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Jun 07.
Military And Security Developments
06 June.
• Ukraine: New wiper malware highlights security, operational risks facing national infrastructure. On 5 June, the cyber security company Cisco Talos reported that an unnamed Russia-nexus advanced persistent threat (APT) group employed a new wiper malware (‘PathWiper’) to conduct a disruptive cyber attack against a critical national infrastructure (CNI) entity in Ukraine. The group reportedly compromised a legitimate administrative console to manage the attack and enable remote command execution, though the initial attack vector is unknown. Throughout the attack, the threat actors mimicked legitimate system activity, highlighting the pre-meditated nature of this operation. The group then executed the main PathWiper payload via a multi-stage process to identify and override all system files. While the impact of the attack is unknown, there is a realistic possibility that the malware will permanently disrupt the organisation’s ability to provide key services due to the loss of data. As such, we assess this showcases the sustained security and operational risks facing Ukrainian infrastructure amid the ongoing war.
05 June
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KHARKIV: Russia is currently field testing a new glide bomb variant with a range of up to 59 miles (95km), placing many frontline cities well within its range
• STRIKES: Russia continues to expand its drone and missile production capabilities, which will sustain a heightened threat of increasingly frequent high-intensity combined strikes in the coming months
• NEGOTIATIONS: Further details have emerged about Russia’s ‘peace’ memorandum following talks on 2 June; they reflect that Moscow has not softened its war objectives
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin has vowed to respond to Ukraine’s 1 June ‘Operation Spiderweb’, indicating a likely increase in massive, high-intensity strikes against Ukraine
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to conduct assaults in the salient between Toretsk and Pokrovsk, making steady progress northwards along key roads leading towards Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage published on 4 June indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 highway to the north-east of Pokrovsk, and that they entered the western outskirts of Yablunivka, a village located just seven miles (11km) to the south-west of the outskirts of Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the north-east, geolocated footage published on 2 June indicated that Russian forces advanced to the south of Chasiv Yar. Russian sources claim they are now fighting inside Stupochky, located just 2.5 miles (4km) to the south-west of Chasiv Yar along the T-0504 highway that runs south-west to Kostiantynivka. If confirmed, this would indicate growing pressure on Ukrainian positions between Chasiv Yar and Toretsk further south.
• DONETSK: As of 2 June, Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances to the south of Malynivka, which is located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Russian forces have not made any confirmed advances in recent days, though they are maintaining a high operational tempo. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the sector reported on 4 June that Russian forces are intensifying small-group infantry assaults after transferring additional personnel to the area.
• KHARKIV: Ukrainian officials reported on 3 June that Russia is currently field testing a new extended-range glide bomb variant, which the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has already used to great effect along the frontline. According to Ukrainian sources, the current UMPK guided glide bomb has an effective range of between 37 and 50 miles (60-80km), whereas the newly updated UMPK-PD has an effective range of up to 59 miles (95km). According to the head of Kharkiv oblast’s prosecutor’s office, Russia launched four such glide bomb attacks against Kharkiv on 31 May, noting that these weapons can hit anywhere in Kharkiv city. If deployed en masse over the battlefield in the coming months, this asset will further increase Russia’s glide bomb advantage, and allow it to launch stand-off attacks even further away from Ukrainian air defences.
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage published on 4 June confirms that Russian forces have taken Vodolahy, a village located around 15 miles (24km) to the west of Sudzha. Meanwhile, footage from 2 June indicates that Russian forces have also advanced to the north of Andriivka, located five miles (8km) to the south-west of Vodolahy and around 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claims that its forces have taken the village, alongside a number of others in the area, though this cannot yet be confirmed. If Russian forces are able to consolidate control over these villages, this will likely set the conditions for further advances south towards the towns of Khotin and Pysarivka, as well as a string of other settlements that sit along the H07 highway. This would put Russian forces just ten miles (16km) to the north of Sumy city, which would in turn place the city within conventional tube artillery range.
• KURSK-SUMY: Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continue to launch counter-attacks inside Kursk oblast. Geolocated footage from 3 June indicates that Ukrainian forces managed to advance to the east of Tetkino (Kursk). However, their overall efforts to progress towards the frontline town remain slow and have largely been repulsed.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have involved mostly moderately large drone attacks. Following Ukraine’s ‘Operation Spiderweb’ targeting Russia’s strategic aircraft on 1 June, we assess that Moscow will highly likely retaliate in the form of strikes. For further information, please see the FORECAST below.
• STRIKES: Russia continues to expand its drone and missile production capabilities, which will sustain an elevated threat of increasingly frequent high-intensity combined strikes in the coming months. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), as quoted by the Kyiv Independent on 4 June, Russia will soon be capable of launching more than 500 long-range drones in a single attack against Ukraine. This surge in capability is due to Moscow ramping up its drone production to 100 units per day and constructing new drone launch sites; this is likely in addition to the extremely cheap and easy-to-produce decoy drones, which have further increased the numbers available for daily attacks. Since mid-May, Russia has set several records by launching an unprecedented number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with the latest record being 472 drones in a single attack.
• STRIKES: Additionally, the GUR has reported that Russia’s production of ballistic missiles has increased by at least 66% over the past year. Moscow is currently producing between 60 and 70 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 15 ‘hypersonic’ Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles, particularly the Iskander-M variant, are among the most difficult to intercept; only the US-provided Patriot missile system has demonstrated effectiveness against these projectiles. However, due to the low numbers of Patriot systems and dwindling stocks of their interceptor missiles, Moscow’s increased production of ballistic missiles has exacerbated the risk of larger and more frequent strikes.
• STRIKES: According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Russia has conducted approximately 48,600 aerial attacks since the start of the year; these include 11,200 Shahed drone attacks, 9,000 other UAV attacks and 700 missile strikes. These figures highlight the growing importance of drone attacks in Russia’s overall strike strategy. While Ukraine has demonstrated a relatively high interception rate, Russia compensates through sheer quantity, which enables an increasing number of drones (and missiles) to penetrate air defences to reach their targets. Ultimately, these dynamics indicate that without an increase in Ukraine’s air defence capabilities, Russia’s saturation strategy will likely continue to bear ever more fruit in the coming months, increasing the risks facing major urban areas, including the capital Kyiv.
• STRIKES: The US’ diminishing military support for Ukraine will continue to increase Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russian long-range attacks. On 4 June, The Wall Street Journal reported that US President Donald Trump’s administration is redirecting anti-drone technology initially destined for Ukraine to its own military forces based in the Middle East. This equipment includes special fuses used in ground-to-air rocket systems designed to offer protection against drone attacks.
• STRIKES: On 4 June, US intelligence officials told Reuters that 20 Russian bombers were struck during Operation Spiderweb. Although this is lower than the figure of 41 initially reported by the Ukrainian authorities, we assess that the operation inflicted severe damage to Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. Crucially, Ukrainian sources maintain that at least one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft was destroyed; if confirmed, this would represent a significant loss for the VKS, which is estimated to operate only a small number of these critical assets.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: Further details have emerged concerning Russia’s ‘peace’ memorandum following the second round of direct negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations on 2 June; they reflect that Moscow has not softened its war objectives. Russia insists that a settlement to end the war would require international recognition of Russian claims over Crimea (Ukraine), which it annexed in 2014, as well as Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (all Ukraine). Moscow also wants Ukraine to withdraw its forces from these four oblasts, despite Russia only fully controlling Luhansk.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Aside from territory, Moscow maintains that Ukraine should become a neutral country and not a member of NATO. It also insists that Kyiv should protect the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine and make Russian the official language. Many of these conditions directly oppose the contents of Ukraine’s memorandum (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 June 2025) and have not changed significantly over the course of the full-scale invasion. The positions of both sides are unlikely to converge in the foreseeable future, which will preclude the possibility of a major breakthrough towards a ceasefire or a wider peace settlement in the medium term.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russia has also presented two options for a ceasefire, though the terms of both are almost certainly unacceptable to Ukraine at present. The first option requires Ukraine to withdraw fully from Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, while the second would involve Kyiv halting military redeployments and accepting a cessation of foreign military aid, satellite communications and intelligence sharing. Ukraine would also have to lift martial law and hold presidential and parliamentary elections within 100 days. Both of these options entail major concessions to Moscow, and would put Ukrainian forces at a disadvantage (and therefore provide Russian forces with the opportunity to advance even further should it wish). Both options would also provide Russia with conditions within which it could proclaim that it has won the war, either via territorial acquisitions or the successful de-militarisation and ‘de-nazification’ of Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine is continuing to push for an unconditional and full ceasefire that lasts 30 days or longer, to which Russia remains reluctant to agree.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russian officials are using the likely recent sabotage of rail bridges in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts (both Russia), which border Ukraine, to peddle the narrative that Kyiv is the impediment to peace. The Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov mentioned that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed this in their phone call on 4 June (see FORECAST below). Ushakov stated that, in Russia’s view, the incidents underscore that Ukraine’s leadership has ‘degenerated into a terrorist organisation’. At the same time, he attempted to portray Russia as the party with greater self-restraint by not succumbing to provocation and participating in direct talks with Ukraine. Prior to the call, Putin made similar comments and essentially rejected the prospect of a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, himself and Trump. The Kremlin will likely continue leveraging recent Ukrainian attacks to justify Russia’s opposition to direct presidential-level talks to stop the war.
• NATO: Bloomberg reported on 4 June that the US is refusing to provide aerial cover to support a proposed post-war ‘coalition of the willing’ in Ukraine. Most countries that have expressed interest in joining this force have argued that a ‘US backstop’ is needed for it to be effective, specifically air protection and intelligence sharing. While we cannot confirm the reports, they would, if true, indicate that the US under President Trump seeks to limit its military involvement in a post-war strategic settlement. Nevertheless, other Western partners continue to discuss deploying this proposed coalition of the willing to bolster Ukraine’s defences. President Zelensky disclosed on 2 June that Ukraine has been invited to the NATO summit on 24-25 June. Ukraine will likely utilise the summit as a platform from which to reiterate calls for more air defences and other forms of weaponry (as well as the coalition of the willing).
• SANCTIONS: President Trump has asked the US Senate to delay voting on a bill that allows additional sanctions to be imposed against Russia. Republican Senator Roger Wicker announced this development on 4 June, adding that Trump had asked Senate Majority Leader John Thune not to bring the legislation to a vote this week. The bill, developed by Senator Lindsey Graham, would impose a 500% tariff on imports from any country that purchases Russian gas, oil, uranium and other products. It currently has broad bipartisan backing, with 82 of 100 senators supporting the initiative (this likely renders it ‘veto-proof’).
• SANCTIONS: Trump has often voiced his reluctance to impose additional sanctions against Russia, claiming that this could hinder the peace process (and possible commercial opportunities). While we assess that the US is unlikely to intensify sanctions pressure against Russia significantly in the near term, new punitive measures are nevertheless possible in the coming weeks and months. However, there is a realistic possibility that these would be less intense than those advocated for by Graham, hence the request for a delay to the bill’s hearing.
FORECAST
STRIKES: On 4 June, President Trump spoke with President Putin over the phone; the latter vowed to respond to Ukraine’s recent operation targeting airbases across Russia. Trump’s comments following the call did not provide any indication as to how Russia could respond, nor did the US president say that he had either encouraged or discouraged Russia from retaliating. For further analysis on Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb on 1 June, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 June 2025.
Our assessment is that Russia will highly likely retaliate with large-scale and high-intensity combined strikes across Ukraine, including against Kyiv. In recent months, Russia has significantly expanded its drone and missile production (see STRIKES above). While Russian missile strikes have not been particularly large (at least compared to earlier stages of the war), its drone attacks have reached unprecedented levels. For instance, on the day of Operation Spiderweb, Russia launched 472 UAVs against Ukraine, which marked its largest drone attack since the start of the war and surpassed the previous record of 355 drones in a recent strike (a record that was set only days before).
In addition to a significantly high number of drones, any such retaliatory attack would likely include a large number of missiles, including both ballistic and cruise missiles. We assess that Russia will likely use large numbers of UAVs to saturate Ukraine’s air defence systems and create optimal conditions for more lethal missile systems to inflict severe damage. Russian forces would most likely employ innovative strike tactics with which they have been experimenting in recent months. Some of these tactics include UAVs flying at very high altitudes; these drones then dive down to strike their targets once they are closer, often in swarm-style patterns. Russian retaliation would possibly involve consecutive strikes over several days in order to maximise their overall impact, including via the psychological effect on the Ukrainian population. Crucially, Moscow will likely seek to demonstrate to Ukraine, as well as its own domestic audience and the international community, that Operation Spiderweb did not cripple its capability to launch cruise missiles via strategic bombers – it retains sufficient numbers of these aircraft to continue such attacks for the foreseeable future.
It remains uncertain whether Moscow will use strategic missile systems such as the nuclear-capable Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in a bid to demonstrate its capability and resolve to respond to Ukrainian attacks. On 21 November 2024, Russia launched an Oreshnik missile for the first time. It caused limited damage, as the projectile likely lacked an effective conventional warhead. As such, without a nuclear payload, the Oreshnik missile has limited utility in a conventional strike capacity. That said, Russia’s use of such equipment would likely be aimed at delivering a psychological impact. Russia will possibly employ the missile in tandem with its more commonly used missile systems and large-scale drone attacks in a bid to deter future Ukrainian strikes. However, we ultimately assess it is unlikely to do so.
We assess that Russian retaliatory strikes are likely to target major urban centres, including Kyiv. While Kyiv retains the densest air defence coverage in Ukraine, large-scale and high-intensity combined strikes would still be capable of inflicting damage on the city, either through direct hits or collateral damage from falling debris. Any such attacks would also likely target critical infrastructure; damage to energy facilities would likely cause severe blackouts.
• Russia: Ukrainian drone strikes will continue to impact, disrupt flight operations at Moscow airports. On 5 June, a prominent Russian media outlet reported that at least two foreign airlines have initiated negotiations to transfer several of their flights from three of Moscow’s airports to St Petersburg. One of the airlines involved is likely to be Turkish Airlines. A key reason for this shift is the repeated impact of air restrictions and disruption caused by Ukraine’s regular drone strikes targeting Moscow. As of May, these strikes have caused at least 217 temporary airport closures across Russia since the start of the year, with Moscow’s airports being the most affected. This figure surpasses the total number of closures for both 2023 and 2024. Ukraine’s attacks likely reflect a deliberate strategy to target Moscow (the largest aviation hub in Russia) to pressure the country’s economy and continue undermining the Kremlin’s effort to shield its population from the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war. We assess that Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities will continue to pose a threat to flight operations across Russia for the duration of the war.
03 Jun.
• Russia-Ukraine: Opposing stances over terms for war’s end will continue to block breakthrough. On 2 June, Russian and Ukrainian delegations held a second round of direct negotiations aimed at establishing a ceasefire and the outlines of a longer-term settlement to end the war. The two sides once again failed to reach an agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire of at least 30 days, for which Ukraine, its European allies and the US continue to advocate. Instead, Russia proposed a halt in hostilities for two-to-three days along certain sections of the frontline to allow for the retrieval of dead combatants. Aside from disagreements over the conditions needed for a ceasefire, the positions of both sides on ending the war remain distant and are unlikely to narrow in the near term. Moscow’s terms outlined in its memorandum reaffirm our assessment that Russia maintains maximalist war objectives which have remained broadly consistent throughout its full-scale invasion. Although Ukraine has proposed holding another meeting at the end of June, a notable breakthrough towards peace or a robust ceasefire lasting longer than a few days remains unlikely.
02 Jun.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief has reported that Russian forces have significantly intensified offensive operations along the southern Zaporizhzhia axis this past month
• STRIKES: On 1 June, Russia launched the largest combined drone attack of the war; Ukraine’s decreasing interception rate indicates that Russia’s saturation strategy is successfully overwhelming Ukranian air defences
• NEGOTIATIONS: Earlier on 2 June, the second round of direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations took place in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey), with Russia claiming it had agreed to a 2-3 day temporary ceasefire
• FORECAST: On 1 June, Ukraine launched a series of co-ordinated first-person-view (FPV) drone strikes against Russian airbases, inflicting notable losses on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have been advancing to the east and north-east of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast); this will apply additional pressure on Ukraine’s eastern flanks to the north of the frontline town. Most significantly, geolocated footage from 1 June confirms that Russian forces now control Dyliivka, located four miles (6.5km) to the north of Toretsk. Additionally, geolocated footage from 31 May indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Dachne, a village located just north of Toretsk. These developments indicate that Russian forces are currently attempting to apply additional pressure on the Ukrainian eastern flank north of Toretsk, control over which Russian forces are still struggling to fully consolidate.
• BAKHMUT: Further west, Russian forces are continuing efforts to further close the Ukrainian salient between Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) and Toretsk, with frequent attacks on and around the H20 and T-0504 highways. Footage from 31 May also indicates that Russian forces now control the entirety of Zorya, located roughly six miles (10km) to the west of Toretsk along the H20 highway. Nevertheless, geolocated footage published on 31 May indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced to the west of Popiv Yar, located around 17 miles (27km) to the west of Toretsk. This likely reflects ongoing Ukrainian efforts to launch counter-attacks to limit Russian gains in the critical salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces advanced towards Novovpavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and further south, to the west of Kurakhove. Geolocated footage from 30 May shows that Russian forces have likely recently captured Troitske, a settlement located around 12.4 miles (20km) to the south-east of Novopavlivka. Additional footage posted on the same day shows recent Russian gains in eastern Oleksiivka, located approximately 18 miles (29km) to the west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: On 29 May, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Border Service, Andriy Demchenko, assessed that Russia has concentrated sufficient forces in Kursk oblast to conduct offensive operations further into Sumy oblast. The assessment comes amid a growing number of Ukrainian reports that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the area. This is likely part of the effort to establish a ‘buffer zone’ along the border ordered by the Kremlin, as well as bring Sumy city into conventional tube artillery range. This would allow Russian forces to apply additional pressure on Ukrainian defences.
• KURSK-SUMY: On 29 May, Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have taken the villages of Kostiantynivka (not to be confused with the larger city in Donetsk oblast) and Volodymyrivka, both located 16 miles (26km) to the north of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, on 31 May, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Vodolahy, located around two miles (3km) east of Volodymyrivka, though this remains unconfirmed. Other unofficial Russian sources also claimed they had seized the village of Oleksiivka, located 2.5 miles (4km) to the south of Vodolahy. This similarly remains unconfirmed, but, if accurate, would reflect the expanding presence of Russian forces in northern Sumy oblast.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report.
• SOUTHERN: On 31 May, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces have significantly intensified offensive operations along the southern Zaporizhzhia axis this past month. While he did not provide specifics, he noted that Russian forces retain the advantage in fibre-optic drones. A Ukrainian officer operating on the western sector of the Zaporizhzhia axis furthermore reported on 29 May that Russian forces are deploying with extended ranges, which are now striking targets between 12.5-18.6 miles (20-30km) behind the frontline. Despite the intensification of assaults across the Zaporizhzhia axis, there has been little confirmed Russian progress over the last week.
• SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, along the eastern sectors of the southern axis, geolocated footage from 31 May indicates that Russian forces have taken the village of Novopil, located 10 miles (16km) west of Velyka Novosilka on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border.
• STRIKES: Early on 1 June, Russia launched its largest drone strike to date, involving, in all, 472 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), coming just days after the previous record of 355 UAVs. The drones were accompanied by three Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and four cruise missiles, including Kh-101 and Iskandr-K projectiles. According to the Ukrainian authorities, the attack struck Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa oblasts, damaging various civilian and military infrastructure. A missile struck a training unit in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, killing 12 and injuring at least 60 service members.
• STRIKES: The interception rate was relatively low; Ukrainian forces succeeded in intercepting three Kh-101/Iskandr-K cruise missiles and 213 UAVs, but no ballistic missiles; 172 drones were reported lost. The Ukrainian air defences therefore failed to intercept 87 out of 472 drones on 1 June (as well as 67 out of 355 between 25 and 26 May). Additional Russian long-range attacks on 31 May and 2 June included moderately large numbers of UAVs complemented by a limited number of missiles.
• STRIKES: The decreasing interception rate during recent Russian long-range drone attacks indicates that Russia’s saturation strategy, predicated upon ever-larger strike packages with cheap drones, is successfully overwhelming Ukraine’s air defence system. The overall uptick in the number of drones, together with the successful implementation of new tactics and technical upgrades, indicates that Ukraine’s air defence network will likely require significant upgrades itself if it is to respond to this evolving threat.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: Earlier on 2 June, the second round of direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations took place in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey); they lasted over an hour. The two sides were expected to discuss their respective ideas for what a ceasefire and a longer-term peace settlement should look like. Reuters claims to have seen the proposal from the Ukrainian side, which includes a full and unconditional ceasefire on land, in the sky and at sea for at least 30 days. Ukraine also requests that territorial disputes are to be discussed only after a ceasefire and urges the international community not to recognise Russian territorial claims since 2014 (which would include Crimea). Ukraine’s proposal rejects Russia’s demand for Ukrainian neutrality and limits on its military capabilities while also reiterating Kyiv’s pursuit of security guarantees.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Notably, Kyiv is open to some sanctions relief for Russia, though it argues that this should be done in phases and gradually, with mechanisms for reinstating them if necessary. Ukraine also wants frozen Russian assets to be used for reconstruction or for those funds to remain immobilised until Moscow pays reparations. The proposal also calls for Europe and the US to be involved in negotiations, with the US and third countries to participate in ceasefire monitoring. Ukraine’s terms for ending the war have not changed significantly in recent months. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 30 May that Russia was still withholding its roadmap for ‘peace’. The Russian side now says that it has given Ukraine its memorandum, which consists of two parts. The first focuses on which steps Russia thinks are necessary to achieve a real long-term peace, while the second centres on how to make a fully-fledged ceasefire a possibility.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russia’s chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, announced that Russia has offered Ukraine a ‘concrete ceasefire’ for two or three days along certain sections of the front. Medinsky did not provide specifics as to which areas of the battlefield, though he stated that this would allow commanders to gather the bodies of their soldiers. Nevertheless, Russia would highly likely seek to exploit any paused military operations to regroup and possibly allow for deployments to other areas of the frontline where fighting is more intense and additional reinforcements are needed. A longer, comprehensive ceasefire remains elusive.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Despite the absence of a significant breakthrough in the talks, the two sides have agreed to several prisoner swaps, which likely aim to build the severely low levels of trust between them. Ukraine had called for confidence-building measures addressing humanitarian concerns in its proposal, notably the return of deported and displaced Ukrainian children, as well as the exchange of all prisoners held by Russia. Medinsky stated that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to exchange captured fighters under the age of 25, as well as all prisoners of war (POWs) held by each side who are sick and seriously wounded. Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, who headed the Ukrainian delegation, stated that Ukraine proposed to hold another meeting at the end of this month, between 20 and 30 June. If such bilateral meetings can be held semi-frequently, they will likely modestly increase the likelihood of the two sides reaching an agreement on a lasting ceasefire and narrowing their positions on ending the war. However, despite the positive prisoner swap agreement, it remains unclear whether the proposed 2-3 day ceasefire will hold; wider progress towards a definitive end to the war remains elusive.
• POLITICS: In a report released on 30 May, The Times outlined details of a growing feud between President Zelensky and Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko. Klitschko has accused Zelensky of using military administrations across the country to centralise power, adding that the country under the current president is veering towards ‘authoritarianism’. The outlet also mentioned a series of arrests by Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) targeting Klitschko’s circle, with seven of his subordinates arrested and another three under investigation. Many of those officials under investigation are charged with corruption relating to allocating construction permits, though Klitschko maintains that his office reacts harshly and quickly to suspected cases of corruption.
• POLITICS: According to The Times, Klitschko is rumoured to have presidential ambitions despite renouncing his candidacy in the 2014 race. Elections cannot take place under martial law in Ukraine, which has been in force since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Nevertheless, Klitschko’s comments reflect growing opposition to Zelensky from certain Ukrainian political figures. That said, Zelensky still enjoys a high level of public support. Opinion polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) shows a significant increase in his approval ratings between December 2024 and March, rising from 52% to 69%. However, further corruption scandals, allegations of abuse of power and the possibility of Kyiv having to defend unpopular concessions to end the war will likely weaken support for Zelensky over the medium term. Such dynamics will likely drive calls for elections and spur a ‘return of politics’ to Ukraine. However, a serious threat to Zelensky’s position is unlikely in the short-to-medium term, limiting government stability risks.
FORECAST
STRIKES: On 1 June, Ukraine launched a series of co-ordinated first-person-view (FPV) drone strikes against Russian airbases hosting strategic aircraft across Russia. The operation, code-named ‘Spiderweb’, was reportedly planned over 18 months and reflects Kyiv’s expanding drone capabilities and its ability to co-ordinate complex, simultaneous drone attacks deep inside Russian territory. Unnamed sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), quoted by various media outlets, claimed responsibility for the attack. According to the SBU, the operation struck 41 Russian strategic aircraft stationed at Belaya Air Base (Irkutsk oblast), Dyagilevo Air Base (Ryazan oblast), Ivanovo Air Base (Ivanovo oblast) and Olenya Air Base (Murmansk oblast). The furthest of these targets (Irkutsk oblast) is located 2,750 miles (4,440km) away from Ukrainian-held territory.
While Ukraine has previously targeted various Russia’s long-range strike assets, including strategic bombers, this is the most impactful attack against Russia’s strategic air fleet since the start of the war. The assets targeted included A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, fixed-wing platforms which are used respectively to detect Ukrainian air defences and launch cruise missile strikes against Ukraine. According to the SBU, the damage caused by the operation amounts to USD 7 bn and disabled 34% of Russia’s cruise missile bomber fleet, representing a significant blow to Russia’s strategic air capabilities. While the impact of the attacks has yet to be corroborated, satellite imagery and other sources have confirmed the destruction of at least eight aircraft as of 1800hrs (Kyiv time) on 1 June, including five Tu-95 bombers, two Tu-22M3 bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft.
The attack will likely complicate Russia’s ability to launch cruise missile strikes against Ukraine, prompting Moscow to rely on alternative launch platforms other than strategic bombers. Russia will most likely experience difficulties replacing the damaged and destroyed aircraft, given that Russia likely no longer manufactures the chassis for the Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers. Subsequently, Moscow will likely adopt a more conservative use of such assets and will increasingly rely on other aircraft to carry out cruise missile strikes, such as Sukhoi models, which are already being employed more frequently for this purpose.
Ukraine’s Spiderweb operation involved launching, in all, 117 FPV drones from semi-trucks positioned close to the targeted airbases. The use of FPVs, rather than larger long-range drones, is highly significant and represents a significant intelligence failure for Russia, given Ukrainian operatives were able to thoroughly map the airbases and approach them undetected to launch the drones. According to President Zelensky, the drones and launchers were assembled in Russian territory. The co-ordinated attacks achieved operational surprise; this ensured that Russian forces (principally air defence forces) had very little time to respond to the threat.
The operation marks an innovative use of FPV drones in extended-range deployments as part of a broader, cost-effective strategy that has inflicted significant losses on the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). FPV drones are typically used along the frontline for short-range tactical purposes. Given that such equipment is inexpensive to produce, the attack underscores the significant asymmetric advantage this strategy provides Ukraine. We also assess that Russia will likely seek to replicate such a use of FPV drones against strategic assets in Ukraine.
While Ukraine’s Spiderweb operation marks an innovation in drone strikes, it has also underscored the persistent vulnerability of Russian strategic assets. The success of these attacks underscores the deficiencies in air defence coverage of such facilities. The attacks also likely indicate that Russian planners, faced with overstretched air defences, relied upon the fact that the bases were located far from Ukraine to protect the aircraft. The fact that the strategic bombers were not held in hardened shelters indicates a level of complacency on the part of Russian operators, despite Ukraine illustrating a steadily expanding long-range drone capability over the last 12 months in particular. While Russia will likely adapt and learn lessons from the most recent attacks, pressure on Russia’s stretched air defence assets will only intensify amid the need to protect assets thousands of kilometres apart.
Separately, overnight on 31 May-1 June, explosions led to the collapse of two rail bridges in Russia’s bordering Bryansk and Kursk oblasts. In Bryansk oblast, a bridge collapsed after an explosion onto a railway line late on 31 May, derailing a passenger train heading to Moscow and killing seven people. In Kursk, a rail bridge collapsed following an explosion, resulting in the derailment of a freight train early on 1 June. The Russian authorities have not disclosed who was responsible for the explosions, though both incidents were classified as acts of terrorism. The attacks occurred on the same night as the Spider Web operation. While some Ukrainian sources have claimed they were false-flag attacks orchestrated by Russia, we assess that Ukrainian forces or pro-Ukraine partisan groups were likely behind the incidents. Both have been involved in sabotage attacks on Russian railways before; the timing of the sabotage could realistically have been co-ordinated with Operation Spiderweb.
The Spiderweb operation will most likely trigger severe Russian retaliation, which will likely take the form of high-intensity combined strikes in the coming days or weeks. Moscow has already increased the intensity of its drone and missile attacks in recent weeks, as demonstrated by the 1 June strike involving, in all, 472 drones (see STRIKES above). Russia’s response to the Spiderweb operation will likely involve a large number of drones and various missiles, including ballistic and cruise systems, even though its cruise missile launching capabilities remain partially degraded following the Spiderweb attack. Major Ukrainian urban centres, including the capital Kyiv, will remain vulnerable to such likely retaliatory strikes.
The timing of the operation is significant given the second round of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations taking place later on 2 June. Although we had already assessed that the prospect of a significant breakthrough in the talks was low, the operation highly likely sought to bolster Ukraine’s position beforehand, given that Russia has maintained its maximalist war goals and unwillingness to ease its demands. Axios reported that Ukraine did not notify the administration of US President Donald Trump in advance of the attacks, citing both Ukrainian and US officials. Trump is unlikely to condone the Ukrainian operation given his attempts at brokering peace and concerns about escalation. However, it remains a realistic possibility that the Trump administration will seek to admonish Ukraine, including by halting possible military aid shipments. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jun 25. SBU Confirms Underwater TNT Strike on Crimean Bridge. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said it damaged the Crimean Bridge early Tuesday using underwater explosives, the third such attack on the key Russian supply route since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. The announcement was made via a Telegram post, which included video footage of the blast.
“The underwater support pillars were heavily damaged at the base — 1,100 kg of explosives (TNT equivalent) contributed to this. As a result, the bridge is now effectively in an emergency condition,” the SBU wrote.
No casualties have been reported, although traffic was suspended twice on Tuesday.
Pro-Russian Telegram channels reported that naval drones continued to target the bridge after the explosion, though these claims remain unverified.
According to the SBU, the operation was the result of several months of planning, overseen by its head, Lieutenant General Vasyl Maliuk.
“The Crimean Bridge is an absolutely legitimate target, especially given that the enemy was using it as a logistical artery to supply its troops. Crimea is Ukraine, and any manifestations of occupation will receive our harsh response,” said Maliuk.
The 12-mile-long structure, commonly referred to as the Kerch Bridge, connects Russia to the occupied Crimea and plays a vital role in military logistics. It was constructed following Russia’s 2014 annexation of the region and officially opened by President Vladimir Putin in 2018.
Previous Ukrainian strikes damaged the bridge in October 2022 and July 2023. Russia repaired it both times.
The SBU’s recent operation came just days after Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian airbases, which Ukraine said damaged over a third of Russia’s cruise missile carriers.
The latest attack comes ahead of the NATO summit in The Hague, where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to attend.
As of press time, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has not yet released a statement regarding the incident. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
04 Jun 25. Tenfold increase in UK drone deliveries for Ukraine at 50-nation Ukraine summit. The UK is investing a record £350m this year to increase the supply of drones to Ukraine from a target of 10,000 in 2024 to 100,000 in 2025
The UK is ramping up its support for Ukraine with a target to achieve a tenfold increase in production and procurement of drones to deliver to Ukraine this year.
With more than 10,000 drones delivered to Ukraine last year by the UK, tens of thousands more have already been delivered towards an ambitious new target of 100,000 drones for the current financial year. The record £350m investment in drones for Ukraine is part of the UK’s £4.5bn military support this year.
As Ukraine’s Armed Forces have demonstrated the effectiveness of drone warfare in defending against Putin’s illegal invasion, the UK has been doubling down on investment in drones with British defence companies, including small to medium sized enterprises, supporting the UK economy and jobs, as part of the government’s Plan for Change.
Convening a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) with his German counterpart, the Defence Secretary will also announce that the UK will spend a further £247m this year on training the Armed Forces of Ukraine, supporting its highly successful programme of training for Ukrainian recruits on British soil, Operation Interflex, which has provided more than 55,000 Ukrainian recruits with basic combat training since 2022 – with contributions from 13 partner nations.
Ukrainian units have confirmed that UK-provided drones have helped stabilise parts of the frontline by driving back Russian attacks and protecting Ukrainian lives, and Defence Intelligence has confirmed that drones currently kill more people than artillery on the frontline in Ukraine.
As well as this, the Defence Secretary will confirm the completed delivery of 140,000 artillery munitions by the UK for Ukraine since the start of 2025, in a vital boost for Ukraine’s frontline troops.
As part of the Strategic Defence Review – published on Monday – the government announced more than £4bn for autonomous systems and drones for the UK Armed Forces, to help learn the lessons from Ukraine. This follows the government’s historic commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5% of UK GDP by April 2027.
The Defence Secretary is set to join the German Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius, to host Ukrainian Defence Minister, Rustem Umerov, at the latest meeting of the 50-nation strong UDCG at NATO headquarters today (Wednesday).
Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:
The UK is stepping up its support for Ukraine by delivering hundreds of thousands more drones this year and completing a major milestone in the delivery of critical artillery ammunition.
We are learning lessons every day from the battlefield in Ukraine, which British companies are using to develop advanced new drones to help protect Ukraine’s civilians and also strengthen our own national security.
Defence is an engine for growth, delivering on this government’s Plan for Change, and this investment will help keep us secure at home and strong abroad, while ensuring the UK is a world leader in rapidly developing drone technology.
To provide further training and equipment supplies for Ukraine’s forces, the UK will also invest £40m in the trust fund for NATO’s NSATU mission for Ukraine, for which the UK is the framework nation, which is prioritising rapid procurement of spare parts and fuel for vehicles, training, and consumables to support troops in combat.
Artillery is critical to Ukraine’s war effort, holding back Putin’s forces from making significant gains on the frontline. With supply chains around the world under unprecedented strain, securing reliable sources for artillery ammunition is vital for Ukraine’s defence.
Many of the drones built in the UK harness new cutting-edge technology, from highly manoeuvrable first-person view (FPV) drones to precisely attack Russian targets, to interceptor drones designed to boost Ukraine’s air defence by destroying Russian missiles and drones, to new fibre-optic drones which are tethered via a cable which safeguards against jamming from Russian electronic warfare systems.
The UK has also been providing low-cost drones which can drop explosives on Russian positions. Between this type of drone and FPV systems, these two types of drone are reported to be responsible for 60-70% of damage currently caused to Russian equipment.
The UK is fully committed to working with allies to step up support to ensure Ukraine remains in the strongest possible position, which is why £4.5bn of military support will be provided this year – more than ever before. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
06 Jun 25. Ukraine Destroys Russian Iskander Missile Systems in Bryansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike on Thursday against a Russian missile unit near Klintsy, a town in Russia’s Bryansk region, according to the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.
In a Telegram post, the General Staff said Ukrainian forces struck the missile launchers while Russia’s 26th Missile Brigade was preparing to fire on Ukrainian territory. The strike was carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in coordination with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). According to the General Staff, the attack destroyed one Iskander missile launcher and damaged two others. While the results are still being verified, video footage confirmed a missile fuel detonation.
“Thanks to effective reconnaissance and the coordinated efforts of the Armed Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine, the targets were successfully hit,” the General Staff stated. No civilian casualties were reported.
The Iskander is a short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers. It can carry conventional or nuclear warheads and is one of Russia’s main tactical missile systems.
The strike followed increased Russian activity in Ukraine’s northeast. On Tuesday, Russian forces hit downtown Sumy with rocket artillery, killing four people and injuring 28. The attack also damaged homes, a medical center, and set cars on fire.
Ivan Shevtsov, a spokesman for the Ukrainian military in the area said Russian forces have been advancing in the Sumy region and have reportedly taken control of a stretch of territory approximately 15 kilometers along the frontline and 6 to 7 kilometers deep. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
05 Jun 25. Sweden boosts Nato support for Ukraine. Majority of the donations is dedicated to acquiring non-lethal military aid as requested by Ukraine. The Swedish Armed Forces has been directed by the government to allocate Skr550m ($57m) towards Nato’s assistance efforts for Ukraine. Of the total Skr550m sum, Skr300m will be channelled into the Nato Comprehensive Assistance Package Trust Fund, which is dedicated to acquiring non-lethal military aid as requested by Ukraine. Items such as medical supplies, vehicles, fuel, and field rations are procured through this fund. The remaining Skr250m is earmarked for the Nato Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine Trust Fund. This fund focuses on the procurement of goods and services that Ukraine has requested, including essential spare parts.
Sweden Defence Minister Pål Jonson said: “The scope of Sweden’s military support is a strength. The contributions to these NATO funds will enhance Ukraine’s endurance and logistical capabilities.”
Since the onset of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Sweden has progressively escalated its military assistance to Ukraine. The nature of this support has evolved from initially supplying personal protective gear to eventually providing tanks, sophisticated weaponry, and munitions in subsequent aid tranches.
As of 31 March, with the announcement of its 19th support package, Sweden’s cumulative defence aid to Ukraine has reached an estimated value of Skr80bn.
The country has also established a three-year plan aimed at bolstering its military assistance to Ukraine, ensuring sustained stability. This framework, spanning from 2024 to 2026, allocates a total of Skr75bn in support, which translates to an annual commitment of Skr25bn.
Earlier in March, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration was granted permission to purchase 18 Archer artillery systems from BAE Systems Bofors at an estimated cost of Skr3bn ($296.66m), intended as aid for Ukraine.
In related developments, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius signed an agreement with Ukrainian counterpart Rustem Umerov on 28 May, under which, Germany commits approximately €5bn ($5.64bn) in military support to Ukraine, with an emphasis on financing Ukraine’s production of long-range weapon systems. (Source: army-technology.com)
06 Jun 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine to form new air defense units amid record Russian drone attacks. Ukraine will establish new air defense units to counter Russia’s intensifying drone campaign, following a record-breaking aerial assault and continued attacks on civilian infrastructure, the Air Force confirmed on June 2. Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat told Ukrainian media that training for these new units is already underway across multiple regions in Ukraine. The focus will be on integrating anti-aircraft drones capable of intercepting hostile UAS, an increasingly urgent priority as Russia expands its use of unmanned systems.
“We are talking about anti-aircraft drones that help intercept air targets,” Ihnat said. “Crews are being trained in different locations… new units will be introduced.”
His remarks came just one day after Russia launched its largest drone attack on Ukraine to date. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, 472 drones, primarily Shahed-type loitering munitions, were launched overnight on June 1. Ukrainian forces shot down 210, while electronic warfare systems intercepted or disrupted 172 others. Dozens of drones still struck their targets.
The scale of such assaults means that even high interception percentages still result in devastation for Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. Ihnat noted that Russian forces are now using “mass launch” tactics, often sending large swarms toward a single target from high altitudes to overwhelm defenses.
While peace negotiations remain stalled and Moscow refuses calls for a ceasefire, Ukraine is working to expand its domestic drone and counter-drone capabilities. President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in late May that Russia aims to produce up to 500 drones per day.
In response, Ukraine has accelerated its own drone production, more than doubling long-range UAS output in 2024 and developing over 300 new weapon types since 2022.
However, officials emphasize that layered air defense, including interceptors, anti-aircraft drones and electronic warfare, is essential to counter ongoing threats from the sky.https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-to-form-new-air-defense-units-amid-record-russian-drone-attacks/
(Source: https://cuashub.com/)
04 Jun 25. Ukraine conflict: Germany trains Ukrainians on Boxer in preparation for RCH 155 SPH. The first Ukrainian soldiers have begun training at an undisclosed location in Germany on the Boxer 8×8 armoured vehicle under the auspices of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA) in preparation for the Remote Controlled Howitzer (RCH) 155 self-propelled howitzer (SPH) that Kyiv is procuring, the Bundeswehr announced on its website on 2 June.
The initial focus of the training is on learning how to handle the vehicle offroad and gaining a technical understanding of the Boxer before training on the Boxer-based RCH 155, which the Bundeswehr noted has an almost identical chassis as the training vehicles. The driver training includes manoeuvring through rough terrain, reversing with limited visibility, and climbing steep inclines. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius handed over the first RCH 155 SPH for Ukraine to the Ambassador of Ukraine to Germany, Oleksii Makeiev, at KNDS Deutschland’s plant in Kassel on 13 January. Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defence said at the time that Ukraine would receive the first six of 54 RCH 155s in 2025. A contract for 18 RCH 155s was signed in 2022, and a further 36 of the SPHs were ordered in 2023. This is enough to equip three artillery battalions. Six of the RCH 155s for Ukraine will initially remain in Germany to train Ukrainian soldiers. (Source: Janes)
04 June 25. Britain pledges to deliver 100,000 drones to Ukraine by April 2026. Britain pledged on Wednesday to supply 100,000 drones to Ukraine by the end of the current financial year in April 2026, marking a tenfold increase, after saying the unmanned aerial vehicles had transformed the way wars are fought. The government on Monday endorsed an independently-produced Strategic Defence Review, which calls for a more lethal, tech-driven army to counter emerging threats, including possible Russian aggression.
Britain, one of Ukraine’s staunchest Western supporters, plans to learn from Kyiv’s more than three-year fight against Russian invasion, during which drones have transformed the battlefield.
The £350m ($473m) drone package is part of a broader 4.5-bn-pound military support initiative for Ukraine, the government said.
Defence Secretary John Healey will make the announcement at a 50-nation Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting in Brussels, co-hosted with Germany. (Source: Reuters)
03 Jun 25. Operation Spiderweb: Analysis of Ukraine’s Deep-Strike Drone Offensive. The success of OPERATION SPIDERWEB highly likely indicates a porous Russian front line and also that Ukraine has integrated basic artificial intelligence (AI) targeting metrics into autonomous UAS platforms, enhancing precision and responsiveness. Ukrainian swarm capabilities are likely limited to light Class I systems. These are optimised for striking vulnerable and lightly protected assets such as parked aircraft and exposed communications infrastructure.
In turn, Russian responses are likely to be swift and aggressive, as Moscow is almost certainly grappling with the emerging threat of Ukrainian-deployed systems operating within its own territory.
Key Judgements
KJ-1. The success of OPERATION SPIDERWEB is highly likely indicative of a porous front line.
1. The movement of seven (based on visual analysis) truck-borne UAS launch platforms into Russia indicates ground lines of communication (GLOC) are not well defended and can be exploited for the movement of combat support equipment. [source]
2. The use of ground movement across the broader battlespace is highly likely indicative of significant electronic interference. This includes jamming and/or spoofing. This tactic was likely employed to negate Russian air defences by exploiting a comparatively weaker ground-based defensive posture. [source]
KJ-2. It is likely that Ukraine has developed and integrated basic Artificial Intelligence (AI) targeting metrics into its autonomous Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) platforms.
1. Following the attack, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced that the UAS were launched remotely, operated autonomously, and employed artificial intelligence to identify key weaknesses within the targeted systems. [source]
2. Visual analysis of the three-dimensional movement exhibited by one of the attack systems taken during its tertiary guidance phase is highly likely indicative of onboard AI-based decision-making processes. Patterns in the system’s longitudinal and latitudinal manoeuvring align with characteristics typical of machine decision-making, rather than human-in-the-loop control. [source]
3. The drones employed in the attack appear to be of a similar model or configuration to the DJI Mavic series. Given the drones’ limited range, the target areas’ electromagnetic complexity, and the highly likely absence of forward-deployed operators, it is highly likely that Ukraine did not manually control the drones on-site. This strongly suggests the use of pre-programmed flight paths or onboard autonomous guidance systems to execute the attack. [source]
4. Photos showing SBU Head General Vasyl Malyuk observing what appears to be current satellite imagery of the intended targets remain unconfirmed as proof that Ukraine has access to high-definition satellite imagery of key Russian positions. It is possible that Ukrainian intelligence may have repurposed pre-existing images to illustrate the optimal Joint Point of Impact (JPOI) for targeting a specific airframe. This corresponds with the placement of target markers observed on the aircraft. Specifically on the wing root of the TU-95 BEAR and the central fuselage of the TU-22 BLACKJACK. Both points represent the optimum JPOI for a light, non-penetrative explosive device, maximising structural disruption with minimal payload. These locations are highly likely to have formed a critical decision point within the AI modelling used in the attack. [source]
KJ-3. Ukrainian UAS swarm capabilities are likely limited to light Class I systems, primarily suited for targeting vulnerable and lightly protected assets such as parked aircraft and exposed communications infrastructure.
1. Decision-making delays observed in the visual analysis of footage from one of the UAS involved in Operation Spiderweb suggest low onboard AI processing speeds. These latency indicators likely necessitate the use of a hover function to provide the system with sufficient time to complete targeting or navigation calculations. As a result, such AI-driven guidance appears limited to rotor-borne UAS platforms capable of maintaining a stable hover. [source]
2. Ukraine has announced the development of the GOGOL-M autonomous launch system platform. While the system presents some tactical value, it is highly likely constrained by several key design limitations. These include its vulnerability to surface-to-air threats in a dense and contested air defence environment. This also includes documented attrition rates associated with rotor-borne systems when deployed from fixed-wing launch platforms. These factors will likely limit the system’s survivability and also its operational effectiveness in high-intensity conflict zones. [source]
3. Targeting considerations and limitations drawn from OPERATION SPIDERWEB were likely to remain constrained to lightly armoured or vulnerable assets. This likely results from a combination of slow onboard decision-making speeds and the inherently limited penetrative effect of a low-speed Class I UAS acting as an unshaped kinetic delivery platform. As such, it is highly unlikely that this capability, in its current form, poses a significant threat to heavily armoured vehicles or hardened infrastructure. [source]
KJ-4. Russian responses are highly likely to be swift and aggressive. Moscow is almost certainly reeling as it confronts the potential spread of Ukrainian-deployed threat systems within its territory.
1. Russian internal media and messaging channels have launched information campaigns aimed at diverting attention from, denying, or downplaying the effects of Operation SPIDERWEB. [source]
2. This attack possibly represents the first in a series of strikes launched from prepositioned, covert UAS launch platforms. Defensive activity in the vicinity of key Russian strategic assets, including air bases, logistics hubs, and communications nodes, is likely to increase significantly over the next 24 to 96 hours. This will almost certainly include broad search efforts to identify other possible launch vehicles.
3. Based on historical precedent, Russia’s external reaction is highly likely to include a large-scale, aggressive strike against Kyiv. This will almost certainly involve massed waves of one-way attack UAVs and cruise missiles targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and life-support systems. The strike will likely coincide with a messaging campaign by President Putin. This campaign will be aimed at saving face and mitigating the reputational damage caused by OPERATION SPIDERWEB.
Summary of Analysis
Confidence in assessments surrounding the capability wielded in this attack is high, supported by extensive image and video analysis. This aligns with Ukrainian claims of operational success. Russian reporting also confirms that the strikes occurred, though often framed in downplayed or limited terms. Contradicting this, assessments made regarding the scale of effect of the attack possess substantially less confidence.
Broad misinformation campaigns are likely underway, aimed at distorting perceptions of the scale and impact of the attacks. This includes their effect on the broader Russian war effort and the effectiveness of Russian responses. These responses include the reported arrests of suspects and the performance of defensive measures.
Ongoing messaging from both Russia and Ukraine is likely to become increasingly unreliable. This is because information warfare campaigns intensify, and propaganda is generated and disseminated by both sides. This growing information contest will further complicate independent assessments of operational outcomes and strategic effects.
(Source: UAS VISION/Grey Dynamics)
29 May 25. EU proposes new maritime security hub in Black Sea region. Additional initiatives are aimed at upgrading transport infrastructure to facilitate military mobility. EU and its regional partners will implement three initiatives to stimulate growth and address security challenges. Credit: Christophe Licoppe/Shutterstock. The European Union (EU) has adoption of a new strategic approach to foster a stable and secure Black Sea region, revealed Kaja Kallas, serving as the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy/vice-president of the European Commission. This area is recognised for its significant strategic relevance to EU interests, including aspirations of regional countries to join the EU. The new Strategy for the Black Sea comes in response to various security challenges, such as airspace violations, assaults on ports and maritime routes, and the presence of naval mines attributed to Russian activities. European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: “An active role of the European Union is crucial in advancing security and peace in the Black Sea region especially with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
“We will closely work with our neighbours to foster security and stability in the region. Together we can build a stronger and more prosperous future for all.”
Central to this strategy is the enhancement of security measures within the Black Sea vicinity. The EU plans to establish a new Maritime Security Hub designed to bolster its capabilities in responding to threats. (Source: naval-technology.com)
30 May 25. Ukraine’s Armed Forces have deployed a drone-carrying mothership known as GOGOL-M to transport and deploy two first-person view (FPV) uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to a distance of 300 kilometres (km) from an enemy target.
Meanwhile, the UAVs are capable of autonomously identifying and striking precise targets from parked aircraft to air defence systems and military infrastructure.
The cost of a mission is only $10,000, compared to $3–5m for traditional missile strikes.
Video footage reveals that the mothership is a fixed-wing aircraft carrying a drone on pylons beneath each wing. The drone carrier also appears to fly from a catapult system.
Extending the range of precision strike missions
Strategy Force Solutions developed the carriers through Brave1 – a platform set up by the Ukrainian government to centralise collaboration among defence companies, forces, and investors.
In an interview with Forbes, a company official said that the mothership is powered by an artificial intelligence (AI) platform known as SmartPilot, which combines data from across numerous sensors for environment perception and target recognition.
In recent months, the fibre-optic controlled drone has grown in use in the Russia-Ukraine war to evade any adversarial jamming efforts. However, the limitation is that these drones are limited to ranges of around 10-20km.
The concept of a drone carrier would be able to overcome the range limitation by transporting fibre-optic drones, ensuring precision strike and security of the systems from jamming. However, this concept also depends on the additional weight of the fibre-optic wind and the battery system of fibre-optic drones.
According to GlobalData intelligence, the global military UAV market is valued at $13.6bn in 2025 and is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 6.3% over the next ten years. (Source: army-technology.com)
30 May 25. Russia Attacks Ukraine with 470 mph Drone. Russia launched a new type of jet-powered attack UAV called the Dan-M against Ukraine on the morning of 29 May. The drones were launched in a group from Crimea.
Source: Serhii “Flesh” Beskrestnov, a consultant specialised in military radio technologies, on social media
Details: Beskrestnov explained that the Dan-M is originally a target drone used for training and testing air defence systems, which Russia has now converted into a strike UAV.
Quote:
“We did the same with Strizh jet drones at the beginning of the war, but only because we lacked cruise missiles and long-range strike drones. Why Russia has made this modification is unclear – perhaps they have a large stock of these UAVs.”
More details:
Beskrestnov added that the original target drone is red, but in this case the body colour had been changed.
He also specified that the drone’s flight time is 25-40 minutes, its speed ranges between 400 and 750 km/h, and it can fly at altitudes of up to nine kilometres.
Background: Serhii “Flesh” Beskrestnov recently reported that Russian forces have started using an AI-powered drone with a petrol engine capable of flying over 100 km to carry out attacks on Ukraine.
(Source: UAS VISION/Pravda Ukraine)
30 May 25. Cuashub.com said today that Zelensky calls for increased domestic production amid escalating drone strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has called for a sharp increase in the domestic production of drones and long-range strike systems, following a strategic meeting with senior military leadership on May 27. The discussion focused on Ukraine’s response to Russian attacks, including preventive measures to counter emerging threats.
Present at the meeting were Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Chief of the General Staff Andriy Hnatov and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. In his evening address, Zelensky said Ukraine must not only react to Russian strikes but act proactively, with a particular emphasis on scaling up the country’s drone and missile manufacturing capabilities.
“Hundreds of Ukrainian enterprises are already delivering results for the country’s defense, and we plan to do even more,” he said.
Zelensky stressed the need to prioritize UAS, interceptors, cruise missiles and ballistic systems, noting that these technologies are central to battlefield awareness, long-range strikes and the protection of Ukrainian forces. He also highlighted the government’s ongoing efforts to involve Ukrainian businesses in weapons development and secure new agreements with European partners to support defense manufacturing.
Though specific operational plans were not disclosed, the president made clear that Ukraine is preparing to respond to all threats from Russia, including those involving drones, with Russian drone strikes reaching record numbers in recent weeks.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/zelensky-calls-for-increased-domestic-production-amid-escalating-drone-strikes/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
30 May 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine unveils AI turret to counter relentless drone strikes. Ukrainian engineers have developed and tested a new autonomous air defense system designed to help counter the relentless waves of Russian drone attacks. The system, known as Sky Sentinel, is a domestically produced, AI-powered turret capable of autonomously detecting, tracking and engaging aerial threats such as the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones frequently used by Russia.
According to UNITED24, the official fundraising platform of the Ukrainian government, launched by President Volodymyr Zelensky in May 2022: “Human intervention, such as a soldier manually aiming the turret, is not required. Deploy the Sky Sentinel into a combat position, feed it radar data, and it does the rest: detects, locks on, tracks the flight paths, calculates the shot and fires. All on its own.”
Sky Sentinel is armed with a .50-caliber M2 Browning machine gun and uses an advanced sensor suite to intercept low-flying targets at speeds of up to 800 km/h. It is designed to operate autonomously once deployed and configured, offering a scalable response to the high volume of drone threats Ukraine continues to face.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, over 45,000 attack drones have reportedly been launched against Ukraine, targeting infrastructure and civilian areas across cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Sumy. The pace of attacks, sometimes exceeding 100 drones per day, has pushed Ukrainian air defenses to adopt lower-cost, autonomous solutions that can complement more expensive interceptor missile-based systems.
Sky Sentinel’s relatively low unit cost, estimated at around $150,000, is relatively cheap in comparison with the price of interceptor missiles, which can run into ms, and the cost of the Shahed’s themselves at around $100,000.
Developers say that between 10 and 30 systems are needed to defend a typical city, which is still much less costly than deploying traditional missile systems.
While the system’s full range remains classified, the M2 machine gun used has a known effective range of roughly 1.5 kilometers against airborne targets. During trials, Sky Sentinel reportedly demonstrated the ability to neutralize threats significantly smaller than the Shahed drone and, in some conditions, even cruise missiles.
Though Russia continues to upgrade its Shahed platforms, with some recent claims suggesting AI control via mobile networks and video streaming through Telegram, Ukrainian officials and electronic warfare specialists have largely dismissed these reports as implausible.
Military electronics expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov noted that while some Shaheds may transmit limited telemetry, they still rely on satellite navigation and remain susceptible to jamming.
The emergence of systems like Sky Sentinel offers an alternative to increasingly unreliable electronic warfare techniques and a shift toward automated, hard-kill countermeasures that are affordable, scalable and adaptable to frontline and urban environments.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-unveils-ai-turret-to-counter-relentless-drone-strikes/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
03 Jun 25. Russia Deploys Chinese Laser Weapon to Target Ukrainian Drones. Russian forces have begun using the Chinese-made Silent Hunter laser system to destroy Ukrainian drones, according to video footage shared by a pro-Russian Telegram channel. The video shows the Russian Kochevnik special operations unit operating the system from inside a vehicle, followed by scenes of drones, identified by the Telegram channel SPZ Vodohrai as Ukrainian Shchedryk, Skywalker X8, and Distractor models, catching fire mid-air. The video concludes by showing recovered drone fragments marked with burns that suggest laser engagement. Silent Hunter, a 30-kilowatt fiber-optic laser system developed by the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, includes radar and optical sensors for targeting drones at ranges up to five kilometers. The same system has previously been identified in Iranian service, reflecting the growing military cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran. Its deployment comes shortly after reports of Israel’s Iron Beam laser being used in combat. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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