Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Military And Security Developments
Oct 17.
- Russia-Ukraine-US: Major breakthrough towards ending Russo-Ukrainian war is unlikely in near term. On 16 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump spoke via telephone and agreed to meet in Budapest (Hungary) for a summit on the Russo-Ukrainian war. President Trump has suggested that this meeting could be held within the next two weeks. The call comes ahead of a meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later on 17 October in Washington DC. In recent weeks, President Trump has signalled that the US is prepared to take a harsher stance on Russia to increase pressure to end the war, including through discussions about supplying Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles. President Putin’s engagement with President Trump indicates that Russia is almost certainly attempting to deter the US from adopting a tougher approach towards the Kremlin. We asses that the next Putin-Trump summit is unlikely to result in a breakthrough towards ending the war. The last meeting in Alaska (US) in August failed to yield a ceasefire. However, Russia and the US could realistically propose a short-term partial ceasefire and/or a moratorium on long-range strikes. Nevertheless, any potential ceasefire announcement will almost certainly remain vulnerable to violations or a collapse.
Oct 16.
• Russia: New UK sanctions seek to weaken oil revenues, further isolate Russian financial entities. On 15 October, the UK government announced sweeping sanctions against Russia’s oil trade and financial sector. The latest punitive measures target Russia’s two largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, which the UK claims together export 3.1 m barrels of oil per day (bpd). As part of the new sanctions, the UK has targeted four oil terminals in China and 44 tankers in Russia’s shadow fleet, which Moscow uses to circumvent a price cap set by the G7. Meanwhile, the UK has also imposed sanctions against four Russian banks and the National Payment Card System (NSPK), which operates Russia’s Mir payment system (see Sibylline Sanctions Quarterly Review – April 2024). Ultimately, we assess that the latest measures seek to undermine Russia’s ability to generate sufficient revenue with which to sustain its war effort and conduct cross-border payments. Nevertheless, Russia has shown that it is capable of finding workarounds to Western sanctions throughout the Russo-Ukrainian war. This ability will possibly reduce the effectiveness of the UK’s latest measures.
• Ukraine: Removal of port city’s mayor will escalate infighting between central, local governments. On 15 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Serhiy Lysak, to head a newly created military administration for the city of Odesa (Odesa oblast). Lysak’s appointment followed Zelensky’s decision to deprive the city’s (former) mayor, Hennadiy Trukhanov, of his Ukrainian citizenship after Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) claimed that documents had emerged proving Trukhanov owns a Russian passport. Zelensky’s move to strip Trukhanov of his Ukrainian citizenship effectively ousted Trukhanov from his post. He had served as the mayor of the southern port city since 2014 and was re-elected twice. Trukhanov has denied being a Russian citizen despite long-standing allegations to the contrary; he has vowed to appeal his citizenship’s revocation in court. Despite being embroiled in multiple scandals and having been widely viewed as a Russian sympathiser for several years, Trukhanov has seldom criticised the central Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, we assess that the decision to push Trukhanov out of office possibly indicates that Zelensky is trying to further centralise and exert control over local authorities.
Oct 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• MOBILISATION: New Russian legislation looks set to increase Russia’s pool of recruits to sustain the attritional war in Ukraine, without declaring a formal partial mobilisation drive, amid wider efforts to reconstitute Russia’s ground forces
• TANKS: Internal documents from the Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) indicate Russia’s plans to reconstitute its battle tank stocks by expanding T-90 production by 80%, peaking in 2027
• STRIKES: Russian strikes designed to degrade Ukrainian energy security have likely disabled nearly 60% of Ukrainian gas production in recent weeks, with further intense strikes likely to trigger scheduled and unscheduled blackouts
• FORECAST: President Trump has stated that the US may provide Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles if Russia does not want to end the war, though it remains unclear whether such sales will occur
• MOBILISATION: New Russian legislation looks set to increase Russia’s pool of recruits to sustain the attritional war in Ukraine, without declaring a formal partial mobilisation drive. On 13 October, the Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved new legislation that will allow members of Russia’s mobilisation reserve to be deployed for ‘defence-related missions’ during peacetime, including outside of Russian territory, without the need for a declaration of war or a formal mobilisation decree. The Chairman of Russia’s State Duma Defence Committee Andrei Kartapolov stated that the new law will allow reservists to be deployed outside of de jure Russian territory, including ‘Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts’. Under current Russian law, reservists cannot be deployed to conflict operations without a previous declaration of mobilisation or war. The Kremlin has refused to issue another partial mobilisation order since the highly unpopular 2022 decree resulted in notable societal backlash.
• MOBILISATION: Moscow is likely undertaking the legislative preparations to further expand the rolling mobilisation of Russia’s active reserve; this is a strong indication that Russia does not plan to end the war in the short-to-medium term, but rather seeks new means to double down on its attritional strategy. The new law applies to reservists from Russia’s ‘human mobilisation reserve’. This is the country’s active high-readiness reserve, made up of individuals that have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to serve in this group, normally for a period of three years. Therefore, this is different to Russia’s much deeper inactive reserve, made up of ms of former conscripts. We assess that the new legislation sets an important precedent that will likely enable Russia to conduct rolling low-intensity mobilisations; this will preclude the need for a highly unpopular mobilisation decree, which the Kremlin has clearly sought to avoid since the aforementioned backlash in 2022.
• MOBILISATION: The new legislation comes amid reports that Russia’s existing recruitment strategy, predicated upon financial incentives for individuals to join the military, is seeing diminishing returns. On 12 October, the Russian outlet Idel Realii reported that unspecified employees in military recruitment offices claim that the number of military contracts being signed is not increasing, including in the regions that offer the highest financial signing bonuses. While we cannot confirm this, it likely remains the case that the Russian authorities are able to offset losses by attracting new recruits with lucrative financial rewards, but that this strategy is not sustainable over the medium-to-long term; 2026 likely represents a key crunch point for Russia’s recruitment efforts. This report reinforces the likelihood that the Kremlin will resort to alternative mechanisms to sustain the war in Ukraine. These alternatives will likely include the deployment of active reservists in a bid to reduce the long-term economic costs of Russia’s current recruitment strategy based on ‘volunteers’, which is proving increasingly expensive.
• TANKS: In further indications that Russia is focusing on long-term military reconstitution, internal documents from the Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) indicate Russia’s plans to reconstitute its battle tank stocks by significantly expanding T-90 production. On 11 October, the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) organisation Frontelligence Insight published internal UVZ documents that outline the company’s aims to increase T-90 production by 80% by 2028 (from 2024 rates), as well as to begin serial production of the modernised T-90M2, surging production in 2027. According to the documents, which cannot be confirmed, T-90M/M2 production will remain relatively modest in 2026 at 10 units, before peaking at 428 units in 2028. Overall, UVZ aims to produce 1,118 new modernised T-90Ms and T-90M2s between 2027 and 2029. The timeline to produce over 2,000 new T-90M, T-90M2 and T-72B3M tanks is 2026-2036, though Russia would likely be able to rebuild potent offensive capabilities before 2036.
• TANKS: In tandem with the modernisation of T-72B3Ms and other tanks that have been produced since 2022, the projected UVZ production rates would effectively replenish and modernise Russia’s main battle tank force, enabling the country to fight another major land war by the early 2030s at least, with peak production in 2027. UVZ could realistically fail to meet these targets, particularly due to enduring corruption issues and pressure from sanctions. Nevertheless, the production programme remains realistic and reflects Russia’s clear long-term planning to reconstitute its ground forces, likely as deterrence against and/or in preparation for a potential confrontation with NATO forces. The significance of this development is further underscored by the sustained decrease in tank deployments in Ukraine, where Russia currently focuses on utilising dismounted infantry operations due to the saturation of drones. Despite tanks’ reduced usage, there have been periodic mechanised assaults using armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) over the last year; this confirms the relevance of tanks (and other AFVs) under conditions when the threat of drones is mitigated, such as during poor weather conditions or electronic warfare (EW) interference. Therefore, we assess that Russia is clearly planning for large-scale mechanised manoeuvre operations in the future.
• OFFENSIVES: While Russian forces continue to prioritise the capture of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), resources have been allocated away from this sector to the south-west, in the direction of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). On 8 October, an open-source analyst reported that the Russian military command has largely redeployed the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) from southern Pokrovsk in the direction of Novopavlivka. Russia will possibly attempt to close the Ukrainian salient near Novopavlivka and level the frontline in order to provide a more stable basis for further advances into Dnipropetrovsk oblast, where Russian forces have advanced up to 6 miles (10km) in certain areas. Simultaneously, it is possible that Russian forces will intensify efforts to envelop Pokrovsk from both the south-west and the north-east; there have been marginal advances in the latter direction over the past week. We assess that this situation has possibly enabled Russia to transfer 41st CAA elements further south.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes designed to degrade Ukrainian energy security have disabled nearly 60% of Ukrainian gas production in recent weeks, according to unnamed Ukrainian officials cited by the Financial Times (FT). The most significant strike in recent days took place overnight on 9-10 October; it involved two Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, alongside 465 Shahed-type and decoy drones. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the air defences failed to intercept 60 drones and 13 missiles. The strikes caused power outages in the capital Kyiv and its surrounding Kyiv oblast, as well as Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Russia has consistently targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of and during the winter since it launched the full-scale invasion. These attacks highly likely aim to erode Ukrainian morale and to drive energy insecurity nationwide. Bloomberg has reported that Russian long-range strikes targeting Ukraine’s domestic natural gas production will possibly require Ukraine to spend EUR 1.9 bn (USD 2.2 bn) on fuel imports this upcoming winter. We assess that an increase in successful Russian attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure will increase the likelihood of scheduled and unscheduled blackouts, with the former taking place on a rolling basis. In such a scenario, business operations will likely face disruption over the coming months, especially if the Ukrainian authorities prioritise supplying household consumers and/or certain sectors during set hours of the day.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian forces have continued to conduct numerous strikes to degrade Russian oil and gas infrastructure over the past week. Overnight on 12-13 October, Ukrainian forces struck the Feodosia Marine Oil Terminal and several sub-stations in Russian-occupied Crimea. On 11 October, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that the Ukrainian forces had struck a Bashneft-Novoil refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan; a Ukrainian open-source analyst estimated that this refinery is located 869 miles (1,400km) from the Russian-Ukrainian border. On 9 October, Ukrainian forces struck the Korobkovsky Gas Processing Plant in Volgograd oblast; the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that this is one of Russia’s largest natural gas and petroleum gas facilities in southern Russia. These operations underscore Ukraine’s assessment that its strike campaign is effective in driving fuel shortages in Russia (for further analysis on Ukraine’s strike campaign, see FORECAST below).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump stated on 13 October that he plans to shift his focus to resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war, after the US helped broker a ceasefire agreement to end the Israel-Hamas war. The establishment of a ceasefire in Gaza and the successful release of Israeli hostages will likely encourage the Trump administration to build on this momentum and increase its efforts to end Russia’s full-scale war. The US will realistically launch a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at encouraging Russia and Ukraine to engage in negotiations (either bilaterally or separately with the US) over the coming weeks. Nevertheless, even if the US does ramp up efforts to end the war in Ukraine, we assess that a major breakthrough remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term. This is largely due to limited indications that Russia is willing to compromise on the US’ objectives.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Recent comments from Russian officials continue to underscore the Kremlin’s lack of willingness to engage in the peace process. On 8 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that the ‘strong momentum’ generated in August at the Alaska summit between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin has waned. Ryabkov blamed European countries for this, without elaborating further; he also did not acknowledge Russia’s lack of constructive steps towards ending the war since the Alaska summit. Meanwhile, on 10 October, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine’s negotiating position is deteriorating steadily. His comments are highly likely an attempt to push Kyiv to negotiate, presenting it as being in the country’s interests to agree to unfavourable peace terms now rather than in the future, when Moscow could potentially toughen its demands for the war to end.
• RAILWAYS: On 11 October, Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) received hoax bomb threats aboard three long-distance trains, resulting in the evacuation of passengers and a temporary suspension of train services. The affected trains were on various routes either to or from Kyiv, including two domestic trains departing from the cities of Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and Ternopil (Ternopil oblast). Notably, Ukrzaliznytsia received a hoax bomb threat for a service operated between Kyiv and the Polish capital Warsaw, which is a popular route for entering and leaving Ukraine for international visitors and Ukrainians alike during wartime.
• RAILWAYS: Bomb threats of this nature are rare, though they coincide with an intensification of Russian long-range attacks on Ukrainian railway infrastructure since summer. Since August, Russia is estimated to have conducted nearly 300 long-range attacks on Ukrzaliznytsia infrastructure, though these are predominately focused on eastern Ukraine rather than on western routes. We assess that Russia will likely increase efforts to disrupt Ukrainian railways over the coming weeks and months, increasing the likelihood of train services being cancelled, delayed or re-routed at a short notice. However, the Ukrainian authorities are competent at restoring services quickly, including after long-range strikes, meaning that a severe disruption is less likely.
FORECAST
AID: On 12 October, President Trump stated that the US may provide Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles if Russia does not want to end the war. President Trump implied that he would possibly inform President Putin of this, in a bid to encourage a settlement to the conflict. However, he did not offer any further details regarding when he would potentially speak with Moscow.
Trump’s comments underscore our earlier assessment that discussions around supplying Tomahawk missiles are likely part of the US’ strategy to utilise a ‘peace through strength’ approach to push Russia to end the war. We have repeatedly assessed the possibility of the Trump administration leveraging military aid and/or sanctions in an attempt to bring an end to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 October 2025). If Moscow continues to show a limited willingness to take productive steps aimed at establishing peace, this will increase the likelihood of Washington DC providing the Tomahawk missiles in the coming weeks or months. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to meet with Trump in Washington DC on 17 October; the sale of Tomahawks will almost certainly be discussed.
However, even if the US decides to authorise the missiles’ transfer, Ukraine will likely receive a limited number. According to assessments shared by the FT on 13 October, the US could possibly send between 20 and 50 missiles to Ukraine. This low figure is likely due to currently limited stockpiles, very low production rates and the possible need for the US to reserve stocks for strikes against targets near Venezuela’s coast (and possibly on Venezuelan soil). Former Pentagon official Mark Cancian has estimated that the US has 4,150 Tomahawk missiles in total. The US is believed to have launched over 120 Tomahawk missiles out of the 200 that the Pentagon has procured since 2022. Given the low production rates, we assess that the Trump administration will almost certainly prioritise the US’ stockpiles and other competing geopolitical flashpoints over supplying Ukraine with a large number of Tomahawk missiles.
Given that Trump has previously set deadlines on Russia that have lapsed, the timeline for the potential sale of Tomahawks remains unclear amid Russia’s own efforts to deter a decision. On 10 October, President Putin stated that Russia may soon unveil a new weapon (possibly nuclear-capable) that it had previously announced without providing further details; this comment is likely aimed at deterring Tomahawk sales. While Russia is increasing threats of escalation to deter the US, it remains possible that it will also seek to re-engage with President Trump’s diplomatic efforts. However, it remains to be seen whether President Trump would consider any such moves as sufficient, given that earlier efforts have not been successful and that he has adopted a publicly harsher stance against Russia in recent weeks. We assess that the Trump administration could realistically provide the missiles to Ukraine but not authorise their immediate use, thereby providing Russia a window to negotiate. As such, the delivery (and usage) of Tomahawk missiles could realistically take several months, similarly to earlier debates around the provision of other offensive capabilities for Ukraine, some of which dragged out for years
The US has reportedly been providing Ukraine with intelligence to help plan long-range drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure since the summer; this could realistically indicate decreasing US concerns of escalation. On 12 October, the FT reported details of this, citing unspecified Ukrainian and US officials who claimed that their bilateral co-ordination is part of a wider effort to weaken Russia’s economy in order to pressure it to enter peace talks. According to the FT, US intelligence has helped Ukraine’s military to determine the flight routes, altitude and timing for drones to evade Russian air defences; the US has reportedly been closely involved in planning strikes. Although one US official claimed that Ukraine chooses the targets and strikes alone, other people familiar with the matter claimed that the US also helps identify sites of interest. While we cannot confirm to what extent US intelligence is aiding Ukraine, if true, this could realistically indicate that the Trump administration’s risk threshold is decreasing in regard to Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia. This would increase the possibility of Tomahawk missiles being sent to Ukraine in the coming months.
In other developments related to military assistance, Western aid supplies have been unexpectedly lower in recent months despite a new aid initiative, as per the Kiel Institute. According to a report published on 14 October, total military aid (measured by value) to Ukraine fell by 43% in July and August compared to the first half of 2025. This is despite the introduction in mid-July of the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, a new scheme allowing NATO countries to purchase US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. Military aid allocations from European countries decreased by 57% compared to the period between January and June, even when combining their aid with their contributions to PURL. Ultimately, the report underscores the persistent fluctuations in aid, particularly following the end of packages under former US president Joe Biden. If these shifts in aid continue for prolonged periods of time, they will undermine and constrain Ukraine’s military planning for 2026.
(Source: Sibylline)
10 Oct 25. Rheinmetall to supply Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 to Ukraine – order value in the three-digit m Euro range Rheinmetall is supplying Ukraine with further Skyranger 35 air defence systems based on the Leopard 1. The order is worth a three-digit m Euro figure. The systems are being financed by an EU country as part of the EU’s Windfall Profit Mechanism initiative. The production and integration of the systems will be carried out by Rheinmetall Italia SpA at its headquarters in Rome. “We are grateful for the trust that Ukraine has placed in us,” said Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall AG. “We would also like to thank the EU country, for the support, which underlines our continued efforts to support Ukraine.” The Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 combines the mobility and protection of a proven tracked vehicle with the outstanding effectiveness of a cannon-based air defence system. The Skyranger 35 is equipped with a KDG 35/1000 revolver cannon in 35 mm x 228 calibre with a firing rate of 1,000 rounds per minute. It has an effective range of up to 4,000 metres and a high degree of commonality with the Oerlikon Revolver Gun Mk 3. Thanks to AHEAD technology, the Skyranger 35 is airburst capable. In the future, it will also be possible to equip it with modern guided missiles.
10 Oct 25. Russia Deploys Chinese Radars to Track Ukrainian Drones.
Russian air defense units are now equipped with Chinese radar systems designed to detect and track unmanned aerial vehicles. The technology is being integrated into counter-drone units to enhance targeting and guidance of FPV interceptors used against Ukrainian drones.
Russian forces have acquired FSTH-LD02 and FSTH-LD03 radar systems manufactured by Zhejiang Fanshuang Technology. These compact, all-weather radars are described as the “eyes” of Russian anti-drone teams and are now being fielded alongside interceptor drones across multiple units.
FSTH-LD02 and FSTH-LD03
The FSTH-LD03 radar uses a digital antenna array and operates in the X-band frequency range between 8 and 12 GHz, with a wavelength of 3.75 to 2.5 cm. It employs mechanical azimuth scanning and has a stated detection range of up to 15 kilometers against targets with a radar cross-section of 0.01 square meters. Detection accuracy is reported at 10 meters for range and 0.3 degrees for both azimuth and elevation.
The FSTH-LD02 functions on a similar principle but operates in the Ku-band (12–18 GHz, with wavelengths between 2.5 and 1.67 cm). Its maximum detection range is 10 kilometers for targets of the same size, but it offers higher precision — up to 5 meters in range and 0.3 degrees in azimuth and elevation.
Both radars have technical limitations that operators must account for. They feature blind zones of approximately 300 meters (for the LD03) and 150 meters (for the LD02), and are unable to track objects moving at speeds below 1 meter per second. Although the manufacturer has not disclosed dimensions, the systems are estimated to measure roughly 1 to 1.3 meters in length and 0.6 to 0.8 meters in height.
A lighter variant, the FSTH-LD02C, is also widely available through Chinese online marketplaces. This version consumes only 400 watts of power and can detect quadcopter-type drones at ranges of 8 to 10 kilometers. Operating in the 9–10.2 GHz portion of the X-band, it offers slightly lower accuracy — around 10 meters for range and 0.5 degrees for azimuth and elevation — but is more compact at about 1 meter by 0.6 meters in size.
The use of these radars has been observed in the 22nd Air Defense Missile Regiment of Russia’s 11th Army Corps. The deployment suggests that Russia is reorganizing its drone interception capability by integrating FPV drone teams within existing air defense units. This structure is intended to improve coordination between radar operators and drone pilots, enabling a more unified defense approach within shared operational zones.
The introduction of Chinese radar technology into Russian service highlights the evolving nature of drone warfare in the conflict. As Ukraine increasingly relies on small, agile, and hard-to-detect drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes, Russia is seeking ways to counter these threats with more precise detection and guidance systems.
By pairing these radar systems with interceptor drones, Russian units aim to create a layered defense against Ukraine’s rapidly expanding fleet of unmanned systems — a capability that continues to shape the tactical landscape of the battlefield. (Source: UAS VISION/ Defence Blog; Defense Express)
10 Oct 25. UK accelerates missile aid to Ukraine, surpassing delivery timelines. The ongoing missile production efforts within the UK is creating 200 new jobs, while sustaining an additional 700 positions.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has expedited the provision of critical air defence missiles to Ukraine, surpassing the initial delivery schedule by five months. Hundreds of Martlet Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs), produced in Belfast, were delivered under UK’s gifting programme. Produced by Belfast-based Thales, LMM is a surface-to-surface, surface-to-air precision strike missile. The weapons, each weighing 13kg, can travel at a speed of over Mach 1.5.
They have been deployed in Ukraine since the start of the conflict with Russia in February 2022. The delivery coincides with UK Defence Readiness and Industry Minister Luke Pollard’s visit to Kyiv as part of a trade delegation. It also comes as Thales entered a new phase of collaboration with Ukrainian partners.This advancement pertains to a segment of the earlier £1.6bn ($2.1bn) agreement, which will facilitate the enhanced incorporation of these decisive missiles into Ukraine’s air defence infrastructure. The missile production efforts within the UK are not only creating 200 new jobs but also sustaining an additional 700 positions. This contributes to economic growth and aligns with the Government’s Plan for Change.
Luke Pollard said: “The UK is stepping up our ironclad commitment to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s illegal invasion. This year alone we are spending £4.5bn on military support for Ukraine, more than ever before.
“It was an honour to lead this trade delegation to Kyiv, and to see so many other countries participating in the event. Driving industrial partnerships is essential so that we can learn from their expertise and together build the industrial base we need to defend the UK, deter our adversaries and support Ukraine.”
Previous trade missions between the UK and Ukraine have yielded over 30 joint ventures and partnerships, fostering job creation, economic prosperity, and enhanced security for both countries.
Notably, Ukrspecsystems, Ukraine’s drone manufacturer, plans to invest £200m in establishing two new facilities in the UK.
This move is expected to generate 500 high-skilled jobs and stimulate economic expansion. The trade delegation visit follows Programme LYRA, a technology sharing initiative that will see joint development of advanced military equipment between UK and Ukrainian industries. This partnership supports British employment while reinforcing national security for both nations. An industrial partnership has emerged from this agreement, leading to Project OCTOPUS, an air defence interceptor drone development venture. The UK aims to produce thousands of these drones monthly to aid Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s ongoing drone attacks on its cities. (Source: army-technology.com)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————