NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 24.

Executive summary

* In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.

* This month, US President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, reflecting the administration’s current strategy to increase pressure on Moscow to make progress towards ending the war. While oscillating positions and cycles of rhetoric are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, we assess that these latest sanctions will unlikely be sufficient to force Russia to end the war (or even agree to a stable ceasefire) without serious concessions from Ukraine. China and India have reportedly sharply cut seaborne imports of Russian oil; this will have a significant impact on state revenues if it is sustained. However, it remains our assessment that the Kremlin is willing to endure even worse economic pain, given that years of heavy sanctions have had little to no impact on the Kremlin’s determination to achieve its objectives in Ukraine. While the US could increase pressure further, the Trump administration will likely remain reticent to substantially increase its support for Ukraine at the same time.

* Ukraine’s energy crisis throughout the 2025/6 autumn and winter is likely to be worse than in previous years due to Russia’s innovative strike tactics, which are more co-ordinated and impactful than during previous years. Russia’s strike strategy likely aims to disable the energy system in its entirety by simultaneously damaging electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure. Hits to thermal power plants this month have already triggered unscheduled blackouts, with officials estimating that strikes over the last month have already disabled nearly 60% of Ukraine’s gas production.

* Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch out for in November include the reported localised ceasefire around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast) to enable the repair of the last remaining powerline to the site, as well as the possibility of false-flag or other ‘provocations’ amid high tensions with various Western European countries, including the Baltics, Poland, Romania and the UK.

• Ukraine: War impact will continue to severely undermine socio-economic health. On 23 October, Ukraine’s National Bank (NBU) cut its growth forecast for 2025 from 2.1% to 1.9% and for 2026 from 2.3% to 2%. The NBU noted that the pace of growth remains subdued due to the Russo-Ukrainian war’s ongoing impact. The NBU also highlighted that the energy deficit resulting from Russia’s strike campaign against energy infrastructure, combined with persistent labour shortages nationwide, is impeding business activity. We assess that Ukraine’s energy crisis throughout the autumn and winter will likely be worse than in previous years due to Russia’s increasingly sophisticated and co-ordinated strike tactics, which are proving more effective than in earlier winters. Moscow’s current strategy focuses on simultaneously damaging electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure. This is likely to significantly heighten energy security risks, severely affecting business operations. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to face a chronic labour shortage, which is sharply undermining the country’s productivity. Overall, we assess that the ongoing war with Russia will continue to severely erode Ukraine’s long-term socio-economic health outlook.

Oct 23.

• Russia: EU LNG ban will further restrict state revenues, adding long-term financial pressure. On 22 October, EU member states approved the 19th package of sanctions against Russia. The new measures include a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), following Slovakia’s decision to lift its opposition to the initiative after receiving assurances from the European Commission concerning high energy prices. The ban will be implemented in two phases, with short-term contracts ending after six months and long-term contracts ceasing on 1 January 2027. Russian LNG exports to Europe reached 9.5 m tonnes between January and August 2025; Russia’s total LNG exports over this period amounted to 18.8 m tons. According to the environmental NGO Greenpeace, the Russian state earned approximately EUR 8.1 bn in tax revenues from LNG exports to European countries between 2022 and 2024. Therefore, the latest EU ban will highly likely lead to a reduction in Russian LNG revenues over the long term, adding further pressure on the Russian state’s public finances. However, we assess that this is unlikely to significantly affect Russia’s capacity to continue its war against Ukraine in the short-to-medium term.
• Russia-US: New oil sanctions will unlikely force Moscow to end war in near term. On 22 October, the US sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, alongside several of their subsidiaries, due to the Kremlin’s ‘lack of serious commitment to peace’ in Ukraine. It comes after preparations for a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart Donald Trump were shelved. Despite periodic threats from the Trump administration that it will increase sanctions pressure on Moscow and reissue measures adopted during the former president Joe Biden’s administration, these are the first that have been directly imposed against Russia by President Trump in this term. The sanctions mark a tactical change in the US’ efforts to end the Russo-Ukrainian war and are aimed at pressuring Russia to negotiate in good faith. Although the US Treasury has threatened to impose further sanctions, the Trump administration will likely wait for signals from Russia that it is prepared to engage constructively in the peace process. While Russia will possibly feign interest in peace to try reverse the punitive measures and prevent new ones, the sanctions alone are unlikely to alter the Kremlin’s calculus on ending the war in the near term.
• Ukraine: Government, war relief entities face heightened cyber espionage risks. On 22 October, the cyber security company SentinelOne warned about a cyber espionage operation (‘PhantomCaptcha’) that targeted Ukrainian regional government administrations and NGOs involved in war relief efforts earlier in October. The campaign lasted one day, distributing phishing emails impersonating the Ukrainian president’s office to trick victims into opening an embedded PDF attachment. The attachment contained a conference link for the video-meeting platform Zoom that redirected users to a fake CAPTCHA verification page. The page then prompted victims to paste a token that covertly executed multiple payloads to facilitate reconnaissance, data exfiltration and remote command execution, highlighting PhantomCaptcha’s sophistication. While PhantomCaptcha has not been attributed to any groups, the campaign was reportedly linked to another Russian state-sponsored surveillance operation and was operated from Russia-based infrastructure. Consequently, this report underscores the heightened cyber espionage risks facing Ukraine-related entities amid the ongoing war.

Oct 21.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• OFFENSIVES: Reports indicate that Russian forces have launched a series of mechanised assaults in recent weeks; which have been rare in 2025 amid a general pivot towards dismounted infantry assaults due to the saturation of drones the battlefield
• CEASEFIRE: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a localised ceasefire to facilitate the repair of the last remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
• GREY ZONE: Russian intelligence agencies have intensified information operations in recent weeks accusing the UK of preparing ‘provocations’ in Europe, underscoring the realistic possibility of ‘false-flag’ grey zone operations in coming months
• FORECAST: Our assessment remains that the US is unlikely to significantly alter its policy towards Russia and Ukraine, despite a flurry of diplomatic activity and mixed messages from the White House on its policy towards the war
• OFFENSIVES: Reports indicate that Russian forces have launched a series of mechanised assaults in recent weeks; these have been rare throughout 2025 amid a general Russian pivot towards favouring dismounted infantry assaults due to the saturation of drones on the battlefield. On 9 October, Russian forces launched a battalion-sized mechanised assault against Shakhove (Donetsk oblast), a village located around 14 miles (22km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) in the crook of the Dobropillia salient, which Russian forces have struggled to stabilise for months. Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian attack involved approximately 35 tanks and armoured vehicles, of which three tanks and 16 armoured vehicles were reportedly destroyed or damaged. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s 1st Azov Army Corps reported on 13 and 16 October that Russian forces have conducted smaller reinforced company-sized mechanised assaults near Shakhove. Ukrainian forces allegedly destroyed three tanks and 13 and 11 armoured vehicles during the first and second attacks, respectively. An additional company-sized mechanised assault also took place on 6 October near Pankivka (Donetsk oblast), located just south of Shakhove. While we cannot confirm the details, these assaults appear to have failed to generate any significant results, but they remain significant.
• OFFENSIVES: The sharp uptick in mechanised assaults throughout October likely reflects our previous assessment that Russia has not abandoned mechanised operations and hopes to restore manoeuvre to the battlefield. Notably, the recent mechanised assaults have taken place during poor weather, when drone operations are heavily constrained. We assess that the saturation of the battlefield by first person view (FPV) drones is the most important reason why mechanised assaults are so difficult for both sides, given the ease with which the enemy can identify a large force and subsequently track its movements. As winter approaches, poor weather conditions will likely provide (notionally) better conditions for mechanised assaults. However, the recent attacks clearly underscore that restoring manoevure to the battlefield will remain extremely challenging; this renders a dramatic battlefield breakthrough unlikely in the short term.
• POKROVSK: Ukrainian forces continue to rapidly counter Russian infiltration operations into Pokrovsk, limiting the scope for major advances at present. Ukrainian forces have reported that Russian assault units managed to infiltrate the centre of Pokrovsk, reaching areas near the railway station. However, Ukrainian forces reportedly successfully eliminated these infiltrating units. Similarly, geolocated footage from 19 October shows that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration operations in eastern Myrnohrad (Donetsk oblast), immediately east of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drone operators are contesting Russia’s recent advances in this area.
• POKROVSK: Russia’s use of infiltration tactics likely aims to facilitate flanking operations around Pokrovsk. These operations resemble Russian infiltration tactics in Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast; located to the north of Pokrovsk), where the primary aim was to probe defences and expand contested ‘grey zone’ areas, rather than to rapidly and permanently occupy territory. We assess that Russia’s goal highly likely remains to envelop Pokrovsk, rather than to capture it through urban fighting and frontal attacks. Nevertheless, it may resort to a grinding assault in 2026 if its efforts to encircle Pokrovsk fail. Infiltration operations in eastern Myrnohrad and southern Pokrovsk also likely serve to fix Ukrainian forces, particularly units of the 7th Air Assault Corps, to limit the prospect of concentrated counter-attacks.
• POKROVSK: A decisive factor in the assault on Pokrovsk will be whether Russian forces succeed in stabilising the front in the direction of Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast) to the north-east, enabling it to continue flanking operations north of Pokrovsk. Russia’s 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) has been tied up in fighting around Dobropillia, preventing it from committing to enveloping Pokrovsk from the north. If the Dobropillia front is stabilised, the 51st would likely be able to continue operations towards Rodynske (Donetsk oblast; a town located north of Pokrovsk), which would facilitate the broader envelopment of efforts from the north. Regardless, 51st CAA’s inability to simultaneously stabilise the situation in the Dobropillia direction and to conduct encirclement operations around Pokrovsk is likely due to personnel constraints and the current concentration of Ukrainian drones. Therefore, we assess that Ukraine’s successful counter-attacks around Dobropillia are likely to continue impeding Russian operations around Pokrovsk in the short term.
• CEASEFIRE: On 18 October, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a localised ceasefire to facilitate the repair of the last remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The plant is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and has not received stable power in four weeks after severe damage to power lines. While the plant remains in shutdown, it still requires power and has relied on diesel back-up generators to power its systems since 23 September; this constitutes the longest blackout of the war thus far. It is almost certain that amid the current blackout, the Russian authorities are continuing to prepare to connect the ZNPP to Russia’s electricity grid. By integrating the plant into Russia’s power network and consequently disconnecting it from the Ukrainian grid, the Kremlin is clearly indicating its intention to retain control of the plant permanently.
• CEASEFIRE: The details of the proposed localised ceasefire remain limited, with no confirmation of its location and duration. Nevertheless, the IAEA has stated that technical work is underway to restore power to the plant. If such a ceasefire does indeed take place and allows this repair work to complete, it would mark a notable (though highly localised and specific) precedent for limited on-the-ground ceasefires. While US President Donald Trump’s administration may see this as a positive sign towards a general ground ceasefire, we continue to assess that such a ceasefire remains either highly unlikely in the short term, or that if reached it would highly likely collapse soon thereafter. For further analysis on the state of negotiations, see the FORECAST below.
• MOBILISATION: Russia is reportedly scaling back financial incentives for volunteer soldiers, supporting our previous assessment that the Kremlin is likely shifting its military recruitment strategy. Several Russian federal subjects are reportedly reducing and cancelling one-time enlistment bonus payments for new contract service recruits across multiple regions. This is likely part of the federal authorities’ efforts to centralise recruitment after relying on a decentralised force-generation mechanism since the start of the war. These developments follow reports that the number of military contracts being signed is stagnating, even in the regions that offer the highest financial bonuses. While the existing recruitment system has achieved results thus far, we previously assessed that Russia’s current decentralised recruitment model (heavily reliant on financial incentives) is unsustainable in the medium-to-long term and is already showing diminishing returns (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 October 2025).
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia’s strike campaign included a significantly large attack on 16 October involving a total of 320 drones, 28 ballistic missiles and nine cruise missiles. The attack primarily targeted Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts, causing power outages in Poltava due to strikes on energy infrastructure. Strikes on other days were relatively smaller but continued to regularly target energy infrastructure.
• STRIKES: The aforementioned attacks form part of Russia’s systematic campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy capabilities ahead of and during the heating season. However, the current campaign against energy infrastructure is likely to be significantly more damaging than previous campaigns. Notably, on 20 October, Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk stated that Russia’s current strike campaign is more co-ordinated than the campaign during autumn and winter in 2024. According to Kolisnyk, Russia’s current campaign limits targets to specific regions and facilities, whereas a larger set of facilities was targeted in 2024. This will allow for more accurate and concentrated attacks that will likely pose a more systematic threat to the Ukrainian grid. Russian long-range attacks aim to simultaneously damage electricity production and transmission and distribution infrastructure, as well as air defences protecting these facilities.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its own strike campaign against Russian oil and gas infrastructure with growing success, worsening fuel shortages across Russia. On 19 October, Ukrainian drone strikes targeted the world’s largest gas processing plant in Russia’s south-western Orenburg oblast, forcing the facility to halt gas intake from Kazakhstan. Ukraine has previously struck oil infrastructure in the area, but this constitutes the first attack aimed specifically at a gas plant. The strike has reportedly affected gas production at Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field (West Kazakhstan region) by between 25 and 30%. Earlier on 21 October, two Western energy companies announced that they had reduced oil and gas output at a major gas condensate field in Kazakhstan. Other Ukrainian attacks this week have also struck several Russian oil facilities. Such attacks typically focus on critical refinery infrastructure rather than on storage tanks or logistical hubs, in order to increase the operational impact on Russia’s oil sector.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SANCTIONS: The EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia may realistically be approved on 23 October, though new punitive measures are unlikely to force the Kremlin to end the war in the near term. This is according to comments on 20 October from the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. Slovakia continues to oppose the measures and reportedly wants a debate at an EU leaders’ summit on 23 October; nevertheless we assess that Slovakia will possibly agree to the measures in the coming days if it secures certain concessions from the European Commission. Meanwhile, on 20 October, EU energy ministers supported a proposal to phase out Russian oil and gas imports to the bloc by January 2028, as part of efforts to end Europe’s energy dependency on Russia. (For further analysis on the 19th sanctions package, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 22 September 2025).
• SANCTIONS: Meanwhile, the US Senate has decided to postpone its consideration of new sanctions on Russia until after an expected summit between the presidents of both countries. The bill envisions new tariffs of up to 500% on imports from countries that buy Russian energy products and do not actively support Ukraine. However, the Trump administration has been reluctant to impose new sanctions against Russia due to concerns that this could undermine the limited progress made towards peace. Ultimately, we assess that the Trump administration likely wants to avoid imposing new punitive measures against Russia while it seeks an economic and diplomatic rapprochement with the Kremlin. As such, these dynamics will likely reduce the prospect for new US punitive measures against Russia in the near term (see FORECAST below for further analysis).
• GREY ZONE: Russian intelligence agencies have intensified information operations in recent weeks that primarily accuse the UK of being involved in or preparing ‘provocations’ in Europe designed to undermine Russia or Russian interests. Earlier on 21 October, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed without providing evidence that the UK is planning acts of sabotage in the Baltic and Black seas. Meanwhile, on 16 October, the director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, accused the UK of assisting Ukraine in co-ordinating an audacious, large-scale drone attack against Russian military airfields in June. Bortnikov also accused NATO intelligence agencies of being involved in suspicious drone activity in EU airspace in recent weeks, many of which we assess as likely to be Russia’s responsibility.
• GREY ZONE: The aim of such information operations is likely to sow confusion among Europe’s population and potentially to set the conditions for false-flag operations and/or ‘justify’ grey-zone retaliation across the continent. Russian intelligence networks have previously claimed UK-backed Ukrainian operatives were planning false-flag operations in the past. The latest allegations relate to preparations for a supposed UK-backed operation targeting a European or Russian ship in European waters, using pro-Ukrainian Russian nationals wearing Russian military uniforms. It remains a realistic possibility amid the current escalating tensions in the Baltic region that the Russians will engineer an incident at sea in the coming months, designed to generate further tension, confusion and contradictory claims of blame, as part of its ongoing grey-zone campaign.

FORECAST

DIPLOMACY: Our assessment remains that the US is unlikely to significantly alter its policy towards Russia and Ukraine, despite a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at ending the war in recent days. Statements from President Trump in recent weeks have signalled the possibility of increased US support for Ukraine and the adoption of a tougher stance on Russia, given the growing frustration at the lack of progress towards a peace deal or a ceasefire. However, we continue to see limited indications that these moves will translate into a significant policy shift in the near-to-medium term. The Trump administration’s rhetoric is likely to continue to oscillate between various possible positions in the coming months, as it attempts to encourage and coerce Russia and Ukraine to negotiate. Previously, the Trump administration has rhetorically alternated between various policy positions on Ukraine multiple times. This possibly reflects a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, which avoids the need to commit the US to a more hardline stance in either direction until a time of its choosing.

It remains highly likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s call with President Trump on 16 October reinforced that Russia’s terms to end the war remain unchanged and uncompromising; this messaging may realistically have influenced President Trump’s subsequent meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. During his call with President Trump, President Putin reportedly renewed his demands for Ukraine to surrender full control of Donetsk oblast as a condition for ending the war. Unspecified officials familiar with the call have claimed that President Putin suggested he would be willing to cede parts of Russian-annexed Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in exchange for this territory. This arrangement would be a non-starter for Ukraine for multiple reasons, including Donetsk oblast’s strategic significance and the lack of any meaningful guarantees that fighting would not resume soon thereafter.

Putin’s reported offer to ‘cede’ parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (neither of which is under full Russian control) is almost certainly framed to appear as a significant concession, but is highly unlikely to be one. It remains our assessment that President Putin’s alleged comments referred to territory that Russia has nominally annexed but does not control, rather than an offer to withdraw from territory that Russian forces currently occupy. Therefore, Russia’s negotiating position has not changed in recent months. On 20 October, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia has not deviated from its position on pausing hostilities in Ukraine along the current frontlines, effectively ruling out this possibility.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that President Trump allegedly pushed President Zelensky to agree to various Russian terms during their meeting on 17 October, including Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbas region. This comes shortly after President Trump’s own assertions in late September that Ukraine could still win back its land from Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 25 September 2025). According to reports of the Trump-Zelensky meeting by the Financial Times (FT), President Trump insisted that Ukraine needs to either make a deal or face destruction by Russia. If the FT’s account of the meeting is accurate, this indicates that the Trump administration expects Ukraine to make difficult concessions and that the US is likely unwilling to commit to substantially stepping up support for Ukraine over the long term. Although President Trump reportedly later advocated for a freezing of the frontlines, his alleged comments indicate (at least rhetorically) that he is open to endorsing some of Russia’s current demands to reach a ceasefire.

The lack of any progress on talks to increase support for Ukraine, including selling Tomahawk cruise missiles, reinforces our existing assessment that such discussions primarily remain a negotiating tactic for the US. Despite discussions that the US could supply Ukraine with long-range Tomahawk missiles, President Trump has implied that the US also needs this capability, expressing the hope that the war can be resolved without handing the missiles to Ukraine. Even if Ukraine were to receive Tomahawks in the future as part of US efforts to increase pressure on Russia, the US would likely provide only a small symbolic number. This is largely due to production constraints (the US produced only 22 Tomahawk missiles in 2024) and the US’ desire to maintain its own stockpiles for future military operations. For further analysis on Tomahawk missiles, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 7 October 2025.

Despite announcements about a second summit between President Putin and President Trump in the coming days or weeks, it remains uncertain if and when it will take place. President Trump had previously suggested that the two leaders could meet in the coming two weeks in Budapest (Hungary). However, an unspecified senior White House official stated earlier on 21 October that there are no plans for the two presidents to meet ‘in the near future’. Similarly, Peskov stated that there was no ‘precise timeframe’ for a summit and stressed that ‘serious preparation’ is needed before it can take place. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov called on 20 October, though their own anticipated meeting (which Reuters claimed would take place on 23 October) has reportedly been postponed indefinitely. We assess that even if the two sides schedule and hold the summit, a major breakthrough to end the war in Ukraine is highly unlikely in the near term, as none of the key drivers we track which influence the decision-making in Kyiv, Moscow and Washington DC have seriously shifted. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Oct 25. Ukraine has taken a bold step towards rebuilding its air power, signing a letter of intent with Sweden to acquire as many as 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E multirole fighters. The announcement, made in Stockholm on 22 October following talks between Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, marks one of the most ambitious defence collaborations of the war so far. The letter of intent covers 100 – 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen Es. If the intent translates into a firm order, it would be by far the biggest export contract in history for Sweden. The signing sets the stage for detailed negotiations on cost and production timelines. As reported in Reuters, Kristersson noted that the first Gripen E/F arrival could be within three years of a firm order being made. While the LOI covers the in-production E variant, separate discussions continue about the transfer of used Gripen C/Ds from Sweden to the Ukrainian forces. Talk about this transfer has been ongoing for months, but Sweden was urged by allies to hold off on the transfer while Ukraine focused on the introduction of the F-16.

“This agreement opens a new chapter in our cooperation,” Zelenskyy said during the joint press conference. “The Gripen is a proven, modern, and reliable aircraft that would dramatically strengthen our ability to defend our skies.”

Ukraine’s air force is still flying Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s, and even with F-16s from Western partners, its long-term modernisation depends on building a more sustainable, interoperable fleet. The Gripen fits that brief perfectly: robust, adaptable, and relatively easy to maintain in austere conditions. Designed by Saab for Sweden’s own dispersed-base operations, the Gripen is known for being able to take off from stretches of highway, refuel quickly, and get back in the air within minutes. Those qualities could prove vital for Ukraine, where airbases are frequent targets for Russian strikes. The latest E-series version brings an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, extended range, and a powerful electronic warfare suite, putting it almost on par with some 5th-generation systems in terms of situational awareness. Analysts say a fleet of 150 aircraft would be game-changing. “If realised, this would be the largest single fighter transfer in modern European history,” one defence expert told AGN. “It would effectively make Ukraine the biggest Gripen operator outside Sweden. Of course, ambition comes with a hefty price tag. At roughly $80–90 m per aircraft, the total programme could exceed $12 bn once training, support, and weapons integration are included. Financing is expected to involve a mix of Swedish state support, international aid, and possibly European Union or NATO mechanisms.

“We understand who we are fighting against, and Gripen is one of the best (fighters) in the world,” Zelenskyy said, adding that Ukrainian pilots have already begun training on the Swedish planes.

For Sweden, the agreement highlights its growing profile as a NATO member and regional defence exporter. For Ukraine, it sends a clear signal: even as it fights day-to-day for survival, it’s also planning for the future of its air force and its place within Europe’s security framework. (Source: Google/https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/)

 

23 Oct 25. Trump Denies Lifting Key Restriction on Ukraine Using Long-Range Missiles to Hit Targets Inside Russia. Washington officials cited by the Wall Street Journal said that they expect Ukraine to expand its campaign of cross-border attacks now that the key restriction has been removed.  US President Donald Trump denied reports that the US had quietly lifted a key restriction on Ukraine’s use of some Western-supplied long-range missiles on Wednesday. It came after The Wall Street Journal, citing US officials, said that Washington’s decision would give Kyiv expanded freedom to carry out strikes on targets inside Russia. Trump wrote on his Truth Social network: “The Wall Street Journal story on the USA’s approval of Ukraine being allowed to use long range missiles deep into Russia is FAKE NEWS!”

“The US has nothing to do with those missiles, wherever they may come from, or what Ukraine does with them!” He continued.

The reports had emerged just one day after Ukraine used a British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missile to hit a munitions and rocket fuel facility in the Russian city of Bryansk, describing the hit as “successful.” Thousands of Latin Americans, primarily Colombians, have joined Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion, bringing military expertise from their homeland. According to the report, Washington’s decision enabled Kyiv to use the missile. The shift allegedly followed an internal change in authority at the Pentagon, as oversight for approving such attacks was transferred from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the top US general in Europe who also serves as NATO commander. Grynkewich previously told a Senate confirmation hearing that he believed Ukraine could win the war against Russia. Washington officials cited by the Wall Street Journal said that they expect Ukraine to expand its campaign of cross-border attacks using the Storm Shadow. The US can restrict Ukraine’s use of the missile because it uses American targeting data.  At least four people have been injured after a second straight night of drone attacks Moscow target civilian targets, including a kindergarten. Storm Shadows have a far shorter range than US Tomahawks, which Trump had said he was mulling supplying to Kyiv before abruptly pouring cold water on the proposal. This, and the fact that Tuesday was not the first occasion on which they had been used, means that renewed use of Storm Shadows is not expected to fundamentally alter battlefield conditions. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

22 Oct 25. US sanctions Russian oil companies as Moscow holds nuclear drills.

• Summary
• US sanctions Rosneft and Lukoil, in a change of approach
• Russia says it held exercise with strategic nuclear weapons
• US says Putin-Trump summit plans on hold

The United States hit Russia’s major oil companies with sanctions on Wednesday and accused the Russians of a lack of commitment toward ending the war in Ukraine, as Moscow conducted a major training exercise involving nuclear arms. The new sanctions were unveiled one day after plans for a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin fell apart. Trump told reporters he cancelled the meeting because “it didn’t feel right to me.” The U.S. Treasury Department said Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, were targeted in a bid to damage Moscow’s ability to fund its war machine. The move marked a sharp turnaround for the White House, which has veered between pressuring Moscow and taking a more conciliatory approach aimed at securing peace in Ukraine. Only last week Trump appeared ready to hold off on new actions targeting Moscow.

“Now is the time to stop the killing and for an immediate ceasefire,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said. Oil prices extended gains after Bessent’s comments, rising by more than $2 a barrel. ](Source: Reuters)

 

21 Oct 25. Mass production of Ukrainian drones in the UK to launch within weeks. Mass production of Ukrainian interceptor drones in the United Kingdom is gearing up, as the war-torn country transitions to licensed production of domestically designed weapons in partner countries. Speaking at a press conference on Oct. 20, British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey said the joint manufacturing project, dubbed Octopus, would begin “within weeks.” The announcement comes a few days after Ukraine’s government-backed defense technology group Brave1 identified a handful of weapon categories deemed fit for export to Western allies. Over the last few months, Kyiv has explored the possibility of easing its arms transfer ban. In July, leaders launched a new initiative to authorize allied countries, such as members of the Ramstein group of global backers, to produce Ukrainian systems locally. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that this process will be gradual and will only entail a partial and regulated lift of restrictions limited to weapons in surplus. According to Healey, the Octopus interceptor, a proven system against Shahed-type attack drones, will become the foundation of the so-called European “drone wall” to deter further Russian aerial threats. This joint partnership could result in the production rate of around 2,000 units per month, Bloomberg reported on Oct. 10.

“Through Project Octopus, our Ukrainian friends will share the technology and intellectual property with the UK –in turn, we’ll develop this further and mass-produce it to supply thousands of interceptor drones back to Ukraine monthly,” Healey explained earlier.

In September, the privately-owned Ukrainian drone manufacturer Ukrspecsystems announced that it was investing over $267 m in the building of a new factory in Mildenhall, U.K. The interceptor in question was developed in Ukraine with the support of UK technicians and staff, but reportedly costs less than 10% of the systems it was conceived to target. Britain is doubling down on its drone capabilities, as Healey also announced the creation of a new U.K. Drone Centre, adding that investments in drone and other autonomous systems would double to total more than £4 bn ($5 bn). The country has committed to spending 10% of its equipment budget on new technologies, starting this year. (Source: Defense News)

 

21 Oct 25. Ukraine unveils upgraded sea drone for Black Sea strike missions. Ukraine’s state security service has unveiled an upgraded sea drone it says can now operate anywhere in the Black Sea, carry heavier weapons and use artificial intelligence for targeting. Ukraine has used the unmanned naval drones to target Russian shipping and infrastructure in the Black Sea. The Security Service of Ukraine, known by its Ukrainian acronym SBU, has credited strikes by the unmanned vessel known as the “Sea Baby” with forcing a strategic shift in Russia’s naval operations. The range of the Sea Baby was expanded from 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) to 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), SBU said. It can carry up to 2,000 kilograms (about 4,400 pounds) of payload, SBU officials said. At a demonstration attended by The Associated Press, variants included vessels fitted with a multiple-rocket launcher and another with a stabilized machine-gun turret. SBU Brig. Gen. Ivan Lukashevych said the new vessels also feature AI-assisted friend-or-foe targeting systems and can launch small aerial attack drones and multilayered self-destruct systems to prevent capture.

Developing a new kind of naval warfare

Drone strikes have been used in successful attacks against 11 Russian vessels, including frigates and missile carriers, SBU said, prompting the Russian navy to relocate its main base from Sevastopol in Crimea to Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast.

“The SBU became the first in the world to pioneer this new kind of naval warfare — and we continue to advance it,” Lukashevych said, adding that the Sea Baby has evolved from a single-use strike craft into a reusable, multipurpose platform that expands Ukraine’s offensive options.

Authorities asked that the time and location of the demonstration not be made public for security reasons. The craft are operated remotely from a mobile control center inside a van, where operators use a bank of screens and controls.

“Cohesion of the crew members is probably the most important thing. We are constantly working on that,” said one operator who was identified only by his call sign, “Scout,” per Ukrainian military protocol.

Ukrainian sea drones helped push back Russia’s navy

The SBU also said sea drones helped carry out other high-profile strikes, including repeated attacks on the Crimean Bridge, most recently targeting its underwater supports in a bid to render it unusable for heavy military transport. The Sea Baby program is partially funded by public donations through a state-run initiative and is coordinated with Ukraine’s military and political leadership. The evolution from expendable strike boats to reusable, networked drones marks an important advance in asymmetric naval warfare, Lukashevych said.

“On this new product, we have installed rocket weaponry that will allow us to work from a large distance outside of the attack range of enemy fire. We can use such platforms to carry heavy weaponry,” he said. “Here we can show Ukrainians the most effective use of the money they have donated to us.” (Source: Defense News)

 

20 Oct 25. Bell Textron Inc., a Textron Inc. (NYSE: TXT) company, has signed Letters of Intent (LOI) to identify and evaluate areas for cooperation with Ukraine. At a ceremony in Washington, delegates from Bell Textron, the Ministry of Economy, Ecology, and Agriculture of Ukraine, and UkraineInvest signed agreements to assess approaches of Industrial Cooperation as part of a potential procurement of the AH-1Z and UH-1Y aircraft. Under a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) program, Bell would work with the U.S. Government to supply aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, bolstering their operational capabilities.

“We are proud to announce this agreement, and the potential to supply these incredible aircraft to Ukraine,” said Jeffrey Schloesser, senior vice president, Strategic Pursuits, Bell. “This initiative has been in development for some time, and we look forward to bringing it to completion.”

Bell Textron is a world-leading provider of commercial and military aircraft, serving both public and private sector customers globally. Within the defense sector, the Bell AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom aircraft stand as two of the company’s premier platforms. Designed to operate seamlessly together, the two aircraft share 85% parts commonality, making the models one of the most versatile and effective helicopter pairings available for modern military operations.

“We are confident that H-1s can play a pivotal role in further building defense capabilities in Ukraine, providing a much-needed upgrade while strengthening current Ukrainian air support,” continued Schloesser.

 

18 Oct 25. Norway has established a new training camp for Ukrainian troops in Poland which hosts more than 200 trainers from the Norwegian Army. Norway has established a new training camp for Ukrainian troops in Poland. Called Camp Jomsborg, the base already hosts more than 200 trainers from the Norwegian Army and a large number of Ukrainian Army trainees. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the camp will conduct both general training for soldiers and advanced courses for officers and specialists. Norway is the lead nation for Operation LEGIO, an effort to train and equip the Ukrainian armed forces that involves seven other NATO Allies, namely Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. Norway has committed approximately 10 bn Norwegian krone to Operation LEGIO. (Source: joint-forces.com)

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