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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

19 Jun.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to slowly advance towards Kostiantynivka from three directions, though they are still far from directly threatening it
  • STRIKES: Russia launched its third-largest single combined strike of the war overnight on 16-17 June, underscoring that Russia is seeking to maintain the pressure on Kyiv’s air defences
  • SANCTIONS: The US Senate is postponing plans to increase sanctions on Russia until at least July due to the ongoing Iran-Israel war; this comes amid wider indications that the US will not increase pressure on Russia in the short term
  • FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin has confirmed that Russian and Ukrainian negotiating teams are in contact and have agreed in principle to meet after 22 June, though specific details remain limited

 MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to slowly advance towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast) from three directions, and while they are still far from directly threatening it, steady advances are beginning to slowly create a cauldron around the city. Geolocated footage posted on 16 June indicates Russian forces are advancing along the T-0504 highway to the north-west of Yablunivka, located around 5.5 miles (9km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka. Further to the east, Russian forces have also advanced north in and around Dyliivka, located four miles (6.5km) north-east of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). Such developments underscore the likelihood that Russian forces are successfully consolidating their control over the areas to the north of Toretsk, indicating that they have pushed the Ukrainians from the city outskirts, though we cannot confirm this at present.
  • BAKHMUT: Further south to the west of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), geolocated footage published on 17 June confirms that Russian forces have seized Stupochky, located just 2.5 miles (4km) to the south-west of Chasiv Yar along the T-0504 highway that runs south-west to Kostiantynivka. This places Russian forces just 3.5 miles (6km) to the east of the outskirts of Kostiantynivka. Together with advances to the south around Toretsk, as well as progress between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to the south-west, the Russian presence in Stupochky points to ever-increasing pressure on Kostiantynivka from three directions.
  • BAKHMUT: Further north, Russian forces have also continued to advance east and north-east of Siversk, along the Donetsk-Luhansk oblast border. Geolocated footage published on 17 June indicates that Russian forces advanced into the north-eastern outskirts of Serebrianka, a village located less than three miles (4.5km) to the north-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast).
  • DONETSK: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk sector, focusing on advancing to the north-east of the city. Ukraine’s General Staff reported that the sector remains the most intense hotspot for fighting, with a total of 48 clashes recorded in the past 24 hours. Russian tactics continue to rely on small, fast-moving units. Ukrainian military personnel operating in the sector noted that Russian forces are relentlessly targeting Ukrainian logistics with strikes while also attacking using motorcycles and buggies. Another Ukrainian military source reported that Russia is launching multiple waves of small-group motorcycle assaults in an effort to overwhelm defensive positions.
  • KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
  • KURSK-SUMY: On 16 June, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Border Service, Andriy Demchenko, reported that the rate of Russian assaults in northern Sumy oblast had decreased recently, possibly due to heavy Russian losses (though we cannot yet confirm this). That said, geolocated footage from 16 June indicates that Russian forces are now in control of Kindrativka, a village located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city; the forces continue to advance to the west of the town along the international border.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to launch assaults to the west and north-west of Velyka Novosilka along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border; however, progress remains slow. Geolocated footage from 16 June shows that Russian forces recently advanced in north-eastern Komar, located inside Donetsk oblast, 24.6 miles (40km) to the south of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Various sources have in recent days also reported that Russian forces have advanced further to the north along the Vovcha River towards the village of Zaporizhzhia (not to be confused with the city of the same name), located 13 miles (21km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka. However, we cannot yet confirm this development.
  • STRIKES: Over recent days, Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine has continued. It included the third-largest single combined strike of the war overnight on 16-17 June, involving the launch of, in all, 440 drones and 32 missiles, including both cruise and ballistic types. The attack heavily targeted the capital, Kyiv, hitting residential areas and killing 28 residents. The recent attacks show that, despite retaining the densest air defence network in the country, the capital remains increasingly exposed to strikes in the context of Russia’s prolonged and intense strike campaign. Other strikes this week were more aligned with usual patterns, involving moderately large-scale drone attacks. We assess that the risk of another very large-scale attack, such as the one launched on 17 June, remains credible in the coming weeks as Russia seeks to maintain the pressure on Ukraine’s air defences.
  • STRIKES: The mayor of Kyiv, Vitaliy Klitschko, claimed that fragments of cluster munitions had been discovered following the attack on 17 June. While we cannot confirm this, if drones have been armed with cluster munition warheads, this would mark a notable innovation in Russia’s drone strategy and tactics, likely signalling an effort to demoralise the population further during large-scale attacks. However, we cannot yet confirm this development.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • NORTH KOREA: On 17 June, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in the North Korean capital Pyongyang for his third visit in almost three months. After meeting North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, Shoigu announced that North Korea will send 1,000 sappers for demining and 5,000 military engineers and construction workers to reconstruct Russia’s Kursk oblast. North Korean troops were deployed to the region in Autumn 2024, months after Ukraine launched an incursion into Kursk oblast. Various other indicators also pointed to a deployment of North Korean construction workers in occupied Donetsk oblast earlier in the war. The most recent announcement reflects the increasingly close and open ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, as well as the extent to which North Korean manpower remains a resource which Russia can tap to assist in both military and reconstruction efforts.
  • SANCTIONS: The US Senate is postponing plans to increase sanctions pressure on Russia until at least July due to the ongoing Iran-Israel war and other legislative priorities. According to reports from 17 June, one of the co-authors of the bill, Senator Lindsey Graham, said Iran is taking precedence currently. However, Lindsey implied that the sanctions legislation would progress ‘sooner rather than later’. Additionally, Senate Majority Leader John Thune said that a ‘July timeframe’ for considering the Russia sanctions was most likely. We assess that this development underscores that competing global crises (particularly in the Middle East) will likely continue to divert US attention from the war in Ukraine.
  • SANCTIONS: Our assessment remains that US President Donald Trump is likely still reluctant to increase pressure on Russia (including through sanctions), irrespective of other geopolitical developments. On 17 June, Bloomberg reported that G7 leaders failed to convince Trump to toughen his approach to Moscow. Trump reportedly argued that sanctions entail a significant economic cost for the US. Meanwhile, Reuters has reported that the Trump administration disbanded a working group established to formulate strategies to push Russia into speeding up peace talks with Ukraine. According to three unnamed US officials, the initiative lost momentum in May as it became clear that Trump was not interested in adopting a harsher stance toward Russia. The group was considering different options. These included offering tailored economic deals designed to encourage countries with ties to Russia to break out of Moscow’s influence and unspecified ‘covert special operations efforts’. The group’s closure (if confirmed) further supports our assessment that a major increase in US pressure on Russia is unlikely, at least in the short term.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at a roundtable on 18 June during which he disclosed that Russian and Ukrainian negotiating teams are in contact and that they agree in principle to meet after 22 June, though specific details on a potential next round of talks remain limited. Putin claimed that Moscow is ready to end the war without indicating any genuine willingness to do so. Even if the new round of talks were to take place, the likelihood of a major breakthrough towards a ceasefire lasting at least 30 days (not least a strategic settlement) remains low. Meanwhile, earlier on 19 June, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha announced that 100 days have passed since Ukraine unconditionally accepted the US proposal for a ceasefire. Sybiha characterised this period as 100 days of Russian ‘manipulation’ and ‘escalating terror’ against Ukraine, as well as missed opportunities to end the war.  Although Putin has attempted to portray Russia as ready to hold negotiations with Ukraine at a high level, he remains reluctant to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin reiterated Russian narratives aimed at discrediting not only Zelensky’s legitimacy (and also that of the wider Ukrainian leadership), by giving his interpretation of the Ukrainian constitution concerning presidential and parliamentary powers under martial law. Elections cannot be held under martial law as per Ukraine’s constitution. However, Putin once again claimed that if the mandate of a Ukrainian president (in this case, referring to Zelensky) is illegitimate, the entire system of power is also illegitimate. Putin implied that he would be ready to meet Zelensky, though at the final stages of negotiations, before stating that only the ‘legitimate authorities’ of Ukraine can sign a peace document. By raising legal technicalities, Russia is either maintaining its demand for regime change in Ukraine, or is setting conditions to renege on any possible future strategic settlement (or, as is likely, both). Putin also implied that Russia would oppose the involvement of European countries in brokering peace. While Putin claimed that Moscow is open to resuming contact with European states, he stated that a mediator must be ‘neutral’. According to him, Russia views Germany, alongside other European countries, as supporters of Ukraine and sometimes as accomplices in aiding Kyiv’s war effort, meaning they are not neutral. Ultimately, such comments are likely aimed at encouraging Ukraine’s European supporters to change course if they seek an end to the war through negotiations, especially given that the Iran-Israel war will likely divert US attention to the Middle East. For further analysis on how this will impact the Russo-Ukrainian war, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 June 2025. Comments from other Russian officials in recent days indicate that Moscow maintains maximalist demands for ending the war. In an interview on 18 June with CNN, Russia’s ambassador to the UK, Andrei Kelin, stated that Kyiv can either accept Moscow’s conditions now for a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive settlement, or surrender later under much worse terms. Meanwhile, on 16 June, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said Moscow will insist that Ukraine dismantle and destroy all Western-supplied weapons as part of a ceasefire deal. Although Russian officials (including Putin) have stated that Ukraine’s demilitarisation is a goal of the full-scale invasion, Grushko’s comments mark an additional demand beyond previous calls for limits on Ukraine’s military. We assess that by listing new terms for a ceasefire, Russia intends to prolong the process of reaching a cessation of hostilities and increase pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s terms.

16 Jun.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to make slow but steady advances across the eastern axis, including in and around Chasiv Yar and Toretsk
  • STRIKES: A building used by a US aerospace company in the capital Kyiv was directly struck in a Russian aerial attack overnight on 15-16 June, likely underscoring Russia’s continued disinterest in meaningful peace efforts
  • CASUALTIES: Russia has suffered over one m casualties since the beginning of its full-scale invasion, according to Ukrainian estimates, but this will unlikely deter or prevent Russia from continuing the war for the foreseeable future
  • FORECAST: The ongoing Iran-Israel war will highly likely impact Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine in various ways, including modestly reducing Iranian exports to Russia and driving Russian oil revenues
  • BAKHMUT: Russian forces have made several modest but tactically significant advances in central Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast), the Ukrainian defence of which continues to stunt Russian efforts to build pressure on Kostiantynivka to the west. Geolocated footage from 12 June indicates that Russian forces have advanced to Matrosova Street in central Chasiv Yar, a notable development given the two-year-long battle for the town. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 12 and 13 June also indicated that Russian forces advanced south-east of Bila Hora and north of Ivano-Darivka, both located to the south-east of Chasiv Yar.
  • BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, to the north-east, geolocated footage from 12 June indicates that Russian forces have seized the village of Hryhorivka, located just 4.5 miles (7km) to the north-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast). Russian forces have made very limited progress on this section of the frontline since the fall of Lysychansk in July 2022. However, last month, Russian forces did take the nearby town of Bilohorivka, located due east of Hryhorivka. In addition, various Ukrainian sources have reported an uptick in Russian assaults in the area east of Siversk in recent days.
  • BAKHMUT: Further south in and around Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to fight heavily over the town, with Ukrainian counter-attacks continuing to slow Russian advances. Geolocated footage from 12 June indicates that Ukrainian forces successfully recaptured positions in Dyliivka, which is located to the north-east of Toretsk, before Russian counter-attacks similarly retook several of those positions on 14 June. The battle underscores the highly contested nature of frontline positions in the Toretsk area; frequent Ukrainian counter-attacks are preventing Russian forces from consolidating their positions and setting conditions for the advance towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast).
  • DONETSK: Russian forces have continued to slowly advance on the eastern and western flanks of Pokrovsk in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 12 June indicates that Russian forces recently captured Kotylne, which is located south-west of Pokrovsk. Additionally, geolocated footage circulated on 11 June points to marginal Russian advances north of Malynivka, which is located east of Pokrovsk.
  • DONETSK: Further to the east, Ukrainian forces continue to conduct successful, albeit highly localised, counterattacks on the outskirts of Toretsk. Geolocated footage posted on 17 June shows that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions in northern Dyliivka and in southern Oleksandro-Kalynove, which are respectively located north and west of Toretsk. That said, geolocated footage from 8 June has emerged, indicating that Russian forces marginally advanced along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway in north-western Toretsk and pointing to growing overall Russian control of the settlement, despite Ukrainian counter-attacks on the outskirts.
  • KHARKIV: On 12 June, Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Kharkiv Grouping of Forces Pavlo Shamshyn claimed that Russian forces are currently taking the equivalent of a battalion in casualties every week in the Kharkiv direction. Shamshyn claimed that such high casualty rates are preventing Russian forces from being able to accumulate sufficient reserves to generate a tactical breakthrough in and around Vovchansk; this is likely accurate given the slow progress over the last 12 months. Despite this, Russian forces continue to innovate with new tactics, including greater reliance upon all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to move more quickly around the battlefield.
  • KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage published on 12, 13 and 14 June indicates that Russian forces have continued to make slow but steady progress in northern Sumy oblast. This likely includes the seizure of Oleksiivka, located around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (both Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 13 June that its forces had also taken the entirety of Yablunivka, located around 4.5 miles (7 km) to the east of Oleksiivka.
  • KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on 14 June that, amid various counterattacks in the region, Ukrainian forces had retaken the village of Andriivka, located 1.5 miles (2.5km) to the west of Oleksiivka (though we cannot confirm the veracity of his statement). If accurate, this would likely slow Russian efforts to advance south towards the H-07 highway. This likely remains the principal Russian tactical objective in northern Sumy oblast, as control over the string of settlements along the road will allow Russian forces to target Sumy city with conventional tube artillery and increase pressure in the area.
  • OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage posted on 13 June indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south-west of Krasne Pershe, which is located to the north of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) on the west bank of the Oskil River. Additional geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have also likely taken other, unspecified positions on the west bank of the river. A Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces attacking in the direction of Kupiansk are making heavy use of motorcycles and light vehicles, a tactic which has helped the Russians achieve marginal gains across various parts of the frontline in recent weeks. The officer also noted that the Russians have not recently attempted to cross the Oskil River with pontoons, but are instead resorting to ropes and boats with one to two servicemen at a time (likely due to the heavy losses incurred during failed pontoon crossings earlier in the war).
  • SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to advance slowly towards and along the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk oblast border. Geolocated footage from 13 June indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Komar, a village located under ten miles (15km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka on the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian MoD claimed on 13 June that its forces had seized the entire settlement, but this remains unconfirmed. Meanwhile, further to the north, geolocated footage confirmed on 13 June that Russian forces have taken Horikhove, a village located 17 miles (27km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka, near the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk oblast border.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 13 June, Russian forces launched, in all, 55 Shahed-136/131 drones and decoy drones as well as four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles at Ukraine. The attack was directed primarily at Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) reported that 28 drones were intercepted while 15 were lost due to electronic warfare (EW) measures. A similar scale strike was conducted overnight on 14 June, with 58 drones targeting Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
  • STRIKES: A far larger, combined strike involving 183 drones, two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, one Iskander-M/KN 23 ballistic missile, four Iskander-K cruise missiles and four Kalibr cruise missiles were targeted primarily against the city of Kremenchuk (Poltava oblast) overnight on 15 June. According to the UAF, 111 drones were intercepted and 48 were lost or suppressed by electronic warfare. Eight of the missiles were also reportedly intercepted.
  • STRIKES: A building used by US aerospace company Boeing in the capital Kyiv was directly struck in a Russian aerial attack overnight on 15-16 June. Boeing is among the most prominent US businesses to retain a presence in Ukraine. The FT newspaper reported that it has seen photographs and spoken to people familiar with the matter, which indicate the attack was deliberate. This indicates that a high-precision missile, as opposed to a drone or a less sophisticated method, was used in the attack. The deliberate targeting of a US company would realistically mark a modest inflection point in Russia’s strike campaign, given that Russia has targeted Western assets in Ukraine before. However, this would also highlight that Russia is not seriously committed to any talks on ending the war. A Boeing spokesperson told the FT that no employees were harmed as a result of the attack.
  • STRIKES: Overnight on 15-16 June, Russian forces launched, in all, 138 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones primarily in the direction of Donetsk oblast. The UAF reported that 84 drones were intercepted, while a further 41 drones were lost or suppressed by EW measures.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • PRISONERS: On 14 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed that Ukraine and Russia had conducted their fourth exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) in a week. Zelensky did not provide a specific figure of people returned from Russia, though he stated that many had been held by Russia since 2022. Those returned to Ukraine included soldiers of Ukraine’s armed forces and the State Border Service (DPSU). Following the second round of direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia earlier this month, the two sides agreed to conduct prisoner swaps (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 June 2025). Although a ceasefire and peace settlement remain unlikely in the near term, conducting successful large-scale prisoner (and body) swaps will moderately help build levels of trust between the two sides, which we assess to currently be extremely low.
  • CASUALTIES: Russia has suffered over one m casualties in Ukraine (both dead and wounded) since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in 2022, according to Ukrainian estimates. Ukraine’s General Staff reported this figure on 12 June, specifying that this includes killed, wounded or incapacitated Russian personnel. It also claimed that of the 1,000,340 Russian losses, 628,000 took place in the past year and a half. While we cannot verify this statement, given that Russia and Ukraine do not publicly disclose accurate casualty information, an unspecified senior NATO official estimated in early April that Russia had lost 900,000 troops since the war began. Of that number, 250,000 had been killed. We assess that the figures underscore the high casualty rates sustained by Russia in Ukraine, though this alone will unlikely deter or prevent Russia from continuing a prolonged attritional war in the medium term, especially given that Moscow continues to recruit ever-larger numbers of contract personnel every month.
  • CASUALTIES: Meanwhile, the UK’s Defence Intelligence (DI) reported on 15 June that North Korean forces have highly likely sustained over 6,000 casualties during combat operations in Russia’s Kursk oblast. It stated that this figure amounts to more than half of the 11,000 North Korean troops initially deployed there in October 2024. While we cannot confirm these figures, if true, they would reflect our earlier reporting that North Korean forces learned hard lessons on the modern battlefield, namely that conducting large-scale infantry assaults (as opposed to small-scale attacks favoured by Russia) without appropriate drone cover results in disproportionately high casualties. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 31 October 2024.
  • SANCTIONS: The US will unlikely shift its opposition to lowering the G7 price cap on Russian oil in the near term despite European calls to do so. Bloomberg reported on 13 June, citing unspecified insiders, that US President Donald Trump will make the final decision, though unnamed officials still remain hopeful he could agree to a reduction. The outlet noted that, while the EU and the UK could assess lowering the cap from USD 60 per barrel (pb) to USD 45 pb as the bloc envisions, several member states are reluctant to do so without the US. We assess that a unified agreement among G7 member states would highly likely improve the enforcement of a new price cap, thereby reducing Russia’s ability to profit from its oil revenues. However, as assessed in the FORECAST below, a protracted crisis in the Middle East would likely drive oil prices up, mitigating the impact of a price cap on Russian oil revenues. (Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Jun 25. North Korea to Deploy 6,000 More to Russia’s Kursk Region. North Korea will send 6,000 people to Russia’s Kursk region to help with reconstruction and mine removal, a Russian official said Tuesday. According to Russia’s state news agency, Tass, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu made the announcement after visiting Pyongyang.  Shoigu reportedly said the group will include 1,000 demining personnel to clear mines in Russia’s Kursk region, along with 5,000 military construction workers to assist with infrastructure restoration. Shoigu called the move a gesture of “brotherly aid” and said memorials would be built in both countries to honor North Korean soldiers who died in the conflict. No timeline was given for when the workers will arrive. This is not the first time North Korea has sent personnel to support Russia. In late 2024, Pyongyang deployed around 12,000 troops to assist Russian forces after Ukraine captured parts of the Kursk region. With North Korean support, Russian troops recaptured most of that territory by March 2025. The latest deployment follows a report from the U.K. Defense Ministry last week, stating that over 6,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed or wounded while fighting alongside Russian forces in the war against Ukraine. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

18 Jun 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drone strike halts operations at Russian explosives plant. A Ukrainian drone attack on June 14 temporarily shut down operations at Nevinnomyssk Azot, one of Russia’s major producers of explosives precursors and solid-fuel rocket components. The facility, located in the Stavropol Territory, came under a coordinated assault involving 13 UAS, according to Russian independent outlet Astra. The strike caused damage to doors, windows a production workshop, and the plant’s anti-drone defense systems. Photos and videos shared by local residents also show a fire breaking out at the site shortly after the drones hit. Reports indicate that the roof of the plant’s cafeteria was among the damaged structures. Roughly 800 workers took shelter on site during the attack. There were no reported casualties, but plant operations were suspended due to the extent of the damage. Nevinnomyssk Azot is a subsidiary of EuroChem and is considered a key contributor to Russia’s defense-industrial supply chain. It produces over one m tons of ammonia and 1.4 m tons of ammonium nitrate annually. In addition to its role in fertilizer production, the facility supplies chemical components for solid-fuel rocket engines manufactured by NPO Iskra, a key enterprise in Russia’s missile development programs. The plant also allegedly provides raw materials for the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, which manufactures military-grade explosives such as hexogen and octogen. These compounds are commonly used in artillery shells and missile warheads. The strike is the latest in a series of Ukrainian long-range attacks targeting Russian defense industry infrastructure far from the front lines as it continues to push for ceasefire terms. Kyiv’s strategy has consistently been focused on disrupting Russia’s war production capacity through asymmetric means.

Ukrainian drone strike halts operations at Russian explosives plant

(Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

16 Jun 25. German defense chief pledges $10bn in Ukraine aid for 2025. Germany is on track to give €9bn ($10.4bn) in aid to Ukraine in 2025, maintaining the country’s position as one of Kyiv’s key backers. The amount was announced by Berlin’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, during his visit to Ukraine on June 12. It marks the fifth time that Pistorius has visited Kyiv since the outbreak of the war when Russia invaded its neighbor in February 2022. Some of the forthcoming assistance will take the form of joint ventures between the German and Ukrainian military-industrial complexes, an idea that was presented earlier this year and has been pushed by Germany’s new conservative leadership. Joint defense production projects are in line to get €1.9bn ($2.2bn) of the overall funding. Part of the amount will be dedicated to financing long-range weapon systems that will be manufactured in Ukraine. Under the arrangement, Germany will provide funding while Ukraine will contribute its battlefield-tested technological know-how. “The first systems should be available in the next few months,” Pistorius said during a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, who in turn said that the joint venture was an expression of deep trust in Berlin. Pistorius noted that “the picture of war has changed” from traditional tanks and jets to electromagnetic warfare and drone combat, making this technological exchange valuable for both countries. The Social Democratic defense minister, who has often been at odds with his own party, has pushed forcefully for German rearmament and a more prominent military posture on the world stage. Also in Kyiv, Pistorius addressed a longstanding elephant in the room by saying that Germany was not planning to transfer its Taurus cruise missiles, widely considered one of the most advanced available, to Kyiv.

“Since you asked me whether we are considering this, my answer is no,” Pistorius told a journalist. The government of Chancellor Friedrich Merz had previously maintained a purposely ambiguous posture on the matter.

However, Germany will deliver more IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine. Zelenskyy stated that the assistance would be provided under a three-year plan, but said he would not provide further details. The Ukrainian president did, however, let slip that he expects Ukraine to localize the production of “very high-quality” German air defense systems, which may suggest a plan to produce the systems inside the country. Currently, IRIS-T air defense systems are made in Germany. The supply plan builds on substantial existing contracts. In May, Ukraine and Germany signed a €2.2bn ($2.54bn) contract for IRIS-T systems and missiles, covering four complete surface-launched units with mobile launchers, radars, command centers, and missiles. Air defense has been identified as one of the key priorities for Ukraine in light of relentless Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities using cruise missiles and drones. Germany’s total aid in support of Ukraine amounts to €48 bn ($55.5 bn) since the start of the war, as of April 30, the government said in response to a parliamentary inquiry. Of that, €15.6bn ($18bn) was military assistance. Germany remains the largest supporter of Ukraine aside from the United States. Under Merz’s chancellorship, Berlin has stopped releasing detailed tallies of its military support to Kyiv, citing operational security. (Source: Reuters)

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