NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 11.

• Ukraine-US: Possible military aid will moderately improve short-term offensive, defensive capabilities. On 10 July, Reuters reported that US President Donald Trump will send weapons to Ukraine using the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for the first time since returning to office. The assistance will possibly include missiles for Patriot air defence systems and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) artillery from US stockpiles. In total, the assistance could possibly be worth approximately USD 300m. Additionally, on 10 July, Trump announced that the US will supply weapons to Ukraine via NATO, which the military alliance will pay for. While we cannot confirm Trump’s slated use of PDA to send aid to Ukraine, it would mark a notable precedent given his administration has so far only sent weapons authorised by his predecessor, former president Joe Biden. We assess that the expected provision of assistance will likely moderately strengthen Ukraine’s air defence network and fighting capabilities in the short term. However, the recent intensification of Russian long-range strikes will sustain pressure on Ukraine for the foreseeable future.

 

Jul 10.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• OFFENSIVES: Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which oversee Ukrainian drone operations along the frontline, have reportedly been responsible for every third Russian target hit throughout June, highlighting the growing importance of drones
• STRIKES: Russia continues to demonstrate its ability to significantly increase the scale of its strikes, with the largest one to date involving 741 aerial threats, mainly targeting the west of Ukraine
• INFIGHTING: The recent suspicious deaths of officials within Russia’s transport ministry point to increased infighting and a potential limited purge to draw a line under recent failures
• FORECAST: The US has resumed sending certain weapons to Ukraine after a brief pause in deliveries, but major uncertainty remains around future delays and suspensions
• OFFENSIVES: On 9 July, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which oversee Ukrainian drone operations along the frontline, have been responsible for every third Russian target hit throughout June. According to Syrskyi, 5,024 objects were destroyed by the USF in June, including 129 armoured personnel carriers, 427 artillery systems, 31 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and 88 tanks, though this cannot be confirmed. Drones, particularly first-person view (FPV) drones, remain one of the few areas where Ukrainian forces retain an advantage over Russia, with Ukraine significantly increasing drone production over the last year. The relative importance of drones (particularly aerial drones) will only increase for Ukraine. The prospect of reduced US weapon supplies and the resultant shortages of artillery shells and other munitions will likely force Ukrainian forces to rely even more heavily upon drones to hit Russian forces.
• OFFENSIVES: Drones currently dominate the battlefield, and the way they are being employed is evolving rapidly. On 9 July, Ukraine’s Third Separate Assault Brigade claimed that, for the first time, Russian soldiers surrendered to unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) without supporting infantry and were subsequently taken prisoner. We cannot confirm the specifics and whether this is truly the first such occurrence. Up until now, UGVs have been primarily used as a means of resupplying frontline positions and conducting medical evacuations and body retrieval.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have continued to make slow progress to the north and west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 8 July indicates Russian advances due north of Toretsk itself, as well as inside Yablunivka, a highly contested village located about 10 miles (16km) to the north-west of Toretsk, just south of the T-0504 highway. While Russian attacks continue in this direction amid efforts to build pressure around Kostiantynivka to the north, it does appear that the overall focus of Russian efforts has pivoted westwards towards Pokrovsk (both Donetsk oblast). Nevertheless, further to the north-east, geolocated footage from 7 and 8 July indicated that Russian forces advanced to the north-east and south-west of Dyiilivka respectively, located about eight miles (13km) south of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk).
• DONETSK: Although Russian forces have not made progress in recent days in the Pokrovsk direction, they have continued assaults in the area as part of likely ongoing efforts to envelop the city from the north. A Ukrainian military intelligence officer operating in the area noted on 8 July that Russia is equipping its well-trained infantry with advanced anti-drone camouflage technology. According to this source, Russian forces have also reportedly intensified their use of drones to increasingly target Ukrainian logistics and vehicles along key ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces spokesperson, Viktor Trehubov, recently stated that Russia has concentrated around 100,000 personnel in the area, likely to pursue its objective of enveloping Pokrovsk from the north, and possibly reaching Dobropillya further to the north-west. Meanwhile, further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 9 July shows that Russian forces appear to have captured Tovste, a settlement located south-west of Novopavlivka.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage published on 8 July indicates that Ukrainian forces have successfully counter-attacked and advanced in northern Sumy oblast, pushing Russian forces back at multiple points. Ukrainian forces advanced particularly into northern Kindrativka, located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, Russian forces advanced marginally in the area, with geolocated footage from 7 July indicating advances north of Yunakivka, located around 11 miles (18km) to the east of Kindrativka (Sumy). Further west, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 7 July that its forces crossed the international border and seized the border village of Bezsalivka, located around 28 miles (45km) to the north-west of Sumy city. However, we cannot confirm this.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Over the last few days, the Russians have made no further confirmed advances along the Zaporizhzhia frontline, but the rate of attacks remains high. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade fighting in Zaporizhzhia assessed on 7 July that the current intensity of Russian assaults is the highest since the start of the full-scale invasion in early 2022. He assessed that Russian forces will likely continue these assaults during the summer with the aim of taking the major towns of Kamianske, Orikhiv and eventually Komyshuvakha, the latter of which is just 15 miles (24km) to the east of the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). However, it remains unlikely that Russian forces will be able to seize Komyshuvakha in the short term, with a substantial commitment of Russian reinforcements likely necessary to generate such advances.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia has continued to demonstrate its ability to significantly increase the scale of its strikes, as evidenced by the 9 July strike – the largest to date, involving 741 aerial threats. The strike comprised 728 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (the largest drone attack to date), as well as seven Kh-101/Iskandr-K cruise missiles and six Kinzhal ballistic missiles. As such, the attack saw a 34% increase in drone use compared to the previous record strike on 4 July, which involved 550 UAVs. During the 9 July attack, Ukrainian forces intercepted 296 UAVs (415 were reported lost) and all cruise missiles.
• STRIKES: Pro-Russian sources in Ukraine told Russian media outlets that the attack heavily targeted military assets, including airbases, defence plants, depots and training grounds. Ukrainian authorities reported that the attack primarily targeted Ukraine’s most western regions, including Lviv, Ternopil and Volyn oblasts. They also reported hits against residential areas in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts.
• STRIKES: The latest attack followed US President Donald Trump’s decision to resume the supply of some defensive equipment to Ukraine. As such, the attack was likely aimed at disrupting key logistical nodes in the west of the country, which are possibly used to store and transit European- and US-provided equipment. More broadly, it was highly likely aimed at deterring the West from supporting Kyiv, particularly by signalling Moscow’s resolve and ability to launch increasingly intense and frequent strikes, which will likely continue to grow in size and intensity in the short term.
• STRIKES: The nature of the targets struck by Russian attacks clearly underscores that Moscow’s ongoing long-range campaign is pursuing a psychological effect aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale. This is reflected in the frequent strikes on civilian-populated areas. In the same vein, Russia has intensified attacks on recruitment centres and military training grounds. Ukrainian Ground Forces spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated on 9 July that such attacks aim to disrupt Ukraine’s military recruitment efforts. According to Sarantsev, these strikes are intended to instil fear among Ukrainians, particularly by reinforcing the perception that visiting a recruitment or enlistment office is dangerous.
• STRIKES: The continued expansion of Russia’s domestic drone production programme remains the primary enabler of its capacity to significantly increase UAV deployment. On 8 July, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated that Russia has tripled its planned drone production for 2025. Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources reported that Russia has launched 28,743 Shahed-type drones, including 2,736 in June alone, which therefore represents nearly 10% of the total launched during the entire war.
• STRIKES: Russia has also increasingly deployed Shahed-type UAVs to attack targets along or close to the frontline, particularly to target Ukraine’s GLOCs. Up until now, Shahed-type UAVs have overwhelmingly been used to strike targets in Ukraine’s rear. This development further underscores Moscow’s success in scaling up Shahed-type drone production and will increase pressure still further on Ukrainian forces that are also defending against tactical first-person view (FPV) and, particularly, fibre-optic drones. Nevertheless, recent reports indicate that Russia is facing difficulties in supplying frontline units with the requisite number of UAVs, possibly due to bureaucratic and logistical inefficiencies, though we cannot confirm the scale of these problems.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• RECONSTRUCTION: US special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated on 9 July that international partners should assist in Ukraine’s reconstruction by launching a new ‘Marshall plan’. That said, Kellogg acknowledged that developing an initiative comparable to the original Marshall plan (a post-Second World War agreement which famously provided aid for rebuilding Western Europe) would be ‘extremely challenging’ and that a ceasefire would be needed first. While Kellogg’s comments were almost certainly aimed at galvanising interest for Ukraine’s reconstruction, concerns regarding corruption, post-war government stability and the resumption of fighting will likely stunt confidence in such an initiative, as will the likely limited appetite in Washington DC to support such a large funding commitment.
• RECONSTRUCTION: Kellogg’s remarks came ahead of a conference on Ukraine’s recovery in Italy, in the capital Rome, between 10 and 11 July; it marks the fourth major international event focused on garnering support for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Kellogg and Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov will meet at the conference, before meeting in Ukraine, in the capital Kyiv, later this week and again during the week after (according to a report on 7 July by Politico). These discussions will most likely focus on military aid, including the provision of air defences. Meanwhile, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is expected to propose additional air defence support while at the conference in Rome.
• SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump disclosed on 8 July that he is looking ‘very strongly’ at a bill that would ramp up sanctions pressure on Russia while expressing frustration over Moscow’s continuation of the war. A date for a vote on the legislation has not yet been set, with Trump reportedly seeking to soften its provisions. According to an unspecified senior Trump administration official, the legislation must preserve what the White House regards as the president’s sole authority to oversee US foreign policy. The current draft of the bill allows Trump to waive a 500% tariff on countries which purchase Russian oil and uranium for up to 180 days. Meanwhile, one of the bill’s authors has agreed to revise the legislation to include a second waiver, which would be subject to congressional oversight.
• SANCTIONS: Trump’s seeming readiness to engage with the legislation will moderately increase the likelihood of new US sanctions against Russia in the coming weeks. That said, we assess that Trump still wants to keep avenues open for US involvement regarding attempts to end the war in Ukraine, including through direct contact between the presidents of Russia and the US. Trump had previously said that sanctions would jeopardise progress towards resolving the conflict. The inclusion of waivers and measures to suit Trump highly likely reflects his preference for greater flexibility regarding sanctions, though this will likely ultimately reduce the impact of the new punitive measures. In turn, these sanctions alone are unlikely to encourage Russia to re-evaluate its continuation of the war in the near term.
• INFIGHTING: The recent suspicious deaths of officials within Russia’s transport ministry point to increased infighting and a potential limited purge to draw a line under recent failures. On 7 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed former transport minister Roman Starovoyt, who (according to official accounts) allegedly committed suicide hours later. The deputy head of the ministry’s property management department, Andrei Korneichuk, also died that day, seemingly of a heart attack. Starovoyt previously served as governor of Russia’s Kursk oblast until May 2024, months before Ukraine launched its offensive into the region. His successor and other regional officials are all under investigation for the embezzlement of funds allocated for the construction of fortifications in Kursk. Some suspects had reportedly accused Starovoyt of profiting from these schemes; ongoing criminal cases point to individuals blaming one another for the failings at the border that facilitated Ukraine’s advance.
• INFIGHTING: While we cannot confirm the exact reasoning for Starovoyt’s dismissal, it may realistically reflect the Kremlin’s efforts to shift blame for Ukraine’s Kursk offensive and other war-related security failures. Other failures for which Starovoyt and his team might well be seen as responsible include operation Spiderweb, during which Ukraine smuggled over 100 drones into Russia using commercial transportation, as well as significant civilian flight disruption the weekend prior to Starovoyt’s dismissal (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 7 July 2025). The recent deaths could realistically be an attempt by the Kremlin to draw a line under the recriminations and infighting caused by these recent military and political failures and place the blame squarely at the feet of Starovoyt and (to a lesser extent) his wider team, including Korneichuk. However, the deaths could also realistically serve as a warning to elites that the corruption which the Kremlin is willing to sanction has its limits, particularly if it compromises Russian military readiness in critical areas.

FORECAST

AID: The US has resumed sending certain weapons to Ukraine after a brief pause in deliveries. According to unspecified US officials on 9 July, the temporary cessation appears to have been linked to concerns about US military stockpiles possibly being too low. While the resumption of certain equipment will moderately alleviate Ukrainian concerns about rationing such materiel in the short term, broader questions remain about the status of US aid to Ukraine and the future of support. The support that has since resumed includes 155mm artillery shells and missiles for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). Relevant officials did not specify how many weapons were being sent, nor whether a resumption of the shipment of other weapons is expected. Previous reports indicated that the pause last week included 30 Patriot air defence interceptor missiles and 142 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, alongside 8,500 155mm artillery shells and over 250 GMLRS missiles. As such, it remains uncertain when Kyiv could receive additional Patriot missiles, which are a crucial component of Ukraine’s air defence capabilities (specifically against ballistic missiles). Trump stated on 9 July that his administration would consider supplying Ukraine with an additional Patriot air defence system. His remarks echo an earlier report from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on 8 July, which claimed that the White House has asked the Pentagon for options relating to sending Ukraine additional weapons. US officials are also reportedly exploring whether other countries have the capacity to provide further Patriot systems to Ukraine. The WSJ claimed that the US could provide one for Ukraine if ordered, though it is uncertain how many interceptors and/or batteries the US and its partners would be willing to contribute. For example, reports from 8 July state that Trump has promised to send ten of the 30 interceptor missiles. While we cannot confirm whether the US will send an additional Patriot system, a shortage of missiles would inevitably weaken Ukraine’s air defence capabilities and capacity to respond to Russian attacks. We assess that while the provision of a single battery is highly likely insufficient to address Ukraine’s deteriorating air defence network, let alone the uncertainty surrounding interceptor supplies. It would serve only to mitigate the threat posed by the recent uptick in Russian strikes to a moderate extent. Recent contradictory remarks from Trump underscore how perceived miscommunication within his administration could realistically risk delaying or temporarily suspending future aid shipments to Ukraine. Trump claimed on 9 July that ‘he would know’ of any decision within his administration to halt shipments, despite stating the day prior that he did not know who had suspended deliveries earlier this month. Reports indicate that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did not inform the White House before authorising the most recent suspension of support. Hegseth is alleged to have taken similar action before unilaterally (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 7 July 2025). Trump also reportedly told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a call on 4 July that he was not responsible for the suspension of aid shipments. Trump reportedly told his Ukrainian counterpart that he had ordered a review of US munitions stockpiles, but that he did not direct a halt to weapons deliveries. While we cannot confirm this, if true, it underscores how misinterpretations can and will likely continue to disrupt deliveries of weaponry to Ukraine.

Jul 09.

• Ukraine: Expected cabinet overhaul will unlikely elevate government stability risks in near term. On 7 July, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to make his biggest wartime cabinet reshuffle in the coming days. According to unspecified officials, Ukrainian ambassador to the US Oksana Markarova is expected to be replaced. The FT claimed that those who could take her position include Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, Defence Minister Rustem Umerov and Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko. Meanwhile, Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko has been suggested as a potential replacement for Shmyhal. Unspecified Ukrainian officials claimed that the head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, has been orchestrating the reshuffle. While we cannot confirm this, it aligns with recent reports (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 7 July 2025). Although the Ukrainian government has undergone reshuffles since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, this one likely illustrates Yermak’s expanding influence within Zelensky’s administration and his attempts to promote his allies (namely Svyrydenko). Nevertheless, we assess that changing power dynamics within Ukraine’s leadership and indications of infighting are unlikely to seriously destabilise Zelensky’s government in the near term.

Jul 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• DONETSK: Recent Russian operations to the north-east of Pokrovsk are likely part of an ongoing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (both Donetsk oblast) from the north and north-east
• STRIKES: On 4 July, Russia launched its largest combined strike since the beginning of the war, reflecting the continued trend of Russia launching ever-larger attacks in recent weeks
• INFIGHTING: The head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, has reportedly led efforts in recent weeks to oust three top officials in the government, though such infighting is unlikely to destabilise the Ukrainian government
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump denied that military assistance to Ukraine had been paused and claimed that the US is ‘giving weapons’, despite significant uncertainty over the provision of critical air defence supplies
• BAKHMUT: On 5 July, Russian sources claimed that their forces had advanced to the eastern outskirts of Siversk (Donetsk oblast), which cannot be confirmed. Otherwise, both Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to launch attacks and counter-attacks in the area, with geolocated footage from 2 and 4 July indicating that both sides have advanced to the north-east of Siversk.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, geolocated footage published on 4 July indicates that Russian forces advanced within the heavily contested refractory plant in south-western Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). Fighting remains fierce in the town, where Ukrainian defences have stunted Russian efforts to take control for the last 15 months. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 4 July that its forces had taken the village of Predtechnye, located to the south-west of Chasiv Yar. While we cannot confirm this, if it is accurate, this would put the Russians less than 2.5 miles (4km) east of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Further south still, Ukrainian milbloggers reported on 3 July that Russian forces have lowered the intensity of their assaults around Toretsk as they regroup. They also reported that the forces are focusing the majority of their efforts further west, between Pokrovsk and Toretsk (both Donetsk oblast, see DONETSK section below). Geolocated footage published on 3 July nevertheless indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk.
• DONETSK: Recent Russian operations to the north-east of Pokrovsk are likely part of an ongoing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (Donetsk oblast) from the north and north-east. Geolocated footage from 4 July confirms that Russian forces recently captured Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to south-eastern Razine, a string of settlements all located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military authorities have noted that recent Russian offensives are primarily focused on interdicting Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (located due east of Pokrovsk).
• DONETSK: Russian forces are likely attempting to reach the settlement of Rodynske, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. This would likely allow Russian forces to either launch a direct assault on Pokrovsk or advance further to the north-west to cut the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway. If successful, such a manoeuvre could realistically force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat of envelopment, especially if Russian forces to the south-west of Pokrovsk advance in parallel. However, due to Ukraine’s successful drone operations, Russia has only made marginal advances to the south and south-west of Pokrovsk in recent months. As such, Russia’s operational focus will likely remain to the north-east of Pokrovsk in the coming weeks.
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations to the north-east of Pokrovsk are likely part of a longer-term effort to bypass Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk oblast from the west, rather than launching direct attacks on fortified cities like Kostiantynivka. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated at the end of June that Russian forces are concentrating their offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction, located to the north-west of Pokrovsk. Russian troops are likely attempting to create a salient between Dobropillya and Kostiantynivka. However, heavy material and personnel losses have likely hindered Russia’s ability to execute such a manoeuvre in the short-to-medium term. An effort to take Dobropillya and Pokrovsk could realistically take over a year given the current rate of advance.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces made advances along the Donetsk–Dnipropetrovsk border, consolidating their presence in the area. Geolocated footage from 6 July shows that Russian forces recently captured Piddubne, located to the south of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Previously, on 5 July, DeepState, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group, confirmed Russia’s capture of Dachne, located to the south of Novopavlivka.
• KHARKIV: On 5 July, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi visited the Kharkiv frontline, where he assessed that ‘there is a threat of new offensive operations’, just days after Russian forces launched a new cross-border assault. While he did not provide further details, Russian forces have stepped up the intensity of assaults in the area over the last month, particularly in Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast).
• KHARKIV: However, the most significant development over the last few days was the Russian operation to seize the border town of Milove, located around 58 miles (92km) to the east of Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast). The Russian MoD claimed their forces have taken the entire settlement, though geolocated footage from 3 July only confirms partial control at present. Nevertheless, the attack on Milove marks the first time Russian forces have launched a sustained cross-border attack in this direction since 2022. It could realistically indicate that efforts to create a so-called ‘buffer zone’ along the international border have been allocated additional resources by the Russian High Command. It remains unclear how significant Russian efforts to advance in the area will prove. Nevertheless, the attack likely aims at driving Ukrainian forces to screen the border and redeploy much-needed troops to protect this area, moving them away from other critical sectors of the frontline.
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage published on 4 July indicates that Russian forces have taken the village of Novomykolaivka, located about 16 miles (26km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage published on 5 July shows recent marginal Russian advances in south-western Dvorichna, located to the north-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Meanwhile, further south, Ukrainian forces recently progressed in eastern Novoyehorivka, located to the south-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast), according to footage also posted on 5 July.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 3 July indicates that Russian forces have taken the village of Vesele, located around six miles (10km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, further west along the Zaporizhzhia frontline, Russian forces have continued to launch attacks in and around Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), at the extreme western flank of the line. According to Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn, Russian forces have struggled in recent days to gain a foothold on the north (right) bank of the Yanchekrak River amid efforts to seize control of the entirely of Kamianske. If the Russians manage to gain control of Kamianske, Voloshyn assesses that they could more easily advance towards Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast), though we assess this would require a significant effort. A growing number of Ukrainian sources, including Voloshyn, have been reporting a build-up of Russian forces in the area. However, it is unlikely that Russia will prioritise a major offensive towards Zaporizhzhia city at the expense of progress in Donetsk oblast.
• STRIKES: On 4 July, Russia launched its largest combined strike since the beginning of the war, reflecting the continued trend of Russia launching ever-larger attacks in recent weeks. The attack involved 539 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 11 missiles, including one Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, four Iskandr-K cruise missiles and six Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces intercepted 270 aerial threats, including 268 drones (while an additional 208 UAVs were reported lost) and two Iskandr-K cruise missiles.
• STRIKES: The strike reportedly resulted in hits in eight locations across Ukraine, though the capital Kyiv remained the primary target. In the capital, the attack reportedly damaged a consular building at the Polish embassy. Residential buildings and civilian infrastructure were also struck in Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Odesa and Poltava oblasts. According to Ukrainian authorities, the strike also damaged China’s Consulate in Odesa city. We assess that the damage to diplomatic premises was likely unintentional, instead reflecting the elevated risk of collateral damage associated with such high-intensity attacks.
• STRIKES: On 5 July, Russia carried out another large-scale UAV attack, involving 322 drones, primarily targeting Starokostiantyniv (Khmelnytskyi oblast), which is located near a key military airbase. Infrastructure damage was also reported in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts, as well as elsewhere in Khmelnytskyi oblast. The following day, Russia launched additional drone strikes accompanied by a limited number of S-300 missiles. The attack on 6 July reportedly targeted a military registration and enlistment centre in Kremenchuk (Poltava oblast) – a growing trend as Russia likely seeks to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts. Ukrainian authorities also reported that Russia conducted double-tap strikes against emergency responders in Kharkiv city.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its own successful long-range strike campaign against Russian military-industrial facilities. In the early hours of 5 July, Ukrainian drones struck a defence plant producing components for guided aerial bombs, Iskandr-K cruise missiles and Shahed-type drones in Russia’s Chuvash Republic. In addition, Ukraine’s large-scale drone operations over the weekend caused major flight disruptions in the Russian capital. Between 5 July and 0600hrs (Moscow time) on 7 July, 485 flights were cancelled due to security risks, according to Russia’s Federal Agency for Air Transport (Rosaviatsia). Around 1,900 flights were delayed and 88 aircraft were diverted to alternative airfields. The development underscores the increasingly detrimental impact of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign on Russia’s aviation sector.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• INFIGHTING: The head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, has reportedly led efforts in recent weeks to oust three top officials in the country’s government, though this cannot be confirmed. The Economist reported on 6 July, citing multiple unspecified insiders, that Yermak has sought the removal of the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, and Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal. Yermak has also reportedly been a driving force in a corruption investigation into Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, though there is no evidence to suggest that he ordered the probe (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 July 2025). Yermak reportedly used his influence to let the case progress while allowing other cases to freeze.
• INFIGHTING: While we cannot confirm Yermak’s direct role in these instances, rumours of a government reshuffle to replace Shmyhal have circulated for months, as have periodic claims that Budanov is to be replaced. Nevertheless, the US reportedly warned Ukraine not to dismiss Budanov, which may have aided him in retaining his position. This underscores the possible limitations of Yermak’s influence and that President Volodymyr Zelensky ultimately retains the final decision in such matters. If the reports are true, however, they point to increasing infighting within the Ukrainian government and attempts by Yermak to expand his influence over political rivals. That said, we assess that such infighting is unlikely to jeopardise or destabilise President Zelensky’s government overall in the short term.
• NUCLEAR: On 4 July, Ukrainian state grid operator Ukrenergo reported that its specialists had restored a high-voltage line supplying electricity to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP, Zaporizhzhia oblast). The ZNPP had been running on power from diesel generators for over three-and-a-half hours prior to this. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the cause of the loss of off-site power earlier that day was not immediately known, though the Ukrainian side attributed it to Russian shelling. While the ZNPP’s proximity to ongoing hostilities will highly likely sustain concerns about its security, a major nuclear meltdown at the plant remains highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.
• CHINA: Recent (unconfirmed) comments from China’s top diplomat possibly highlight Beijing’s self-interest in Russia winning the Russo-Ukrainian War. On 2 July, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas that China did not want to see Russia lose the war in Ukraine. According to several unspecified people familiar with the exchange, Wang expressed caution that this would possibly encourage the US to shift its focus to China. However, Wang rejected accusations that China was materially supporting Russia’s war effort, either financially or militarily.
• CHINA: China has proclaimed its neutrality throughout the full-scale invasion and called for a ceasefire as well as negotiations, though its close ties with Russia have called its stance into question. While we cannot confirm the exchange, Beijing is unlikely to overtly change its position on the war in favour of openly supporting Russia due to concerns over secondary sanctions (and possible US tariffs). Instead, Beijing will highly likely maintain close ties with Moscow and enjoy the benefits of Russia’s economic and political isolation, namely increased trade and discounted imports, and support Russian indirectly, such as through massive dual-use technology exports. Nevertheless, as the conflict continues, China (alongside Russia) will highly likely continue to advocate for a multipolar world order not dominated by the US’ interests – for which the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War will likely be a key test.

FORECAST

AID: On 3 July, President Donald Trump denied that military assistance to Ukraine had been paused and claimed that the US is ‘giving weapons’. However, Trump then made contradictory remarks that the US has to make sure it has enough weapons to meet domestic needs and criticised his predecessor Joe Biden’s policy of providing significant military assistance to Ukraine. The comments come after the White House said that the US had halted certain weapon shipments earlier this month. Following a call with President Zelensky, Trump stated on 5 July that the US may supply Patriot air defence systems to Ukraine. The US president acknowledged the current intensity of Russian long-range strikes and how this equipment would aid in countering such attacks. Nevertheless, Trump’s comments render it difficult to ascertain the current status of US military assistance to Ukraine and the future of such support. Trump had made similar comments about providing additional Patriot missiles to Ukraine in late June, before the aid suspensions. We assessed then that those comments did not represent a concrete pledge for such support, nor do the most recent comments. That said, Zelensky’s comments following their telephone call on 4 July provide some indication that the US could possibly provide additional support for air defences. President Zelensky described their conversation as ‘probably the best’ and ‘most productive’ conversation the two leaders have had thus far. According to him, the two presidents described air defence issues and Zelensky expressed his gratitude for Trump’s seeming willingness to help. It is possible that Trump’s disappointment at the lack of results from his call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 3 July has encouraged the Trump administration to consider sending air defences. Following that call, Trump disclosed that no progress had been made towards a ceasefire (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 4 July 2025). Meanwhile, Trump described the call with Zelensky as ‘very strategic’. However, the US’ increasing frustration with Russia, as it shows no genuine interest in ending the war, is unlikely to result in the Trump administration significantly ramping up aid to Ukraine in the near-to-medium term. Lastly, Germany is reportedly in advanced talks with the US to secure at least two additional Patriot air defence systems for Ukraine. According to an unspecified government spokesperson, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz spoke with Trump on 3 July to discuss providing Ukraine with more air defence systems. Berlin is willing to provide Kyiv two Patriot systems, including interceptor missiles, and cover the full cost for their transfer. The decision now lies with US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius is expected to travel to the US capital Washington DC on 14-15 July for talks with Hegseth. It is therefore possible that the decision will be discussed (and potentially approved) then. However, it remains uncertain whether Hegseth would allow the transfer given his previous involvement in suspending aid supplies to Ukraine. Reports on 4 July claimed that he unilaterally halted weapons for Ukraine earlier that week despite assessments that the shipments would not jeopardise the US’ own stockpiles. According to unspecified insiders, this marked the third time Hegseth alone had stopped shipments of aid to Ukraine, though in previous incidences in February and May, this action was reversed days later.

• Russia: Ukrainian strikes will increase financial burden, operational disruption to aviation sector. From 5 July until 0600hrs (Moscow time) on 7 July, airlines cancelled 485 flights due to security risks over long-range Ukrainian drone attacks, according to Russia’s Federal Agency for Air Transport (Rosaviatsia). Approximately 1,900 flights were delayed and 88 aircraft were directed to alternate airfields. As a result of the disruption, airlines issued 155,000 food vouchers, offered accommodation to 94,000 passengers and processed 43,000 ticket refunds. Among airports to experience mass cancellations and delays were Chkalov International Airport (GOJ) in Nizhny Novgorod (Nizhny Novgorod oblast), Pulkovo International Airport (LED) serving St Petersburg (Leningrad oblast) and Sheremetyevo International Airport (SVO, Moscow oblast). Rosaviatsia has since stated that the situation is manageable and normalising. Unspecified insiders believe that the disruption could cost airlines around RUB 20 bn (over USD 254 m). Ultimately, the development underscores the impact of Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on operational and travel disruption for the aviation sector. Such strikes will highly likely sustain significant financial burden for domestic and international carriers operating in Russia.

Jul 04.

• Russia-US: Breakthrough towards ending Ukraine war remains elusive despite presidential contact. On 3 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump spoke via telephone. Trump disclosed that the call did not yield any progress towards a ceasefire in the Russo-Ukrainian war. According to the Kremlin, Putin told Trump that Russia will not back down from its military objectives in Ukraine. At the same time, Putin claimed that Russia is prepared to continue negotiations to end the war. Separately, Trump denied that military assistance to Ukraine had been paused, after the White House said the US had halted certain weapon shipments earlier this month (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 July 2025). The engagement marks the sixth known time the leaders have called since Trump’s return to office in January, reflecting Trump’s continued efforts to engage with Russia directly to facilitate an end to the war. However, Moscow continues to show no genuine signs of readiness to make concessions to end the war at present; we assess that a significant breakthrough in this regard will remain unlikely in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Jul 25. Rheinmetall delivers fourth mobile rescue station to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Rheinmetall, the Düsseldorf-based technology group, is supplying another mobile rescue station (Role 2 type) to the Ukraine. In addition to that, service members of the Ukrainian armed forces were trained at the Rheinmetall Mobile Systeme GmbH site in Meckenbeuren.
The modular system consists of three truck-trailers. Each of these truck-trailers is equipped with two container modules that have extendable elements. When assembled, these extensions form a functional medical treatment centre with various areas, including triage, emergency care, X-ray, an operating theatre and an intensive care unit. The aid station can be relocated, set up and put into operation within a very short time. Mobile field hospitals are of utmost importance to the Ukrainian armed forces in order to provide quick and professional treatment to wounded soldiers.
“The Ukrainian soldiers participated in the training in a highly professional and committed manner”, said Armin Krenn, CEO of Rheinmetall Mobile Systeme GmbH (engl. ‘mobile systems’). “Especially under the current operational conditions, safe handling of the systems and of the medical equipment is crucial for saving lives on the front line”.
The training of Ukrainian personnel focused both on operating the mobile infrastructure as well as on the medical and technical equipment inside the containers. This includes ventilators, X-ray machines, monitoring equipment and important surgical instruments. Procedures for rapid commissioning, patient care and cooperation between treatment teams were also taught.
The highly modern rescue station was designed to be relocated and made ready for operation within a very short time, even in difficult terrain and weather conditions. Not only does it offer protection and medical capacities close to the front line, but its 20ft containers also allow it to be easily integrated into logistics and command structures.
With the delivery and training of the fourth system, Rheinmetall is once again upholding the defence capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, and enhances medical care for the people in the Ukraine.
Further deliveries and training courses have been ordered and will be implemented by the end of 2026.

 

10 Jul 25. New Ukrainian Jammer Blasts Radio Noise in a Powerful Stream to Deflect Russia’s ‘Miracle’ Glide-Bombs. In early 2024, Russian engineers modified the Russian air force’s KAB glide-bombs with more channels for their satellite radios. This made them harder to defeat by electronic means, as a jammer would have to interfere with each Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna channel to send the bomb off course. Ukraine’s Night Watch electronic warfare team sprung into action.

“When the enemy began using KAB guided bombs with Cometa‑8 eight-channel CRPA, we implemented eight-fold jamming coverage,” said Night Watch’s leader, whose nom de guerre is “Alchemist.”

It was the latest bout in an ongoing duel between Russian munitions-makers and Ukrainian electronic-warfare developers. The Russians develop a new bomb, missile or drone; the Ukrainians develop a new jammer to stop it; the Russians respond with another new munition; the Ukrainians hurry to field yet another jammer. Neither side can rest, lest the enemy gain a lasting advantage. So on and so forth as Russia’s wider war on Ukraine grinds toward its fourth year. In the third year, the Russians very nearly gained an enduring firepower edge—with KABs that blew right through area jamming coming from just one direction.

Night Watch’s eight-channel Lima jammer, installed around power substations in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts as well as around the cities of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, worked as intended. In the areas Lima covered, no KABs struck within 250 yards of a target, Alchemist claimed, citing Ukrainian government sources. But the KABs, which normally weigh 1,100 or 2,200 pounds and range as far as 25 miles on pop-out wings, continued to pummel front-line positions. As many as 100 KABs struck every day. The glide-bombs were a “miracle weapon” for the Russians, the Ukrainian Deep State analysis group noted. And Ukrainian forces had “practically no countermeasures.”

The problem, for the front-line troops, is that they can’t surround themselves at depth with jammers that broadcast in all directions, as the Russians control the terrain opposite them. Jammers work best when they can create a wide zone of radio interference emitting from multiple directions. They work much less well when targeting a missile, bomb or drone from just one side as the munition barrels toward its target. The missile, bomb or drone might maintain its comms from the unjammed hemisphere long enough to zero in. In other words, the omnidirectional jamming fields that protected cities and power stations deep behind Ukrainian lines last year weren’t as effective along those same lines. Night Watch was determined to change that.

“Upon the appearance of the Cometa‑8-equipped KABs, our team studied them thoroughly,” Alchemist said. “We reverse‑engineered the technical protocol—then designed a new device, Lima Focus, to jam from a single side.”

If omnidirectional jamming is a flood, single-side directional jamming is more akin to a stream of water shooting from a hose.

Single-Direction Jammer

Exactly how the Lima Focus directional jammer works is a closely held secret. But it’s a safe bet it features a very different antenna arrangement compared to an omnidirectional Lima jammer—and potentially more power, too. In any event, “field tests were excellent,” Alchemist said. Night Watch, which has been gaining fame for its bootstrap approach to jammer-development and its fruitful relationship with a highly effective Chinese spy, pitched the single-side Lima Focus to the Ukrainian defense ministry’s electronic warfare department. But full certification from the E.W. department would require three months of testing—and there was no time to wait as the KABs rained down. The general staff in Kyiv cut right through the red tape. It order Lima Focus into combat. “Same-day deployment,” Alchemist recalled. Within a week of the Lima Focus’s deployment near Hremyach in Kharkiv Oblast, the Russian air force ceased KAB strikes in the area, Alchemist claimed. “We extended deployment to Vovchansk—with identical results.” Ukrainian intelligence overheard Russian pilots complaining over the radio that satellite navigation signals were failing 60 miles from the front. The Zaporizhzhia regional council was the first to formally order Lima Focus units from Night Watch. “After deployment, KAB strikes on the city halted,” Alchemist said. The E.W. department formally certified the jammer, making it easier for government agencies to acquire it. The Russians were watching, however—and learning. Recently undertaking their fourth major upgrade to the KAB navigation kits, they’ve begun adding four more radio channels.

“To suppress that, 12‑fold emitter coverage is needed,” Alchemist explained. “Without it, the current E.W. fields lose effectiveness—causing rising hit frequency.” (Source: UAS VISION/Trench Art)

 

10 Jul 25. UK to sign deal to supply air defence missiles to Ukraine. Britain’s Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner will on Thursday sign a previously announced deal to supply Ukraine with more than 5,000 air defence missiles from Thales. Rayner is expected to sign the agreement in Rome, where the Ukraine Recovery Conference is taking place. The deal was first announced by Prime Minister Keir Starmer on March 2. The government also re-confirmed it would supply up to 283 m pounds in bilateral assistance to Ukraine over the next year. ($1 = 0.7355 pounds) (Source: Reuters)

 

08 Jul 25. BlackSky Technology Inc. (NYSE: BKSY) signed a Gen-3 early access agreement with a current international Gen-2 customer in support of Ukraine. The renewal contract adds Gen-3 very high-resolution imagery to the customer’s active Gen-2 low-latency, high-cadence monitoring services.

“This important contract demonstrates the powerful, comprehensive tip-and-cue utility between our Gen-3 and Gen-2 systems. The two generations of satellites work synergistically as analysts seamlessly combine reliable high-cadence, time-diverse Gen-2 data with the enhanced very high-resolution capabilities of Gen-3,” said Brian O’Toole, BlackSky CEO.

Customers can incorporate Gen-3 and Gen-2 data seamlessly into their current workflow through BlackSky’s Spectra® tasking and analytics platform, enabling sustained monitoring operations over multiple locations using Gen-2 high-cadence imagery and analytics. Analysts have the option to collect low-latency very high-resolution Gen-3 imagery in response to localized, rapidly emerging situations.

“Accelerated international interest in Gen-3 is indicative of our customers’ growing confidence and trust in BlackSky’s commercial services as an integral part of their daily military and intelligence operations,” said O’Toole. “As we integrate more and more Gen-3 satellites into the fleet our early access customers will experience unparalleled reliability and quality of imagery at industry-leading speeds in support of the full range of strategic to tactical ISR operations.”

The proven on-orbit operational and technical heritage of Gen-2 has been leveraged into the design and operations of Gen-3. Gen-3 satellites generate rapid-revisit, time diverse 35-centimeter imagery that enables automated identification and classification of a wider library of vehicles, aircraft, vessels and other objects of military interest, enhancing the value of BlackSky’s current Gen-2 dawn-to-dusk dynamic monitoring services. With two Gen-3 satellites on orbit, BlackSky is on track for a six-satellite Gen-3 constellation this year.

 

08 Jul 25. Cuashub.com said today that 5 C-UAS lessons from Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb. Operation Spiderweb has shattered long-held assumptions about what drones can do—and how far they can reach. Ukraine’s audacious strikes deep inside Russian territory exposed critical blind spots in traditional counter-UAS strategies. Ukraine weaved together months of covert logistics, telecom exploitation and ground infiltration to strike targets thousands of kilometers from the front. This evolution will force defenders to rethink every layer of their air defenses, from human intelligence and cargo screening to telecom monitoring and point-defense systems. The Spiderweb attacks mark a new era of drone warfare, one where distance offers no safety, civilian networks become weapons and threats can emerge from trucks parked meters from bn-dollar assets. We take a look at five counter-UAS lessons the world has learned from Operation Spiderweb.

1. Counter-intelligence is now a core component of counter-UAS

The Spiderweb strikes were not a simple set of random raids. They were the culmination of 18 months of clandestine planning, smuggling drones and payloads deep into Russian territory before launch. As Institut Montaigne observed, this “reveals the current dominance of Ukrainian counter-intelligence” over its adversary. In practice, that means traditional counter-UAS defenses (radars, jammers, guns) are not enough on their own. Security services must also prioritize human intelligence and counter-espionage to detect hidden UAS networks and supply chains before they strike. Effective counter-UAS now requires guarding against long-term infiltration and routinely hunting for secret drone caches or sleeper networks just as much as it requires radar detection.

2. Telecom networks offer a new attack surface

The Spiderweb drones were not flown in via typical operator control links, they essentially functioned as mobile phones. As the U.S. think tank CSIS notes, each FPV strike drone was “remotely controlled through Russian mobile telecommunications networks, including 4G and LTE”. In effect, civilian telecom infrastructure became part of Ukraine’s targeting chain. This means adversaries can exploit commercial networks, or even local Wi-Fi/5G, to pilot drones from extreme distances. Defenders will need to deny or harden those networks. Counter-UAS plans should include monitoring or jamming suspect cell/LTE signals near sensitive sites, enforcing strict communications encryption and working with telecoms organizations to flag unusual drone-related traffic.

The border between cyber/telecom security and physical air defense is blurring. Attackers can weaponize any data link, so defenders must secure them as vigorously as they secure airspace.

3. Distance is no longer a defense

Before Operation Spiderweb, bases 2,000 – 4,000 km behind the frontlines were thought safe by virtue of distance. This is no longer the case. The Strikes hit both Olenya, ~2,000 km from Ukraine, and Belaya, ~4,000 km away, demonstrating that geographic depth alone will not protect high-value assets. Many modern UAS have reliable autopilot (e.g. open-source ArduPilot) and can recover GPS dropout by dead reckoning, while LTE/satellite links allow pilots to guide them from thousands of kilometers away. In practice, even remote bases or ships at sea can now be reached by low-cost drones. Defenders must assume that any point on the map is potentially within range. This drives the need for persistent, multi-layered surveillance including radars, acoustics and cameras, not just at the border, but around every asset.

4. UAS threat vectors have expanded beyond the sky

Defenders conventionally focus on airborne threats, but Spiderweb showed that UAS threats can arrive along roads among civilian traffic. The Ukrainian drones never flew across the front line, they were smuggled in by truck and assembled in rented warehouses. According to security service reports, dozens of drones were hidden inside cargo containers, then placed on trucks and driven near target airfields. At the pre-planned time a remote mechanism opened the container roofs and the drones flew out right next to their targets. This tactic bypassed most radar and standoff defenses entirely. The key takeaway is that attackers can exploit any vector, including containers, trucks, ships or even trains, to position UAS deep inside a theater. To be entirely comprehensive, counter-UAS planning must therefore include ground-based countermeasures, screening inbound cargo and vehicles, interdicting clandestine logistics networks and using intel to patrol routes. In short, protect “the last mile” of the threat chain. If a hostile drone can be driven or smuggled in nearby, it can strike almost unimpeded once launched.

5. Traditional air defenses are not equipped for close-range drone threats

Conventional anti-air systems simply aren’t optimized for tiny, close-proximity drones. In the Spider Web attacks, the drones were launched from just outside the airfields, often meters away, making them virtually invisible to systems like the Pantsir or S-300, which are tuned for jets and missiles. CSIS reports that “Pantsir and S-300 units” failed to detect or engage the low-flying quadcopters launched from cargo trucks nearby. In effect, the enemy slipped inside the ring of traditional air defenses. For defenders, this means even a modern air-defense battery is insufficient against swarming, ground-level threats. Solutions require dedicated short-range counters such as small radar/optical sensors, quick-reaction drones or anti-drone missiles, acoustic gunfire locator systems or even handheld jammers. https://cuashub.com/en/content/5-c-uas-lessons-from-ukraines-operation-spiderweb/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

09 Jul 25. Ukraine’s New Ammo Turns Ordinary Rifles Into Drone Killers. Ukraine’s defense innovation cluster Brave1 has introduced the country’s first dedicated anti-drone ammunition designed for standard infantry rifles. The new rounds dramatically improve a soldier’s chances of hitting fast-moving aerial targets—such as FPV drones or commercial quadcopters—before they strike. Though the cartridges resemble regular 5.45 mm rounds, they feature a custom-designed warhead that creates a dense and rapid fragmentation effect upon firing. This enables soldiers to engage airborne threats with significantly higher accuracy using conventional automatic rifles—no modifications needed. Video footage released by the developers shows Ukrainian troops using the rounds in live testing, successfully hitting FPV drones mid-flight. According to Brave1, the ammunition has already been codified for use and is intended for mass deployment. The goal is to equip every infantry soldier with at least one magazine of these anti-drone rounds to provide immediate, last-resort protection during air alerts on the front lines. The system offers both tactical speed and safety, addressing one of the biggest battlefield threats faced by Ukrainian forces: low-cost, high-impact drone strikes.

Fighting FPV Drones with Innovation, not Just Armour

FPV drones have rapidly become one of the most dangerous and unpredictable threats on the battlefield. Small, fast, and often packed with explosives, they can slip past traditional air defenses and strike with deadly precision. Their low flight altitude and erratic maneuvering make them extremely hard to intercept using conventional means. Ukraine’s response has been to combine layered defense systems—electronic warfare, drone-jamming rifles, net traps, and now, specialized ammunition. Each tool fills a different gap in the protective “anti-drone net” being built across the front. The newly developed anti-drone rounds represent a critical link in this chain. Unlike jammers or advanced interceptors, these cartridges can be carried by every soldier and used on instinct, seconds before impact. In close-quarters environments—trenches, forest lines, urban combat—they may be the only effective option. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24)

 

07 Jul 25. Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell on Ukraine Military Aid. At President Trump’s direction, the Department of Defense is sending additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure the Ukrainians can defend themselves while we work to secure a lasting peace and ensure the killing stops. Our framework for POTUS to evaluate military shipments across the globe remains in effect and is integral to our America First defense priorities. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

07 Jul 25. Ukraine and Eric Schmidt’s Swift Beat to Expand Production of Unmanned Systems. In Denmark, in the presence of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov and Swift Beat, LLC CEO Eric Schmidt signed a memorandum on a long-term strategic partnership. The document provides for expanding the company’s production capacity, with modern drones to be supplied to Ukraine on a priority basis, under special terms and at cost price. Thanks to this partnership, the number of essential unmanned systems will increase significantly. This includes hundreds of thousands of drones this year, with further volume growth planned for 2026.  The company will produce interceptor drones for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to destroy Russian UAVs and missiles, quadcopters for reconnaissance, surveillance, fire adjustment, and logistics, as well as medium-class strike drones for engaging enemy targets. Development of new innovative solutions is also planned — including interceptors for cruise and ballistic missiles, automated turrets, and reconnaissance platforms. Swift Beat, LLC is an American company with a significant presence in Ukraine. It specializes in the production of autonomous AI-powered drones and actively collaborates with Ukrainian engineers and the military, conducting drone testing on Ukrainian territory. According to the Ukrainian government, Swift Beat is expected to manufacture hundreds of thousands of drones this year alone, with that number set to increase in 2026. The company reportedly specializes in AI-integrated UAVs and already has a substantial presence in Ukraine.

Corporate Origins and Hidden Structures

Swift Beat is owned by Volya Robotics OÜ, a company registered in Tallinn, Estonia, whose sole beneficiary is Eric Schmidt. Interestingly, Swift Beat was at one point rebranded as White Stork—a name that appeared in public reports in 2024 in connection with the development of low-cost, AI-enabled drones for Ukraine. Though Swift Beat itself had not previously appeared in the public domain, White Stork was linked to ongoing UAV development efforts. Schmidt, who has personally visited Ukrainian production sites and test ranges, is associated with a network of companies that appear to be structured to limit public visibility.

Leadership and Background

Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Swift Beat, is best known for his role as Google’s CEO from 2001 to 2011. He also served as Chairman of the Department of Defense Innovation Board between 2016 and 2020, and later as a member of the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Schmidt has publicly supported the use of drones as low-cost, high-impact weapons. He has also funded the Ukrainian startup accelerator D3 and held meetings with officials from Ukraine’s government. It remains unclear whether manufacturing facilities will be located in Denmark—where the agreement was signed—or in Estonia, where the parent company is registered. For now, little public information is available about the company’s current product line or production status. However, the scale of the planned collaboration suggests that Swift Beat will play a significant role in Ukraine’s drone capabilities in the near future. (Sources: United24Media; President of Ukraine/UAS VISION)

 

07 Jul 25. Ukraine codifies domestic pump-action shotguns for use against kamikaze drones. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has codified a number of new domestically manufactured infantry weapons.  These include three domestically produced modifications of 12-gauge smoothbore pump-action shotguns which have been approved for operational use in the military. Pump-action shotguns have demonstrated their effectiveness during the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a countermeasure against enemy kamikaze drones. The Ministry of Defence says they are particularly suitable for infantry operating in dense urban environments or narrow trench systems.  The infantry arsenal has also been reinforced with a new 40 mm automatic grenade launcher developed in Ukraine as well as optical devices and ammunition. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

04 Jul 25. EU militaries game out Ukraine-inspired resupply tactics via drones. As supplies are rushed to the front line in Ukraine using unmanned aerial and terrestrial platforms, the European Defense Agency has brought manufacturers and militaries together at an Italian training site to ensure Europe has the right kit and doctrine – as soon as possible – to do the same thing. Unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles were sent into action at an exercise near Rome organized by the EDA to spark better dialogue between the developers of new platforms and the soldiers that need them. The first-ever European Defence Innovation Operational Experimentation (OPEX) campaign, was designed to bring what the EDA called the “valley of death,” where industry research and innovation stall and die before getting into the hands of militaries.

“The war in Ukraine reshaped our understanding of defense innovation, compressing years of development into weeks through rapid prototyping, adaptability, and tight collaboration among armed forces, engineers, and civilians,” said André Denk, EDA’s chief executive at the event.

“Accelerating innovation from the lab to the field is our ticket to operational relevance,” he added.

The exercise at the Italian army’s Montelibretti facility showed off aerial and terrestrial platforms from six companies. Portugal’s Beyond Vision, Greece’s Altus LSA and Austria’s Schiebel fielded UAVs while Spain’s Alysis, Poland’s Piap and Germany’s Arx Robotics showed off UGVs. As UGVs scrambled in and out of water filled ditches they were watched by military officials from Italy, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, Cyprus and Greece. Three weeks of technical trials at Montelibretti which wrapped up on July 3 will be followed by operational trials at the Italian army’s facility at Nettuno, also Rome.

“We are missing a link between research and development and end users, and this exercise was a chance for militaries to see the technology in action and understand the possibilities for tactics and doctrine,” said an EDA official.

“Ukrainian experts have helped us design scenarios for the use of the technology and the EDA will create a blueprint to show armies how they can quickly integrate it,” added the official.

The exercise involved showing how supplies could be dropped off by UAV and transferred to a UGV for a final journey to a front line. The official said such experimentation was underway at the national level in Europe using local firms.

“We are now showing armies systems they don’t know about and increasing discussions and lessons for the first time,” the official said. (Source: Defense News)

 

07 Jul 25. Facing battlefield setbacks, Ukraine withdraws from mine ban treaty.

• Summary
• Kyiv is quitting treaty banning anti-personnel landmines
• Decision has been criticised by rights campaigners
• Russia is not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention
• Ukraine is looking for ways to halt Russian advances

Oleksiy, a 26-year-old Ukrainian soldier, is six months into a difficult recovery after losing most of his left leg to an anti-personnel mine. Despite his injuries, he says Ukraine is right to withdraw from a treaty banning such weapons.

Facing challenges in securing new U.S. supplies of artillery and munitions, or to recruit enough new soldiers to hold frontline positions, Kyiv announced its withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention on June 29. (Source: Reuters)

 

07 Jul 25. Russian forces gain control of two settlements in Ukraine, Russian military says. Russian military forces have gained control of two more villages in Ukraine in areas where they have been making advances, one in the eastern Donetsk region and the other in the Kharkiv region in the northeast, according to the Russian Defence Ministry. A ministry statement issued on Sunday said Russian troops had seized Piddubne in the Donetsk region, where Moscow’s forces have long been advancing slowly westward. The statement said Russian forces also captured Sobolivka, near the town of Kupiansk in the Kharkiv region, another area that for months has been under Russian attack. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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