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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jul 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made several confirmed advances along different parts of the southern Zaporizhzhia axis, marking a notable change along a frontline that has been comparatively stable over the last year
  • DIPLOMACY: On 1 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron held their first telephone call since September 2022, though the call is unlikely to have resulted in any meaningful diplomatic shift
  • CORRUPTION: Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court ruled that Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov will not be dismissed despite amid an ongoing corruption investigation
  • FORECAST: The White House has confirmed that the US has halted certain weapon shipments to Ukraine, including those pledged by former President Joe Biden; this will likely have a significant impact on Ukraine’s air defence capabilities in the short-to-medium term
  • OFFENSIVES: According to Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT), Russian forces have occupied an additional 215 square miles (556 sq km) of territory in June. We cannot confirm this, particularly as other sources estimate advances of only 180 square miles (466 sq km). Nevertheless, if the former estimate is accurate, it would mark the most territory gained in a single month since the height of the autumn offensive in November 2024. The overall rate of Russian advances has remained higher in recent months than earlier in 2025. The prospect of a prolonged pause in US military aid to Ukraine could also realistically increase the likelihood of a further increase in Russian advances in the coming months. For further analysis, please see FORECAST below.
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 30 June and 2 July indicates that Russian forces continued to slowly advance to the north of Toretsk and to the north of Yablunivka, located seven miles (11km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka (all Donetsk oblast).
  • DONETSK: While Russian forces have not made any confirmed advances in the sector in recent days, they did progress south of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). According to the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade, Russian forces currently enjoy a quantitative drone advantage in the Pokrovsk sector.
  • DONETSK: Meanwhile, further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 1 July shows recent Russian gains east of Piddubne, a village located approximately ten miles (16km) to the south of Novopavlivka. Footage from 30 June indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced into northern Dachne, a settlement located around eight miles (13km) to the south of Novopavlivka. Russian state media claimed the full capture of the settlement; however, this was refuted by Ukraine’s General Staff. Due to conflicting reporting, the status of Russian control over Dachne remains unclear. That said, confirmed advances in the settlement’s northern part verify Russia’s presence in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 30 June, Leonid Pasechnik, the head of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), claimed that Russian forces had captured the entirety of Luhansk oblast. However, Russian milbloggers denied this, stating that Nadiya and Novoyehorivka, two settlements located to the east of Borova, have not been seized. Small portions of Luhansk oblast remain contested; while we cannot confirm whether Russian forces have taken the entire oblast, we assess that they are in control of the vast majority of the region.
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made a number of confirmed advances along different parts of the southern Zaporizhzhia axis, marking a notable change along a frontline that has been comparatively stable over the last year. Geolocated footage published on 29 and 30 June confirms Russian advances in Malynivka, a village located 20 miles (32km) south-west of Velyka Novosilka inside Zaporizhzhia oblast. Similarly, at the furthest western flank of the Zaporizhzhia axis, geolocated footage from 30 June indicates that Russian forces have advanced north further into Kamianske, a frontline town located around 17 miles (27km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: According to Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn, as of 30 June, the terrain in Kamianske is unsuitable for motorcycle assaults, meaning Russian forces must attack on foot. Certain Russian sources reported on 1 July that the Ukrainian forces have been counter-attacking in Kamianske; we cannot confirm whether they have successfully pushed the Russian forces back, as much of the town remains heavily contested.
  • STRIKES: In recent days, Russian forces have conducted moderately large drone attacks. The strike on 2 July included four S-300 missiles, in addition to the deployment of 112 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); all other recent strikes have included UAVs only. Nevertheless, the regional authorities reported this week that, in June, Kharkiv city (Kharkiv oblast) incurred the largest number of aerial attacks (air strikes, artillery, drones and missiles) of the war to date. Due to its proximity to the frontline and the Russian border, Kharkiv remains highly exposed to various Russian strikes. The intensity of strikes is set to remain high, if not increase further, in the coming weeks.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian authorities continue to warn of the persistent risk posed by large-scale drone attacks. On 30 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Moscow is continuing to heavily invest in the production of UAV components and plans to further increase the number of drones used in its strikes. Since the end of May, Russia has significantly increased the number of UAVs in its strike mix, with several attacks involving over 400 drones. Zelensky’s remarks support our current assessment that Moscow has ramped up the production of both drones and missiles, allowing it to sustain the current rate of high-intensity strikes in the coming months (see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast and Scenarios – 27 June 2025).
  • STRIKES: The US’ decision to suspend the provision of crucial air defence supplies and other equipment will highly likely increase the impact of Russian strikes against Ukraine. For further analysis, please see FORECAST below.
  • STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its strike campaign against Russia’s defence industrial base. On 3 July, Ukraine targeted the Energia factory in Russia’s Lipetsk oblast. The facility manufactures components for drones and missiles, including batteries for Russia’s Iskander systems. Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, confirmed the attack and described the site as a critical defence plant for Russia, though we cannot assess the damage caused.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • RECRUITMENT: More than 210,000 Russians have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to fight in Ukraine since the beginning of the year, according to Russian figures. Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev disclosed this on 2 July, adding that another 18,000 people have joined volunteer units. While we cannot confirm these figures, intelligence estimates from unspecified Eastern European officials and the US reported in late April claim that Russia recruits between 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers a month. We assess that coercion, lucrative financial incentives and perceptions that the war will possibly end (or reduce in intensity) in the coming months are likely among factors encouraging signups within Russia. While we cannot confirm the latest numbers, Russia enjoys a significant personnel advantage over Ukraine, and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
  • DIPLOMACY: On 1 July, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron held their first telephone call since September 2022. In a readout of the call, the Élysée Palace stated that the two leaders spoke for over two hours and discussed Iran’s nuclear programme and the war in Ukraine. During their conversation, Macron emphasised France’s ‘unwavering support’ for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The French president also called for Russia to agree to a ceasefire and engage in negotiations to work towards a solid, lasting settlement of the conflict. According to the Élysée, the two presidents will continue discussions on this issue, though no further specifics were provided as to when they could speak next.
  • DIPLOMACY: Macron highly likely aimed to use the call to increase pressure on Putin to end the war; this follows the US’ special envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, accusing Moscow of delaying peace talks on 30 June. Although the Kremlin described the call as ‘substantive’, Russia has almost certainly not changed its position on ending the war as a result of the conversation. Putin told Macron that the war in Ukraine is a direct consequence of the West’s policies, which he claimed had ignored Moscow’s security interests. The Russian leader also criticised the West’s continued provision of military aid to Kyiv, which he said is prolonging the conflict. Putin also reiterated Russia’s ongoing position that a peace settlement must eliminate the ‘root causes’ of the war and consider ‘new territorial realities’. This emphasises that Moscow has not deviated from its maximalist objectives, nor dropped demands for considerable territorial concessions from Kyiv.
  • DIPLOMACY: Moscow will highly likely perceive the call as a signal that the West’s diplomatic isolation of Russia is not permanent. Russia will highly likely interpret the engagement as evidence that the West does need to co-operate with Moscow on global developments of mutual interest, including in the Middle East. However, the Macron-Putin call will possibly cause divisions among Ukraine’s European allies on whether leaders should engage directly with Russia’s leadership while the war is ongoing. Meanwhile, Putin announced earlier on 3 July that he would speak with US President Donald Trump later, underscoring Trump’s continued interest in maintaining direct contact with the Russian president.
  • CORRUPTION: On 2 July, Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court ruled that Deputy Prime Minister and National Unity Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov will not be dismissed despite an ongoing corruption investigation. It comes after Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) filed a motion with the court to impose bail and suspend Chernyshov from his duties (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 27 June 2025). Chernyshov is a close ally of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and previously held several influential positions.
  • CORRUPTION: We assess it is a realistic possibility that Chernyshov will use his position to influence the course of the corruption investigation. If this is the case, this will likely weaken confidence in Zelensky’s administration in regards to tackling corruption, both within Ukraine and from international observers. This particularly includes the EU, as Kyiv hopes for membership within the bloc. Ukraine’s stalled progress regarding certain reforms has already raised concerns in recent months that the war will continue to delay substantive progress, despite the opening of EU accession talks. That said, Chernyshov’s non-dismissal is unlikely to trigger significant social backlash, thereby mitigating against heightened government stability or domestic unrest risks in the near term.

FORECAST

AID: On 1 July, US White House spokesperson Anna Kelly confirmed that the US has halted certain weapon shipments to Ukraine, including those pledged by former President Joe Biden. Kelly stated that the decision was made to prioritise US interests following a review of military support and assistance to other countries. An unspecified US official said the action was over concerns regarding US military stockpiles falling too low. It is unclear how long the suspension will last or whether it is permanent. This marks the second time since President Trump’s inauguration that the US has suspended military assistance to Ukraine; the latest decision will highly likely impact Ukraine’s ability to counter long-range Russian strikes. The most recent suspension affects air-launched missiles designed for use with F-16 fighter jets, Patriot air defence interceptors and precision artillery rounds. The Patriot system has proven to be the most effective defence against Russian ballistic missile threats. Ukraine continues to face a chronic shortage of these systems and interceptors, most of which have been concentrated around the capital Kyiv. The decision will likely only accelerate shortages and force Ukraine to husband the interceptors, precisely at the time when Russia has significantly increased the scale of its long-range strike campaign in recent weeks, as demonstrated by a strike on 29 June involving 537 drones and missiles (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 30 June 2025).   Russia will highly likely exploit depleting Ukrainian air defences to maintain the current high tempo of large-scale strikes. Since the end of May, Russia has significantly increased the intensity of its strikes, launching at numerous times more than 400 aerial threats during a single attack. Notably, Russia launched five of its largest combined strikes since the start of the war between March and June. While drones have typically accounted for the largest share of the Russian strike mix, missile launches have also intensified, including ballistic missiles (against which the Patriots are the only reliable air defence). A rapid depletion of air defences, particularly Patriot interceptors, means that areas previously well protected, such as the capital, will become increasingly vulnerable to Russian missile attacks, especially ballistic systems. This will likely force Ukraine to allocate critical air defence resources to either the protection of civilian centres (most likely) or the protection of strategic military sites, which will result in the weakening of the defence of critical infrastructure across the country. Unspecified Ukrainian officials claim that all shipments of US weapons, including shells and spare parts, have been halted; however, US officials deny this. If true, this would have wider implications for Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting Russian forces on the battlefield. While the DoD has presented the suspension of aid as a limited and temporary action (as had been the case in March), the decision plays into Russian demands. In late May, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, stated that Moscow is prepared to consider a ceasefire if Kyiv stops receiving Western weapons. Russia has welcomed the announcement. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov claimed that the delivery of fewer weapons to Ukraine means the war’s end is closer. Russia will highly likely seek to exploit the US suspension of aid, given that Ukraine’s military leadership will likely be forced to ration certain materiel. According to reports from the Wall Street Journal on 2 July, US assistance via Poland (already en route to Ukraine) was halted. The Ukrainian MoD has stated that Kyiv did not receive any official notifications regarding the suspension or revision to deliveries ahead of the announcement. In the immediate term, this will likely impact Ukrainian operational planning, as previously established delivery timelines almost certainly play a central role in Ukrainian force generation and operational plans. As such, the stoppage of aid will possibly prompt Ukrainian commanders to reassess their battle plans and realistically constrain future operations, including large and costly counter-attacks under Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi’s preferred ‘active defence’ strategy. The suspension is unlikely to make Russia more willing to agree to a pause in hostilities in the near term, and our assessment remains that Russia shows no genuine signs of willingness to entertain a ceasefire at present. Rather, Moscow will likely continue fighting until it feels it has achieved as much as it can militarily. Ukraine’s European allies will unlikely be able to fill the void of a long-term end to certain US assistance; the decision will likely cause more friction with the Trump administration regarding its Ukraine policy. According to one unnamed official familiar with the matter, European officials were surprised by the decision, especially after President Trump’s comments at a recent NATO summit. At that event, Trump implied that he was open to supplying Ukraine with additional missiles for Patriot air defence systems (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 26 June 2025). Unspecified European allies are reportedly seeking clarification; several are also hoping that the US may soften or reverse the decision, though it remains uncertain whether this will happen in the near term.

Jul 02.

Key points 

  • While we assess that the war in Ukraine will likely continue in the short-to-medium term, in post-war Ukraine, institutional weakness and high levels of corruption will likely facilitate criminal infiltration of key sectors involved in the country’s reconstruction and recovery.
  • Criminal infiltration of the legal economy will likely expose foreign firms to elevated compliance, corruption, legal and reputational risks.
  • The weakening of the Ukrainian security apparatus post-war will highly likely facilitate an increase in criminal violence, elevating physical threats to businesses.

Context

Ukraine’s government, the European Commission (EC), the UN and the World Bank Group released a report estimating that, as of 31 December 2024, the cost of Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery over the next decade amounts to USD 534 bn. Given the continuation of the war since the report’s release and the high likelihood that conflict will persist in some form over the next 12 months, this figure will likely climb even higher. The anticipated influx of substantial financial aid, along with the prospect of significant private investment in Ukraine earmarked for its reconstruction, will highly likely attract criminal interest, both in capturing a share of these funds and in infiltrating the legal economy. Throughout the war in Ukraine, the Ukrainian state has successfully mobilised considerable security resources, not only to support the war effort against Moscow but also to maintain domestic order. However, any durable cessation of hostilities with Russia, whether through a stable ceasefire or a strategic settlement, would likely be followed by a process of demobilisation and a likely reduction of the domestic security apparatus. Such developments would most likely facilitate organised criminal groups (OCGs) in expanding their activities and recruitment efforts. The likely growth of OCG activity will pose a significant threat to Ukraine’s broader reconstruction process, including for companies involved in these efforts.

Forecast

Elevated corruption risks in post-war Ukraine will likely ease criminal access to reconstruction industries

Despite Ukraine having made progress in the anti-corruption field since 2014, particularly following its attainment of EU candidate status in 2022, corruption remains a deeply entrenched governance issue. This is demonstrated by high-profile arrests of officials implicated in military procurement and recruitment scandals. The case of Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital, struck by a Russian missile in July 2024, illustrates these concerns. The hospital’s reconstruction contract was awarded to a company with a history of alleged embezzlement in multiple state projects. This example highlights the heightened corruption risks surrounding public tenders and the use of charitable donations in post-war rebuilding efforts. We assess that Ukraine’s post-war institutional weaknesses will very likely facilitate widespread corrupt practices and provide OCGs with favourable conditions to infiltrate the legal economy. We assess that OCGs are particularly likely to infiltrate key sectors such as construction and transport logistics, as well as extractive sectors. Gaining access to these sectors will enable them not only to siphon reconstruction funds but also to launder illicit proceeds by securing legitimising stakes in Ukrainian corporations. Furthermore, the Ukrainian government will likely pursue further privatisation of state-owned enterprises, including those nationalised since the start of the war. We assess that such entities will also likely attract interest from criminal networks seeking influence, opportunities to launder illicit proceeds and profit.  Since 2014, Ukraine has taken several steps to improve its anti-corruption efforts, including the creation of multiple government bodies dedicated to combating corruption. Despite being embroiled in a full-scale war since 2022, Ukraine has continued its reform efforts. The EC has acknowledged the country’s progress in strengthening the rule of law and launching further anti-corruption initiatives. While these achievements have resulted in the EU opening accession negotiations with Kyiv, its anti-corruption drive still faces challenges, including in ensuring the implementation of regulations and fostering a culture of accountability and integrity in the public sector. In a post-war context, we assess that the financial prospects tied to the reconstruction process will likely act as a catalyst for corrupt behaviour in the public sector. Ongoing uncertainty over the institutional strength of the judiciary and existing anti-corruption bodies will possibly further contribute to this risk, despite the progress made in recent years.

The expansion of the OCG footprint in the legal economy will increase reputational and compliance risks for firms involved in reconstruction

The risk of criminal infiltration of the legal economy during the reconstruction phase will likely expose foreign firms to elevated compliance, legal and reputational risks. Engaging with local corrupt partners or intermediaries linked to OCGs will increase the likelihood of breaches of international anti-corruption regulations. Concurrently, association (direct or indirect) with illicit and corrupt actors will raise reputational risks, particularly amid heightened scrutiny from anti-corruption activists and civil society organisations, as well as investigative media. Although reconstruction projects are likely to prompt significant foreign interest, these dynamics will threaten to deter firms with strong public accountability obligations or strong brands. However, global actors involved in the reconstruction of Ukraine will very likely be required to increase their due diligence efforts to limit exposure to violations of anti-corruption regulations.

The reduction of post-war Ukraine’s domestic security capabilities and powers will likely lead to an increase in OCG-led violence, elevating physical security risks for businesses

Under martial law, Ukrainian law enforcement and state security agencies have been granted expanded powers to control and monitor society. In a post-war scenario, the lifting of martial law will most likely result in the relaxation of these enhanced security measures, weakening the monitoring and suppression of OCGs. At the same time, the demobilisation of Ukraine’s armed forces will very likely create opportunities for OCGs to recruit individuals with military training and specialist skills. It will also increase the risk of criminal networks gaining access to war-grade weaponry from poorly secured stockpiles; the proliferation of drones, small arms and other equipment will likely be a major issue after the war. In this context, OCGs will likely become more inclined to resort to violent tactics, which a weakened domestic security apparatus may struggle to contain effectively. Their infiltration of legitimate economic sectors will heighten the risk of extortion and intimidation, particularly targeting local staff working for foreign or reconstruction-related businesses. Furthermore, equipment, materials and project sites will become attractive targets for looting and theft. The possibility that OCGs expand control over commercially significant territories could also limit safe movement and undermine the security of reconstruction operations, increasing exposure to cargo theft and related corruption risks.

  • Ukraine: US suspension of crucial ammunition shipment will likely hinder air defence capabilities. On 1 July, US White House spokesperson Anna Kelly confirmed that the US has halted certain weapon shipments to Ukraine, including those pledged by former President Joe Biden. The suspension affects air-launched missiles designed for use with F-16 fighter jets, Patriot air defence interceptors and precision artillery rounds. The Patriot system has proven to be the most effective defence against Russian ballistic missile threats. Ukraine continues to face a chronic shortage of these systems and interceptors, most of which have been concentrated around Kyiv. The announcement comes as Russia has significantly increased the scale of its long-range strike campaign in recent weeks, as demonstrated by a recent strike involving 537 drones and missiles. Given that Russia will likely maintain a high tempo of large-scale strikes, the US decision will highly likely undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russia’s long-range campaign. We assess that this will likely lead to a deterioration of the security environment across the country.

Jun 30.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • STRIKES: On 29 June, Russia launched its largest combined strike against Ukraine to date, involving a total of 537 aerial threats, indicating the continually growing Russian capability to strike major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv
  • MINES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has signed a decree to withdraw Ukraine from a treaty banning anti-personnel mines; this will augment defensive capabilities at the frontline and sustain threats to civilians
  • SPENDING: Russian President Putin claimed that Russia plans to reduce defence spending next year and over the coming three years, though this remains contingent upon the tempo of the war in 2026 and beyond
  • FORECAST: A senior US senator indicates that US President Donald Trump is seemingly in favour of the Senate advancing a vote on a bill to impose new sanctions on Russia in the near term, though this remains unclear
  • BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 26 June indicates that Russian forces have continued to advance to the north of Toretsk amid slow progress towards the southern outskirts of Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast). Russian forces have made minor advances, likely including seizing the village of Dyliivka, located around two miles (3km) to the north of Toretsk. Meanwhile, further west, Russian forces have advanced to the north of the village of Yablunivka, which is located seven miles (11km) to the south-west of the outskirts of Kostiantynivka and is due south of the T-0514 highway.
  • DONETSK: Russian forces continued to advance to the south and south-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), consolidating control in the area. Geolocated footage published on 26 June indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway, located to the north-east of Shevchenko, a settlement situated six miles (10km) to the south of Pokrovsk. On the same day, Russia’s Ministry of Defence claimed the capture of Shevchenko, which, if confirmed, grants Moscow access to one of the largest lithium ore deposits in Europe, located nearby. Meanwhile, further to the south-west of Pokrovsk, Russian forces have advanced into northern Zirka, located to the south-west of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). They likely control the area and may have seized the settlement.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 27 June shows that Russian forces have recently made advances in southern Hlushkivka, located close to the Oskil River and approximately 12 miles (19km) to the south-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). These confirmed gains come as Russia intensifies its operations in the Oskil River area. According to Pavlo Shamshyn, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Kharkiv Group of Forces, Russian troops are attempting to establish a crossing over the Oskil River to transfer armoured vehicles. However, at present, Russian forces are using boats and rafts to move all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to the western (right) bank of the river. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian military source operating in the area reported that Russian forces are exploiting favourable weather conditions to step up assaults to the north and east of Kupiansk.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Concurrently, further south of Kupiansk, Ukrainian localised counter-attacks resulted in moderate gains in the Lyman direction. Geolocated footage from 27 June shows that Ukrainian forces made limited advances in northern Torske, located approximately 8.5 miles (14km) to the east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made modest progress along the Zaporizhzhia frontline, which has remained among the most static and quiet fronts of the war in recent months. Geolocated footage from 27 June indicates that Russian forces have advanced westwards along the T-0815 highway further into Mala Tokmachka, a frontline town located around 37 miles (60km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
  • SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces, Vladyslav Voloshyn, reported on 29 June that Russian forces are concentrating infantry at various points along the southern axis. Voloshyn assessed that Russia is likely aiming to seize Kamianske, a frontline town at the extreme western flank of the southern axis located around 17 miles (27km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city. Voloshyn claimed that a newly formed regiment is being deployed somewhere within Russia’s Southern Military District’s area of responsibility, which encompasses much of the southern axis in Zaporizhzhia oblast. It remains unclear whether such (unconfirmed) deployments reflect preparations for an intensification of assaults across the southern axis.
  • STRIKES: On 29 June, Russia launched its largest combined strike against Ukraine to date, involving a total of 537 aerial threats. The attack comprised 477 Shahed-type and decoy drones, 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles, five Kalibr cruise missiles, four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles and three S-300 surface-to-air missiles.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian forces achieved a relatively high interception rate, reportedly neutralising 475 targets. In all, 249 aerial objects were shot down by air defences, while 226 targets were reported lost, likely suppressed by electronic warfare systems. Ukraine’s air defences downed 211 drones, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, four Kalibr missiles and one Iskander-M ballistic missile. The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed that F-16 fighter jets were deployed to counter drone attacks. However, one F-16 was lost during the operation and its pilot was killed in action. Although Ukrainian forces recorded a relatively high interception rate, they failed to intercept the majority of ballistic missiles. These systems (particularly Iskander-M missiles) remain among the most difficult projectiles to intercept. However, the launch of a significantly large number of drones allows Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences, thereby increasing the likelihood of missile penetration.
  • STRIKES: Hits were recorded in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Ternopil and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In these regions, a range of civilian targets were hit, including businesses and infrastructure facilities, such as Poltava-Pivdenna railway station in Poltava oblast.
  • STRIKES: The strike followed a previous large-scale Russian attack on 27 June involving 373 aerial targets, including 371 drones, six Kalibr cruise missiles and two Kinzhal ballistic missiles. We continue to assess that Russia’s expanding drone and missile production capacity will enable it to sustain the current pace of large-scale combined strikes in the short-to-medium term. These attacks are steadily degrading Ukraine’s air defence capabilities, and in the absence of additional Western support, the country will become increasingly vulnerable to future Russian strikes. For further analysis, please refer to the Strike Pattern Analysis section in Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast and Scenarios – 27 June 2025.
  • STRIKES: Strikes in recent days also show evidence that Russia is experimenting with new drones, glide bombs and missiles as part of its broader effort to diversify its strike arsenal. Russia’s strike earlier 30 June reportedly involved 107 drones, with sources indicating that an upgraded version of the Chernika drone was used to target Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast) for the first time. While the Chernika drone has been in Russian service since 2022, reports from late April 2024 suggested that a modernised variant, the Chernika-2, was being deployed across the frontline. This upgraded drone is believed to be relatively inexpensive to produce and features target acquisition capabilities that allow it to continue towards its objective even when facing signal jamming. It reportedly carries a payload of approximately 3.5kg and has a range of 62 miles (100km). The drone can fly in automatic mode, but can also be controlled manually to increase accuracy.
  • STRIKES: Ukrainian authorities also reported the interception on 28 June of a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro city (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). The projectile combines features of a glide bomb and the Kh-36 air-to-air missile, using the latter’s missile engine. The inclusion of the missile engine provides the bomb with a range of 62 to 100 miles (between 100 and 150km), which is superior to the 40-mile (65km) range of glide bombs. According to a Ukrainian engineer, Russia does not mass-produce this hybrid projectile. However, increasing the launch of such projectiles would likely minimise the exposure of Russian aircraft to Ukrainian short-to medium-range air defences across the frontline. It would also enable strikes on targets behind the frontline, such as logistical nodes and major urban centres, such as Dnipro city.
  • STRIKES: Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) claimed responsibility for a drone strike against the Kirovske military airfield in occupied Crimea on 28 June. The attack reportedly destroyed various helicopters as well as a Pantsir-S1 self-propelled anti-aircraft missile and gun system. Overnight between 26 and 27 June, the SBU reportedly struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd oblast, damaging four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • MINES: On 29 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree to withdraw Ukraine from a treaty banning anti-personnel mines. The 1997 Ottawa Convention bans the production, stockpiling, use and transfer of anti-personnel mines. Zelensky stated that Russia has never been a party to this treaty and claimed that it uses anti-personnel mines ‘extremely cynically’. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasised that the decision to withdraw from the treaty is in relation to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself; the Ukrainian parliament must still approve the move, though we assess that this is highly likely. Ukraine remains one of the most heavily mined countries on Earth. While such a move will likely only reinforce this and sustain high threats to civilians in the post-war environment, such mines will significantly augment Ukraine’s defensive capabilities at the borders and frontlines.
  • SPENDING: On 27 June, Russian President Putin claimed that Russia plans to reduce defence spending next year and over the coming three years, though he did not specify by how much. Putin caveated that there are no final agreements yet between the relevant ministries, though he claimed that there is a consensus towards reducing spending. Russia increased state spending on national defence by a quarter in 2025; the figure currently stands at 6.3% of GDP. Putin acknowledged that increased military spending has influenced higher levels of inflation, which he claimed Moscow is tackling. It is plausible that Putin made such comments to portray that Russia’s leadership is considering the socio-economic toll of the war on the population to mitigate discontent among the Russian public.
  • SPENDING: Putin disclosed the supposed preparations to reduce military spending in response to a journalist’s question about NATO allies recently pledging to boost spending to 5% (up from 2% annually). Putin implied that this development underscores that the West is ‘behaving aggressively’. As such, Putin’s comments are likely aimed at furthering Russian narratives that NATO is escalating tensions vis-à-vis Russia and that it does not want the Russo-Ukrainian War to be resolved. We assess that Moscow’s ability to reduce military spending will almost certainly be contingent on the tempo of the war in the coming 12-18 months. Putin stated that Russia seeks to end the war with the result it needs. While a genuine pledge to reduce defence spending could realistically indicate preparations for at least a reduction in the intensity of the war in 2026 or beyond, if the war continues on its current tempo, Russian defence expenditure will likely continue increasing. As such, Moscow is likely willing to endure more economic hardship over the coming months to get closer to achieving the goals of its full-scale invasion.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: President Putin stated on 27 June that Russia is ready for a third round of direct negotiations with Ukraine. However, he emphasised that the two sides need to agree on a time and place; Ukraine had previously expressed interest in holding another round of talks between 20-30 June. In a similar vein, Putin suggested that he would be willing to meet with his US counterpart, President Donald Trump, but he did not specify when precisely this could take place. Trump has been claiming since January, even before his inauguration, that Putin wants to meet him. However, an in-person meeting is yet to materialise. As such, Putin’s comments are most likely further evidence of Russia feigning interest in negotiations while Moscow continues to show no genuine willingness to make compromises to end the war at present.

FORECAST

SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump is seemingly in favour of the Senate advancing a vote on a bill to impose new sanctions on Russia in the near term. On 29 June, US Senator Lindsey Graham stated that Trump had told him the day before that ‘it is time to move’ the legislation. The US president has so far been reluctant to tighten sanctions pressure out of concerns that this will harm the (limited) progress to end the war in Ukraine and efforts to reset bilateral US-Russia ties. Graham, however, caveated that the president has a waiver, meaning that it is ultimately Trump’s decision how to impose the new sanctions measures. Reports from earlier this month claim that the Trump administration was encouraging Graham to significantly soften the legislation, including by adding waivers (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 9 June 2025). As such, Graham’s comments imply that the content of the sanctions package has likely been watered down. In turn, this would likely reduce the economic impact of the new sanctions on Russia, which Graham previously described as ‘bone-crushing’. Even so, additional US sanctions are unlikely to encourage Moscow to re-evaluate the economic cost of continuing the war or to motivate Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in the near-to-medium term. Recent developments underscore that Russia will continue efforts to find workarounds to counter the impact of Western sanctions as long as they remain in force (which we assess will be the case over the long term). Bloomberg reported on 29 June that Russia is attempting to expand its exports of liquified natural gas (LNG), which were undermined by US sanctions. Ship-tracking data and satellite imagery show that an LNG vessel had docked at an Arctic LNG 2 facility and left for the first time since October 2024. Meanwhile, at least 13 ships have been assembled to potentially serve Arctic LNG 2. In September 2024, the US imposed sanctions on two companies and two vessels linked to the project, which Russia had deemed as crucial to achieve its ambitions to export 20% of global LNG by 2030. In a related development, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó claimed on 29 June that the US had lifted sanctions that hindered the expansion of Hungary’s Paks Nuclear Power Plant. Russian state-owned nuclear company Rosatom is leading the project; Szijjártó added that construction of the major pieces of equipment for the facility is proceeding in France and Russia. The US did not immediately comment on the development, though the sanctions were imposed under Trump’s predecessor, President Joe Biden. While we cannot confirm the development, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has close ties with Trump, meaning it is nevertheless possible. If true, the development will likely moderately increase friction between the Trump administration and the EU regarding the co-ordination of sanctions pressure against Russia.  Meanwhile, Hungary and Slovakia continue to obstruct European efforts to impose further sanctions on Russia. Reports emerged earlier on 30 June, citing an unspecified EU diplomat, alleging that Slovakia blocked a proposed 18th package of sanctions against Russia on 27 June at a meeting of the bloc’s ambassadors. Hungarian representatives also said that approval of the new measures should be postponed. Bratislava reportedly wants to receive guarantees and compensation from the EU for the bloc’s plans to abandon Russian gas after 2027; conversely, Budapest did not state any specific conditions. We previously assessed that Hungary and Slovakia would create the most resistance to any new sanctions against Russia, though our assessment remains that a compromise is possible in the coming weeks. Despite deadlock over the latest measures, EU leaders on 26 June agreed to extend existing sanctions against Russia for another six months. This demonstrates consensus within the bloc to maintain sanctions against Russia at least in the medium term. It also reaffirms our assessment that the EU will almost certainly not lift sanctions against Russia over the coming months, especially without a definitive resolution to the war. Sibylline’s forecasting is underpinned by specifically chosen probability terminology, which aims to quantify levels of certainty throughout our assessments. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Jul 25. Putin fires 550 drones and missiles at Kyiv after ‘disappointing’ Trump phone call. Vladimir Putin fired 550 drones and missiles at Ukraine in a new record attack hours after Donald Trump lamented their “disappointing” phone call. Kyiv was the main focus of Russia’s overnight bombardment, which left 14 Ukrainians in hospital, according to Vitali Klitschko, the city’s mayor.

“Absolutely horrible and sleepless night in Kyiv. One of the worst so far. Hundreds of Russian drones and ballistic missiles rained down on the Ukrainian capital. Right after Putin spoke with President Trump,” Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister, said.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, said Russia would not “change its dumb, destructive behaviour” without increasing pressure, particularly from the US. The attack, which broke a record set only last weekend, came hours after Mr Trump spoke with Putin, a phone call the US president described as “disappointing”.

“I’m very disappointed with the conversation I had today with President Putin, because I don’t think he’s there,” he told reporters. “I’m just saying I don’t think he’s looking to stop, and that’s too bad.” Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov claimed Putin and Mr Trump were “on the same page”. The US president disagreed: “I didn’t make any progress with him at all.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

04 Jul 25. EIFO, the Export and Investment Fund of Denmark, announces an investment of US$5m into D3, a defence technology venture fund with a strong presence and track-record in Ukraine. The investment will boost Ukrainian and European defence innovation, funding the development and scaling of new defence technologies including drones, sensors, demining and AI solutions. D3 acts as a bridge between Ukraine, with its growing expertise in asymmetric defence and related technologies, and its Allies, connecting start-ups with the capital and partnerships needed to scale frontier technologies. The partnership between D3 and EIFO will have additional benefits for Denmark, opening doors for Danish companies to access new technology, knowledge, and partnerships. As the first state-backed fund to invest in D3, EIFO has demonstrated a continued commitment to Ukraine’s defence, in alignment with its mandate to support Danish and European supply chains for the green transition, defence and technology. Alongside this latest investment in D3, EIFO is operating a guarantee scheme for investments into Ukraine’s defence industry with a total budget of DKK 1 billion (US$157 million), and has secured financing for developments including the construction of Ukraine’s largest ever wind energy project. Following Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has become a hub for innovation in asymmetric defence technology. A wealth of Ukrainian early-stage companies has developed, deployed and gained deep expertise in leading defence technology innovations that are crucial not only to Ukraine’s defence, but for all allied countries. EIFO’s investment provides risk-tolerant funding to support the defence technology ecosystem in Ukraine and Europe more broadly, enabling the innovation required to stay ahead in an era of rapidly evolving warfare.

Peder Lundquist, CEO at EIFO, commented: “Our investment in D3 underscores EIFO’s strategic objectives to support Ukraine, strengthen the Danish defence industry, and bolster European defence capabilities. In partnership with D3, we are providing equity to defence and security startups in Ukraine, receiving vital combat-proven technology in return. D3 is one of the most insightful, active and effective defence-focused investors in Europe, and we are proud to be partnering with this dedicated team.”

Morten Bødskov, The Danish Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, commented: “Denmark stands side by side with Ukraine in their fight for freedom. We demonstrate this unwavering support once again with the investment into D3. This not only supports Ukraine’s heroic defence of their country and their freedom, but it is also an investment in European security. At the same time, EIFO opens the door for Danish companies to access new technology, knowledge, and partnerships. It is an investment in the defence industry of the future, where innovation and collaboration across borders are crucial for both security and growth.”

Founding and managing partner at D3, Eveline Buchatskiy, welcomes EIFO as the first state-owned fund to invest in the Ukraine-focused venture fund: “We’re proud to welcome EIFO as a strategic investor in D3. Denmark has shown bold leadership in understanding how Ukraine fights – and how critical technology is to win. As a state-owned fund, EIFO’s backing signals Europe’s growing recognition that combat-proven innovation from Ukraine is vital to our collective defence. This is more than solidarity – it’s building the tech backbone of a resilient, democratic Europe.”

Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries, Herman Smetanin said: “We are grateful to Denmark and EIFO for this strategic investment. An investment that is paving the way for the next generation of defense technologies. This is not only a contribution to Ukraine’s security, but to the shared capacity of the democratic world to respond to emerging threats. Ukrainian engineers and entrepreneurs have proven their ability to deliver breakthrough solutions, and with Denmark’s support, we can now scale these innovations for the benefit of the entire Euro-Atlantic community.”

Established by Eveline Buchatskiy, Anton Verkhovodov and Elya Chiechienieva in the summer of 2023, D3’s ambition is to fund the most promising and groundbreaking new startups in areas such as UAVs, autonomy, robotics, electronic warfare, and demining – and helping them scale to the next level for the benefit of Ukraine and Europe.   The ambition is to invest into +30 early-stage startups within a short period of time and with an already proven track record of more than 700 screenings and 16 investments with co-investors like top VC-funds Sequoia Capital, a16z, and Lux Capital, D3 looks like a perfect fit for the Danish state fund.

About EIFO and its engagement in Ukraine

EIFO is the national promotional bank and export credit agency of Denmark combined in one financial institution. Active in over 100 countries, and with a total business volume of more than 170 billion DKK, EIFO provides financial solutions for Danish companies and their global partners, while also investing in startups and funds. We exist to open doors for Danish global business, accelerate the green transition, promote new technologies and develop the Danish defence industry. With our willingness to take risks in financing, EIFO paves the way for those who dare to think big. With a total capacity of DKK 6.6bn, EIFO has a strong presence in Ukraine. Activities include financing the reconstruction of business and infrastructure, as well as defence investments. Uniquely, EIFO as the Danish ECA offers a 100% guarantee in connection with trade with Ukraine, which means that trade happen despite war and risks. EIFO’s new equity investment guarantee of 1 billion DKK also makes it possible for Danish companies to invest in Ukrainian defence companies with 70% risk coverage, partly to support the Ukrainians and partly to give Danish defence companies access to current Ukrainian innovation. EIFO is currently directly involved in 19 projects totaling DKK 3 billion. The projects are located in large parts of Ukraine and are distributed in agriculture, wastewater, drinking water, construction, and industry.  With a guarantee of 2.85bn DKK, EIFO has secured financing for the construction of Ukraine’s largest wind energy project ever, Tiligul. Using Vestas wind turbines, the completed wind farm can ensure electricity for 900,000 households and will have a total capacity of 498 MW, making it one of Europe’s largest onshore wind farms. EIFO still has a significant amount available for activation of projects in Ukraine, where EIFO has local representation in Kyiv. EIFO is currently looking at 25 new cases, the total scope of which is more than 3,4 billion DKK. See more at: www.eifo.dk/en/

About D3 – For Founders who Dare to Defend Democracy

D3 is an early stage defence technology venture fund established in 2023 by Eveline Buchatskiy, Anton Verkhovodov and Elya Chiechienieva with the purpose of funding innovative founders in defence tech who can help protect Ukraine and strengthen the security in Europe. D3 plays the role of a bridge between Ukraine, with its growing expertise in asymmetric defence and related technologies, and their Allies, who are equipped with more capital and can be partners for frontier technologies. The fund’s strategy involves investing in pre-seed and seed-stage defence technology companies located in Ukraine and allied countries. For companies originating in Ukraine, D3 offer support in establishing a business foundation for global growth. For companies coming from Allied countries, D3 creates opportunities for soft-landing in Ukraine’s tech ecosystem and defence sector. D3 plans to invest in +30 companies.

 

03 Jul 25. Netherlands to provide 20 quad and buggy Ermine manned/unmanned vehicles for Ukraine. The Dutch Ministry of Defence signed a contract with Rheinmetall Defence Nederland to supply Ukraine with 20 quad and buggy manned and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) called Ermine, a Rheinmetall representative confirmed to Janes on 27 June. The representative did not provide any more details on the type of buggy to be provided to Ukraine. According to the German defence manufacturer, the Ermine modular hybrid vehicle family includes a 4×4 quad used for silent hit and run operations; a 4×4 buggy that can be used as a light weapon station; and a 6×6 buggy that can carry launcher systems for missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or loitering munitions. The line also includes UGVs, which can be used to transport wounded soldiers. All vehicles are based on a diesel-electric hybrid platform that can carry up to one tonne of payload and have a range of more than 1,000 km depending on the vehicle’s configuration. The vehicles, set to be delivered in 2026, are intended to strengthen Ukraine’s capability for casualty evacuation (casevac) near the front line, according to Rheinmetall. Dutch company Demcon Defense & Security Systems is set to provide “part of the unmanned scope”, the Rheinmetall representative said. According to the Demcon website, the company offers components of unmanned systems including integration between hardware and software. The Royal Netherlands Army asked Demcon to research artificial intelligence (AI) technology, including the way it processes data from various sensors, according to the company. In 2018 the Dutch army began working on a Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) project, which looks at autonomous systems and robotic platforms. Belgium-based Abiom Communication Systems “will provide part of the communication scope”, according to the Rheinmetall representative. (Source: Janes)

 

03 Jul 25. Ukraine’s New Drone Built to Kill Shaheds. The Ukrainian Air Force has showcased an unmanned aerial system (UAS) built to intercept Iranian-designed Shahed drones widely used by Russia. The first-person view drone launches from a mobile catapult with a simplified setup, enabling quick deployment even for troops with minimal drone training. It sports a fixed-wing airframe, a carbon fiber shell, and a propulsion system tuned for long-range and high-altitude flights. Crew training is ongoing, pilots are being trained. This was reported by the Air Command “West”.

“We are expanding the training of drone interceptor crews. We are studying the experience of effective combat units, mastering new weapons. Our trained crews are already performing combat work to detect and destroy enemy UAVs in various regions of our country in areas near the line of combat contact,”  said the head of the group coordinating the use of unmanned systems of the West Air Command.

Units of drone interceptor crews have been created in the military units of the “West” air command. Crew training is ongoing, and pilots, foremen, mechanics, and sappers are being trained to equip drones with ammunition. (Source: UAS VISION/Focus; The Defense Post)

 

01 Jul 25. Norway to build low-cost interceptors and USVs in Ukraine. More than 40% of weapons used by Ukraine’s armed forces are produced domestically, Zelenskyy claimed. An extended-range Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is fired from a NASAMS launcher and engages a target drone in Norway. Credit: Kongsberg. The Norwegian government and its leading defence supplier Kongsberg have signed two contracts with two Ukrainian companies to develop and build low-cost interceptors and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) inside Ukraine. Norway will finance the endeavour while Kongsberg establishes a permanent office in Kyiv. The agreements were made on 22 June, when the Norwegian Defence Minister Tore Sandvik met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, and Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin, according to a Norwegian government release on 27 June. Zelenskyy noted the increasing number of weapon systems produced in Ukraine for the war effort, an endeavour that comes from the support of foreign partners. More than 40% of weapons used by the armed forces are produced in Ukraine, he claimed. This surprising portion of production is based, Zelenksyy stated, on the country’s output of drones.

“A new sector of our domestic manufacturing has emerged and [it has] immediately become one of the world’s most advanced – the production of drones of various types,” the president maintained.

“We are implementing a systematic effort with partner countries to attract investment in production in Ukraine — bns of dollars of investment are flowing into our production of weapons, equipment, and machinery.”

It is suggested that more than 70,000 businesses and entrepreneurs have already benefitted from Ukraine’s state programmes and foreign partnership agreements.

Interceptors

The newly formed industrial team will design and build new low-cost interceptors for the National Advanced  Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), an air defence system developed between Kongsberg and the US defence prime Raytheon, of which there are around 12 systems deployed to protect Ukraine.

“There is an urgent need to produce more cost-effective air defence missiles in large volumes, to deal with threats from attacking drones,” said Eirik Lie, Kongsberg’s president.

On the night of 28-29 June 2025, Russia conducted its largest drone strike in the war. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that the aggressor launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones. Zelenskyy acknowledged that one Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot died while repelling the strikes. (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

03 Jul 25. Russia’s Weapons Stockpile: How Many Missiles and Drones are Left? As of June 15, 2025, Russia has more than 1,950 strategic missiles of various types, including ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic Kinzhals, as Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence told RBC-Ukraine. Moscow also owns thousands of Shahed-136 attack drones and their imitators, according to the Ukrainian intelligence (HUR).

Russia’s main missile stockpile includes:

  • up to 500 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles;
  • up to 300 9M728/9M729 Iskander-K cruise missiles
  • up to 260 Kh-101 cruise missiles launched by Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers;
  • up to 280 Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 bombers;
  • more than 400 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles
  • up to 150 hypersonic aeroballistic missiles Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on MiG-31K fighters
  • up to 60 North Korean-made KN-23 ballistic missiles.

According to the GUR, Russia produces up to 195 missiles per month, including:

  • up to 60 Iskander-M missiles
  • up to 20 Iskander-K missiles
  • up to 60 Kh-101 missiles
  • up to 10 modernized Kh-32;
  • up to 30 Kalibr missiles
  • up to 15 Kinzhals.

Production of Drones

According to military intelligence, as of June 15, Russia had more than 6,000 attack UAVs of the Geran-2 (Shahed-136) and Garpiya-A1 types, as well as more than 6,000 imitators (Gerbera). According to the HUR, Russia is capable of producing up to 170 such drones per day, both attack and imitation. By the end of this year, Moscow plans to increase the production of these UAVs to 190 units per day. Russia is increasingly using fast motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles on the battlefield in Ukraine. The aggressor country’s reserves of tanks and armored vehicles may last until the end of this year at the most. Analysts cited a source that monitors equipment in Russian military warehouses using satellite images. Russia’s warehouses store 46% of its pre-war tank stocks, as well as 42% of such stocks of infantry fighting vehicles and 48% of stocks of armored personnel carriers. (Source: UAS VISION/RBC- UKRAINE)

 

30 Jun 25. Russia’s New AI Shahed‑136 Drone Uses NVIDIA Jetson Orin AI Processor. A modified Iranian-made Shahed-136 suicide drone reportedly featuring an onboard camera, a direct radio control system from Russia, and an artificial vision module has been discovered in Ukraine for the first time, according to military electronics expert Serhii Flesh, who released photos of the wreckage on June 19. While such a variant had long been rumoured, this is the first confirmed case of its use in combat. The advanced configuration includes a radio modem that allows Russian operators to manually control the drone from up to 150 kilometers away—either from within Russian territory or from the front lines. According to Flesh, the drone could potentially be guided from even greater distances if airborne signal relays are deployed in Ukrainian airspace. Images of the drone’s remains were also analyzed by the military-affiliated Telegram channel “Polkovnyk HSH”, which concluded that the UAV was an original Iranian Shahed-136, not the Russian-assembled Geran-2 variant that has been widely used in attacks against Ukrainian cities. The drone was reportedly equipped with a new Iranian-made 8-element CRPA antenna, designed to resist GPS jamming and improve targeting accuracy in contested electronic warfare environments. But the most notable upgrade was its “machine vision” module, which used an NVIDIA Jetson Orin AI processor—the same technology recently identified in Russia’s new V2U strike drones. Analysts say the AI-powered vision system acts like a missile seeker head, enabling precision terminal guidance onto targets even without GPS.

“Machine vision based on the NVIDIA Jetson Orin module—like in the new Russian V2U strike drone—is used for terminal targeting, essentially functioning as a self-guiding warhead,”

Polkovnyk HSH reported.

Experts believe this drone could indicate a resumption of complete Shahed UAV deliveries from Iran to Russia, marking the first such case since 2023. Until now, Iran was believed to be supplying only components, while Russia assembled the drones domestically. Last fall, Russian media showcased a new Shahed-like drone with a modified nose housing an optical system, similar to the Iranian Shahed-236, which features an electro-optical targeting station allowing for autonomous target acquisition and manual operator control. Earlier, a senior Ukrainian defense official issued a warning over the increasing lethality of Russia’s Shahed drone assaults, saying they now deliver more explosive force than cruise missiles. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24 MEDIA)

 

27 Jun 25. Ukraine’s deputy defence minister meets with industry to discuss evolving C-UAS needs. Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence Valerii Churkin held a working meeting with representatives from the defence industry last week, including developers of drones, electronic warfare systems and radar technologies. The discussion was focussed on countering enemy drones and also included participants from the Ukrainian General Staff and relevant scientific institutions. The primary goal of the meeting was to coordinate joint actions for developing a technologically integrated system using new drone-based solutions. Participants discussed approaches to designing an effective architecture for the system, potential technical requirements for its components, and mechanisms for interaction among its elements.

“Coordination between developers, scientists, and the Defence Forces significantly accelerates the path from concept to practical solution. In the context of highly dynamic combat operations, this is of critical importance,” noted Valerii Churkin, adding that the next phase of the Defence Ministry’s programme focuses on developing scalable solutions that operate with minimal reliance on human resources.

In related news, Kongsberg announced on June 22 that it will develop and deliver air defence missiles to Ukraine and establish a permanent office in Kyiv.

“There is an urgent need to produce more cost-effective air defence missiles in large volumes, to deal with threats from attacking drones. Together with our Ukrainian partner, and with support from the Norwegian authorities, we look forward to developing an effective missile that we can manufacture and deliver in large numbers and that can be integrated with the NASAMS air defence system,” said Eirik Lie, President of Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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