter-offensive effort south of Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast); the significance of any such operation remains unclear. According to Russian occupation officials and milbloggers, Ukrainian forces launched a high-intensity artillery bombardment. Ukraine’s 33rd Brigade is now reportedly leading a significant operation around Robotyne, located eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv. While Kyiv has remained silent on the matter, and we cannot yet confirm the scope of the apparent attack, over 80 Ukrainian armoured vehicles and tanks are reportedly taking part. According to Russian sources, the attack has already penetrated Russian defences in three unspecified areas of the frontline. Fierce fighting is reportedly underway and it remains unclear whether Russia’s flexible defence (which has so far proven competent and doctrinally sound) will be able to blunt the offensive. Zaporizhzhia oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that ‘the second wave of the [Ukrainian] counter-offensive has begun’.
SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, the Ukrainian General Staff reported on 26 July that its forces have achieved success further east along the Vremevsky salient. While Kyiv did not provide specifics, it claims that its forces have made progress towards Staromaiorske, located six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). This has been a key battleground over the last two weeks.
STRIKES: On the night of 25-26 July, Russia launched a drone strike against industrial facilities (which were subsequently damaged) in the city of Pervomaiskyi (Kharkiv oblast), according to the regional governor. The number of drones remains unknown. The spokesperson for Ukraine’s air force, Yuriy Ihnat, has also confirmed since the publication of our last report that Russia launched ten Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones against Ukraine during an overnight attack on 24-25 July.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BLACK SEA: The UK’s foreign secretary, James Cleverly, cautioned on 25 July that Russia will possibly attack civilian ships in the Black Sea to escalate its campaign to destroy Ukrainian food exports. Cleverly insisted Moscow should stop holding global food supplies ‘hostage’ and return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), from which it withdrew last week. According to a 26 July intelligence update from the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has altered its posture since Moscow abandoned the agreement. The MOD claims that increased surface vessel deployments are likely preparing to enforce a blockade on Ukraine. The patrol vessel Sergei Kotov has been deployed to the Black Sea’s southern waters, and is likely preparing to patrol the shipping lane between the Bosphorus and Odesa (Ukraine). The UK’s MOD assesses that there is a realistic possibility the vessel will form part of a task group employed to intercept commercial vessels which Russia believes are bound for Ukraine; this will increase the risk of at-sea boarding of commercial vessels by Russian forces.
BLACK SEA: A Romanian merchant ship was damaged following Russia’s 24 July attack on the Ukrainian Danube River port of Reni. According to preliminary information, the vessel only sustained minor damage and continued its movement. Nevertheless, the incident underscores that there is a realistic possibility that future Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure in Odesa oblast, especially against the Izmail and Reni Danube River ports, will hit Romanian and other international vessels. This elevates the hard security risks for commercial assets moving in and out of Romanian internal and territorial waters.
AFRICA: The second Russia-Africa summit is scheduled to take place on 27-28 July in St Petersburg. Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated on 25 July that the forum signals Africa’s desire to strengthen its ties with Moscow irrespective of other ‘circumstances’. According to Ushakov, 49 African countries have confirmed their participation at the event, with 17 heads of state set to attend. While Russia will likely seek to forge new economic agreements and partnerships across the African continent at the summit, the event comes after Moscow announced its withdrawal from the BSGI last week; this threatens to exacerbate acute food insecurity across Africa. Russian President Vladimir Putin promised ahead of the summit that Russia will continue to provide grain, food products, fertilisers and other goods to Africa. While such pledges will aim to mitigate fears within the African delegation and to underscore that Moscow can still be regarded as a trustworthy partner, they are unlikely to reassure Russia’s African partners fully. Nevertheless, the fact that Moscow is holding such a high-profile summit underscores its continuing influence across Africa.
NORTH KOREA: On 26 July, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu hailed his country’s ties with North Korea during an official visit. Shoigu called Pyongyang an ‘important partner’ of Moscow, adding that the two states share a common border and a rich history of co-operation. North Korea invited senior delegations from China and Russia to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War (1950-53). The US has accused North Korea of providing weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine, which Moscow and Pyongyang have both denied. Nevertheless, the presence of a Russian delegation at the celebrations signals Moscow’s efforts to strengthen its relations with the internationally isolated North Korea as tensions with the West remain high.

FORECAST

REGIME STABILITY: The Washington Post reported on 25 July that according to European and Ukrainian officials, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the wider Russian state failed to respond to the Wagner Group mutiny effectively, despite being forewarned of the insurrection. According to the unnamed officials, Putin did not issue any orders for most of 24 June, despite the Russian security services highlighting the likelihood of an attempted rebellion at least two or three days beforehand. During the mutiny and Wagner’s march on Moscow, regional officials reportedly had to make independent decisions on how (or how not) to respond; it was reportedly their decision not to attempt to stop the Wagner column’s progress towards the capital.

If accurate, these reports expose the extent to which paralysis in the Kremlin has granted de facto control to Russian regional authorities; they also underscore how indecisiveness prevented a coherent and rapid response to a serious domestic security threat. Ultimately, crippling hesitancy in the Kremlin has exposed serious weaknesses in the central government’s grip over domestic security issues; this is something the Kremlin is clearly attempting to remedy by pushing forward with efforts to militarise Russian society.

On 25 July, the Russian State Duma approved a law authorising governors of regions under martial law to create ‘enterprises’ akin to private military companies (PMCs). These de facto PMCs will officially participate in law enforcement activities such as countering sabotage and reconnaissance groups and protecting state borders, though they will also likely take part in the war in Ukraine. The PMCs will be funded by both federal and regional budgets, with the Russian MoD providing them with small arms. However, these weapons will need to be returned if (or when) the federal government orders any unit to disband. This will provide the Kremlin with nominal control over these new enterprises. However, the level of de facto autonomy which governors exercised during the Wagner mutiny means the extent to which Moscow can control these entities in the event of instability remains unclear.

The law ultimately reflects the proliferation of PMCs in Russia, as well as Moscow’s growing reliance on such entities and its need to replace the capabilities lost following the Wagner Group’s mutiny. Efforts to encourage competition between smaller units are likely aimed at preventing the emergence of a single dominant PMC actor akin to the Wagner Group. However, the steady militarisation of Russian security and law enforcement will present command and control issues for Moscow; it will also increase human rights risks in these enterprises’ areas of operation. However, if they are effectively managed, these new entities will likely go some way in helping to improve domestic security and filling the capability vacuums left by the Wagner mutiny.

Jul 25.

OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov acknowledged on 24 July that Ukraine’s counter-offensive is ‘behind schedule’. However, he insisted that it is still going according to plan. Ukrainian forces are making slow but steady gains around Bakhmut and along the southern axis, though it is clear that Russia’s innovative mining tactics and its doctrinally sound flexible defence are presenting major obstacles. For example, Russian troops are reportedly leaving trench lines empty so as to encourage Ukrainian forces to occupy said trenches. They then remotely detonate explosives and mines in these trenches before moving to retake them. Similarly, Russian forces are beginning to ‘stack’ TM-62 anti-tank mines on top of one another. This is reportedly resulting in greater numbers of Ukrainian demining vehicles (high priority targets for Russian forces) being destroyed or heavily damaged. Even Western-supplied demining equipment is generally only designed to withstand one or two mine blasts at any one time. This tactic is almost certainly designed to slow the Ukrainian troops’ rate of advance – particularly as Kyiv is struggling to co-ordinate operations above the battalion level.
BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces have likely made notable advances along Bakhmut’s southern flank over the last 24-48 hours, though the full extent of these gains remains unconfirmed at present. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on 25 July that Russian forces have withdrawn from their positions in Andriivka, located six miles (10km) south of Bakhmut. If accurate, this would represent one of the most significant, though still relatively limited, advances in recent weeks. Russian sources have acknowledged over the last 24 hours that Ukrainian forces have also entered the southern outskirts of the village of Klishchiivka, located roughly two miles (3km) north of Andriivka, and that they have taken additional elevated positions in the area. These reports support the claims made by the General Staff, meaning Ukrainian forces are therefore likely pushing forwards. Some Russian sources reported that a lack of unit rotations and effective Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) are making it increasingly difficult for Russian forces to defend these positions.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian sources claim that their forces took control of a Ukrainian position near Karmazynivka, located seven miles (12km) south-west of Svatove. While these claims remain unverified, geolocated footage from 24 July indicates the Russian forces have made limited advances south of Kreminna; Russian sources have also reported advances in the forested area near the town, as well as attacks near Bilohorivka and Serbrianske, both of which are situated around seven miles (12km) south of Kreminna. Notably, the Ukrainian General Staff did not report that their forces had successfully repelled Russian advances along the eastern front on 24-25 July. Such an omission likely represents tacit acknowledgement that Russian forces have made advances in these areas over the last 24 hours.
SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces have likely made limited gains along the Vremevsky salient in Donetsk oblast, though progress remains slow. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defence Tavriisk Direction Group of Forces, Valeriy Shershen, reported on 24 July that Ukrainian forces have advanced between 350m and 1.4km in the Berdiansk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff specified on 25 July that they were successful near Staromaiorske, located six miles (10km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). It remains unclear if Ukrainian forces are moving through the village, or if they can retain control of newly taken positions amid concerted Russian counter-attacks. Further west in Zaporizhzhia oblast, Ukrainian forces have also continued offensive operations; they have likely made limited advances towards Robotyne, located eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv.
STRIKES: Overnight on 24-25 July, Russian forces launched drone strikes against Cherkasy, Kyiv, Poltava and Zhytomyr oblasts. At the time of writing, the number of drones remains unknown. While the authorities in Kyiv claimed that air defences intercepted all the drones which targeted the capital, others reportedly damaged agricultural facilities in Poltava and civilian infrastructure in Zhytomyr.
Ukraine-Russia: ZNPP meltdown highly unlikely despite reactor shutdown transition, presence of mines. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on 24 July that Russian authorities at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) had ordered Reactor 4 into ‘hot shutdown’ mode. Energoatom insisted the specific reactor must be operated exclusively in cold shutdown, which would limit the risk of radiation leaks during an incident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on 24 July that its experts had observed anti-personnel miles in an area of the ZNPP, but noted any detonation of them should not affect the site’s nuclear safety. A catastrophic meltdown at the plant remains highly unlikely in the short term, even if fighting erupted around the plant. While Reactor 4 and 5 (also currently in hot shutdown) would be the most vulnerable during any fighting, the ZNPP’s six reactors are protected by containments; this would mitigate the release of radiation in the event of any incident.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

NUCLEAR: The Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on 24 July that the Russian authorities at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) ordered Reactor 4 into ‘hot shutdown’ mode. Energoatom insisted that the reactor must be operated exclusively in ‘cold shutdown’, as this would limit the risk of radiation leaks during an incident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on 24 July that its staff have observed anti-personnel mines around the ZNPP, but noted that their detonation would not affect the site’s nuclear safety. A catastrophic meltdown at the plant remains highly unlikely in the short term, even if fighting breaks out near the facility. While Reactors 4 and 5 (also currently in hot shutdown) would be the most vulnerable during any fighting, the ZNPP’s six reactors are protected by containments; these will mitigate the release of radiation in the event of any incident. For further analysis on the differences between hot and cold shutdown modes (and the key implications) see Sibylline Special Report – Ukraine – 19 July 2023.
AID: Germany and Poland have reached an agreement on establishing a repair centre for Leopard 2 tanks deployed in Ukraine. A German Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesperson, Mitko Müller, stated on 24 July that Berlin welcomed the fact that Leopard tanks can now also be repaired in Poland. Polish Defence Minister Mariusz Błaszczak confirmed on 22 July that a maintenance hub for Leopard tanks is now operating in the southern city of Gliwice. Błaszczak also disclosed that two vehicles have already arrived for repair. Meanwhile, the Spanish defence ministry announced on 24 July that four Leopard 2A4 tanks, alongside other military and humanitarian aid bound for Ukraine, had left for Poland. The package also includes ten M-113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), ten cargo trucks, an armoured multi-purpose vehicle and five ambulances. These donations will ultimately enhance Ukraine’s ground capabilities and allow for the easier maintenance and repair of its equipment, particularly ahead of the next stage of the counter-offensive.
AID: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken cautioned on 23 July that the training and maintenance required to operate F-16 fighter jets could take several months. However, Blinken stated that the process is moving forward. Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov announced earlier this week that training for Ukrainian pilots will begin in August.

FORECAST

GRAIN: Romanian President Klaus Iohannis condemned the Russian military’s 24 July attacks against Ukrainian Danube River ports (Izmail and Reni), stating that the strikes constitute an ‘escalation’ which poses serious risks to Black Sea security. Iohannis noted the infrastructure’s proximity to Romania (roughly 200m from the international border). While direct Russian strikes against Romanian territory remain highly unlikely, the Izmail and Reni attacks nevertheless underscore the elevated risk of conflict spillover-related second-order impacts, especially as these attacks are likely to have a significant impact on Danube River traffic. Almost 30 vessels were stopped near Ukraine’s Izmail port terminal on 24 July after the attacks, according to ship tracking data from MarineTraffic. A further three vessels also dropped anchor along the waterway leading to the Reni-Odesa terminal, highlighting the impact of the strikes on supply chains along the Danube. The route has acted as a crucial alternative thoroughfare for Ukrainian grain exports since Moscow withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) last week. Insiders familiar with the matter told Reuters that several insurance providers are assessing whether to continue covering Ukraine’s Danube ports, as we previously forecast. If coverage is halted, companies are less likely to be involved in the export of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea, which would necessitate alternative overland export options. This will further compound the risk of a spike in global food prices.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed earlier on 25 July to have obtained a document allegedly intended for Russia’s top military and political leadership on how to disrupt the grain deal, indicating Moscow had formulated premeditated plans to scupper the initiative. According to the report, the authenticity of which we cannot confirm, Russia planned to restrict the access of ships to the port of Pivdennyi, to reduce the number of inspection teams and to stop the registration of grain carriers. This reportedly allowed Russia to limit the number of ships heading to Ukrainian ports and to reduce the volume of food exports from Ukraine (Kyiv was consequently unable to export approximately 20 m tonnes of cargo). If authentic, the report indicates that Moscow was never fully committed to adhering to the BSGI. Overall export volumes from Ukrainian ports in recent months have decreased notably; Russian efforts to undermine the BSGI were therefore highly likely taking place in the months leading to Moscow’s withdrawal. US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller warned on 24 July that Russia is possibly preparing a false-flag operation in the Black Sea. Miller claimed this assessment is based on events that took place following Moscow’s withdrawal from the BSGI, such as Russian forces conducting a practice assault against a mock ship in the Black Sea last week. Threats have also been made against ships operating in international waters. Miller’s comments reflect the growing militarisation of the Black Sea; further incidents similar to those cited as evidence by Miller are highly likely in the short term. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 25 July that Ukrainian forces tried to attack a Black Sea Fleet patrol ship using two high-speed unmanned boats. The MoD reported that both remote-controlled boats were destroyed and that there were no casualties. However, it remains unclear whether this attack ever took place. Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated on 25 July that Kyiv will continue to conduct attacks against Russian-occupied Crimea and the Kerch Bridge that connects the peninsular to de jure Russian territory. Amid Ukraine’s determination to expand maritime operations in the Black Sea, Russian Navy Day (30 July) will remain a key flashpoint for increased hostilities. In particular, an uptick in Russian naval activity in the Black Sea and increased attacks against Ukrainian port infrastructure are likely. Celebrations will possibly also spur Kyiv to conduct bolder attacks against the Kerch Bridge and the Crimean peninsula; these in turn would likely trigger Russian retaliation – most likely in the form of long-range drone and missile strikes against Odesa.

Jul 24.

Russia: Denial of ship passage underscores increasing risk of maritime traffic disruption in Black Sea. On 22 July, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) denied a ship passage to Rostov-on-Don. According to the FSB, alleged traces of explosives found in the hold of the boat. Similarly, the shipping crew and name were changed while docked in Ukraine and Turkey, which allegeldly raised suspicions over the risk of Ukraine carrying out a sabotage act against Russia. The FSB’s move comes a week after Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Following the withdrawal, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said it would consider any civilian vessels traveling to Ukrainian Black Sea ports as potential military cargo carriers. The denial of the ship’s passage underlines the heightened risk of further disruption of maritime traffic, with false-flag operations or open attacks against civilian vessels along the grain corridor a growing risk.
Belarus-Poland: Wagner fighters highly unlikely to attack Poland; border provocations remain realistic possibility. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed on 23 July that Wagner Group fighters are putting pressure on Minsk to go on an ‘excursion’ into neighbouring NATO member Poland. According to Lukashenka, the mercenary forces want to go to the Polish capital, Warsaw, and the south-eastern city of Rzeszów. The Belarusian Ministry of Defence (MoD) also said on 20 July that Wagner Group fighters were training Belarusian special forces close to the Polish border. Warsaw announced on 20 July it would move military units to eastern Poland due to the mercenary forces’ presence in Belarus. Lukashenka’s comments are highly likely aimed at driving tensions with NATO. This is in part, because the mercenary force lacks the capability or will to openly attack a NATO member. Border provocations designed to ramp up tensions will nevertheless remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. Improved Polish and Lithuanian border security has mitigated the risk of a repeat of the Belarusian migrant crisis in 2021-22.
OFFENSIVES: The Ukrainian commander of Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems, Colonel Serhiy Baranov, claimed on 22 July that Ukrainian missile and artillery systems have been responsible for around 90% of Russian casualties. He maintained that this is due to high-precision Western artillery systems, which are preventing Russia from conducting effective counter-battery operations. As we have previously assessed, Ukraine’s steady degradation of Russian artillery systems is likely aimed at preparing the battlefield for future offensive operations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 21 July that the tempo of Ukrainian counter-offensive operations will possibly increase soon.
BAKHMUT: Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Maliar reported earlier on 24 July that Ukrainian forces advanced 2.4 miles (4km) in the Bakhmut direction over the last week. Geolocated footage published on 21 July indicated that Ukrainian forces have made marginal progress along the M-03 (E-40) highway, roughly five miles (8km) north-west of Bakhmut. Russian sources furthermore reported on 22 July that elements of airborne VDV and Spetsnaz units launched unsuccessful counter-attacks in an effort to regain these lost positions. Elsewhere, Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces made numerous attempts over the weekend of 22-23 July to break through Russian defences around Berkhivka, located three miles (5km) north-west of Bakhmut. They reportedly conducted renewed efforts earlier on 24 July. Unconfirmed Ukrainian reports indicate that Kyiv’s forces made marginal progress near the town of Bakhmut on 23 July, though this has not been confirmed.
DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 23 July, a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to three miles (5km) in depth and four miles (7km) along the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River west of Svatove and Kreminna. However, there is no indication of such advances. Notably, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 23 July that despite an uptick in small-unit assaults in this sector, Russian gains remain marginal, even though the Russian information sphere continues to assert the opposite. As such, these latest claims are likely part of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) wider campaign to present marginal gains as operationally significant advances. DI assesses that the main objective of Russian operations is to push Ukrainian forces beyond the Oskil River to create a buffer zone around Luhansk oblast. However, Russia’s limited offensive capabilities and its strategic defensive posture mean that this is unlikely to be accomplished in the short term.
SOUTHERN: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces advanced 7.5 miles (12km) across the southern axis, according to Deputy Defence Minister Maliar on 24 July. Ukrainian forces have reportedly made marginal advances along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (along the Vremevsky salient), as well as in western Zaporizhzhia (south of Orikhiv). Russian sources reported on 24 July that Ukrainian precision-guided artillery strikes against Russian logistics, artillery positions and rear areas have increased ‘dramatically’ along the southern axis. The same sources claim that this indicates Ukraine plans to attack in the near future. They claim this assessment is corroborated by the deployment of additional engineering units, including Western-supplied pontoon bridging equipment and demining systems. Heavy fighting also continues around Robotyne (Zaporizhzhia), located eight miles (13km) south-east of Orikhiv.
STRIKES: On 22 July, five days after the Kerch Strait Bridge attack, a Ukrainian drone struck an ammunition depot near Oktyabrske in Krasnohvardiiske (Crimea). Russian sources also claimed that a drone struck an airfield near Oktyabrske, where Russian forces have reportedly been stockpiling defence equipment. As a result, traffic along the Kerch Strait Bridge was temporarily suspended. On 24 July, Russian media outlets and Telegram channels reported that a drone strike damaged buildings near the Russian MoD in Moscow. Unspecified Ukrainian defence sources claim that Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was responsible for the drone attack, though this cannot be confirmed.
STRIKES: On 23 July, Russian forces launched 19 missiles against Odesa oblast, including five Onyx, three Kh-22 and four Kalibr cruise missiles, as well as five Iskandr-K and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. While Russian media outlets claim that the strikes targeted sites where Ukraine produces maritime drones, the Orthodox Cathedral in Odesa city centre was also damaged, underscoring the increased collateral risks. According to Ukraine’s air force, its air defences intercepted nine missiles.
STRIKES: On 24 July, Russia launched 15 drones against the Reni River port on the River Danube, destroying several Ukrainian grain warehouses. This comes amid Russia’s strike campaign against Odesa following Moscow’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Strikes against Danube ports are highly likely part of Russia’s broader effort to destroy Ukrainian grain export facilities. They indicate a continued determination by Moscow to undermine the prospects of a rapid restoration of the deal. As such, while Kyiv announced that it is seeking to develop alternative export routes to the Black Sea’s grain corridor, exports of agricultural products via the Danube will remain at risk; Russian forces will most likely continue to target Ukrainian port and grain facilities along both the Danube and the Black Sea coast.
STRIKES: On 23 July, the GUR reported that Russian intelligence is assessing the state of Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure. Russian forces are reportedly using various capabilities, including satellite imagery, to monitor these facilities. If accurate, these reports possibly indicate that Moscow is preparing for a winter strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid, akin to the campaign it conducted between October 2022 and February 2023. At present, Russian forces are prioritising military and logistical targets, as well as port infrastructure following the collapse of the BSGI. However, there is a realistic possibility that Moscow will return to targeting energy infrastructure in the run-up to winter, despite the last campaign’s failure to achieve any significant strategic or military successes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

BLACK SEA: On 22 July, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) denied a ship passage to Rostov-on-Don (Russia). According to the FSB, traces of explosives were found in the hold of the vessel; the crew and name of the vessel were also allegedly changed while it was docked in Ukraine and Turkey. The Russian authorities were reportedly concerned that Ukraine intended to carry out an act of sabotage against Russia. This comes a week after Russia withdrew from the BSGI. Following Moscow’s decision to leave the pact, the Russian MoD said it would consider any civilian vessels traveling to Ukrainian Black Sea ports as potential military cargo carriers (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 20 July 2023). The NATO-Ukraine Council is likely to convene on 26 July to discuss security in the Black Sea after Moscow’s withdrawal from the grain deal. However, grain exports are highly unlikely to restart in the short term. The denial of the ship’s passage underlines the heightened risk of further disruption for maritime traffic; there is also a growing risk of false-flag operations, raids, seizures and/or attacks against civilian vessels transiting the grain corridor.
CONSCRIPTION: Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on 24 July that raises the upper age limit for reservists by five years. According to the law, the age limit for senior officers in the mobilisation reserve has been increased to 65 years of age, while the limit for junior officers has been changed to 60 years of age. The legislation will come into force on 1 January 2024; it envisions a gradual transition to new reserve terms until 2028 and comes after Russian lawmakers announced that a planned increase to the age limit for conscription will not be implemented (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 21 July 2023). Ultimately, the legislation signals that Moscow recognises that manpower shortages will remain a problem in the coming weeks and months. The latest decrees also lower the likelihood of another single nationwide mobilisation drive; the Russian government is almost certainly keen to avoid any domestic backlash.

FORECAST

BELARUS: Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed on 23 July that Wagner Group fighters are putting pressure on Minsk to allow them to go on an ‘excursion’ into neighbouring Poland (a NATO member). According to Lukashenka, the mercenary forces want to ‘visit’ the Polish capital Warsaw and the south-eastern city of Rzeszów – a major transit hub for Western weapons shipments heading to Ukraine. The monitoring group Belarusian Hajun Project reported on 23 July that the Wagner Group’s tenth military convoy had arrived in Belarus. According to the project, at least 3,500 Wagner mercenaries are already in Belarus, though a Wagner commander claimed the number is closer 10,000. Satellite imagery of the Tsel military garrison in central Belarus purports to show an increase in vehicles and equipment; further Wagner deployments in the coming weeks are likely. Lukashenka’s comments are highly likely rhetorical and aimed at driving tensions with NATO, especially as the mercenary force lacks the capability or will to attack a NATO member country openly. The Belarusian Ministry of Defence (MoD) also said on 20 July that Wagner Group fighters were training Belarusian special forces close to the Polish border. Warsaw announced on 20 July that it would move military units to eastern Poland due to the mercenary forces’ presence in Belarus. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that Wagner fighters in Belarus pose a credible military threat to Poland or Lithuania given the protections laid out in Article 5. Furthermore, questions remain around the Wagner Group’s capabilities. The Russian MoD announced on 12 July that the Wagner Group was finalising the transfer of its heavy military equipment to Russia’s regular armed forces, meaning it is unlikely that the group retains significant independent offensive capabilities, including armour, air defence assets and artillery. While open military confrontation along the border remains highly unlikely, border provocations designed to ramp up tensions will remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. Improved Polish and Lithuanian border security has mitigated the risk of a repeat of the Belarusian migrant crisis in 2021-22, though attempts to weaponise migrants once again also remain a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)

28 Jul 23. Ukraine ‘recaptures’ village from Russia amid counteroffensive. Ukraine says it has recaptured a village on the southern front, as Kyiv ramps up its counter-offensive. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted a video in which a group of Ukrainian soldiers said they had taken control of the village of Staromaiorske in the Donetsk region next to the Zaporizhzhia province.

“Our South! Our guys! Glory to Ukraine!” President Zelensky declared.

Russian military bloggers have confirmed that Ukrainian forces have taken part of the village that was the focus of Ukraine’s attacks in recent days. The expulsion of Russian forces from the village would mark one of the first such victories on the southern front since Ukraine started its counter-offensive in June. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

27 Jul 23. Russia is raising the maximum conscription age by three years, widening the pool of men that can be called up to serve as fighting intensifies in Ukraine’s southern regions. A bill that passed through a key security committee in the upper house of parliament on Thursday extends the upper age limit to 30. Currently, men aged 18 to 27 are eligible for one year of compulsory military service. The move is part of the Kremlin’s plan to grow the country’s armed forces, announced soon after the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February last year, as Moscow increasingly prepares for a long-term conflict. The measure reflects a broader militarisation of Russian society. If signed into law by President Vladimir Putin, the bill would come into force in January and broaden the pool of potential conscripts by more than 2mn men by 2027, according to projections by independent demographer Alexey Raksha. The move came as fighting intensified in Ukraine’s southern front lines, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia region. Russia also launched further missile strikes on Black Sea ports in what western officials say is an attempt to cripple Ukraine’s grain industry and disrupt global food markets. The number of Russian army recruits depends on presidential orders issued ahead of each conscription round. These occur twice a year, in spring and autumn, with about 120,000-150,000 usually called up each time. Late last year, the defence ministry announced plans to increase Russia’s regular army from about 1mn men to 1.5mn, including both conscripts and those who sign up voluntarily as contract servicemen, though analysts doubt that either figure has much bearing on reality. Conscripts are not supposed to be sent to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though there have been many reports of this happening. The army has recently focused on expanding its ranks of contract soldiers. Others have joined more independent fighting forces such as the Wagner paramilitary group. (Source: FT.com)

27 Jul 23. Subcontracting War: “торгуватися” That’s Ukrainian for Bargain. Nearly half of Republicans and GOP-leaning independents say the U.S. is giving too much aid to Ukraine. That’s rich, given that the GOP has long advocated boosting defense spending to achieve “peace through strength.” But does that peace end at U.S. borders? Following a brutal invasion featuring attacks on civilian targets that have killed at least 9,000 innocents (and likely “considerably” more, according to the UN), Russia’s malignancy will continue to metastasize if it isn’t cauterized in Ukraine. On July 17, a third of GOP House members voted to cut off all military aid to Ukraine. Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that this was a terrible message for the United States to be sending to Russia at such a critical moment in the conflict. It might be hard for some to say out loud, but the war in Ukraine is proving the much-vaunted Russian military to be much more of a paper tiger. The U.S.’s long-standing superpower foe has been pinned down and pummelled following its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine 17 months ago. (Some maintain the U.S. provoked Russia into invading Ukraine, which is akin to saying the U.S. provoked Japan into World War II by imposing sanctions on it).

While numbers are sketchy, the consensus is that nearly half of the Russian military’s front-line armor has been destroyed, abandoned, rendered useless, or captured by Ukrainian forces.

Let’s pull out a pencil and jot down some ballpark figures on the back of an envelope. So far, the U.S. has said it is providing Ukrainian with $43bn (PDF) in military aid — which works out to about $2.5bn a month since the war began. Meanwhile, the cost of the U.S. military since the invasion has been about $70bn a month.

This crude calculation suggests the U.S. (and its allies) are subcontracting out the decimation of Moscow’s military for about 4% of the Pentagon’s annual budget. No U.S. troops are risking their lives on the Russo-Ukrainian front.

War is a serious business, and one that is too important to leave only to the accountants. But the pocket-change pittance the Pentagon is paying to pulverize Putin’s predators is, to date, the military торгуватися (bargain) of the century. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Project on Government Oversight)

27 Jul 23. NATO-Ukraine Council Addresses Serious Security Situation in the Black Sea. The NATO-Ukraine Council met on Wednesday (26 July 2023) to address the serious security situation in the Black Sea region following Russia’s unilateral termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg convened the meeting following a request for crisis consultation from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană chaired the Council.

Allies and Ukraine strongly condemned Russia’s decision to withdraw from the Black Sea grain deal and its deliberate attempts to stop Ukraine’s agricultural exports on which hundreds of ms of people worldwide depend. They also condemned Russia’s recent missile attacks on Odesa, Mykolaiv, and other port cities, including Moscow’s cynical drone attack on the Ukrainian grain storage facility in the Danube port city of Reni, very close to the Romanian border. Allies noted that Russia’s new warning area in the Black Sea, within Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone, has created new risks for miscalculation and escalation, as well as serious impediments to freedom of navigation.

Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană said: “Russia continues to show utter disrespect for international law and for the people worldwide who depend on Ukrainian grain. Russia is threatening civilian ships, terrorising peaceful cities, and destroying parts of the world’s cultural heritage with its brutal strikes. NATO is united. We stand in solidarity with our Black Sea Allies, we will continue to protect one another, and we will continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said: “Russia bears full responsibility for its dangerous and escalatory actions in the Black Sea region. Russia must stop weaponising hunger, and threatening the world’s most vulnerable people with food instability. Russia’s actions also pose substantial risks to the stability of the Black Sea region, which is of strategic importance to NATO. Allies are stepping up support to Ukraine and increasing our vigilance. We remain ready to defend every inch of Allied territory from any aggression.”

Allies welcomed the continued efforts of Türkiye to revitalise the grain deal, and the efforts of other Allies – including Bulgaria and Romania – as well as the European Union and the United Nations to enable the continued export of Ukrainian grain by land and sea. Allies also made clear that they would continue to provide Ukraine with major military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.

NATO and Allies are stepping up surveillance and reconnaissance in the Black Sea region, including with maritime patrol aircraft and drones. Since last year, in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, NATO has significantly increased its presence in the region, including with two new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria and Romania.

Today marked the second meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, following its inaugural meeting at the Vilnius Summit earlier in July. NATO ambassadors and invitee Sweden were joined by videoconference by Oleksandr Kubrakov, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure; and Brigadier General Oleksii Hromov, Deputy Chief of Main Operational Directorate (J3) of General Staff of the Armed Forces. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/NATO)

26 Jul 23. Ukraine launches main thrust of its counter-offensive against Russia. Kyiv’s forces are backed by thousands of troops and Western arms as US official says: ‘This is the big test’

Ukraine launched the main thrust of its counter-offensive on Wednesday with thousands of men and Western armoured vehicles pouring onto the frontlines in Zaporizhzhia.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, on Wednesday night hailed his country’s “very good results” on the front line, and promised to provide details of their successes soon.

An enlarged Ukrainian force, whose ranks are swelled with Western-trained troops, and around 100 Western-supplied armoured vehicles, hopes to advance south to sever a land bridge to Crimea.

The new operation, if successful, could take one to three weeks, Ukrainian officials have told Washington. “This is the big test,” one senior US official said.

Ukraine is currently attacking in three directions, in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Bakhmut.

Sources within the Pentagon told the New York Times that Ukrainian officials are focusing on Zaporizhzhia, southern Ukraine as turmoil engulfs Russian leadership in the region.

According to one official, Ukraine sensed an opportunity to gain ground after the local regional Russian commander, Major General Ivan Popov, claimed he was ousted after raising battlefield concerns with his superiors.

“The Russians are stretched,” an official told the New York Times. “They are still experiencing problems with logistics, supply, personnel and weapons. They’re feeling the pressure.”

As the counter-offensive entered full throttle, artillery battles flared along the front in Zaporizhzhia.

Igor Konashenkov, the spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry, said a “massive” assault and fierce battles south of Orikhiv, a town that Ukraine holds about 60 miles north of the Sea of Azov.

Russian officials said the assault involved Ukrainian troops who had been trained overseas and were equipped with around 100 armoured vehicles, including German-made Leopards and American-made Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

Footage showing the Ukrainian advance on the Zaporizhzhia frontline in Bradley vehicles on Wednesday appeared to support those claims.

Ukrainian officials have reportedly told their American counterparts their ambition is to advance south – over terrain covered by Russian mines – towards the city of Tokmak.

They then hope to advance to Melitopol, near the coast, with the ultimate goal of severing the so-called land bridge between Russian-occupied Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula.

Failing that, they hope to bring Ukrainian forces within range of the Crimean peninsula.

However, analysts speculated that the Ukrainian briefing of secret plans to US news outlets could be a feint to distract Moscow.

Ukrainian troops along the southern front have reported incremental progress in pushing Russian troops back, with their way impeded by minefields and heavy Russian shelling and airstrikes.

White House officials are closely following their progress.

Mr Zelensky has previously conceded that the offensive in Russian-occupied areas of the country’s east and southeast is going more slowly than he would like.

But in a video address on Wednesday night, Mr Zelensky said: “Today our boys had very good results at the front. Good for them. Details will follow.”

Thousands of well-trained reinforcements, which were being held back by Kyiv, have now been deployed to the front lines, according to Pentagon sources.

Many of those units have been trained on advanced manoeuvre tactics by Western allies.

It appeared to tally with previous speculation from Washington’s defence officials that Kyiv would hold back its best-trained forces until it had identified weak spots in Russian lines.

Pentagon officials said there were substantive arguments for Ukraine’s decision to hone in on Zaporizhzhia.

In addition to the commotion among the local Russian leadership, Ukrainian forces have made headway clearing a path through Russian defences, including minefields in the region.

Kyiv also sees an opportunity to exploit vulnerabilities far behind the front lines to target Russian ammunition depots and command posts.

Before news broke of the Ukrainian assault, Kyiv was facing criticism for going too slowly among its western allies.

James Heappey, the UK’s armed forces minister, on Wednesday dismissed such concerns in an interview with The Telegraph.

He said the effort was progressing according to a plan worked out with Britain and America over the winter.

He stressed that Kyiv was being “appropriately cautious” in how it deployed large numbers of men and western weapons into dense Russian minefields.

Ukraine was waiting for the right moment to strike with its full force, he said, and was wise to keep western armour ‘out of sight’ until then.

Other Western officials have underscored the point that Kyiv was being judicious in committing the second part of its force to the best possible avenue for attack.

Separately, Joe Biden on Wednesday ordered his administration to begin sharing evidence of alleged Russian war crimes in Ukraine with the International Criminal Court.

The Pentagon had been resistant to the move amid concerns any cooperation with the court in the Hague could open the way for the prosecution of American troops deployed overseas.

The ICC, a permanent war crimes tribunal, in March issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for suspected deportation of children from Ukraine, which would be a war crime. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

26 Jul 23. Dstl unveils battle-winning scientific support to Ukraine.

Scientists praised for vital role following Putin’s illegal and unprovoked invasion. Since the start of Russia’s illegal invasion, the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) has played a pivotal role in the UK’s efforts to help the Ukrainian armed forces defend their country.

With agility and innovation, Dstl has made use of every skill, idea and technology that we and our partners have to offer.

What we have done to date has been a critical factor in strategic and tactical success, ensuring MOD science and technology adds impact and advantage to defence and national security operations.

Minister for the Armed Forces James Heappey said:

“What Dstl has done over the last year is bring to bear the brilliance of UK defence science – in partnership with the UK defence industry, defence intelligence, and the cunning of the UK and Ukrainian militaries – in order to deliver capability at pace for the Ukrainians.

“That has not only kept them in the fight but put them in a position where they can win.

“Dstl has a lot to be proud of for the fact that we have reached that point.”

Hundreds of Dstl experts have been called upon to support Ukraine, including in areas such as:

Counter drone technology
Counter electronic warfare
Protection systems
Analytic insight

The Defence Command Paper 2023 revealed that Dstl used the depth of its scientific knowledge on camouflage, concealment and deception techniques to provide novel and innovative solutions to improve the survivability of the M270 Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) gifted to Ukraine by the UK.

Using its extensive materials expertise, Dstl also developed bespoke and readily available armour protection solutions for the Challenger 2 main battle tanks, to provide additional protection from specific Russian threats.

And Dstl technical expertise enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to mount and integrate the UK-gifted Starstreak short-range air-defence system on to a number of Ukrainian armoured fighting vehicles.

Dstl has also provided ongoing operational support and advice to the armed forces and our security partners since the start of the conflict covering many more areas.

Our rapid support to operations and crises is only made possible because of MOD’s enduring science and technology investment in research, key capabilities and facilities, allowing it to provide an indispensable source of novel and diverse technical support at pace.

We will continue to provide support to the UK response to Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

We stand united with Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

26 Jul 23. US maintains Ukraine counter-offensive makes “slow but steady progress.” US DoD will sustain the “slow but steady” counter-offensive while Ukraine starts defending liberated territory.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has announced it will provide its 43rd military assistance package, worth $400m, to Ukraine on 25 July 2023 as the country wages a slow but steady counter-offensive.

The DoD will supply additional air defence munitions, artillery and other ammunition, armoured vehicles, anti-armour weapons and other equipment while the Ukrainian counter-offensive continues at a pace that was described by the Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary, Sabrina Singh, as “slow but steady progress.”

The package includes additional munitions for Patriot air defence systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Stinger anti-aircraft systems; additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds and 60mm mortar rounds, among other equipment.

“More air defence for Ukraine, more artillery, more long-range weapons [are needed],” the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stated two days earlier. “The recipe for ending the war is obvious: everything depends on the unity and determination of all those who value freedom, culture and life.”

“Slow but steady” despite defending territory and internal betrayal?

In the Pentagon press briefing on the 25 July, Singh was asked by one reporter what the DoD thought of Russian forces mounting an offensive near the Oskil River near the Kupiansk region.

Referring the journalist to Ukraine Ministry of Defence, many are left to ask if this demonstrates what the DoD labelled “slow but steady progress” if Ukraine must divert forces to defend territory it had previously liberated.

Furthermore, the military aid comes at a time when Zelenskyy also faced what he called “internal betrayal” from top government and military officials exploiting the wealth of the state at a time of a brutal war.

“No one will forgive MPs, judges, ‘military commissars’ or any other officials for putting themselves in opposition to the state. For some, it’s about islands and resorts during the war, for others it’s about lining one’s pockets in the military enlistment office, for others it’s about bribes in the courts. For any public official, this is a betrayal of state principles, a betrayal of the interests of society,” Zelenskyy stated. (Source: army-technology.com)

26 Jul 23. Russia: Proliferation of PMCs underscores militarisation of Russian society, efforts to improve domestic security. On 25 July, the Russian State Duma approved a law authorising governors of regions under martial law to create ‘enterprises’, akin to private military companies (PMCs). The de facto PMCs will officially participate in law enforcement activities such as countering sabotage and reconnaissance groups and protecting state borders, though they will also likely take part in the war in Ukraine. The PMCs will be funded by both regional and federal budgets, with the Ministry of Defence providing them with military weapons. The law ultimately reflects the proliferation of PMCs in Russia, with efforts to encourage competition between smaller units likely aimed at preventing the emergence of a single dominant PMC actor, such as the Wagner group. However, the steady militarisation of Russian security and law enforcement will present command and control issues for Moscow, increase human rights risks in their area of operation, but will also go some way to improving domestic security following Wagner’s mutiny. (Source: Sibylline)

26 Jul 23. Russia ‘preparing to blockade Ukraine.’ Moscow could be preparing to blockade Ukraine using its Black Sea Fleet, according to the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The ministry warned in an intelligence update that any move to cut off the vital trade route would increase the possibility of violence in the area. Britain is said to be “carefully monitoring” Russian activity there after Moscow withdrew from an agreement last week which guaranteed safe passage for merchant ships transporting foodstuffs out of Ukraine via the Black Sea.

The MoD said in a statement: “The modern corvette Sergey Kotov, has deployed to the southern Black Sea, patrolling the shipping lane between Bospohorus and Odesa.

“There is a realistic possibility that it will form part of a task group to intercept commercial vessels Russia believes are heading to Ukraine.

“There is now the potential for the intensity and scope of violence in the area to increase.”

Russia said on Tuesday that Ukraine had launched an airstrike on the Sergey Kotov, but apparently shot down the drones before they could cause any damage. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

26 Jul 23. Medvedev: ‘Russia is fighting a war in cyberspace.’ Russia is facing attacks from computer hackers and needs to improve its security, a former president has said.

Dmitry Medvedev, who sits on Russia’s security council, said: “All manner of challenges and threats in this field have increased dramatically since the start of the special military operation.

“A real war has been unleashed against Russia in cyberspace.

“We need to actively improve domestic technologies and all of our products, making sure that they function in the safest possible way and are capable of [blocking] or at least minimizing attacks in cyberspace.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

25 Jul 23. Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine. Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced additional security assistance to meet Ukraine’s critical security and defense needs. This authorization is the Biden Administration’s forty-third drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021 as the U.S. government has continuously provided Ukraine with the weapons and equipment it needs for the battlefield. Today’s commitment in security assistance, valued at up to $400 m, includes additional air defense munitions, artillery and other ammunition, armored vehicles, anti-armor weapons, and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia’s ongoing war of aggression.

The capabilities in this package include:

Additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS);
Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
155mm and 105mm artillery rounds;
120mm and 60mm mortar rounds;
32 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin and other anti-armor systems and rockets;
Hornet Unmanned Aerial Systems;
Hydra-70 aircraft rockets;
Tactical air navigation systems;
Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing;
Over 28 m rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades;
Night vision devices and thermal imagery systems; and
Spare parts, training munitions, and other field equipment.

The United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with capabilities to meet its immediate battlefield needs and longer-term security assistance requirements. (Source: U.S. DoD)

25 Jul 23. UN atomic watchdog inspectors have found landmines at the site of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, occupied by Russian forces since the early days of the war after their full-scale invasion last year. The International Atomic Energy Agency said the mines were planted in a buffer zone between the internal and external perimeter barriers, at what is the biggest nuclear facility in Europe. “Having such explosives on the site is inconsistent with the IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance and creates additional psychological pressure on plant staff,” Rafael Grossi, the IAEA’s director- general, said in a statement on Monday night. But he added that the “detonation of these mines should not affect the site’s nuclear safety and security systems”. Since last year Ukraine has accused Russia of militarising the plant by basing troops there and storing weaponry at the site. It is located in Energodar, a city in the southern regions of Ukraine, which Russia’s forces occupy along with the country’s far east. Grossi said the IAEA had been aware of the previous placement of mines “outside the site perimeter and also at particular places inside”. He added the nuclear body’s permanent inspectors on the site “have been told that it is a military decision, and in an area controlled by military”. The IAEA said its experts had carried out inspections and regular “walk-downs” across the nuclear plant “without seeing any heavy military equipment”. But they said they were “continuing to request access to the roofs of the [plant’s] reactors and their turbine halls, including units three and four which are of particular interest”. Western officials, military analysts and scientists have long warned about the possibility of a nuclear accident at Zaporizhzhia. Safety concerns spiked last month after the nearby Kakhovka dam along the Dnipro river was blown up, flooding swaths of land and threatening to deprive the nuclear plant of water needed to cool nuclear fuel on site, even though electricity generation was halted last year.

“The IAEA experts are continuing to closely monitor the situation regarding the availability of water for cooling the ZNPP’s six reactors and other essential nuclear safety and security functions,” the IAEA statement said. “Available water supply remains relatively stable . . . the site continues to have sufficient water for some months,” it added. Lingering concerns about the nuclear power plant come a week into a Russian air strike campaign that has targeted Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in a bid to choke Ukrainian grain exports. Moscow last week withdrew from a UN-brokered agreement from last summer that created a maritime food shipment corridor to ease Russia’s Black Sea blockade of Ukrainian ports. In a phone call with UK prime minister Rishi Sunak on Tuesday, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy pleaded for additional air defence systems to protect his country’s ports, including the provincial capital Odesa, whose historic centre was this weekend heavily scarred by a Russian missile strike. “Ukraine urgently needs to strengthen its air defence to protect its historical heritage and continue the Black Sea Grain Initiative,” Zelenskyy wrote on Twitter. On Monday Russia launched drone strikes on Ukraine’s Reni port on the Danube, which forms a border with Romania, an EU country and member of the Nato military alliance. Officials said all those aimed at Kyiv were intercepted, but some infrastructure damage was reported in other regions. EU agriculture ministers are scheduled to meet in Brussels on Tuesday to discuss alternative routes for Ukrainian grain to reach world markets after Russia threatened to attack ships in the Black Sea, the main supply route. Plans include increasing capacity to bring cereals out over land and river routes through the EU, said Luis Planas, Spain’s agriculture minister, who is chairing the meeting. (Source: FT.com)

25 Jul 23. British spies using AI to disrupt flow of weapons to Russia. Richard Moore, the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6, answers questions after giving his first public speech since becoming head of the organization, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on Nov. 30, 2021. British spies are already using artificial intelligence to hamper the supply of weapons to Russia, the head of Britain’s MI6 agency said Wednesday, predicting that Western intelligence agencies will increasingly have to focus on tracking the malign use of AI by hostile states.

In a rare public speech, Richard Moore also urged Russians who oppose the invasion of Ukraine to spy for Britain, saying others had already done so since the war began.

“Our door is always open,” he said.

In a speech that depicted artificial intelligence as both a huge potential asset and a major threat, Moore said his staff at Britain’s foreign intelligence agency “are combining their skills with AI and bulk data to identify and disrupt the flow of weapons to Russia for use against Ukraine.”

Moore called China the “single most important strategic focus” for his agency and said, “we will increasingly be tasked with obtaining intelligence on how hostile states are using AI in damaging, reckless and unethical ways.”

Moore, who has previously warned that the West was falling behind rivals in the AI race, said his service “together with our allies, intends to win the race to master the ethical and safe use of AI.”

But he said AI would not replace the need for human spies, arguing that the “human factor” will remain crucial in an era of rapidly evolving machine learning.

“As AI trawls the ocean of open source, there will be even greater value in landing, with a well-cast fly, the secrets that lie beyond the reach of its nets,” he said.

He argued that “the unique characteristics of human agents in the right places will become still more significant,” highlighting spies’ ability to “influence decisions inside a government or terrorist group.”

Moore also told an audience at the British ambassador’s residence in Prague that Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine had run out of steam and “there appears to be little prospect of the Russian forces regaining momentum.”

He said Ukraine’s counteroffensive was proving “a hard grind” against strong Russian defenses, but he was optimistic it would succeed.

Moore said the government of President Vladimir Putin was beset by “venality, infighting and callous incompetence” and the mutiny by Wagner Group mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin had “exposed the inexorable decay of the unstable autocracy over which Putin presides.”

He said Putin was “under pressure” after the brief rebellion and the “humiliating” deal he struck with the help of Belarus to end it. The Kremlin says Prigozhin attended a military meeting in Moscow with Putin after the mutiny.

“He really didn’t fight back against Prigozhin. He cut a deal to save his skin,” Moore told the audience.

“Prigozhin started off as a traitor at breakfast, he had been pardoned by supper, and then two days later he was invited for tea,” Moore said. “So there are some things that even the chief of MI6 finds a little bit difficult to interpret, in terms of who’s in and who’s out.”

He accused Russia of using Wagner as a tool of imperialism in Africa, offering leaders in the Central African Republic, Mali and other countries a “Faustian pact” of protection in return for handing over mineral wealth to Russia.

Moore also called out Iran for fueling further conflict in Ukraine by supplying Russia with drones and other weapons — a policy he said “has provoked internal quarrels at the highest level of the regime in Tehran.”

Speaking publicly about spycraft is still something of a novelty for Britain’s intelligence services. The government refused even to confirm the existence of MI6 until 1992, and public speeches by its leaders are infrequent.

Moore chose to give Wednesday’s address in the Czech capital, home of the 1968 “Prague Spring” freedom movement that was crushed by Soviet tanks.

Evoking that moment, he said many Russians now felt “the same tugs of conscience as their predecessors did in 1968.” The crushing of the Prague Spring spurred a wave of defections from the USSR to the West.

“I invite them to do what others have already done this past 18 months and join hands with us,” he said, assuring prospective defectors that “their secrets will always be safe with us.”

Most intelligence defectors’ names are never known — unless something goes wrong. Former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned and seriously sickened with a Soviet-made nerve agent in 2018 in the English city of Salisbury, where he had been living quietly for years.

Moore recounted how an agent codenamed Ecclesiastic, who penetrated German intelligence for MI6 in 1944, was looked after by the service until her death at age 100. He said MI6 agents then gathered to scatter her ashes in the English Channel.

“Our loyalty to our agents is lifelong, and our gratitude eternal,” he said. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)

24 Jul 23. Two drones crashed into buildings in Moscow while more than a dozen targeted Crimea, with one hitting a weapons cache on the annexed peninsula, said Russian officials on Monday. The attacks, which authorities said were conducted by Ukraine early on Monday, come a day after Russia launched a barrage of missiles on the southern Ukrainian port city of Odesa, killing one person and severely damaging the city’s historic cathedral. They also mark at least the fourth time that drones have reached Moscow since early May when two drones were shot down late at night over the Kremlin. Others have hit buildings in suburban areas. Ukraine does not usually claim responsibility for strikes in Russian territory and Crimea, but a senior official strongly suggested Kyiv had carried out the attacks as part of increased use of its “army of drones”. On Monday, Russia’s defence ministry claimed it successfully took down both drones over Moscow using “electromagnetic warfare”, where specialists disrupt the signals that guide drones to their targets. One crashed into the top floors of a glass office building on Likhacheva Avenue, videos showed, causing substantial damage to the structure, which appears to have been under construction and not in use. State media reported that another hit a low-rise building on Komsomolsky Avenue, a main thoroughfare through Moscow, causing minor damage to the roof. Both sites are located relatively close to the defence ministry’s main headquarters. A man was detained early on Monday filming the building, according to the Baza telegram channel, which is close to Russian police forces. “Drone strikes on two non-residential buildings were recorded at around four o’clock this morning. No serious damage or casualties,” Moscow mayor Sergei Sobyanin wrote on his official social media channel on Monday. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: “All the drones were neutralised.” A resident of an apartment block near the Komsomolsky Avenue drone crash site recorded a video from inside his apartment, showing that the explosion shattered the glass in his windows. Both roads were closed after the attacks. Workers clear broken glass at a building damaged in the drone attack in Moscow © Yuri Kochetkov/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock Russia’s defence minister said 17 drones were launched at Crimea, which was occupied and illegally annexed by Moscow in 2014. The peninsula’s governor said one drone hit a weapons store in Dzhankoi in the north, and road and rail travel in the area was suspended. Settlements in a 5km radius around the site were evacuated.

All the drones targeting Crimes were either shot down or suppressed using electromagnetic defences, the ministry said. Eleven crashed in the Black Sea and three landed on the peninsula, while no casualties were reported, it added. Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, said in a Telegram post: “Electronic warfare and air defence are less and less able to protect the skies of the occupiers. Whatever happened there, there will be more of it.” Fedorov’s comments highlight Ukraine’s strategy of neutralising Russia’s military threat from Crimea. Moscow has heavily militarised the Black Sea peninsula since 2014 and used it as a staging area to support its full-scale invasion launched 18 months ago. Reducing the threat from the south is vital to helping Kyiv more efficiently conduct its counteroffensive along a more than 1,000km-long frontline in its southern and eastern regions, where Russia occupies about 18 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Addressing the Aspen Security Forum this weekend, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested that further strikes could be conducted on the Crimean Bridge, which was last week damaged for a second time since Russia’s invasion by what Kremlin officials claimed was a Ukrainian sea drone strike. “This is the road that is used to feed the war with ammunition. And it militarises the Crimean peninsula,” Zelenskyy told the conference in Colorado, US. “This is an enemy facility built outside international law, so understandably, it is an objective.” Ukrainian officials said Russia conducted an overnight drone strike against the port of Reni on the Danube river, which marks the country’s border with Romania, a member of the Nato military alliance. Silos were set ablaze by the latest air strike in a Russian campaign that has targeted ports near Odesa after Moscow pulled out of the UN-brokered deal to export Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea. Klaus Iohannis, Romania’s president, said he “strongly condemns the recent Russian attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure on the Danube”. “This is a provocation against Ukraine and Nato given that the strike was conducted de facto at the border with a Nato country,” said a senior Ukrainian military official on condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the matter. (Source: FT.com)

24 Jul 23. NATO Ships Boost Interoperability with Ukraine in Exercise Sea Breeze Off Scottish Coast. Ships from Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG1) participated in Exercise Sea Breeze, which was held June 26 – July 7, off the western coast of Scotland, together with Allies and partners including the Ukrainian Navy. Sea Breeze series is a multinational maritime exercise, led by the USA, to enhance the Black Sea maritime capabilities with Allies and partners. It has been held since 1997. Sea Breeze 2023 brought together 15 NATO Allied and Partner nations to conduct maritime and land command and control and security operations with an emphasis on mine countermeasure and dive operation mission areas.

“The crews of SNMCMG1 feel privileged and deeply honoured to be in a position where we can assist our Ukrainian partners reach new milestones with their mine countermeasures vessels

“During this exercise our full focus and effort has been directed towards supporting the build up of a Ukrainian mine countermeasures capability,” said Commander SNMCMG1, Norwegian Commander Ole Torstein Sjo. “The crews of SNMCMG1 feel privileged and deeply honoured to be in a position where we can assist our Ukrainian partners reach new milestones with their mine countermeasures vessels. I am deeply impressed with what they have achieved so far.”

The exercise aims to build maritime security and stability operations with multinational partners, to enhance the capabilities of Black Sea and Partnership for Peace maritime security forces, while progressively training and preparing the Ukraine Maritime Command staff.

“Providing Ukraine with a capability and tools to secure and safeguard the country’s future after the war is equally important,” continued Commander Sjo. “To be a part of this endeavor is truly something we are proud of, as we stand with our Ukrainian friends.”

During Sea Breeze 2023, the ships of SNMCMG1 included HNLMS Vlaardingen, HNLMS Makkum, and HNLMS Snellius (The Netherlands), ENS Sakala (Estonia), HMS Pembroke (UK), FS Sagittaire (France) and the HNoMS Nordkapp (Norway).

The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One is a multinational naval task force dedicated to ensuring the safety of maritime navigation by providing a constant and credible MCM capability to the Alliance. The group currently operates in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and the eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/NATO)

24 Jul 23. UK Royal Navy divers train Ukrainian troops to disarm explosives. The training will help the Ukrainian Armed Forces neutralise Russian explosive devices in their towns, fields, rivers and lakes.

UK Royal Navy divers, bomb disposal and mine warfare experts are training their Ukrainian counterparts to find and safely neutralise mines and other explosive devices. Russian forces have set up a range of explosive devices during the war in Ukraine. Recently, the commercial satellite imagery company, PlanetLabs, released an image of incongruous “objects resembling explosives on the roof of several power units of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” amid the war in Ukraine.

These devices blight Ukrainian land and waters, so “this training will ensure that once the war is over, Ukrainian people and the commercial shipping industry can live and operate without fear or risk from explosives,” the Royal Navy stated in a release on 21 July.

Specialist personnel from the Royal Navy’s Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG) – experts in dealing with explosive threats on land through extensive experience in Afghanistan, and at sea with the UK’s respected mine warfare forces – used the remote waters of Loch Ewe in north-west Scotland to pass on their knowledge and expertise to Ukrainian Navy divers, Ukrainian explosive ordnance disposal operators and personnel who work with uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs).

Building on training the Royal Navy has provided over the past 12 months to Ukrainian personnel – which includes F-16 fighter pilot and Challenger 2 main battle tank training schemes – this is just one element of the United Kingdom’s widespread commitment to training and supporting Ukraine.

Explosive countermeasure assets

Ukrainian teams used UUVs – submarine robots packed with cutting-edge technology such as sensors that generate images of objects so operators can identify the threat.

Once the team identified a threat, the divers neutralised the device to make the area safe. The training dealt with different types of exercise targets: free-floating buoyant mines, ground mines and improvised explosive devices in, on, and around the water.

According to GlobalData intelligence, though UUVs have been part of naval operations for several decades, advances in vehicular autonomy are driving a newfound interest in large platforms such as Large UUVs or Extra-Large UUVs, as well as swarming capabilities for smaller UUV platforms.

Although the leading intelligence consultancy company expects autonomy to drive the UUV market, manual disarming will continue to play a critical role in disarming explosives.

GlobalData forecasts expenditures in the global UUV market to rise from $379m in 2023 to $965m by 2033 as the market continues to surpass its previous records. Demand for military UUVs is driven by the development of autonomous mine-countermeasure capabilities and the implementation of hybridised fleet initiatives by several nations including China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US. (Source: army-technology.com)

24 Jul 23. Russia blames Ukraine for “terrorist” drone attack on Moscow. Russia’s defence ministry accused Ukraine of a “terrorist” drone attack on Moscow on Monday, after the city’s mayor said that two buildings were hit and media reported that debris was found not far from the defence ministry’s buildings.

The defence ministry said on its Telegram messaging app that two drones “were suppressed and crashed.”

Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said on his Telegram messaging app that two non-residential buildings were struck at around 4 a.m. (0100 GMT), adding that there was no “serious damage or casualties.”

It was unclear whether the drones hit the buildings when they were downed, or whether they deliberately targeted the buildings.

Neither the defence ministry nor the mayor said where the drones were intercepted.

Russia’s state news agencies reported, citing emergency services, said that drone fragments were found near a building on the Komsomolsky Avenue, which runs through central Moscow. The site is about 2 kilometres (1.2 miles) from the defence ministry’s buildings.

Traffic was closed on the Komsomolsky Avenue as well as was on Likhachev Avenue in Moscow’s south, where a high-rise office building was damaged, Russian news agencies reported.

“I was asleep and was woken up by a blast, everything started shaking,” said Polina, a young woman who lives near the high-rise building on Likhachev Avenue.

Russia’s defence ministry television channel Zvezda published a short video on its Telegram channel showing a high-rise building with missing windows on its top floors and damaged structure.

Other Russian Telegram channels, with links to Russia’s security forces, published videos of glass and concrete debris on what they said was the Komsomolsky Avenue.

The alleged attack comes after nearly a week of Russia’s continued pounding of Ukraine’s southern port of Odesa, where on Sunday, missiles killed one person, injuring scores and badly damaging a historic Orthodox cathedral.

There was no immediate comment from Kyiv. Ukraine almost never publicly claims responsibility for attacks inside Russia or on Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine, but has been saying in recent months that destroying Russia’s military infrastructure helps Kyiv’s counteroffensive. (Source: Reuters)

21 Jul 23. Kremlin critic who shot down flight MH17 arrested for ‘inciting extremism.’ The former Russian security officer convicted of shooting down Malaysian airlines flight MH17 was arrested in Moscow, as the Kremlin widened a crackdown on dissent after last month’s Wagner mutiny.

On Friday morning, officers from Russia’s Investigative Committee arrested Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, an extreme nationalist militia leader turned blogger, at his Moscow flat.

At a court appearance in the afternoon he was detained for two months on extremism charges.

His wife, Mirslava Reginskaya, said in a statement released on his Telegram channel that he was arrested at their home at about 11.30 in the morning while she was out.

“I do not know anything about the whereabouts of my husband, he did not get in touch,” Ms Reginskaya said.

At a court appearance later in the afternoon, prosecutors from the Federal Security Service (FSB) requested that he be remanded in custody on charges of inciting extremism. The charge carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.

Girkin stood motionless in a glass cage, his arms folded, during the hearing.

A Girkin, a former FSB officer, was involved in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and played a key role in Russia’s first invasion of eastern Ukraine the same year.

He later fell out with the Kremlin over Vladimir Putin’s refusal to commit to a full-scale war at that time and emerged as an extreme Right-wing critic of the government.

His arrest comes a month after Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner mercenary chief, launched a short-lived mutiny that saw his men seize control of Rostov and march on Moscow.

Girkin had a public feud with Prigozhin, who he had earlier accused of plotting a coup, and there is no evidence linking him to the plot.

Rather his arrest suggests a broader crackdown on “angry nationalists” whose venomous criticisms of the war effort have previously been tolerated.

“Strelkov had overstepped all conceivable boundaries a long time ago, sparking the desire among security forces – from the FSB to military chiefs – to apprehend him,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, an expert on the Russian elite.

“[His] arrest undeniably serves the interests of the ministry of defence. This is a direct outcome of Prigozhin’s mutiny: the army’s command now wields greater political leverage to quash its opponents in the public sphere.”

‘Pulling the trigger’ in Donbas

Igor Girkin fought as a foreign volunteer in wars in Transnistria and Bosnia in the 1990s before joining the FSB. He has been accused of involvement in the disappearance of several Chechen men during the second Chechen War. His nom-de-guerre, Strelkov, means “shooter” or “rifleman”.

In 2014, he claimed credit for “pulling the trigger” on the war in Donbas when he and a group of other Russian volunteers seized control of the town of Slavyansk and proclaimed himself “defence minister” of the break away Donetsk People’s Republic.

Last November, a Dutch court sentenced him to life in prison for the murders of 298 people on board MH17, a Malaysian airlines Boeing 777 that a Russian Buk missile launcher shot down over eastern Ukraine in July 2014. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

21 Jul 23. Rheinmetall: A Powerful Partner at Ukraine’s Side. Major deliveries of military material and extensive logistical support make Rheinmetall one of Ukraine’s most important backers in its fight to defend itself against Russian aggression. Thanks to its massive production capacity, the Düsseldorf-based tech enterprise is able not only to furnish vital products like ammunition. It can also draw on its extensive technology portfolio to aid Ukraine’s struggle for national survival.

In addition to short-term shipments of military hardware, in the long run Ukraine will need help in re-establishing its own defence industry and reorienting its production to western standards. In May 2023 Rheinmetall therefore announced a strategic cooperation agreement with Ukraine’s state-owned Ukroboronprom. As a first step, repair and maintenance of combat vehicles is planned, to be followed by production in Ukraine of armoured vehicles like the Fuchs/Fox armoured transport vehicle, the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle and Panther main battle tank. The objective is to turn Ukraine into an efficient partner, to rebuild its once powerful defence sector, and to assure its strategic autonomy.

What Rheinmetall is doing to air Ukraine

Ammunition

Rheinmetall is now the sole defence contractor capable of supplying the Ukrainian military with large amounts of new medium- and large-calibre ammunition, including 20mm for the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, and 105mm and 120mm tank ammunition for the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2. Very soon, a first lot of 35mm ammunition for the Gepard antiaircraft tank will be ready for shipment, part of a total of 300,000 rounds currently earmarked for Ukraine. Moreover, Rheinmetall is a vital strategic source of 155mm artillery ammunition for Ukraine, having already supplied the embattled country with tens of thousands of rounds, with more on the way.

Marder IFV

Rheinmetall is also providing Ukraine with substantial support in the combat vehicle domain, either through multilateral Ringtausch exchange programmes with partner nations like Greece, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, or via direct transfers. Acting on behalf of the German government, Rheinmetall shipped the first of twenty Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine back in March 2023. Recently ordered, a second lot of twenty Marder IFVs is slated to ship this summer. Furthermore, another sixty Marder vehicles are available that could also be readied for action. Under a Ringtausch exchange initiated by the German government, Rheinmetall is also supplying Greece with the Marder 1A3. In exchange for the German systems, the Greek armed forces have transferred Soviet-era infantry fighting vehicles and other military equipment to Ukraine.

Leopard 1 and 2 MBTs

The potential for supplying Ukraine with Leopard 1 tanks is also substantial: Rheinmetall is capable of furnishing scores of these tried-and-tested vehicles. The Leopard 2 is advancing as well. In addition to Ringtausch programmes with Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Rheinmetall is supplying Ukraine with these tanks, financed in this case by the Dutch and Danish governments. In addition, a contract has been awarded for maintaining these combat vehicles, another example of Rheinmetall’s wide-ranging support of the Ukrainian war effort.

The success of the 35mm Gepard antiaircraft tank in Ukraine underscores the effectiveness of cannon-based air defence, especially against cruise missiles and drones. Upholding this tradition is Rheinmetall’s state-of-the-art Skynex, which is also a cannon-based system. It is designed for very close-range air defence operations, where guided missiles are ineffective. Using programmable 35mm Ahead ammunition, developed by Rheinmetall precisely this purpose, is significantly less costly than comparable guided missile-based systems. Moreover, it is impossible to influence or deflect 35mm rounds with electronic countermeasures.

In the second half of 2023, Ukraine will take delivery of two cutting edge Skynex air defence systems, including airburst munitions. The Skynex systems will be mounted on new Rheinmetall HX 8×8 military trucks.

Rheinmetall HX miitary logistic vehicle

Made by Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles, HX trucks are among the most widely used military logistic vehicles worldwide, with a global reputation for durability, offroad mobility, user-friendliness and modularity that sets them apart from industry rivals.

At present nearly 100 Rheinmetall-made trucks are operating in Ukraine, which recently took delivery of 26 more brand new ones straight from the factory.

Service and logistical support

Wherever military equipment is in action, service and maintenance support is indispensable. To keep Western-made systems operational and assure adequate logistical support, Rheinmetall is establishing a maintenance and logistics centre at Satu Mare in Romania, a fellow NATO member nation. In future, the hub will also be available to service armoured vehicles and logistic trucks belonging to NATO armed forces in the region.

Mobile field hospitals

At the behest of the German government, Rheinmetall subsidiary ZMS GmbH is supplying Ukraine with a turnkey field hospital this year that will be a huge help to the country’s armed forces. A combined tent- and container-based system, it will enable lifesaving surgical operations to be carried out close to the frontline. A second field hospital is slated for delivery in 2024.

At the end of 2022, Rheinmetall was awarded a contract to supply a Role 2 hospital. It consists of three vehicle trailer combinations, each comprising a truck and trailer as well as a total of six containers. A turnkey system, it is equipped with state-of-the-art medical technology.

Reconnaissance systems

Augmenting this extensive support package is the SurveilSPIRE mobile reconnaissance system, which is equipped with day-and-night-capable cameras and autopiloted mini drones. Five SurveilSPIRE airspace surveillance systems were supplied in 2022, with another five ordered in 2023. Rheinmetall is cooperating here with an Estonian partner company. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/Rheinmetall)

21 Jul 23. Russia Develops Hibernation Tool for FPV Drones. The Center for Integrated Unmanned Solutions (CCDB) has developed a tool for the hibernation of FPV drones of the Joker line, which allows unmanned aerial vehicles to go into sleep mode for up to several weeks after being placed in an attack position. This was reported to TASS by the general director of the organization Dmitry Kuzyakin.

“A tool for the hibernation of FPV drones of the Joker line and its top model, Ultimatum, was developed and implemented in the CCDB. A drone with a hibernator can take a position to attack and literally go into hibernation for several weeks. On the air, the sleeping drone does not manifest itself in any way. As a rule, dominant heights, roofs of buildings or other tall structures are chosen. When the time comes, he doesn’t have to cover the distance for the goal. The drone is already in place and all it needs is to turn on and attack,” Kuzyakin said.

According to him, the hibernation tool allows you to minimize the time to prepare the device for an attack.

“Time is saved for the flight. A few seconds pass between turning on the drone and the attack, which leaves no chance of launching counteraction systems. One FPV pilot can place, and then “wake up” and consistently apply up to 15 “sleeping” drones,” the specialist stressed.

Kuzyakin noted that the CCDB is working ahead of technology in the field of FPV drones.

“We are on the threshold of the FPV revolution in armaments. Now, in a situation of a stable front, the scenarios that we see in Telegram channels are most in demand: attacks on enemy strongholds and hunting for armored vehicles. But if you look at the FPV tool more broadly and improve the functionality, you can get ahead of the enemy not only in the technique itself, but also in the scenarios of its application,”

said the CEO of the organization.

The head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation clarified that cooperation with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation regarding the combat use of FPV systems has been conducted since the spring of 2021.

“The first results and the first combat experience were obtained in March 2022. Now the work of the center is aimed at expanding the functionality and scenarios for the use of FPV drones. For all the time of its operation, there was not a single loss from among the FPV pilots trained by the Central Research Bureau,” Kuzyakin said.

The center is based in Zhukovsky, develops and manufactures FPV drones, and also trains specialists. The CCBI works only with law enforcement agencies. The center is self-funded. (Source: UAS VISION/VPK)

21 Jul 23. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine dismissed two longstanding allies in the cabinet and diplomatic service, as he warned that spending must be focused on the defence of the country against Russian aggression. In his evening address, Zelenskyy said he had asked Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to “consider replacing” his culture minister Oleksandr Tkachenko over his decision to allocate ms of dollars to projects unrelated to the country’s war effort. “In a time of war like this the maximum amount of state attention and therefore state resources should go to defence,” the president said late on Thursday. “Museums, cultural centres, symbols, TV series — all of this is important, but now there are other priorities.” Hours later, Zelenskyy fired Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK. Vadym Prystaiko, a former foreign minister, had served as Kyiv’s top diplomat in the UK since July 2020. Tkachenko had wanted to spend about $13.5m to finish a Kyiv museum commemorating Ukrainians killed in the Holodomor, the man-made famine under Soviet leader Josef Stalin the 1930s. Tkachenko said he had submitted his resignation to Zelenskyy and defended the projects he had hoped to fund. “Culture in wartime is important as this war is not just about territory but also people — our memory, history, language and creativity despite the war,” he said in post on Facebook early on Friday. “Private and state funding for culture in wartime is no less important than for drones. Culture is the shield for our identity and our borders.” Oleksandr Tkachenko has lost his job as culture minister for allocating money to projects unrelated to Ukraine’s war effort © Vyacheslav Madiyevskyi/Future Publishing/Getty Images A decree published by Zelenskyy’s office gave no reason for Prystaiko’s sacking, but his recent criticism of Zelenskyy over a testy exchange between the Ukrainian president and UK defence minister Ben Wallace at a Nato summit had ruffled feathers in Kyiv. Wallace had said western nations were “not Amazon” and that Ukraine should show more gratitude for the weapons it had received in order to ensure their continued support. (Source: FT.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

Protek Selected By Dutch Armed Forces

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS

MANAGEMENT ON THE MOVE