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Military And Security Developments
May 09.
Ukraine-US: Ratification of minerals deal will likely improve relations. On 8 May, Ukraine’s parliament voted in favour of ratifying a recently concluded minerals and economic resources deal with the US. In total, 338 lawmakers voted in favour of ratifying the deal, with none against. The quick and unanimous vote in favour of ratifying the deal underscores that Ukrainian lawmakers perceive that the terms of the agreement are considerably more favourable to Ukraine compared to previous iterations. This is despite the absence of any explicit security guarantees from the US within the agreement. Recent polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology also indicates societal approval for the deal, with 47% of respondents stating that they support it. Meanwhile, 22% of Ukrainians say the deal may possibly entail negative consequences; 19% believe it will have no impact. Despite political and societal support for the deal, we assess that it is unlikely to offer significant returns for the US and US entities in the near term, but will ease bilateral tensions.
Ukraine-Hungary: Espionage allegations will likely sustain elevated regional tensions. Earlier on 9 May, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) announced that it had dismantled a Hungarian military intelligence network operating in Zakarpattia oblast, a region home to a large ethnic Hungarian minority. The SBU stated that this was the first time it had exposed such a network, which had reportedly been formed by two Ukrainian agents recruited by Hungarian intelligence services. The objective of the operation was reportedly to gather intelligence on Ukrainian military defences and to assess local sentiment in the event of a Hungarian military presence in the region. Zakarpattia has historically been a point of tension between Ukraine and Hungary due to the ethnic composition of the region. Kyiv has frequently accused Budapest of political interference, particularly through the promotion of dual citizenship schemes. Relations between the two countries are already strained, particularly due to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Russia-friendly stance. We assess that this latest development will highly likely further escalate regional tensions.
09 May 25. Ukraine and its western allies are ready to propose an “unconditional ceasefire” in a co-ordinated move that could see the US and Europe hit Russia with harsh new sanctions if the Kremlin rejects the offer, according to people familiar with the plan.(Source: FT.com)
09 May 25. Emmanuel Macron has called for “direct talks” between Ukraine and Russia in the event of a ceasefire in Moscow’s three-year invasion. If there is a 30-day truce, as Western countries have floated, “we will look to direct talks between Ukraine and Russia, we are ready to help,” Mr Macron said in an interview with French news outlets while travelling to Kyiv to meet European leaders. Sir Keir Starmer; Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor; and Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, are in Kyiv today, vowing to ratchet up pressure on Russia until it agrees to a ceasefire. It is the first time the leaders of the four European nations have made a joint visit to Ukraine. More than three years into Russia’s invasion, the hugely symbolic show of European unity comes a day after Vladimir Putin struck a defiant tone at a Moscow parade marking 80 years since victory in World War II. Donald Trump has proposed a 30-day unconditional ceasefire as a step to end the conflict. But Putin has resisted so far. “Alongside the US, we call on Russia to agree a full and unconditional 30-day ceasefire to create the space for talks on a just and lasting peace,” the leaders said in a statement ahead of the visit. “We are ready to support peace talks as soon as possible, to discuss technical implementation of the ceasefire, and prepare for a full peace deal,” they added. “We are clear the bloodshed must end, Russia must stop its illegal invasion, and Ukraine must be able to prosper as a safe, secure and sovereign nation within its internationally recognised borders for generations to come”. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
09 May 25. Denmark will allocate €830m ($935m) to the Ukrainian defense industry in 2025 on behalf of the European Union, using windfall profits from frozen Russian assets to buy Ukraine-made weapons. The Danish Ministry of Defence and the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, signed an agreement giving Denmark the role as implementing actor for the disbursement of a large portion of the windfall profits this year, the ministry said in a statement on Friday. The Danes have been frontrunners in investing Western military aid in Ukraine’s defense manufacturing, using funds to buy locally produced weapons rather than foreign equipment through what is known as the Danish model. (Source: Defense News)
May 08.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• BAKHMUT: Over the last week, Russian forces have intensified offensive operations between Pokrovsk and Toretsk, making several notable advances as they attempt to set the conditions for a future advance towards Kostiantynivka
• STRIKES: Before the Victory Day ceasefire unilaterally announced by Russia (8-11 May), both parties continued to exchange large-scale attacks; there remains a realistic possibility that Ukraine will attack Russia in the coming days
• DIPLOMACY: The US has signalled that it will possibly scale back its efforts to mediate an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war; this comes amid growing US frustration at the lack of progress towards peace
• FORECAST: At 0000hrs (Moscow time) on 8 May, a unilateral ceasefire declared by Russia supposedly entered into force, though it remains unlikely that it will hold for the duration of the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow
• BAKHMUT: Over the last week, Russian forces have intensified offensive operations between Pokrovsk and Toretsk, making several notable advances as they attempt to set the conditions for a future advance towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Russian forces have likely penetrated a Ukrainian defensive line that has been protecting the key T-0504 highway, which runs between two key Russian operational objectives – Pokrovsk to the south-west and Kostiantynivka to the north-east. We have long assessed that advancing along this road and reducing the subsequent Ukrainian salient to the east (between the highway and Toretsk) remain critical steps in Russian preparations for an assault towards the much more significant (and heavily defended) town of Kostiantynivka – which is likely a key Russian war aim for 2025.
• BAKHMUT: In line with this objective, geolocated footage and Russian reports have indicated over the last week that the Russian High Command has likely sent reinforcements to this sector, so as to support ongoing offensive efforts. Russian forces have likely deployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), which we assess were likely previously fighting along the Zaporizhzhia front. Their redeployment to Toretsk and the T-0504 area likely reaffirms our assessment that Russian forces are prioritising the approaches to Kostiantynivka during the ongoing spring offensive.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 6 May shows a Russian flag flying over northern Novoolenivka, a village which sits just to the east of the T-0504 highway (specifically the northern-most point of the road that Russian forces are now threatening). Further to the south-west, Russian forces also seized the southern tip of Nova Poltavka, a village which crosses the T-0504 highway. It remains unclear to what extent Russian forces have penetrated the defensive line, but it is clear that they are now directly threatening multiple points of the T-0504 highway; they will likely attempt to consolidate their control before pushing north-east towards Kostiantynivka.
• BAKHMUT: Amid Russian efforts to reduce the Ukrainian salient to the south-west of Toretsk, Russian forces have also been consolidating control of the town itself, as well as advancing to the south-west. Geolocated footage from 4 and 6 May indicated Russian advances in southern and eastern Novospaske, respectively, a satellite town due west of Toretsk. Geolocated footage from 5 May also confirmed Russian advances to the north-east of Toretsk, near the village of Dyliivka. Meanwhile, further to the north in Chasiv Yar (Donetsk), geolocated footage from 7 May indicated that Russian forces advanced to the north of the town, and have now reached the Severny Mine.
• DONETSK: Over the past week, Russian forces have not made any confirmed advances in the Pokrovsk sector; however, they have reportedly intensified their use of drones. On 6 May, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces conducted Shahed-136/131 drone attacks on Ukrainian positions to the north-east of Pokrovsk. On 3 May, it reported a similar attack on a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kramatorsk, located to the north-west of Chasiv Yar. On 7 May, a Ukrainian military source operating in the area reported that Russian forces have increased their drone strikes in the sector, targeting locations 12.4 miles (20km) from the frontline.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, further to the south-west of Pokrovsk, Russian forces made confirmed advances amid broader efforts to reach the administrative borders of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Geolocated footage published on 6-7 May indicated that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Novoserhiivka, located 10.9 miles (17.5km) to the north-east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk), as well as to the eastern part of Troitske, situated 12.4 miles (20km) to the south-east of Novopavlivka. Additionally, geolocated footage posted on 3 May indicated that Russian forces have recently advanced to the east of Kotlyarivka, which is located 19.9 miles (32km) to the north-east of Novopavlivka.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 5 and 7 May indicated that Russian forces have made minor advances in central Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast), after months of almost no movement along the frontline. Russian forces have advanced near the Aggregate Plant in the city centre, closer to the northern banks of the Vovcha River, which runs through the centre of the town. The Kharkiv frontline has not been a priority for either side in recent months, though Russian forces have nevertheless launched occasional mechanised and infantry attacks; these have rarely resulted in any notable advances.
• KURSK-SUMY: Overnight on 4-5 May, Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited cross-border mechanised attacks into Kursk oblast (Russia); they likely retain a small presence inside Russia. Ukrainian forces reportedly utilised mine-clearing equipment and vehicles to create a path for their forces to penetrate Russian border defences near the border town of Tetkino, located over 41 miles (67km) to the west of Sudzha (Kursk). According to Russian sources, a firefight broke out near the Tetkino railway station. However, Ukrainian forces subsequently withdrew back across the border into Sumy oblast (Ukraine). Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces reportedly continued attacking on 6 and 7 May, with unconfirmed reports indicating that they had managed to seize and hold two streets in the south-western outskirts of Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on 6 May showing Russian forces conducting an airstrike on a building in southern Tetkino strongly indicated that Ukrainian forces did retain positions in the town.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past week, Russian forces made limited gains across the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. Geolocated footage from 3 May showed Russian forces advancing to the north of Torske, a settlement located ten miles (16km) to the east of Lyman. Additional footage from 3 May also showed Russian advances to the west of Makiivka, a settlement located 23 miles (38km) from Borova.
• SOUTHERN: Over the last week, Russian forces have been steadily advancing towards the Dnipropetrovsk border, located to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Geolocated footage from 4 May indicated that Russian forces have advanced into the centre of Vilne Pole, located around six miles (10km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. On 4 May, Russian forces similarly advanced into northern Novosilka, located around six miles (10km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka. Large numbers of motorcycles were used in the Russian assault; Ukrainian sources claim their forces destroyed 70 motorcycles during the attack. Nevertheless, Russian forces are now contesting both villages from the east. Further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 7 May also indicated that Russian forces have advanced to the east of Novopil, located around ten miles (16km) to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka.
• STRIKES: Before the Victory Day ceasefire unilaterally announced by Russia (8-11 May), both parties continued to exchange large-scale attacks. Russia carried out typically large drone assaults, which were occasionally accompanied by missile strikes. While Moscow has reportedly refrained from long-range attacks since the ceasefire began, the Ukrainian authorities stated that Russia has continued to conduct airstrikes using guided bombs against frontline regions. Similarly, the Russian authorities have accused Kyiv of conducting various strikes during the ceasefire. For further analysis on the Victory Day ceasefire, please see the FORECAST below.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine launched a series of massive drone attacks of its own in recent days. Russia’s MoD claimed that on 7 May, its air defences shot down 524 Ukrainian drones, marking the largest attack to date – though we cannot confirm this. The assault caused significant disruption, leading the Russian authorities to close numerous airports temporarily, including in the capital Moscow and other western regions. As a result, airlines were forced to cancel or reroute hundreds of flights.
• STRIKES: The large-scale attack also reportedly targeted strategic assets across Russia. Andriy Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, reported that the attack severely damaged the Fibre Optic Systems plant in Saransk, located in Russia’s Republic of Mordovia. This plant is Russia’s only manufacturer of fibre optic cables and had already been targeted in early April. According to Kovalenko, the attack also affected defence enterprises in Tula city. In addition, a Ukrainian media outlet, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, indicated that a defence production plant in Moscow oblast was also targeted. Other reported targets included military airbases in Kaluga, Moscow and Tula oblasts. Russia’s MoD claimed that Ukraine launched various strikes in the past 24 hours, including rocket launches and drone attacks involving 182 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
• STRIKES: Russia has most likely allocated a significant proportion of air defence resources to the capital Moscow in preparation for Victory Day (9 May) celebrations, likely drawing these assets from other regions. This has most likely increased the vulnerability of these other regions (as well as strategic assets therein), which already suffer from chronic shortages of air defence systems. As such, we assess the intensification of Ukrainian drone attacks in recent days likely forms part of Kyiv’s strategy to exploit the increased vulnerability of strategic assets across Russia. While we assess that Ukraine is unlikely to carry out long-range drone attacks against central areas of Moscow where the Victory Day parade will take place, it will possibly still target the wider Moscow area, along with other regions.
• STRIKES: The Russian authorities have also imposed mobile internet restrictions in Moscow and several other Russian regions during Victory Day celebrations. These measures are likely aimed at restricting Ukrainian drone attacks, which have intensified significantly in recent days. A Russian media outlet reported in April that the authorities had begun restricting mobile networks in several regions to reduce the risk of their use in UAV attacks. The move also likely seeks to prevent the filming and dissemination of any drone strikes that do occur during the event, at which a number of prominent international leaders will be present.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• DIPLOMACY: The US has signalled that it will possibly scale back its efforts to mediate an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war. On 1 May, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce announced that the US is not going to ‘fly around the world at the drop of a hat’ to mediate meetings. Bruce stated that the responsibility for ending the war now lies with Russia and Ukraine, adding that they need to present and develop concrete ideas about how to resolve the conflict. The remarks reflect increasing US frustration at the lack of tangible progress towards ending the war, despite the Trump administration’s efforts to engage with the two countries separately. However, it is not clear whether Bruce’s comments reflect the wider Trump administration’s stance on mediating talks to end the war.
• DIPLOMACY: On 4 May, US President Donald Trump stated that he is ‘sometimes’ close to withdrawing from the peace process, but implied that he is not yet at that stage. Nevertheless, Bruce’s comments possibly indicate that the US will scale back the frequency with which it dispatches high-level officials for shuttle diplomacy, whether that be to Russia or Saudi Arabia. On 2 May, US Vice President JD Vance stated that, during the next 100 days of the Trump administration, the US will work to bring Russia and Ukraine together for direct talks. While these developments indicate that the US is keen for the Russian and Ukrainian delegations to engage directly, we assess that the Trump administration is unlikely to withdraw totally from efforts to broker peace in the near term.
• AID: Reuters reported on 6 May that the office of US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered a temporary halt of flights transporting military aid to Ukraine in early February without notifying the White House. In total, 11 flights carrying artillery shells and other arms were affected. Ukrainian and Polish officials questioned whether the suspensions marked a permanent or partial pause in US aid. However, senior officials in the White House, the Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department could not provide answers.
• AID: Three unspecified insiders stated that Hegseth had misinterpreted discussions with President Trump about the US’ Ukraine policy and aid shipments. Meanwhile, four other unspecified individuals stated that a small number of staffers inside the DoD who have long opposed US aid to Ukraine advised Hegseth to consider pausing aid. While we cannot confirm precisely why military assistance to Ukraine was temporarily suspended in February, the reported incident does underscore the risks stemming from communication issues and their impact for Ukraine.
• ENERGY: The EU’s plans to end Russian gas imports by the end of 2027 are likely overly ambitious. On 6 May, the European Commission (EC) presented a roadmap on how to end the bloc’s dependency on Russian energy. The plan envisions that the EU will gradually wean itself off Russian oil, gas and nuclear energy, with member states preparing national plans by the end of this year detailing how they intend to phase out such imports. Aside from a pledge to end all imports of Russian gas by the end of 2027, the roadmap states that new contracts with suppliers of Russian gas will be prevented and spot contracts (for immediate payment) will be stopped by the end of 2025.
• ENERGY: Russia supplied approximately 45% of the EU’s gas prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; that share decreased to 19% in 2024. Hungary and Slovakia, the governments of which are among the most Russia-friendly in the EU, still receive Russian gas via pipelines. Meanwhile, Belgium, France and Spain still buy Russian liquified natural gas (LNG). Ultimately, Hungary and Slovakia are among those states that are most likely to resist a complete termination of Russian gas imports. Hungary also remains heavily reliant on Russian nuclear fuel (Budapest has resisted tougher energy sanctions against Russia in the past). Ultimately, continued dependence and resistance from certain states will reduce the feasibility of any such plans coming to fruition in the coming years.
FORECAST
CEASEFIRE: At 0000hrs (Moscow time) on 8 May, a unilateral ceasefire declared by Russia supposedly entered into force. The temporary cessation of hostilities is due to last until 0000hrs on 11 May and to coincide with Russia’s commemoration of Victory Day on 9 May (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 April 2025). However, Ukraine has already accused Russia of breaking its own truce. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha blamed Russia for violating the ceasefire at least 734 times after it came into effect. The latest Russian-announced truce is highly likely part of Moscow’s information operations to portray itself as the party that wants peace. The Russian MoD claimed earlier on 8 May that its armed forces are strictly observing the ceasefire and have stopped combat operations, though this remains unlikely. The lack of robust monitoring mechanisms also renders it difficult to verify compliance. The ministry also claimed that Russian units are not carrying out airstrikes or long-range attacks using drones or missiles. At the same time, the Russian MoD has accused Ukraine of attempting to break through the border of Kursk and also not pausing military operations in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declared ceasefire.
Regardless of whether this is true, Ukraine has not formally committed to abide by the ceasefire. Notably, on 7 May, an unspecified insider in the Ukrainian presidential office did not exclude the possibility of Ukrainian forces continuing military operations during the ceasefire period. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the proposed truce as a ‘theatrical performance’ designed to ensure that Victory Day celebrations proceed in Moscow without disruption. This aligns with our assessment that Putin declared the supposed ceasefire over this period to serve Russia’s short-term interests, rather than out of a genuine willingness to end the war. We assess that Russia will likely use the ceasefire to consolidate its positions across the frontline, though it remains unclear if Ukraine will adhere to the truce. Ukraine continues to advocate for an unconditional ceasefire of at least 30 days, which it has already agreed to (though Russia has refused to do so).
President Zelensky stated on 3 May that Ukraine cannot guarantee the safety of foreign officials planning to attend the Victory Day parade in Moscow. As of 6 May, at least 29 world leaders were expected to attend the event, including Chinese President Xi Jinping. Western officials are largely boycotting the celebrations, though Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and Serbian President Aleksandr Vučić are expected to participate. Russia traditionally uses Victory Day to showcase its military might. However, following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has used such celebrations to showcase that it is not fully isolated on the world stage. Nevertheless, our assessment remains that Ukraine is unlikely to attack areas of Moscow where Victory Day celebrations will take place on 9 May. However, Zelensky’s comments indicate there is a realistic possibility of symbolic attacks elsewhere in Russia during the celebrations.
Russia has almost certainly heightened security measures to ensure the protection of events in the coming days commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 7 May that Russia’s intelligence services and military are taking all necessary steps to ensure a calm environment for these celebrations. We assess that the Russian authorities have highly likely prioritised defending Moscow given the prominence of the Victory Day celebrations and high-profile attendees. This will possibly leave other areas (including the surrounding Moscow oblast) more vulnerable to potential Ukrainian attacks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 May 25. Germany Delivers 10 IRIS-T Air Defense Missile Systems to Ukraine to Counter Daily Russian Air Strikes. Germany has announced the delivery of 10 air defense missile systems to Ukraine, comprising both IRIS-T SLM and IRIS-T SLS variants. The German Ministry of Defense confirmed this significant step on May 6, 2025. The latest shipment builds on previous contributions, bringing the total number of IRIS-T systems delivered by Berlin to ten—a notable increase from the six systems previously confirmed. Alongside the hardware, a fresh batch of IRIS-T missiles was also supplied, further enhancing Ukraine’s capability to intercept Russian aerial threats.
The delivery comes at a critical moment as Ukraine continues to endure relentless daily attacks from Russia, which employs a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles, Shahed-type loitering munitions, and various armed drones. In response to the escalating threat, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has renewed his appeal to Western allies for more advanced air defense systems. He emphasized the urgent need to protect urban centers, energy infrastructure, and frontline positions from persistent aerial barrages. In recent statements, President Zelensky has noted that while current air defense assets have saved countless lives, they remain insufficient given the volume and frequency of incoming attacks.
This development reflects Germany’s growing role as a central defense partner to Ukraine, particularly in the field of advanced air defense solutions. As the war continues to see persistent missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure and population centers, such systems are critical in maintaining a functional defense umbrella. The inclusion of both SLM and SLS systems allows for a multi-layered approach to threat interception, addressing both long-range and close-in aerial dangers.
The IRIS-T SLM (Surface-Launched Medium range) system is a state-of-the-art air defense platform developed by Diehl Defence. It is designed to neutralize a wide array of airborne threats, including combat aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and cruise missiles. The system has an interception range of up to 40 kilometers and can engage targets flying at altitudes of up to 20 kilometers. Each SLM unit typically features three mobile launchers, each equipped with eight ready-to-fire missiles, coordinated through a high-performance radar system and a centralized command post. The SLM system provides area defense capabilities and has proven effective in previous combat deployments by offering precision and reliability even under saturation attack conditions.
Complementing the medium-range capability, the IRIS-T SLS (Surface-Launched Short range) variant is optimized for short-distance aerial engagements. With an effective range of approximately 12 kilometers, the SLS system is intended to counter low-flying threats such as drones, cruise missiles, and aircraft operating at closer proximity. Though more compact, the SLS uses the same family of IRIS-T missiles, adapted for vertical launch from a lighter vehicle platform. This makes it especially valuable for mobile deployments or to protect smaller, high-value targets that require a rapid-response shield. When integrated with the SLM units, the SLS provides a close-in protective layer, ensuring no gaps in air coverage.
The successful deployment of earlier IRIS-T units in Ukraine has already demonstrated the systems’ effectiveness on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces have reported high intercept rates against a variety of Russian missile types and drone incursions, thanks to the responsiveness and precision targeting of the IRIS-T systems. With each additional delivery, Ukraine’s integrated air defense network becomes more robust, better enabling it to defend its cities, troops, and infrastructure from constant aerial assault.
Germany’s commitment to supplying Ukraine with these modern systems goes beyond equipment. The support package includes training, integration assistance, and long-term sustainment capabilities. Looking forward, Germany has pledged to deliver 17 more IRIS-T air defense missile systems by 2026, reinforcing a strategic partnership rooted in defense innovation and resilience. The latest delivery marks a significant milestone—not just in terms of numbers, but in the depth and sophistication of Western air defense assistance to Ukraine. For both countries, it signals an ongoing evolution of military cooperation shaped by the demands of modern warfare and shared commitment to defending sovereign airspace. (Source: Google/armyrecognition.com)
07 May 25. Ukrainian Drones Strike Moscow, Forcing Airport Closures Ahead of Victory Day. Ukrainian drones targeted Moscow and several other Russian cities overnight, escalating tensions just days before Russia’s Victory Day parade. According to Russian authorities, 105 drones were intercepted across the country. Mayor Sergei Sobyanin confirmed that 19 drones were destroyed near Moscow.
As a precaution, all four of Moscow’s international airports suspended flights for several hours. Airports in Kaluga, Volgograd, Saratov, Samara, Ivanovo, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Kazan, and Nizhnekamsk were also affected, according to Russian state news agency TASS.
There were no immediate reports of serious damage or casualties, though debris from downed drones did fall on a major highway, according to Mayor Sobyanin.
This was the second night in a row that drones hit Moscow. The attacks come just before the May 9 Victory Day parade, marking 80 years since the defeat of Nazi Germany. The event is a major national holiday and a key political moment for President Vladimir Putin.
Russia expects leaders from 29 countries, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Vietnamese President To Lam, to attend the event. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
06 May 25. Ukraine drone attack shuts Moscow airports, says Russia. For the second night in a row, Russia says Ukraine has targeted Moscow with a drone attack. Russia’s defence ministry said it destroyed 26 Ukrainian drones in the early hours of Monday. All four of Moscow’s major airports were closed for several hours overnight but later reopened, Russia’s aviation watchdog said. Moscow’s mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, said at least 19 Ukrainian drones had been destroyed before they reached the city “from different directions”, adding that some of the debris had landed on a key highway into the capital. Ukraine has not yet commented, but the mayor of Kharkiv said Russia had also carried out drone strikes in the city overnight, as well as in the Kyiv area. (Source: BBC)
06 May 25. Ukraine roll out nationwide Resistance Centres. This will eventually include areas of Ukraine currently occupied by Russia. Ukraine’s government introduced national Resistance Centres in every unoccupied region across the war-torn nation last month, preparing civilian citizens with the knowledge and practical skills needed to resist the Russian adversary.
These teachings will also serve as a “driving force behind societal resilience,” she added in an afterthought.
Army Technology has recently learned that part of the mandate of these Resistance Centres is to instil a patriotic conciousness and sustainable motivation among Ukrainian citizens.
This is also required from a military perspective too since morale has taken a hit due to the persistent demand for more manpower and the inability of the service to rotate forces operating for long periods of time on the front lines.
Furthermore, the government intend to open more Centres in areas of the country currently under Russian occupation – namely Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson – after eventual deoccupation and following the implementation of unspecified stabilisation measures.
Will citizens learn combat skills?
The details of the training that will take place in these Resistance Centres are uncertain. However, Ukraine’s cabinet of ministers approved a resolution outlining the requirements governing the Centres which indicate the nature of the training.
Ukraine’s government confirmed that military veterans will lead the Centres and instruct citizens in their training. In addition, the Territorial Defence Forces, of which there is a brigade in every region, will approve a standardised training programme for civilians.
It is telling that military personnel are tasked with directing these Centres. It suggests that the knowledge and practical skills necessary to resist the Russian occupiers will cover direct combat.
Likewise, the centres that the government may establish in the occupied regions, when they are regained, will help to prevent any future Russian invasion by cultivating a martial mentality, as well as a nationalist one, among the civilian population.
Latest in Ukraine
After claims that Ukraine had lost control of the Russian Kursk region at the end of April, there are now reports saying that a fresh incursion into the same area is underway.
The Institute for the Study of War suggests that that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the border near Tetkino, Popova-Lezhachi, and Novyi Put in the Kursk region on 4 and 5 May.
It is believed that Ukraine’s forces are attempting to isolate Russian units near Tetkino and throughout Glushkovsky Raion.
Meanwhile, inside Ukraine, along the front lines, Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka. (Source: army-technology.com)
06 May 25. Two Russian Su-30 Flankers Downed by AIM-9s Fired from Ukrainian Drone Boats. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shot down two Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters with AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared-guided air-to-air missiles fired by Magura-7 drone boats, the head of the agency told The War Zone exclusively. This marks the first time fighter airecraft have been downed by drone boats and the first use of the AIM-9 from a drone boat for a kill.
“It’s a historical moment,”
Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov told us. The War Zone cannot independently verify this claim.
The incident took place in the Black Sea on Friday, said Budanov, who offered new details about what happened. Previous reporting from GUR, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and Russian Telegram channels stated that one Flanker was shot down by an adapted infrared-guided R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range air-to-air missile.
Video emerged on social media showing the first Flanker downing. Budanov said there were no videos or images of the second engagement.GUR used three Magura-7 drone boats in the attack, with two of them firing on the jets, according to Budanov. The Magura-7 is an air defense variant of the Magura-5, he explained, declining to elaborate on the difference between the two.
Budanov said that the crew of the first Su-30 survived and was picked up in the Black Sea by a civilian ship. Preliminary reports say the crew of the second jet was killed, he added.
Ukraine’s successful shooting down of an Su-30 Flanker fighter on May 2 has been joined by a second downed Flanker. These are the first two fighter jets in history to be downed by an uncrewed surface drone, but they are unlikely to be the last. We can now add further details following statements by Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, chief of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate (HUR), and by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Naval News can reveal the previously unreported maritime drone (USV) which scored the kills.
As a point of detail, some statements indicated that a Magura V5 drone was used, but Naval News can confirm that it was in fact a larger Magura V7. This is the first time that the V7 variant has been revealed to the public.
Naval News initially reported, before further information was available, that the USVs likely used AA-11 Archer missiles. That configuration, known as Sea Dragon, was the only one publicly known. Now we can reveal the Sidewinder armed type.
A Mature Capability: Magura V7
The Magura V7 is quite different from the USV used to carry Sea Dragon missiles. That was a wider hull with large fixed launch rails. The V7 is essentially an enlarged Magura V5, the baseline model used to ram enemy ships with an explosive charge. It is approximately 8 meters (26 feet) long compared the the V5 at 5.5 meters (18 feet).
The V7 represents a mature capability compared to the Sea Dragon version which can be thought of as the prototype. It is cleaner and better thought out. It is unclear however whether it is exclusively armed with Sidewinder missiles or can carry other weapons.
The Magura V7 shares similar lines to the V5 version but has a reshaped bow. This feature suggests improved sea keeping, useful for operations in winter. It is seen with several communications antenna and sensors. It does not appear to have an explosive charge in the bow, due to the lack of impact detonators, but this may be configurable.
Sidewinder Armed
The two American-made Sidewinder missiles are mounted on their aircraft launch rails, which appear to be able to be elevated for launch. The missile’s operational range and performance is similar to the Soviet era AA-11 Archer (R-73) missiles used by the Sea Dragon. Engagements may take place at around 10 km, although it may be much shorter in practice than in theory. The success of Ukraine’s uncrewed surface drones (USVs) cannot be overstated. They are rewriting the rules of naval warfare. (Source: UAS VISION/Naval News; The War Zone)
05 May 25. Ukraine’s Brave1 launches ‘Amazon-style’ marketplace for purchasing defence equipment. Ukraine’s Brave1 defence technology cluster and the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine have launched an online defence technology marketplace, according to a 28 April press release. More than 1,000 pieces of defence technology are currently listed on ‘Brave1 Market’ including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems, artificial intelligence (AI)-based technologies, software, and ammunition. Brave1 confirmed to Janes in a written statement on 2 May that they are looking to introduce tactical gear and combat simulation systems. When asked about the type of ammunition on Brave1 Market, a representative said it is a “closed category”. Food and clothing are not included in the market.
Beyond the initial landing page, the user must sign into the marketplace via the government’s digital portal, called Diia, to view the main technologies in the catalogue. Sensitive equipment information is stored in a separate catalogue, which is only open to verified military personnel and can be accessed via the Ukrainian government and military ‘Delta’ communications system. Once a selection is made, the buyer must contact the manufacturer directly to arrange the acquisition.
“Brave1 Market will become the Amazon for the military, enabling units to buy the needed technologies on the front lines right now,” Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov said during the Defence Tech Era conference on 28 April. (Source: Janes)
05 May 25. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy, in Prague, says ceasefire could be put in place at any moment.
• Summary
• Zelenskiy seeks greater pressure on Moscow
• Says ceasefire with Russia could be put in place at any time
• Czech president says Moscow has all the cards to end the war
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Sunday that a ceasefire with Russia in its more than three-year-old war was possible at any moment and called on Kyiv’s allies to apply greater pressure on Moscow to put the measure in place.
Zelenskiy, speaking at a joint news conference in Prague alongside Czech President Petr Pavel, said that unless increased pressure were applied, Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin would take no real steps to end the conflict. (Source: Reuters)
05 May 25. Allies seek deal on more Patriots for Kyiv before NATO summit, source says. Ukraine’s western allies are in discussions about supplying additional Patriot air defence systems to Kyiv and are aiming to reach an agreement before a NATO summit at the end of June, a source familiar with the matter said on Monday. The U.S. and Greece are among the potential suppliers of these systems, according to the source who spoke on condition of anonymity. Ukraine is increasingly desperate to get more Patriots, with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy telling CBS news last month his government was ready to buy 10 of the U.S.-made air defence systems that are vital for shooting down Russian ballistic missiles.
According to Ukrainian Defence Express military analysts, as of April this year, Ukraine had seven fully operational Patriot systems. Quoting U.S. officials, the New York Times reported on Sunday that Washington was planning to send a Patriot system that was based in Israel to Ukraine after it is refurbished. It added that allies were talking about “the logistics of Germany or Greece” giving another one. (Source: Reuters)
02 May 25. Is the UK planning to send Chinooks and Pumas to Ukraine? In 2024 the UK axed 31 helicopters as part of a sweeping range of defence cuts, with suggestions the airframes could be sent to Ukraine. The UK government has remained noncommittal on the prospect of donating axed Puma HC2 and CH-47 Chinook helicopters to Ukraine, coming at a time when defence remains in a holding pattern waiting for the long-awaited Strategic Defence Review.
In 2024, the UK announced that it would remove its 17-strong Puma HC2 fleet from Royal Air Force (RAF) service before the replacement Airbus helicopters were delivered, a significant blow to operational capability at key overseas sites such as Cyprus and Brunei.
With the HC2 retirement, UK forces in Brunei and Cyprus are absent an RAF-operated rotary search and rescue capability, until the new fleet of Airbus H145s come online in 2026.
In addition, at the same time 14 Chinook helicopters were also cut, representing 25% of the active fleet.
An order for 14 new CH-47 Extended Range variants has been signed between the UK and US defence prime Boeing, although the first platforms are not expected to be delivered until 2027 at the earliest.
In a 29 April parliamentary response, UK Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard said that any granting of weapons and equipment to Ukraine was made in response to official requests made by the Ukrainian government.
“We continue to liaise closely with Ukraine to deliver the capabilities they require to resist Russian aggression. Further decisions on Puma and Chinook will be made in due course and be communicated in the usual way,” Pollard said.
While the Puma fleet has been in service for 52 years, the airframes underwent a modernisation programme in the 2010s and could offer a short-term solution for troop movements and logistics behind the frontline. Upgrades to the HC2 force included new Turbomeca engines and improved instruments and avionics. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
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