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Military And Security Developments
May 26.
26 May 25. Pentagon Ukraine hub could see downgrade in policy office reshuffle. The Pentagon is likely to downgrade a policy office instrumental in the military’s response to the war in Ukraine, according to three former U.S. defense officials and two European officials. As part of a larger reshuffle of the Pentagon’s policy apparatus, the office dedicated to Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia affairs would be shifted under a separate office that handles Europe and NATO issues, the sources said. Doing so wouldn’t stop its work or necessarily involve firing employees. Still, the shift would demote an office that until earlier this year had become one of the most important in the Pentagon. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the once relatively obscure office has helped shape U.S. policy toward the war and manage the vast sum of military aid sent to help support its self-defense.
Laura Cooper, its previous director, helped convene a group of 50 countries that has since met 27 times to raise and coordinate more than $130 billion in security assistance to Kyiv, with around half of that coming from the United States.
A Defense Department spokesperson didn’t confirm the potential change, explain the rationale behind it or say whether any positions may be cut. Cooper departed in December, and a career civil servant now leads the office in an acting capacity. Both offices report to the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, which currently lacks a fully confirmed director. Daniel Zimmerman, the nominee to lead it, is awaiting a full Senate vote. Multiple sources stressed that the decision is not yet final, and that any changes would be part of a larger reorganization. It’s not unusual for new policy chiefs to shift around their offices, one former official said, but multiple other sources saw the potential change as a sign of the Pentagon’s overall lower-priority approach to Ukraine under the second Trump administration.
Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy chief, has long argued that America should reduce its military support for Ukraine and shift resources toward Asia to deter China from invading Taiwan.
When visiting NATO headquarters in February, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that Europe needs to take control of its own security, including for Ukraine.
“Leaders of our European allies should take primary responsibility for defense of the continent,” Hegseth said.
As a practical matter, two former U.S. officials raised the concern that combining the offices would overwhelm the person in charge. The Trump administration is considering drastic changes to U.S. security policy toward Europe, arguing countries on the continent should spend far more on their defense as America refocuses elsewhere. Meetings with David Baker, the official now leading the Europe and NATO office, have been in high demand as European countries try to understand the coming changes and prepare for the June NATO summit. (Source: Defense News)
26 May 25. Developers begin testing fixed-wing loitering munitions over 40km ranges. Fixed-wing loitering munitions with beyond 40-kilometre ranges have been tested by the Ukrainian government during the first examination in a planned series of three trials. More than 10 manufacturer teams tested their fixed-wing loitering munitions in flights exceeding the distance and simulated strikes on designated targets. The event was attended by Armed Forces of Ukraine Deputy Commander in Chief Brigadier General Andrii Lebedenko, the Armed Forces’ Innovation Directorate as well as representatives of Ukraine’s security and defence forces.
“The initial trial aimed to assess the readiness of systems currently available on the Ukrainian market and identify the most effective solutions. Based on these results, manufacturers can refine their platforms and proceed to the next round of field testing,” according to a statement from Brave1, the Ukraine government’s coordinated platform for defence technology.
“In addition to complete unmanned systems, the event showcased Ukrainian-made components and software solutions, including those based on artificial intelligence. These technologies may be integrated into loitering munitions in the future to enhance their effectiveness.
“The criteria for manufacturers included specialised video transmission at an affordable price and a number of other technical requirements.” (Source: Defence Connect)
26 May 25. Trump asks ‘what the hell happened to Putin’ after Ukraine bombings
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May 23.
23 May 25. Largest Ukraine trade mission boosts UK defence partnerships. Largest multinational Ukraine trade mission boosts defence partnerships for British business.
- The UK led its largest-ever trade mission to Ukraine, with 51 defence companies taking part.
- The mission brought together UK industry and likeminded European nations to secure contracts and boost high-skilled jobs across the UK.
- Trade missions help strengthen national security, the foundation of the Plan for Change, and open up opportunities for our world class defence sector.
A record 51 UK and international companies joined the fifth UK-Ukraine trade mission in Kyiv this week, making it the largest British-led trade delegation to Ukraine to date.
Participating companies from across the defence economy specialising in areas like uncrewed systems and military goods are securing contracts which will boost high-skilled jobs in regions across the country, supporting the government’s Plan for Change.
This week’s mission brought together leading UK defence firms to deepen cooperation with Ukrainian industry and partners from Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Latvia. This collaboration is vital in demonstrating a united multinational industrial front with European allies, scaling up support for Ukraine’s defence needs and strengthening supply chain resilience with international partners.
This latest mission is a significant step in the UK’s 100 Year Partnership with Ukraine, reinforcing the UK’s long-term support for Ukraine’s defence, security and recovery and drawing on the collective industrial capacity and capability of European allies.
Defence is a key growth sector in the Government’s upcoming modern Industrial Strategy and a prime example of how Government and industry can work together to aid our allies and boost UK security.
Lord Coaker, Defence Minister said: “Working with the Netherlands, Norway, and Ukraine we’re building resilient supply chains, putting Ukraine in the strongest possible position to achieve a just and lasting peace for years to come. The UK is continuing to lead the way on support for Ukraine, from military support to leading the Ukraine Defence Contact Group where since the UK took the chair nearly £23bn has been pledged in military support for Ukraine.”
Kevin Craven, CEO of ADS said: “It is a privilege for industry to lead the UK in engagement both within Ukraine and with our Ukrainian counterparts. Indeed, this week’s trade mission – the most multinational of its kind to date – has been nothing but inspiring. The UK defence industry’s support to Ukraine is unwavering and stands ready to increase production capacity, develop innovative new capabilities, and build a resilient ecosystem. Continued collaboration, both with our government counterparts and international allies, is pivotal as illegal Russian aggression continues to intensify. We will continue to deepen our industrial ties and fulfil our moral duty to the Ukrainian people.”
Marte Gerhardsen, Norwegian State Secretary said: “European allies needs to stand together with Ukraine for as long as it takes. We work closely with Ukraine the UK and other European countries. The Russian aggression against Ukraine continues, and the need to rapidly strengthen Ukrainian and European defence capabilities are apparent. The security situation demands that we innovate and adapt. We need to ensure that our industries can meet the growing demands from our governments and armed forces. One of the purposes of the visit is to facilitate the establishment of projects and collaborations by more Norwegian companies in Ukraine. I am pleased to see how Norwegian companies work with Ukrainian partners to scale up productions. The mission follows the new UK-EU Security & Defence Partnership that was agreed on Monday, which could lead to significant opportunities for the UK’s world-leading defence industries, generating more high-skilled jobs across all regions of the UK. By joining forces with our European partners, the UK is strengthening its own defence industry while contributing directly to Ukraine’s long-term resilience.”
Background:
- JEF nations represented on this mission include: Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Latvia
- DBT and MOD working closely together through the cross-government Task Force HIRST to drive increases in UK, Ukrainian and allies’ industrial capacity to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as domestic military resilience. It has recently secured a £1.6bn deal for air defence missiles for Ukraine.
- The UK is fully committed to working with allies to step up support to ensure Ukraine remains in the strongest possible position, which is why £4.5 billion of military support will be provided this year – more than ever before.
- Defence already supports 434,000 jobs and is an engine for growth. The Government’s new Defence Industrial Strategy will make sure national security and a high-growth economy are aligned and delivering on our promise to crack down on waste and boost Britain’s defence industry.
- This week’s mission builds on the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) Oslo Summit held earlier this month, highlighting the UK’s growing cooperation with European partners on defence and security. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
May 22.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have recently crossed the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast); however, it remains unclear if Russia retains positions on the southern bank of the river
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kursk oblast to meet local officials; during the visit, he was asked to establish a buffer zone in Sumy oblast (Ukraine) that should include Sumy city, though this remains unlikely in the medium term
• SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump reportedly opposes additional sanctions against Russia as he believes this would harm business opportunities, indicating that further US sanctions pressure is unlikely in the near term
• FORECAST: On 19 May, US President Trump spoke with Russian President Putin and Ukrainian President Zelensky in separate telephone calls to discuss the prospects for peace in Ukraine; however, no breakthrough has been made
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces continue to make slow advances in and around Toretsk and Chasiv Yar (both Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 19 and 20 May indicates that Russian forces advanced to the north and west of Toretsk. Meanwhile, further north, geolocated footage from 20 May indicates that Russian forces successfully advanced to the north of Chasiv Yar, to the north of the village of Kalynivka. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting in Chasiv Yar reported on 20 May that Russia has been accumulating forces in and around Chasiv Yar for an unspecified period, but is now deploying those forces to intensify assaults.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 20 May indicates that Russian forces have recently crossed the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast); however, it remains unclear if Russia retains positions on the southern bank of the river. Russian forces have made some advances in central Vovchansk in recent weeks, but this is the first time Russian personnel have been seen operating on the far side of the river (specifically due west of the city centre). A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting in the area did state on 20 May that Russian forces have increased the number of assaults in not only Vovchansk, but also at other points along the Kharkiv frontline. That said, he also claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over all ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area, which are preventing Russian forces from building pontoon crossings across the Vovcha River.
• KHARKIV: The potential consolidation of Russian forces at a beachhead on the southern banks of the Vovcha River would be a significant development and would likely reflect a deterioration of Ukraine’s (thus far) relatively strong defences in the city. It remains unclear, however, whether Russian forces will be able to withstand potential Ukrainian counter-attacks in the coming days.
• KURSK-SUMY: On 20 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kursk oblast to meet local officials, during which he was asked to establish a buffer zone in Sumy oblast (Ukraine) that should include Sumy city. It was the first time Putin had visited Kursk since Russian forces effectively pushed the Ukrainians out of the region in March. The visit likely formed part of Moscow’s wider strategy (which we have been tracking) that seeks to present Russia as determined and able to continue fighting the war indefinitely. This strategy aims to project the narrative that Russian demands will likely increase unless concessions are agreed upon in the immediate term. Russian officials and military commanders have long discussed the establishment of a buffer ‘sanitary’ zone along the international border, likely to a distance of 18.6 miles (30km), in order to prevent Ukrainian artillery attacks against de jure Russian territory. Sumy city is approximately 16.5 miles (27km) from the international border.
• KURSK-SUMY: While it is likely that Moscow does want to establish such a buffer zone along the entire length of the international border, it is unlikely to have the resources and capability to do so; this is especially true when considering the seizure of a large city such as Sumy. However, unconfirmed reports from individuals close to the recent Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) negotiations reported that Russian officials had threatened to seize Sumy (and Kharkiv) oblasts in addition to the four annexed regions. While this likely indicates Russia’s wider territorial ambitions, its military capability to achieve said ambitions will highly likely remain lacking.
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations across northern Sumy oblast for the foreseeable future amid efforts to expand the so-called buffer zone in the region. In line with this, geolocated footage published on 19 May indicated that Russian forces advanced in south-western Loknya, a village located around ten miles (16km) west of Sudzha inside Sumy oblast (Ukraine). Russian forces are continuing efforts to reach the H-07 highway that runs from the international border south-west towards Sumy city, but progress remains very slow.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 20 May indicates Russian forces advanced across open country around 6.5 miles (11km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka. Further west along the Zaporizhzhia axis, geolocated footage from 19 May indicates that Russian forces advanced westwards along the T-0815 highway just south of the village of Bilohiria, which is located roughly 43 miles (69km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes in recent days continued to include large-scale drone strikes. Early on 22 May, Russia launched a strike including an Iskandr-M ballistic missile along with in all 128 unmanned aerial vehicles.
• STRIKES: Russia’s expanding use of fibre-optic first-person view (FPV) drones is posing an increasing threat to Ukrainian artillery systems, including Western-supplied platforms. On 21 May, the Telegraph published an article detailing the role of Rubicon, an elite Russian drone unit. The unit, formed in September 2024, is now operating inside Ukraine after playing a crucial role in Russia’s offensive campaign aimed at pushing out Ukrainian forces from Kursk oblast. It is reportedly targeting US-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) using FPV drones equipped with fibre-optic cables, which are highly resistant to electronic jamming. Rubicon reportedly tested innovative drone tactics during the Kursk offensive and is now likely being redeployed to target high-value Ukrainian assets (such as HIMARS). According to the Telegraph, the first confirmed destruction of a HIMARS launcher by a fibre-optic drone occurred last month near Chasiv Yar.
• STRIKES: HIMARS have been instrumental to Ukraine’s long-range artillery capabilities, enabling Kyiv to hit Russian logistics and command hubs deep behind the front line. Of the approximately 40 HIMARS units originally provided by the US, at least four have now been destroyed. Amid dwindling stockpiles and limited prospects for resupply, an intensification of Russia’s drone campaign against these systems would likely undermine Ukraine’s long-range artillery capabilities.
• STRIKES: On 20 May, the Kyiv Independent reported that Ukraine is responding by ramping up its own deployment of fibre-optic FPV drones. This highlights both sides’ continued efforts to rapidly adapt to the other’s innovations.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, on 21 May, a Ukrainian drone attack struck a semiconductor plant in Russia’s Oryol oblast, which produces components for Sukhoi warplanes as well as Iskandr and Kinzhal ballistic missiles. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of in all 64 drones. The attack highlights Kyiv’s continued efforts to disrupt Russia’s military supply chains as part of a broader campaign to obstruct Moscow’s war effort.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump reportedly opposes the imposition of additional sanctions against Russia as he believes this would harm business opportunities, further indicating that the US is unlikely to escalate sanctions pressure in the near term. The New York Times reported this on 20 May, citing an unnamed White House official who claimed that Trump wants to ‘maximise economic opportunities’ for US citizens. While we cannot confirm the veracity of these statements, they nevertheless align with Trump’s apparent willingness to ease Russia’s economic and political isolation. Following a call with Russian President Putin on 19 May, Trump stated that Russia wants to engage in ‘large-scale trade’ with the US once the war ends, with which he said he agrees.
• SANCTIONS: Trump’s comments suggest an additional motive for not increasing US sanctions pressure against Russia despite calls from European leaders and Ukraine to do so. On 19 May, Trump expressed his reluctance to ramp up punitive measures because of the ‘chance’ of progress towards peace. He warned that such actions could jeopardise this process, but did not rule out that the US could increase sanctions in the future. However, the Trump administration’s reluctance to intensify pressure on Moscow by escalating sanctions will almost certainly continue to be a point of contention with Kyiv and its European allies. A lack of alignment between the EU, UK and US on this issue could also realistically reduce the effectiveness of any new sanctions enforced in the coming weeks or months.
• SANCTIONS: That said, on 20 May, the EU adopted four sets of sanctions against Russia, including a 17th package of new punitive measures. The new tranche of sanctions targets Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers and Russian oil major Surgutneftegas. Additionally, the bloc announced measures related to domestic human rights violations, Russian hybrid activities and the use of riot control agents by Russian forces in Ukraine. On the same day, the UK announced new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy, financial and military sectors. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stated on 19 May that work is already underway on the EU’s 18th sanctions package, underscoring the commitment of Ukraine’s European allies to imposing new punitive measures, even without US participation.
• TRADE: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has offered Trump a free trade agreement between their two countries. Ukraine’s Deputy Economy Minister and Trade Representative Taras Kachka announced this on 20 May, adding that Zelensky had proposed other areas for co-operation within the defence industry and trade more broadly. Kachka explained that Ukraine is interested in a free trade agreement despite the fact that the US is not the country’s largest trading partner. In 2024, Ukraine’s main trading partners were China and several European countries (namely Germany, Poland and Spain), according to Ukraine’s State Customs Service. Zelensky’s proposal for greater economic co-operation with the US highly likely aims to bolster ties between the two countries over the longer term.
• TRADE: The offer also likely aims to appeal to Trump’s desire to enhance economic opportunities and secure deals while also showing that Ukraine is capable of negotiating in good faith. Zelensky also likely hopes that this agreement would possibly strengthen US interest in Ukraine’s post-war security and, in turn, increase the Trump administration’s support for Kyiv in the peace process. At the same time, however, Ukrainian efforts to realise additional agreements and co-operation will possibly increase the risk of the Trump administration using this to influence Kyiv’s decision-making, especially concerning the war. This could possibly manifest as the US threatening to terminate deals or actually doing so if any similar arrangements are reached over the coming weeks and months.
• ASSASSINATION: On 21 May, unidentified gunmen in Pozuelo de Alarcón (Madrid province, Spain) shot dead former Ukrainian politician Andriy Portnov, who previously served as a senior aide to pro-Russia ex-president Viktor Yanukovych. The US sanctioned Portnov in 2021 for corruption and bribery; he was accused of using his influence to buy access and decisions in Ukrainian courts and undermining judicial reforms. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) previously investigated Portnov’s possible involvement in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, though the case was later closed. A motive for his murder remains uncertain, though Spanish media outlets have claimed (citing undisclosed sources) that his death could possibly be linked to debt issues.
• ASSASSINATION: Given Portnov’s ties to Yanukovych and influence over Ukraine’s judiciary, Ukrainian involvement (whether that be intelligence agencies or non-state actors) remains a realistic possibility. We have previously assessed that events in recent years, including the apparent assassination of a Russian defector to Ukraine in 2024 and a series of letter bomb threats, underscore that Spain is an important jurisdiction for indirect proxy operations between Russian and Ukrainian interests and operatives (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 22 February 2024). Portnov’s murder could realistically indicate that Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) has its own assets operating within the country, which has seen a sizeable influx of Ukrainian refugees since the full-scale invasion. We assess that Spain is likely becoming an increasingly high-risk jurisdiction for high-profile Ukrainian and Russian defectors alike.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: On 19 May, US President Trump spoke with Russian President Putin and Ukrainian President Zelensky in separate telephone calls to discuss the prospects for peace in Ukraine. The interaction between Putin and Trump lasted two hours and is their third known phone call since the latter’s inauguration. While Trump publicly offered a positive assessment of the talks, he reportedly told European leaders in private that Putin is not ready to end the war as he believes Russia ‘is winning’. Despite the recent discussions, the emergence of a robust and comprehensive ceasefire that lasts at least 30 days, let alone a peace settlement, remains highly unlikely in the near term.
Following his conversation with Putin, Trump stated that Russia and Ukraine will ‘immediately start’ negotiations over a ceasefire and an end to the war. However, it was not immediately clear how these supposed talks would differ from those that took place between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Turkey recently. Unspecified insiders have claimed that Zelensky had to remind Trump during a later call with European leaders that Putin had already agreed to negotiate and that the first round of ceasefire talks had already happened. As such, it remains unclear if Trump had interpreted his discussions with Putin to mean that further talks between the two sides are to be expected in the near term. The Wall Street Journal reported on 21 May that a new round of talks between Russia and Ukraine is expected to start in mid-June in the Vatican (Vatican City), though details remain limited.
Trump has also implied that he is willing to ‘back away’ from talks, reinforcing the growing possibility that the US will reduce its direct role in the peace process. Trump claimed that the conditions of a peace deal could only be negotiated between Russia and Ukraine because, according to him, the warring parties ‘know details…that nobody else would be aware of’. This marks a considerable departure from Trump’s previous pledges that he wants to prioritise efforts to end the war as soon as possible. Zelensky has reiterated the importance of the US not distancing itself from the peace process, as he believes that this would ultimately benefit Russia. This aligns with our assessment; significantly reduced involvement from the US would highly likely incentivise Russia to continue the war and refrain from meaningful engagement with Ukraine in bilateral peace talks while it seeks further battlefield advances. We assess that Ukraine’s position at the negotiating table would also be significantly weakened.
Putin disclosed that Russia is ready to work with Ukraine to draft a ‘memorandum regarding a potential future peace agreement’, which does not suggest a strong commitment towards finding an end to the war. The Kremlin has since stated that most of the work on the document would be carried out discreetly and is not to be made public. The Russian authorities have also stated that Russia has not set a deadline for preparing this document, nor did Putin and Trump discuss a timeframe for a possible ceasefire, according to Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov. The absence of any clear deadlines and US pressure will highly likely grant Russia more time to stall any meaningful progress towards a ceasefire and the peace process more broadly.
The Russian president claimed that the two sides must now show their commitment to peace and find compromises that are acceptable for both parties. However, Putin did not offer any indication of what ‘compromises’ Russia could be willing to offer, though we assess that these are likely minimal and insignificant in comparison to those which Moscow expects Kyiv to make. This is further reinforced by the fact that Putin reiterated long-standing Russian narratives about the need to eliminate what Moscow considers to be the ‘root causes’ of the conflict. Such comments indicate that Russia will highly likely remain unwilling to change its stance on numerous issues. These mostly include Ukrainian ambitions of joining NATO, territorial claims to Crimea, ‘protecting’ Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Donbas and restoring Russian cultural and linguistic status in Ukraine.
Additionally, Trump reportedly told Zelensky and European leaders after the call with Putin that he had asked the Russian leader to present ‘something people can agree to’ and not a proposal that will be rejected outright. However, we assess that Russia’s perception of acceptable terms is almost certainly at odds with Ukraine’s, as well as that of Kyiv’s key European allies. A convergence in their opinions in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely. European partners will likely seek to maintain pressure on Russia and for Ukraine not to have to make comparatively larger, more painful sacrifices (most likely relating to ceding territory) to Moscow.
Recent comments from a senior Russian official following the Putin-Trump call also reaffirm that the latest interaction between the two presidents is unlikely to have resulted in a significant breakthrough. On 20 May, Deputy Chairperson of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev claimed that many in Russia favour Ukraine’s ‘unconditional surrender’ over other options such as negotiations. Medvedev also questioned the legitimacy of Ukrainian officials by claiming that there are no people authorised to conclude a peace treaty among the main figures within Ukraine’s leadership. Such comments highlight that Russia still remains unwilling to engage in negotiations in good faith at present and that it maintains its maximalist goals in Ukraine.
• Europe-US: Long term cyber espionage campaign heightens security risks from Russian state actor. On 21 May, the US Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published an advisory stating that the Russian state-sponsored group ‘APT28’ has been conducting a large-scale cyber espionage campaign since 2022. The campaign has targeted entities involved in providing aid to Ukraine (including through the defence, transportation and maritime sectors) based in several European countries and the US. APT28 used the exploitation of software vulnerabilities, password spraying techniques and spear phishing to infiltrate targeted systems and deploy malicious payloads. It also used living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques for stealth and detection evasion and hijacked targeted email accounts to access sensitive information regarding aid provision. The group also compromised cameras at Ukrainian border crossings to monitor aid shipments, highlighting the co-ordinated nature of this operation. This advisory showcases the scope of Russian cyber operations amid the war in Ukraine, emphasising heightening security and cyber espionage risks to European, Ukrainian and US entities.
May 21.
• Ukraine-Russia: US reluctance to issue new Russia sanctions will raise likelihood of two-track regime. Later on 21 May, Ukraine will reportedly ask the EU to lead on tightening sanctions against Russia in the coming days amid wavering US support for increased pressure on Moscow. US President Donald Trump reportedly voiced his opposition to imposing new sanctions on Russia in the near term following a call on 19 May with President Vladimir Putin. That said, the EU and the UK announced new sanctions against Russia on 20 May, which targeted a range of entities and sectors. The imposition of new sanctions and the reported developments underscore the growing divergence in Western actors’ positions regarding the use of sanctions to pressure Moscow to a ceasefire and end the war in Ukraine. We assess that differing approaches will increase the likelihood of the emergence of a two-track sanctions system between European countries and the US; this would highly likely create compliance uncertainties for businesses over the long term.
May 20.
• Russia-Ukraine: Near-term prospects for peace settlement remain low despite recent engagements. On 19 May, US President Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in separate telephone calls to discuss the prospects for peace in Ukraine. Following his conversation with Putin, Trump stated that Russia and Ukraine will ‘immediately start’ negotiations over a ceasefire and an end to the war. However, Trump did not offer any further information about negotiating teams or precisely when these talks will happen. Meanwhile, Putin disclosed that Russia is ready to work with Ukraine to draft a ‘memorandum regarding a potential future peace agreement’. Putin also reiterated long-standing Russian narratives about the need to eliminate what Moscow considers to be the ‘root causes’ of the conflict. The Russian president claimed that the two sides must now show their commitment to peace and find compromises that are acceptable for both parties. Despite this, we assess that Russia continues to show no genuine willingness at present to make meaningful concessions to end the war; the prospects for a robust and comprehensive ceasefire that lasts at least 30 days are still elusive.
May 19.
• COMMAND: The appointment of new Russian Ground Forces commander strongly indicates that Moscow approves of his attritional, positional tactics while indicating its readiness to continue taking extremely high casualty rates in exchange for slow, grinding advances
• STRIKES: Overnight on 17-18 May, Russia launched its largest drone strike in a single attack since the start of the war, deploying 273 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
• AID: Reports indicate that Australia has begun loading the first of 49 decommissioned Abrams tanks bound for Ukraine, despite private US opposition to the transfer
• FORECAST: US President Trump has reportedly begun planned calls with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin; however, a breakthrough remains unlikely
• COMMAND: Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 15 May appointing Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev as the new Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Ground Forces. Mordvichev replaces General Oleg Salyukov, who has been appointed as deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council. Mordvichev was previously the commander of Russia’s Central Grouping of Forces and notably oversaw the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, which eventually facilitated the advances to the west that placed Russian forces on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. Mordvichev is one of the very few Russian commanders who have managed to penetrate Ukraine’s defences to generate grinding advances in recent years.
• COMMAND: Mordvichev’s promotion therefore strongly indicates that the Moscow High Command approves of his attritional, positional tactics; it also highlights Moscow’s readiness to continue taking extremely high casualty rates in exchange for slow, grinding advances. The timing of the appointment is also notable given comments made by the Russian delegation in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) last week, which claimed that Russia is willing to continue fighting for years if necessary (see FORECAST below for further analysis). Additionally, Moscow confirmed the appointment of Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as Mordvichev’s replacement as commander of the Central Grouping of Forces. Solodchuk had previously commanded Russia’s Kursk Grouping of Forces, which successfully pushed Ukrainian forces out of the region earlier this year. Russia is therefore promoting commanders with proven battlefield experience and successes to their name. As such, Russian forces will highly likely continue their positional, attritional strategy for the foreseeable future; this strategy aims to grind down Ukrainian forces while creating opportunities for limited advances.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 15, 16 and 17 May indicates that Russian forces have advanced across Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) amid continued Ukrainian counter-attacks aimed at preventing Russia from consolidating its control over the town. Russian flags are now flying in central Oleksandropil and Nova Poltavka (both settlements are located to the south-west of Toretsk) after the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed it had seized Oleksandropil on 17 May. Russian forces have also made some advances to the north of Toretsk. That said, geolocated footage from 15 May indicated that Ukrainian forces advanced in the north of Toretsk also.
• BAKHMUT: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces reported on 17 May that Russian forces have improved the quality of their assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction and have increased the rate of assaults with armoured vehicles; this has risen from three to six assaults per day a few weeks ago, to seven to nine assaults per day currently. Relatedly, geolocated footage from 17 May indicates that Russian forces advanced marginally in central Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). Ukraine’s stubborn defence of Chasiv Yar (as well as Toretsk) will likely continue to frustrate Russian efforts to set conditions for an eventual drive on Kostiantynivka to the west.
• DONETSK: Russian offensive operations are likely prioritising areas to the east and north-east of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage from 16 May indicates that recent Russian advances resulted in the full capture of Myrolyubivka and Mykolaivka, both located approximately 11.5 miles (18.5km) to the east of Pokrovsk. There are indications that the Russian command has redeployed military personnel from further south in the Kurakhove sector to areas to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Recent Russian advances are likely aimed at expanding the salient in this area, possibly as part of broader efforts to capture Pokrovsk, which could become a key objective during summer offensive operations. Meanwhile, Russian forces also advanced in the north-eastern outskirts of Dachenske, located around six miles (10km) to the south of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Further south-west of Pokrovsk, Russian forces advanced south-east of Bohdanivka, located approximately 15 miles (24km) to the south-east of Novopavlivka, as of 16 May. Ukrainian military sources recently reported that Russia continues to rotate and replenish forces in this direction, sustaining elevated pressure on Ukrainian positions. Further south, as of 17 May, Russian forces recently captured Bahatyr, a settlement located approximately 17.4 miles (28km) to the west of Kurakhove. Footage from the same day also shows recent Russian advances south of Odradne, located about 21.7 miles (35km) to the south-west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: On 15 May, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s Kharkiv Group of Forces, Pavlo Shamshyn, reported that Russia is building up forces in the Kharkiv direction, and has already intensified offensive operations. Geolocated footage published over the last few days have confirmed Russian attacks, including reconnaissance-in-force operations, in and around Vovchansk, but they have resulted in no confirmed advances.
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, both sides have achieved limited gains along the Oskil–Kreminna front. Geolocated footage from 18 May shows recent Russian advances south of Hrekivka and north-east of Novomykhailivka, both located approximately 20 miles (32km) to the south-east of Borova. Meanwhile, footage from 16 May shows Ukrainian forces advancing in central Torske, located around 8.5 miles (13.6km) to the east of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 15 May indicates that Russian forces seized the village of Vine Pole, which is located around six miles (10km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka and only four miles (6km) south-east of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border. Further west, Russian forces made some marginal advances along the western-most point of the Zaporizhzhia frontline. Geolocated footage from 15 May confirmed Russian advances north-west of Lobkove, located around 24 miles (39km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 17-18 May, Russia launched its largest drone strike in a single attack since the start of the war, deploying in all 273 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The assault included 128 decoy UAVs, which were reported as lost by Ukraine’s Air Force. Ukrainian air defences intercepted 88 drones. A Russian milblogger claimed the effectiveness of the strike, underscored by the lower interception rates by Ukrainian air defences, was due to the use of the Geran-3 drone, the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238. This drone is reportedly equipped with a turbojet engine and a 300-kilogram warhead, though we cannot confirm this. The strike reportedly caused damage in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kyiv oblasts. On other days in our reporting period, Russian drone attacks also remained intense, often involving more than 100 UAVs, underscoring Russia’s ability to maintain a high tempo of drone attacks.
• STRIKES: A report from the Kyiv Independent published on 17 May highlights that Russia’s technological improvements to its drones have increased their lethality. One key advancement is the integration of jet engines. This has significantly increased the speed of Shahed drones from 125mph (200km/h) to between 236mph and 249mph (380km/h and 400km/h) and enables them to carry heavier warheads (up to 90kg) compared to the previous 30kg. Furthermore, the jet engines allow Russian forces to operate the drones at higher altitudes before launching swarm-style attacks when closer to their target. The new jet engines are more expensive than the earlier two-stroke piston engines, with Moscow reportedly relying on imported technology. That said, Russia has managed to establish effective procurement networks to source the necessary components and has clearly ramped up domestic production of such drones in recent years.
• STRIKES: Another technological improvement includes new programming added to the Shahed’s visual guidance system, allowing some drones to perform reactive manoeuvres, such as avoiding detection by search lights. Ukrainian military sources also told the Kyiv Independent that some drones are flying with Starlink terminals, allowing them to stay connected to drone operators in Russia in flight. If this is the case, which we cannot confirm, this has likely made recent attacks less predictable and, thus, harder for Ukrainian air defences to counter.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has reported that in recent months, Russia continues to increasingly rely on decoy drones and swarm-style attacks. This was demonstrated by the largest Russian drone assault to date, which took place overnight on 17-18 May. Ukrainian military forces responded with improved communication networks, reflected in the growing use of applications like Visage, improving Ukraine’s ability to track incoming air attacks. Ukrainian forces have also integrated Delta, a mapping and communications application, to improve their counter-UAV operations.
• STRIKES: On 18 May, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that Russia was planning a training launch of a RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile overnight on 18-19 May. However, according to Ukrainian media outlets, the launch did not take place, possibly due to a technical failure. In 2023, Russia reportedly failed twice in a row to successfully launch RS-24 missiles, both of which veered off course. The RS-24, adopted by Russia in 2009, is a nuclear-capable missile with a range of up to 6,835 miles (11,000km). The launch was expected to occur shortly after peace talks in Turkey and before a scheduled phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump later on 19 May. The launch would likely have been intended to demonstrate Moscow’s willingness and capability to escalate the conflict, deter Western allies from supporting Ukraine and signal Russia’s continued commitment to pursuing the war. As such, further demonstrations of such capabilities, including potential deployment of Oreshnik missiles, remain realistic possibility in the coming months.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• AID: Reports emerged earlier on 19 May that the Australian authorities have begun loading the first of 49 decommissioned Abrams tanks bound for Ukraine despite private US opposition to the transfer. According to one unspecified US official, Washington DC cautioned Canberra (prior to US President Donald Trump’s return to office) regarding sending these tanks to Ukraine. The official stated that the reasoning was that transferring the vehicles would be complicated and that Ukrainian forces would find them difficult to maintain once they arrive. That said, the US eventually gave permission for Australia to begin shipping the US-made tanks to Ukraine. This development comes after reports on 10 May that the US had approved the transfer of 125 long-range artillery rockets and 100 Patriot air defence missiles from Germany to Ukraine.
• AID: The development possibly indicates that the US (at least currently) will not block other countries’ efforts to support Ukraine by providing US-made equipment. That said, this stance could realistically change depending on the type of assistance countries wish to send Kyiv, how it will be used and the state of such aid (i.e. whether equipment has been decommissioned). However, the shipments of Abrams tanks from Australia provides cautious optimism for Kyiv since it indicates that the US will possibly allow European countries to purchase Patriot air defence systems for Ukraine’s benefit over the coming months.
• COALITION: German Chancellor Friederich Merz stated on 17 May that Ukraine’s European allies are ‘far from’ discussions about deploying troops as part of a so-called Coalition of the Willing for peacekeeping purposes. Merz emphasised that Europe’s efforts are currently centred on securing an unconditional ceasefire from Russia. We assess that Merz’s comments reflect the persistent lack of certainty about the will and feasibility of a Western troop deployment for peacekeeping (or more likely peace enforcing) in Ukraine. We assess that differing risk thresholds among decisionmakers will likely continue to undermine cohesion on committing to such a force.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: US President Trump has reportedly begun planned calls to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin separately earlier on 19 May; the calls are currently ongoing. The Kremlin has confirmed that the Putin-Trump phone call, which was expected to start at 1700hrs (Moscow time), will centre on the outcomes of negotiations in Istanbul between Russian and Ukrainian delegations on 16 May.
Despite the two sides remaining at odds regarding their willingness to enact an unconditional ceasefire and preferred terms to end the war, the Istanbul talks marked their first direct negotiations in three years. According to unspecified insiders familiar with the Istanbul talks, Russia demanded that Ukraine adopt a neutral status and not host foreign troops or weapons of mass destruction. The Russian side also demanded that Kyiv abandon its pursuit of reparations from Moscow for war damages. It also demanded that Ukraine rescind claims to Russian-annexed Crimea and four Ukrainian oblasts that Russia does not fully control (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia).
The Russian delegation also said Moscow would only agree to a ceasefire once Ukraine had withdrawn its troops from those regions and surrendered them. The Russian side also insisted that the Kremlin wants all five regions to be recognised internationally as part of Russia. While we cannot confirm this, many of these terms are what Russian officials (including Putin) have listed as its conditions for not only ‘peace’, but also a ‘ceasefire’. We continue to assess that Russia is highly likely unwilling (at present) to offer meaningful concessions to end the war, believing that it currently has the advantage. In line with this assessment, the leader of Russia’s delegation in Istanbul, Vladimir Medinsky, claimed on 16 May that Russian forces are ‘ready to fight forever’ to achieve its goals, invoking the 21-year long Great Northern War with Sweden in the 18th century. Such rhetoric is likely part of a wider Kremlin-led effort to present Russia has retaining the demographic, military and political wherewithal to continue this attritional war for the foreseeable future in order to extract concessions from Ukraine.
In line with this, recent unconfirmed reports from the talks also imply that Russia has not abandoned its maximalist territorial objectives in Ukraine. An unidentified insider claimed on 16 May that the Russian side also threatened to seize Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts during the negotiations. While we cannot confirm the veracity of such claims, if true, the remarks either underscore that Russia likely maintains wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine than the land it currently occupies or considers its own land, or is trying to convince Ukraine that it needs to concede now or risk allowing Russia’s list of demands to grow. A ‘well-placed source’ familiar with the recent talks also stated that the Russian side is ready to fight for ‘however long it takes’. This aligns with reports from Bloomberg on 18 May citing unnamed Kremlin insiders that Putin is ready for a protracted conflict if that is what is required to achieve his war objectives.
Putin is reportedly also confident that his forces can break through Ukrainian defences by the end of the year to fully take control of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. While this is highly likely an overly optimistic assessment and unlikely to be fulfilled during that timeframe, Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov previously voiced this as a goal for 2025. The reports highly likely indicate that Russia will remain reluctant to make significant territorial concessions to Ukraine to end the war and will seek to control these territories either through negotiations or military means.
While Russia continues to feign interest in the peace process, if such negotiations are a delaying tactic, as we assess is highly likely the case, US diplomatic patience may expire. One unspecified senior European diplomat disclosed on 16 May that Putin is doing ‘just enough’ to convince Trump that he is engaged in finding peace in Ukraine while also doing as much as possible to ensure that peace efforts do not materialise. Nevertheless, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on 18 May that the Senate could act to apply additional sanctions against Russia irrespective of the White House’s position if there is a lack of progress towards a ceasefire. Such comments are highly likely aimed at increasing pressure on Moscow to agree to a ceasefire in the near term and make steps towards ending the war. By portraying new sanctions as a possibility that Trump and officials involved in engaging with Russia cannot prevent, the administration could realistically position the use of sanctions relief as an incentive for Russian co-operation. (Source: Sibylline)
22 May 25. Ukrainian Sniper Group Claims 1,700-Meter Kill of Russian Soldier Inside Armored Vehicle. A Ukrainian sniper reportedly struck a Russian armored personnel carrier (APC) from 1,700 meters away during an enemy assault operation this week, according to a report shared on Telegram by Ukraine’s Sniper Group E40. The sniper reportedly used a Barrett M82A1 rifle, chambered in .50 BMG (12.7×99 mm), to fire several precise shots at the vehicle. One of the rounds reportedly hit the driver, bringing the vehicle to a stop.
“The vehicle stopped, enemy radio chatter screamed the driver’s head was taken off – shock. Even the shooter himself didn’t believe the result at first. But this isn’t a myth. This is the work of our most experienced sniper,” wrote the group.
Anti-materiel rifles, such as the M82A1, are designed for long-range accuracy, capable of effectively engaging targets up to 1,800 meters or more, depending on the ammunition and environmental conditions. Meanwhile, the .50 BMG round is known for its ability to penetrate steel plating and engine blocks, making it highly effective against vehicles and fortified targets.
Ukrainian snipers have carried out similar long-range shots in recent months. In April, a sniper from the Gray Area Group hit a Russian soldier at 1,450 meters using a Canadian PGW LRT-3 rifle.
In November 2023, a Ukrainian sniper serving with the Security Service of Ukraine reportedly set a new world record by eliminating a Russian soldier from a distance of 3,800 meters, surpassing the previous world record of 3,540 meters. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
21 May 25. Russia’s elite drone unit destroying Ukraine’s precious Himars launchers. Kyiv’s US-supplied long-range missiles are among its most valuable battlefield assets – but they are now under a dangerous new threat. Footage captured the moment a Ukrainian Himars rocket launcher was destroyed by an elite Russian drone unit just 10km (six miles) from the front line last month.
In a grainy video filmed just outside Chasiv Yar, in Donetsk, the US-supplied missile system was seen hurtling along a dirt-laden road as a Russian UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) closed in from above.
The feed cut out seconds before impact, but separate footage showed an explosion moments later, confirming one of Ukraine’s most valuable rocket systems had been destroyed.
The attack was reportedly carried out by Rubicon, the Kremlin’s elite drone warfare unit that Ukrainian soldiers have come to fear.
Previously deployed earlier this year during Russia’s brutal campaign to recapture the eastern town of Kursk, Rubicon has now been redirected to hunt Ukraine’s most valuable battlefield assets: its US-supplied long-range missiles.
There are signs it is succeeding.
Since the start of the war, Ukraine has received around 40 vital Himars systems from Washington.
The satellite-guided rocket launchers, capable of striking targets with pinpoint accuracy up to 80km away, have played a key role in blunting Russia’s advances, allowing Kyiv to pin Russia back by disrupting logistics, command hubs and ammunition depots.
Their advantage lies in the fact that they can sit deep behind the front line, out of Russian reach.
Because of their importance, it is unusual for a Himars launcher to be placed just 10km from the front line. The one that was destroyed near the war-torn town of Chasiv Yar was therefore probably being used to hit a target deep behind enemy lines.
“Himars have remained an important tactical and operational level system for the Ukrainians, particularly as it can hold Russian targets at risk some distance from the front line, affecting Russian logistics and command and control, as well as combat power,” said Tom Withington, a weapons expert at Rusi, a defence think tank.
But, following the latest destruction of the launcher near Chasiv Yar, at least four have now been lost – a small but significant dent in Ukraine’s arsenal at a time when US support appears likely to dry up.
Donald Trump’s administration has given no indication it will resupply Ukraine with new Himars systems, further raising the stakes for Ukraine over its remaining ones.
The latest method used to destroy a Himars launcher is especially concerning for Kyiv.
Unlike previous losses, which mostly resulted from missile or artillery strikes, the latest attack on one of the systems was reportedly carried out by a first-person view (FPV) drone using a fibre-optic guidance cable – a sophisticated and largely jam-proof design that signals a dangerous shift in the conflict.
Traditional FPV drones are vulnerable to Ukraine’s electronic warfare systems, which jam incoming frequencies and render them blind mid-flight.
(Source: Daily Telegraph)
20 May 25. Ukraine Prepares for a Russian Summer Offensive.
by Dr Jack Watling.
Russia will seek to intensify offensive operations to build pressure during negotiations, but the pressure cannot be sustained indefinitely.
US President Donald Trump had been calling for a ceasefire in Ukraine from his inauguration in late January. But when Ukrainian negotiators met their Russian counterparts in Istanbul last week, Russia continued to make maximalist demands and claimed that it was prepared to fight for years. Russia cannot sustain operations indefinitely, but for now Moscow thinks its leverage over Ukraine will build over time and since Trump has strongly implied that he will withdraw from negotiations the Russian military is set to intensify its operations.
The rate of Russian advance began to accelerate over the autumn of 2024. Russian advances then stalled as Ukraine adapted to Russian assault tactics and imposed a 15 km deep belt of attrition that prevented Russian troops reaching the line of contact in sufficient numbers to break through. Ukraine has suffered throughout this period from a shortage of troops, with recruitment still below the level needed to maintain the force. But Russia’s ability to inflict casualties on the Armed Forces of Ukraine was not matched by an ability to take ground.
April and early May of 2025 saw a reduction in the intensity of Russian operations, partly as a result of performative ‘ceasefires’ around Easter and Victory Day, and the redeployment of forces following the collapse of Ukrainian positions in Kursk. Russian recruitment, however, has exceeded Kremlin targets for every month of 2025. Having shuffled commanders and built-up reserves of equipment, Russia is now set to increase the tempo and scale of attacks.
The word ‘offensive’ conjures up visions of rapid manoeuvres by large mechanised units. The Russians lack the force quality to operate in this way. Instead, its summer offensive will likely have a soft launch with a steady increase in the number and scale of assaults across a broadening area around the main axis. Indeed, there are indications this process has already started.
Russia has spent some time suggesting that it might threaten Kharkiv and testing Ukrainian defences in Sumy and Zaporizhzhia. These attacks have either been intended to fix Ukrainian troops away from Donbas or forestall further Ukrainian raids across the Russian border. The main Russian effort into the summer will once again be against the key towns of Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. Russian forces continue to plan against orders to complete the occupation of Donetsk.
Accompanying the intensifying attempts to take ground, Russia has also been innovating to work out how to degrade Ukraine’s layered drone defences. Ukraine has, for some time, been expanding its ability to knock down Russian reconnaissance drones using its own drone interceptors, thereby blinding Russian units that would otherwise direct glide bombs and ballistic missiles against targets in the Ukrainian rear. The Ukrainian interceptors, however, are guided by small radar, and Russia is now systematically working to locate and target these radar stations.
Another important line of effort for the Russians is attacking Ukraine’s UAV pilots. Here the methodology is to use direction finding, signals intelligence and reconnaissance to pinpoint the location of pilots and then target them with wire guided drones and glide bombs. This has become more effective as Russia has increased the speed at which it can pass information between its units.
Separate from Russian attacks on the front will be the continuation of a high tempo of deep strikes against Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and bases. The Russians understand that these have an impact on the civilian population in Ukraine and the international community. The Kremlin will want to suggest a deteriorating situation as negotiations continue and to signal to Europe that the rear is not safe, to discourage European militaries from putting forces in country.
Another point of leverage that Russia will endeavour to exploit is the tensions between the United States and its NATO allies and the potential for significant US troop withdrawals from Europe following a force posture review this summer. Intensifying attacks on Ukraine before and during the Hague summit is likely to be used to try and disrupt a NATO summit that is supposed to focus on spending to resource the alliance’s regional plans, and instead make it about Ukraine, where there is a divergence of priorities between Washington and allied capitals.
The picture is therefore of a challenging four months for the Ukrainian military as US materiel support runs out. This will place a premium on the efficiency of Ukrainian drone and artillery operations, the ability of Ukrainian commanders to preserve their troops, and the continuity of supplies flowing from Ukraine’s international partners.
Much hope has been vested in the possibility that President Trump will become frustrated with Russian intransigence and that the United States will begin to put pressure on Russia. But Trump essentially ruled this out during a phone call with President Putin on Monday, where he essentially signalled that the US would leave negotiations to the Russians to slow-roll, while offering the prospect of trade, and therefore sanctions relief.
It must be hoped that disengagement is not accompanied by the active obstruction of European efforts to sustain Kyiv’s war effort, such as by preventing the purchase of US equipment to gift to Ukraine. So long as the US allows re-export, Europe should be able to meet most of Ukraine’s needs. Shortages of air defence interceptors and guided multiple launch rockets will present tactical problems, but the impact can be mitigated.
If the US or Europe were to begin to expand sanctions against Russia, however, it would be timely. Russian stockpiles of legacy Soviet equipment, from tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, to artillery pieces, will be running out between now and mid-autumn, such that Russia’s ability to replace losses will be entirely dependent on what it can produce from scratch. At the same time, while Russia can fight another two campaign seasons with its current approach to recruitment, further offensive operations into 2026 will likely require further forced mobilisation, which is both politically and economically challenging.
Russia’s economic outlook also darkens as we approach 2026. The collapse in the oil price following Donald Trump’s tariff policy will severely limit Russian revenue, while its reserves are becoming depleted. More aggressive enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet and the continuation of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign could reduce the liquid capital that has so far allowed Russia to steadily increase defence production and offer massive bonuses for volunteers joining the military. If Ukraine can deny Russia from reaching the borders of Donetsk between now and Christmas, and Kyiv’s international partners are diligent in degrading Russia’s economy, Moscow will face hard choices about the costs it is prepared to incur for continuing the war. Under such conditions the Russians may move from Potemkin negotiations to actually negotiating.
There is a darker possible future, in which the summer offensive overpowers Ukrainian defences to take key towns in Donbas, after which Russia pivots to attacking Kharkiv in the autumn, while once again switching its deep strike campaign to degrade Ukrainian power generation and distribution ahead of the winter. Under such circumstances, the Russians hope that they can steadily convince Europe to pressure Ukraine to sue for peace, even on unacceptable terms. It is the belief that this trajectory is possible that is keeping the Kremlin prepared to plough on, despite the chronic underperformance of its arms. Ukraine and its partners must strip the Kremlin of its illusions.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution. (Source: RUSI)
20 May 25. Ukraine Hits Russian Radar on Black Sea’s Boyko Towers in Dual Drone Strike. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) carried out a successful drone strike against a Russian-controlled gas platform in the Black Sea, destroying radar equipment and other Russian military assets. In a Telegram post, the SBU said the strike targeted the Boyko Towers — gas rigs that Russia seized after annexing Crimea in 2014. The SBU’s 13th Main Directorate of the Military Counterintelligence Department led the strike using a combination of air and sea drones.
The operation reportedly started with an aerial drone strike, followed by a precision strike carried out by a maritime drone. A video released by the agency shows a large explosion and fire on the platform, though the footage has not been independently verified.
“Within one special operation, SBU specialists used two types of drones, which demonstrated the effectiveness of working in pairs,” the SBU stated in their report. “We once again reminded the enemy that no Russian junk has a place in the Black Sea.”
According to SBU, the strike destroyed the Neva-B radar system, capable of tracking up to 200 targets simultaneously, along with warehouse facilities and living quarters on the platform. This is the third known Ukrainian strike on the Boyko Towers, following earlier attacks in June 2022 and December 2024. Ukraine has used over 100 uncrewed surface drones, like the Magura V5 and Sea Baby, since 2022 to strike Russian ships, platforms, and infrastructure. In addition to the recent strike, the SBU also highlighted earlier drone operations, which included strikes on the Crimean Bridge and 11 Russian warships. According to the SBU, these attacks have weakened Russia’s naval dominance in the Black Sea and played a key role in reopening the grain corridor. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 May 25. Trump says Russia, Ukraine agree to immediate ceasefire talks, Kremlin offers no timeframe.
• Summary
• Russia ready to work with Ukraine on a memorandum about future peace talks
• Zelenskiy calls for high-level talks with Russia, Western countries
• Trump says Vatican interested in hosting talks
Donald Trump said after his call on Monday with President Vladimir Putin that Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations for a ceasefire, but the Kremlin said the process would take time and the U.S. president indicated he was not ready to join Europe with fresh sanctions to pressure Moscow.
In a social media post, Trump said he relayed the plan to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy as well as the leaders of the European Union, France, Italy, Germany and Finland in a group call following his session with the Russian leader.
“Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War,” Trump said, adding later at the White House that he thought “some progress is being made.”
Putin thanked Trump for supporting the resumption of direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv after the two sides met in Turkey last week for their first face-to-face negotiations since March 2022. But after the Monday call he said only that efforts were “generally on the right track”.
“We have agreed with the president of the United States that Russia will propose and is ready to work with the Ukrainian side on a memorandum on a possible future peace accord,” Putin told reporters near the Black Sea resort of Sochi. (Source: Reuters)
19 May 25. Finland to use proceeds from frozen Russian assets to supply ammunition to Ukraine. Finland will supply 90 m euros ($101.35 m) of ammunition to Ukraine by using proceeds from Russian financial assets frozen by the European Union after Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the Finnish defence ministry said on Monday.
The EU has estimated that 210 bn euros of the roughly $300 bn worth of frozen Russian assets are held in the 27-nation bloc, mainly in the form of government bonds that Russia’s central bank had stored as reserves.
The European Commission decided last year that proceeds from the assets could be used to support Kyiv’s military through an EU-run fund.
“We were able to negotiate additional funding for Finland’s support for Ukraine,” Defence Minister Antti Hakkanen said. “The products are purchased from Finnish industry to boost employment at home and sent to Ukraine to help its defence. I am very pleased with the outcome.”
The Kremlin did not immediately respond to a request for comment. It has repeatedly said that any move to seize or sell off frozen Russian assets would be illegal; contravene property rights; set a dangerous precedent, and would be challenged in court. (Source: Reuters)
17 May 25. Italy arms Ukraine with 400 M113 APCs and a satellite system. On May 17, 2025, Italy announced a significant new military aid package for Ukraine, delivering 400 M113 armored personnel carriers and an unspecified satellite surveillance system to bolster Kyiv’s defense capabilities amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The announcement, reported by credible sources including the Italian outlet il Giornale, marks Italy’s 11th military aid package to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. This latest contribution underscores Rome’s continued commitment to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while reinforcing Italy’s role as a key player in European defense cooperation.
The package, confirmed by Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, aims to enhance Ukraine’s ground mobility and situational awareness, critical elements in countering Russian forces.
The M113 armored personnel carrier, a cornerstone of this aid package, is a fully tracked vehicle developed by the United States FMC Corporation in the late 1950s. First deployed by the U.S. Army in 1961, the M113 has seen extensive use across multiple conflicts, earning a reputation for reliability and versatility.
Measuring 4.86 meters in length, 2.69 meters in width, and 2.5 meters in height, the M113 weighs approximately 12.3 tons in its base configuration. Its aluminum armor, a pioneering feature at the time of its introduction, provides protection against small arms fire and artillery shell fragments, though it is less effective against modern anti-tank weapons.
The vehicle is powered by a Detroit Diesel 6V53T six-cylinder engine, producing 265 horsepower, which enables a maximum road speed of 67 kilometers per hour and an operational range of about 480 kilometers.
The M113’s design prioritizes troop transport, capable of carrying up to 11 infantrymen in addition to a crew of two—a driver and a commander. Its primary armament typically consists of a single .50 caliber M2 Browning machine gun mounted on a pintle, offering suppressive fire against infantry and light vehicles.
Some variants, such as the M113A1, which Italy may be providing, feature improved engines and transmission systems for enhanced performance. The vehicle’s amphibious capability, enabled by its lightweight construction and sealed hull, allows it to ford water obstacles with minimal preparation, making it adaptable to diverse terrains.
Over 80,000 M113s have been produced in various configurations, serving in roles ranging from troop transport to command vehicles, medical evacuation platforms, and mortar carriers.
Italy’s decision to supply 400 M113s likely draws from its decommissioned military stockpiles, as evidenced by satellite imagery reported by BulgarianMilitary.com in May 2024, which revealed significant reactivation of stored Italian equipment, including M113s, Leopard 1 tanks, and M109L self-propelled howitzers.
The M113s in question may include the VCC-1 “Camillino,” an Italian-upgraded variant of the M113A1. The VCC-1 features enhanced armor protection, improved firepower with options for additional machine guns or missile launchers, and better internal ergonomics for infantry.
These upgrades make the VCC-1 a more robust platform for modern battlefields, though its age limits its effectiveness against advanced threats like Russia’s T-90 tanks or Kornet anti-tank missiles.
The inclusion of a satellite surveillance system in the aid package adds a strategic dimension to Italy’s contribution. While specific details about the system remain undisclosed, its role is likely to enhance Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Satellite systems provide real-time imagery and data, enabling commanders to monitor troop movements, detect artillery positions, and coordinate strikes with precision. Such systems are particularly valuable in Ukraine’s vast operational theater, where Russian forces have employed drones and long-range artillery extensively.
The lack of specificity about the system has sparked speculation, with some analysts suggesting it could involve commercial satellite imagery services or a military-grade platform developed by Italian firms like Leonardo S.p.A., a leader in aerospace and defense technology.
Leonardo’s COSMO-SkyMed constellation, for instance, offers high-resolution radar imaging capable of operating in all weather conditions, a critical asset for monitoring contested regions.
Italy’s military aid aligns with its broader strategy of supporting Ukraine through both bilateral and multilateral channels. Since 2022, Rome has delivered 10 prior aid packages, including advanced systems like the French-Italian SAMP/T air defense system, Storm Shadow missiles, and M109L howitzers, as noted by Euromaidan Press.
The SAMP/T, or Sol-Air Moyenne Portée/Terrestre, is a medium-range air defense system designed to intercept aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles. It features the Aster 30 missile, which has a range of up to 120 kilometers and can engage targets at altitudes of up to 20 kilometers.
The system’s radar, the Arabel, provides 360-degree coverage and can track multiple targets simultaneously, making it a formidable asset for protecting Ukrainian cities and military installations. Italy’s delivery of a second SAMP/T unit in July 2024, under a German-led initiative, highlights its commitment to enhancing Ukraine’s air defense network.
The M113s and satellite system are part of a broader European effort to sustain Ukraine’s military capabilities as uncertainties loom over U.S. support following the inauguration of President Donald Trump in January 2025. Trump’s administration has signaled a focus on negotiating a ceasefire, with the U.S. Department of State noting on March 12, 2025, that “the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is unsustainable and must end.”
This stance has prompted European nations, including Italy, to step up their contributions. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has emerged as a vocal advocate for Ukraine, pledging €1.7 bn in military aid for 2025, a record amount for Rome, according to Militarnyi.
Meloni’s diplomatic efforts, including her proposal for NATO-style security guarantees for Ukraine, reflect Italy’s ambition to shape the geopolitical landscape while maintaining close ties with Washington.
The M113’s operational history provides context for its relevance in Ukraine. During the Vietnam War, the M113 served as the backbone of U.S. mechanized infantry, navigating dense jungles to deliver troops and firepower. Its simplicity and low maintenance requirements made it a favorite among crews, though its thin armor drew criticism against rocket-propelled grenades.
In Ukraine, the M113 has been widely used since 2022, with over 1,500 units donated by countries including the United States, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark, per Wikipedia. The vehicles have supported Ukraine’s rapid offensives, such as the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive, by transporting infantry to forward positions and evacuating wounded personnel.
However, their vulnerability to modern anti-tank weapons has led to significant losses, with 391 M113s reported destroyed, damaged, or captured by Russian forces as of January 2025.
Comparatively, the M113 lags behind modern armored personnel carriers like the U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicle or Russia’s BMP-3, which offer heavier armor and integrated missile systems. The Bradley, for instance, features a 25mm Bushmaster cannon and TOW missile launchers, providing greater firepower and survivability.
Ukraine has received over 300 Bradleys, which have been used in combined arms operations alongside M1 Abrams tanks. The M113’s lighter weight and lower cost, however, make it suitable for rapid deployment and logistics support, particularly for a Ukrainian military stretched across a 1,000-kilometer front line.
Italy’s VCC-1 variant, with its enhanced armor, may offer marginal improvements, but it remains a stopgap compared to next-generation platforms like the U.S. Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle [AMPV], which is replacing the M113 in American service.
The satellite surveillance system, though less tangible in its description, could prove more transformative. Russia’s use of Lancet drones and Iskander ballistic missiles has underscored the need for persistent surveillance.
A system like COSMO-SkyMed, with its 1-meter resolution and rapid revisit times, could enable Ukraine to detect Russian troop concentrations or supply depots, facilitating preemptive strikes with HIMARS or Storm Shadow missiles. Italy’s expertise in space technology, bolstered by Leonardo’s partnerships with the European Space Agency, positions it to provide cutting-edge solutions.
The system’s integration with Ukraine’s existing intelligence network, including U.S.-provided SIGINT and NATO AWACS data, could amplify its impact.
Italy’s aid package reflects a delicate balance between supporting Ukraine and managing domestic defense priorities. The reactivation of M113s from storage, as we reported, suggests Rome is depleting older inventories to avoid compromising its active forces.
Italy’s military modernization, including the €15 bn A2CS program to replace the Dardo infantry fighting vehicle, indicates a shift toward next-generation platforms, per Defense News.
The A2CS aims to produce 1,050 tracked vehicles with scalable armor and advanced electronics, positioning Italy as a leader in European defense innovation. By transferring legacy systems like the M113, Italy frees resources for these initiatives while meeting its international commitments.
The broader geopolitical context amplifies the significance of Italy’s contribution. The European Union’s approval of €35 bn in loans for Ukraine, with €3 bn disbursed in January 2025, underscores the bloc’s resolve to sustain Kyiv’s war effort, as reported by Euromaidan Press.
Italy’s leadership in the Armored Vehicles Coalition, alongside its role in training Ukrainian personnel under the EU’s EUMAM mission, highlights its multifaceted support. The imposition of sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet and defense sector, as noted in the EU’s 16th sanctions package, further tightens the economic pressure on Moscow, complementing military aid.
Italy’s latest aid package strengthens Ukraine’s ability to maintain territorial control and protect its skies, but questions remain about the long-term sustainability of such support. The M113s, while numerous, are aging platforms that require significant maintenance, and the unspecified satellite system’s effectiveness depends on its integration and operational scope.
As Europe braces for potential shifts in U.S. policy, Italy’s proactive stance positions it as a linchpin in the transatlantic alliance. Whether this aid will tip the balance in Ukraine’s favor or merely prolong a grueling conflict is an open question, one that hinges on the evolving dynamics of a war now in its fourth year. (Source: Google/bulgarianmilitary.com/)
16 May 25. Ukrainian Intelligence Makes First Public Reveal of Magura-7 Drone Boat Used to Down Russian Jets. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) publicly revealed its Magura-7 uncrewed surface vessel (USV) Thursday, showcasing new footage and technical specifications during a ceremony that also unveiled a commemorative stamp honoring the country’s naval drone campaign. The event marked the first official presentation of the Magura drone series, including the Magura V5, V6P, and the newly unveiled V7. GUR Commander Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov and members of Ukraine’s special services introduced the models and confirmed the V7’s combat role in a recent operation that reportedly resulted in the downing of two Russian Su-30 Flanker fighter jets over the Black Sea using mounted air-to-air missiles.
Footage released by GUR showed a Magura-7 fitted with two live AIM-9M Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles mounted on fixed, aircraft-style launch rails. The drone’s configuration has been deemed capable of surface-to-air interception.
According to Budanov, this was the same loadout used to target and destroy the two Su-30s—marking the first publicly reported instance of a drone boat downing fixed-wing combat aircraft in active conflict. As The War Zone first reported, the missiles rely on infrared homing for targeting, with the drone maneuvering to aim instead of using a traversable launcher.
The Magura V7 is reportedly designed for extended endurance, increased payload capacity, and multi-role operations. Measuring about 23.6 feet long and powered by a 270-horsepower diesel engine, it can reach speeds up to 39 knots and operate for 48 hours, or up to seven days with an auxiliary generator. It carries up to 1,430 pounds of weapons and has an operating range of approximately 540 nautical miles. The vessel is reportedly capable of handling sea states with wave heights up to four feet.
It is also equipped with a gyro-stabilized day and night surveillance turret, multiple video feeds, and an acoustic environment monitoring system. A variant featuring a machine gun combat module was also displayed.
GUR emphasized that Ukraine’s USVs are now deployed as a coordinated system involving various specialized roles, including kamikaze drones, interceptors with air-to-air missiles, and defensive gunboats.
Though not highlighted at the event, SOFX has previously reported on operations that have shown USVs being used as mobile launch platforms for unmanned aerial vehicles as well. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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