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Military And Security Developments
May 01.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces likely continue to operate in a small portion of Kursk oblast (Russia), though continued Russian advances in Sumy (Ukraine) and Belgorod (Russia) oblasts will likely complicate their ability to hold this ground
• NEGOTIATIONS: Contradictory remarks made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likely underscore that Russia has not abandoned its maximalist objectives in Ukraine, despite the proposed three-day May ‘truce’
• BELARUS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Russia is preparing for unspecified military aggression under the guise of joint summer exercises with Belarus; we assess this remains highly unlikely
• FORECAST: The US and Ukraine have signed a minerals and economic resources deal designed to facilitate long-term economic co-operation, though it omits any reference to security guarantees
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage posted on 28 April indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Hyhorivka, which is located to the north-east of Siversk. This comes amid very slow overall Russian progress along the northern portion of the axis in recent weeks. Further south, geolocated footage posted on 27 and 29 April indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to a dam located to the north of Toretsk, as well as within north-western Toretsk, respectively. However, Ukrainian forces continue to launch successful counter-attacks. Geolocated footage posted on 29 April indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the south-east of Dachne, which is located to the north-east of Toretsk; Ukrainian forces also advanced in southern Shcherbynivka.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made confirmed gains in the Pokrovsk area, while continuing their offensive push to reach the administrative borders of Dnipropetrovsk oblast further south. Geolocated footage from 29 April shows recent Russian advances along the railway line to the west of Shevchenko, which is located to the south of Pokrovsk. Further to the south-west of Pokrovsk, Russian forces continue to progress to the east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk), as well as to the north-east and east of Nadiivka (Donetsk oblast), a settlement that has recently come under Russian control. These advances form part of Russia’s current objective of reaching the administrative borders of Dnipropetrovsk, as well as its wider goal to expand control over Donetsk. Meanwhile, further to the south-west, Russian troops recently advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia city highway. This was confirmed by geolocated footage from 28 and 29 April.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Ukrainian forces are likely continuing to operate in Kursk oblast (Russia) despite the Kremlin declaring that Ukrainian forces have been entirely pushed out of the region. Geolocated footage posted on 26 April indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to the south-west of Kucherov, which is located to the south of Sudzha. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported earlier on 1 May that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Kursk. Ukrainian forces are likely fiercely attempting to hold their remaining positions amid Russian clearing operations. However, continued Russian advances in Kursk, Sumy (both Ukraine) and Belgorod (Russia) oblasts will likely render holding these positions unsustainable in the coming weeks.
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces continue to achieve marginal advances in both Sumy and Belgorod. Geolocated footage posted on 28 April indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the west of Loknya, which is located to the north-west of Sumy, as well as to the south-west of Basivka and south-east of Zhuravka, which are located to the north and north-west of Loknya, respectively. Additional footage posted on 27 April indicates that Russian forces also advanced in northern Bilovody, which is located to the north-east of Sumy. Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 26 April indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the west of Demidovka, which is located to the north-west of Belgorod city (Belgorod).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In recent days, Russian forces have made confirmed advances in the directions of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) and Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 28 April shows that Russian forces recently captured Kamyanka, a settlement located to the north-east of Kupiansk and near the international border. Russian forces have also progressed into the settlement’s eastern outskirts. To the north-east of Lyman, Russia recently seized Nove, according to geolocated footage posted on 30 April.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Early on 1 May, Russia launched five Iskandr-M ballistic missiles along with 17 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ukrainian air defences shot down 74 UAVs; 68 were recorded as lost, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) measures. Air defences failed to intercept the missiles; there were no reports on where the missiles caused damage at the time of writing. Earlier in the week, Russian long-range attacks solely comprised large numbers of UAVs.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, early on 30 April, Ukraine reportedly launched a drone strike on the Murom Instrument-Making Plant in Vladimir oblast (Russia). This was reported by a source within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) quoted by the Kyiv Independent. The plant produces ignition components for ammunition used by the Russian security forces. Explosions were reported at the facility.
• STRIKES: Ukraine continues to expand its drone production programme amid efforts to reduce its dependence on US military aid. Reports from 1 May indicate that a Ukrainian company manufacturing first-person-view (FPV) drones has begun mass production of 25km (15.5-mile) and 30km (18.6-mile) fibre-optic coils. Most existing fibre-optic coils have a maximum range of 20km (12.4 miles). The development of this new line of coils is likely to extend the operational range of FPV drones, which have proven to be a key element of Ukrainian defensive operations against Russian advances.
• STRIKES: This development underscores Ukraine’s continued efforts to innovate and expand its drone programme. The country remains heavily reliant on UAVs, which have allowed Ukraine to compensate for its artillery disadvantage. Indeed, due to their relatively low cost, drones are cheaper than artillery shells and have proven to be a cost-effective alternative, especially amid chronic ammunition shortages. Ukraine’s drone attacks, particularly those using FPV assets, have become a major obstacle for Russian advances.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a three-day May truce represents the beginning of ‘direct negotiations’ with Ukraine without preconditions, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. However, Lavrov made the statement on 29 April while also listing reasons why a longer-term ceasefire is not possible. The minister claimed that Moscow does not envisage any possibility for the honest monitoring of a ceasefire in Ukraine. Lavrov’s comments are highly likely aimed at increasing pressure on Kyiv to agree to Putin’s unilaterally announced ceasefire during Russia’s Victory Day (9 May) celebrations. Ukraine has not yet formally stated whether it will agree to a temporary cessation of hostilities during this period, though Kyiv has questioned why Moscow will not agree to an immediate unconditional 30-day ceasefire.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 28 April that the May truce is ‘another attempt at manipulation’. The declaration of a temporary ceasefire over Victory Day is highly likely Russia’s latest attempt at portraying itself as being interested in peace and ending the war. However, it is unclear whether this will be sufficient in keeping the Trump administration onside in its efforts to broker an end to the war. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that President Trump wants to see a permanent ceasefire when acknowledging Putin’s proposed May truce. This possibly implies that the Trump administration is becoming increasingly aware that such declarations of temporary ceasefires are primarily aimed at serving Russia’s interests rather than being reflective of a genuine willingness to end the war.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Lavrov contradicted his comments about direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine without preconditions in a recent interview with Brazilian media published on 28 April. Lavrov stated that Kyiv’s non-membership in NATO, as well as neutrality, would be among the key conditions for Russia to negotiate with Ukraine. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia’s claims on Ukrainian land, including Crimea and the four regions Russia annexed in 2022: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (all Ukraine). Lavrov also listed Ukraine’s ‘demilitarisation’ and changes to its legislation that would restore the status of the Russian language, as well as cultural and religious institutions. Ultimately, Lavrov’s statements underscore that Russia maintains its sweeping maximalist objectives in Ukraine (which have not significantly deviated throughout the full-scale invasion).
• BELARUS: President Zelensky claimed on 29 April, without providing evidence, that Russia is preparing unspecified military aggression under the guise of joint exercises with Belarus this summer. Zelensky hypothesised that new aggression could be directed towards Ukraine or NATO members Lithuania and Poland, but did not offer further details regarding why he thought these countries are possibly under threat. Although Russia used Belarus as a launchpad for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, our assessment remains that renewed offensive operations from Belarus are highly unlikely in the coming months.
• BELARUS: We also continue to assess that Russia (and Belarus) are highly unlikely to pursue direct military confrontation with NATO, meaning that the threat of an attack against Poland and/or Lithuania is very low. Zelensky has made similar remarks previously, most notably in an interview with The Economist in mid-February. During that interview, Zelensky claimed that Russia is preparing to deploy a significant number of troops to Belarus (approximately 100,000), possibly for an offensive against a NATO state. Belarus and Russia will hold joint military exercises in Belarus in September, with over 13,000 troops expected to participate based on information from the Belarusian Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February. An advisor to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda stated on 29 April that NATO does not consider the upcoming drills to pose a threat, which aligns with our assessment.
• AID: On 29 April, the administration of US President Donald Trump notified Congress that it is preparing to authorise the sale of ‘USD 50 m or more’ in ‘defence articles’; this would mark the first such defence package approved under President Trump’s second term in office. No details were given on the types of weapons or services that the package would entail, though USD 50m, which Ukraine is expected to pay (rather than receive in-kind), is a relatively limited figure that is unlikely to bolster Ukraine’s defences significantly. For instance, President Zelensky recently expressed an interest in the purchase of ten US-made Patriot air defence systems, which would amount to USD 15 bn. We continue to assess that the Trump administration is highly unlikely to resume the level of funding for Ukraine that was provided by the previous administration.
FORECAST
MINERALS: On 30 April, Ukraine and the US signed a minerals and economic resources deal. The original version of the deal collapsed in late February following a public dispute between the presidents of both countries. Since then, the two sides have engaged in negotiations to reach a deal. As Kyiv has extracted more equitable terms for itself, we assess that the Ukrainian parliament is considerably more likely to ratify the deal in the coming weeks.
The agreement establishes joint investment in Ukraine’s mineral wealth, including oil, gas and other natural resources. According to reports detailing elements of the deal, both parties will jointly manage the investment fund, with neither side holding a dominant role. The deal also stipulates that all resources within Ukraine’s territory and waters belong to Ukraine, meaning that the Ukrainian state determines what resources to extract and where. Critics of the deal previously opined that it would have allowed the US to exploit Ukraine’s natural resources and potentially endanger its relations with other partners, namely the EU, which Kyiv is trying to join. However, the terms appear considerably more preferable to Ukraine than previous drafts. In addition, the deal mentions the US’ acknowledgement of Ukraine’s determination to avoid conflicts with obligations that form part of the EU accession process or agreements with international financial institutions.
However, the deal omits any clear reference to security guarantees – which we assessed was one element on which the US was unlikely to shift. Nevertheless, Kyiv highly likely perceives that the language of the agreement sends a clear signal to Russia about long-term US interest in Ukraine’s post-war trajectory. One of the objectives of the agreement is to strengthen the strategic partnership between the two countries for the ‘long-term reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine’ in response to the destruction caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion. It also states that the agreement is an expression of a ‘broader, long-term strategic alignment’ between their two governments and people. We continue to assess that the Trump administration highly likely views the US’ long-term investment and presence in Ukraine as a deterrent to renewed Russian aggression. However, Kyiv will almost certainly deem that this alone is insufficient; we assess that it will continue to pursue other means of ensuring Ukraine’s security and sovereignty in the long term.
This version of the agreement omits any demand for Ukraine to repay the US for past assistance and potentially opens the way for future military aid. Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that the deal will possibly afford Kyiv an opportunity to receive fresh US support, such as the provision of air defence systems. The deal also mentions that future US military aid contributions can be considered as part of the US’ contributions to the investment fund. This possibly indicates that the Trump administration is more open to providing US assistance in the future now that a deal has been signed (though most likely on a transactional basis). That said, the resumption of large-scale military aid packages (as seen under the previous administration of Joe Biden) is unlikely.
While the deal is a notable development and will contribute to the prospect of long-term US investment in Ukraine, Washington DC is unlikely to reap the rewards of the deal in the near term. Reports also indicate that for the first decade of the reconstruction investment fund, profits will be fully reinvested in Ukraine’s economy, either in new projects or reconstruction. Meanwhile, economists and mining experts argue that Ukraine currently has no commercially operational rare earth mines, which therefore points to the need for significant time and investment. Various estimates state that around 53% of Ukraine’s total mineral resources are contained in the four regions Russia annexed in September 2022, while Dnipropetrovsk (which borders the largely-occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia) is also mineral-rich. As such, substantial US investment in developing Ukraine’s minerals and enhancing its other resources is unlikely without a robust and sustainable end to the conflict. Even in this scenario, concerns about renewed conflict will possibly deter US private sector investment, particularly in regions close to (what will eventually become) former frontlines.
• Ukrainian parliament will likely ratify recently signed minerals deal in near term. On 30 April, Ukraine and the US signed a long-stalled minerals and economic resources deal. The agreement establishes joint investment in Ukraine’s mineral wealth, including oil, gas and other natural resources. According to reports detailing elements of the deal, both parties will jointly manage the investment fund, with neither side holding a dominant role. The deal also stipulates that all resources within Ukraine’s territory and waters belong to Ukraine, meaning that the Ukrainian state determines what resources to extract and where. Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that the deal will possibly afford Kyiv an opportunity to receive fresh US assistance, such as the provision of air defence systems. The original version of the deal collapsed in late February following a public dispute between the presidents of both countries. Since then, the two sides have engaged in negotiations to reach a deal. As Kyiv has extracted more equitable terms for itself, we assess that the Ukrainian parliament is considerably more likely to ratify the deal in the coming weeks.
Apr 29.
• Spring offensive update. Numbers of Russian troops on the ground have increased by 20,000 to 627,000. Russia cannot sustain current losses if the war goes into 2026. They are already using Soviet era equipment. There is a current 3 day Truce albeit it with violations.
• Foreign cyber security assistance cuts will likely elevate security risks. On 26 April, international news outlets reported that the US has limited its cyber security assistance to Ukraine following the implementation of significant cuts across the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The suspension has resulted in the termination of dozens of contracts of employees working to provide technical support to protect Ukrainian organisations and critical national infrastructure (CNI) from cyber attacks. It has also suspended computer equipment and software deliveries to Ukraine. Ukraine’s financial systems have suffered several outages since the suspension. While the cause of the outages remains unclear, we assess that they highlight the potential impact of these cuts on the country’s cyber resilience in the short-to-medium term. Russian state-sponsored groups have frequently used cyber attacks to supplement kinetic action in the war in Ukraine. As such, we assess that the cuts will likely elevate security risks to Ukrainian entities.
• Russia-Ukraine: Declared May ceasefire will highly likely remain vulnerable to violation. On 28 April, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a unilateral three-day ceasefire to coincide with commemorations for Victory Day (9 May). Putin stated that the ceasefire, during which all military operations will allegedly be paused, will enter into force at 0000hrs (Moscow/Kyiv time) on 8 May and end at 0000hrs on 11 May. The Kremlin has urged Ukraine to reciprocate, though Kyiv has questioned why Moscow will not agree to an immediate unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Nevertheless, Ukraine will likely feel obliged to agree to the latest proposal out of concern that the US would otherwise abandon its efforts to broker peace in the coming weeks. For this reason, we assess that Putin has declared the ceasefire to avoid alienating Washington DC rather than as a sincere step towards ending the war in the near term. We also assess that (without robust monitoring mechanisms, as well as prior formal agreement and clearly defined terms) the temporary ceasefire will highly likely be at risk of (alleged or actual) violation, as was the case with Putin’s ‘Easter Truce’.
Apr 28.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KURSK-SUMY: Russia and North Korea have, for the first time, publicly acknowledged the role played by North Korean forces in supporting Russia’s efforts to retake Kursk oblast; no indication was given on the nature of future co-operation
• STRIKES: Comments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indicate that Russia will continue to strike civilian infrastructure in Ukraine following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposal to halt such attacks
• PEACEKEEPING: Unconfirmed reports emerged that the UK could abandon plans to deploy troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force, highlighting ongoing uncertainty of the feasibility of a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’
• FORECAST: Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a truce between 7 and 9 May, though in the absence of agreed upon conditions, repeated violations akin to the recent ‘Easter truce’ are likely
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces have continued to achieve marginal territorial advances in the direction of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk (Donetsk oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage posted on 26 April indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Ozaryanivka, which is located to the south-west of Bakhmut, in the direction of Chasiv Yar. Further to the south, geolocated footage posted on 26 and 27 April indicates that Russian forces also recently advanced in north-eastern Scherbynivka and in central Berzivka, which are located to the west and south-west of Toretsk, respectively. Nonetheless, Ukrainian forces continued to carry out effective, small-scale counterattacks in and around the highly contested town of Toretsk. Geolocated footage posted on 23 April indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the north-west and south-west of the town.
• DONETSK: Russian forces have maintained a high tempo of attacks in the Pokrovsk sector in recent days. According to Ukraine’s General Staff, 64 out of a total of 168 frontline clashes occurred in this area in the past 24 hours. Geolocated footage from 25 April shows recent Russian advances towards southern Lysivka, situated to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have made confirmed progress north of Mykolaivka, also located to the south-east of Pokrovsk, as of 26 April. Despite the high pace of offensive operations, Ukrainian forces are mounting localised counter-attacks that continue to yield gains in and around south-west Pokrovsk.
• DONTESK: Further south-west from Pokrovsk, Russian forces have made advances east of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), having captured the settlement of Nadiivka. This was reported on 28 April by DeepState, a Ukrainian OSINT group. The capture of the settlement underscores the Russian command’s continued efforts to reach the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Concurrently, further south and to the south-west of Kurakhove, Russian forces advanced south of Bahatyr following a motorised assault, according to footage from 26 April.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov claimed on 26 April that Russian forces have fully retaken control of Kursk oblast (Russia). The Ukrainian General Staff refuted the claim on the same day, as did Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 27 April. More significantly, Russian milbloggers also stated on 26 April that fighting was ongoing near Oleshnya, (which is located to the north-west of Gornal) and Guyevo (which is located to the south of Sudzha) as well as at the St.Nicholas Monastery (which is located to the south-west of Guyevo). This aligns with our previous assessment that Russian forces had retaken control of the vast majority of the settlement but were likely engaged in clearing operations near the international border. Moscow will almost certainly use the claim (whether accurate or not) to undermine Ukraine’s leverage amid US-led efforts to begin peace negotiations.
• KURSK-SUMY: Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and the authorities in North Korea have, for the first time, publicly acknowledged the role that North Korean forces played in supporting Russia’s effort to regain control of Kursk oblast. Putin praised the ‘heroism’ of North Korean soldiers fighting alongside Russian forces in his praise of the reported liberation of Kursk. The North Korean acknowledgement was given on the KCNA state news agency; the authorities cited the reported recapturing of Kursk as evidence of the two countries’ strategic relationship. No indication was given of what role North Korean forces will play in supporting Russian military operations hereon.
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces have recently advanced in both Belgorod (Russia) and Sumy (Ukraine) oblasts. Geolocated footage posted on 26 April indicates that Russian forces recently seized control of Popovka, which is located to the north-west of Belgorod city (Belgorod oblast). Meanwhile, geolocated footage posted on 26 April indicates that Russian forces advanced along the C191503 highway in Loknya, which is located to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russia has continued to launch large-scale drone attacks. The assault on 26 April included in all one Onyx anti-ship missile, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 114 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ukraine was unable to intercept the missiles but managed a moderately high interception rate of the drones. Overall, these attacks have continued to inflict damage and casualties across numerous oblasts.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on 27 April that Russia will persist in targeting sites used by Ukraine’s military forces. Lavrov’s remarks align with earlier comments made by Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent proposal to cease strikes on civilian infrastructure. In particular, Putin asserted that Ukrainian forces utilise civilian infrastructure for military purposes. Both officials’ statements clearly indicate that Russia is highly unlikely to agree to Zelensky’s proposal and will, therefore, continue to target civilian infrastructure throughout Ukraine.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has continued its drone campaign, focusing on strategic targets within Russia. Overnight on 27-28 April, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported the interception of in all 115 Ukrainian UAVs over Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk Oblast, as well as occupied Crimea. Bryansk oblast was reportedly targeted by 102 missiles, with the regional authorities confirming strikes in the city of Bryansk (Bryansk oblast). Andriy Kovalenko, an official from Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, reported that UAVs targeted the Kremniy-El plant, a crucial facility producing microelectronics for military systems, including various missiles. This plant was previously targeted in January and earlier in October 2024. The attacks highlight the ongoing vulnerability of Russian strategic assets, such as defence production facilities, to Ukrainian drone strikes.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• MINERALS: On 27 April, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said Kyiv will not be required to repay the US for past assistance provided following Russia’s full-scale invasion as part of a pending minerals and natural resources deal. This possibly indicates more flexibility than we previously assessed from the Trump administration regarding its propensity to change terms of the deal to make them more favourable for Ukraine. For further analysis, see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 28 April 2025.
• PEACEKEEPING: Reports emerged on 24 April that the UK could realistically abandon plans to send troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force on the ground. According to The Times, British and European troops would not guard key cities, ports and nuclear power plants, but would instead focus on reconstituting and rearming Ukraine’s military with protection from air and sea. While military instructors from France and the UK would be sent to western Ukraine, they would not be sent near the frontline, nor would they guard key installations or protect Ukrainian troops. The Times did not specify the identity of this insider, though they stated that the risks were too high for a force of tens of thousands of ground troops.
• PEACEKEEPING: While we cannot confirm these reports, if true, they reflect the persistent uncertainties relating to both the will for and feasibility of a large-scale deployment of Western troops to Ukraine for peacekeeping. Concerns regarding a lack of US willingness to be involved in any so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ had compounded such uncertainty. Nevertheless, The Telegraph claimed on 25 April that unnamed US officials have privately offered to provide security guarantees for any such deployment and opened discussions on giving intelligence and logistical support. However, it remains unknown whether the US would be willing to intervene if Western soldiers came under attack by Russia. Uncertainty regarding the extent to which the US is prepared to commit to such a force and act in the event of renewed Russian aggression will continue to impede any possible arrangement in the near term.
• ASSASSINATIONS: On 25 April, a senior Russian general was killed when a car detonated in Moscow oblast (Russia). The Russian authorities later reported that they had charged a ‘Ukrainian special services agent’ with terrorism in connection with the killing of General Yaroslav Moskalik. Moskalik was deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) believes that the individual who orchestrated the attack planted the IED in the car, but that it was detonated from Ukraine.
• ASSASSINATIONS: Meanwhile, a Russian engineer involved in modernising electronic warfare (EW) systems, Yevgeny Ritikov, was reportedly killed in a car bombing in the Russian city of Bryansk (Bryansk oblast) overnight on 18 April. His deputy or assistant was likely killed in the blast, also. We cannot confirm Ukrainian involvement in both incidents; Ukrainian agencies have not publicly claimed responsibility for the assassinations. That said, the incidents reflect the trend of Ukrainian-orchestrated assassinations of high-profile and/or strategic targets in Russia throughout the duration of the full-scale invasion. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 24 October 2023.
FORECAST
CEASEFIRE: Earlier on 28 April, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a temporary ceasefire to coincide with commemorations for Victory Day (on 9 May). The occasion marks the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, with Russia typically using Victory Day as an event to showcase its military might.
The proposed ceasefire will be in effect from 0000hrs (local time) on 8 May and last until 0000hrs on 11 May. According to a statement from the Kremlin, all military operations will be suspended during this period; it emphasised that Ukraine should also reciprocate. We assess that Ukraine will likely agree to illustrate its willingness to work towards peace, though it will possibly request clarification and measures in place beforehand to improve the prospect of a ceasefire actually being upheld. The Kremlin has mentioned that the Russian side will respond to any ceasefire violations from Ukraine ‘appropriately and effectively’.
Details about what constitutes a cessation of military operations remain unclear at present, as do details regarding which measures will be in place to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. The last Russian-declared truce over Easter, which Ukraine agreed to, likely failed for these aforementioned reasons. As such, any temporary ceasefire in May will likely remain volatile and at risk of violation without formal prior agreement and robust monitoring measures in place. Even if the two sides were to clearly define what a suspension of military operations means, it will remain at risk of actual or alleged violation.
The Kremlin said that the ceasefire was announced ‘out of humanitarian considerations’, though the declaration was likely a result of growing US pressure and frustration towards Russia’s lack of serious steps towards peace. On 26 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump met on the sidelines of Pope Francis’ funeral at the Vatican (Vatican City). According to Zelensky’s office, the two leaders discussed reaching a full and unconditional ceasefire, as well as attaining a reliable and lasting peace that will prevent a renewal of Russian aggression. While the meeting was brief, lasting around 15 minutes, the White House described it as ‘very productive’. It marked their first in-person encounter since a public spat in February in the Oval Office, with this meeting likely having helped smooth residual tensions since then.
Notably, Trump expressed doubts about Putin’s desire for peace following the meeting with Zelensky, citing recent Russian long-range strikes into Ukrainian civilian areas. Trump accused Putin of ‘tapping’ him along and reiterated threats of imposing additional sanctions against Russia, specifically punitive measures targeting Russia’s banking sector or secondary sanctions. Trump has threatened to take similar action before against Russia, but has failed to do so thus far. At the same time, the Trump administration has not removed or relaxed any US sanctions or export controls against Russia. Such threats are aimed at encouraging Moscow to change its course and run in tandem with the Trump administration’s periodic statements about possibly easing Russia’s economic isolation. Russia became the most sanctioned country in the world following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but has largely managed to navigate Western sanctions. As such, threats of additional sanctions will unlikely alter the Kremlin’s calculus on ending the war in Ukraine in the near term.
Recent comments from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also suggest that the Trump administration will unlikely follow through with its threats of new sanctions in the coming days and weeks. On 27 April, Rubio implied that the negotiating process remains in a delicate balance and that the imposition of additional sanctions would risk prolonging the war. Such remarks align with our earlier assessment that, while the US acknowledges that it can use sanctions to try and influence an end to the war, it will likely impose new measures as a last resort. This is because the Trump administration highly likely perceives that it has made significant steps to re-engage with Russia and re-establish ties since Trump’s inauguration in January and that sanctions would jeopardise such progress.
Despite increasing US pressure on Russia to end the war, the Trump administration has not abandoned its efforts to engage with Moscow bilaterally. On 27 April, Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke via telephone. According to a readout of the call from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the two sides emphasised the importance of ‘consolidating the prerequisites for starting negotiations’ in order to agree on a reliable path to a long-term, sustainable peace. The dialogue followed a meeting between President Putin and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff on 25 April, which lasted three hours. According to the Kremlin, it was constructive and quite useful. Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said the meeting helped the two sides align their position on Ukraine and other international issues.
That said, our assessment remains that Russia is likely still reluctant to make significant concessions to end the war at present. Announcements of short-term, temporary ceasefires at risk of violation are more realistic prospects over the coming weeks. Such announcements will possibly coincide with other holidays in Russia of significance, possibly including Russia Day (12 June) and Navy Day (27 July) in the absence of a longer-term comprehensive ceasefire.
• Ukraine-US: Minerals deal signing is more likely after reported removal of aid repayment requirement. On 27 April, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said Kyiv will not be required to repay the US for past assistance provided following the full-scale invasion as part of a pending minerals and natural resources deal. Shmyhal stated that the two sides had reached an agreement on the matter, though the US has yet to corroborate this. The issue had previously been a point of contention after the administration of US President Donald Trump reinstated this clause following the collapse of the original minerals agreement in late February. The newest version of the deal remains unsigned. Ukraine and the US signed a memorandum of intent on 17 April, which stated that the two sides aimed to finalise the agreement by 26 April and sign it soon after. We assess that the reported removal of the aid repayment requirement will likely moderately increase the prospects of the two sides signing the deal in the near term. That said, other factors, such as progress vis-à-vis ending the war, will likely continue to render the terms of the deal uncertain, along with any possible signing.
Apr 25.
Executive summary
• In our latest Strategic Risk Forecast, we present various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the coming 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will highly likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility that a fragile ceasefire will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• Despite Russia’s announcement of a 30-hour ‘Easter truce’ on 19 April, both sides failed to agree on a comprehensive ceasefire. The ‘pause’ in hostilities coincided with growing US frustration regarding the lack of progress towards ending the war.
• There are growing indications that the Trump administration supports a peace framework that would be more advantageous for Russia than Ukraine. The US will likely increase pressure on Ukraine to make significant concessions. However, institutional obstacles will ultimately hamper Kyiv’s willingness to agree to unfavourable terms, especially with regard to territory.
• The moratorium on strikes targeting energy infrastructure between Russia and Ukraine expired this month (the Kremlin unilaterally announced that it ended on 18 April). On 20 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky subsequently proposed a 30-day halt of long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure (in both Ukraine and Russia). However, Russia is unlikely to agree to the proposal and will likely continue to conduct long-range attacks on civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities. Meanwhile, we assess that Ukraine’s air defences will continue to suffer from chronic material shortages. Other key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in May include a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin (though Trump is unlikely to attend Russia’s Victory Day celebrations on 9 May). Such a meeting would mark a notable development and underscore Trump’s current strategy to end the war by prioritising engagement with Moscow. Additionally, Russia will likely intensify battlefield operations as part of its wider spring offensive
(Source: Sibylline)
01 May 25. Ukraine, US sign minerals deal sought by Trump
The U.S. and Ukraine have signed a deal to give the United States preferential access to new Ukrainian minerals deals and fund investment in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
• Summary
• Deal positions two countries to boost Ukraine’s recovery
• Ukraine official says US may provide new assistance
• Signing follows months of negotiations, frayed ties
• Ukraine official says Kyiv decides what, where to mine
Ukraine and the U.S. on Wednesday signed a deal heavily promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump that will give the United States preferential access to new Ukrainian minerals deals and fund investment in Ukraine’s reconstruction.
The two countries signed the accord in Washington after months of sometimes fraught negotiations, with uncertainty persisting until the last moment with word of an eleventh-hour snag.
The accord establishes a joint investment fund for Ukraine’s reconstruction as Trump tries to secure a peace settlement in Russia’s three-year-old war in Ukraine.
The agreement is central to Kyiv’s efforts to mend ties with Trump and the White House, which frayed after he took office in January. Ukrainian officials have hoped that the deal would ensure continued U.S. support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko were shown signing the agreement in a photo posted on X by the Treasury, which said the deal “clearly signals the Trump Administration’s commitment to a free, sovereign, prosperous Ukraine.” (Source: Reuters)
30 Apr 25. L3Harris leverages Ukraine support into NGC2 development. Programme officials at L3Harris are leveraging the company’s ongoing support of Ukrainian forces to inform development efforts for the US Army’s Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) programme.
The company’s ongoing work providing tactical communications capabilities to Ukraine in its war against Russia is “helping define and advocate for positions we are taking on technologies we are developing” for NGC2, according to Samir Mehta, president of Communications Systems at L3Harris.
The crux of the NGC2 is to establish a common data layer accessible across echelons that would break down data access stovepipes based on the mission, said Network Cross-Functional Team (CFT) Director US Army Major General Patrick Ellis.
Rather than delineate combat data flows by mission – C2, intelligence, and fires – battlefield information would be funnelled into a common data layer, accessed through a series of applications developed through an applications layer, he said in January. NGC2 was officially stood up as a Program of Record (POR) in September 2024.
Company officials working on NGC2 capability development are “making sure we understand what vulnerabilities could exist because of peer capabilities” demonstrated by Russian forces on the battlefield, he told reporters during a 29 April briefing in Washington, DC.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, L3Harris has delivered over 40,000 tactical radios to Ukrainian forces for the duration of the war, according to Mehta. “We do not deliver these radios, and then they just operate freely,” he said.
“We are getting constant feedback from our customers … as to how they need to be upgraded on a regular basis” from a hardware and software perspective, according to Mehta. (Source: Janes)
29 Apr 25. Cuashub.com said today that Russia to use motorbikes in front-line assaults to evade Ukrainian drones. Russia may be preparing to deploy motorbikes systematically in front-line assaults this summer in an effort to evade Ukrainian drones that have proven devastating against heavier armored vehicles, according to a new assessment from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Reports from Ukraine’s eastern front have long indicated that Russian forces are using civilian vehicles, including motorbikes and golf carts, to bolster assaults on Ukrainian positions. Large, slow-moving armor has increasingly become vulnerable to the hundreds of drones operating daily over active battle zones.
Now, according to ISW’s latest analysis, Moscow appears poised to “systematically integrate motorcycle usage” into its offensive operations across the battlefield through the summer and fall. The U.S.-based think tank pointed to footage released Saturday by Russia’s Defense Ministry showing paratroopers at a training ground learning to “seize strongholds on cross-country motorbikes.” The video likely featured soldiers from Russia’s 299th Paratrooper Regiment, ISW said.
The move suggests Moscow could soon issue a significant number of motorcycles to units deployed in Ukraine. Russia’s Defense Ministry has not commented on the reports.
Ukrainian officials have also observed an uptick in motorcycle use. Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn, a spokesperson for Ukrainian forces in the east, told local media that Russia has been deploying motorbikes along the extensive front lines, including in the embattled Kharkiv region. He said Ukrainian intelligence indicates Russia is actively training troops to conduct assaults on motorcycles, both at training centers and within individual units.
Shamshyn described instances where Russian soldiers attached motorbikes to infantry fighting vehicles during attempts to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna, north of Kupiansk.
The ISW noted it has “observed an increased trend of Russian units conducting mechanized and combined motorized assaults and transporting infantry with motorcycles and civilian vehicles” as commanders adapt to Ukrainian drone strikes.
Ukrainian forces, Shamshyn added, will need significantly more explosive first-person view (FPV) drones to effectively counter fast-moving motorbike units. “And they move quite quickly,” he said.
On Saturday, Ukrainian troops reported that Russian forces near the village of Bahatyr in Donetsk region attacked using motorcycle and car convoys. Ukrainian fighters claimed to have destroyed 15 of 18 motorcycles during the engagement.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/russia-to-use-motorbikes-in-front-line-assaults-to-evade-ukrainian-drones/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)
29 Apr 25. Accuracy Comparison of Ukrainian and Russian Fiber Optic Drones. According to estimates, Ukrainian fiber-optic drones have a significantly shorter flight range to targets compared to their Russian counterparts. Oleksii Babenko, VYRIY’s founder and CEO, shared this information with Militarnyi. He stated that the statistics for Ukrainian fiber-optic drones reaching the targets at distances of up to 15 km are approximately 10–30%, depending on the unit and drone manufacturer. When using spools for 10 km, the statistics are slightly better, up to 50%. Meanwhile, in Russian units, according to intercepted Ukrainian military radio communications, this figure reaches 80% for flights at distances of up to 20 km. However, 20% of failed operations are most likely attributed not to technical issues, but to pilot errors.
According to him, the difference lies in the different approaches to creating signal transmitters for fiber optics. Ukrainian companies mostly use a system where a single circuit from China takes analog video, converts it into a digital signal, and transmits it further. It receives remote control signals, converts them into digital packets that are understood by the flight controller, and sends them to the drone.
For signal transmission, radiation with a wavelength of 1550 nanometers is used for video, and 1310 nanometers for control. However, at 1310 nanometers, the attenuation in fiber optics per kilometer is three times higher than at 1550. As a result, the drone loses the control signal.
Meanwhile, Russian drones use a wavelength range of 1490–1550 nanometers, where the attenuation is two and a half times lower. Additionally, their signal transmitter has twice the power. Instead of analog cameras, as used on Ukrainian drones, the Russians use digital IP cameras, the same as those used in surveillance cameras, along with a media converter and software developed based on the open-source code OpenIPC.
However, according to Babenko, this solution is more expensive than what is used in Ukrainian drones, which is why it is not popular among manufacturers aiming to maximize their profit margin.
“But when we are told about the high cost, the people selling spools with a markup of x3, if the price increases by UAH 2000, what will they do? They won’t change the price because it’s already x3 above the cost price. The high cost of fiber optics isn’t because of some nanotechnologies, but because the people selling it don’t always… Well, they mostly commercialize what they make,” he said.
Another factor affecting effectiveness is the thickness of the fiber optic cable. The thicker the fiber, the harder it is to break or bend during flight. Therefore, the thickness can be increased, but this also increases the weight, cost, and size of the drone. Ukrainian manufacturers typically use thin fibers with a diameter of 0.25 mm, whereas Russians have adopted the use of both thin and thick fibers.
“And as a result, their drones end up being more expensive to produce than those made by Ukrainian fiber optic companies. In terms of sales price, they’re about the same. This is a question for the Ukrainian companies themselves. In terms of quality, well, like 10% vs. 80%. It’s not even comparable,” Oleksii Babenko sums up. (Source: UAS VISION/Militarnyi)
25 Apr 25. Ukraine need reliable, analogue systems for frontline reality. The war-torn nation praise the effectiveness of the legacy M777, while also finding new mechanical solutions with fibre-optic drones. Ukraine’s Armed Forces require a mass of analogue weapon systems, which have been found, for the most part, to be more reliable than complex technologies when facing the realities of the frontline.
Speaking at an Integrated Air and Missile Defence conference hosted by the Royal United Services Institute on 24 April 2025, Oleksandra Azarkhina, formerly Ukraine’s deputy minister for infrastructure, and now co-founder of the We Build Ukraine foundation, considered Ukraine’s air defence requirements.
Azarkhina pointed to the effectiveness of the 155mm M777 howitzer, a BAE Systems artillery unit built in the United States, which has been in service with the Marine Corps for the last 25 years. This system, she said, “works better than the Panzerhaubite, they work better than the Krab, and many others because they did not have things [that could be] jammed.”
Automated howitzers that came after M777 have complex electronic systems for loading, aiming, and firing, making them more susceptible to jamming.
These simpler, mechanical designs are what Ukraine needs, she asserted. “With all the technologies, with all the [artificial intelligence], sometimes you really just need to have a mechanical switch.”
At the same time, Azarkhina does not rule out the utility of more modern and sophisticated systems. “Of course, there is a lot of knowledge gained, and the things which we’re doing there in many cases are super innovative,” she stipulated.
Ukraine’s defence industry: old and new
Ukraine’s defence industry is learning this lesson. The country has ramped up production of one its sovereign systems: the 155mm 2S22 Bohdana wheeled artillery system. While the Bohdana does use electrical systems, it is backed up with mechanical alternatives.
While the Defence Procurement Agency only provided a figure of “more than 20” Bohdanas per month. Similarly, drones are also adapting to the mechanical trend with the use of wired, first-person view uncrewed air vehicles (UAVs) that use fibre-optic cables. The idea of this type of UAV is to deny the enemy any chance of jamming the system. However, side-stepping the threat of electronic warfare in this way brings limits the range of the drones themselves to 20 kilometres (or 12 miles). This means that they would typically be deployed for tactical use. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Ukraine’s forces intend to scale up production of these fibre-optic UAVs over the next three months (until July 2025). (Source: army-technology.com)
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