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Military And Security Developments
May 15.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: CNN has reported that Russia is currently amassing forces for a possible new offensive; this comes amid Moscow’s claims that it is now recruiting between 50,000 and 60,000 new personnel every month
• GAS: Gas stocks in Ukraine’s underground gas storage facilities (UGS) are at their lowest level in 11 years, but an increase in gas imports will likely offset the risk of shortages
• BORDER: A protest by Polish truckers intending to block the Yagodyn-Dorohusk border crossing ended on 13 May after a Polish court ruled against the demonstration
• FORECAST: On 15 May, Russian and Ukrainian delegations are scheduled to meet in Istanbul to hold the first direct negotiations since the collapse of talks in April 2022; however, a major breakthrough remains highly unlikely
• OFFENSIVES: On 15 May, CNN reported two unnamed US officials as assessing that Russia is currently amassing forces for a possible new offensive. Various other sources in recent weeks have indicated a possible Russian buildup at various points along the frontline. While the spring offensive has been grinding forward in recent months, Russia has achieved few significant territorial advances in Ukraine in a campaign that has largely been attritional and positional in nature. That said, we have assessed in recent months that Russian forces are likely attempting to set conditions for an eventual drive on Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast); as such, an intensification of offensive operations east of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk remains a realistic possibility in the coming weeks.
• OFFENSIVES: In line with this, on 13 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that between 50,000 and 60,000 personnel voluntarily sign contracts with the Russian military every month. While this number is unconfirmed (and could realistically be a slight exaggeration), Russian forces are likely currently significant numbers even during the fourth year of war. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed on 13 May that Russia has sustained 177,000 casualties since the beginning of 2025. If Putin’s numbers are accurate, this would indicate that Russia is currently recruiting sufficient volunteers to offset losses while increasing the number of troops available for operations in Ukraine.
• OFFENSIVES: Putin’s announcement is therefore likely an attempt to emphasise Russia’s advantage in personnel over Ukraine, just as direct negotiations are due to begin in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) later on 15 May. The timing just ahead of the scheduled talks also likely attempts to frame Russia as maintaining the military advantage and underscore its willingness and capability to carry on fighting. See FORECAST below for further analysis on the Istanbul talks.
• BAKHMUT: On 12 May, the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade currently fighting in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast) reported that Russia has deployed the ceremonial Presidential Regiment to the area, though this remains unconfirmed. The Regiment, under the control of the Federal Protective Service (FSO), is a ceremonial military unit responsible for guarding the Kremlin and senior officials. While it remains unclear whether the unit has actually deployed to the frontline, if this is true, the troops are unlikely to be highly experienced. However, their prestige may serve propagandistic purposes in preparation for a potential intensification of operations in Chasiv Yar.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have continued to make gains on the highly dynamic battlefield in and around Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), though Russia retains the advantage overall. Geolocated footage published on 12 and 13 May indicates Russian advances to the west and south-west of the town amid efforts to push the Ukrainians back following earlier successful counter-attacks. Russian forces also advanced to the north of Toretsk. If they consolidate, this could pose a threat to various Ukrainian positions to the north of the town.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have also continued to launch various counter-attacks to the north and north-east of Toretsk over the last week. Most notably, geolocated footage published on 12 May indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced along the main highway running into the north-western outskirts of the town; they are estimated to still retain a very limited position inside the city limits.
• DONETSK: In recent days, both sides have made gains east of Pokrovsk, which is likely the locus of an intensification of Russian operations. Geolocated footage published on 13 May indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Myrne, located 10.9 miles (17.5km) to the east of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Russian forces also advanced in central Myrne, likely reflecting the contested nature of the settlement. Russia also captured Yelyzavetivka, located 17 miles (27.4km) to the east of Pokrovsk. Additionally, as of 13 May, Ukrainian forces advanced in central Lysivka 6.8 miles (11km) to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Further south, Russian troops made confirmed advances in southern Bahatyr, located 17.4 miles (28km) to the west of Kurakhove.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Geolocated footage from 12 May shows recent Russian advances in eastern Ridkodub, a settlement located 15.5 miles (25km) north of Lyman (both Donetsk oblast). Footage from 13 May shows Russian forces progressing north-east of Zapadne, located 11.2 miles (18km) north of Kupiansk.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 13 May indicates that Russian forces have seized the village of Novosilka, located around six miles (10km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka (both Donetsk oblast). Further geolocated footage from 14 May indicates that Russian forces have advanced further to the north-west of the village, amid wider efforts to advance ever closer to the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border.
• STRIKES: Over the past 48 hours, Russian long-range strikes included large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In addition to drones, the attack early on 14 May included an Iskandr-M ballistic missile, which hit industrial infrastructure in Sumy (Sumy oblast).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• GAS: According to ExPro Daily Gas data, gas stocks in Ukraine’s underground gas storage facilities (UGS) are at their lowest level in 11 years; however, a dramatic increase in gas imports will likely offset the risk of energy shortages. The latest data indicates that, as of 11 May, 6.02 billion cubic metres of gas were stored in Ukraine’s UGS, representing 19.4% of total capacity. The low storage levels for May are likely due to a significant reduction in Ukrainian gas production due to Russian strikes over the winter.
• GAS: The state-owned UkrGasVydobuvannya (Naftogaz) has confirmed that, as of February, it had lost 50% of its gas production capability following Russian strikes. Naftogaz confirmed in April that it had restored half of the lost production volumes. However, imports of gas will likely offset these levels over the medium term. Imports of gas remain stable, at around 14 million cubic metres per day at current rates; this is notably higher than in May 2024. Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has imported over 1.12 billion cubic metres of gas; this is almost ten times the recorded import levels during the same period in 2024. While these import levels will further strain Ukraine’s finances, Ukraine has plenty of time to inject sufficient gas into USG in preparation for the next winter.
• BORDER: A protest by Polish truckers intending to block the Yagodyn-Dorohusk border crossing ended on 13 May after a Polish court ruled against the demonstration. The decision was made by the Court of Appeal and stands as the final judgement (which cannot be appealed). As such, further organised disruption at the border crossing remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term. Further trucker protests are furthermore less likely following a report from the Financial Times on 14 May that the EU is planning to impose higher tariffs on Ukrainian imports in the coming weeks; the import of cheap Ukrainian (primarily agricultural) products into Poland was a leading grievance and driver for the border protests.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Later on 15 May, Russian and Ukrainian delegations are scheduled to meet in Istanbul to hold the first direct negotiations since the collapse of talks in April 2022. The Kremlin has confirmed that President Vladimir Putin will not attend despite the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is already in Turkey and had called for a direct meeting. Russian media reported later on 15 May that there is a realistic possibility that talks will be postponed until 16 May. The Kremlin has taken its assertion that the negotiations will be a continuation of the Istanbul talks that collapsed in 2022 quite literally, given that the negotiating team flying to Turkey almost perfectly reflects the original delegation sent in 2022. The delegation will be headed by Vladimir Medinsky, a presidential aide, who will be accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin and the head of Russian military intelligence (the GRU), Admiral Igor Kostyukov, among other junior officials. GRU head Kostyukov’s presence is notable, given the GRU has played an important role in facilitating prisoner swaps with Ukraine, which remain the only successful low-level contact between Russia and Ukraine to date. However, the fact that the delegation is almost a carbon copy of that in 2022 strongly supports our assessment that Russia will use this first round of direct talks to propose a (potentially updated) version of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols. Medinsky did state on 15 May that his delegation is ready to discuss ‘possible compromises’ with the Ukrainian side in Istanbul, but it remains unclear how far those compromises will go. The initial protocols effectively demanded Ukraine’s capitulation, a dramatic reduction in its military strength and a ban on Ukraine hosting foreign military personnel, in addition to enforcing Ukraine’s neutrality and inability to join any military alliances. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 12 May 2025.
While the Kremlin ruled out President Vladimir Putin’s attendance on 15 May, several senior Ukrainian officials are already in Turkey, including President Volodymyr Zelensky himself, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak. Zelensky stated earlier on 15 May that Russia has sent ‘stand-in props’ for the talks and had also previously indicated his unwillingness to engage in the talks directly unless Putin was there personally. According to the Washington Post, numerous US and European officials convinced Zelensky that attending the talks would reflect well on Kyiv, regardless. Zelensky confirmed earlier on 15 May that the Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov will head the negotiating delegation for Ukraine in Istanbul, though it remains unclear if Zelensky himself will travel to Istanbul from Ankara as well. The incongruence in the seniority of the Russian and Ukrainian delegations, as well as the fact that both sides’ negotiating strategies and positions are fundamentally at odds, make any significant breakthrough towards peace highly unlikely in the short term. The Ukrainian government confirmed on 15 May that its delegation will use the talks to discuss a 30-day ceasefire and its implementation only, rather than wider terms. Moscow, meanwhile, will almost certainly reiterate its long-held position that a ceasefire is only possible if the alleged ‘root causes’ of the conflict (namely NATO expansion and alleged Ukrainian discrimination against Russian speakers) are resolved.
Both sides are therefore so far apart from the outset that the nascent peace process is highly likely to drag out for the foreseeable future, which is likely part of the Russian strategy to delay negotiations as it seeks greater advantage on the battlefield. Russia will likely attempt to leverage the Istanbul talks as a delaying tactic to continue refusing ceasefire proposals by claiming they are engaging in talks. However, given the significant US interest in the talks and the Trump administration’s determination to reach some sort of settlement (or at least a temporary ceasefire), Moscow risks alienating Washington DC the longer the talks drag on without any notable compromise on the Russian side.
US President Trump confirmed on 13 May that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, alongside Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg, will attend the talks. Trump had also indicated his willingness to travel to Istanbul to take part in the talks on 16 May, though unnamed US officials have indicated he will not attend, following Putin’s refusal to take part in the talks. Trump has subsequently stated that ‘nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together’, suggesting that the president does not see much chance of significant progress being made in Istanbul.
• Russia: Secret budget spending procedures will allow government to sustain protracted conflict. On 15 May, The Moscow Times reported on Russia’s continued use of secret federal budget spending, which has cost Russian taxpayers more than RUB 20 trillion (USD 250 bn). This classified budget expenditure has increased by 44% in the first quarter of the year compared to the same period in 2024. Almost all of this hidden spending is allocated to defence expenditure; the growth observed in this year’s first quarter likely reflects a boost in the financing of weapons contracts, as well as increasingly expensive pay packages to attract recruits. We previously assessed (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 11 March 2025) that expanding defence expenditure remains a key driver of Russia’s long-term budget deficit. In addition to this secret financing scheme, the government has also relied on off-budget financing mechanisms to sustain its growing defence spending, significantly increasing the risk of a credit crisis. Ultimately, while this soaring defence spending will allow Moscow to sustain its war in Ukraine, it will nonetheless remain a driver of long-term economic instability.
• Armenia-Azerbaijan: Repeated ceasefire allegations underscore low prospects for reducing tensions. On 14 May, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that, on the evening of 13 May, Armenian forces allegedly opened fire on Azerbaijani positions across the border. The MoD stated that its forces took retaliatory measures, without providing further details. Armenia’s MoD issued a statement contesting Baku’s claims. Yerevan denied similar claims issued earlier in May. Such allegations from both sides – particularly from Baku – have become more frequent since the start of the year. The growing frequency of these claims underscores that tensions between both countries are heightening, as is volatility in their shared border area. Nonetheless, we continue to assess that the risk of armed conflict will remain low in the short-to-medium term. However, amid sustained tensions, we also assess that ongoing peace negotiations are unlikely to yield significant progress; normalisation between both countries is unlikely in the medium-to-long term.
May 14.
• Ukraine: Cyber operations underscore elevated security risks from North Korean threat actors. On 13 May, the cyber security company Proofpoint reported that the North Korean state-sponsored group ‘Konni’ (also known as ‘TA406’ and ‘Opal Sleet’) has targeted Ukrainian government entities in multiple cyber espionage operations since at least February. Konni uses phishing emails containing a malicious link and/or attachment to infiltrate targeted systems. The link/attachment executes a PowerShell script onto a victim’s system, enabling the threat actors to gather initial system information, establish persistence and deploy additional malicious payloads. This likely includes a backdoor to facilitate the long-term exfiltration of sensitive information. Konni also conducts reconnaissance operations prior to these attacks to harvest user credentials so as to hijack accounts. The group has likely ramped up its cyber operations against Ukraine to collect tactical and strategic information to support the deployment of North Korean troops in the country; we assess this underscores the elevated security and cyber espionage risks facing Ukrainian government entities in the short-to-medium term amid the ongoing war.
May 12.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• STRIKES: After Russia’s unilateral ceasefire saw neither side launch long-range attacks, Russia has resumed with large-scale drone attacks after the ceasefire expired on 11 May
• CEASEFIRE: Russia’s unilateral three-day ‘Victory Day’ ceasefire (8-11 May) did not result in a cessation of fighting along the frontlines; however, it did result in a temporary suspension of long-range drone and missile attacks
• CHINA: A joint Chinese-Russian statement issued during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations affirmed Moscow’s position that a long-term peace can only be accomplished by resolving the ‘root causes’ of the war in Ukraine
• FORECAST: Both Moscow and Kyiv have agreed to hold direct talks in Istanbul on 15 May; while this is an important development in the nascent peace process, a major diplomatic breakthrough remains highly unlikely
• BAKHMUT: Fighting remains intense in the Toretsk area (Donetsk oblast), where Russian forces are intensifying strikes and accumulating troops; however, Ukraine also recorded tactical gains. Geolocated footage from 10 May shows Ukrainian forces making recent gains north of Druzhba, located approximately four miles (6.5km) to the north-east of Toretsk. Meanwhile, Russia continues to claim that its forces have advanced south-west and west of Toretsk, though these claims remain unconfirmed. On 10 May, Dmytro Zaporozhets, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Luhansk Group of Forces, reported that Russia had intensified airstrikes on Toretsk and is continuing to build up military personnel in the sector.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces made confirmed advances in the Pokrovsk sector, as well as further south-west towards Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). On 11 May, Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces, stated that fighting remains intense in both sectors. According to a Ukrainian military source operating in the Pokrovsk area, Russian operations are currently focused on destroying infrastructure, including reconnaissance and communications equipment, in Ukraine’s rear areas to facilitate future advances. We previously reported an increased use of drones by Russian forces targeting Ukrainian near-rear positions. Geolocated footage from 9 and 10 May also confirms recent Russian advances in northern Kotlyne and south-eastern Novoserhiivka. Both settlements are located approximately 7.5 miles (12km) and 12.4 miles (20km) to the south-west of Pokrovsk, respectively.
• DONETSK: Further south-west of Pokrovsk, Russian forces continued advancing towards the administrative borders of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Geolocated footage from 11 May shows confirmed Russian gains south and west of Novooleksandrivka, located approximately 11.8 miles (19km) to the north-east of Novopavlivka; the settlement is likely under Russian control. Earlier on 12 May, Russia’s Ministry of Defence claimed the capture of Kotlyarivka, east of Novopavlivka, a settlement where its forces made confirmed advances according to geolocated footage from 9 May. Kotlyarivka is located 10 miles (16km) to the north-east of Novopavlivka.
• KHARKIV: Russian forces have recently advanced in northern Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast), amid a steady uptick in the intensity of Russian assaults in the area. Geolocated footage from 10 May indicates that Russian forces advanced in the north-eastern flank of the town, north of the Vovcha River. The advance comes after further Russian progress in the centre of the town last week. This is a notable development given how this frontline has been static for almost a year.
• KURSK-SUMY: Geolocated footage published on 7, 8 and 10 May indicates that Ukrainian forces have made minor advances in south-western and south-eastern Tetkino, a frontline town inside Russia’s Kursk oblast. Elsewhere along the Kursk axis, Russian forces advanced into central Loknya (Sumy oblast) as of 7 May; Loknya is a village located nine miles (14km) to the west of Sudzha. Amid the unilateral Victory Day ceasefire (8-11 May), there was an overall reduction in the tempo of ground attacks, though geolocated footage from 10 May indicated Russian attacks in northern Sumy oblast did continue, but did not result in any confirmed advances.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: After Russia’s unilateral ceasefire expired on 11 May at 0000hrs (local time), it resumed long-range strikes, including large-scale drone attacks, as anticipated. Attacks targeted various Ukrainian regions (including Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zhytomyr oblasts) over the past 24 hours. That said, it was notable that neither Russia nor Ukraine launched serious long-range drone attacks against one another during the ‘Victory Day’ ceasefire period.
• STRIKES: On 10 May, Reuters cited claims from Western security officials that Iran is preparing to supply Russia with an unspecified number of Fath-360 launchers for short-range ballistic missiles in the short term. In September 2024, various sources quoted by Western news outlets indicated that Iran had supplied Russia with around 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles. The accompanying launchers were likely not included with the delivery of the missiles, which likely explains the absence of evidence that Russia has launched these missiles. In April, US Army General Christopher Cavoli, commander of US European Command, said that Iran had transferred over 400 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.
• STRIKES: The use of Fath-360 ballistic missiles will likely increase pressure on Ukraine’s strained air defences; it will likely be used against targets close to the frontline and the Russian border. The Fath-360, with a range of approximately 75 miles (120km), requires minimal preparation and limited training to operate. Although the missile is less accurate and carries a smaller warhead than Russia’s more advanced systems, its deployment would enable Russian forces to preserve more effective systems, such as the Iskandr-M ballistic missile, for strategic targets.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• CEASEFIRE: Russia’s unilateral three-day ‘Victory Day’ ceasefire (8-11 May) did not result in a cessation of fighting along the frontlines, though it did result in a temporary suspension of long-range drone and missile attacks. Both sides had accused one another of violating the ceasefire; there is ample evidence of fighting throughout recent days. One of the Russian claims is that the Ukrainian government and High Command cannot control elements of its forces. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on 7 May that Putin had refused a comprehensive ceasefire due to ‘nuances’ concerning enforcement mechanisms; Zakharova claimed that issues around weapons proliferation would also have to be resolved by Kyiv before a ceasefire could be implemented. Such claims are likely delaying tactics to justify Moscow’s continued refusal of a comprehensive ceasefire (see FORECAST below for further analysis).
• CHINA: A joint Chinese-Russian statement issued on 8 May supported Moscow’s position that a long-term and sustainable peace can only be accomplished by resolving the ‘root causes’ of the war in Ukraine. The statement came amid Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May. The Kremlin has long called for the elimination of the ‘root causes’ of the war, which it uses to justify its full-scale invasion in 2022. These alleged causes include NATO’s expansion into eastern Europe from the 1990s and alleged Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic-Russians. Chinese officials have never before openly stated their official support for the need to resolve these ‘root causes’. As such, the latest statement marks a notable increase in China’s diplomatic support for Russia. The joint statement also reiterated established positions, including both parties’ respective support for a multi-polar world order and the creation of a new Eurasian security architecture.
• BORDER: On 12 May, the Ukrainian State Border Service confirmed that Polish truckers will conduct a protest at the Yagodyn-Dorohusk border crossing, potentially beginning later on 12 May. Polish truckers and farmers have previously held long-running protests at the border. It remains unclear how extensive these protests will prove. However, they will highly likely drive operational disruption and exacerbate queues and delays at the border crossing.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Over the last 72 hours, an elaborate series of diplomatic moves and counter-moves have resulted in proposals from both Moscow and Kyiv for direct talks later this week in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) on 15 May; this comes without an agreement on a US-European-Ukrainian proposed 30-day ceasefire. US President Donald Trump called for a 30-day ceasefire on 8 May, which Trump claimed ‘must ultimately build toward a peace agreement’. Thereafter, the leaders of the European Coalition of the Willing (COW) group of four (France, Germany, Poland and the UK) journeyed to Kyiv and called for a 30-day ceasefire on 10 May, threatening to impose significant new sanctions if Moscow did not agree. While Moscow rejected this proposed ceasefire on 10 May, the prospect of a ‘resumption’ of direct talks in Istanbul (confirmed by the Turkish government on 11 May) marks an important development in the nascent peace process.
Kyiv and its European allies initially demanded an unconditional 30-day ceasefire as a prerequisite for talks; however, Russia subsequently demanded that talks must take place first, which Moscow claimed could later lead to a ceasefire. Following this, Zelensky and his European allies reiterated their demands for a ceasefire first, but US President Trump directly called on Kyiv to enter immediate talks. Zelensky’s ability to resist Trump’s demands remains very limited, given the recently signed minerals deal, the threat of a further suspension of US intelligence sharing and the tentative US approval of certain arms sales to Ukraine (which Ukraine needs to carefully cultivate if it is to maintain US support). That said, Kyiv again sought to outflank Moscow in turn, with Zelensky stating that he will be waiting for Putin ‘personally’ in Istanbul. It remains unclear who will represent each side during the Istanbul talks, but it remains unlikely that Putin would personally attend talks at this stage.
Despite direct talks between Russia and Ukraine undoubtedly being a significant development, there has been no indication that either side has shifted their negotiating positions; a breakthrough is highly unlikely in the short term. At present, both sides are likely primarily engaging in talks in a bid to court the US and convince President Trump that they are (respectively) not blocking peace efforts. Putin had reportedly not consulted his staff before making his late-night announcement on 10 May. In addition, he had reportedly also not asked Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan beforehand if talks were possible. This strongly indicates that Putin’s call for direct talks was a reactive attempt to outflank the European ceasefire demands and appeal to the US.
As such, both Russia and Ukraine are currently engaged in a careful balancing act. They are both trying to improve their own respective strategic positions (and delay meaningful talks until such a time as they believe their positions have improved), all while avoiding alienating the Trump administration, which remains committed to a quick peace process.
Russia’s framing of the talks as a ‘resumption’ of the Istanbul talks, which it claims were disrupted in April 2022, suggests that Russia’s terms will likely resemble the Istanbul Protocols draft proposals. The proposals essentially demanded Kyiv’s capitulation, the abandonment of its aspirations for NATO membership and constitutional amendments to enshrine Ukraine’s neutrality, preventing it from joining any military alliances, in addition to the drastic reduction of the size of the Ukrainian military. Additionally, Putin stated during his late-night announcement on 10 May that any negotiations must address the so-called ‘root causes’ of the invasion, which include NATO expansion after 1997 and alleged Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic-Russians or Russian speakers. Putin also stated that, in the meantime, any ceasefire should not enable the ‘rearmament’ and ‘replenishment’ of the Ukrainian military. This likely indicates that the Kremlin maintains its previous position that all Western military aid to Ukraine should cease for the duration of a ceasefire.
Such a negotiating position remains at odds with Ukraine’s; as such, it remains highly unlikely that any serious breakthrough will occur in Istanbul in the short term. In the meantime, European COW countries have reiterated that Moscow has until later on May 12 to agree to a 30-day ceasefire or face a fresh wave of sanctions. We continue to assess that sanctions have a minimal impact on Kremlin decision-making. As such, the fighting will highly likely continue, with new sanctions packages set to be announced on 13 May.
• Russia-Ukraine: Proposed talks are unlikely to result in ceasefire. On 11 May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on 15 May, stating his willingness to meet Putin personally. It remains unlikely that Putin will attend talks himself at this stage. Despite the agreement to hold some form of talks, disagreements over a ceasefire are ongoing, with Moscow rejecting a joint US-EU proposal for a general ceasefire of at least 30 days starting earlier on 12 May. Putin has framed the upcoming talks as a resumption of direct negotiations (which he claimed were interrupted in Turkey in April 2022), referring to Russia’s Istanbul Protocol draft agreement. The protocol demanded Kyiv’s effective capitulation, the abandonment of its aspirations for NATO membership and constitutional amendments to enshrine Ukraine’s neutrality, preventing it from joining any military alliances. Putin’s statements highly likely indicate Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise on its strategic demands regarding Ukraine. As such, we assess that this meeting is highly unlikely to lead to meaningful peace progress in the short term; a ceasefire remains similarly unlikely.
• Russia: Exiled anti-Kremlin Russians will likely face increased judicial pressure. On 11 May, Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Volodin announced that the Duma is considering legislation to tighten punitive measures against Russians living abroad who commit offences deemed to be against Russia’s interests. Such offences likely include expressing anti-Kremlin sentiment, including discrediting the Russian military. The draft bill reportedly proposes in absentia trials and the seizure of property belonging to individuals convicted of such offences. This move forms part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to suppress dissent both within Russia and among the Russian diaspora overseas. We assess that the Duma will highly likely pass the legislation. If adopted, it would significantly increase the risk of asset seizures for exiled Russians who publicly express anti-Kremlin views. The Russian authorities have historically monitored diaspora communities closely. We assess that the passing of this law would mean that anti-Kremlin views expressed on social media platforms will likely increase the risk of prosecution. (Source: Sibylline)
16 May 25. Russia and Ukraine to hold first direct peace talks in over three years. Russian and Ukrainian negotiators will meet in Istanbul on Friday for their first peace talks in more than three years as both sides come under pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump to end Europe’s deadliest conflict since World War Two. The encounter at the Dolmabahce Palace on the Bosphorus is a sign of diplomatic progress between the warring sides, who had not met face-to-face since March 2022. (Source: Reuters)
15 May 25. Putin, Trump to skip Ukraine’s peace talks that Russian leader proposed.
• Summary
• Peace talks are pencilled in for Thursday in Istanbul
• Putin, Trump not attending
• Zelenskiy on his way to Turkey
• Zelenskiy said he would attend talks only if Putin present
U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated they would not attend what could be the first direct peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv in three years on Thursday, with the Kremlin sending instead a group of experienced technocrats.
Putin on Sunday proposed direct negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul on Thursday “without any preconditions”. Late on Wednesday, the Kremlin said the delegation would include presidential adviser Vladimir Medinsky and Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin – but Putin’s name was not on the list. (Source: Reuters)
14 May 25. Cuashub.com said today that Denmark to send troops to Ukraine for drone warfare training. The Danish Armed Forces will deploy unarmed personnel to Ukraine to observe and study the country’s frontline innovations in drone warfare. Major General Peter Boysen, Denmark’s commander-in-chief, announced the initiative during an interview with state broadcaster TV 2, describing the effort as a short-term training observation mission slated to begin as early as this summer.
“We’re sending some teams down to see what experiences the Ukrainians have had – first-hand,” Boysen said. “They are not going there to actively participate in the war.”
Unlike the numerous NATO-led training missions that have taken place outside Ukraine’s borders since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Denmark’s plan marks one of the first official acknowledgments of allied personnel entering Ukrainian territory for military-related observation.
According to Boysen, the Danish teams will be stationed at training centers in western Ukraine, well away from the front lines, with the region around Lviv considered a likely location. Each course is expected to last one to two weeks and will be conducted by Ukrainian forces with Danish troops in a strictly observational role. The objective is to glean insights from Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone warfare strategies and integrate them into Denmark’s own military doctrine.
“In the 42 years I have been in the Armed Forces, I have not experienced things moving as fast as they are right now,” Boysen remarked.
Both Ukraine and Russia have heavily relied on drones for a wide range of purposes, including reconnaissance, artillery coordination and precision strikes. Denmark views the Ukrainian theater as a real-time laboratory for modern conflict, particularly in how drones are integrated into both conventional and asymmetric operations.
Boysen noted that the initiative is being undertaken at the invitation of Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyi. He also highlighted the Ukrainian military’s preparedness and infrastructure for hosting foreign personnel, including robust air raid alert systems and shelters.
“I’ve spent time in one of them in Kyiv myself,” Boysen said.
The announcement has not gone unnoticed by Russia. In a strongly worded statement, Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin condemned the move as a “provocation,” warning that it could deepen Denmark’s entanglement in the conflict.
“Facilities, including headquarters, training and education centers, as well as locations of military personnel and military equipment, both deep inside Ukrainian territory and on the front line, are a legitimate target for the Russian Armed Forces,” Barbin said.
Despite such threats, Copenhagen appears committed to a long-term partnership with Kyiv. Denmark was among the first European nations to sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine earlier this year. The 10-year pact, finalized in February 2024, outlines sustained defense cooperation aimed at supporting Ukraine until it secures NATO membership.
In addition to the training observation mission, Denmark has also expressed interest in a separate initiative under discussion among European allies, namely the possible deployment of a multinational “reassurance force” to Ukraine. This would occur only after a ceasefire and would focus on securing key infrastructure and facilities in rear areas to help stabilize the country during post-war reconstruction and reform.
For now, the immediate focus remains on gathering operational knowledge. The Danish teams will come from various regiments and will rotate through the program over the coming months.
Boysen’s visits to Ukraine, including his recent talks with Syrskyi, helped lay the groundwork for the initiative. “This is about learning,” he said. “The Ukrainians are setting the pace for drone warfare, and we must keep up.”
The Danish Defense Ministry is expected to release further operational details in the coming weeks. The first Danish teams could arrive on Ukrainian soil as early as June.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/denmark-to-send-troops-to-ukraine-for-drone-warfare-training/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
14 May 25. Ukraine Finds 20+ Foreign Components in Russia’s New Drone-Launched Cruise Missile. Ukrainian military intelligence has uncovered detailed information about a new Russian cruise missile called the S8000 “Banderol” (Parcel), revealing a complex network of international electronic components used in its construction.
Russia evades sanctions on electronic components by using complex networks of shell companies and intermediary firms, and by routing imports through countries like Armenia, Kazakhstan, China, Türkiye, and the UAE, which act as backdoors for dual-use and military-grade chips and semiconductors
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense identified more than 20 foreign-made components in the missile, with a significant portion originating from the United States.
The weapon is developed by the sanctioned Russian enterprise “Kronshtadt” and primarily designed to be carried by the Orion unmanned aerial vehicle.
Investigators found 10 American microchips among the missile’s components. The missile also contains electronic parts from Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and China. Specific foreign components include an Australian telemetry module, Japanese battery systems, South Korean servo drives, and a Chinese jet engine.
According to the intelligence, the Chinese Swiwin engine, typically used in aviation modeling, is available on AliExpress for approximately $16,000. Most foreign electronic components reportedly enter Russia through “Chip and Dip,” one of the country’s largest electronics distributors.
The S8000 “Banderol” demonstrates unique technical capabilities. It can execute turns with a smaller radius compared to typical Russian cruise missiles while maintaining a characteristic flight trajectory. The missile carries a 150-kilogram warhead, travels at 500 kilometers per hour, and has a range of 500 kilometers, using aviation kerosene as fuel.
The intelligence agency is also adapting the missile for deployment on Mi-28N attack helicopters, expanding its potential military applications.
(Source: UAS VISION/Euromaidan)
10 May 25. UK Raven air defence system proving vital in Ukraine. The Ministry of Defence has showcased the Raven air defence system in a recent video on its official YouTube channel, providing insight into how the innovative system has become a key asset in Ukraine’s air defence network. The video features Colonel Todd from Task Force Kindred, who provides an overview of Raven’s development and operational effectiveness.
According to the MOD video, the Raven system was conceived and delivered within three months in 2022. It is built on the HMT 600 Supercat vehicle, utilising surplus ASRAAM air-to-air missiles mounted on adapted rails from decommissioned aircraft such as the Hawk, Jaguar, and Tornado. This rapid innovation led to one of the most effective short-range air defence systems currently in use in Ukraine.
Colonel Todd describes Raven as an “amazing system” that was developed in collaboration between UK industry, the RAF Air and Space Warfare Centre, MBDA, and DE&S. He notes that it has demonstrated significant success in Ukraine, with over 400 engagements recorded so far, achieving a success rate of more than 70%. The system has proven particularly effective against drones, cruise missiles, and potentially against aircraft and helicopters.
The Raven system can be operated either from within the vehicle cab or remotely from up to 50 metres away, using a gamepad-style controller to identify, track, and engage targets. This flexible approach allows operators to remain in relative safety while maintaining high responsiveness.
As described in the video, the Raven is praised by Ukrainian forces for its reliability and utility within their air defence network. Colonel Todd stated: “The Ukrainians love this system. They said how effective it is and how important it has been as part of their air defence network.”
The MOD highlights that eight Raven systems were initially sent to Ukraine in 2022, followed by an additional five systems. The project utilises equipment from the UK’s existing inventory that was otherwise scheduled for disposal, allowing support to Ukraine at minimal cost to UK operational readiness.
Colonel Todd explains the value of the project: “The Raven system, both the vehicle, the rail, and the missile, uses systems which were in the UK inventory but were no longer required. These were missiles which had had their operational use in the RAF and were otherwise planned for disposal. Therefore, the support to Ukraine has not been at the expense of UK operations or readiness.” (Source: Google/ukdefencejournal.org.uk/)
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