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Military And Security Developments
Oct 02.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: Prominent Ukrainian open-source monitoring group DeepState has assessed that the pace of Russian advances more than halved in September compared to August
• STRIKES: Ukrainian and Western officials suspect that Russia has successfully upgraded its ballistic missiles to further undermine Ukraine’s air defences, which will likely sustain if not increase the lethality of ballistic missile strikes
• DRONES: French military personnel have boarded a Russia-linked oil tanker suspected of launching drones into European airspace, underscoring growing likelihood that shadow fleet tankers are being used in grey zone operations
• FORECAST: The US will reportedly provide Ukraine with intelligence for long-range missile strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure; if confirmed, this would represent a notable pivot of US policy in a likely negotiating tactic
• OFFENSIVES: On 1 October, the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) monitoring group DeepState assessed that the pace of Russian advances more than halved in September compared to August. According to DeepState’s estimates, Russian forces seized 100 square miles (259 sq km) in September, a reduction of 44% compared to the previous month. DeepState’s analysis states that most of Russia’s advances occurred along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border, which aligns with our assessments over the last month (see SOUTHERN below). Ukrainian defences at other critical points of the frontline, including around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), remain broadly stable at present, with Russian forces struggling to build momentum.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to slowly encroach towards Siversk (Donetsk oblast) from the north, east and south, including from the northern banks of the Siverskyi Donets River. Geolocated footage published on 28 September indicates that Russian advances along the Donetska railway to positions roughly two miles (3km) south-east of Siversk’s outskirts. Following the Russian consolidation of the Serebrianske forest north of the Siverskyi Donets River, Russian forces are now applying increased pressure on the town from the north. Geolocated footage from 30 September shows Russian forces operating to the north-east of Dronivka (Donetsk oblast), a village located on the river’s southern banks around 3.5 miles (5.5km) to the north of Siversk. It remains unclear whether these positions were established by Russian forces that had swum across the river, or forces moving westwards along the southern bank of the river from their positions to the east of Serebrianka (Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Reports that dismounted Russian troops are swimming across the Siverskyi Donets River underscores the inability of Russian forces to conduct large-scale, mechanised amphibious operations across the river. Russian forces attempted such operations earlier in the war in 2022, to disastrous effects. Given the saturation of the battlefield with drones and Ukrainian fires, any further attempt would likely similarly result in failure.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the south-west, Russian forces have made modest advances west of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast) amid wider efforts to begin encircling the city. Geolocated footage from 28 and 29 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the banks of a small reservoir to the north-west of Rusyn Yar, a village roughly 11 miles (18km) to the west of Kostiantynivka. While slow, advances in this direction will support ongoing Russian operations to the west that seek to stabilise a tactical penetration north-east of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have achieved small territorial gains in northern Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts in recent days, though it is unclear if this reflects an intensification of fighting along this axis. In Kharkiv oblast, geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian and Russian forces have advanced in locations to the south-east of Borova. Similarly, in northern Donetsk oblast, at the southern end of the Oskil-Kreminna line, geolocated footage points to advances by both sides to the north-east of Lyman. On 1 October, a Ukrainian commander operating in Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast; a key Ukrainian logistical hub and a Russian target on this axis) reported that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate the city by sending one or two troops at a time. Reportedly, these troops are wearing civilian clothes; while we cannot confirm this, that would constitute a war crime under the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, the commander stated that Russian forces have been unable to control any territory as a result and remain in the city’s northern outskirts.
• SOUTHERN: Russian efforts to establish a so-called ‘buffer zone’ in Dnipropetrovsk oblast continue to progress slowly, with confirmed westwards advances over the last week. Geolocated footage published on 28 September and 1 October indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Verbove (Donetsk oblast), a village located around 20 miles (33km) west of Velyka Novosilka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). These efforts are also being supported by further advances to the south, inside neighbouring Zaporizhzhia oblast. Geolocated footage from 30 September indicates that Russian forces have entered eastern Poltavka (Donetsk oblast), located around 10 miles (16km) north-east of Hulyaipole (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
• STRIKES: Unnamed Ukrainian and Western officials suspect that Russia has successfully upgraded its ballistic missiles to further undermine Ukraine’s air defences, according to the Financial Times (FT). This suspicion is based on the worsening interception rate of Ukrainian air defences since September (or conversely, the growing success rate of Russian missile strikes hitting their target). In particular, the officials suspect that Russia has adapted its Iskander-M mobile system and its Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. The missiles have reportedly outpaced Ukraine’s air defences by diving and plunging into a vertical dive, as well as by executing manoeuvres that ‘confuse’ Patriot interceptors, in contrast to more conventional ballistic terminal trajectories. An unnamed official told the FT that improvements made to Patriot interceptors have successfully lagged Russia’s evolving tactics.
• STRIKES: The changes in Russia’s ballistic missiles point to the growing threat posed by Russia’s long-range missiles strikes, as well as Russia’s ability to make battlefield innovations, offsetting Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. The Patriot system is the only system in Ukraine’s possession capable of intercepting Russian ballistic missiles. If the Russian adaptation is confirmed, it would indicate that strikes involving ballistic missiles will pose an increased risk until a counter-adaption has been made, particularly in the capital Kyiv where the systems are most heavily concentrated. This will place significant pressure on businesses (including Western-owned assets) in the coming months, especially given the uptick in the overall intensity of long-range strikes over the summer, the likely further intensification of strikes during the coming winter period and Russia’s expanding missile production rates.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 30 September-1 October, Russian forces launched 49 Shahed-type and decoy drones, as well four Iskander-M ballistic missiles and one P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile at locations across central, northern and eastern Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, five drones and all five missiles struck their targets. This underscores the aforementioned reports that Russia has adapted its ballistic missiles to improve its penetration rate of Ukrainian air defences. Strikes were recorded in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Russia has also carried out two drone strikes in recent days. Overnight on 1-2 October, Russia launched 86 drones in total, including 31 that struck locations in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Furthermore, overnight on 29-30 September, Russia launched 32 Shahed-type and decoy drones, with the Ukrainian air defences intercepting 23 drones. Strikes were recorded in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: On 29 September, the Ukrainian forces carried out a Neptune missile strike against a Russian defence industrial enterprise in Karachev (Bryansk oblast). The Elektrodetal plant reportedly produced electronic components and military equipment for missile control systems, armoured vehicles and command and control (C2) devices. According to the Russian opposition outlet Astra, the missile forced the plant to halt operations; the extent of the damage remains unclear. This strike underscores Ukraine’s ability to carry out strikes on Russia’s defence industry in conjunction with the ongoing campaign to degrade Russian oil refineries. For further analysis of Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, see FORECAST below.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• DIPLOMACY: US President Donald Trump has again called for the leaders of Russia and Ukraine to meet, though the prospect of such negotiations taking place in the near-to-medium term is low. On 30 September, President Trump urged a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, emphasising the need to ‘settle’ the war. Although President Zelensky has emphasised his willingness to meet with his Russian counterpart on numerous occasions, President Putin continues to show reluctance. We assess that Russia will likely prioritise either engaging bilaterally with the US to normalise relations, or proceeding with lower-level technical negotiations with Ukrainian delegations; a concerted effort to make peace with Ukraine remains unlikely. Nevertheless, amid a potential pivot in US strategy (see FORECAST below), this could realistically incentivise Russia to agree to some form of procedural talks in the coming months.
• DRONES: On 1 October, reports emerged that French military personnel had boarded a Russia-linked oil tanker suspected of launching drones into European airspace. A French navy vessel intercepted the Russian oil tanker on 28 September; the ship was en route to India with 750,000 barrels of crude oil from the Russian oil terminal in Primorsk (Leningrad oblast). The vessel, a Benin-flagged tanker known as the Boracay, was one of four Russia-linked vessels spotted near Denmark at the time of drone sightings on 22 September and 24 September. The vessel has operated under numerous names; it was monitored sailing around Denmark under the name Pushpa in late September. On 29 September, President Zelensky accused Russia of using oil tankers in the Baltic Sea to launch drones and to violate countries’ airspace across the region, which we assess remains likely.
• DRONES: While we cannot verify if the Russian ship served as a launchpad for drones against Denmark, if confirmed, it would demonstrate Russia’s willingness to utilise its so-called shadow fleet of oil tankers for grey zone purposes. Russia has typically used these vessels to evade sanctions, specifically the price cap on Russian oil set by the G7 in December 2022. Ultimately, if Russia is using its shadow tankers to launch drones into the airspace of European countries, this will likely reaffirm Europe’s efforts to increase sanctions against such vessels. Nevertheless, Russian attempts to obfuscate the vessels’ ownership and names will likely undermine any initiatives aimed to clamp down on Russia’s shadow fleet over the coming months. This sustains the risk that such ships will be used in Russian maritime grey zone operations across Europe. For further analysis on recent drone incursions, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 October 2025.
• SANCTIONS: The G7 is prepared to tighten sanctions pressure on Russia by utilising various measures aimed at reducing its revenues, though its impact on the Kremlin’s decision-making will likely remain limited in the short-to-medium term. According to a statement from 1 October, G7 countries agree that it is time to ramp up pressure on Russian oil exports. The source announces that the member states are ready to target ‘those who are continuing to increase’ purchases of Russian oil and the entities facilitating circumvention. The G7 statement also pledges to significantly reduce remaining imports from Russia (including hydrocarbon supplies), with the ultimate goal of phasing these out. It also said that the G7 is strongly considering imposing trade and other restrictions on countries and entities that help finance Russia’s war effort. Ultimately, the G7’s pledges align with President Trump’s efforts to encourage Western countries to forgo Russian oil as a pre-condition for the US to increase sanctions pressure. However, further squeezes on Russia’s budget are unlikely to force an end to the war in the short-to-medium term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 September 2025.
FORECAST
INTELLIGENCE: The US will reportedly provide Ukraine with intelligence for long-range missile strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure; if confirmed, this would entail a notable pivot of US policy. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) first reported this on 1 October, citing unspecified US administration officials; Reuters has corroborated the reports. The US is also reportedly asking NATO allies to provide Ukraine with similar intelligence support.
This development marks the first time that the Trump administration has approved such substantial intelligence support; the move comes as the US considers sending Ukraine missiles, which would significantly strengthen its long-range strike capabilities. The US has long shared intelligence with Ukraine, though officials stated that the expansion of intelligence-sharing will allow Ukraine to target refineries, pipelines and other infrastructure deep inside Russia, marking a step up in the Trump administration’s intelligence support. According to the WSJ, President Trump approved the initiative for intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense to aid Ukraine with strikes shortly before he claimed that Ukraine could retake all of its land occupied by Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 25 September 2025). As such, the provision of such intelligence indicates a notable shift in the US’ policy towards taking a harsher stance on Russia.
While the move to greenlight this intelligence sharing could realistically signal that the US will supply Ukraine with longer-range missiles, we assess that it is more likely a negotiating tactic (at least in the short term). The Trump administration is still debating whether to supply Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles; the approval of US-Ukrainian intelligence sharing does not necessarily indicate that a decision on the matter is imminent. If it is a negotiating tactic, the Trump administration is likely waiting to see whether the prospect of Ukraine being able to strike energy infrastructure deeper inside Russia will encourage the Kremlin to re-engage in the stalled peace process. If the US perceives that Russia is unwilling to take serious steps to end the war, the provision of Tomahawk missiles could realistically materialise over the coming months. However, even if Russia does make efforts to organise renewed talks, it is unlikely that the US’ decision will encourage Russia to end the war in the near term, despite the growing economic toll Ukrainian strikes are causing Russian refineries.
The US’ decision to begin providing intelligence for these strikes likely reaffirms that the Trump administration perceives that reducing Russia’s energy revenues is key to push the Kremlin to negotiate. In recent weeks, the US has criticised European and NATO countries’ continued purchases of Russian oil; on 13 September, President Trump stated that this weakens the West’s bargaining power over Russia. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian oil refineries have proven significantly disruptive. As of 28 September, 38% of Russia’s oil refining capacity was ‘idle’, according to Russian media reports citing the Russian energy market analysis agency Seala. The reports stated that Ukraine’s drone attacks are the main cause for this, estimating that they account for up to 70% of shutdowns. Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries have caused fuel shortages and price hikes in certain regions of de jure and de facto Russian territory.
Therefore, Ukraine has already shown its sovereign capability to conduct deep strikes; the new Ukrainian-built FP-5 Flamingo long-range cruise missile will theoretically provide Ukraine with an even deeper strike capability than Tomahawks. While numbers remain uncertain, the Flamingo (which is understood to be operational) has a purported range of 1,800 miles (2,900km) in contrast to the Tomahawk’s range of 1,500 miles (2400km). As such, if Flamingo missiles prove to be a workable capability, Ukraine will not be solely reliant upon the US’ potential missile provision to further increase pressure on Russia’s deep rear and its oil refining capabilities. Nevertheless, the limited numbers of the still broadly unproven Flamingo missile will likely mean that Tomahawks remain an important component in a future Ukrainian deep strike missile campaign.
Russia will possibly respond to the US’ decision by increasing the intensity of long-range strikes against Ukraine and by staging additional airspace incursions into European airspace in the coming weeks, in a bid to deter the provision of Tomahawks. According to reports by Bloomberg, a Russian diplomat claimed during recent talks with Western envoys that recent aerial incursions into NATO airspace were a response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea. We assessed that this was an attempt to link Ukrainian long-range strikes directly with Russia’s retaliation against Europe, clearly in an attempt to deter support for providing long-range cruise missiles. Consequently, the already elevated threat of further violations of European airspace or other grey zone sabotage activity will highly likely increase if the US provides the missiles. If Tomahawks are provided, Russia will seek to deter Germany from providing long-range Taurus cruise missiles, which Ukraine has long sought to use to attack Russia’s rear.
Oct 01.
• Recent Russian incursions into Estonian and Polish airspace highlight the intensification of efforts to test NATO’s readiness and responses.
• The risk of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) activity near critical national infrastructure (CNI), including airports and ports, will remain elevated in coming weeks across various parts of Europe.
• Resultant air traffic restrictions will drive operational disruption for the aviation sector in the Baltic region; an elevated NATO defence posture will also likely exacerbate air traffic disruption in Poland.
• Future drone activity could realistically cause significant disruption at major European ports; this would have knock-on impacts on global supply chains, including riverine cargo.
• Denmark’s proposed security legislation to provide autonomous counter-drone capabilities to airports and other CNI operators will likely face moderate enforcement challenges.
Context
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, unauthorised incursions into the Baltic airspace have occurred on a semi-regular basis. However, the recent uptick in Russian jet and drone activity along NATO’s eastern flank likely reflects an intensification of Russian efforts to test NATO’s readiness and responses. In Germany, suspected Russian reconnaissance drone activity has been detected near numerous sensitive military facilities, defence companies and critical infrastructure including liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, port facilities and railways. Since 22 September, there have been drone flights over Danish airports and military sites. While these have not been attributed to Russia officially, the Danish government has categorised them as a systematic grey zone attack by a ‘professional’ operator, consistent with patterns of Russian activity.
In response to these incidents, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, US President Donald Trump and numerous European leaders have signalled support for shooting down any Russian aircraft that enters allied airspace. While such engagements would spike regional tensions and threats, we continue to assess that a major NATO-Russia war remains highly unlikely. In the coming months, Russia will highly likely continue conducting grey zone attacks to test NATO’s boundaries; airports, ports and other CNI sites will remain key targets.
Sep 29.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukrainian commanders have claimed that their ongoing ‘counter-offensive’ has encircled Russian forces north-east of Pokrovsk, but it remains more likely that counter-attacks are achieving more limited results
• STRIKES: Russian forces launched the third-largest combined strike against Ukraine on 28 September; the fact that the Polish Embassy in Kyiv was damaged underscores high threats to Western assets in the short-to-medium term
• LABOUR: Ukrainian labour shortages in the hospitality sector are likely to worsen following reports expecting mass closures of restaurants, shortly after the government relaxed rules for young men to travel• FORECAST: US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg has stated that US President Donald Trump is in favour of Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia, though the provision of Tomahawk missiles remains uncertain
• BAKHMUT: Heavy fighting continues south of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast), where Ukrainian counter-attacks are containing Russian advances and preventing significant progress towards the city’s southern outskirts. On 26 September, Russian sources reported that their forces had withdrawn from the village of Pleshchiivka, located under four miles (6km) south-east of Kostiantynivka, following a Ukrainian counter-attack. This is likely accurate and underscores the pressure Ukrainian forces can bring to bear on Russian forces. Russian troops have been advancing at a very slow rate northwards towards Kostiantynivka since consolidating their presence in Toretsk (Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Further north, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had taken Mayske, a village located around three miles (5km) north-west of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, numerous Russian sources have claimed advances to the west and north-west of Chasiv Yar over the last week, indicating a realistic possibility that progress has been made towards the village.
• DONETSK: Senior Ukrainian authorities continue to claim successful ‘counter-offensive’ efforts in the Dobropillia sector (Donetsk oblast), though such statements have been moderated by a prominent Ukrainian military observer. Earlier on 29 September, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that several Russian units had been encircled near Dobropillia. Syrskyi further stated that Ukrainian forces had liberated around 68 square miles (175 sq km) of territory in the area and had cleared an additional 75.3 square miles (195 sq km) of Russian sabotage groups. Syrskyi also assessed that Russian casualties amounted to 3,185 soldiers, together with the loss of 969 pieces of weapons and military equipment over an undefined timeframe. We continue to assess that Ukrainian operations in this direction constitute counter-attacks rather than a full-scale ‘counter-offensive’.
• DONETSK: A prominent Ukrainian military observer has qualified Ukraine’s aforementioned claims, indicating that a genuine encirclement of Russian forces is currently unlikely at present, in line with our assessment. Earlier on 29 September, the observer described Ukrainian operations in the Dobropillia sector as counter-attacks conducted as part of stabilisation efforts, rather than a full counter-offensive. Russia reportedly continues to hold ground east of Dobropillia, as far north as Kucherov Yar (Donetsk oblast), maintaining much of its tactical wedge east of Dobropillia and west of the Kazennyi Torets River. However, Russian forces continue to struggle to advance westward towards Dobropillia. While the observer acknowledged that Ukraine’s control of positions north of Nikanorivka and Pankivka (two villages located to the east of Dobropillia) creates a genuine threat of encirclement for Russian elements in the area, he nevertheless downplayed the likelihood of an actual encirclement of Russian troops. Geolocated footage from 26 September indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into eastern Dorozhnie, located to the south-east of Dobropillia.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made gains to the south-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). Recently published geolocated footage indicates that Russian troops advanced west of Kotlyne as well as on the south-eastern outskirts of Udachne. A prominent Ukrainian military observer acknowledged the deterioration of Ukraine’s operational situation to the east of Pokrovsk, along the Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad axis. The observer noted that, in addition to gaining a foothold in Novoekonomichne, Russian forces are launching small assault groups towards the mines, which are located to the west of Novoekonomichne.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces made limited gains along the Oskil-Kreminna line in recent days. Geolocated footage from 28 September shows recent Russian gains south of Zarichne to the east of Lyman (both Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces contested claims of Russian capture of Novoselivka to the north-west of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Russia continues to launch large-scale combined strikes complemented by smaller strikes on other days. On 28 September, Russia conducted the third-largest strike since the onset of the war. It involved 593 Shahed-type drones, two Banderol cruise missiles launched by drones (a relatively new capability), two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, 38 Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles and eight Kalibr cruise missiles. Ukrainian forces intercepted 566 Shahed drones, both Banderol drones, 35 Kh-101 missiles and all Kalibr missiles.
• STRIKES: Hits were reported in Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as in the capital Kyiv and its surrounding oblast. The Kyiv oblast authorities reported that the attack caused blackouts. In the capital, the strike killed four civilians, and missile fragments reportedly damaged the building of the Polish embassy. Similarly, the EU delegation building was also damaged; this is the second time it has been hit since August. The damage to these official buildings underscores the growing risks to foreign assets during significantly intense Russian strikes. For more analysis on such risks, please see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 26 September 2025. Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast) was also heavily targeted by at least eight missiles. Ukrainian authorities noted that Russian forces had adjusted their tactics, flying Shahed-type drones over neighbourhoods up to 12 times before striking.
• STRIKES: The provision of additional US Patriot air defence systems will moderately improve Ukraine’s defences against Russian strikes, particularly in Kyiv, where these systems are most likely to be deployed. On 27 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Patriot systems provided by Israel have been operating in Ukraine for a month; he also indicated that Ukraine will receive two more systems later in the autumn. According to The New York Times, Ukraine will ultimately have a total of ten Patriot systems. We assess that this number remains insufficient to significantly enhance Ukraine’s overall air defence capabilities, given the intensification of Russian strikes in recent months. Ukrainian authorities are likely to allocate some of the additional systems to high-priority areas such as Kyiv, which would improve the city’s operational environment, increasing its defences against cruise (and to a lesser extent, ballistic) missiles. Ultimately, the steady provision of Patriot interceptors remains crucial to maintain Ukraine’s long-term air defence capabilities.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• LABOUR: Ukrainian labour shortages in the hospitality sector are likely to worsen following reports expecting mass closures of restaurants, shortly after the government relaxed rules for young men to travel. According to Stanislav Zavertailo, co-founder of two dining establishments in Kyiv, it is predicted that up to 30% of male hospitality sector personnel between the ages of 18 and 22 will leave Ukraine. Another restaurateur has forecast that hundreds of establishments will close in Kyiv in the coming months. However, Rodion Yeroshek (CEO of Poster, a Ukrainian company automating systems for restaurants and stores) stated that he has not yet seen widespread closures of coffee shops, cafes or restaurants. Ultimately, the Ukrainian government’s decision to ease travel restrictions under martial law for men between the ages of 18 and 22 will likely intensify already-chronic labour shortages in certain sectors, including hospitality.
• ASSETS: Germany is pushing for the EU to use frozen Russian assets to finance a loan supporting Ukraine’s war effort, though such assistance is unlikely to materialise in the near term. In an article published in the Financial Times on 25 September, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz advocated for using these immobilised funds to back a EUR 140 bn (USD 164 bn) interest-free loan for Ukraine. According to him, repayment would be due once Russia has compensated Ukraine for damages caused during the full-scale invasion. Chancellor Merz stated that the loan should be used to fund military equipment, not to cover Ukraine’s budget more broadly.
• ASSETS: Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has opposed appropriating Russian assets as such. On 26 September, Prime Minister De Wever warned that seizing a third country’s bank assets would set a ‘dangerous precedent’. He also expressed concerns that such a measure would lead other EU member states to decide to withdraw their reserves from the Eurozone. Until now, the EU has used the interests generated by frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. Most of these frozen assets are held by Euroclear, based in Belgium. The Belgian government’s resistance to using Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit will likely prevent the creation of such a loan in the coming weeks and months.
• SANCTIONS: The EU is reportedly considering modifying its sanctions extension process to prevent Hungary from vetoing punitive measures related to Russia. On 26 September, Politico cited an internal European Commission document which proposes shifting from unanimity to a qualified majority when renewing sanctions. Nevertheless, we assess that even if implemented, Hungary will highly likely cause an obstacle to future sanctions against Russia over the longer term. For instance, Hungary and Slovakia are creating opposition to the EU’s plan to phase out Russian energy as part of its 19th sanctions package.
FORECAST
US: On 28 September, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated in an interview with Fox News that US President Donald Trump is in favour of Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia. Kellogg’s comments were unclear as to whether President Trump has reversed his long-standing opposition to Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia with US equipment.
The US is considering providing Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles, according to US Vice President JD Vance; this could realistically signal a shift in the US’ position. On 28 September, Vice President Vance stated that President Trump will make the final decision on this matter, without specifying a timeframe. On 26 September, The Telegraph reported that President Zelensky had asked President Trump in a closed meeting to provide the missiles, which boast a range of up to 1,500 miles (2,414km). This is much farther than the range of Western missiles currently provided to Ukraine, which consists of British and French Storm Shadows/SCALP missiles and the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Previously, former US president Joe Biden had rejected Ukraine’s requests for Tomahawk missiles.
If approved, the provision of Tomahawk missiles would significantly expand Ukraine’s existing long-range strike capabilities and allow for further damage to Russian infrastructure, aiding the Ukrainian war effort. On 25 September, Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russia’s oil sector have severely disrupted fuel supplies and logistics for the Russian military. Syrskyi said that Ukrainian forces have hit 85 targets on Russian soil in under two months, including 33 military sites and 52 military-industrial facilities. While Tomahawk missiles can target much larger areas of Russia with precision missiles (together with current long-range drones), they are unlikely to become a war-winning capability for Ukraine in the near-to-medium term.
Discussions surrounding the possibility of the US providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine are highly likely part of President Trump’s current strategy of increasing pressure on Russia to end the war. This comes after President Trump claimed on 23 September that Ukraine could reclaim all of its territory from Russia with the help of the EU and NATO. We assess that the Trump administration is highly likely adopting a progressively tougher stance on Russia, signalling that increasing support for Ukraine is possible, because the peace process remains stalled. On 28 September, Vice President Vance stated that Russia is refusing to engage in bilateral negotiations with Ukraine, as well as in trilateral talks with the US. It ultimately remains uncertain if and when Kyiv would receive Tomahawk missiles, and whether talks about their provision are largely aimed at pressuring Moscow. Concerns around limited US stocks of Tomahawk missiles will likely loom large in the US’ decision-making on whether to supply an operationally significant number of weapons to Ukraine.
Russia has indicated willingness to enter new talks, which are expected to be held later this autumn, possibly in response to growing US pressure. On 27 September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that he had agreed with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to meet for a third round of talks, though the date remains unknown. According to Foreign Minister Lavrov, the talks are aimed at removing ‘irritants’ in US-Russia relations, though he could realistically use the talks to discourage the US from adopting an increasingly tougher stance on Russia.
On 25 September, Bloomberg reported that unspecified British, French and German envoys had privately warned Russian officials that NATO is ready to respond to further airspace violations with force, including by shooting down Russian aircraft. The Western diplomats reportedly concluded that Russian commanders had ordered the incursion deliberately, even though the Kremlin has publicly claimed that it did not violate Estonian airspace.
A Russian diplomat reportedly said that the recent aerial incursions into NATO airspace were a response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea, indicating an attempt to link Ukrainian military action with retaliation in Europe. The diplomat claimed that Russia considers that it is already engaged in a ‘confrontation’ with European countries. While we cannot confirm the veracity of these reports, if true, this would likely indicate that Russia is open to a managed military escalation in order to erode Western support for Ukraine. In this context, Russia is likely to present aerial incursions and other tests of NATO’s eastern flank as a deterrent against Western-backed long-range strikes inside Russia. The Kremlin will likely attempt to prevent Ukraine’s provision of Tomahawk missiles by threatening escalatory retaliation against Europe, sustaining the very credible threat of renewed drone and grey zone operations across the continent.
• Russia-Ukraine-US: Uncertainty over US arms provision will persist. On 28 September, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated in an interview with Fox News that US President Donald Trump is in favour of Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia. Kellogg added that President Trump holds the final decision-making power on whether Ukraine may carry out such strikes. Kellogg also clarified that the US has not yet decided whether to provide Ukraine with long-range US-made Tomahawk missiles, as per Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request. Kellogg’s comments are unclear as to whether President Trump has reversed his long-standing opposition to Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia with US equipment. We assess that Kellogg’s statements are highly likely part of President Trump’s strategy of adopting a progressively tougher stance on Russia, with the goal of coercing Russian President Vladimir Putin into negotiations while managing escalation risks. We assess that even if President Trump were to formally approve such strikes, it remains uncertain whether he will provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles ahead of possible US-Russia talks later this autumn. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Sep 25. Vatag heavy UGV makes debut in Kyiv. Vatag, a heavy armed and armoured unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), was first unveiled at the Defense Tech Valley 2025 exhibition held in Kyiv on 16–17 September.
Although some UGVs manufactured in Ukraine since 2022 have been armed, Vatag draws attention because of its size. It is larger than the UGVs developed and deployed by the country so far, with its manufacturer Ground Robotics saying it is capable of transporting over 2 tonnes, with integrated software-and-hardware solutions enabling autonomous behavioural decision-making. It was displayed with a 25 mm cannon mounted on a remote weapon station (RWS), which the company called a “proprietary universal combat module”. It added that the range of weapon configurations is being expanded, including the integration of universal combat modules that can be adapted to different mission profiles.
The 8×8 wheeled platform displayed had unspecified sensors and cameras across its body for situational awareness and navigation, potentially enabling the platform to move autonomously. It had cargo rings on its flat top designed to secure cargo for logistical support purposes. In addition, its RWS is apparently gyrostabilised, which would enable operators to shoot while the platform is moving. The modular flat-top design allows the Vatag to be compatible with other types of armament and payloads.
The company said that Vatag is designed for missions from providing fire support during assault or defensive operations to delivering unit support in fully autonomous mode. It added that Vatag has been developed as the foundation of an H (Heavy)-UGV ecosystem. (Source: Janes)
29 Sep 25. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy proposes joint air shield with allies.
• Summary
• Zelenskiy suggests joint air defence with allies against Russian threats
• Ukraine to train Polish troops on drone countermeasures
• Germany cautions drone wall project will take years to complete
Ukraine has proposed building a joint air defence shield with allies to protect against threats from Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday, after a series of airspace incursions that caused alarm on NATO’s eastern flank.
NATO leaders have said that Russia has been testing the alliance’s readiness and resolve with airspace incursions in Poland and the Baltic states, and Kyiv says its experience in dealing with aerial threats would be valuable.
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“Ukraine proposes to Poland and all our partners to build a joint, fully reliable shield against Russian aerial threats,” he said in an address to the Warsaw Security Forum delivered via video link.
“This is possible. Ukraine can counter all kinds of Russian drones and missiles and if we act together in the region we will have enough weapons and production capacity.”
Ukraine has already said that its troops and engineers will train Polish counterparts on countering drones.
Romania, meanwhile, aims to partner with Ukraine to build drones under a new European Union defence funding mechanism.
Romanian Defence Minister Ionut Mosteanu told the Warsaw Security Forum that new drone fragments were found in the eastern Romanian county of Tulcea, neighbouring Ukraine, on Monday.
The topic of defence cooperation with Kyiv was high on the agenda as leaders gathered in Warsaw for the annual security forum.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius told the conference that “Europe’s and Ukraine’s defence industry must work together more closely and effectively”.
“The European Union must back this by providing a much more flexible regulatory framework for the defence industry in Europe.”
Following the Russian incursions into NATO airspace, countries on the alliance’s eastern flank have agreed on the need for a “drone wall” with advanced detection, tracking and interception capabilities.
Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said Ukrainian participation would be essential to the project.
“Polish-Ukrainian cooperation in this area already exists, but we expect… there to be cooperation between the European Union and Ukraine,” he said.
“Otherwise, we will have dangerous spaces, we will have gaps in the air, missile and anti-drone defence systems.”
However, Pistorius warned that establishing a drone wall would not be a quick process.
“We’re not talking about a concept that will be realised within the next three or four years,” he said. “We need to prioritise, and recognise that we require more capabilities and capacities than previously described.” (Source: Reuters)
25 Sep 25. Ukraine navy, a battle-tested force, plays enemy in NATO drone drill. Representatives from the Ukrainian navy participated in NATO’s largest unmanned maritime systems exercise this month, simulating the opposing force to test the capabilities of two dozen allied countries in scenarios inspired by frontline action. Ukraine was one of 24 countries that took part in the Portugal-led military exercise, REPMUS 2025, from Sept. 1-26, dedicated to testing hundreds of autonomous systems for naval applications.
Captain Valter de Bulha Almeida of the Portuguese Navy told reporters that Ukrainian forces took on the role of the adversarial “red team,” with scenarios shaped by what they were seeing on the battlefield in their defense against Russia.
“The question is not who is winning, I am much more interested in developing tactics – we’re learning a lot from Ukraine, I can guarantee you that, because we have to act as if the threat is real, so they are doing what they do and see on the front lines, and for us it’s very important,” he said during a Sept. 24 media briefing at the Portuguese Navy Operational Experimentation Centre (CEOM) in Tróia.
The official added that Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels participated in the exercise, but did not provide more details, citing security reasons.
A presentation of REPMUS capabilities broke down the number of unmanned assets between the two different teams: the red team was listed as having 61 drones, 57 USVs and one unmanned ground vehicle.
Images purportedly showing an upgraded variant of the Magura V7 drone boat at the CEOM port, produced by the Ukrainian state-owned company SpetsTechnoExport, or STE, were first published by the Portuguese defense blog Defence360.
When asked to confirm the craft’s presence for the exercise, an STE representative told Defense News that the company had no comment, but provided a link to a report from the Ukrainian media outlet Militarnyi detailing the naval drone’s presence in Portugal.
The deployment of Magura naval drones throughout the war has been widely documented. In 2023, at the DSEI trade show in London, the Ukrainian company shared a white paper stating that the Magura V5 was “the world’s first maritime drone with public video confirmation of hitting legitimate targets, including [Russian] warships.”
According to Militarnyi, in this configuration, the Magura V7 weighs approximately 3,400 kilograms and can cover distances of up to 1,500 kilometers.
Naval drones are becoming increasingly common in European militaries.
In 2023, the Portuguese Navy established its first squadron-sized drone unit, which officers here said was directly inspired by the situation on the Ukraine battlefield.
Dubbed X31, the group falls under the authority of the naval command and is primarily responsible for testing and operating aerial, surface, and subsea unmanned systems. It also contributes to the development and coordination of drone warfare doctrine.
Some of the systems the unit is currently trialling were present at REPMUS, including the Trator Do Mar, developed by the Portuguese Navy’s Unmanned Vehicles Operational Experimentation Cell (CEOV). The USV is designed for maritime domain awareness and sea-bed mapping, but is not yet in service. A particularity of the NATO exercise this year was that jamming trials were carried out daily between 5-6 p.m. to test the exercise drones in combat-like environments. (Source: Defense News)
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