NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jun 15.

15 Jun 25. Russian forces carried out an overnight strike on the Kremenchuk oil refinery that supplies fuel to Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region, Russia’s defence ministry said on Sunday. The ministry’s statement said that missiles had been fired at the refinery in Ukraine’s Poltava region from both sea and air and that strike drones were also used in what it said had been a successful attack. Reuters could not verify the battlefield report and there was no immediate Ukrainian comment on the Russian statement. Russia has claimed Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region as its own and controls most of its two regions, Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine is fighting to stop Russia taking control of the rest of Donbas and has said it plans to retake territory it has lost through a combination of force and diplomacy.  The Russian Defence Ministry said separately that its forces had taken control of the village of Malynivka in the Donetsk region, known in Russia as Ulyanovka It also said its forces had advanced deep into enemy defences in Ukraine’s Sumy region and inflicted heavy losses on Ukrainian units there. Sumy is not one of the regions Russia has formally claimed as its own, but it has spoken of creating a buffer zone there. (Source: Reuters)

Jun 14.

14 Jun 25. Zelenskiy says Ukraine halts Russian troop advance in Sumy region.

Jun 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Although Russian forces have made confirmed advances inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, there is no indication that a significant offensive will be launched; Donetsk oblast will remain Russia’s focus
• NATO: A draft of an upcoming NATO communique will reportedly omit reference to Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, likely underscoring the current diplomatic approach of the Trump administration
• AID: US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed that Washington DC intends to cut its budget for weapon supplies to Ukraine in 2026, though he did not specify by how much
• FORECAST: The EU’s proposal to ban transactions involving the Nord Stream pipelines as part of the 18th package of sanctions on Russia is largely a long-term measure that will have little impact on Russia’s prosecution of the war
• OFFENSIVES: Russian forces have made confirmed advances along the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border; however, there is no indication of a major offensive within Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Geolocated footage posted on 9 June shows that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Horikhove, located approximately 12 miles (20km) to the south-east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Additional footage from 10 June shows recent Russian advances on the south-western outskirts of Novomykolaivka, situated near the Donetsk border and approximately eight miles (13 km) to the north-east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). We continue to assess that Russian operations in this sector are likely intended to support offensive efforts elsewhere in Donetsk oblast (Russia’s primary focus). This will likely involve attempts to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and logistic routes that support Ukrainian defensive operations in Donetsk oblast.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have continued to make slow advances in and around Chasiv Yar and Toretsk (both Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage circulated on 11 June indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Severny Mine area located north of Chasiv Yar. Additionally, geolocated footage posted on 9 June indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced in an industrial area north-east of Stupochky, located south of Chasiv Yar. Further south, Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Toretsk, according to geolocated imagery posted on 9-10 June. That said, Ukrainian forces continue to fiercely contest Russian advances; in addition, geolocated footage circulated on 9-10 June points to recent Ukrainian advances in central Dyliivka and an industrial area, located to the north and north-west of Toretsk, respectively.
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage posted on 11 June indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Malynika, which is located east of Pokrovsk.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces are likely transferring additional resources to north-east Sumy oblast in order to expand control of areas on the border with Russia and draw Ukrainian forces from more critical areas of the frontline in Donetsk oblast. On 10 June, a Ukrainian military observer noted that Russia had deployed most of the Kursk Group of Forces to northern Sumy oblast, where it was making significant efforts to expand its positions in the border area. An advisor to the exiled mayor of Russian-occupied Mariupol (Donetsk oblast) also reported on 9 June that Russian forces were transferring equipment from Crimea and Kherson oblast to Sumy. Russian forces are currently attempting to advance in the direction of Pysarivka, a settlement that would grant Russian forces greater control over the northernmost portion of the H07 highway.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have advanced along portions of the Oskil-Kreminna front in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 9 June shows that Russian forces recently captured Krasne Pershe, located approximately 22 miles (35km) to the north-east of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Meanwhile, geolocated footage from the same day indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Novoyehorivka (Luhansk oblast), situated approximately 21 miles (34km) to the south-east of Borova. Additional footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured unspecified positions north of Lozova, located to the north-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Finally, geolocated footage also published on 10 June shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north-east of Torske, located approximately nine miles (14km) to the east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: On 10 June, Russia launched another large-scale combined strike following several days of similar attacks. The attack involved, in all, 315 drones, two KN-23 ballistic missiles, and five Iskander-K cruise missiles. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 213 drones (with 64 reported lost), both ballistic missiles and all cruise missiles. The attack targeted 16 locations, including Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa oblasts. In the capital Kyiv, the strike inflicted damage on a building near the premises hosting the EU’s delegation to Ukraine. The subsequent strike on 11 June consisted solely of 85 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its strike campaign targeting Russia’s defence manufacturing facilities. On 11 June, Russian media reported that a large Ukrainian drone attack was repelled by Russian forces. Concurrently, residents in Tambov oblast reported hearing multiple explosions and witnessing a large fire in the area of a gunpowder plant in the town of Kotovsk. The facility is reportedly one of the largest industrial sites producing ammunition for the Russian military. The Tambov regional authorities confirmed an explosion caused by a falling drone at an unspecified location in Kotovsk.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 11-12 June, Russian forces fired, in all, 64 Shahed-136/131 and decoy drones of various types, primarily in the direction of Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts. In all, 28 drones were intercepted; 21 were reportedly lost (or failed to hit a target) due to electronic warfare (EW) measures.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: Recent comments from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky underscore that Russia is fully aware that its so-called peace memorandum is a non-starter for Ukraine. In an interview published on 10 June, Zelensky stated that Russian negotiators told their Ukrainian counterparts that Moscow knows that the document is an ultimatum which Kyiv will not accept. Russia’s ‘peace’ terms are almost certainly unpopular among the Ukrainian leadership as well as within Ukrainian society. According to a survey published by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on 10 June, 82% of Ukrainians categorically reject Russia’s ‘peace plan’. Just 10% of respondents said they were ready to accept its terms. While we cannot confirm Zelensky’s comments, it is a realistic possibility that the Russian side could have said this. If true, the comments reflect that Russia remains unwilling to engage in genuine peace talks to end the war.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Meanwhile, Russia continues attempts to pressure Ukraine into agreeing to unfavourable terms now while implying that future conditions for peace will be even harsher. In an interview on 9 June, Russia’s chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, claimed that Russia’s conditions for peace in the early phases of the full-scale invasion were softer than its current demands. However, we continue to assess that Moscow’s war objectives have remained largely unchanged since the onset of the war and are still maximalist. For further analysis regarding  Russia’s envisioned terms for peace and how many of these directly oppose Ukraine’s, please see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 5 June 2025.
• NATO: According to Bloomberg, a draft joint declaration for the upcoming NATO summit on 24-25 June will omit reference to Ukraine’s NATO membership ambitions as well as a previous pledge of over EUR 40 billion (USD 46.4 billion) in support for Ukraine. This likely reflects US President Donald Trump’s preference to avoid explicitly blaming Russia for the war while his administration continues efforts to focus on negotiations; this is opposed to imposing punitive measures on Russia to force it to the negotiation table. However, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on 9 June that, despite the omission from the NATO communique, Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is ‘irreversible’. We continue to assess that Ukraine is highly unlikely to join NATO due to divisions over this prospect within the alliance, as well as Russia’s vehement opposition to such an outcome.
• AID: US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced on 10 June that Washington DC intends to cut its budget for weapons supplies to Ukraine in 2026. Hegseth, however, did not specify how large the reduction would be. That said, he stated that the Trump administration ‘takes a very different view’ of the war compared to its predecessor. Hegseth argued that the Trump administration continues to believe that a negotiated peace settlement is in the interest of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as US national interests, in light of ‘competing interests around the globe’.
• AID: We have long assessed that the Trump administration was likely to scale back military aid to Ukraine. Over the medium term, this will disadvantage Ukraine’s ability to fight a protracted attritional war, given that its European allies will highly likely struggle to fill the void of reduced US aid. However, European countries continue to demonstrate their commitment to Ukraine through new military support. On 11 June, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Kyiv is expected to receive nearly GBP 1.7 billion (USD 2.26 billion) from the UK to buy air defence systems and missiles.

FORECAST

SANCTIONS: On 10 June, the EU unveiled details of its proposed 18th sanctions package against Russia. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the measures intend to increase pressure on Moscow to end its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The proposed economic penalties will target Russia’s energy sector and financial institutions primarily, while strengthening measures to undermine Russian efforts to circumvent sanctions. The latest tranche of punitive measures includes a proposal (for the first time) to ban transactions involving the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. According to von der Leyen, no EU operator will be able to engage directly or indirectly in any transaction regarding those pipelines. However, these underwater gas links are not currently in operation, with the second set of pipelines having never received an operating permit to begin transporting gas after completion in 2021. Additionally, explosions to the pipelines in September 2022 damaged the original pair of Nord Stream 1 pipelines and one of the Nord Stream 2 links, leaving just one intact. As such, envisioned penalties targeting Nord Stream infrastructure are unlikely to have a significant economic impact in the near-to-medium term. Instead, the proposed sanctions are highly likely aimed at inflicting economic pressure on Russia over the longer term and reducing the EU’s energy reliance on Russian supplies. Von der Leyen also disclosed that the EU is proposing to lower the oil price cap from USD 60 per barrel (pb) to USD 45 pb. Von der Leyen said that the issue will be discussed at a G7 leaders meeting in Canada on 15-17 June, with the EU executive unable to lower it unilaterally. The US has so far refrained from endorsing a reduction of the price cap, though Canada and the UK are believed to support such action. President Zelensky is advocating for a cap of USD 30 per barrel. While the EU could theoretically establish a lower price cap alone, this remains unlikely, given internal divisions (primarily resistance from Hungary and Slovakia) would reduce the likelihood of a unanimous vote among member states. Even if the EU acted alone, differing price caps would almost certainly create confusion among maritime service providers. Russia would highly likely seek to take advantage of weaker enforcement and uncertainty of regulation, given that oil exports are believed to represent one-third of Russia’s government revenues. Additionally, the Commission proposes restricting the access of a further 22 Russian banks to the SWIFT international payments system. Von der Leyen also stated that the EU seeks to extend a ‘transaction ban’ to financial operators in third-party countries which finance trade to Russia and aid Moscow in circumventing sanctions. This measure may realistically imply secondary sanctions, which the EU has traditionally opposed. The latest tranche of measures also outlines sanctions against the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), as well as its subsidiaries and investment projects. Von der Leyen stated that the RDIF, Moscow’s sovereign wealth fund, would be sanctioned to prevent it from funding projects aimed at modernising the Russian economy. We assess that the proposed measures aim to further tighten Russian financial institutions, as well as those in other jurisdictions aiding Moscow. Meanwhile, President Zelensky claimed in an interview on 10 June that unspecified Western partners refuse to impose new sanctions on Russia in part because of Ukraine’s reluctance to lower the mobilisation age to 18. It is possible that Zelensky was referring to the US, given reports in January prior to President Donald Trump’s inauguration that he intended to push Ukraine to lower the conscription age to 18. The US is also yet to announce new sanctions against Russia as of the time of writing, given concerns that this could jeopardise efforts to broker peace and future economic opportunities with Russia. While we cannot confirm Zelensky’s comments, if true, they possibly underscore that Western partners (the US in particular) are hesitant to escalate sanctions pressure without Ukraine making politically difficult decisions to bolster manpower.

Jun 09.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces have continued to make slow but steady advances in north-east Sumy oblast
• STRIKES: On 9 June, Russia launched its largest, high-intensity combined strike against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022; this was almost certainly in retaliation against Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web
• SANCTIONS: An unconfirmed WSJ report claims that the Trump administration is pushing for a Republican proposal to sanction Russia to be watered down, underscoring ongoing reluctance to undermine US-initiated peace talks
• FORECAST: Russian forces will almost certainly remain focused on capturing Donetsk oblast, despite the unconfirmed Russian claim that Russian forces are carrying out offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk oblast
• BAKHMUT: Ukrainian forces continue to carry out small-scale counter-attacks in Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), though the overall momentum remains with Russian forces attacking between Toretsk and Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage posted on 6 June indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Dyliivka and to the south of Yablunivka, which are located north-east and north-west of Toretsk, respectively. Nonetheless, geolocated footage posted on 8 June also indicates that Russian forces made advances inside a mine located to the north-west of Toretsk. A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces have advanced towards the centre of Yablunivka, a village located seven miles (11km) to the south-west of the outskirts of Kostiantynivka, though we cannot confirm this.
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage published on 8 June shows recent Russian advances north of Shevchenko, located approximately six miles (10km) south of Pokrovsk. Further south, Russian forces advanced in south-eastern Oleksiivka, located around 18.6 miles (30km) west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces have continued to achieve marginal advances in north-east Sumy oblast in recent days. Geolocated footage circulated on 5 June indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Andriivka, which is located approximately 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city, having likely captured the settlement. Additional geolocated footage indicates Russian advances in several locations, including Kindrativka, southern Oleksiivka, to the east of Loknya and eastern Yablunivka (all of which are small settlements in north-east Sumy oblast located near the Russian border). Furthermore, Deepstate, a Ukrainian OSINT group, confirmed on 8 June that Russian forces now control the settlement of Loknya; the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that the settlement was captured on 24 May.
• KURSK-SUMY: Further north in Russia’s Belgorod oblast, geolocated footage posted on 5 June indicates that Russian forces also advanced south of Demidovka, which is located to the north-west of Belgorod city.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have achieved marginal advances in the direction of both Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) and Lyman (Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 5 and 6 June indicated that Russian forces recently advanced into central Kindrashivka and to the north of Dvorichna, both of which are located to the north of Kupiansk, which is a key Ukrainian logistical hub. Meanwhile, geolocated footage also indicated that Russian forces have advanced in several locations in the direction of Lyman; these include the Serebryanske forest, south-east of Zelena Dolyna and north-west of Kolodyazi, located to the east, north and north-east of Lyman, respectively.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have achieved marginal advances in offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka (western Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 6 June indicates that Russian forces recently captured the village of Fedorivka, which is located to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Additional geolocated footage circulated on 7 June indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced in the south-east of Komar, a village located to the north of Fedorivka. Further west in Zaporizhzhia oblast, geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south-west of Myrne, which is located to the south-west of Huliaipole.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia launched massive, high-intensity combined strikes. Overnight on 5-6 June, Russian forces launched, in all, 407 drones, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, 36 Kh-101 cruise missiles, two Iskander-K cruise missiles and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile. Ukraine’s Air Force reported the interception of 199 drones (169 were reported lost), four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles and two Iskander-K cruise missiles. According to the Ukrainian authorities, the strike targeted major urban centres including Chernihiv (Chernihiv oblast, Kremenchuk (Poltava oblast), Kyiv (Kyiv oblast), Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Ternopil (Ternopil oblast). Other regions affected included Cherkasy, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: On 9 June, Russia launched 499 drones and missiles, which constitutes the largest strike since the start of the war. The attack included, in all, 479 drones, four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, ten Kh-101 cruise missiles, three Kh-22 cruise missiles, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukraine reported the interception of 277 drones (with 183 drones reportedly lost), along with ten Kh-101 cruise missiles, four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles and one Kh-35 cruise missile. According to Ukraine’s Air Force, air defences were active in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts.
• STRIKES: The latest intensification of Russian attacks is highly likely linked to retaliation for Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web, launched on 1 June against Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. We continue to assess that the risk of further large-scale combined Russian strikes will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Major urban centres, including the capital Kyiv, will remain vulnerable to such attacks.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued to conduct long-range drone strikes against strategic targets in Russia. Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of, in all, 174 drones over Bryansk, Kursk, Ryazan, and Saratov oblasts overnight on 5-6 June. According to Ukraine’s General Staff, the strikes targeted Engels Air Base in Saratov oblast and Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan oblast. Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the JSC Progress Plant in Michurinsk (Tambov oblast), which produces stabilisation and control systems for missile, artillery and aviation systems. Kovalenko additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted an unspecified Russian military facility in Bryansk oblast. In addition, on 8 June, Ukraine reportedly struck a Russian chemical plant in Tula oblast that produces explosives for artillery shells, bombs and missiles.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump will likely remain reluctant to escalate sanctions against Russia; the likelihood of new punitive measures which inflict significant economic pressure on Moscow will remain low in the coming weeks. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on 6 June that the Trump administration is trying to push Senator Lindsey Graham, who authored a bill allowing additional harsh sanctions against Russia, to significantly soften its provisions. Unspecified congressional aides disclosed that White House and other administration officials have requested waivers that would allow Trump to choose who or what entities are sanctioned, as well as lexical changes which would undermine the legislation.
• SANCTIONS: While we cannot verify this report, we have previously assessed that Trump will likely remain opposed to tightening sanctions pressure against Russia in the near term. Trump continues to maintain that issuing new punitive measures would possibly jeopardise US efforts to broker an end to the war in Ukraine, as well as future economic opportunities with Russia. On 5 June, Trump refused to state when precisely the US could impose sanctions against Russia, acknowledging that he has a mental deadline for taking such action. Notably, he implied that the US could also sanction Ukraine, which aligns with our assessment that the US will likely consider using punitive measures to pressure both sides to end the war.
• SANCTIONS: Meanwhile, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stated on 8 June that Bratislava will block further EU sanctions against Russia if these harm national interests. Slovakia has not yet blocked any of the bloc’s previous sanctions against Russia. While EU pressure will likely encourage Slovakia to agree to new punitive measures, Fico’s comments underscore increasing divisions within the bloc over its Russia policy. We assess that Hungary and Slovakia (the governments of which are the most Moscow-friendly within the EU) will likely continue to threaten to thwart further EU sanctions against Russia, but will fall short of blocking any packages.
• PRISONERS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed earlier on 9 June that Russia and Ukraine have begun exchanging prisoners of war (POWs). According to him, prisoner swaps will continue in stages over the coming days. Those being returned now include injured and seriously wounded combatants, as well as those under 25. It comes after Russia’s chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, accused Ukraine of postponing prisoner swaps and being ready to leave the bodies of killed Ukrainian combatants for an indefinite period.
• PRISONERS: On 8 June, Zelensky accused Russia of using POWs to play ‘some kind of dirty political and information game’. We assess that Russian attempts to portray Ukraine as impeding prisoner exchanges form part of Moscow’s broader efforts to depict Kyiv as the party blocking the peace process. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 June 2025.

FORECAST

OFFENSIVES: On 8 June, the Russian authorities claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division, had reached the western border of Donetsk oblast and were conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Russia has not made any formal territorial claims against Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the goal of these operations was to create a buffer zone and protect the borders of the Russian Federation, namely, Russian-annexed territories, including Donetsk oblast. According to various Russian sources, Russian forces occupied territory south-east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) as of 8 June; however, this remains uncorroborated. The Ukrainian authorities denied claims of Russian penetration into Dnipropetrovsk oblast, though they acknowledged the critical situation along the south-western border of Donetsk oblast. Major Andriy Kovalev, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s General Staff, dismissed Russian claims as disinformation. That said, Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces reported on Telegram that Russian forces were continuing attempts to breach Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, stated on 8 June that fighting was ongoing in the Novopavlivka direction, but solely within Donetsk oblast. Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stated that Russian offensives in Dnipropetrovsk oblast were intended as a warning to ‘those who do not want to recognise the realities of war during negotiations.’ Russian officials have frequently implied that Moscow has broader territorial ambitions beyond the currently annexed Ukrainian regions, most likely in Kharkiv, Odesa and Sumy oblasts. However, we assess that such ambitions are highly unlikely to materialise within the next 12 months, nor will any possible Russian advances in Dnipropetrovsk oblast in the coming months succeed in capturing the region’s administrative capital, Dnipro. Instead, Russian forces are more likely to remain focused on seizing the remaining parts of Donetsk oblast (Donbas region) that remain in Ukrainian control. We assess that Russian activity across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk border is likely aimed at supporting offensive efforts in Donetsk oblast, rather than the opening of a front in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In recent months, Russian forces operating in this area have concentrated on reaching the administrative border of the region, east of Novopavlivka (in Dnipropetrovsk oblast). These operations are likely intended to support the broader objective of seizing full control of Donetsk oblast, including in the Pokrovsk sector, one of the most fiercely contested areas in the oblast. (Source: Sibylline)

12 Jun 25.  Ukraine, NATO eye tech trials for intercepting Russia’s cabled drones. NATO and Ukrainian officials are slated to stage a trial of unmanned aerial vehicle technologies aimed at addressing a dogged threat: Russian first-person-view drones with fiber-optic cables that cannot be brought down with electronic interference. An event organized by the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and NATO’s Allied Command Transformation will be held on June 20 in Tallinn, Estonia, to demonstrate new countermeasures that have been percolating among defense firms. The envisioned countermeasures are required to have a detection range of at least 500 meters, be able to operate during the day and at night, weigh under 100 kilograms, and not exceed an overall cost of $100,000. FPV drones operating via fiber-optic cables are a new military challenge globally, as they are largely immune to jamming and interception attempts. These cheap and small weapons relay signals through a thin cable, which makes them resistant to eletro-magnetic interference. Drones were a key part of Ukraine’s largest long-range attack since the onset of the war carried out on June 1, where the smuggled weapons were used to target and strike Russian warplanes and strategic sites. The appearance of command-wire drones has opened yet another chapter in the cat-and-mouse game of innovations and countermeasures in drone warfare on both sides, said Federico Borsari, resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

“From a technical standpoint, Russia and Ukraine are now trying to push the limits of the usual tradeoff between range, speed, payload and endurance by introducing more powerful batteries to increase their capabilities and longer fiber-optic spools,” he said.

He added that longer cables are useful in carrying out attacks and ambush tactics against enemy logistics where the FPVs lie dormant near roads and are activated by an operator when a convoy passes nearby. Ukrainian troops have so far favored an FPV-tracking tactic by spotting the reflective fibers spooling out behind the drones, which were easiest to find in bright sunlight, and then tracing them back to Russian operators. In one documented instance, one of the drone units of the Ukrainian National Guard Kara Dag Brigade struck a Russian base during the winter months by following a maze of fibre optics back to the hideout. However, as the use of fiber-optic FPVs has exploded, old cables are now littering parts of the battlefield, creating mazes that are almost impossible trace to their launch points. Borsari said Ukraine has also experimented with active countermeasures, including using drone interceptors and quadcopters to destroy FPVs mid-flight or when they are on the ground by dropping small bomblets on them.

“Currently, the best defense relies on a combination of passive and active countermeasures and should also incorporate robust signal intelligence and other forms of intel-gathering techniques to intercept Russian communications and locate their drone teams,” he said. (Source: Defense News)

11 Jun 25. Russia has scattered its most valuable warplanes to a remote airbase in the far east of the country, after a surprise Ukrainian drone attack devastated its strategic bomber fleet last Sunday. Two Tupolev Tu-160 planes have been moved 4,000 miles from the front lines to the remote Anadyr airbase, which can only be accessed by air and sea, satellite imagery showed. Located on the desolate Chukotka Peninsula, the airfield is around 410 miles from Alaska and was set up during the Cold War to defend Russia from potential US attacks. The supersonic Tu-160 bombers can carry nuclear weapons and are by far the most expensive in Russia’s inventory, with a price tag of around $500 m per unit. By comparison, the B-52 Stratofortress, the mainstay of the US’s bomber fleet, has an estimated value of roughly $94 m. ‘Operation Spider’s Web’ were the result of 18 months of meticulous planning by Ukraine’s security service In addition to being expensive, Tu-160s are rare. Russia is thought to have only 16 operational airframes, and Ukraine said it damaged some in last Sunday’s attacks. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

12 Jun 25. Ukraine says Russia has sustained one million combat losses. Deadly new drone technology is reshaping the battlefield, bringing a terrifying new lethality to modern warfare. Ukraine has claimed to have inflicted one m combat casualties on Russian forces since the large-scale invasion by Moscow in February 2022, a significant, if unverified, milestone in a war that is redefining Europe’s political and security landscape. Providing its daily claimed combat figures on 12 June, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence stated that, with Russia suffering 1,140 combat casualties over the previous 24 hours, Russian losses in its more than three-year-old war had reached over one m military personnel. While the figure is disputed, Western officials have previously broadly agreed with Kyiv’s claims, indicative of the levels of combat still being seen across the frontline in Ukraine, where the daily losses for Russia reach over 1,000 on a regular basis. Ukraine’s own losses are a closely held state secret, although it is thought combat casualties, those killed and injured, is well in excess of 100,000 and likely far more. Additional claims by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence for the 24 hours preceding 12 June include the destruction of six Russian tanks, bringing the claimed total to nearly 11,000 since 2022, and 47 artillery systems, with Kyiv now claiming to have knocked out in excess of 29,000 such platforms. Perhaps most concerning is that the Ukraine-Russia war is beginning to take on a back seat in Western affairs, as national strife, migration, unrest, economic downturns, and the ongoing war in Gaza, dominating the front pages in European and North American capitals. Since the last meeting between US envoy Steven Witkoff and Russian President Vladimir Putin in April, the fourth such instance since the start of the year, little has been heard from Washington about prospective peace deals between Kyiv and Moscow. In the near-two months since, it is likely that tens of thousands of combatants on both sides have been killed or injured in fighting. Particularly notable among the 12 June combat claims by Kyiv were 138 tactical-level Russian UAVs intercepted, likely small to medium sized drones used for strike operations or surveillance. Drone warfare has supplanted all other forms of lethal strike on Ukraine’s battlefield, with the vast majority of combat losses now caused by the hundreds of suicide drones loitering over the frontlines. A recent attack by Ukraine into Russia territory, an audacious strike on Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers, saw the use of drones hosted inside commercial trucks to swarm defences. (Source: army-technology.com)

12 Jun 25. German defence minister visits Ukraine for talks on weapons support. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has arrived in Kyiv to discuss military support for Ukraine in its war with Russia, the DPA news agency reported on Thursday. Pistorius plans to hold talks with Ukrainian government representatives about further weapons aid from Berlin, according to the report.

“We are doing everything we can to support Ukraine so that it can defend itself and get into a position where Russia is prepared to enter into serious negotiations,” Pistorius said ahead of his departure.

The German defence ministry was not immediately available for comment. Germany is Ukraine’s second-biggest military backer after the United States, whose commitment to Kyiv has been called into question, putting pressure on Europe to step up. Russia and Ukraine met for peace talks in Istanbul earlier this month in a renewed push to settle the conflict, which began with Russia’s invasion in February 2022. (Source: Reuters)

12 Jun 25. Ukraine to Receive British RapidRanger Air Defense Systems. Ukraine will be equipped with British-made RapidRanger short-range air defense systems, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced during a government meeting on Wednesday, June 11.  According to Shmyhal, Ukraine will secure nearly £1.7bn in financial support from the United Kingdom to purchase additional air defense systems and missiles for them. This includes the acquisition of RapidRanger air defense missile systems and Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM), 5,000 of which were pledged earlier this year. The project is financed through a loan backed by UK Export Finance (UKEF), the British government’s export credit agency. In addition to supplying weapons, the intergovernmental agreement also envisions localization of production and technology transfer for the LMM missiles. Shmyhal emphasized that the British systems would significantly bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. He also noted that earlier this month, the UK announced record drone support for Ukraine worth £350 m. The funding will be used to deliver 100,000 drones to Ukraine this year. (Source: https://militarnyi.com/)

11 Jun 25. Spending Review comment: Andriy Dovbenko, Founder and Principal, UK-Ukraine TechExchange. “While a more specific date for the increase in defence spending has been announced, a shorter timeline for this 2.6% of GDP is needed as we embark on this new era for defence and security. As a priority, Britain must be on a war footing now and cannot wait until April 2027 for the crucial funding to implement the defence capabilities required for national security. If the UK is to truly become a defence industrial superpower, sacrifices must be made elsewhere. Ukraine’s prowess in developing technology to detect and suppress Russian attacks should be at the forefront of the strategy and a key pillar of R&D and procurement. MoD and NATO scouting and procurement remain detached from the demands of the challenges the UK faces. To that end, the UK must develop its own policy on how to embrace innovation from outside existing structures, including Ukrainian technologies that have NATO codes. There remains so much the UK can learn from Ukraine’s battle-proven DefenceTech startups. Closer collaboration between the UK and Ukraine to inform defence investment is paramount to navigating this increasingly unstable world. Yet, this cannot act in a silo. Increased defence spending without structural changes is ineffective and inefficient. Ukraine has shown that the democratisation and decentralisation of manufacturing and procurement are essential for agile warfare.”

06 Jun 25. Netherlands to provide $455m for Ukraine’s maritime security. Dutch Minister for Defence, Ruben Brekelmans, made the announcement during the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Brussels, Belgium. The Netherlands has pledged a substantial maritime support package to Ukraine, valued at around €400m ($455m), aimed at enhancing the country’s naval capabilities amid ongoing threats in the Black Sea and surrounding waterways. Dutch Minister for Defence, Ruben Brekelmans, made the announcement during the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Brussels, Belgium. The package includes more than 100 fast patrol boats and military vessels designed for special operations. It also incorporates dozens of maritime drones. The vessels are outfitted with a variety of sensors, weapons, and communication systems. The initial deliveries have commenced and are scheduled to continue through to 2026. Minister Brekelmans emphasised the significance of the support, stating, “It is an important package to strengthen the maritime security of Ukraine. We see that the Russian threat on the Black Sea and the Dnieper River, among other places, is only increasing.” He highlighted the critical nature of the Black Sea port of Odessa and its trade routes, which are vital to the Ukrainian economy, underscoring the necessity of robust maritime protection.

US Tariffs are shifting – will you react or anticipate?

Don’t let policy changes catch you off guard. Stay proactive with real-time data and expert analysis. In addition to the naval equipment, the Netherlands is investing €20m in the Maritime Regional Training Centre, where Ukrainian marines are receiving training. This investment covers weapons, ammunition, and both personal and tactical gear. Furthermore, Minister Brekelmans mentioned the recent delivery of the last Dutch F-16s to Ukraine, expressing gratitude to Denmark and the US for their partnership in the Air Force Capability Coalition, which facilitated this transfer.

He concluded: “But that’s not the end of the job. Our work continues with the training of pilots, maintenance personnel and other ground personnel. We also continue to support the Ukrainian Air Force in terms of parts, infrastructure and ammunition.” In December 2024, the government of Norway pledged Nkr2.7bn ($240.9m) to support the Ukrainian Navy, as part of the Nansen Support Programme for the war-torn country.  (Source: naval-technology.com)

10 Jun 25. Cuashub.com said today that Trump Administration directs C-UAS systems from Ukraine to US units in the Middle East. The Trump administration is planning to redirect proximity fuses intended for the 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets, initially designated for Ukraine, to US Air Force units in the Middle East. While the allocated funds, part of the Biden Administration’s $3.85 bn Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, have already been used, the equipment procured will continue to be delivered until the end of 2026. The APKWS missiles are a component of the L3Harris VAMPIRE counter-drone system, over thirty of which have been supplied to Ukraine to bolster its defense against Russian drone threats. The Wall Street Journal, which first reported this policy change, stated that the Pentagon informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the fuses are needed under a “Secretary of Defense Identified Urgent Issue” directive, allowing US Air Force units stationed in the Middle East to prepare for a potential confrontation with Iran and Houthi militants in Yemen. The Air Force has integrated APKWS rockets as a cost-effective alternative to Sidewinder and AMRAAM air-to-air missiles for use against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by F-16 and F-15E fighter aircraft. The decision highlights growing pressure from the Trump Administration for European nations to take on a greater share of future military aid to Ukraine. In March, the US temporarily halted military shipments to Ukraine, resuming them only after Ukrainian officials accepted a truce plan during discussions in Jeddah on March 11. Furthermore, no new military aid packages for Ukraine have been approved since President Trump began his second term in January 2025. This pressure was perhaps further underscored by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s absence from Wednesday’s Ramstein Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) meeting at NATO headquarters. This was the first instance since the start of the full-scale war that the US Defense Secretary was not in attendance. The timing of this policy shift is particularly sensitive. Following Ukraine’s Spiderweb attack on Russian strategic airfields on June 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly warned President Trump in a phone call on June 4 that a forceful response would follow, likely resulting in an escalation of drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and military positions.  On June 1, Russia carried out its most extensive drone offensive since the onset of the full-scale invasion, deploying a wave of 472 attack drones. President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 4 that, since the beginning of 2025, Russia has launched more than 20,000 drones against Ukraine. Furthermore, a source in Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) told the Kyiv Independent earlier this week that Russia has ramped up the production of the Shahed 136 (Russian designation Geran-2) one-way attack drones, and will soon be able to deploy more than 500 a night to attack Ukraine.

In response, President Zelensky has urged allies to increase investments in domestic arms production and provide “faster deliveries” of additional air defense systems, specifically Patriot missiles, to counter intensifying Russian aerial offensives.

Trump Administration directs C-UAS systems from Ukraine to US units in the Middle East

(Source: https://cuashub.com/)

06 Jun 25. German defense boss teases changes for global Ukraine defense group. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group is in for some changes aimed at streamlining international support for Ukraine’s defense, according to German officials. The group, which has played a key role in coordinating military aid for Kyiv, saw a leadership change earlier this year following the inauguration of Donald Trump as U.S. president. Washington stepped back from a leading role, in line with the new president’s tepid support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s attacks, leading Germany and the U.K. to host meetings since then.  Work to tweak the UDCG structure is expected to commence next week, with German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius describing the intended changes as a “joint evolution.” The idea is to better integrate the group’s work with the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission and the smattering of so-called capability coalitions aimed at improving individual military disciplines key to Kyiv’s defense, a German MOD spokesman in Berlin said. Alliance officials created the NATO support organization for Ukraine at the July 2024 Washington summit. Placed under the auspices of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE, its purpose is to coordinate “the provision, transfer and repair of military equipment critical to Ukraine’s operations, as well as training in Allied countries to bolster Ukraine’s military effectiveness” in line with NATO standards, reads a description on the alliance’s website.  The new UDCG strategy is also expected to expand the capability coalitions framework. The supply of fighter jets to Kyiv, for example, was facilitated through such channels. Meanwhile, the capability coalition responsible for electronic warfare will see additional members, with Belgium, Estonia, Sweden, Italy and Turkey joining the forum, Pistorius announced Wednesday. Electronic warfare capabilities have become crucial on the battlefields of Ukraine. They encompass manipulations of the electromagnetic spectrum aimed at disabling aerial threats, including drones. (Source: Defense News)

06 Jun 25. Russia faces struggle to replace bombers lost in Ukrainian drone strikes.

• Summary
• Companies
• Russia has used long-range fleet to fire missiles at Ukraine
• Nuclear-capable planes form part of strategic arsenal
• Like-for-like replacement unlikely due to their age
• Test of next-generation bomber expected next year

Russia will take years to replace nuclear-capable bomber planes that were hit in Ukrainian drone strikes last weekend, according to Western military aviation experts, straining a modernisation programme that is already delayed.

Satellite photos of airfields in Siberia and Russia’s far north show extensive damage from the attacks, with several aircraft completely burnt out, although there are conflicting versions of the total number destroyed or damaged. (Source: Reuters)

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